

23-6819  
Case No.

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In The Supreme Court for the United States of America

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In re: MARY ALICE NELSON ROGERS TRUST  
Mary Alice Nelson-Rogers;

Petitioner,

v.

United States District Court For the Eastern District of California, Sacramento

Supreme Court, U.S.  
FILED

DEC 28 2023

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Respondent,

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On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District  
Court For the Eastern District of California, Sacramento

Case No. 2:21-cv-02151-JAM-KJN

Case No. 22-15469

Honorable District Judge John A Mendez


Honorable Kenneth J. Newman, Magistrate Judge

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Writ of Mandamus

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Mary Alice Nelson-Rogers, Muskogee Seminole Creek American Indian  
Grantor Trustee of the Mary Alice Nelson-Rogers Trust,  
Rural Free Delivery: 2072 50<sup>th</sup> Avenue, Sacramento, California (nation-  
state) [00000]. Without the U.S



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
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## QUESTIONS/ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Has the Petitioner presented a valid United States Constitutional claim to the federal courts and does the violation of that claim demand remedy, or is the claim frivolous as stated by 9<sup>th</sup> Circuit 3 judge panel.
2. Has the Eastern District Court of California officials taken lawful action in their ministerial duties owed and obligated to Petitioner.

The issue here goes beyond a miscarriage of justice. The 9<sup>th</sup> Circuit Appellate Court and the Eastern District Court of California blatant and outright refusal to administer justice, when law warrants otherwise is contrary to what the United States Supreme court in *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225, 240, (1972) proclaimed, "throws open the doors of the United States courts to those whose rights under the Constitution are denied or impaired",

3. The doors of the 9<sup>th</sup> Circuit Appellate Court and Eastern District of California Courts are willfully, maliciously, and improperly closed to self-represented persons, like the indigent Petitioner thereby foreclosing (1) a *civil* forum of justice, and (2) denying Petitioner her "day in court", simply to protect the status quo and suppress what is coined by attorneys, judges and magistrates as "Self-Help" litigants in *propria persona* which is an abuse of power. This court's refusal to intervene and foreclose a civil forum sends a disturbing message that the United States Supreme Court remains the only avenue for justice?

4. The Eastern District Court of California has become defendant(s) by denying Petitioner Mary Alice Nelson-Rogers (of the Mary Alice Nelson-Rogers Trust) her united states of America Constitutional and Statutory afforded protections.

## LIST OF PARTIES

Honorable John A. Mendez (abbreviated name), United States District Judge

Honorable Kendall J. Newman (abbreviated name), United States Magistrate




## STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Article 1 Section 2, Clause 3 as Mary Alice Nelson-Rogers is an American National Indian as described up to the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act, Indian Declaration of Independence, Fair Housing Act, et seq.; Article III of U.S. Constitution; 28 U.S. C. § 1254, §1651, Sup. Ct. Rule 20.

"The All Writs Act . . . authorizes [this Court] to issue mandamus relief necessary to protect [its] 'prospective jurisdiction.'" *Cal. Power Exch. Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Commission*, 245 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting *Pub. Util. Commissioner v. Bonneville Power Admin.*, 767 F.2d 622, 630 (9th Cir. 1985)); *see also* 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (authorizing federal courts to issue all writs appropriate "in aid of their respective jurisdictions"); *Fed. Trade Commission v. Dean Foods Co.*, 384 U.S. 597, 603 (1966) ("The exercise of . . . power [under the All Writs Act] extends to the potential jurisdiction of the appellate court where an appeal is not then pending but may later be perfected.") (Citation omitted).

## CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

- a. First Amendment "petition the government for a redress of grievances"
- b. Fourth Amendment "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects...."
- c. Fifth Amendment "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
- d. Fourteenth Amendment, deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"
- e. Article 1, Section 7 of the California Constitution "A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws."
- f. Bill of Rights 10<sup>th</sup> Amendment "The Tenth Amendment says that the Federal



Government only has those powers delegated in the Constitution. If it isn't listed, it belongs to the states or to the people."

- g. Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 Statute, civil rights statute, 28 USC §§ 351-364 et seq.
- h. 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act and all associated Acts
- i. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 1985; 1988; 2000(d)
- j. 18 U.S.C. § 241; 242; 245
- k. 15 U.S.C. § 1; 2; 1692

#### REMEDY SOUGHT

5. A writ of mandamus from the full 9<sup>th</sup> Circuit to the inferior government officials, ordering the government officials to properly fulfill their official duties and to correct an abuse of discretion. *Cheney v. United States District Court For D.C.* (2004). A civil forum, independent of defendant(s) to adjudicate claims and pleadings against the City of Sacramento on the merits, against individuals and/or entities in their official and individual capacities.

#### FACTS AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE


Petitioner Mary Alice Nelson-Rogers ("Grantor- Trustee; Real Party in Interest; Injured Party; I; Me; My; Her; She") of the Mary Alice Nelson Rogers Trust ("Trust") prosecuted action to the extent possible without the actions of the Eastern District Court of California officials Kendall J. Newman ("Newman") and John A. Mendez ("Mendez") (assumed names; dba's, etc.), and the Ninth Circuit clerk and senior justice panel who relied on Newman's and Mendez's findings and recommendations, order and judgment. Both Newman and Mendez treated me in a demonstrably egregious and hostile manner. The defendants have engaged in intentional discrimination on the basis of my color, and national origin, and ignored all due process and equal protection clauses; property and land rights; declarations, affidavits, homestead, land records; and evidentiary records submitted by Real Party in Interest showing the Trust records. Moreover, Newman and



Mendez ignored the facts of the heading and jurisdiction raised in the Motion to Remand to state court, and relied on defendants' attorneys frivolous and deceptive claims for removal which turned into a dismissal of my claim. The Supreme Court stated many years ago that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protects those liberties that are "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." *Snyder v. Com. of Massachusetts*, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332. Article 1, Section 7, First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment protects my right to secure in my person and property; all of these things were overstepped by Newman and Mendez which aided and abetted these ultra vires attorneys commit fraud upon the court.

The United States Eastern District Court of California has failed to perform various ministerial duties including filing of documents sent to the respective court. The magistrate in the Eastern District Court of California displayed a persistent disregard of the Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by this Court. Once I filed a motion to recuse Newman, the motion was ignored and Mendez rejected the motion without cause.

Plaintiff, Mary Alice Nelson-Rogers, filed original complaint on October 18, 2021 for an action to quiet title in the Superior Court of California, Sacramento County, Gordon D. Schaber Courthouse 720 Ninth Street, Sacramento, California 95814. A Motion for Preliminary Injunction was filed the following day. On November 19, 2021, Attorney John D. Freed filed a Notice of Removal to Federal Court claiming diversity for JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., and Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. Freed further filed a 129(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, claiming Chase actually bought the "PROPERTY" from the self-appointed trustee (WAMU equity deed of trust) Quality Loan Service Corporation in lawful money and was the highest bidder on October 15, 2021. Quality then filed a Trustee's Deed Upon Sale in Sacramento County land records, stating that Quality Loan as trustee under a deed of trust has now conveyed rights and title over to Chase under the orders of trustor Mary Alice Nelson-Rogers. Freed, in his motion stated that Quality was nominal and was only conducting ministerial duties on behalf of Chase, not Mary Alice Nelson-Rogers, and should be dismissed away. Freed also stated that Schools Financial Credit




Union was nominal as well as Schools had no financial interest. During this time, Freed failed to disclose that Chase was in a subordinate position to Schools, never provided an affidavit from any executive director of record in the Secretary of State verifying Freed's statements, and obviously repeatedly committed perjury and willfully misrepresented facts before Newman and Mendez. Quality Loan Service Corporation's Attorney Melissa Robbins Coutts of McCarthy & Holthus LLP followed suit, and colluded with Freed in making false statements.

As the Real Party in Interest, and having first-hand knowledge of the facts, I presented to the court judicial notice and Motion to strike defendants' motions showing Newman that these attorneys were fabricating lies, and bringing claims as witnesses not attorneys. I provided case law regarding *trinsey v. pagliaro* "An attorney for the plaintiff cannot admit evidence into the court. He is either an attorney or a witness". (Trinsey v. Pagliaro D.C.Pa. 1964, 229 F. Supp. 647).


Furthermore, provided was Supreme Court of the United States 1795 "Inasmuch as every government is an artificial person, an abstraction, and a creature of the mind only, a government can interface only with other artificial persons. The imaginary, having neither actuality nor substance, is foreclosed from creating and attaining parity with the tangible. The legal manifestation of this is that no government, as well as any law, agency, aspect, court, etc. can concern itself with anything other than corporate, artificial persons and the contracts between them." S.C.R. 1795, *Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators* (3 U.S. 54; 1 L.Ed. 57; 3 Dall. 54). Furthermore, I provided Public Law "PL 99-361, 1986 HR 237, July 9, 1986. "An act to amend the fair debt collection practices act to provide that any attorney who collect debts on behalf of a client shall be subject to the provisions of such act." I added this to my Judicial Notice and Motion to Strike due to the fact that Quality Loan, and McCarthy & Holthus LLP are owned and controlled by the same people and all documents submitted by Quality had Debt Collection disclosures stating that Quality Loan was a debt collector on the documents recorded in the Sacramento County Land Records.

From this point in proceedings, Petitioner points out two facts in the district court that caused extreme prejudice to Petitioner's action and appeal before Appellate Court. (1) That the




action in the heading was a complaint to quiet title ONLY and jurisdiction was satisfied; (2) That in my state action, I never expressly asked for any specific amount in monetary damages; (3) That Quality Loan Service Corporation was not nominal and not ministerial in their actions, as I never appointed them as trustee to execute any sale of property or land that was now owned by the Trust. Moreover, I stated Quality was in fact not nominal because Quality is not legally or lawfully Trustee and had no standing to foreclose and quoted California Civil Code 2924l et seq. CCC 2924l (a) which states: a) In the event that a trustee under a deed of trust is named in an action or proceeding in which that deed of trust is the subject, and in the event that the trustee maintains a reasonable belief that it has been named in the action or proceeding solely in its capacity as trustee, and not arising out of any wrongful acts or omissions on its part in the performance of its duties as trustee, then, at any time, the trustee may file a declaration of nonmonetary status. Attorney Coutts, never filed a declaration of nonmonetary status, and Attorney Freed or Coutts never contested these claims in the strike and remand; (4) In the appellate court, all of my judicial notices were ignored. I informed the court that while Freed was claiming diversity against my quiet title action, Attorney Coutts Quality Loans counsel, was filing a unlawful detainer complaint "ON BEHALF OF" "JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, and all other successors and/or assigns" in the superior court of California, Sacramento, with the claim in Paragraph 3 that "at all times Plaintiff has been lawfully doing business in California." I provided attachments showing the pleading Coutts filed proving what I have been trying to show Newman and Mendez that these attorneys were colluding together to willfully commit fraud upon the court to steal Trust land and dispossess me and my family from our land and their inheritance.

In asserting my claim Plaintiff will show that defendants have agreed to a civil conspiracy, and willful intent to aid and abet defendants' counsel to commit: fraud upon the court, paper terrorism, economic terrorism, attorney ethics violations, judicial ethics violations, title fraud, deed fraud, breach of trust and fiduciary duty and care, mortgage fraud, securities fraud, misprision of a felony, involuntary servitude and peonage, conspiracy against rights and deprivation of rights under color of law, actions that are not federally protected, by the defendants,



based upon my race, ethnic origin, true nationality as an Indian, my age and gender as an elderly woman to deprive me of the right to peaceably be secure on my land and in my property with the same freedom as is secured to Caucasian or European persons. Courts have explicitly found that an affirmative duty exists on the part of the judge is to be transparent, impartial, fair and balanced, to preserve law and order and to provide for the equal protection of all persons in the community. In American Jurisprudence, "As expressed otherwise, the powers delegated to a public officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officer. Furthermore, the view has been expressed that all public officers, within whatever branch and whatever level of government and whatever be their private vocations, are trustees of the people, and accordingly labor under every disability and prohibition imposed by the law on trustees relative to the making of personal financial gain from a discharge of their trusts. That is, a public officer occupies a fiduciary relationship to the political entity on whose behalf he or she serves, and owes a fiduciary duty to the public. It has been said that the fiduciary responsibilities of a public officer cannot be less than those of a private individual. Furthermore, it has been stated that any enterprise undertaken by the public official which tends to weaken the public confidence and undermine the sense of security for individual rights is against public policy." (63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees, 247). "Fraud in its common law sense of deceit – and this is one of the meanings that fraud bears in the statute, see United States vs. Dial, 757 F 2d, 163, 168 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985) – includes the concealment of material information in a setting of fiduciary obligation. A public official is a fiduciary toward the public, including, in the case of a judge, the litigants who appear before him, and if he deliberately conceals material information from them, he is guilty of fraud." McNally vs. United States, 483 U.S., 350 (1987). That a failure by Newman and Mendez to perform effectively this function would be a negligent omission of duty, denial of equal protection and therefore a violation of their judicial canons and concluded that "an unreasonable omission of this nature would be actionable under all above mentioned statutes. It is safe to say without a doubt or contradiction that Newman and Mendez has a personal and financial interest in my civil



action and by the inappropriate conduct done by Mendez and Newman, these acts, I believe is not their first rodeo.

The United States Constitution and the laws of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land; and judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. Civil rights laws attempt to guarantee full and equal citizenship for such persons and to protect them from arbitrary and capricious treatment. In determining which rights are fundamental or frivolous, judges are not left at large to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions. The inquiry is whether a right involved "is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions." *Powell v. State of Alabama*, 287 U.S. 45, 67, 53 S.Ct. 55, 63.

The right to have a fair trial and a trial by jury is fundamental and absolute; therefore Petitioner is entitled to relief sought. Any person within a state's jurisdiction is constitutionally entitled to be treated equitable and to be free from arbitrary and unreasonable treatment at the hands of ultra vires officers or officials, judges, and/or attorneys.

The Preferred Freedoms Doctrine holds that some constitutional rights are so fundamental to a free society that they deserve an especially high degree of judicial protection. In 1980, the Supreme Court in *Maine v. Thiboutot*, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), held that the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 remedy is not limited to federal constitutional rights and may also be used to vindicate federal statutory rights, and that the federal statutes enforceable under § 1983 are not limited to those guaranteeing equal or civil rights.

Writ Will Be In Aid of 9<sup>th</sup> Circuit Court's Appellate Jurisdiction

(1) The 9<sup>th</sup> Circuit Court of Appeals has thwarted the appeal simply to obstruct justice. The appeal filed has been dismissed, despite a timely filed opening brief. "In determining what is appropriate [to grant a writ] we look to those principles which



should guide judicial discretion in the use of an extraordinary remedy... [Where] action or omission on its [lower court's] part has thwarted or tends to thwart appellate review of the ruling; and [the] function of mandamus in aid of appellate jurisdiction is to remove obstacles to appeal", *Roche*, *supra*, 26, and its progeny *Mallard*, *supra*, 308.

(2) The 9<sup>th</sup> Circuit's Court of Appeal three panel judge's dismissal is unsupported by law and leaves Petitioner without recourse with lower courts. "[W]here a case is within the appellate jurisdiction of the higher court, a writ of mandamus may issue in aid of the appellate jurisdiction which might otherwise be defeated by the unauthorized action of the court below... In *Ex parte Bradstreet*, 7 Pet. 647, 8 L. ed. 815, the same rule was laid down by Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the court, requiring a Federal court of inferior jurisdiction to reinstate a case, and to proceed to try and adjudicate the same", *McClellan*, *supra*, 268. "That power protects the appellate jurisdiction which might be otherwise defeated and extends to support an ultimate power of review, though it not be immediately and directly involved." *United States v. US. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of NY.*, 334 U.S. 258, 263, (1948).

(3)-"The traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction both at common law and in federal courts has been to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so. *Ex parte Republic of Peru*, *supra*, 63 S.Ct. 797", *Roche*, 26.

(4)-Petitioner having exhausted all remedies before the lower court, and the petition for certiorari, this court's appellate jurisdiction will be lost forever.

#### REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. Adequate Relief Cannot Be Obtained In Any Other Forum or From Any Other Court
2. Mandamus appropriate where petitioner "lack adequate alternative means to obtain the relief they seek", *Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa* 490 U.S. 296, 309, (1989).



The Eastern District Court of California are covering up, and where attempts to obtain relief, *on merits*, have been exhausted and *proven to be unobtainable* in the lower courts, given the cover-up, conflict of interest, fraud on the court, corrupting of the judicial process, et al., there is no other forum, recourse, other than this court, to seek justice. Petitioner petitions for his day in court.

The Eastern District Court of California have *obstructed justice* by shutting Petitioner out, despite Petitioner, doing everything necessary to obtain justice *on the merits*. The Eastern District Court of California summarily dismissed the claims, *for no good cause, simply to avoid addressing them on its merits.*

When the inferior courts refuse to perform its required duty, the only remaining course of action is a writ.

"The writs thus afford an expeditious and effective means of confining the inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction, or of compelling it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so", *Ex parte Republic of Peru*, 318 U.S. 578, 583, (1943); same *Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn.*, 319 U.S. 21, 26, (1943).

Writ of mandamus was issued "where it was necessary to confine a lower court to the terms of an appellate tribunal's mandate, *US. v. US. Dist. Court*, 334 U.S. 258, (1948)"; *Will v. United States*, 389 U.S. 90, 95-96, (1967)

#### Exceptional Circumstances

(1) Reason in above, abuse and usurpation of judicial power, constitutes as exceptional circumstance, *Roche*, supra 27. Instances of "clear abuse of discretion," *Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland*, 346 U.S. 379, 383, (1953), or conduct amounting to "usurpation of [the judicial] power," *De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States*, 325 U.S. 212, 217, (1945), to be entitled to issuance of the writ", *Mallard v. US. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa*, 490 U.S. 296, 309, (1989).

(2) Lower courts' *refusal to perform its true adjudicator role & duty*, and instead, corrupt the judicial process, constitutes an exceptional circumstance. Here,



the action(s) of the Eastern District Court of California nullified its purpose and reasons for its existence. See *La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.*, 352 U.S. 249, 256-258, (1957), "refused to exercise its functions; cases were improperly referred to a master. The use of masters is 'to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties and not to displace the court. The exceptional circumstances here warrant the use of the extraordinary remedy of mandamus... Litigants are entitled to a trial by the court, in every suit, save where exceptional circumstances are shown"; Same, *McClellan v. Carland*, 217 U.S. 268, 279, (1989), where refusal by the district court to adjudicate issues properly presented to it.

(3) Petitioner's irreparable harm, constitutes an exceptional, emergency circumstance, especially when the lower courts have made it clear that they will not address the claim(s) on its merits.

(4) Where "circumstance[s] 'inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice' and 'present(s) exceptional circumstances'", a writ must issue, *Davis v. United States*, 417 U.S. 333, 346, (1974).

(5) Petitioner has *exhausted appeal remedy* and is "shut out" from that remedy by the 9th Circuit personnel, leaving with no other avenue for justice. "Exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial 'usurpation of power' will justify the invocation of this extraordinary writ remedy".

"Where a [lower court] judge displayed a persistent disregard of the Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by this Court, *La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.*, 352 U.S. 249, (1957)."

The Eastern District Court of California actions here constitute abdication of its constitutional judiciary duties. Writ of Mandamus is appropriate where "the lower Court's actions constituted an unwarranted impairment of judicial branch in the performance of its constitutional duties", *Cheney v. US. Dist. Court for D.C.*, 542 U.S. 367, 371, (2004).

Mandamus is both appropriate and warranted. Writs of mandamus are appropriate "for



promptly correcting serious errors" made in a "particularly injurious or novel privilege ruling."

*Mohawk Industry Inc. v. Carpenter*, 558 U.S. 100, 109-11 (2009).

The substantive legal issue involved in both *Marbury* and *Fletcher* was the protection of "vested rights." Once an interest has been vested in an individual, it is immune from government divestment. A state, local, or municipal statute "affecting and changing vested rights is generally considered in this country, as, founded on unconstitutional principles and consequently inoperative and void." Chancellor James Kent, *Commentaries on American Law* (1826).

#### CONCLUSION

The All Writs Act confers on the Courts of Appeals the discretionary power to issue writs of mandamus in the exceptional circumstances existing here." *La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.*, 352 U.S. 249, 259-60.

The Eastern District Court of California has abused its powers. Writ is "an established remedy to oblige inferior courts and magistrates to do that justice which they are in duty, and by virtue of their office, bound to do... One of its peculiar and more common uses is to restrain inferior courts and to keep them within their lawful bounds",

*Commonwealth of Virginia v. Rives*, 100 U.S. 313, 323-324, (1879)

Writ of mandamus, et al., should be granted.


Respectfully submitted,

Date: February 18, 2024

Mary Alice Nelson-Rogers  
Real Party/Grantor Trustee  
Re: Mary Alice Nelson Rogers Trust

By: *Mary Alice Nelson Rogers*, a.p.r. L.S.

Signature By Representative  
Third Party Intervenor; Injured Party  
Under Reservation of Rights



## STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES

### Superior Court of California, Sacramento County:

- *Nelson Rogers, Mary Alice, Real party of interest in personne physique Of MARY ALICE NELSON ROGERS, Mary Alice Nelson Rogers Family Trust, infant/minor estate, and all other derivatives, trustees associated in trust., vs. Washington Mutual Bank, F.A.; J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A., et al, No. 34-2021-00309810* --- Complaint to Quiet Title, Temporary Injunction; Notice of Removal to Federal Court on Diversity

### District Court of the United States for the Eastern District, Sacramento Division

- *Nelson Rogers, Mary Alice, Real party of interest in personne physique Of MARY ALICE NELSON ROGERS, Mary Alice Nelson Rogers Family Trust, infant/minor estate, and all other derivatives, trustees associated in trust., vs. Washington Mutual Bank, F.A.; J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A., et al, No. 2:21-cv-02151-JAM-KJN* --- Complaint to Quiet Title; Notice of Removal on Diversity by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Motion to Dismiss by All Defendants 12(b)(6), Motion to Remand by Plaintiff, Case Dismissed with prejudice.

### Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for the United States

- *Nelson Rogers, Mary Alice, Real party of interest in personne physique Of MARY ALICE NELSON ROGERS, Mary Alice Nelson Rogers Family Trust, infant/minor estate, and all other derivatives, trustees associated in trust., vs. Washington Mutual Bank, F.A.; J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A., et al, No. 22-15469* --- Complaint to Quiet Title; Notice of Removal on Diversity by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

### Superior Court of California, Sacramento County:

- *JPMorgan Chase Bank, N. A, et al. v. ROGERS, MARY ALICE NELSON*, No. 22UD00860 --- Unlawful Detainer, Judgment for Plaintiff, Writ of Possession and Eviction Granted, Writ Recalled and Reissued

### Superior Court of California, Sacramento County:

- *JPMorgan Chase Bank, N. A, successors and/or assignees. v. Mary Alice Nelson Rogers, Kim Edward Rogers, Paula Carrie Rogers, Harold Edward Rogers, Jr, Jayaton Kerry Thomas*, No. 23UD03814 --- Forcible Detainer, Trial by Judge, Judgment for Plaintiff, Writ of Possession and Eviction Granted

### District Court of the United States for the Eastern District, Sacramento Division

- *Mary A. Nelson-Rogers vs. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A., et al*, No. 2:22-cv-01954-TLN-CKD --- Tort to real property to and deprivation and violation of civil rights, Mortgage Fraud

### Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for the United States

- *Mary A. Nelson-Rogers vs. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A., et al*, No. 23-15768 on Appeal from 2:22-cv-01954-TLN-CKD