

No. \_\_\_\_\_

---

IN THE  
**Supreme Court of the United States**

---

**KHEUNGHAM VONGPHAKDY,**  
*Petitioner.*

v.

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,**  
*Respondent.*

---

**On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the  
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit**

---

**APPENDIX**

---

JOHN BAKER  
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

JARED P. MARTIN  
ASSISTANT FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER  
*Counsel of Record*

ANN L. HESTER  
ASSISTANT FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA  
129 W. Trade Street, Suite 300  
Charlotte, NC 28202  
704-374-0720  
[Jared\\_P\\_Martin@fd.org](mailto:Jared_P_Martin@fd.org)

## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

	<b><u>Page</u></b>
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, filed October 12, 2023.....	A1
Notice of Judgment and Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, filed October 12, 2023.....	A6
Judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, filed October 6, 2022.....	A9

**UNPUBLISHED**

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

---

**No. 22-4593**

---

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KHEUNGKHAM VONGPHAKDY,

Defendant - Appellant.

---

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Kenneth D. Bell, District Judge. (3:21-cr-00184-KDB-DSC-1)

---

Submitted: August 31, 2023

Decided: October 12, 2023

---

Before AGEE and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

---

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

---

**ON BRIEF:** John G. Baker, Federal Public Defender, Jared P. Martin, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Ann L. Hester, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States Attorney, Anthony J. Enright, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

---

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

A federal jury convicted Kheungkham Vongphakdy of unlawful procurement of naturalization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a). The district court sentenced Vongphakdy to four months' imprisonment. On appeal, Vongphakdy challenges the district court's decision to admit evidence that he alleges was obtained in violation of *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), as well as the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a prior guilty plea he entered in state court because he asserts that his counsel in the state court proceedings rendered ineffective assistance. We affirm.

Vongphakdy first argues that the district court reversibly erred by allowing the Government to introduce evidence obtained in violation of *Miranda* regarding his ability to respond to an English-language interrogation. “[T]he Fifth Amendment guarantees that ‘[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’” *United States v. Khweis*, 971 F.3d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V). “Recognizing that the pressure and isolation inherent in custodial interrogation could overcome the resilience of a suspect otherwise not inclined to incriminate himself, the Supreme Court in *Miranda* instituted measures to [e]nsure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination is protected.” *Id.* (cleaned up). “Thus, unless a defendant is advised of his Fifth Amendment rights pursuant to *Miranda* and voluntarily waives those rights, statements he makes during a custodial interrogation must be suppressed.” *United States v. Azua-Rinconada*, 914 F.3d 319, 325 (4th Cir. 2019).

We discern no error by the district court. “To qualify for the Fifth Amendment privilege, a communication must be testimonial, incriminating, and compelled.” *Hiibel v.*

*Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev.*, 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004). The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination thus only protects a defendant from being compelled to provide “testimonial” evidence, meaning that the communication “must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information.” *United States v. Oriakhi*, 57 F.3d 1290, 1299 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly distinguished between “the use of compulsion to extort communications from a defendant” and merely “compelling a person to engage in conduct that may be incriminating,” such as providing samples of one’s voice, handwriting, or physical appearance, all of which are constitutionally permissible. *United States v. Hubbell*, 530 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2000). We conclude that the language spoken by a person during otherwise privileged communications, while potentially incriminating, does not, by itself, “relate a factual assertion or disclose information” and that it is therefore not testimonial evidence subject to suppression under *Miranda*. See *Oriakhi*, 57 F.3d at 1299; see also *Pennsylvania v. Muniz*, 496 U.S. 582, 590-99 (1990) (noting that impaired defendant’s slurring of his speech in response to questions during interrogation was incriminating but not testimonial where the incriminating nature of that fact was not based on content of his answers).

In any event, admission of a defendant’s statement obtained in violation of *Miranda* does not mandate a new trial if “the admission of the statement at issue was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, such that it is clear that a rational fact finder would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” *United States v. Giddins*, 858 F.3d 870, 885 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the *Miranda* context, factors relevant to

harmlessness include: “(1) the importance of the statement to the government’s case; (2) the impact on credibility of other evidence; and (3) the admission of prejudicial evidence based solely on the admission of the statement.” *Id.* at 886 (citing *Arizona v. Fulminante*, 499 U.S. 279, 297-300 (1991)). Even assuming that a *Miranda* violation occurred, we conclude that the Government has met its burden to establish “that the admission of the [statement] did not contribute to [Vongphakdy’s] conviction.” *Fulminante*, 499 U.S. at 296.

Turning to Vongphakdy’s remaining claim, when considering a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. *United States v. Pulley*, 987 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2021). Guilty pleas are ordinarily “presumed to be valid,” as they are “protected by a strong presumption . . . of regularity.” *United States v. Locke*, 932 F.3d 196, 199 (4th Cir. 2019). Further, “a trial for a subsequent offense” is ordinarily “not the appropriate forum to assess the validity of [a] prior conviction.” *United States v. Anglin*, 284 F.3d 407, 410 (2d Cir. 2002). While Vongphakdy contends that he should have been permitted to challenge the admission of his state court guilty plea because his state counsel allegedly provided constitutionally ineffective assistance under the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Padilla v. Kentucky*, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), we conclude that Vongphakdy’s claim was not cognizable in his federal prosecution, *cf. Custis v. United States*, 511 U.S. 485, 494, 496-97 (1994); *see also* *Mondragon v. Holder*, 706 F.3d 535, 543-44 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding *Custis* barred

challenge to prior conviction based on claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings).\*

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*

---

\* We “may affirm on any grounds apparent from the record,” notwithstanding the reasoning of the district court. *United States v. Riley*, 856 F.3d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).

FILED: October 12, 2023

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUITNo. 22-4593, US v. Kheungkham Vongphakdy  
3:21-cr-00184-KDB-DSC-1

## NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Judgment was entered on this date in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 36. Please be advised of the following time periods:

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI:** The time to file a petition for writ of certiorari runs from the date of entry of the judgment sought to be reviewed, and not from the date of issuance of the mandate. If a petition for rehearing is timely filed in the court of appeals, the time to file the petition for writ of certiorari for all parties runs from the date of the denial of the petition for rehearing or, if the petition for rehearing is granted, the subsequent entry of judgment. See Rule 13 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States; [www.supremecourt.gov](http://www.supremecourt.gov).

**VOUCHERS FOR PAYMENT OF APPOINTED OR ASSIGNED COUNSEL:** Vouchers must be submitted within 60 days of entry of judgment or denial of rehearing, whichever is later. If counsel files a petition for certiorari, the 60-day period runs from filing the certiorari petition. (Loc. R. 46(d)). If payment is being made from CJA funds, counsel should submit the CJA 20 or CJA 30 Voucher through the CJA eVoucher system. In cases not covered by the Criminal Justice Act, counsel should submit the Assigned Counsel Voucher to the clerk's office for payment from the Attorney Admission Fund. An Assigned Counsel Voucher will be sent to counsel shortly after entry of judgment. Forms and instructions are also available on the court's web site, [www.ca4.uscourts.gov](http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov), or from the clerk's office.

**BILL OF COSTS:** A party to whom costs are allowable, who desires taxation of costs, shall file a Bill of Costs within 14 calendar days of entry of judgment. (FRAP 39, Loc. R. 39(b)).

**PETITION FOR REHEARING AND PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC:**

A petition for rehearing must be filed within 14 calendar days after entry of judgment, except that in civil cases in which the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the petition must be filed within 45 days after entry of judgment. A petition for rehearing en banc must be filed within the same time limits and in the same document as the petition for rehearing and must be clearly identified in the title. The only grounds for an extension of time to file a petition for rehearing are the death or serious illness of counsel or a family member (or of a party or family member in pro se cases) or an extraordinary circumstance wholly beyond the control of counsel or a party proceeding without counsel.

Each case number to which the petition applies must be listed on the petition and included in the docket entry to identify the cases to which the petition applies. A timely filed petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc stays the mandate and tolls the running of time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari. In consolidated criminal appeals, the filing of a petition for rehearing does not stay the mandate as to co-defendants not joining in the petition for rehearing. In consolidated civil appeals arising from the same civil action, the court's mandate will issue at the same time in all appeals.

A petition for rehearing must contain an introduction stating that, in counsel's judgment, one or more of the following situations exist: (1) a material factual or legal matter was overlooked; (2) a change in the law occurred after submission of the case and was overlooked; (3) the opinion conflicts with a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, this court, or another court of appeals, and the conflict was not addressed; or (4) the case involves one or more questions of exceptional importance. A petition for rehearing, with or without a petition for rehearing en banc, may not exceed 3900 words if prepared by computer and may not exceed 15 pages if handwritten or prepared on a typewriter. Copies are not required unless requested by the court. (FRAP 35 & 40, Loc. R. 40(c)).

**MANDATE:** In original proceedings before this court, there is no mandate. Unless the court shortens or extends the time, in all other cases, the mandate issues 7 days after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for rehearing. A timely petition for rehearing, petition for rehearing en banc, or motion to stay the mandate will stay issuance of the mandate. If the petition or motion is denied, the mandate will issue 7 days later. A motion to stay the mandate will ordinarily be denied, unless the motion presents a substantial question or otherwise sets forth good or probable cause for a stay. (FRAP 41, Loc. R. 41).

FILED: October 12, 2023

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

---

No. 22-4593  
(3:21-cr-00184-KDB-DSC-1)

---

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

KHEUNGKHAM VONGPHAKDY

Defendant - Appellant

---

JUDGMENT

---

In accordance with the decision of this court, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of this court's mandate in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 41.

/s/ NWAMAKA ANOWI, CLERK

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
**Western District of North Carolina**

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

**V.**

**KHEUNGKHAM VONGPHAKDY**

) **JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE**  
 ) (For Offenses Committed On or After November 1, 1987)  
 )  
 )  
 ) Case Number: DNCW321CR000184-001  
 ) USM Number: 56545-509  
 )  
 ) Taylor Goodnight  
 ) Defendant's Attorney

**THE DEFENDANT:**

- Pleaded guilty to count(s).
- Pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) which was accepted by the court.
- Was found guilty on count(s) 1 after a plea of not guilty.

**ACCORDINGLY**, the court has adjudicated that the defendant is guilty of the following offense(s):

Title and Section	Nature of Offense	Date Offense Concluded	Counts
18 U.S.C. § 1425(a)	Procurement of Citizenship or Naturalization Unlawfully	08/03/2011	1

The Defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 6 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

- The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s).
- Count(s) (is)(are) dismissed on the motion of the United States.

**IT IS ORDERED** that the Defendant shall notify the United States Attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay monetary penalties, the defendant shall notify the court and United States attorney of any material change in the defendant's economic circumstances.

Date of Imposition of Sentence: 10/6/2022

  
 Kenneth D. Bell  
 United States District Judge 

Date: October 6, 2022

Defendant: Kheungkham Vongphakdy  
Case Number: DNCW321CR000184-001

Judgment- Page **2** of **6**

### **IMPRISONMENT**

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of **FOUR (4) MONTHS TO RUN CONCURRENT TO EXISTING STATE SENTENCE.**

- The Court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:
- The Defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.
- The Defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this District:
  - As notified by the United States Marshal.
  - At \_ on \_.
- The Defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:
  - As notified by the United States Marshal.
  - Before 2 p.m. on \_.
  - As notified by the Probation Office.

### **RETURN**

I have executed this Judgment as follows:

---

---

Defendant delivered on \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_, with a certified copy of this Judgment.

---

United States Marshal

By: \_\_\_\_\_  
Deputy Marshal

Defendant: Kheungkham Vongphakdy  
 Case Number: DNCW321CR000184-001

Judgment- Page 3 of 6

## SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on supervised release for a term of ONE (1) YEAR.

The condition for mandatory drug testing is suspended based on the court's determination that the defendant poses a low risk of future substance abuse.

## CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

The defendant shall comply with the mandatory conditions that have been adopted by this court.

1. The defendant shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime.
2. The defendant shall not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.
3. The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the Court (unless omitted by the Court).
4. The defendant shall cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer (unless omitted by the Court).

The defendant shall comply with the discretionary conditions that have been adopted by this court and any additional conditions ordered.

5. The defendant shall report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where he/she is authorized to reside within 72 hours of release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs the defendant to report to a different probation office or within a different time frame.
6. The defendant shall report to the probation officer in a manner and frequency as directed by the Court or probation officer.
7. The defendant shall not leave the federal judicial district where he/she is authorized to reside without first getting permission from the Court or probation officer.
8. The defendant shall answer truthfully the questions asked by the probation officer. However, defendant may refuse to answer a question if the truthful answer would tend to incriminate him/her of a crime. Refusal to answer a question on that ground will not be considered a violation of supervised release.
9. The defendant shall live at a place approved by the probation officer. The probation officer shall be notified in advance of any change in living arrangements (such as location and the people with whom the defendant lives). If advance notification is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, the defendant shall notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
10. The defendant shall allow the probation officer to visit him/her at any time at his/her home or any other reasonable location as determined by the probation office, and shall permit the probation officer to take any items prohibited by the conditions of his/her supervision that the probation officer observes.
11. The defendant shall work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at lawful employment, actively seek such gainful employment or be enrolled in a full time educational or vocational program unless excused by the probation officer. The defendant shall notify the probation officer within 72 hours of any change regarding employment or education.
12. The defendant shall not communicate or interact with any persons he/she knows is engaged in criminal activity, and shall not communicate or interact with any person he/she knows to be convicted of a felony unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer.
13. The defendant shall notify the probation officer within 72 hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer.
14. The defendant shall not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as nunchakus or tasers).
15. The defendant shall not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential informant without first getting the permission of the Court.
16. The defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not unlawfully purchase, possess, use, distribute or administer any narcotic or controlled substance or any psychoactive substances (including, but not limited to, synthetic marijuana, bath salts) that impair a person's physical or mental functioning, whether or not intended for human consumption, or any paraphernalia related to such substances, except as duly prescribed by a licensed medical practitioner.
17. The defendant shall participate in a program of testing for substance abuse. The defendant shall refrain from obstructing or attempting to obstruct or tamper, in any fashion, with the efficiency and accuracy of the testing. The defendant shall participate in a substance abuse treatment program and follow the rules and regulations of that program. The probation officer will supervise the defendant's participation in the program (including, but not limited to, provider, location, modality, duration, intensity) (unless omitted by the Court).
18. The defendant shall not go to, or remain at any place where he/she knows controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered without first obtaining the permission of the probation officer.
19. The defendant shall submit to a search if the Probation Officer has a reasonable suspicion that the defendant has committed a crime or a violation of a condition of supervised release. Such a search may be conducted by a U.S. Probation Officer, and such other law enforcement personnel as the probation officer may deem advisable, without a warrant or the consent of the defendant. Such search may be of any place where evidence of the above may reasonably be expected to be found, including defendant's person, property, house, residence, vehicle, communications or data storage devices or media or office.
20. The defendant shall pay any financial obligation imposed by this judgment remaining unpaid as of the commencement of the sentence of probation or the term of supervised release in accordance with the schedule of payments of this judgment. The defendant shall notify the court of any changes in economic circumstances that might affect the ability to pay this financial obligation.
21. The defendant shall support all dependents including any dependent child, or any person the defendant has been court ordered to support.
22. The defendant shall participate in transitional support services (including cognitive behavioral treatment programs) and follow the rules and regulations of such program. The probation officer will supervise the defendant's participation in the program (including, but not limited to, provider, location, modality, duration, intensity). Such programs may include group sessions led by a counselor or participation in a program administered by the probation officer.
23. The defendant shall follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

Defendant: Kheungkham Vongphakdy  
Case Number: DNCW321CR000184-001

Judgment- Page **4** of **6**

### **CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES**

The defendant shall pay the following total criminal monetary penalties in accordance with the Schedule of Payments.

<b>ASSESSMENT</b>	<b>RESTITUTION</b>	<b>FINE</b>
\$100.00	\$0.00	\$0.00

The determination of restitution is deferred until. Upon such a determination an *Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case* (AO 245C) will be entered. Failing such a determination by, restitution amount becomes \$0.00 without further Order of the Court.

### **INTEREST**

The defendant shall pay interest on any fine or restitution of more than \$2,500.00, unless the fine or restitution is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the date of judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on the Schedule of Payments may be subject to penalties for default and delinquency pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

■ The court has determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:

- The interest requirement is waived.
- The interest requirement is modified as follows:

### **COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL FEES**

The defendant shall pay court appointed counsel fees.

Defendant: Kheungkham Vongphakdy  
Case Number: DNCW321CR000184-001

Judgment- Page 5 of 6

## SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties shall be due as follows:

A  Lump sum payment of \$0.00 due immediately, balance due  
 Not later than \_\_\_\_\_  
 In accordance  (C),  (D) below; or

B  Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with  (D) below); or

C  Payment in equal monthly installments of **\$50.00** to commence **60 days** after the date of this judgment; or

D  In the event the entire amount of criminal monetary penalties imposed is not paid prior to the commencement of supervision, payments shall be made in equal monthly installments of **\$50.00** to commence **60 days** after release from imprisonment to a term of supervision. The U.S. Probation Officer shall pursue collection of the amount due, and may request to modify a payment schedule if appropriate 18 U.S.C. § 3572.

Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:

The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.  
 The defendant shall pay the following court costs:  
 The defendant shall forfeit the defendant's interest in the following property to the United States

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise in the special instructions above, if this judgment imposes a period of imprisonment payment of criminal monetary penalties shall be due during the period of imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalty payments are to be made to the United States District Court Clerk, 401 West Trade Street, Room 1301, Charlotte, NC 28202, except those payments made through the Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. All criminal monetary penalty payments are to be made as directed by the court.

**The Defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.**

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) AVAA assessment, (5) fine principal, (6) fine interest, (7) community restitution, (8) JVTA assessment, (9) penalties, and (10) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.

Defendant: Kheungkham Vongphakdy  
Case Number: DNCW321CR000184-001

Judgment- Page **6** of **6**

**STATEMENT OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT**

I understand that my term of supervision is for a period of \_\_\_\_\_ months, commencing on \_\_\_\_\_.

Upon a finding of a violation of probation or supervised release, I understand that the court may (1) revoke supervision, (2) extend the term of supervision, and/or (3) modify the conditions of supervision.

I understand that revocation of probation and supervised release is mandatory for possession of a controlled substance, possession of a firearm and/or refusal to comply with drug testing.

These conditions have been read to me. I fully understand the conditions and have been provided a copy of them.

(Signed) \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
Defendant

(Signed) \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
U.S. Probation Office/Designated Witness

The Court gives notice that this case may involve other defendants who may be held jointly and severally liable for payment of all or part of the restitution ordered herein and may order such payment in the future.