

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT**

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 20th day of October, two thousand twenty-three.

Weili Cao-Bossa,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

ORDER

New York State Department of Labor,

Docket No: 21-2593

Defendant - Appellee,

Lindsay Pulcher, Project Assistant, Associate Accountant,
Kathleen A. Elfeldt, Director of Finance,

Defendants.

Appellant, Weili Cao-Bossa, filed a petition for panel rehearing, or, in the alternative, for rehearing *en banc*. The panel that determined the appeal has considered the request for panel rehearing, and the active members of the Court have considered the request for rehearing *en banc*.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is denied.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk


Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe

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21-2593-cv

Cao-Bossa v. New York State Department of Labor

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this Court's Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation "summary order"). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 7th day of March, two thousand twenty-three.

PRESENT: JOSE A. CABRANES,
REENA RAGGI,
JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
Circuit Judges.

WEILI CAO-BOSA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

21-2593-cv

v.

NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

Defendant-Appellee,

LINDSAY PULCHER, Project Assistant,
Associate Accountant; KATHLEEN A. ELFELDT,
Director of Finance,

Defendants.

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:

Weili Cao-Bossa, *pro se*

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:

Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General,
Jeffrey W. Lang, Deputy Solicitor General,
Sarah L. Rosenbluth, Assistant Solicitor

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General, for Letitia James, Attorney
General of the State of New York,
Albany, New York.

Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Glenn T. Suddaby, *Judge*).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the August 19, 2021 decision and order of the District Court be and hereby is **AFFIRMED**.

Appellant Weili Cao-Bossa, proceeding *pro se*, appeals the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the New York State Department of Labor ("NYSDOL") with respect to her claims that NYSDOL unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of her national origin and age. Cao-Bossa asserted that NYSDOL discriminated against her in violation of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") by (1) failing to hire her for one "Accountant Trainee" position and (2) after hiring her for a different Accountant Trainee position, firing her from it.¹

"We review *de novo* a district court's grant of summary judgment after construing all evidence, and drawing all reasonable inferences, in favor of the non-moving party." *Sotomayor v. City of N.Y.*, 713 F.3d 163, 164 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). "Summary judgment is appropriate only when 'there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" *Id.* (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

I.

The first issue on appeal is whether the District Court "abused its discretion" by (1) denying Cao-Bossa's requests for an extension of time to file a second response to NYSDOL's motion for summary judgment and (2) crediting as undisputed certain facts in NYSDOL's statement of material facts. *See Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.*, 378 F.3d 220, 226 (2d Cir. 2004); *Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc.*, 258 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir. 2001).

Cao-Bossa, after two sixty-day extensions, filed her opposition to NYSDOL's summary judgment motion and argued only that the motion should be denied because NYSDOL's brief allegedly exceeded the prescribed page limit. The District Court acted well within its discretion

¹ On appeal, Cao-Bossa does not challenge the District Court's denial of her claims under the ADEA. Because Cao-Bossa does not raise this issue on appeal, she "has abandoned it." *LaSacco v. City of Middletown*, 71 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1995).

when it denied Cao-Bossa's request to file a second, substantive response. Cao-Bossa had been made aware of the consequences of failing to substantively reply to NYSDOL's memorandum of law and statement of material facts, but nevertheless chose not to file a substantive response. Additionally, the District Court independently ensured that the material facts identified by NYSDOL were supported by the record. *See Vt. Teddy Bear Co., Inc. v. 1-800 Beargram Co.*, 373 F.3d 241, 242 (2d Cir. 2004).

We therefore affirm the District Court's denial of Cao-Bossa's request to file a second response to NYSDOL's motion for summary judgment and its determination that certain material facts were undisputed.

II.

The second issue on appeal is whether the District Court properly granted summary judgment to NYSDOL on Cao-Bossa's "failure to hire" claim on the basis that it was not timely filed.

"Title VII requires a claimant to file a charge of discrimination with the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")] within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment action or, if the claimant has already filed the charge with a state or local equal employment agency, within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory action." *Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines*, 80 F.3d 708, 712 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)). Cao-Bossa's failure to hire claim is based on NYSDOL's decision not to hire her for the first Accountant Trainee position on July 14, 2016. Cao-Bossa did not file her complaint with the New York State Department of Human Rights ("NYSDHR") until July 13, 2017, and the record does not reveal that she filed anything with the EEOC before that date.² Cao-Bossa failed to comply with Title VII's time constraints, and the District Court thus properly dismissed Cao-Bossa's "failure to hire" claim.³

² By form dated January 26, 2018, the EEOC adopted the NYSDHR's December 20, 2017 finding that Cao-Bossa had failed to establish "probable cause" that NYSDOL had engaged in unlawful employment practices. Supp. App'x at 105–08.

³ For the first time on appeal, Cao-Bossa argues that her failure to hire claim could be construed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cao-Bossa did not, however, bring her claim under § 1983 and cannot now receive the benefit of bringing a claim under that statute, namely the ability to file a claim more than 300 days after the allegedly discriminatory event. *See Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP*, 152 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[A] party may not amend pleading[s] through statements in briefs." (citation omitted)).

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III.

The final issue on appeal is whether the District Court properly granted summary judgment to NYSDOL on Cao-Bossa's wrongful termination claim.

To establish a *prima facie* case of wrongful termination under Title VII, a plaintiff must establish, *inter alia*, that she "was performing h[er] duties satisfactorily." *Graham v. Long Island R.R.*, 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000). The record is clear that Cao-Bossa, a probationary employee, was not performing her duties satisfactorily. *See* Supp. App'x at 26–27 (3-month evaluation report rating Cao-Bossa as "needs improvement"); *id.* at 347–48 (6-month evaluation report rating Cao-Bossa as "unsatisfactory" and recommending her termination). The District Court therefore properly concluded that Cao-Bossa failed to establish a *prima facie* case of wrongful termination under Title VII, and we affirm its grant of summary judgment to NYSDOL on that basis.


CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the remaining arguments raised by Cao-Bossa on appeal and finding them to be without merit, we **AFFIRM** the decision and order of the District Court.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

WEILI CAO-BOSSA,

Plaintiff,

v.

1:18-CV-0509
(GTS/TWD)

NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR,

Defendant.

APPEARANCES:

WEILI CAO-BOSSA

Plaintiff, *Pro Se*

1912 East Country Club Drive
Schenectady, NY 12309

OF COUNSEL:

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AIMEE COWAN, ESQ.
Assistant Attorney General

GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief United States District Judge

DECISION and ORDER

Currently before the Court, in this employment discrimination action filed by Weili Cao-Bossa ("Plaintiff") against the New York State Department of Labor ("Defendant"), are the following two motions: (1) Defendant's motion for summary judgment; and (2) Defendant's letter-motion to strike Plaintiff's sur-reply. (Dkt. Nos. 58, 70.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, and its motion to strike Plaintiff's sur-reply is denied.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint

Generally, in her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that Defendant discriminated against her based on her national origin and age in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). (Dkt. No. 25 [Pl.’s Second Am. Compl.].) In support of her claims, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against her by (a) refusing to hire her for a position for which she interviewed in March 2016, and (b) terminating her employment in another position after six months. (*Id.*) More specifically, Plaintiff, who is Chinese and was 45 years old at the time of her termination, alleges that she received unfairly poor performance reviews based on a few sporadic mistakes that resulted in her termination, but that other American and/or younger employees did not receive similar negative performance reviews and were not terminated. (*Id.*)

B. Undisputed Material Facts on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Under N.D.N.Y. Local Rule 56.1 (formerly Local Rule 7.1[a][3]), a party opposing summary judgment must file a response to the moving party’s Statement of Material Facts that “shall mirror the movant’s Statement of Material Facts by admitting and/or denying each of the movant’s assertions in a short and concise statement, in matching numbered paragraphs,” supported by “a specific citation to the record where the factual issue arises.” N.D.N.Y. Local R. 56.1(b). This requirement is not a mere formality; rather “this and other local rules governing summary judgment are essential tools intended to relieve the district court of the onerous task of hunting through voluminous records without guidance from the parties.” *LaFever v. Clarke*, 17-CV-1206, 2021 WL 921688, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2021) (Hurd, J.) (quoting *Frantti v. New York*, 414 F. Supp. 3d 257, 284 [N.D.N.Y. 2019] [Hurd, J.]). Indeed, “[a] proper response to a movant’s statement of material facts streamlines the summary judgment analysis ‘by allocating responsibility for flagging genuine factual disputes on the participants ostensibly in the best

position to do so: the litigants themselves.’’ *LaFever*, 2021 WL 921688, at *7 (quoting *Alke v. Adams*, 16-CV-0845, 2018 WL 5297809, at *2 [N.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2018] [Hurd, J.]). ‘‘The Court may deem admitted any properly supported facts set forth in the Statement of Material Facts that the opposing party does not specifically controvert.’’ N.D.N.Y. Local R. 56.1(b).

In this case, Plaintiff entirely failed to provide any response to Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts, much less one that complies with Local Rule 56.1. Where a party has failed to respond to the movant’s statement of material facts in the manner required under Local Rule 56.1, the facts in the movant’s statement will be accepted as true (1) to the extent that they are supported by evidence in the record, and (2) provided that the nonmovant, if proceeding *pro se*, has been specifically advised of the possible consequences of failing to respond to the motion. *Champion v. Artuz*, 76 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir. 1996).¹ Here, Defendant served on Plaintiff the standard form for this District entitled ‘‘Notification of the Consequences of Failing to Respond to a Summary Judgment Motion,’’ which includes a specific notification of the requirement to respond to the defendant’s statement of material facts in matching numbered paragraphs with citation to supporting evidence as well as a warning that failure to do so could result in the Court deeming facts to be true that are not properly disputed. (Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 2.) Moreover, four days later, the Court served Plaintiff with a duplicate copy of that Notification. (Dkt. No. 59.) Eight days later, Plaintiff requested an extension of the response deadline. (Dkt. No. 60.) Plaintiff has therefore received sufficient notice of the possible consequences of her failure to respond to Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts.

¹ Notably, although ‘‘courts are required to give due deference to a plaintiff’s *pro se* status, that status ‘does not relieve [a *pro se*] plaintiff of his duty to meet the requirements necessary to defeat a motion for summary judgment.’’’ *Salaam v. Stock*, 19-CV-0689, 2021 WL 2367123, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 12, 2021) (Dancks, M.J.) (quoting *Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records*, 351 F.3d 46, 50 [2d Cir. 2003]), report-recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 2102242 (N.D.N.Y. May 24, 2021) (Sannes, J.).

Although the Court has ensured that Defendant's asserted facts are supported by the cited record evidence, it does not have the duty to scour the record for any and all evidence that may contradict those asserted facts. *See Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford*, 288 F.3d 467, 470 (2d Cir.2002) ("We agree with those circuits that have held that Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 does not impose an obligation on a district court to perform an independent review of the record to find proof of a factual dispute."); *Monahan v. New York City Dep't of Corr.*, 214 F.3d 275, 291 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that the Local Rules require the parties "to clarify the elements of the substantive law which remain at issue because they turn on contested facts" and the Court "is not required to consider what the parties fail to point out") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As a result, the following facts were asserted and supported with accurate record citations by Defendant in its Statement of Material Facts and deemed admitted by Plaintiff due to her failure to respond and failure to provide any evidence to dispute the asserted facts. (Dkt. No. 66 [Def.'s Rule 56.1 Statement].)

1. Plaintiff was born on September 21, 1972.
2. Plaintiff is of Chinese national origin.
3. Plaintiff obtained a bachelor's degree in Agriculture in 1996 from Ocean University of China.
4. Plaintiff also received a certificate from Austin Community College in Austin, Texas, in 2012 for "professional accountant with high technology."
5. Plaintiff did not have her Certified Public Accountant ("CPA") license at the time of her deposition.
6. In 2016, Plaintiff did not have the requisite one year of accounting experience, supervised by a CPA, required for CPA licensing.

7. Plaintiff testified that she passed her CPA examinations in 2014.

8. Plaintiff did not have any formal accounting experience before she immigrated from China to the United States in 2008.

9. The first accounting position Plaintiff held after arriving in the United States in 2008 was her position with Defendant in 2016.

10. Defendant is an executive agency of the State of New York, established pursuant to Article 2 of the New York State Labor Law.

11. Defendant's Administrative Finance Bureau ("AFB") is responsible for the budgeting, fiscal management, accounting, and expenditure of all department funds.

12. The AFB also maintains and ensures the accuracy of Defendant's payroll system, provides support operations services, including all procurement and payment activities, and provides property management services covering leasing, space planning, project oversight, and building maintenance.

13. Additionally, the AFB is responsible for the management of Defendant's federal grant funding and ensuring compliance with state and federal reporting requirements.

14. The AFB is divided into multiple sub-units, each with managers who reported to Kathleen Elfeldt when she was the Director of Finance from 2014 until January 2018.

15. The Financial Management Unit ("FMU") is one of the sub-units of the AFB.

16. In March 2016, Defendant posted a job vacancy announcement for an Accountant Trainee I & 2 (Grades 14 and 16) and Senior Accountant (Grade 18) position within the AFB's FMU.

17. In order to be eligible for the Accountant Trainee position, a candidate must pass a Civil Service examination and possess a bachelor's degree in accounting, auditing or taxation,

or a bachelor's degree or higher degree with 24 semester credit hours of accounting, auditing or taxation courses.

18. A list of candidates who meet these requirements is provided to Defendant by the New York State Department of Civil Service.

19. Plaintiff was the fourth candidate on the Accountant Trainee list, with a score of 90, and thus she was eligible for an interview.

20. On July 12, 2016, Plaintiff was interviewed for the open Accountant Trainee position, and then was interviewed by Director Elfeldt the following day.

21. During the second interview, Director Elfeldt explained that the position for which Plaintiff was interviewing was within the AFB's FMU, which manages Defendant's finances related to federal grants and federal programs.

22. Director Elfeldt informed Plaintiff that federal requirements made the FMU position unique, but that in the future she expected that there would be open positions in the Accounting Office that could be a better fit for Plaintiff's skills and experience.

23. At the time of her interview, Plaintiff did not have any experience reviewing federal guidance or regulations and was not familiar with federal grant funding and guidance requirements.

24. Plaintiff emailed Director Elfeldt after the interview, asking "[W]hy you set such an interview if government working experience is a necessity to this job?"

25. Director Elfeldt responded that government work experience was not a job requirement for the position, but that the federal grant funding and reporting requirements made the Department of Labor different than a typical state agency, and the position Plaintiff

interviewed for was not in the accounting office and would not be entering data into an accounting system.

26. Director Elfeldt indicated that Plaintiff's work experience did not make her a good fit for the position.

27. Plaintiff alleges that she did not receive this position because she was discriminated against based on her age and national origin.

28. Plaintiff does not know the basis for her belief that Director Elfeldt discriminatorily denied her the position based on her age and national origin, other than that "there is no other explanation."

29. Plaintiff admitted at her deposition that she did not have the right experience for this position.

30. On July 15, 2016, Defendant posted another job vacancy for an Accountant Trainee 1 & 2 and Senior Accountant, this one in the Accounting Unit.

31. Plaintiff was again reachable for this position on the Civil Service list.

32. Plaintiff claims that Director Elfeldt had her assistant call Plaintiff to let her know that there was another position open.

33. On July 19, 2016, Plaintiff interviewed for the position in the Accounting Unit.

34. On September 13, 2016, Margaret "Peg" Farrell, the Project Director for the State Financial System ("SFS") Project in the Accounting Unit at the time, requested that Plaintiff be hired for a Senior Accountant Trainee position.

35. Plaintiff's hiring was approved by Michelle Daly, the Director of the Accounting Office, and Director Elfeldt.

36. Plaintiff accepted the offer, and her employment began on October 6, 2016.

37. Plaintiff was hired as a trainee on a probationary basis and her salary grade was equivalent to a Grade 14.

38. Plaintiff's probationary period was to run concurrently with her two-year traineeship.

39. After she was hired, Plaintiff was assigned to the Accounting Office's SFS Project Team.

40. Plaintiff's direct supervisor was Project Assistant Lindsay Pulcher and the team manager was Ms. Farrell.

41. Ms. Farrell was Ms. Pulcher's direct supervisor.

42. Ms. Pulcher was the Project Assistant for the SFS Project Team from April 2014 to April 2017.

43. Supervisors for probationary trainees such as Plaintiff are required to present trainees with an Individual Development Plan and quarterly probationary evaluations, as well as traineeship evaluations at six-month intervals during the traineeship.

44. On October 26, 2016, Plaintiff met with Ms. Pulcher and was provided an Individual Development Plan that listed the activities, tasks, and performance standards that were expected of her in her position.

45. However, during the month of November 2016, Plaintiff had many issues completing basic tasks and assignments that were required in her position.

46. On or about December 5, 2016, Ms. Pulcher and Ms. Farrell met with Plaintiff to review her Individual Development Plan to ensure that Plaintiff understood the requirements of her position and what was expected of her.

47. During the meeting, Plaintiff was reminded about the tasks she needed to complete as part of her position and she was reminded as to how she should be completing her assignments.

48. Plaintiff was also reminded during this meeting that her position was a two-year traineeship during which she was on probation and could be terminated for poor performance.

49. Plaintiff recalled at her deposition that Ms. Pulcher and Ms. Farrell discussed during this meeting that she needed to choose her wording carefully in emails and on the telephone.

50. Plaintiff recalled at her deposition that Ms. Pulcher and Ms. Farrell discussed that she is not entitled to "flex time" and was not allowed to leave early if she arrived to work early.

51. Plaintiff recalled at her deposition that Ms. Pulcher and Ms. Farrell discussed that she needed to complete her assignments in the format that her supervisor had requested.

52. At no point during the meeting did either Ms. Pulcher or Ms. Farrell discuss Plaintiff's age or national origin.

53. At no point during the meeting did Plaintiff raise any concerns about discrimination.

54. However, following the meeting of December 5, 2016, Plaintiff continued to have issues with her job performance.

55. On January 6, 2017, Plaintiff received a three-month performance evaluation which indicated that she needed to improve in almost all aspects of her job performance.

56. The three-month evaluation was completed by Ms. Pulcher and reviewed by Ms. Farrell.

57. A meeting was held with Plaintiff on January 6, 2017, in which Ms. Pulcher and Ms. Farrell gave the three-month evaluation to Plaintiff.

58. Ms. Pulcher took notes of the meeting, indicating what was reviewed with Plaintiff and Plaintiff's responses.

59. Plaintiff admits that she made mistakes during the first three months of her probationary term.

60. During the meeting, Ms. Pulcher showed Plaintiff an example of an email in which Plaintiff used a harsh, inappropriate tone.

61. Plaintiff testified at her deposition that she disagrees with Ms. Pulcher's assessment of her performance.

62. Following receipt of her three-month evaluation, Plaintiff met with Lim Arbab, a Human Resources Specialist for Defendant.

63. During this meeting, Ms. Arbab explained to Plaintiff that managers and supervisors may appropriately issue evaluations that accurately reflect the quality of an employee's performance.

64. Ms. Arbab explained that sometimes an employee's performance will be rated as "needs improvement" in certain areas, and that it is not unusual for an employee to receive an evaluation that indicates performance areas that need improvement.

65. Ms. Arbab explained that Plaintiff's three-month evaluation reflected her supervisor's assessment of her performance and included examples of the noted performance deficiencies.

66. At the time, Plaintiff did not express to Ms. Arbab any belief that the three-month evaluation was the result of discrimination.

67. On January 12, 2017, Plaintiff wrote an email to Ms. Pulcher and Ms. Farrell, in which she stated that she “appreciate[d] you letting me know your concerns about my performance in the first quarter evaluation,” and that she “enjoys very much working” with Ms. Pulcher and Ms. Farrell and “can learn something new every day with [their] help.”

68. In the email of January 12, 2017, Plaintiff also listed her plans to improve her performance, including promising to review her emails before sending them to other people, pay attention to formatting details for biweekly downloading and monthly queries, submit a summary of the work she performed that day before she left work every day, take notes so she can stop “asking the same stupid questions,” and charge personal time whenever she has to use work time.

69. Plaintiff also asked Ms. Pulcher to remind her if she asks the “same stupid questions” and stated, “Please help me improve my management skills of work assignments. I will improve my quality of work and other virtues required for my work.”

70. In the email of January 12, 2017, Plaintiff did not complain about feeling like she was being discriminated against, and did not express disagreement with the three-month performance evaluation.

71. Following the three-month performance evaluation, Plaintiff continued to have job performance issues.

72. Ms. Farrell kept a log of some of the performance issues that Plaintiff exhibited for approximately nine weeks after her three-month evaluation:

- a. On January 23, 2017, Ms. Pulcher noted that Plaintiff downloaded the wrong NHRP files.
- b. On February 1, 2017, Plaintiff’s Monthly Mod Accrual and Stat Ledger

queries were for December 2015 rather than December 2016.

- c. On February 6, 2017, Ms. Farrell notified Plaintiff that she had made mistakes on the monthly query, to which Plaintiff responded, “[S]orry for the negligence. Will be more careful in the future.”
- d. Also on February 6, 2017, Ms. Pulcher was forced to remind Plaintiff to download the NHRP522 and NHRP530 files despite the fact that this had been a recurring task for several pay periods.
- e. On February 22, 2017, Ms. Pulcher spoke with Plaintiff about her failure to prioritize assignments correctly.
- f. On February 27, 2017, Ms. Pulcher emailed Plaintiff to inform her that she was enrolled in mandatory training courses, but that those courses were not a priority since they did not need to be completed for eight months, and to identify which assignments were a priority. However, Plaintiff completed these training courses before the priority assignments despite Ms. Pulcher’s directions.
- g. On March 1, 2017, Ms. Farrell asked Plaintiff to complete an assignment immediately, but Plaintiff submitted the assignment the following day, incorrectly. The assignment was still incorrect the second time Plaintiff submitted it.
- h. On March 3, 2017, Ms. Farrell asked Plaintiff to create a tab with a pivot table for each ledger on an Excel spreadsheet. Plaintiff submitted the assignment incorrectly and Ms. Farrell was forced to follow up.

- i. Also on March 3, 2017, Ms. Pulcher contacted Plaintiff regarding an assignment that she submitted incorrectly the previous day. Plaintiff responded, "You are right . . . I guess I was kind of in a hurry. Sorry for the abbreviation."
- j. On March 8, 2017, Ms. Pulcher requested that Plaintiff provide a summary of an accounting training class Plaintiff had attended; however, Plaintiff did not provide that summary and Ms. Pulcher was forced to follow up on March 21, 2017, at which time Plaintiff still had not completed the assignment.

73. Ms. Farrell recorded at least 13 separate instances between January 11, 2017, and March 20, 2017, on which Plaintiff submitted an incorrect or incomplete assignment or needed to be reminded to complete an assignment.

74. On April 3, 2017, Plaintiff received a six-month evaluation from Ms. Pulcher.

75. Ms. Pulcher recommended that Plaintiff be terminated based on her unsatisfactory performance.

76. Ms. Farrell approved Ms. Pulcher's recommendation for Plaintiff's termination.

77. Director Elfeldt also agreed with the recommendation for termination.

78. Ultimately, termination decisions are made by the Personnel Department.

79. The recommendation was forwarded to Lisa Burrell, Associate Director of Human Resources for Defendant, who made the final determination approving Plaintiff's termination.

80. Plaintiff was presented with the six-month evaluation at a meeting, during which Ms. Pulcher indicated the main reasons why her employment was being terminated, including

the fact that her assignments were often not completed per instructions and follow-up was often required, the fact that she needed to be reminded of the same issues repeatedly, and the fact that she did not make the best use of her time or exert a consistent effort.

81. Plaintiff signed the evaluation that recommended her termination.

82. When she received her six-month evaluation, Plaintiff did not complain that her evaluation was the result of discrimination.

83. On April 13, 2017, Plaintiff emailed Director Elfeldt, stating “[T]here were errors in my work because of careless [sic] and inexperience, but they had nothing to do with working abilities.”

84. At her deposition, Plaintiff acknowledged that she admitted she was careless and inexperienced during her six months working for Defendant.

85. Plaintiff did not allege in her email of April 13, 2017, that she felt discriminated against.

86. She did, however, thank Director Elfeldt for giving her a chance “to see how unique and complicated the DOL accounting could be.”

87. The first time Plaintiff ever expressed that she felt discriminated against while working for Defendant was in an email to Ms. Arbab on April 10, 2017.

88. At no point during her employment with Defendant did anyone make any remarks about Plaintiff’s national origin or age.

89. There were “many” employees in Plaintiff’s specific unit who were Plaintiff’s age or older.

90. On July 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights (“NYSDHR”).

91. Her complaint was amended on or about August 2, 2017, and in it she alleged that she was subjected to discrimination based on her age and national origin in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, Title VII, and the ADEA.

92. On December 20, 2017, the NYSDHR issued a Determination and Order After Investigation, in which it determined that there was no probable cause to believe that Defendant engaged in or was engaging in the unlawful discriminatory practices Plaintiff alleged.

93. On January 26, 2018, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") adopted the findings of the NYSDHR.

94. Plaintiff alleges in her Second Amended Complaint that two or three other employees were treated more favorably than her because of their national origin.

95. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Richard Deitz was treated more favorably than her because of his national origin. However, Plaintiff does not know what position Mr. Dietz held or who he is, and she admits that his job responsibilities were different than her job responsibilities. She also "guesses" that he is "American."

96. According to Mr. Deitz's evaluation in the record, his supervisor was Michelle Daly, not Ms. Pulcher, and Ms. Pulcher has never supervised or evaluated Mr. Deitz.

97. The basis for Plaintiff's belief that Mr. Deitz was treated differently than her is that he was praised for "taking initiative" while she was not.

98. Plaintiff also alleges that Frank Shavel was treated more favorably than her because of his national origin. However, Plaintiff is unaware of where Mr. Shavel worked within Defendant's organization, she did not know what position he held, she did not know who supervised him, she has never worked with him and has never seen him in person, she does not

know what his salary grade is, and she does not know whether he was a permanent or probationary employee. Plaintiff also does not know his ethnic background.

99. The only basis for Plaintiff's belief that Mr. Shavel was treated more favorably than her is that he was given a counseling memorandum about failing to complete a mandatory training rather than being terminated, while she did not receive any memoranda before her termination.

100. However, Plaintiff does not know whether Mr. Shavel failed to complete other tasks or training beyond the one related to the counseling memorandum.

101. Plaintiff also alleges that Kayla O'Hara was treated more favorably than her because of her national origin. However, Plaintiff admitted that she does not know Ms. O'Hara's national origin (but she guesses that it is American), she has never worked with Ms. O'Hara or observed her work performance, she has never spoken with anyone who worked with or supervised Ms. O'Hara, she does not know whether Ms. O'Hara made similar mistakes to the ones that are detailed in Plaintiff's own evaluations, and she does not know whether Ms. O'Hara was ever counseled about her time or attendance. Additionally, unlike Plaintiff, who was hired as a Grade 14 Accountant Trainee, Ms. O'Hara was hired as a Grade 18 Senior Budget Analyst effective September 21, 2017.

102. The only basis for Plaintiff's belief that Ms. O'Hara was treated differently than her is because there is no mention of "one-time incident[s]" or "learning process" on Ms. O'Hara's evaluation. Ms. O'Hara's performance evaluation shows that she met performance expectations for her position.

103. Plaintiff also alleges that these employees were treated more favorably than her based on her age.

104. However, Plaintiff admits that Mr. Shavel and Mr. Deitz are both as old or older than her: Mr. Deitz was 45 years old in 2017, and Plaintiff testified that Mr. Shavel is "older than sixty, in his sixties or something . . . He's older than me." Mr. Shavel was in fact 61 years old in 2017.

105. Ms. O'Hara was 27 years old in 2017.

106. Ms. Pulcher was not aware of either Ms. O'Hara's or Plaintiff's ages in 2017.

107. The basis for Plaintiff's belief that she was treated differently because of her age was "some clues from [Ms. Pulcher]," such as when Ms. Pulcher "mentioned something about older people. She just didn't believe older people could do good job."

108. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Pulcher commented that a receptionist, Donna, who is around retirement age, "didn't know what she was doing."

109. Plaintiff also alleges that Ms. Pulcher made a comment about a "guy who's doing payroll" and how he needs to retire.

110. Ms. Pulcher denies ever making any comments about "Donna" or "a guy who's doing payroll" with respect to their age or ability to perform their job, and denies making any comments to Plaintiff during her employment about any employees' ages or how their ages impact their ability to perform their jobs.

111. Director Elfeldt was 57 years old at the time of Plaintiff's termination.

112. Assistant Director Cathryn Piccirillo was 51 years old at the time of Plaintiff's termination.

113. Ms. Farrell was 50 years old at the time of Plaintiff's termination.

114. Associate Director of Human Resources Ms. Burrell was 48 years old at the time of Plaintiff's termination.

115. Plaintiff was not the only employee of Asian descent in the AFB at the time Plaintiff was employed there, and there are currently employees of Asian descent employed in Defendant's Finance Bureau.

116. On April 7, 2017, Ms. Burrell sent a letter to Plaintiff indicating that she concurred with the termination recommendation effective close of business April 14, 2017.

117. On April 10, 2017, Plaintiff emailed Ms. Burrell and stated that she felt Ms. Pulcher was an "inexperienced and inapt [sic] supervisor" who was not qualified and who did not provide her with proper training and help, as well as that she felt that Ms. Pulcher was mean to her and that she had been discriminated against.

118. Nowhere in the email of April 10, 2017, does Plaintiff mention that she felt discriminated against specifically based on her age or national origin.

119. At no point during her employment with Defendant did Plaintiff ever complain to Director Elfeldt that she believed she was being discriminated against in any way.

C. Parties' Briefing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

1. Defendant's Memorandum of Law

Generally, in its motion for summary judgment, Defendant makes three arguments. (Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 1, at 12-43 [Def.'s Mem. of Law].) First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's discrimination claims should be dismissed as untimely to the extent they are based on Defendant's failure to hire her for a position with the FMU in July 2016. (*Id.* at 12-15.) Specifically, Defendant argues that this alleged act of discrimination occurred more than 300 days before Plaintiff filed her complaint with the NYSDHR on July 17, 2017, and thus any portion of her claims based on that alleged act of discrimination must be dismissed. (*Id.*) Defendant additionally argues that, timeliness notwithstanding, Defendant's actions in not hiring

her for that position in July 2016 were not based on discrimination, but rather because she lacked experience with federal grants and other regulatory considerations that were a feature of that specific position. (*Id.*)

Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's national origin discrimination claim pursuant to Title VII should be dismissed. (*Id.* at 15-33.) Specifically, Defendant argues as follows: (a) Plaintiff cannot establish a *prima facie* case of discrimination regarding her termination because (i) she was not qualified for her position in that she did not meet legitimate employer expectations of job performance as evidenced by the job evaluations showing unsatisfactory performance, and (ii) the circumstances of her termination do not give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent given that there was evidence that Plaintiff did many things wrong and there have been no comments alleged to have been made about her ethnic group, and, in particular, the other employees identified by Plaintiff are not sufficiently similarly situated to her to raise such an inference; (b) even if Plaintiff can show a *prima facie* case, Defendant had a legitimate reason for terminating her employment, namely her repeated poor performance despite having meetings and reviews in which she was informed of the ways in which she was not meeting expectations; and (c) Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant's legitimate reason for terminating her employment was a pretext for discrimination because she has no evidence that her national origin was even a factor in that decision, and her own subjective belief that it was is not sufficient to sustain her claim. (*Id.*)

Third, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's age discrimination claim pursuant to the ADEA should be dismissed. (*Id.* at 33-43.) Specifically, Defendant argues as follows: (a) Plaintiff cannot establish a *prima facie* case of discrimination regarding her termination because (i) she cannot show that she was performing her job satisfactorily (as already discussed), and (ii) she

cannot show that her termination occurred under circumstance giving rise to an inference of discrimination based on her age given that the only alleged co-employee who was younger than her is not sufficiently comparable, and any comments that may have been made by Ms. Pulcher about the ages of other employees were merely stray remarks and Ms. Pulcher was nonetheless not the ultimate decisionmaker as to Plaintiff's termination; (b) even if Plaintiff can show a *prima facie* case, Defendant had a legitimate reason for terminating her employment (as discussed above); and (c) Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant's legitimate reason for terminating her employment was a pretext for discrimination because her subjective belief that she was discriminated against and a few stray remarks about employees other than Plaintiff do not show that her age was the but-for cause of her termination. (*Id.*)

2. Plaintiff's Opposition Memorandum of Law

In her response to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court deny that motion, noting the reasons she had needed to request an extension in the past to file her response, and noting that, "[w]hile preparing Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, I found out Defendant's Memorandum of Law did not follow L.R. 7.1. It was 36 pages in length, and it was 45 pages in total with Table of Contents and the cover page." (Dkt. No. 67, at 1-2 [Pl.'s Opp'n Mem. of Law].) Plaintiff does not address any of the substantive arguments made by Defendant, nor does she submit any response to Defendant's Statement of Material Facts, as already discussed above in Part I.B. of this Decision and Order.

3. Defendant's Reply Memorandum of Law

Generally, in its reply, Defendant makes three arguments. (Dkt. No. 68 [Def.'s Reply].) First, Defendant argues that it did not violate the Local Rules of Practice for this Court by filing an overlong brief because the pages for the cover page, the table of contents, and the signature

block do not count toward the overall page count, and Defendant's substantive brief was 35 pages as allowed by this Court's Text Order of December 21, 2020. (*Id.* at 4.)

Second, Defendant argues that the Court should accept its asserted facts as true due to Plaintiff's failure to respond to its Statement of Material Facts as required by Local Rule 56.1 because, even though Plaintiff is *pro se*, she was twice provided notice of the consequences of failing to do so. (*Id.* at 5-6.)

Third, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims should be deemed to have been abandoned because Plaintiff failed to address or oppose any of Defendant's legal arguments. (*Id.* at 6-7.)

4. Plaintiff's Sur-Reply

Plaintiff also submitted a sur-reply without the permission of the Court. (Dkt. No. 69 [Pl.'s Sur-Reply].) In this sur-reply, Plaintiff asserts that she was not informed that Defendant had requested or been granted permission to file an overlong brief with 10 additional pages, and that, because she was not aware of this, she "filed the motion of rejection and was waiting for the Judge's further directions about the allowable length." (*Id.* at 1.) She argues that Defendant's brief exceeds the extended page limit because the Conclusion section was on page 36 of that brief and that Conclusion section is "substantive enough to be counted." (*Id.* at 2.) Plaintiff again requests that the Court deny Defendant's motion for being improperly overlong, noting that she "completed [her] response to Defendant's Material Facts Not in Dispute before [she] filed [her] rejection" and indicating that "I will submit my response in whole when Defendant submit [sic] proper memorandum of law or as further directed by the court if otherwise." (*Id.*)

5. Defendant's Letter-Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Sur-Reply

Defendant filed a motion to strike Plaintiff's sur-reply because such responses are not permitted without permission under the Local Rules of this Court, but that, even if the Court considers the sur-reply, Plaintiff was provided with a copy of Defendant's request for additional pages for its memorandum and the Court's order granting that request was served on Plaintiff by regular mail, and thus she has no basis for claiming she was not reasonably made aware of Defendant's increased page limit. (Dkt. No. 70.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD GOVERNING A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, summary judgment is warranted if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of fact is "genuine" if "the [record] evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the [non-movant]." *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).² As for the materiality requirement, a dispute of fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 248.

In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant. *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 255. In addition, "[the movant] bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the . . . [record] which it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of any genuine issue of material fact." *Celotex v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). However, when the movant has met its initial burden, the non-movant must

² As a result, "[c]onclusory allegations, conjecture and speculation . . . are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact." *Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg.*, 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1998) [citation omitted]. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[The non-movant] must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986).

come forward with specific facts showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c), (e).³

Implied in the above-stated burden-shifting standard is the fact that, where a non-movant willfully fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment, a district court has no duty to perform an independent review of the record to find proof of a factual dispute—even if that non-movant is proceeding *pro se*.²⁵⁵ (This is because the Court extends special solicitude to the *pro se* litigant by ensuring that he or she has received notice of the consequences of failing to properly respond to the motion for summary judgment).⁴ As has often been recognized by both the Supreme Court and Second Circuit, even *pro se* litigant must obey a district court's procedural rules.⁵

Of course, when a non-movant willfully fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he fact that there has been no [such] response . . . does not . . . [by itself] mean that the motion is to be granted automatically." *Champion v. Artuz*, 76 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir. 1996). Rather, as indicated above, the Court must assure itself that, based on the undisputed material facts, the law indeed warrants judgment for the movant. *Champion*, 76 F.3d at 486; *Allen v. Comprehensive Analytical Group, Inc.*, 140 F. Supp.2d 229, 232 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (Scullin, C.J.); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(b)(3). What the non-movant's failure to respond to the motion does is lighten the movant's burden.

³ Among other things, Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) requires that the non-movant file a response to the movant's Statement of Material Facts, which admits or denies each of the movant's factual assertions in matching number paragraphs, and supports any denials with a specific citation to the record where the factual issue arises. N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(a)(3).

⁴ *Cusamano v. Sobek*, 604 F. Supp. 2d 416, 426 & n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Suddaby, J.) (citing cases).

⁵ *Cusamano*, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 426-27 & n.4 (citing cases).

For these reasons, this Court has often enforced Local Rule 56.1 by deeming facts set forth in a movant's statement of material facts to be admitted, where (1) those facts are supported by evidence in the record, and (2) the non-movant has willfully failed to properly respond to that statement⁶—even where the non-movant was proceeding *pro se*.⁷

Similarly, in this District, where a non-movant has willfully failed to respond to a movant's properly filed and facially meritorious memorandum of law, the non-movant is deemed to have “consented” to the legal arguments contained in that memorandum of law under Local Rule 7.1(a)(3).⁸ Stated another way, when a non-movant fails to oppose a legal argument asserted by a movant, the movant may succeed on the argument by showing that the argument possess facial merit, which has appropriately been characterized as a “modest” burden. *See* N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(a)(3) (“Where a properly filed motion is unopposed and the Court determined that the moving party has met its burden to demonstrate entitlement to the relief requested therein . . .”); *Rusyniak v. Gensini*, 07-CV-0279, 2009 WL 3672105, at *1, n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2009) (Suddaby, J.) (collecting cases); *Este-Green v. Astrue*, 09-CV-0722, 2009 WL 2473509, at *2 & n.3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2009) (Suddaby, J.) (collecting cases).

III. ANALYSIS

⁶ Among other things, Local Rule 56.1(b) requires that the non-movant file a response to the movant's Statement of Material Facts, which admits or denies each of the movant's factual assertions in matching numbered paragraphs, and supports any denials with a specific citation to the record where the factual issue arises. N.D.N.Y. L.R. 56.1(b).

⁷ *Cusamano*, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 427 & n.6 (citing cases).

⁸ *See, e.g., Beers v. GMC*, 97-CV-0482, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12285, at *27-31 (N.D.N.Y. March 17, 1999) (McCurn, J.) (deeming plaintiff's failure, in his opposition papers, to oppose several arguments by defendants in their motion for summary judgment as consent by plaintiff to the granting of summary judgment for defendants with regard to the claims that the arguments regarded, under Local Rule 7.1[b][3]; *Devito v. Smithkline Beecham Corp.*, 02-CV-0745, 2004 WL 3691343, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2004) (McCurn, J.) (deeming plaintiff's failure to respond to “aspect” of defendant's motion to exclude expert testimony as “a concession by plaintiff that the court should exclude [the expert's] testimony” on that ground).

A. Whether Plaintiff's Sur-Reply Should Be Stricken

Although Defendant is correct that sur-replies are not permitted under Local Rule 56.1 without permission from the Court, the Court finds that whether or not it considers Plaintiff's sur-reply is immaterial to the ultimate outcome of Defendant's motion because the arguments Plaintiff makes within that sur-reply are not meritorious.

Plaintiff's argument that she never received the Court's Text Order of December 21, 2020, is unconvincing. As Defendant argues, there is sufficient evidence that Plaintiff was reasonably apprised of the Court's Text Order granting Defendant's request for 10 additional pages for its memorandum. (Dkt. No. 48 [noting specifically that a copy of the Text Order was served upon Plaintiff via regular mail].) There is no indication that Plaintiff had changed mailing addresses, that the Text Order had been returned as undeliverable, or that there has been any difficulty with her receiving mail throughout the course of this litigation. (See Dkt. No. 1 [Pl.'s Comp.] [listing her address at the time of filing in April 2018 as the same address on file with the Court as her current address].) As a result, there is no reason that Plaintiff should not have reasonably known about the request for (and grant of) the additional pages.

Similarly, Plaintiff's argument that Defendant's motion should be denied because the non-substantive portions of Defendant's memorandum were in excess of 35 pages is unavailing. Non-substantive matter such as cover page, table of contents, and signature block do not count toward the substantive page limit. *See Moore v. Syracuse City Sch. Dist.*, 05-CV-0005, 2009 WL 890576, at *2 n.8 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009) (Scullin, J.) (noting that it repaginated plaintiff's memorandum by starting page one following the Table of Contents and Authorities); *In re Marina Dev., Inc.*, 05-CV-1349, 2007 WL 9752855, at *1-2 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2007) (Hurd, J.) (noting that the Local Rules applied to brief format in bankruptcy cases, and

concluding that the appellees' briefs should therefore not exceed 25 pages, "exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, table of citations or similar material"). Additionally, although Plaintiff argues that Defendant's one-sentence conclusion is "substantive enough to be counted," the Court disagrees because that conclusion is merely a brief restatement of Defendant's request that the Court grant its motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint that contains no additional substantive argument. (Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 1, at 44 [Def.'s Mem. of Law].) Even if the conclusion were considered to be substantive, the proper course of action in this case would be to merely not consider any pages beyond the allowed amount, not to strike the entire motion as Plaintiff requests. *See Helen Cross v. Colvin*, 16-CV-0111, 2016 WL 7011477, at *4 n.3 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2016) (Suddaby, C.J.) (noting that, "[b]ecause Plaintiff has exceeded the page limit, the Court will not consider the arguments contained in pages eleven through fifteen of her counsel's reply affidavit"). The Court therefore finds that there is no basis for Plaintiff's arguments that Defendant's motion should be denied based on the length of its memorandum of law.

Also unpersuasive is Plaintiff's argument that she has prepared a more detailed substantive response to Defendant's motion (including a response to Defendant's Statement of Material Facts), but has not yet filed her "response in whole" because she has been waiting for this Court's "further directions about the allowable length" of Defendant's memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 69 [Pl.'s Sur-Reply].) Even considering Plaintiff's *pro se* status, there is no justification for Plaintiff's blatant failure to comply with the Local Rules by essentially ignoring the Court's imposed deadlines and manufacturing her own procedure that she now expects the Court to follow. Plaintiff was provided with notice that her response to Defendant's motion for summary judgment was due by February 19, 2021, a notice that she received because she

subsequently requested (and was granted) two separate 60-day extensions of time on that deadline, such that her response was not ultimately due until June 21, 2021. (Dkt. Nos. 59, 60, 61, 62, 64.) The Notification of the Consequences of Failing to Respond to a Summary Judgment form that was filed along with Defendant's motion clearly states that a failure to file a proper response to the motion including a response to the Statement of Material Facts, copies of all pertinent record evidence, and a response memorandum containing legal arguments could result in dismissal of some or all of the claims. (Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 2.)

Despite being made aware of the need to respond fully and despite being granted multiple lengthy extensions to do so, Plaintiff, without any permission or direction from the Court, chose to instead file a brief "motion" to dismiss Defendant's memorandum due to an alleged failure to comply with the page limits in the Local Rules and seemingly expected (again, without any permission or direction from the Court) that such counter-motion held the deadline for submitting a substantive response to Defendant's motion in abeyance. However, Plaintiff's misunderstanding of the rules of procedure based on her *pro se* status do not excuse her failure to comply with those rules of procedure. *See Alzawahra v. Albany Medical Ctr.*, 546 F. App'x 53, 54 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that, "[a]lthough a *pro se* litigant is entitled to a liberal construction of his filings, . . . his *pro se* status does not relieve him of his obligation to comply with the relevant procedural rules"). This is particularly so given that Plaintiff was informed of what she was required to submit in response to Defendant's motion, and the consequences for failing to do so.

Finally, the Court finds that it would not serve the interests of judicial efficiency to allow Plaintiff to submit any further substantive filings in response to Defendant's motion for summary judgment at this point. As already noted, Plaintiff was granted an additional 120 days in which to file her response. In granting her second request to extend that deadline, the Court stated that

no more extensions would be granted without documentary evidence that extension was warranted due to medical issues, and noted that this case has been pending for more than three years. (Dkt. No. 64 [Text Order filed Apr. 19, 2021].) Because Plaintiff's response and sur-reply indicate that her failure to file a full response by the deadline was due to her decision to wait to see what the Court ruled as to the propriety of the length of Defendant's memorandum rather than due to any medical or other issue, there is no basis for allowing Plaintiff additional time to submit a full and proper response. Notably, allowing Plaintiff to do so would require Defendant to expend additional time and effort to prepare yet another reply memorandum despite having already filed a reply and a motion to strike in response to Plaintiff's sur-reply. Lastly, the Court notes that, having reviewed the record on this motion, it is unlikely that providing Plaintiff with additional opportunity to respond to Defendant's motion would result in a different outcome on that motion.

As a result, the Court denies Defendant's motion to strike the sur-reply because the sur-reply offers Plaintiff no relief even if considered.

B. Whether Plaintiff's Discrimination Claim Based on the July 2016 Failure to Hire Must Be Dismissed as Untimely

After careful consideration, the Court answers this question in the affirmative for the reasons stated in Defendant's memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 1 [Def.'s Mem. of Law].) To those reasons, the Court adds the following analysis.

"To sustain Title VII or ADEA claims, a plaintiff must file administrative charges with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged act of discrimination." *Betterson v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.*, 661 F. App'x 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing *Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines*, 80 F.3d 708, 712 [2d Cir. 1996]; *Tewksbury v. Ottawa Newspapers*, 192 F.3d 322, 328 [2d Cir. 1999]).

Thus, any conduct that occurred more than 300 days before the charge is filed is barred in a federal lawsuit unless an exception applies. *Betterson*, 661 F. App'x at 89. *Exception*

Here, Plaintiff filed her complaint with the NYSDHR on July 14, 2017. (Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 12, at 1, 23.) As a result, only alleged acts of discrimination that occurred on or after September 17, 2016, are covered under that complaint. Because the failure to hire that Plaintiff alleges occurred in July 2016, any claim related to that alleged action is barred unless Plaintiff meets one of the defined exceptions to the 300-day requirement.

Recognized exceptions to the 300-day requirement include waiver, estoppel, equitable tolling, or the existence of a continuing violation. *Barr v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC*, 17-CV-0378, 2019 WL 6828987, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2019) (Sannes, J.). None of these exceptions are applicable here. There is no apparent basis for applying waiver or estoppel.

As to equitable tolling, a plaintiff must show that (1) she has been pursuing her rights diligently, but (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in the way and prevented timely filing. *Barr*, 2019 WL 6828987, at *9 (citing *Bolarinwa v. Williams*, 593 F.3d 226, 231 [2d Cir. 2010]). There is no indication of any circumstances between July 2016 and September 2016 that would have prevented her from filing a charge as to the allegedly discriminatory failure to hire in July 2016, much less an extraordinary one.

There is also no basis for applying the continuing violation doctrine here. “Under the continuing violation exception to the . . . limitations period, if a . . . plaintiff files an EEOC charge that is timely as to any incident of discrimination in furtherance of an ongoing policy of discrimination, all claims of discrimination under the policy would be timely even if they would be untimely standing alone.” *Chin v. Port Auth. Of New York & New Jersey*, 685 F.3d 135, 156 (2d Cir. 2012). However, “discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even

when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” *Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan*, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). A discrete act is one that “necessarily ‘constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice’” that would be individually actionable, such as “termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire.” *Chin*, 685 F.3d at 157 (citing *Morgan*, 536 U.S. at 114). It is well recognized that discrete acts that fall outside the limitations period “cannot be brought within it, even when undertaken pursuant to a general policy that results in other discrete acts occurring within the limitations period.” *Chin*, 685 F.3d at 157). Because the alleged failure to hire is a discrete act that was actionable in its own right, the continuing violation doctrine cannot be used to make it timely.

For all of the above stated reasons, the Court finds that the portions of Plaintiff's discrimination claims that are based on the failure to hire her in July 2016 are barred due to her failure to file a timely charge as to that act and must be dismissed.

C. Whether Defendant's Motion Should Be Granted as to Plaintiff's Title VII Claim

After careful consideration, the Court answers this question in the affirmative for the reasons stated in Defendant's memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 1 [Def.'s Mem. of Law].) To those reasons, the Court adds the following analysis.

Claims for discrimination under Title VII are subject to the *McDonnell Douglas* burden-shifting standard. *Kirkland v. Cablevision Systems*, 760 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2014). As an initial matter, the plaintiff must proffer sufficient evidence to state a prima facie case of discrimination. *Kirkland*, 760 F.3d at 225. If the plaintiff can make a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. *Id.* If the defendant does so, the burden shift back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. *Id.* As to this last step, “once the

[defendant] has made a showing of a neutral reason for the complained of action, to defeat summary judgment . . . the [plaintiff's] admissible evidence must show circumstances that would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that the [defendant's] employment decision was more likely than not based in whole or in part on discrimination." *Id.* (quoting *Terry v. Ashcroft*, 336 F.3d 128, 137 [2d Cir. 2003]).

"To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate [the following four elements]: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) circumstances surrounding the employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination." *Fahrenkrug v. Verizon Servs. Corp.*, 652 F. App.'x 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2016). In this case, Defendant concedes that Plaintiff has established the first and third of these requirements, but disputes that Plaintiff can show that (a) she had satisfactory job performance, and (b) her termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

As to the second element, "[i]n determining whether an employee's job performance is satisfactory, courts may—as they often must—rely on the evaluations rendered by supervisors," because "job performance cannot be assessed in a vacuum" and "the ultimate inquiry is whether an employee's performance 'meets his employer's legitimate expectations.'" *Meiri v. Dacon*, 759 F.2d 989, 995 (2d Cir. 1985); *see Manko v. Deutsche Bank*, 554 F. Supp. 2d 467, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that "courts routinely rely on evaluations from the plaintiff's supervisors in determining satisfactory job performance"). Whether performance is satisfactory "depends on the employer's criteria for the performance of the job—not the standards that may seem reasonable to the jury or judge." *Thornley v. Penton Publishers*, 104 F.3d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1997). "Although courts must refrain from intruding into an employer's policy apparatus or

prof *arbitrary and*

second-guessing a business's decisionmaking process. . . . they must also allow employees 'to show that the employer's demands were illegitimate or arbitrary.'" *Meiri*, 759 F.2d at 995.

Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was a probationary trainee employee during the relevant time period, and thus subject to termination if she did not meet employer expectations. (Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 3, at ¶ 5 [Arbab Decl.]; Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 9.) Under the terms of this probationary trainee employment, her supervisors were required to provide an Individual Development Plan and quarterly probationary evaluations as well as traineeship evaluations at six-month intervals during the traineeship period. (Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 3, at ¶ 6 [Arbab Decl.].) Plaintiff was provided with her Individual Development Plan (which she acknowledged with a signature) on October 25, 2016; this document outlined activities and performance standards for her Grade 14 position. (Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 5.) On January 6, 2017, Plaintiff was provided with a three-month probation evaluation signed by Ms. Pulcher and Ms. Farrell, in which Plaintiff was rated as "needs improvement" in all listed areas except "relationships," with details related to those areas written in the comments section that highlight the specific tasks and ways in which Plaintiff was noted to not be performing up to expected standards. (Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 6.) On April 3, 2017, Plaintiff was provided with a six-month probation evaluation signed by Ms. Pulcher and Ms. Farrell, in which it was noted that Plaintiff was rated as "unsatisfactory" in the areas of management of work assignments, quality of work, productivity, personal work characteristics, and problem solving/decision-making, "needs improvement" in the areas of attendance and communications, and "meets expectations" in the area of relationships; again, the evaluation includes written comments regarding the specific tasks and ways in which Plaintiff was not performing up to specific expectations. (Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 7.) Plaintiff was also provided with a six-month performance evaluation, in which concerns about

her performance as to the activities and tasks outlined in the Individual Development Plan were noted. (Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 8.)

Based on the evidence, it is clear both what the standards of Plaintiff's position were and the reasons that Plaintiff's performance did not meet those standards. As discussed above in Part I.B. of this Decision and Order, Plaintiff herself acknowledged that she made some mistakes in the course of her performance of her duties, and additional evidence from Ms. Pulcher and Ms. Farrell substantiates multiple specific mistakes. (Dkt. No. 58, Attachs. 28-33, 44, 47-54.)

Additionally, there is nothing in the record to show that these expectations were in any way illegitimate or arbitrary. Plaintiff has offered no evidence to support her claim but her own subjective belief that her performance was not as bad as her supervisors stated. In an email to Ms. Arbab on April 10, 2017, Plaintiff stated that she believed Ms. Pulcher provided inadequate training or communication to her; however, there is no evidence to substantiate this subjective belief and the undisputed record reflects that both Ms. Pulcher and Ms. Farrell provided fairly significant feedback and reminders to Plaintiff about her tasks and duties. (Dkt. No. 58, Attachs. 28-33, 39-41, 43, 45-54.) Based on the record before the Court, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Plaintiff performed her job satisfactorily.

In the alternative, the Court finds that Plaintiff also has not shown that the circumstances surrounding her termination give rise to an inference of discrimination. Notably, the record is devoid of any indication that any of Defendant's employees ever referenced Plaintiff's national origin during her employment or made any kind of disparaging remarks about her national origin. Additionally, the three employees that Plaintiff holds out as comparators who received better treatment because they were not terminated are not sufficiently similar to her to give rise to an inference of discrimination based on national origin for two reasons. First, Plaintiff's

deposition makes clear that she is not even certain what the national origins of these individuals are, but she merely assumes that they are “American.” (Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 15, at 102-03, 105-06, 109 [Pl.’s Dep.].) Second, there is no evidence to show that these individuals were in comparable positions with comparable responsibilities and that they made comparable mistakes to those made by Plaintiff. To raise an inference of discrimination from more favorable treatment towards similarly situated individuals outside of the protected group, “a plaintiff ‘must show she was similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom she seeks to compare herself.’” *De Jesus-Hall v. New York Unified Court Sys.*, 2021 WL 1259581, at *1 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting *Graham v. Long Island R.R.*, 230 F.3d 34, 39 [2d Cir. 2000]).

As to Ms. O’Hara, although her job tasks and objectives are similar to Plaintiff’s, the evidence shows that Ms. O’Hara was hired as Grade 18 Senior Budget Analyst/Senior Accountant (while Plaintiff was a Grade 14 Senior Accountant Trainee) and her performance reviews show that she overwhelmingly performed tasks up to expectations, with the exception of “needs improvement” on her three-month probation evaluation in the areas of managing work assignments and problem solving/decision-making, where it was noted that she needed to improve on working more efficiently to complete her assignments in a timely manner and in completing analyses and problem solving more independently, and “needs improvement” on her six-month probation evaluation in the area of problem solving/decision-making, where it was noted she needed to improve on completing analyses and problem solving more independently; it was noted that she had improved in these areas and was meeting expectations by the time of her nine-month probation evaluation. (Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 58.) The evidence therefore shows that, even if Plaintiff and Ms. O’Hara performed the same or similar jobs, Ms. O’Hara did so with fewer mistakes and she gradually improved her performance over the course of the documented

time, whereas Plaintiff's evaluations showed that she made far more extensive mistakes and did not show improvement. As a result, the Court finds that Ms. O'Hara is not sufficiently similar and thus the disparate treatment between her and Plaintiff would not allow a reasonable fact finder to infer discrimination.

As to Mr. Deitz, he was a Grade 18 Senior Accountant in a different section or unit than Plaintiff, and his listed tasks and objectives are not similar to those listed in Plaintiff's Individual Development Plan. (*Compare* Dkt. No. 25, at 21-24 *with* Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 5, at 1-2; *see* Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 15, at 111-12 [Pl.'s Dep.] [testifying that she did not do many of the tasks listed on Mr. Deitz's tasks and objectives list and admitting that his responsibilities were "different" than hers].) Additionally, Mr. Deitz was supervised by Melinda Hansen and Michelle Daly, not Ms. Pulcher and Ms. Farrell, and a summary of his performance completed by Ms. Daly indicates that Mr. Deitz performed his job satisfactorily in all noted respects. (Dkt. No. 25, at 24, 26-27.) Because there is no evidence that Mr. Deitz was a trainee, the evidence shows that he had different job responsibilities and different supervisors than Plaintiff, and there is no evidence of ongoing job performance issues, the Court finds that no reasonable fact finder could conclude that the treatment Mr. Deitz received raises an inference of discrimination.

As to Mr. Shavel, there is little evidence about the details of his employment. Plaintiff's only allegation regarding Mr. Shavel is that he was given a counseling memorandum for failing to complete mandatory training, but did not have his employment terminated. (Dkt. No. 25, at 31.) However, there is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Shavel had engaged in any other actions that made his job performance unsatisfactory, much less that he committed mistakes similar to those documented related to Plaintiff's job performance. Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Shavel was a trainee employee or that he worked in a similar position or with

similar tasks and objectives as Plaintiff's position, and the counseling memorandum suggests that Mr. Shavel was supervised in some way by Ms. Hansen, not Ms. Pulcher or Ms. Farrell. (Dkt. No. 25, at 31.) Based on the evidence, the Court finds that no reasonable fact finder could conclude that the treatment Mr. Shavel received raises an inference of discrimination.

Because Plaintiff has not provided evidence which can prove a prima facie case of national origin discrimination under Title VII and because there is no outstanding issue of material fact evident from the parties' submissions, the Court grants Defendant's motion for summary judgment on this claim.

D. Whether Defendant's Motion Should Be Granted as to Plaintiff's ADEA Claim

After careful consideration, the Court answers this question in the affirmative for the reasons stated in Defendant's memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 1 [Def.'s Mem. of Law].) To those reasons, the Court adds the following analysis.

"'In order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination,' the plaintiff 'must show (1) that she was within the protected age group, (2) that she was qualified for the position, (3) that she experienced adverse employment action, and (4) that such action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.'" *Green v. Town of East Haven*, 952 F.3d 394, 403 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting *Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp.*, 596 F.3d 93, 107 [2d Cir. 2010]). In this case, Defendant concedes that Plaintiff has established the first and third of these requirements, but disputes that Plaintiff can show that she (a) was qualified for the position, and (b) her termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Regarding whether Plaintiff was qualified, under the law of this Circuit, "a plaintiff only needs to demonstrate that she possesses the basic skills necessary for performance of the job."

Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting *Owens v. New York City Housing Auth.*, 934 F.2d 405, 409 [2d Cir 1991]). Notably, although misconduct is not a basis for finding an employee lacks the basic qualifications for a position, evidence of performance based on evaluations of an employee's work is appropriate evidence for making that determination. *Owens*, 934 F.2d at 409 (clarifying that it is the ability to perform job duties that is important, not whether the conduct is inappropriate or offensive); *Ralkin v. New York City Transit Auth.*, 62 F. Supp. 2d 989, 998 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding summary judgment appropriate on the issue of whether the plaintiff was qualified for the position because there was no "competing evidence" against the unsatisfactory performance evaluations to create an issue of fact about the plaintiff's performance, and no evidence that the negative evaluations were unfair or incorrect). Here, Plaintiff has offered no evidence that the performance evaluations were inaccurate other than her own general assertions at her deposition that she does not believe they accurately reflect her performance. Because her unsubstantiated assertions and beliefs cannot outweigh the other evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently shown that there is a genuine dispute of material fact about whether she was qualified for her position as that term is defined by the law.

Regarding whether Plaintiff has raised an inference of discrimination, as already discussed above in Part III.C. of this Decision and Order, Plaintiff's attempt to show that she was treated less favorably than younger similarly situated individuals is unavailing. Notably, it is undisputed that Ms. O'Hara was the only individual of the three named that was not as old or older than Plaintiff. However, as discussed previously, Ms. O'Hara is nonetheless not sufficiently similarly situated to Plaintiff because there is no evidence that Ms. O'Hara made the same or similar mistakes as Plaintiff did at the level and frequency at which Plaintiff made those

mistakes. Rather, the evidence shows that Ms. O'Hara was reported to have made fewer overall mistakes and that she improved with each probation evaluation that was conducted. It is undisputed that Plaintiff is not personally familiar with Ms. O'Hara or her work abilities, and that Plaintiff has no knowledge as to how well or not Ms. O'Hara performed her job on a day-to-day basis. As a result, disparate treatment here does not give rise to an inference of discrimination based on Plaintiff's age any more than it does related to her national origin.

The Court also acknowledges Defendant's correct argument that many courts recognize that "an allegation that a decision is motivated by age animus is weakened when the decisionmakers are of the protected class," and also where "Plaintiff was well within the protected age group when she was hired." *Ehrbar v. Forest Hills Hosp.*, 131 F. Supp. 3d 5, 25 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (collecting cases). However, these factors are not dispositive. *Ehrbar*, 131 F. Supp. 3d at 26. Here, Plaintiff was within the protected age group when she was hired, and Ms. Farrell, who was 50 at the relevant time, approved her termination, as did Ms. Burrell, who was 48 at the relevant time. (Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 3, at ¶ 13 [Arbab Decl.]; Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 25, at ¶¶ 5, 29 [Farrell Decl.].) Ms. Pulcher, however, was not in the protected age group. (Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 3, at ¶ 13 [Arbab Decl.].) Additionally, "where the person who made the decision to fire was the same person who made the decision to hire, it is difficult to impute to her an invidious motivation that would be inconsistent with the decision to hire." *Schnabel v. Abramson*, 232 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting *Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc.*, 130 F.3d 553, 560 [2d Cir. 1997]); *see also Downey v. Adloox, Inc.*, 789 F. App'x 903, 907 (2d Cir. 2019) (affirming district court's dismissal of age discrimination claim based in part on the fact that plaintiffs were hired and fired by the same executives within a short period of time). Here, Plaintiff's hiring was prompted by a request from Ms. Farrell, and Ms. Farrell also was one of

the persons who approved her termination approximately six months later. (Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 25, at ¶¶ 5, 27 [Farrell Decl.].) Although it is unclear who precisely had the last authoritative say about Plaintiff's termination, Ms. Farrell's involvement in both Plaintiff's hiring and firing is a factor to consider in determining whether the evidence can be reasonably interpreted as raising an inference of discrimination based on age.

Unlike the national origin claim, which is unsupported by any evidence of statements made by Plaintiff's supervisors about her or other employee's national origins, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Ms. Pulcher made comments to Plaintiff about certain other employees being too old to do their jobs effectively. Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Pulcher made such comments, while Ms. Pulcher denies making such comments. It is undisputed that the two employees about whom Ms. Pulcher allegedly made the comments were at, near, or beyond retirement age, while Plaintiff was 45 at the time she was employed by Defendant. (Dkt. No. 58, Attach. 15, at 114-18 [Pl.'s Dep.] [testifying that Ms. Pulcher said that the employees in question did not know what they were doing and should have retired].) However, even if a fact finder were to accept Plaintiff's testimony that Ms. Pulcher made these comments, it would be insufficient to raise an inference of discrimination in light of all of the other evidence, including the fact that Ms. Farrell (who was not alleged to have made any comments about age) was personally aware of Plaintiff's work performance through working directly with her, and also signed Plaintiff's probationary evaluations and recommended her termination. Put another way, even if Ms. Pulcher had made comments suggesting possible age bias, those comments and any inference of discrimination on her part cannot be imputed to Ms. Farrell in the absence of evidence she was aware of any bias Ms. Pulcher may have held, particularly given that Ms. Farrell was directly and independently familiar with Plaintiff's performance issues. As a result,

the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established that a reasonable fact finder could conclude there was an inference of discrimination even if they resolved the issue about Ms. Pulcher's comments in Plaintiff's favor.

In the alternative, even if a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Plaintiff was qualified and Ms. Pulcher's statements raised an inference of discrimination, denial of summary judgment is inappropriate here because Plaintiff cannot meet her ultimate burden to show that Defendant's proffered non-discriminatory explanation (i.e., that Plaintiff's performance was poor) was a pretext for discrimination. To establish a claim for discrimination under the ADEA, the plaintiff "must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the 'but-for' cause of the challenged adverse employment action and not just a contributing or motivating factor." *Green*, 952 F.3d at 403 (citing *Gorzynski*, 596 F.3d at 106). In other words, Plaintiff's age does not need to have been the only consideration, but rather she still must show that she would not have been terminated without her age being considered. *Perez v. Cnty of Rensselaer, New York*, 14-CV-0950, 2018 WL 3420014, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. July 13, 2018) (Sharpe, J.) (citing *Delaney v. Bank of Am. Corp.*, 766 F.3d 163, 169 [2d Cir. 2014]). A few isolated comments that were not even directed at Plaintiff are insufficient to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that Plaintiff's age was the but-for cause of her termination in light of all of the evidence discussed above related to Plaintiff's failure to show an inference of discrimination. No reasonable fact finder could conclude that Plaintiff would not have been terminated despite her performance reviews if not for her age.

Because Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case and cannot show that her age was the but-for cause of her termination, the Court grants Defendant's motion for summary judgment on this claim.


ACCORDINGLY, it is

ORDERED that Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 58) is **GRANTED**; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's claims for national origin and age discrimination pursuant to Title VII and the ADEA are **DISMISSED**; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 25) is **DISMISSED**.

Dated: August 19, 2021
Syracuse, NY


Hon. Glenn T. Suddaby
Chief U.S. District Judge