


No. 23-6607 ORIGINAL

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES



Harry William Lott

— PETITIONER

(Your Name)

vs.

Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services

— RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

(Ohio Supreme Court)

PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

(Harry William Lott)

(2680 Sealy Ridge Road)

(Vincent, Ohio 45784)

(740 440-5223)

(harrywl4@gmail.com)(harrywl5@hotmail.com)

1 QUESTION: Does the state of Ohio have the ability to stop access to the court by using the Vexatious Litigator OH, Rev, cod, § 2323.52 or does the First amendment protect the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances, which is found in the first Amendment?

2 QUESTION: Is the Ohio The law of Vexatious Litigation F(1) of § 2323.52 “overbreadth” and “vagueness ” in the application of the right to satisfy the right to move a case followed as a Vexatious Litigator?

3 QUESTION: Does the state of Ohio have the ability to dictate legal education that pertaining to out side the state of Ohio and discourages religious pilgrimage and doctrines of Scientology when engaging in the Ohio’s courts?

4 QUESTION: Does the regulation¹ must be a reasonable time pace, or manner restriction that leaves open adequate alternative place for speech?

5 QUESTION: Does the Petitioner have the right to a not to associate for fees and JD requirements under the Ohio Admission the Bar of Ohio over this issues?

6 QUESTION: Does these violations by the Ohio Supreme court justify a Havard bachelor degree, Yale law degree law degree and Ohio law license for the Petitioner?

¹ Vexatious Litigation F(1) of § 2323.52

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² Vexatious Litigation F(1) of § 2323.52

PARTIES

Ohio Department of Job and family Services—office of legal and acquisition services 30 E. Broad Street, 31st Floor Columbus, Ohio 43215-3414

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

First Amendment: Redress to petition the government, Establishment clause, and Prior restraint

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Ohio court will not let Harry William Lott's case move forward unless requirements of Vexatious Litigator OH, Rev, cod, § 2323.52 are met.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Does an Ohio have the absolute right to stop access to the court or does that right exist in the constitution, administrative right to a hearing or Scientology religious of doctrine Fair Game (Id). The petitioner believes that he may not have access to the court again if these injustice goes on!

JURISDICTION

The case originated administrative court, Ohio jobs and family services, Washington County of common Pleas, 4th Circuit Court of Appeal, and Ohio Supreme Court.

1 QUESTION: Does the state of Ohio have the ability to stop access to the court by using the Vexatious Litigator OH, Rev, cod, § 2323.52 or does the First amendment protect the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances, which is found in the first Amendment?

The Court held that "a government employer's allegedly retaliatory actions against an employee do not give rise to liability under the Petition Clause unless the employee's petition relates to a matter of public concern *Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri*, 564 U.S. 379, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 180 L. Ed. 2d 408 (2011). This hearing is a requirement under the 14th Amendment (OH Conts. Art 1 § 16) right to due process under the 14th Amendment, which is a hearing *Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970).

This administrative court is required to rule if this case does not go to a hearing. In addition to being required under the APA, a statement of finding and conclusions is necessary where a "trial type" hearing is required by due process *Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970).

The plaintiff pleaded with the party to examine his auditing requirements to not take the Ohio bar based on the First Amendment. Auditing is a requirement for Scientology, which gives the user the ability to examine and use past lives in the context to gain and manage their lives. The book of Dianetics is based on past live events which Thetan(s) attached to the user's timeline, which can give a user super human ability in the claims for the plaintiff (supra) . As well as, as reason for the ability not to take the bar or any part based on past and existing experiences, which falls under the establishment clause.

If the state of Ohio does not allow other members from others states which to practice Application to the law of non law degree states California³, Vermont⁴, Virginia⁵, Washington⁶, New York⁷, Maine⁸, and West Virginia⁹. Based on the requirement that these laws form this state, of Ohio, and these states are over “Over-breadth” under the First Amendment. These states do not require a law degree to be admitted to practices. The fact that Ohio requires a JD ABA Degree is in effect a “Chilling Effect” to the other states that require no law degrees at all. States that do not hold degrees falls under the requirements under Article 1 § 8 Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution for commercials, which is Commerce. After the circuit court issued a restraining order, the state issued a subpoena for various records, including the NAACP's membership lists. The Supreme Court ruled that Alabama's demand for the lists had violated the right of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).

Applying the law of NAACP v. Alabama¹⁰ standard, I don't have to tell you if I have gone to Harvard business school or Yale law school if I have or don't have the degrees from them. As well, I may have a law license in another state. I have the right not to disclose my

³ <https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Admissions/Requirements/Education>

⁴ <https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/attorneys/admission-vermont-bar>

⁵ <https://www.vsb.org/pro-guidelines/index.php/reciprocity/>

⁶ <https://www.wsba.org/for-legal-professionals/join-the-legal-profession-in-wa/lawyers/qualifications-to-take-the-bar-exam>

⁷ <https://www.nybarexam.org/Eligible/Eligibility.htm>

⁸ <https://mainebarexaminers.org/reciprocal-admission/qualifications/>

⁹ <http://www.courts.wv.gov/legal-community/rules-for-admission.html#rule2> ¹⁵ <https://www.courts.state.wy.us/supreme-court/bar-admission/>

¹⁰ 357 U.S. 449 (1958).

association to the Ohio Bar admission or to this court. After the circuit court issued a restraining order, the state issued a subpoena for various records, including the NAACP's membership lists. The Supreme Court ruled that Alabama's demand for the lists had violated the right of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama¹¹.

2 QUESTION: Is the Ohio The law of Vexatious Litigation F(1) of § 2323.52 “overbreadth” and “vagueness ” in the application of the right to satisfy the right to move a case followed as a Vexatious Litigator?

A court of common pleas that entered an order under division ... (D)(1) of this section to grant the person leave to proceed as described in division (F)(1) of this section, the period of time commencing with the filing with that court of an application for the issuance of an order granting leave to proceed and ending with the issuance of an order of that nature shall not be computed as a part of an applicable period of limitations within which the legal proceedings or application involved generally must be instituted or made.

In that has a remedy to cure the non-vexatious limitation but failed to give instruction to the cause; therefore it is has vagueness properties to it. In term of an “overbreadth” of the first amendment the law require more harmful action(s) than civil actions. It is more rideable to hurt someone than to solve issues than it is to go to court this fails the fundamental issue of why we have the court system. There should be a substance due process issues here under the 14th

¹¹ 357 U.S. 449 (1958).

amendment of the constitution. That it effects the public health and safety of the Community a large.

3 QUESTION: Does the regulation must be a reasonable time pace, or manner restriction that leaves open adequate alternative place for speech

Limited public forum. In these circumstances, the government's choice to limit speech to certain messages will be upheld if it is viewpoint neutral and reasonable given the forum's purpose. For example, the Court struck down a public elementary school's refusal to allow a religious group to use school property after hours for religious activities when the school had allowed nonreligious groups to use the same property for nonreligious activities. Religious group may not use school property after hours for religious activities, although nonreligious group may use the same property for nonreligious actives *Good News Club v. Milford Central School*, 533 U.S. 98, 121 S. Ct. 2093, 150 L. Ed. 2d 151 (2001). Was to be unconstitutional. In this case, religious right to a forum is deemed Constitutional because of the religious right to access and not religious right access the same public forum.

4 QUESTION: Does the state of Ohio have the ability to dictate legal education that pertaining to out side the state of Ohio and discourages religious pilgrimage and doctrines of Scientology when engaged in the Ohio's courts?

That restraint prevents an action to the court and civil justice; rather, it focus on punishing time sensitive cases. In the case of *Lovell v. City of Griffin*, the practitioner did not applied for a permit because she believed that she had been sent [by] "Jehovah to do His work" and she regarded the application as "act of disobedience to His commandment" the Court

conduced that the ordinance was invalidated on this face *Lovell v. City of Griffin*, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938).

Second, in *Lovell v. City of Griffin*¹² a religious right was being raised. What was that right? In *Lovell v. City of Griffin*¹³, the right was getting a license for her speech to permit. The right for this case was a license for plaintiff commercial speech. The belief that a religious right *Lovell* did not apply for a permit because she believed that she had been sent “Jehovah to do His work” and she regarded the application as “act of disobedience to His commandment”. “The purpose of the suit is to harass and discourage rather than win. The law can be used very easily to harass, and enough harassment on somebody who is simply on the thin edge anyway, well knowing that he is not authorized, will generally be sufficient to cause professional decease. If possible, of course, ruin him utterly.” L. Ron Hubbard, *The Scientologist, a Manual on the Dissemination of Material*, 1955.

The case of *Lovell v. City of Griffin*¹⁴ is tantamount to that of the Harry William Lott’s religious right to the use the court system and his ability to sue using the court room.

Does the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibit the imposition of a prior restraint on speech regardless of a citizen’s ability to pay a money judgment? Yes. The Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits the imposition of a prior restraint on speech regardless of a citizen’s ability to pay a money judgment. Article I § 7 states that “every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.” The framers of the Pennsylvania Constitution intended this provision to prohibit any prior restraints on the right to speak. This

¹²303 U.S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938)

¹³303 U.S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938)

¹⁴303 U.S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938)

right is crucial to the nature of a free state. However, citizens may be held accountable for abusing their free speech rights after the speech has occurred. A citizen's economic status does not affect this right. Conditioning the right of free speech upon the monetary worth of a citizen is inconsistent with fundamental principles of justice and violates the Pennsylvania Constitution's admonition that all men are born equally free and independent Willing v. Mazzocone, 393 A.2d 1155, 482 Pa. 377, 482 Pa. Cmwlth. 308 (1978). The case of Lovell v. City of Griffin¹⁵ is tantamount to the that of the Harry William Lott's religious right to the use the court system and his ability to sue using the court room.

5 QUESTION: Right to a not to associate for fees and JD requirements under the Ohio Admission the Bar of Ohio?

The right to a not associate with the Ohio Admission the Bar of Ohio ("Gov. Bar R. I") fees and JD law degree requirements fail under the freedom not associated under the Keller v. State Bar of Cal.,¹⁶ . Based on the information Notion that the bar is a non-governmental agency's use of compulsory dues to finance political and ideological activities that certain members do not agree with violates those members' free speech rights when the activities are not germane to the purpose for which compelled association was justified. These safe guards are: Transparency dues are spent; objection process; and impartial decision-maker to review objection. Both question: Where their objection process? And where their any impartial decision-maker to review objection? They're not hearing Harry Lott vs the Ohio bar admission office () at

¹⁵303 U.S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938)

¹⁶496 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 2228, 110 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990).

which is required in the at 14th amendment for due process by the states and in the case of Goldberg v. Kelly³.

In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209 (1977), the Court confronted the issue whether, consistent with the First Amendment, agency-shop dues of nonunion public employees could be used to support political and ideological causes of the union which were unrelated to collective-bargaining activities. We held that while the Constitution did not prohibit a union from spending "funds for the expression of political views . . . or toward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining representative," the Constitution did require that such expenditures be "financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees who [did] not object to advancing those ideas and who [were] not coerced into doing so against their will by the threat of loss of governmental employment." [Id., at 235-236]. The Court noted that just as prohibitions on making contributions to organizations for political purposes implicate fundamental First Amendment concerns, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), "compelled . . . contributions for political purposes works no less an infringement of . . . constitutional rights." Abood, *supra*, at 234. The Court acknowledged Thomas Jefferson's view that "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical." [431 U. S., at 234-235, n. 31] (quoting I. Brant, James Madison: The Nationalist 354 (1948)). While the decision in Abood was also predicated on the grounds that a public employee could not be compelled to relinquish First Amendment rights as a condition of public employment, see 431 U. S., at 234-236, in the later case of Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U. S. 435 (1984), the Court made

it clear that the principles of Abood apply equally to employees in the private sector. [See 466 U. S., at 455-457].

The Bar is more like an agency-shop dues for non union public employees in *Abood v. Detroit*⁴ which agency-shop dues of nonunion public employees could be used to support political and ideological causes of the union which were unrelated to collective-bargaining activities. We held that while the Constitution did not prohibit a union from spending "funds for the expression of political views . . . or toward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining representative,".

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
6 QUESTION: Does these violations by the Ohio Supreme court justify a Harvard bachelor degree, Yale law degree law degree and Ohio law license to the Plaintiff, Harry William Lott.

Conclusion

State of Ohio laws dealing with vexatious litigator are unconstitutional with the plaintiff's right to religious acts that are protected in state of Ohio has caused the plaintiff irreparable harm by not allowing him to experience his first amendment rights and well has the damages to the plaintiff's health. The plaintiff, is raising the prior restates of the of the law: Vexatious Litigation F(1) of § 2323.52

It is recommended that it be *Reversed*. A rewarded with an Ohio law license and a Harvard Bachelor degree in business administration and a Yale Juris doctor law degree. Based on the failure to give a hearing and equal protection under the 14th amendment under which governments the Bar of Ohio ("Gov. Bar R. I") for the state of Ohio violating the plaintiff's right under the First Amendment.

/S/ Harry William Lott



Harry William Lott Pro se

2680 Sealy Ridge Road

Vincent, Ohio 45784

(740) 440-5223