IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: #1 1ST. N.E. WASHINGTON, DC 20543	
LOWER COURT: Colorado Supreme Crt. ACTION NUMBER: 2023SA306 LOWER COURT: Colo. Crt. of App. ACTION NUMBER: 2023CA1070 LOWER DISTRICT COURT: District Court ACTION NUMBER: 2005CR3972	Δ COURT USE ONLY Δ
IN RE: PETITIONER, ARTHUR JAMES LOMAX v PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO/PROSECUTION RESPONDENT	CIVIL ACTION NUMBER: 23-7271
ATTORNEY/ PRO se Arthur James Lomax #154416 Bent County Correctional Fac. 11560 County road, FF-75 Las Animas, CO 81054	

PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR REHEARING

Rule 44. Rehearing

1. Any petition for the rehearing of any judgment or decision of the Court on the merits shall be filed within 25 days after entry of the judgment or decision,..., except

that a petitioner proceeding in forma pauperris under Rule 39, including an inmate of an institution,... A petition for rehearing is not subject to oral argument and will not be granted except by a majority of the Court, at the instance of a Justice who concurred in the judgment or decision.

2. Mr. Lomax believes his petition is presented in good faith and not for delay.

Rule 10. Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari

Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicicial discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons.

(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter;hhae (e.g. Stevens v. Colorado, 18 Fed. App. 779, 780 (10th Cir. Colo. Sept. 17, 2001 and see The Court of Appeals of Kentuky/Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 170 S.W. 171, 172, 175, 160 Ky. 745 (1914). As to the mandated enacting clauses; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power;

(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a United States court of appeals; e.g. In re Lourie, 6 Colo. 499, 5 & 489, is Colorado Supreme Court binding authority that makes it clear that all felonies are prosecuted by indictment, which is in conflict with Hurtado vs. California,110 U.S. led. 232 (1864); Davis vs. Burke,179 U.S.399; Maxwell vs. Do.,176 U.S. 581; and Dollin vs. Nebraska, are cases from different appellate jurisdictions that have made it clear that prosecutions for felonies are not in violation of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, when the constitution of the State authorizes prosecutions for felonies on information. Colorado's Constitution authorizes felony prosecutions only by indictment. These violations of his federal and state constitutional rights are compelling reasons for this Court to reconsider and grant a rehearing.

This state and federal constitutional violation of his due process rights call for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power. This is a question of National and Local importance under the Colorado Bill of Rights and the U.S. Constitution amendt. See V and XIV and Colo. Cont. Art. II, Sect. 8).

Rule 29. Filing and Service of Documents; Special Notifications; Corporate Listing

1. Any document required or permitted to be presented to the Court or to a Justice shall be filed with the Clerk in paper form.

4. (c) In any proceeding in this Court in which the constitutionality of any statute of a State is drawn into question, and neither the State nor any agency, officer, or employee thereof is a party, the initial document filed in this Court shall recite that 28 U.S.C. Subsect. 2403(b) may apply and shall be served on the Attorney General of that State. In such a proceeding from any court of the United States, as defined by 28 U.S.C. Subsect.451, the initial document also shall state whether that court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Subsect. 2403(b), certified to the State Attorney General the fact that the constitutionality of a statute of that State was drawn into question. See Rule 14.1(e)(v).

In a number of states with constitutional provisions like the one in this state (Colo.), the court have held that the omission of the enacting clause is not fatal. McPherson v. Leonard,29 Md. 377; Ex parte Hudson (Okla.) 106 Pac. 540 and 107 Pac. 735;Cape Girardeau v. Riley,14 Am. Rep. 427; Levin v. Hewes (Md.) 86 Atl. 233; Watson v. Carey (Utah) 21 Pac. 1089; Keating v. Skiles, 72 Mo. 97; Postal T. & C. Co. v. State (Md.) 73 Atl. 679; State v. B. & O.R. Co. (Md.) 77 Atl. 433.

The Court of the State of Minnesota stated: We believe a provision similar to this found in the Constitution of nearly every State, and in a number of them this identical question has arisen, and with perhaps one exception, Missouri, their court have held that the absence of an enacting clause is fatal to a bill. Some few states have upheld bills where there was a substantial, or attempted compliance with the provision, but in the case we

have here, there is neither substantial, attempted nor pretended compliance. There is no enacting clause at all.

The Minnesota Constitution provides, that, "The style of all laws of this state shall be, 'Be it enacted by the State of Minnesota". The case of Sjoberg v. Security, etc. Association 73 Minn. 203, decided in 1898, involved a bill without any enacting clause. The court held the constitutional provision mandatory, and a statute without any enacting clause void. See page 11 of his writ of certiorari.

The Constitution of Michigan provides that the style of all laws shall be: "The people of the State of Michigan enact." In the case of People v. Dettenthaler, 118 Mich. 595, decided in 1898, the court held that the provision of the Constitution was mandatory, and that a law passed without an enacting clause was invalid.

Section 21 of the Constitution of North Carolina is as follows: "The style of the acts shall be: 'The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact." In that State a bill was passed defining a criminal offense. There was no enacting clause. In State v. Patterson, 98 N.C. 660, decided in 1887, the court said that whenever the Constitution prescribed a particular act or thing to be done in a specified way and manner:

> "Such direction must be treated as a command, and an observance of it is essential to the effectiveness of the act or thing to be done. Such can not be complete-such thing is not effectual until done in the way and manner prescribed.

"The purpose of thus prescribing an enacting clause,'the style of the acts' is to establish the act-to give it prominence, uniformity and certainty-to identify the Act of Legislature as the of the General Assembly-to afford evidence of its legislative statutory nature and to secure uniformity of identification, and thus prevent inadvertence, possible mistake and fraud. Such purpose is important of itself, and as it is of the constitution a due observance of it is essential.

"The manner of the enactment of a statute is of its substance. The is so in the nature of the matter as well as because the Constitution makes it so."

The court goes on to point out that the Legislature cannot enact a verbal expression of its will, and that various details of the enactment, such as authentication, etc., are material and essential. Continuing, the court says:

> "And for the like and other reasons the enacting clause is likewise essential****. The Constitution makes it so; and what authority under the Constitution can be heard to say it is not important and may be dispensed with?"

The Constitution of Indiana requires the style of every law to be: "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana." By a joint resolution of the two houses a bill was passed to appropriate money. The court held that money could only be appropriated by an enactment, not by resolution. May v. Rice, 91 Ind. 546, in answer to the contention that the resolution was in effect a law, and that it should be so regarded by simply considering the word "Resolved" in the enacting clause to mean "Enacted," and in that way bring the measure within the scope of the constitutional requirement, said:

"To say that a provision is directory, seems, with many persons, to be equivalent to saying that it is not law at all. That this ought not to be so must be conceded; that it is so we have abundant reason and good authority for saying. If, therefore, a constitutional provision is to be enforced at all, it must be treated as mandatory. And if the Legislature habitually disregard it, it seems to us that there is all the more urgent necessity that the courts should enforce it." (Cited from Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 5th Ed., p. 180.)

"In this case the language of the Constitution is so plain and emphatic, that we need not inquire for reason in its adoption. In such a case, our duty is a plain one, to declare and uphold the Constitution. If we may hold the section under discussion to be directory, it seems to us, that to be consistent, we would be compelled to make a like ruling as to every other section of the Constitution."

The Nevada Constitution provides that the enacting clause shall be, "The people of the State of Nevada represented in Senate and Assembly do enact as follows." In State of Nevada v. Roger, 10 Nev. 250, decided in 1875, it was held that the omission of the words, "Senate and" from the enacting clause rendered the act null and void. The opinion makes this significant observation:

"Every person at all familiar with practice of legislative bodies is aware that one of the most common methods adopted to kill a bill and prevent its becoming a law is for a member to move to strike out the enacting clause. If such a motion is carried, the bill is lost. Can it be seriously contended that such a bill, with its head cut off, could thereafter by any legislative action become a law? Certainly not. The certificates of the proper officers of the Senate and Assembly that such an act was passed in their respective houses do not and cannot impart vitality to any act which upon its face failed to express the authority by which it was enacted.****

This language is susceptible of but one interpretation. There is no doubtful meaning as to the intention. It is, in our judgment, an imperative mandate of the people in their sovereign capacity to the Legislature, requiring that all laws to be binding upon them shall, upon their face, express the authority by which they were enacted; and this act comes to us without such authority appearing upon its face, it is not a law.

In Burritt v. State Com. 120 Ill. 322, 11 N.E. 180, the Illinois Court in considering their constitutional provision that the enacting clause of all bills should read, "Be it enacted by the people," held that there was no substantial compliance with the Constitution in the use of "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives concurring therein."

The text writers declare the law to be as announced in the cases above cited. Lewis' Southerland Statutory Construction, 2d Ed., Sections 70 and 71; Cushing's Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th Ed., Sections 2101 and 2102. With reference to constitutional requirements Cushing makes the following comment:

"I. Where enacting words are prescribed, nothing can be a law which is not introduced by those very words, even though others equivalent are at the same time used.
"II. Where the enacting words are not prescribed by a constitutional provision, the enacting authority must notwithstanding be stated; and any words which do this to a common understanding are doubtless sufficient; or the words may be prescribed by the rule."

In Tennessee the courts have adhered to the rule that constitutional provisions are mandatory, although a bill will not be invalidated where there was a substantial compliance. To illustrate. In State v. Burrow, 119 Tenn. 376; 104 S.W. 526, the Supreme Court of Tennessee, had under consideration a section of the Tennessee Constitution which reads as follows: "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee." A bill had been passed containing all of this enacting clause except the words, "the State of." With reference to this section of the Constitution, the court, in an elaborate discussion of the subject, concludes:

> "We think this one clearly mandatory, and must be complied with by the Legislature in all legislation important or unimportant enacted by it; otherwise, it will be invalid."

But the court held that the enacting clause of the bill did substantially comply with the mandate of the Constitution, and was, therefore, valid.

Maryland and Mississippi courts have not required literal compliance. For instance in Mississippi the Constitution says: "The style of their laws shall be,'Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Mississippi."" An act began with these words: "Resolved by the Legislature of the State of Mississippi." The court sustained the act, holding that the word "Resolved" was equivalent to the word "enact,"and that the measure was in fact a law notwithstanding the use of the word "Resolved." The court said said:"The word resolved is as competent to declare the legislative will as the word enact."

In Maryland the subject was first disposed of by a divided court in the case of McPherson v. Leonard, 29 Md. 377.

The Maryland Constitution provides: "The style of all laws in this State shall be, 'Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland."" The act in question as to Colorado's laws/statutes omitted the words "Be It Enacted By The General Assembly Of The State of Colorado" pursuant to Colorado Const. Art. V, Sect. 18. By mandate, all laws published and recorded must have an enacting clause, for it to be a valid and true law of the state. The conclusion of the majority court on that subject is as follows:

In the later case of Postal Telegraph Co. v. State,110 Md.608, the McPherson case was again discussed, but the court refused to to overrule it because:

"It might therefore do great injustice to those who relied on and had the right to rely on a decision of this court to hold that it had been overruled by a case which in no manner involved the clause question and we can not so hold."

But of the constitution provision and the McPherson case, the court did say:

"If we were passing on this provision for the first time, we might hesitate to hold that it was not mandatory-especially in view of the conclusions reached by many other courts in construing similar provisions. There is certainly much to be said in favor of a strict compliance with a clause in the Constitution which uses such plain, comprehensive language as this one does***.

In Mississippi, Maryland and Tennessee cases, supra, it will be observed that there was an enacting clause to each bill under consideration. The objection went to the failure in haec verba to use the style prescribed. The court merely held that a enactantial compliance was sufficient. But in the instant case, there is absolutely no enacting clause. There is nothing to indicate the source from, or authority by which the law/statute is proclaimed. There is not even a proclamation using as much as the word "Enacted" or the word "Resolved" or some other word of that character. Found in the Colorado Revised Statutes books, which Mr. Lomax was charged with and convicted of (C.R.S. 18-3-402 and C.R.S. 18-3-404). Therefore, his U.S. Const. Amendts rights was violated V, VI, XIII, IX, and XIV. Over-all his due process rights.

In Oklahoma the Constitution provides: "The style of all bills shall be, 'Be it enacted by the people of the State of Oklahoma,"" A legislative bill without an enacting clause was held to be good in ex parte Hudson, 106 P. 540, but in that State, there is a constitutional provision for the enactment of laws directly by the people under what is known as the Initiative and Referendum. The court held that the constitutional provision, supra, had reference alone to direct legislation by the people, and their laws under the Initiative and Referendum must be styled in the manner provided by the Constitution, but the Legislature was under no such restriction.

The Missouri Constitution has a similar requirement as to enacting clause, and there the Legislature is the supreme and only law-making power. The Supreme Court of Missouri has held an act of the legislature is valid which has no enacting clause at all. Cape Girardeau v. Riley, 52 Mo. 424. It based its decision in part on a previous decision of the Missouri Court in respect to the validity of writs issued. By one section of the Missouri Constitution it was provided, that "all writs shall run in the name of the State." The Missouri court was committed to the doctrine that such a provision in the Constitution was directory merely and not mandatory, for it had held that a writ was valid, although not running in the name of the State. Exactly the contrary has been the ruling in Kentucky. Section 5, Article 4, of the third Constitution, and Section 123 of the present Constitution provide: "The style of process shall be, 'The Commonwealth of Kentucky."

In Yeager v. Groves, 78 Ky. 278, this court held invalid a writ of attachment, which did not run in the name of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, although signed by an officer with power to issue. What was then said with reference to the application of that provision of our Constitution is applicable to the case at hand:

"Judicial process is but the command of the sovereign by whose authority the tribunal out of which it issues was established, commanding the person or officer to whom it is

directed, or who is authorized to execute it, to do certain acts therein specified, and it is therefore appropriate that such process shall run in the name of the government. But whether appropriate or necessary or not, the Constitution requires it, and what that instrument requires should be done without hesitation or inquires into the question whether, abstractly considered, the thing required is essential or not.

"The clerk of a court, the Reviser of statutes, the Code of Commissioners or Revising Committee, or Codifiers has no power to command either officer or private persons. His only authority is to issue the command of the Commonwealth in those cases in which he had been authorized to use the name of the Commonwealth.

He is the mere agent of government, with authority to act for it and in its name in issuing judicial process, and he has no more authority to issue such process in his own name than a private person has."

The basis of the Missouri court's opinion detroys its value as a precedent in this State.

Certainly there is no longer room for doubt as to the effect of all provisions of the Constitution of this State of Colorado. By common consent they are deemed mandatory, and, as stated in a recent opinion, perhaps one hundred cases touching on this subject have been written, but in one of them has there been any departure from the principle that they are mandatory and that whenever an act of the Legislature is incompatible with the Constitution, there is no alternative for the court to pursue but to declare that fact and pronounce the act inoperative and void. This uniformity of opinion makes it quite unnecessary to cite, or make quotations from the long list of cases in Kentucky. Perhaps the first was Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Litt. 90. And the most recent are McCreary, Governor v. Speer, 156 Ky. 783, and Board of Penitentiary Commissioners v. Spencer, 159 Ky. 255. A reference to the case of Varney v. Justice, 86 Ky. 596, will serve to illustrate the rule in Kentucky and other common states, and from this case we quote:

"The Constitution of the State was adopted by the people of the State as the fundamental law of the State. This fundamental law was designed by the people adopting it to be restrictive upon the powers of the several departments of government created by it. It was intended by the people that all departments of the State Government should shape their conduct by this fundamental law. Its every section was, doubtless, regarded by the people adopting it as of vital importance, and worthy to become a part and parcel of the constitutional form of government by which the governors as well as the governed were to be governed. Its very mandate was intended to be paramount authority to all persons holding official trust, in whatever department of government, and to the sovereign people themselves. No mere unessential matter were intended to be ingrafted in it; but each section and each article was solemnly weighed and considered, and found to be essential to the form of constitutional government adopted. Whenever the language used is prohibitory, it was intended to be positive and unequivocal negation. Whenever the language contains a grant of power, it was intended as a mandate. whenever the language gives a direction as to the manner of exercising a power, it was intended that the power should be exercised in the manner directed, and in no other manner. It is an instrument of words, granting powers, restraining powers, and reserving rights. These words are fundamental words, meaning the thing itself; they breathe no spirit except the spirit to be found in them. To say that these words are directory merely, is to license a violation of the instrument every day and every hour. To preserve the instrument inviolate, we must regard its words, except when expressly permissive, as mandatory, as breathing the spirit of command."

By an enacting clause, the makers of the Constitution intended that the General Assembly should make its impress or seal, as it were, upon each enactment for the sake of identity, and to assume and show responsibility. While the Constitution makes this a necessity, it did not originate it. The custom is in use practically everywhere, and is as old as parliamentary government-as old as king's decrees, and even they borrowed it. The decrees of Cyrus, King of Persia, which Holy Writ records, were not the first to be prefaced with a statement of authority. The law was

delivered to Moses in the name of the Great I Am, and the prologue to Great Commandments is no less majestic and impelling. But, whether these edicts and commands be promulgated by the Supreme Ruler or by petty kings, or by the sovereign people themselves, they have always begun with some such form as an evidence of power and authority. It may be that in these days some believe the custom useless, and that the section of the Constitution is a relic of antiquity, that it is simply a high-sounding phrase-empty and meaningless, and, therefore, should be ignored. It may be that some believe an observance of this requirement is not nearly so important or valuable to the people as the present benefits offered in the body of a bill, and they are willing to forego one to acquire the other, but such a thought "makes us rather bear those ills we have, than fly to others that we know not of." It is certain that neither this court nor the Legislature-creatures of the Constitution and sworn to uphold it-can afford to ignore or deal lightly with any section of it. Neither can we say, as for one hundred years this court has steadfastly refused to say, that constitutional provisions are directory, or that the section in question is nothing more than a suggestion of form for drafting a bill. If we so hold as to that section, then we may as to another, and another, and of every other section in it, with the result that none of it will amount to more than a suggestion to people, courts, legislatures, and executives, having no binding or mandatory effect upon any of them, so that they may proceed or no, as they please, without let or hindrance. Such a state of affairs is anarchy-nothing less. The people by their Constitution have set these limitations within which their representatives, officers, and servants must act. The very fact that the limitations are set forth in specific terms is sufficient evidence of their importance. No creature of the Constition has power to question its authority or to hold inoperative any section or provision of it. As legislation is needed, whether remedial or restrictive, they become the law of the Commonwealth. There is no other power of enactment. If from a bill an essential is ommitted, they alone can supply it. No court can neither amend nor enact. The bill/laws/statutes in question is not complete-it does not meet the plain constitutional(mandate under Art. V, Sect. 18, of the Const. of Colo. (1876) and C.R.S. 2-4-213, since a law mainly identified as a true constitutional law by way of it's enacting clause). Without an enacting clause it is void.

THE LAWS REFERENCED TO IN THE COMPLAINT CONTAIN NO TITLES

The alleged statutes/laws that Mr. Lomax was charged under and convicted of contain no titles. Therefore, the state of Colorado violated his due process of law and the equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. Amendts.V, VI,IX, XIII, and XIV. The laws listed in the complaint in question,as cited from the Colorado Revised Statutes, contain no titles. All laws are to have titles indicating the subject matter of the law, as required by the Constitution of the State of Colorado, Art. V, Sect. 21. For this reason the county/district court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the party.

Mr. Lomax, petition the U.S. Supreme Court to review and grant his writ of certiorari, it was filed on February 21, 2024 and placed on the docket April 19, 2024 as No. 23-7271. But his writ of certiorari was denied on or about June 24, 2024, and he did not received it until on or about July 1, 2024.

All laws are to have titles indicating the subject matter of the law, as required by the Constitution of the State of Colorado:

Art. V, Sect. 21: No Bill except general appropriate bills shall be passed containing more than one subject which shall be clearly expressly in it title, but if subject shall be embraced in any act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void on as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed.

The principal purpose for the title requirement of Article V, section 21, is to provide fair notice to legislators (and to others) of the contents of a bill:

The constitutional restriction on titles of legislative acts was designed to prevent the use of the title as a means of deceiving members of the legislature and other interested persons as the bill moved through the legislative process. The restriction was intended to assure those who could not examine the body of the act itself that the act did not deal with more than its title disclosed. Warren v. Marion County et al, 222 Ore. 307, 321, 353 P.2d 257 (1960).

The regularity of the enactment of a law may be inquired into and the legislative journals may be examined to ascertain whether the law has been passed in accordance with constitutional requirement. 6 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. (2 ed.) subsect. 8898; State ex rel. Kohlman v. Wagener, 130 Minn. 424, 153 N.W. 749; State v. Twin City Tel. Co. 104 Minn. 270, 116 N.W. 835; In re Ellis' Estate, 55 Minn, 401, 56 N.W. 1056, 23 L.R.A. 287, 43 A.S.R. 514.

The rule which we follow is sometimes called the "journal entry rule." The basis of the rule is that the record of the enrolled bill imports absolute verity and that the rule is convenient in practice obviating inquiries such as the one now being made. The rule is sustained by many courts of high authority, including the Supreme Court of the United States. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S. Ct. 495, 36 L. ed. 294. See 25 R.C.L. p. 895, Subsect. 147. It is the rule in England. The King v. Arundel, Hob. 109. We considered the question long ago in Board of Supervisors v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 281 (330) and adopted the "journal entry rule." The history of the question in this state was there reviewed. We pointed out that our constitutional debates indicated that the constitutional requirements relating to enactment of statutes were intended to be remedial and mandatory - remedial as guarding against recognized evils arising from loose and dangerous methods of conducting legislation, and mandatory as requiring compliance by the legislature without discretion on its part to protect the public interest against such recognized evils, and that the validity of statutes should depend on compliance with such requirements with judicial determination of the question in the manner permitted under the "journal entry rule." See Sjoberg v. Security S. & L. Assn. 73 Minn. 203, 75 N.W.1116, 72 A.S.R. 616. The rule has the merit of preventing a bill from being accepted as law which was not legally enacted.

The "enrolled bill rule" permits bills to become laws which have not been actually passed by the legislature. The rule has been said to be conducive to fraud, forgery, corruption, and other wrongdoings in connection with legislation. Courts applying such a rule are bound to hold statutes valid which they and everybody know were never legally enacted. Rode v. Phelps, 80 Mich. 598, 45 N.W. 493. While we recognize that the "enrolled bill

rule," is upheld by many authorities, the same must be said of "journal entry rule", which we follow and to which we adhere. The avoidance of the evils that might obtain under the "enrolled bill rule" outweigh the argument in its favor.

The petitioner briefly and distinctly state its grounds. The alleged accused moved to dismiss his respective case for lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction. Because the criminal court did not have the proper/legal jurisdiction to hear/decide his cause, nor to rule on the validity or legality of his criminal conviction or sentence. Futhermore,the alleged laws/statutes used against him from the Colorado Revised Statute book contain no enacting clauses pursuant to Colo. Const. Art. V, Sect. 18 and legislative Construction of Statute 2-4-213 and they have no titles pursuant to Colo. Const. Art. V, Sect. 21. There is no link between any bill and the Colorado Revised Statutes Title 18, that the accused was prosecuted under. There are much conflict among our superior courts here in the U.S. in regards to this constitutional question.In violation of his U.S./Const.V,XIII,XIV

CERTIFICATE

I, Arthur J. Lomax, do certify and states that the grounds are limited to intervening circumstances of substantial or controlling effect or to other substantial grounds not previously presented. Also the petitioner also certify that his petition for rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, he prays that this Court will grant a rehearing pursuant to Rule 44 and grant his petition, and resolve these conflicts among our courts in regards to the enactment of our laws/statutes in our states by the Legislature.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I served today by U.S. mail copies of the "PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR REHEARING", on the person(s) on August 16, 2024, as following:

To: The Supreme Court, Clerk of the Court
#1 1st N.E.
Washington, DC 20543

Colo. Attorney General
Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203

Arthur James Lomax

Arthur James Lomax #134416