

In the Supreme Court of the United States

NO. _____

Ernest Bustos,
Petitioner

v.

ENCINO PARK HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION AND SPECTRM
ASSOCIATION MANAGEMENT LP
Respondent

APPENDEX

In the Supreme Court of the United States

NO _____

Ernest Bustos,
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v.

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ASSOCIATION MANAGEMENT LP
Respondent

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APPENDIX A

Court of Appeals Texas San Antonio Opinion 04-21-00009-CV



**Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas**

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-21-00009-CV

**Ernest BUSTOS,
Appellant**

v.

**ENCINO PARK HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
and Spectrum Association Management LP,
Appellees**

From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2018-CI-18828
Honorable Larry Noll, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Irene Rios, Justice
Beth Watkins, Justice

Delivered and Filed: September 28, 2022

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION

In this dispute between a homeowner and his HOA, the HOA sued the homeowner, and the homeowner counterclaimed against the HOA and a management company. The trial court granted summary judgment for the HOA and management company. The homeowner appealed, but his notice of appeal was late, and he did not take any available steps to make it timely.

We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

A. Suit, Partial Summary Judgment, First Appeal

In 2019, the Encino Park Homeowners Association (HOA) sued Ernest Bustos, a homeowner, for breach of restrictive covenants. The HOA sought to recover allegedly unpaid assessments, late fees, interest, and costs associated with collection, including attorney's fees. *See Bustos v. Encino Park Homeowners Ass'n*, No. 04-19-00311-CV, 2020 WL 3441436, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 24, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Bustos, representing himself, answered and counterclaimed against the HOA and Spectrum Association Management LP. *Id.*

The trial court granted summary judgment for the HOA and Spectrum, and Bustos appealed. *Id.* Because Bustos's counterclaims were still live, we dismissed that appeal. *Id.* at *2.

B. Remand, Final Summary Judgment

On remand, the HOA and Spectrum (Appellees) moved for summary judgment on no-evidence grounds against Bustos's counterclaims. The trial court held a hearing on Appellees' motion on October 23, 2020. Bustos appeared pro se. After both sides presented their arguments, the trial court stated it was "going to grant the no evidence motion for summary judgment."

On November 11, 2020, Appellees' counsel e-mailed a proposed order to the trial court's representative, and Appellees copied Bustos on the e-mail. The order states it "finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable." The trial court signed the order on November 12, 2020, and Bustos did not timely file any postjudgment motions.

C. Late Notice of Appeal

Bustos, acting pro se, filed his notice of appeal on January 11, 2021. His notice states he "was not noticed of the order until on December 15th 2020." He asked "this court to use its discretion to grant this appeal."

After the appellate record was filed, Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. They argued that Bustos's notice of appeal was untimely, and we should reject his late-notice argument raised in his notice of appeal.

Bustos responded to Appellees' motion with arguments about the merits of his appeal and the statement that "this Court has discretion to [accept] an Appeal under the circumstances which were outlined in the Notice of Appeal."

D. Show Cause Order, Response

On August 22, 2022, we advised Bustos that his notice of appeal appears to be untimely, and we ordered him to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Bustos timely filed a response. In it, he states that he was incapacitated by COVID-19 from December 16, 2020, until January 9, 2021, and he asks this court to allow his appeal to proceed because "dismissal of the appeal would cause [him] harm and would be unjust."

We begin by reviewing the procedure to seek additional time to appeal if a party does not receive the required notice.

SEEKING ADDITIONAL TIME TO APPEAL

When a party does not receive notice of the trial court's judgment in a civil case, the party may seek additional time to file a postjudgment motion:

If a party affected by a judgment or other appealable order has not—within 20 days after the judgment or order was signed—either received the notice required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a.3 or acquired actual knowledge of the signing, then a period that, under these rules, runs from the signing will begin for that party on the earlier of the date when the party receives notice or acquires actual knowledge of the signing. But in no event may the period begin more than 90 days after the judgment or order was signed.

TEX. R. APP. P. 4.2; *cf. John v. Marshall Health Servs., Inc.*, 58 S.W.3d 738, 740 (Tex. 2001) (quoting Rule 306a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure).

“The procedure to gain additional time is governed by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a.5.” TEX. R. APP. P. 4.2(b); *accord Olvera v. Olvera*, 705 S.W.2d 283, 284 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (op. on reh’g) (per curiam). Rule 306a.5 reads as follows:

In order to establish the application of paragraph (4) of this rule, the party adversely affected is required to prove in the trial court, on sworn motion and notice, the date on which the party or his attorney first either received a notice of the judgment or acquired actual knowledge of the signing and that this date was more than twenty days after the judgment was signed.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a.5; *accord Olvera*, 705 S.W.2d at 284; *see also Grondona v. Sutton*, 991 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied).

The party seeking additional time must file the sworn motion before the trial court’s plenary power expires—based on the date of the notice or actual knowledge of the signing, whichever was later. *See* TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a.4; *John*, 58 S.W.3d at 741; *Grondona*, 991 S.W.2d at 92. If a party fails to comply with Rule 306a.5’s requirements, the party “cannot avail himself of the provisions extending the time for perfecting the appeal.” *Olvera*, 705 S.W.2d at 284.

RULE 306A NOT INVOKED

Here, Bustos did not seek additional time to appeal under Rule 306a. On October 23, 2020, in open court with Bustos present, the trial court announced that it was “going to grant the [Appellees’] no evidence motion for summary judgment.” Bustos acknowledges that he received an e-mail from Appellees’ counsel on November 11, 2020, which included the unsigned draft order. But Bustos asserts he did not receive notice of the signed order until December 15, 2020.

Bustos does not assert, and the record does not show, that he made any effort to inquire about the trial court’s order from November 11, 2020—when he received a copy of the draft order—until December 15, 2020, when he received a copy of the signed order.

Notably, he received the signed copy one day *after* the notice of appeal was due—on December 14, 2020—which was fourteen days *before* a motion for extension of time to file a

notice of appeal was due—on December 29, 2020. *See* TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3; *Verburgt v. Dorner*, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997). Bustos admits he did not read the order to see when it was signed until January 9, 2021; he filed his notice of appeal two days later.

Under Rule 306a, Bustos could have timely filed a Rule 306a.5 motion until January 14, 2021, thirty days after his claimed date of notice, and three days after he filed his notice of appeal. *See* TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a.5; *Olvera*, 705 S.W.2d at 284. But Bustos did not file a Rule 306a.5 sworn motion, request or receive a hearing on the motion, or obtain “a written order that finds the date when the party or the party’s attorney first either received notice or acquired actual knowledge that the judgment or order was signed.” *See* TEX. R. APP. P. 4.2(c); TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a.5; *Green v. Guidry*, 34 S.W.3d 669, 670–71 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, no pet.); *Olvera*, 705 S.W.2d at 284.

Because he did not, and because no other postjudgment motions were filed, the trial court’s plenary power expired—and Bustos’s notice of appeal was due—on December 14, 2020. *See* TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1; TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d) (plenary power for thirty days); *Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith S. Equip., Inc.*, 10 S.W.3d 308, 310 (Tex. 2000). Belatedly, Bustos filed his notice of appeal on January 11, 2021. It was untimely. *See* TEX. R. APP. P. 4.2; *John*, 58 S.W.3d at 741; *Green*, 34 S.W.3d at 671.

Nevertheless, construing it liberally, we conclude that Bustos asked us to extend the deadline to file his notice of appeal under the Supreme Court of Texas’s emergency orders.

EMERGENCY ORDER AUTHORITY

In his notice of appeal, Bustos acknowledged that he received notice of the trial court’s signed order on December 15, 2020. His notice of appeal states that “[b]ecause of illness,” which illness he did not specify, he did not start drafting his notice of appeal until January 9, 2021. His notice of appeal also “asks this court to use its discretion to grant this appeal.”

Bustos's notice of appeal did not state that he was suffering from COVID-19, refer to any Emergency Order, or ask for an extension based on COVID-19. *Cf. Neurological Assocs. of San Antonio, P.A. v. Torres*, No. 04-21-00120-CV, 2022 WL 1559101, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 18, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).

However, in his response to our August 22, 2022 show cause order, Bustos asserted that he was incapacitated by COVID-19 from December 16, 2020, until January 9, 2021, and thus he was prevented from timely filing his notice of appeal. Considering Bustos's statements together, and construing them liberally, we read them as Bustos's request for this court to use its authority under Emergency Order 29 to extend the deadline for filing his notice of appeal. *See Twenty-Ninth Emergency Order Regarding COVID-19 State of Disaster*, 629 S.W.3d 863 (Tex. 2020) (dated November 11, 2020).

Under then-effective Emergency Order 29, we have discretion to extend certain deadlines, but the facts here do not warrant our doing so. *See N. Cent. Baptist Hosp. v. Chavez*, No. 04-20-00590-CV, 2021 WL 983351, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 17, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Specifically, Bustos learned of the signed judgment on December 15, 2020.

On that date, which was before he became ill, he could have filed a notice of appeal, and we would have implied a motion for extension of time. *See Verburgt*, 959 S.W.2d at 617.

On that date, he could have timely filed a motion for extension of time to file his notice of appeal, but he did not. *See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3; cf. Chavez*, 2021 WL 983351, at *2.

And until January 14, 2021—thirty days after his claimed date of notice—he also could have timely filed a Rule 306a.5 motion, but he did not. *See TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a.5; Green*, 34 S.W.3d at 670; *Grondona*, 991 S.W.2d at 92.

Bustos did not exercise any available option to make his January 11, 2020 notice of appeal timely, and we decline to exercise our discretion to do so now. *See Chavez*, 2021 WL 983351, at

*2; *Porch v. Daimler Trucks N. Am., LLC*, No. 03-20-00445-CV, 2020 WL 7063575, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 3, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

CONCLUSION

The record conclusively establishes that Bustos's notice of appeal was late, but as we explained above, it did not have to be. Because Bustos failed to use any of the means available to him to make his notice of appeal timely, we will not now exercise our discretion to do so. We grant Appellees' motion, and we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

APPENDIX B

Court of Appeals Texas San Antonio Opinion 04-19-00311-CV



**Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas**

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-19-00311-CV

Ernest BUSTOS,
Appellant

v.

ENCINO PARK HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
Appellee

From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2018-CI-18828
Honorable Laura Salinas, Judge Presiding¹

Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: June 24, 2020

DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

Appellant Ernest Bustos (“Bustos”) appeals the trial court’s order conditionally granting his motion for new trial and subsequent order denying as moot his motion to vacate the prior order. Because there is no final, appealable judgment in this case and no statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal from these orders, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

¹ The Honorable Laura Salinas signed the first order conditionally granting appellant’s motion for new trial. The Honorable Angelica Jimenez signed the second order denying as moot appellant’s motion to vacate the prior order.

Background

Bustos owns real property in the Encino Park neighborhood in San Antonio. Appellee Encino Park Homeowners Association (“the HOA”) initiated this suit against Bustos, alleging breach and anticipatory breach of restrictive covenants authorizing the HOA to levy assessments against Bustos’s real property and seeking judicial foreclosure to recover allegedly unpaid assessments, late fees, interest, and costs associated with collection, including attorney’s fees. Bustos, representing himself pro se, answered the HOA’s suit and asserted counterclaims and third-party claims against the HOA and Spectrum Association Management, LP (“Spectrum”) for alleged violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and the federal mail fraud statute.

The HOA moved for traditional summary judgment on its claims. After Bustos did not respond to the motion for summary judgment or appear at the hearing, the trial court entered a default final judgment dated February 12, 2019. The default final judgment granted summary judgment in favor of the HOA on all of its claims against Bustos, denied “all other relief not expressly granted herein,” and “ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that this order disposes of all claims and parties and therefore is, in all things, FINAL and APPEALABLE” (emphases in original).

On February 27, 2019, Bustos filed a motion to vacate the summary judgment and for new trial, alleging he “did not receive notice of the hearing for summary [j]udgment.” On April 2, 2019, the HOA and Spectrum jointly filed a motion for no-evidence summary judgment on Bustos’s claims.

On April 11, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on Bustos’s motion for new trial, at which counsel for the HOA demonstrated it served notice of the motion for summary judgment on Bustos at his home address via certified mail, but the pleading was returned as undelivered. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court signed an order granting the motion for new trial “in part, conditioned upon [Bustos] first paying [the HOA] the sum of \$2,500.00 for reimbursement of [the HOA’s] reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs within ten (10) days from the date of this order.”

On April 18, 2019, Bustos filed an “Amended Motion for Judicial Review of [*sic*] Pursuant to Section 51.903 of the Texas Government Code and Motion to Vacate the Court’s April 11, 2019 Order.” On May 13, 2019, the trial court heard Bustos’s motions and the HOA’s and Spectrum’s joint motion for no-evidence summary judgment. At the hearing, Bustos admitted under oath that he did not make the attorney’s fees payment upon which the April 11 order was conditioned. In response, counsel for the HOA and Spectrum argued the default final judgment remained in effect and, because more than thirty days had elapsed since it was signed, the trial court lacked plenary power to consider Bustos’s motions. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court signed an order denying all three pending motions as “moot, because the court no longer has plenary jurisdiction.”

Bustos filed a motion to vacate the May 13 order and another motion for new trial. Following a hearing, the trial court denied both motions in an order dated June 4, 2019. The June 4 order found Bustos failed to make the attorney’s fees payment ordered on April 11, 2019 and held: “[T]he original Final Summary Judgment entered on February 12, 2019 is in effect.” Bustos filed a notice of appeal from the April 11 and May 13 orders.

Discussion

Although Bustos’s pro se appellate brief does not identify any issues on appeal, the prayer of the brief asks this court to: (1) vacate the April 11 order to pay the HOA’s attorney’s fees; (2) “[f]ind the cause of action meritless and feverous [*sic*] in violation of Sec. 9.001(3)(A) and Sec. 9.012”; (3) hold the trial court “abused its discretion by awarding inequitable and unjust

attorney[’s] fees” in the April 11 order; (4) hold the trial court “abused its discretion by dismissing [Bustos’s] Motions” in the May 13 order; and (5) hold the HOA’s and Spectrum’s trial counsel violated Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 1.04. In response, the HOA argues: (1) the trial court did not err in conditioning the April 11 order upon payment of attorney’s fees and denying Bustos’s subsequent motions after he failed to make payment; and (2) this court should deny Bustos’s request to find trial counsel violated Rule 1.04. Spectrum did not file an appellate brief and is not a named party to this appeal.

Although the parties do not raise the issue, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. *See M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape*, 139 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2004) (“Neither party argues to this Court that the summary judgment was not a final, appealable order. Nevertheless, we are obligated to review *sua sponte* issues affecting jurisdiction.”). Generally, unless authorized by statute, appeal may be taken only from a final judgment. *Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.*, 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). “A judgment is final for purposes of appeal if it disposes of all pending parties and claims in the record, except as necessary to carry out the decree.” *Id.* “Because the law does not require that a final judgment be in any particular form, whether a judicial decree is a final judgment must be determined from its language and the record in the case.” *Id.*

Here, the default final judgment contains a Mother Hubbard clause stating: “It is . . . ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that this order disposes of all claims and parties and therefore is, in all things, FINAL and APPEALABLE” (emphases in original). Although this language indicates the trial court intended to render a final, appealable judgment, the face of the record clearly demonstrates the default judgment did not dispose of all claims and parties. The default judgment neither addressed nor disposed of Bustos’s counterclaims and third-party claims against the HOA and Spectrum. Indeed, the HOA and Spectrum did not move for no-evidence summary judgment on those claims until after the trial court signed the default final judgment, and

the trial court denied the motion for no-evidence summary judgment as moot. Because Bustos's claims remain unresolved, there is no final, appealable judgment in this case, and no statute authorizes interlocutory appeal from the April 11 and May 13 orders. Accordingly, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. *See id.*

Conclusion

In light of the record and for the reasons stated above, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

APPENDIX C

Court of Appeals Texas San Antonio 04-21-00009 Order denying rehearing



**Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas**

October 17, 2022

No. 04-21-00009-CV

**Ernest BUSTOS,
Appellant**

v.

**ENCINO PARK HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
and Spectrum Association Management LP,
Appellees**

From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2018-CI-18828
Honorable Larry Noll, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
 Irene Rios, Justice
 Beth Watkins, Justice

The panel has considered Appellant's motion for rehearing; the motion is denied. *See* TEX. R. APP. P. 49.3.

Patricia O. Alvarez
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 17th day of October, 2022.

A circular seal for the Fourth Court of Appeals, State of Texas. It features a five-pointed star in the center, surrounded by the words "FOURTH COURT OF APPEAL" at the top and "STATE OF TEXAS" at the bottom, with small stars separating the text.

Michael A. Cruz
Michael A. Cruz,
Clerk of Court

APPENDIX D

Court of Appeals Texas San Antonio 04-21-00009 Order denying en banc
Reconsideration



**Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas**

November 2, 2022

No. 04-21-00009-CV

**Ernest BUSTOS,
Appellant**

v.

**ENCINO PARK HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
and Spectrum Association Management LP,
Appellees**

From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2018-CI-18828
Honorable Larry Noll, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Irene Rios, Justice
Beth Watkins, Justice
Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Appellant's motion for en banc reconsideration is DENIED. *See* TEX. R. APP. P. 49.5.

It is so **ORDERED** November 2, 2022.

PER CURIAM

ATTESTED TO:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Michael A. Cruz".
MICHAEL A. CRUZ,
CLERK OF COURT



APPENDIX E

Texas Supreme Court 22-1111 Petition for Review Denied

FILE COPY

RE: Case No. 22-1111 DATE: 3/24/2023
COA #: 04-21-00009-CV TC#: 2018-CI-18828
STYLE: BUSTOS v. ENCINO PARK HOMEOWNERS ASS'N

Today the Supreme Court of Texas denied the petition for review in the above-referenced case.

MR. ERNEST BUSTOS
* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

APPENDEX F

Texas Supreme Court 22-1111 Motion for Rehearing Denied

FILE COPY

RE: Case No. 22-1111 DATE: 6/2/2023
COA #: 04-21-00009-CV TC#: 2018-CI-18828
STYLE: BUSTOS v. ENCINO PARK HOMEOWNERS ASS'N

Today the Supreme Court of Texas denied the motion for rehearing of the above-referenced petition for review.

MR. ERNEST BUSTOS
* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *