No. 23-5572

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

JOSEPH W. FISCHER, *Petitioner (Defendant)*

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *Respondent*

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Record No. 22-3038)

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT FISCHER **FROM FORMERFEDS GROUP FREEDOM FOUNDATION, and MEMBERS,** ***et. al,***

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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The FormerFedsGroup Freedom Foundation is an IRS Code Section 501(c)(3) organization.[1] The Foundation and members intend to "***influence***" official proceedings and may engage in actions that some could twist into ***obstructing*** or ***impeding***.

There are thousands of organizations -- including *Amici* here -- who "***influence***" official proceedings. Some are paid lobbyists, others motivated by a cause. Critics might characterize a lobbyist's position as evil or immoral or "corrupt."

Will *Amici* be guilty of "corruptly" "influencing" an "official proceeding" when no one knows what "corruptly" means?

The Foundation's members have seen that their legal risk is directly proportional to whether they espouse opinions (analysis and critiques of governmental actions) of which government officials disapprove.

They watched a violent rampage of hundreds of rioters at the White House, at and inside the U.S. Capitol buildings, and on the streets of America in 1999 and again from 2014 to 2020. There is no question that riots at the White

---

[1] No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than *Amicus Curiae*, its members, or its counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.

House obstructed the official proceedings of the White House, from which the nation's world-wide military forces and diplomatic corps are supervised and controlled when the Secret Service had to rush the Commander in Chief into an underground bunker designed for nuclear war.[2]

Amici consider their current and planned actions proper and right. But they legitimately fear that prosecutors having no standards to guide them or guardrails to limit the prosecutor's creativity, may view their actions as a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2).

The Foundation is an IRS Code Section 501(c)(3) organization that is staffed primarily by hundreds of widows and next of kin of victims of hospital treatment protocols and MRNA vaccines that in many instances were coerced or administered Remdesivir – proven long before COVID to be exceedingly dangerous as a failed drug – without compliance with "informed consent."

These victims have found themselves opposing conventional wisdom through free expression and peaceful civil disobedience. If a Center for Disease Control and Prevention official visited hospitals for fact-finding, activists could be accused of obstructing proceedings by assertively and

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[2] Jon Lockett,"**50 Secret Service agents injured in White House riots as Donald Trump is taken to 'terror attack' bunker**," The Sun, June 1, 2020, https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/11752998/trump-secure-bunker-friday-george-floyd-protests-white-house/

insistently demanding answers about protocols that led to their relative's death.

They have and will protest unsafe hospital procedures and interventions and inadequately tested MRNA genetic, experimental treatments mis-named as vaccines or vaccine boosters in order to stop falsehoods that they are convinced led to the death of their loved ones.

The Foundation website is at: www.FormerFedsGroup.org and there are approximate 1,300 recorded victim eyewitness interviews at www.FormerFedsGroup.org/cases. There are 25 commonalities of the injury to them or relatives www.Chbmp.org/commonalities.

INTRODUCTION

Posture of this Brief

In unusual posture, the United States filed an interlocutory appeal from the District Court's dismissal of charges under 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2). The USAO chose to appeal the dismissal immediately rather than wait for the outcome of trial. Therefore Fischer, Miller, and Lang have gained standing prior to trial by the United States' interlocutory appeal.

The District Court granted Defendants Lang's, Fischer's, and Miller's Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 12 motion to dismiss the charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) from the indictment.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit consolidated these three cases so *Amici* infer that the Supreme Court now is considering all of the issues raised in any of these cases.

Introduction to the Case

Amici hope to assist this Court in why this appeal cannot be analyzed, heard, or decided without also precisely defining "corruptly." That cannot be kicked down the road.

Amici argue and endeavor to explain to the Supreme Court now that it is impossible to separate the scope and validity of the statute from a precise interpretation of the key limiting term "corruptly" as inseparable from the analyses.

The District Court had the question that "corruptly" is unconstitutionally vague before it. The Circuit believed the term sufficiently limits 18 U.S.C. § 1512 regardless of what actual definition is adopted. It does not. Yet the Panel still discussed the term "corruptly" very extensively.

While trying to define the term, it emerges as undeniably unconstitutionally void for vagueness. The Court needs to modify, clarify, or overturn past precedents of this Court to cure this problem.

This brief supports the Appellant and Appellant's substantive requests for relief which are questions of law.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
OF THIS BRIEF

18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) has different prongs *(emphases added)*

> (c)Whoever ***corruptly***—
>
> (1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or
>
> (2) otherwise ***obstructs***, ***influences***, or ***impedes*** any official proceeding, or attempts to do so,
>
> * * *
>
> shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

Congress passed statutes that actually apply to Congress at 40 U.S.C. § 5104. Any harm that might be addressed by an unfettered expansion of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) is already covered by 40 U.S.C. § 5104.

Indeed, the passage of statutes that actually apply to the U.S. Capitol buildings and grounds, explicitly, is a strong indication of Congressional intent that 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) does not apply to the scenarios before the Court.

Proposed *Amici* hope to assist the Court in analysis of "corruptly" as a limit upon 18 U.S.C. §

1512(c)(2). There is no statutory definition.[3]

Amici try to further illuminate that, despite the wording, the lower courts actually did presuppose a definition of "corruptly" in order to allow their analyses to fit. The lower courts assumed a range of possible definitions broad enough for them to rule on the other disputes.

Because none of the proffered definitions can work, the other issues in the case are rendered inoperative. The case cannot be decided without confronting the meaning of "corruptly" first.

First, the Circuit Panel did not reach a definition of "corruptly" apparently because they assumed that whatever the definition is they could still resolve the appeal. This is circular reasoning because the Panel considered only definitions that would allow the Panel to ignore the definition.

Second, lacking a proper definition, common usage and dictionary definitions control.

Although the citation offered by the Government concerns 18 U.S.C. § 1505, the principle – that a dictionary definition demonstrating popular understanding of words controls – is correct and conceded. The Government conceded in Government's Supplemental Brief On 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2),

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[3] There is a statutory definition only for 18 U.S.C. § 1505, found at 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b), but this is focused on "withholding, concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other information."

September 22, 2021, *United States v. Thomas Caldwell / Crowl, et al.,* Case 1:21-cr-00028-APM, Dkt. #437, pages 20-21 *(emphases added):*

> Because Congress is not shown to have intended otherwise, "corruptly" should be understood by a jury and by a court to have its usual meaning. In general, common words in statutes should be given their common or popular meanings, in the absence of congressional definition. See, e.g., *Perrin v. United States*, 444 U.S. 37, 41-45, 100 S. Ct. 311, 313-15, 62 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1979); *United States v. Stewar*t, 311 U.S. 60, 63, 61 S. Ct. 102, 104-05, 85 L. Ed. 40 (1940); *Old Colony R.R. Co. v. Commissione*r, 284 U.S. 552, 560, 52 S. Ct. 211, 213-14, 76 L. Ed. 484 (1932); *Martin v. Hunter's Lessee*, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 556, 571, 4 L. Ed. 97 (1816); *United States v. Smith*, 209 F. Supp. 907, 917 (E.D. Ill. 1962); *Svilokos v. State, Dep't of Community Aff*., 220 N.J.Super. 441, 532 A.2d 743, 744-45 (1987); *Allgood v. Bradford*, 473 So. 2d 402, 411 (Miss.1985); 2A Sutherland Statutory Const. Sec. 47.28, at 223 (4th ed.) and at 50 (Supp.1989).

United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam), *withdrawn and superseded in part by United States v. North*, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam).

Third, Congress qualified ***26-50 statutes*** in the U.S. Code with the limitation ***"corruptly," but 203 statutes*** with the limitation

"unlawfully."

"Corruptly" cannot simply be another way of saying "unlawfully."

The Judiciary is constrained by Congress' intent to treat "corruptly" as something *different*.

Congress did not accidentally or inadvertently say "corruptly." In one commentator's explanation *Pettibone* figures prominently, although not precisely on point:

> The formative case discussing the "corrupt" *scienter* element of the federal obstruction of justice statutes is *United States v. Pettibone.*[39] In *Pettibone,* the Supreme Court opined in 1893 that "corrupt" implied more than a state of general malevolence; it required a "specific design to thwart justice."[40] Courts applying this specific intent standard have typically recognized that the term corrupt implies "a higher degree of mental culpability than mere knowledge or general intent."[41]

Daniel A. Shtob, "Corruption of a Term: The Problematic Nature of 18 U.S.C. §1512(c), the New Federal Obstruction of Justice Provision," 57 Vanderbilt Law Review 1429 (2019), https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol57/iss4/6, page 1437 (citing to *United States v. Pettibone,* 148 U.S. 197, 206-207 (1893)).

Fourth, Congress has enacted statutes

mostly at 40 U.S.C. § 5103, *et seq.* to govern the conduct of the public at and around the U.S. Capitol as the seat of Congress.

18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) is not one of them.

So we cannot interpret 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) as embracing conduct that Congress already addressed in other statutes: 40 U.S.C. §§ 5101 to 5109. What did Congress mean about "corruptly" obstructing an official proceeding, when Congress already addressed this exact scenario in a different set of statutes *without using* the term "corruptly?"

Fifth, 18 U.S.C § 1512(c)(2) is unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in that the statute imposes up to 20 years in prison for one who "(2) otherwise ***obstructs***, ***influences***, or ***impedes*** any official proceeding, or attempts to do so" corruptly.

The inexplicable inclusion of "influences" violates the First Amendment right to Petition the Government for the Redress of Grievances and Free Speech.

This Court should not overlook how jury instructions are prepared and presented. A jury may be confused into convicting on the vague standard of "influence" where it might not have found evidence for "obstruct" or "impede." Thus, it is insufficient to say that the First Amendment is not violated when a jury could decide "Well, at least the Defendant ***attempted*** to ***influence***, even

if there is not enough evidence of obstructing or impeding."

Unfortunately, past judicial evaluation of "corruptly" fails this crucial test. *Amici* argue for the clarification, modification, or over-turning of precedent on the interpretation of "corruptly."

ARGUMENT

The principal parties' briefs address a wide array of issues, including a complex but almost mathematically precise reasoning by The Honorable Carl Nichols, District Court Judge.

Nichols issued the same analysis in granting each of three Defendants' motions to dismiss the count under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2).

A. THIS COURT REVIVED "LENITY" EARLIER THIS YEAR IN *BITTNER*

After the Court of Appeals' decision, this Court clarified the concept of "lenity" in criminal prosecutions earlier this year. And the Court also reaffirmed that criminal statutes are to be construed strictly (that is, narrowly).

This Court should recall and apply its decision in *Bittner v United States* 143 S. Ct. 713 (Feb. 23, 2023) concerning alternative potential readings of a statute. In the past, various courts have so narrowed lenity as to render it almost a nullity. The doctrine has drifted toward a requirement that lenity only applies when there is "grievous ambiguity or uncertainty." Cf., *Barber v. Thomas*, 560 U.S. 474, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 177 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2010).

In *Bittner*, the Court stated:

> To the extent doubt persists at this point about the best reading of the BSA, a venerable principle supplies a way to

> resolve it. Under the rule of lenity, this Court has long held, statutes imposing penalties are to be "construed strictly" against the government and in favor of individuals. (Citing *Commissioner v. Acker*, 361 U. S. 87, 91 (1959)) *Bittner* 143 S. Ct at 724.

Bittner explained:

> …. as Acker acknowledged, "[t]he law is settled that penal statutes are to be construed strictly," and an individual "is not to be subjected to a penalty unless the words of the statute plainly impose it." *Id.* [Citation omitted]

Bittner returned to Constitutional underpinnings at 725:

> ….the rule exists in part to protect the Due Process Clause's promise that "a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed." [Citations omitted]

B. U.S. GOVERNMENT ADMITS THAT 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2) DOES NOT APPLY.

Until now, the United States of America has not used 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2) to apply the kind of conduct at issue here. The DOJ's previous interpretation of the statute without an explanation as to why its interpretation suddenly changed undermines the Government's argument.

That is, the DOJ has never before believed the interpretation it now advances.

C. KEY TERM "CORRUPTLY" NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED

Trial Judge Nichols dismissed the charges under 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2) against Joseph Fischer in Memorandum Opinion, March 15, 2022, *United States v. Joseph Fischer*, Criminal Case No. 1:21-cr-00234 (CJN), Dkt. # 64. In doing so, Nichols referred to and relied upon his previous decision on March 7, 2022, dismissing the same charges for the same reasons against Garrett Miller.

However, Nichols considered "corruptly" in the related case:

> Finally, Miller argues that the *mens rea* requirement of § 1512(c)(2)—that the criminal act be committed "corruptly"—lacks a limiting principle, and is thus unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. Sec. Supp. at 7–16. "Corruptly," he notes, is not defined in the statute, and relying on *United States v. Poindexter*, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991), he argues that it is unconstitutionally vague here. Sec. Supp. at 9–14.

Memorandum Opinion, March 7, 2022, *United States v. Garrett Miller*, Criminal Case No. 1:21-cr-00119 (CJN), page 6.

Therefore, the definition of "corruptly" as

constitutionally infirm was and is in the foundation of this case from the start.

The Circuit Panel assumed that any of various definitions of "corruptly" would not affect the application of the statute. That is not correct.

All three Circuit Panel judges extensively discussed interpretation of "corruptly" and its difficulties, but then tried to resolve the appeal without deciding that.

The Opinion for the Court issued by Circuit Judge PAN, with whom Circuit Judge WALKER joins except as to Section I.C.1 and footnote 8, on page 17 states *(emphases added):*

> *1. "Corrupt" Intent*
>
> The district court expressly declined to interpret "corruptly" as used in § 1512(c), concluding only that "the common meanings of 'corruptly' are sufficiently capacious so as not to limit or clarify the *actus reus* charged in the Indictment." *Miller*, 2022 WL 1718984, at *5 n.3 (denying government's motion for reconsideration). ***I do not agree that the meaning of "corruptly" is necessarily "capacious," and note that a narrow construction of "corruptly" would indeed limit the actus reus of a § 1512(c)(2) violation. The requirement of "corrupt" intent prevents subsection (c)(2) from sweeping up a great deal***

> ***of conduct that has nothing to do with obstruction — for instance, lobbyists who know they advocate for morally wrongful causes***. *See* Appellees' Br. 47. Notably, the other crimes enumerated in § 1512 — such as killing, threatening, or dissuading witnesses — are classic examples of obstruction of justice.

It is error to say that "the common meanings of 'corruptly' are sufficiently capacious so as not to limit or clarify the *actus reus* charged in the Indictment." *Amici* urge that this Court should now address the failure to define "corruptly" as a mistake.

The Circuit Opinion summarizes from page 6 to 7:

> Relying on its understanding of the Supreme Court's holding in *Begay v. United States*, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), as well as canons of statutory construction, statutory and legislative history, and the principles of restraint and lenity, the district court determined that subsection (c)(2) "must be interpreted as limited by subsection (c)(1)." *Miller*, 589 F. Supp. 3d at 78. That led the district court to hold that subsection (c)(2) "requires that the defendant have taken some action with respect to a document, record, or other object in order to corruptly obstruct, impede or influence an official proceeding." *Id*. Because

> appellees' indictments do not allege that they violated § 1512(c)(2) by committing obstructive acts related to "a document, record, or other object," the district court dismissed the § 1512(c)(2) counts. *[citations omitted here].*

And the Panel explained further on page 16 *(emphasis added):*

> **C. Other Elements**
>
> Although the text of § 1512(c)(2) plainly extends to a wide range of conduct, the statute contains some important limitations: The act of "obstruct[ing], influenc[ing], and imped[ing]" described in subsection ***(c)(2) must be accompanied by "corrupt" intent***; and the behavior must target an "official proceeding." Those other elements of a § 1512(c)(2) offense are not the focus of this appeal, but we nevertheless note that they provide significant guardrails for prosecutions brought under the statute.

Amici suggest that whether "corruptly" is an important limitation, and what that limitation is, cannot be divorced from this analysis.

Amici argue that the record of the case shows that "corruptly" actually is a "focus of this appeal" but the Circuit found it unnecessary to reach that far to arrive at a decision on the appeal.

On page 18 the Circuit Opinion summarizes:

> Under all those formulations, "corrupt" intent exists at least when an obstructive action is independently unlawful — *i.e.*, an independently unlawful act is necessarily "wrongful" and encompasses a perpetrator's use of "independently corrupt means" or "an unlawful method."

Therefore, the Circuit repeats what *Amici* cite as error: That "corruptly" could mean *merely* "unlawfully." The Circuit Panel suggests that corruptly could be worse morally, but need not be in the Circuit's view. Nothing more than unlawful conduct standing alone can meet the supposed limitation of "corruptly," the Panel believed.

Actually, (1) the Circuit Court's decision requires consideration of the meaning of "corruptly" which is inseparable from the analysis, (2) it was error to think that the appeal could be decided without understanding an accurate definition of "corruptly," and (3) the "working definition" (so to speak) of the Circuit is error that requires correction.

Meanwhile, the Circuit Opinion includes in its opening paragraph:

> The question raised in this case is whether individuals who allegedly

> assaulted[4] law enforcement officers while participating in the Capitol riot can be charged with corruptly obstructing, influencing, or impeding an official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2).

As a necessary side task, we must correct a mistake. The Defendants below were not necessarily charged with "assaulting."

> 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) *[which prohibits]*:
> "(a)In General.—Whoever—
> (1) forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties; …

The Circuit Opinion sidesteps defining "corruptly" by mistakenly believing (at page 22):

> "But it is beyond debate that appellees and other members of the public had fair notice that assaulting law enforcement officers in an effort to prevent Congress from certifying election results was 'wrongful' and 'corrupt' under the law."

Again, the Circuit telegraphs that it thinks

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[4] On page 4, Circuit Opinion: "The government charged all three appellees with, among other things, …." violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1).

corruptly = unlawfully, saying "'wrongful' and 'corrupt' under the law." But a person violates the statute if they *forcibly* ***(1)*** *resisted,* ***(2)*** *opposed,* ***(3)*** *impeded,* ***(4)*** *intimidated,* ***(5),*** *interfered with, or (6) assaulted* a law enforcement officer.

"Fair notice" is irrelevant. Hundreds of demonstrators who merely stood outside the Capitol or spent mere minutes inside are charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512. Those who plausibly or implausibly violated 18 U.S.C. § 111(a) are separately charged for those actions, including most who merely brushed up against a police officer in the bustle of the crowd or tried to steady themselves in the crowd.

D. CONGRESS SAID "CORRUPTLY" NOT "UNLAWFULLY"

Amici suggest that Congress has <u>*foreclosed*</u> an interpretation of "corruptly" which is nothing more than "unlawfully" or "illegally."

A search of the United States Code through research tool Fastcase, revealed that Congress conditioned crimes

A) on the word "**corruptly**" -- <u>**26 times**</u>[5]
B) on the word "**unlawfully**" -- <u>**203 times**</u>
C) on the word "**willfully**" -- <u>**729 times**</u>
D) on the word "**knowingly**" -- <u>**1,177 times**</u>

[5] The Circuit Opinion references on page 19 that there are around 50 other references to "corruptly" in Title 18 of the U.S. Code but *Amici's* search turned up only 26 of these.

When Congress wants to say “unlawfully,” it knows how to say it. When Congress uses the word “corruptly” sparingly, it must mean something different from “unlawfully.”

> "This Court's duty to give effect, where possible, to every word of a statute, *United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-539, makes the Court reluctant* to treat statutory terms as surplusage. This is especially so when the term occupies so pivotal a place in the statutory scheme..."

Duncan v Walker, 533 U.S. 158, 121 S.Ct. 2087, 150 L.Ed.2d 198 (2001) *(emphasis added).*

Treating the term “corruptly” as nothing more than “unlawfully” would erase and read the term out of the statute.

> "It is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely when it includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another," *Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund,* [6] *ante*, at 338 (internal quotation marks omitted), and that presumption is even stronger when the omission entails the replacement of standard legal terminology with a neologism.

BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 114 S.Ct. 1757, 128 L.Ed.2d 556 (1994).

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6 *I.e.,* 511 U.S. 328 (1994).

The same analysis requires that every statute must "mean something rather than nothing."

E. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT SHOWN BY OTHER STATUTES THAT APPLY

18 U.S.C. § 1512 is explicitly *not* about the U.S. Capitol or Congressional proceedings.

Congress explicitly enacted laws to govern disruption of Congress or its functions or violence in or around the Capitol.

But none of those laws use the term "corruptly." And 18 U.S.C. § 1512 is *not* one of those laws.

In §5104(e)(2)(D) and §1752(a)(2), Congress knew how to say clearly and unmistakably what it meant. While "disorderly" and "disruptive" are poorly-defined, they are limited by "the ***intent*** to impede, disrupt, or disturb.

These indicate that Congress did not intend "corruptly" to ambiguously solve a problem that Congress already clearly and unambiguously solved in actually relevant statutes.

There are roughly a dozen laws that govern conduct at the U.S. Capitol in 40 U.S.C. §§ 5101 to 5109. *(Emphases added below; see Appendix)*:

1) 40 U.S. Code § 5104(e)(2)(D) prohibits "utter[ing] loud, threatening, or abusive language, ***or engag[ing] in disorderly or***

disruptive conduct, at any place in the Grounds or in any of the Capitol Buildings ***with the intent to impede, disrupt, or disturb the orderly conduct of a session of Congress or either House of Congress***, or the orderly conduct in that building of a hearing before, or any deliberations of, a committee of Congress or either House of Congress;"

2) 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(G) commands one not to "parade, demonstrate, or picket in any of the Capitol Buildings."

3) 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(2) decrees punishment within [temporarily] "restricted grounds"of "**(a)** Whoever – *** **(2)** knowingly, and with intent to impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions, engages in disorderly or disruptive conduct in, or within such proximity to, any restricted building or grounds when, or so that, such conduct, in fact, impedes or disrupts the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions;"

4) 40 U.S. Code § 5104(e)(2)(F) prohibits an act of violence in any Capitol building or on the Congressional / Capitol grounds.

5) 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(C) prohibits one "***with the intent to disrupt the orderly conduct of official business***, enter or remain in a room in any of the Capitol Buildings set aside or designated for the

use of—

> **(i)** either House of Congress or a Member, committee, officer, or employee of Congress, or either House of Congress;
>
> ***

Relevant statutes do not invoke "corruptly." A doubtful, duplicative application of an irrelevant statute requires "corruptly."

F. TERM "CORRUPTLY" UNWORKABLE, CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID

18 U.S.C. § 1515 contains definitions for 18 U.S.C. § 1512 under "**(a)**" but defines "corruptly" only for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1505. Worse, this makes a definition even more confusing, because it is yet another inconsistent approach:

> **(b)** As used in section 1505, the term "corruptly" means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another, including making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other information.

The Government argues in *Caldwell*, *supra*, Dkt. # 437 at 21:

> "For purposes of Section 1512(c)(2), "corruptly" includes two components:
> (1) intent to obstruct, impede, or influence; and
> (2) wrongfulness."

So, wrongfulness is wrongful because it is wrongful? Or does "corrupt" = "unlawful?"

Suppose a lobbyist is walking in a corridor in Congress but begins choking. He stumbles into a national security hearing <u>*intentionally*</u> seeking help. His acts are "unlawful" because he does not have a national security clearance and it is illegal for him to enter the classified briefing. He acts knowingly and willfully, seeking to stop the hearing to obtain medical intervention. [7]

The hypothetical lobbyist (a) broke the law by entering without security clearance and (b) acted <u>*illegally*</u> for his own <u>*benefit*</u>. Thus, under *Aguilar's* misreading of "corruptly" he violated §1512(c)(2).

G. "CORRUPTLY" MEANS IMMORAL, SUCH AS AN ACT OF BRIBERY

The statute suffers from a super-abundance of alternate definitions, leading to being unconstitutionally void for vagueness.

Few definitions focus on "corruptly" rather than the root term "corrupt."

> According to a standard dictionary, "corruptly" is the adverbial form of the adjective "corrupt," which means

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[7] *E.g.,* A man proposes marriage in the Rotunda to his Congressional staffer girlfriend. Tourists squealing and applauding with approval and delight could "disrupt or disturb" but that was not the intent.

> "**<u>depraved, evil: perverted into a state of moral weakness or wickedness ... of debased political morality:</u>** characterized by bribery, the selling of political favors, or other improper political or legal transactions or arrangements." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 512 (1976).

United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam), *withdrawn and superseded in part by United States v. North*, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam) *(emphasis added).*

Bribery dominates the common understanding. Yet corrupt also means immoral or sexual abuse or seduction of minors. E.g., Phil Ray, "**Man Enters Guilty Plea to Corrupting a Minor**," <u>Altoona Mirror</u>, June 21, 2021, <u>https://www.altoonamirror.com/news/local-news/2021/06/man-enters-guilty-plea-to-corrupting-a-minor/</u> The statute charged involved seducing an underage child. Apart from sexual perversion, an adult who trains a youth in a life of crime would also be “corrupting” that child.

“Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” -- Lord John Acton. An official might be oppressive, selfish, indifferent to the needs of others, even oppressive, without breaking any law.

Dictionary definitions are contradictory, yet often emphasize bribery. Yet corrupt also means

immoral, not illegal. The Cambridge Dictionary.[8] https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/corrupt "**[T]o make someone or something become dishonest or immoral**: **'The study claimed that violence on television corrupts the minds of children.'**" *Id. (emphasis added).*

Or "When information on a computer becomes corrupt, it cannot be used because it has changed and become wrong: **'corrupt data' or 'a corrupt file.'**" *Id. (emphasis added).*

Again, the issue is a super-abundance of possible interpretations. Merriam-Webster's dictionary includes as a definition of "corrupt" as a verb [9] -- "**to alter from the original or correct form or version**" or as an adjective "**morally degenerate and perverted : Depraved.**" [10] Or "**to become tainted or rotten" or "to become morally debased.**"

Synonyms for "corrupt" as an adjective listed by Merriam Webster include:[11]

- debased
- debauched
- decadent
- degenerate
- degraded
- demoralized

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8 See Cambridge Dictionary, Appendix, page 48.

9 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/corruptly#dictionary-entry-1

10 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/corruptly#dictionary-entry-2

11 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/corruptly#synonyms

- depraved
- dissipated
- dissolute
- perverse
- perverted
- reprobate
- sick
- unclean
- unwholesome
- warped

The ordinary meaning is not a synonym for "unlawfully."

The Bible as a common source of language describes corruption as (among other things) rotting of flesh: Acts 13:36: "For David, after he had served his own generation by the will of God, fell on sleep, and was laid unto his fathers, and saw corruption [of his flesh – *see* Acts 2:31].

No judicial attempt corresponds to any common understanding of the word.

> "Judicial discussion of the transitive and intransitive meanings of the term "corruptly" is an indication that the word is ambiguous by its very nature. The intransitive meaning of "corruptly" implies that an act was done with a bad purpose or motive-that the accused was "wicked" or "immoral." The transitive meaning focuses on the manner of an attempt to influence a proceeding, rather than the motive for so doing. In essence, it depends on the act itself. In

practice, as here, this key distinction has proven difficult to articulate. *Cf. United States v. Poindexter*, 951 F.2d 369, 378-79 (D.C. Cir. 1991)."

Daniel A. Shtob, 57 V.L.Rev at Fn. 41.

The Cambridge Dictionary[12] defines "corruptly" as --

> **in a way that dishonestly uses your position or power to get an advantage, especially for money**

However, note that the problem is the super-abundance of definitions. The definition above is simply yet another, different, inconsistent choice.

H. VOID FOR VAGUENESS OR OVERBREADTH OF "CORRUPTLY"

Since early 2021, attempts have been made to define the term "corruptly" as applied to physically disrupting a gathering, but these incompatible efforts make the problem worse.

Proliferation of inconsistent definitions for "corruptly" renders 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) void for vagueness as applied here. There are too many unrelated definitions, making "corruptly" unconstitutionally void for vagueness.

Unable to rely on clear precedent,

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[12] https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/corruptly

> multiple circuits have referenced dictionary definitions, antiquated legislative histories, and nuances in linguistic analysis to define the term.[76] Given the troubling interpretive history of "corruptly" within the federal obstruction of justice statutes, it seems implausible that the bill's drafters intended to perpetuate this ambiguity, especially in the context of subsection 1512(c), which prescribes a punishment of up to twenty years' incarceration.

Daniel A. Shtob, 57 V.L.Rev at 1442.

> … its passage was deemed critical to both the efficient operation of capital markets and the restoration of faith in the American free enterprise system.[8]

Id. at 1431 (also citing "unscrupulous acts in the business setting" as the law's target).

> Over the last two decades, courts and commentators have debated the meaning of the term "corrupt" in Chapter 73 of Title 18 of the United States Code, the obstruction of justice statutes. [12]

Id. at 1432.

> In light of the past treatment and debate surrounding its structurally similar sister sections, however, a clear textual construction of subsection 1512(c) ***<u>appears impossible</u>***. [28]

Id. at 1435-1436 *(emphasis added).*

A law is unconstitutionally vague when "it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or [is] so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement." *Johnson v. United States*, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015). As stated in *Johnson*

> [O]ur holdings squarely contradict the theory that a vague provision is constitutional merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls within the provision's grasp. For instance, we have deemed a law prohibiting grocers from charging an "unjust or unreasonable rate" void for vagueness — even though charging someone a thousand dollars for a pound of sugar would surely be unjust and unreasonable. *L. Cohen Grocery Co.,* 255 U.S. at 89, 41 S.Ct 298. We have similarly deemed void for vagueness a law prohibiting people on sidewalks from "conduct[ing] themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by"—even though spitting in someone's face would surely be annoying. *Coates v. Cincinnati,* 402 U.S. 611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed. 2d 214 (1971). These decisions refute any suggestion that the existence of *some* obviously risky crimes establishes the residual clause's constitutionality.

This Supreme Court has taught how a vague criminal statute is unconstitutional:

> ***The Johnson Court held the residual clause unconstitutional under the void-for-vagueness doctrine,*** a doctrine that is mandated by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment (with respect to the Federal Government) and the Fourteenth Amendment (with respect to the States). ***The void-for-vagueness doctrine prohibits the government from imposing sanctions "under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement."*** Id., at ——, 135 S.Ct., at 2556. *Johnson* determined that the residual clause could not be reconciled with that prohibition.
>
> * * *
>
> * * * In the Johnson Court's view, the "indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry" made the residual clause more unpredictable and arbitrary in its application than the Constitution allows. Id., at ——, 135 S.Ct., at 2557.
>
> ***"Invoking so shapeless a provision to condemn someone to prison for 15 years to life," the Court held, "does not comport with the Constitution's guarantee of due process." Id., at ——, 135 S.Ct., at 2560.***

Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1261-1262, 194 L.Ed.2d 387 (2016) *(emphases added)*

> Resisting the force of these decisions, the dissent insists that "a statute is void for vagueness only if it is vague in all its applications." *Post*, at 2574.

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2561, 192 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2015) *(emphases added).*

As seen now in unprecedented "January 6 Jurisprudence," a statute purporting to criminalize conduct can be unconstitutional if it leaves a public official with unbridled, standardless discretion to effectively make up their own law within the vagueness of the statute. The statute must not invite enforcement officials to legislate.

Let us not mince words: 18 U.S.C § 1512(c)(2) means whatever a creative prosecutor lacking caution wishes it to mean. To be charged is to be convicted, because the criminal charge has no fixed meaning.

Furthermore, 18 U.S.C § 1512(c)(2) violates the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in that the statute imposes up to 20 years in prison for "influencing" or attempting to "***<u>influence</u>***" an official proceeding despite the command of the First Amendment that the right to Petition the Government for the Redress of Grievances shall not be denied.

> If the line drawn by the decree between the permitted and prohibited activities of the NAACP, its members and lawyers is an ambiguous one, we

> will not presume that the statute curtails constitutionally protected activity as little as possible. For standards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression. See *Smith* v. *California*, 361 U.S. 147, 151; *Winters* v. *New York*, 333 U.S. 507, 509-510, 517-518; *Herndon* v. *Lowry*, 301 U.S. 242; *Stromberg* v. *California*, 283 U.S. 359; *United States* v. *C.I.O.*, 335 U.S. 106, 142 (Rutledge, J., concurring). *N.A.A.C.P.* at 432.

N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S. Ct. 328 (1963).

> An overbroad statute 'sweeps within its scope a wide range of both protected and non-protected expressive activity.'" *Hobbs v. Thompson,* 448 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir. 1971).

Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 435 (Tex. 1998)

As stated in *Hobbs* at 460 *(emphases added):*

> The overbreadth doctrine, therefore, ***focuses directly on the need for precision in legislative draftmanship*** to avoid conflict with First Amendment rights. Even though the interests a statute promotes may justify some infringement upon First Amendment rights, ***the overbreadth doctrine condemns those means to that legitimate end which***

> ***comprehend too broad an incursion*** upon the realm of First Amendment activity. Where a law is substantially overbroad, in that it sweeps within its scope a wide range of both protected and non-protected expressive activity, and where no "readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statute in a single [proceeding],"

As further stated in *Hobbs* at 460-461

> Lack of fair warning to actors or lack of adequate standards to guide enforcers also may lead to a "chill" on privileged activity. A person contemplating action who might be covered by a vague statute is left in doubt as to whether he is covered by the statute and, if so, whether his claim of privilege will be upheld. *See, e.g., NAACP v. Button*, 1963,371 U.S. 415, 432, 83 S.Ct 328, 9 L.Ed. 2d 405. *See also Coates v. Cincinnati*, 1971, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S. Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed. 2d 214.

Therefore, Section (c) and especially subsection (c)(2) are unconstitutionally void for vagueness and overbreadth in impinging upon the fundamental rights of the First Amendment.

CONCLUSION

Amici asks the Court to strike 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) as unconstitutionally vague and over-

broad, particularly burdening the constitutional right under the First Amendment to "influence" an official proceeding. "Corruptly" has too many inconsistent definitions to be constitutional.

But at a minimum this Court should adopt the cases like *United States v. Pettibone,* 148 U.S. 197, 206-207 (1893) and determine that "corruptly" in 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) means acting a **with a specific design to thwart justice.**

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

As required by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(h), I certify that the BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE *FORMERFEDS GROUP FREEDOM FOUNDATION, and its MEMBERS,* et. al, in support of Appellants' Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the above entitled case complies with the typeface requirement of Supreme Court Rule 33.1(b), being prepared in Century Schoolbook 12 point for the text and 10 point for the footnotes, and this brief contains 6,210 words of the allowed 6,500 words, excluding the parts of the petition that are exempted by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(d).

/s/ Edward Lacy Tarpley, Jr.

STATEMENT OF SERVICE

Amici, by counsel, certifies that a copy of the foregoing Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and that Brief attached were served, upon the attorney of record in this Court for the Appellant by first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, on January 29, 2024, on:

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Also, in compliance with Rule 29 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, an electronic copy of this Motion was also sent by electronic mail (email) on the same date in electronic / computer PDF format to all attorneys for the principal parties.

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The undersigned members of the FormerFedsGroup Freedom Foundation wish to authorize and express their support for charged January 6 Americans through their support of filing the following amicis brief:

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APPENDIX: KEY STATUTES

I. <u>18 U.S. Code § 1512, Et. Seq.</u>

(a)

(1) Whoever kills or attempts to kill another person, with intent to—

(A) prevent the attendance or testimony of any person in an official proceeding;

(B) prevent the production of a record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding; or

(C) prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings;

shall be punished as provided in paragraph (3).

(2) Whoever uses physical force or the threat of physical force against any person, or attempts to do so, with intent to—

(A) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding;

(B) cause or induce any person to—

(i) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an official proceeding;

(ii) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the integrity or availability of the object for use in an official proceeding;

(iii) evade legal process summoning that person to appear as a witness, or to produce a record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding; or

(iv) be absent from an official proceeding to which that person has been summoned by legal process; or

(C) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation, supervised release, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings;

shall be punished as provided in paragraph (3).

(3) The punishment for an offense under this subsection is—

(A) in the case of a killing, the punishment provided in sections 1111 and 1112;

(B) in the case of—

(i) an attempt to murder; or

(ii) the use or attempted use of physical force against any person;

imprisonment for not more than 30 years; and

(C) in the case of the threat of use of physical force against any person, imprisonment for not more than 20 years.

(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to—

(1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding;

(2) cause or induce any person to—

(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an official proceeding;

(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding;

(C) evade legal process summoning that person to appear as a witness, or to produce a record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding; or

(D) be absent from an official proceeding to which such person has been summoned by legal process; or

(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation [1] supervised release,,[1] parole, or release pending judicial proceedings;

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

(c) Whoever corruptly—

(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or

(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so,

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

(d) Whoever intentionally harasses another person and thereby hinders, delays, prevents, or dissuades any person from—

(1) attending or testifying in an official proceeding;

(2) reporting to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation [1] supervised release,,[1] parole, or release pending judicial proceedings;
(3) arresting or seeking the arrest of another person in connection with a Federal offense; or
(4) causing a criminal prosecution, or a parole or probation revocation proceeding, to be sought or instituted, or assisting in such prosecution or proceeding;

or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both.

(e) In a prosecution for an offense under this section, it is an affirmative defense, as to which the defendant has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, that the conduct consisted solely of lawful conduct and that the defendant's sole intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully.

(f) For the purposes of this section—
(1) an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense; and
(2) the testimony, or the record, document, or other object need not be

admissible in evidence or free of a claim of privilege.

(g) In a prosecution for an offense under this section, no state of mind need be proved with respect to the circumstance—

(1) that the official proceeding before a judge, court, magistrate judge, grand jury, or government agency is before a judge or court of the United States, a United States magistrate judge, a bankruptcy judge, a Federal grand jury, or a Federal Government agency; or

(2) that the judge is a judge of the United States or that the law enforcement officer is an officer or employee of the Federal Government or a person authorized to act for or on behalf of the Federal Government or serving the Federal Government as an adviser or consultant.

(h) There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section.

(i) A prosecution under this section or section 1503 may be brought in the district in which the official proceeding (whether or not pending or about to be instituted) was intended to be affected or in the district in which the conduct constituting the alleged offense occurred.

(j) If the offense under this section occurs in connection with a trial of a criminal case, the maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for the offense shall be the higher of that otherwise provided by law or the maximum term that could have been imposed for any offense charged in such case.

(k) Whoever conspires to commit any offense under this section shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.

II. 40 U.S. Code § 5101, Et. Seq.

40 U.S. Code § 5101 - Definition

In this chapter, the term "Capitol Buildings" means the United States Capitol, the Senate and House Office Buildings and garages, the Capitol Power Plant, all buildings on the real property described under section 5102(c) (including the Administrative Building of the United States Botanic Garden) [1] all buildings on the real property described under section 5102(d), all subways and enclosed passages connecting two or more of those structures, and the real property underlying and enclosed by any of those structures.

III. 40 U.S. Code § 5104 - Unlawful activities

(a)DEFINITIONS.—In this section—

(1)ACT OF PHYSICAL VIOLENCE.—
The term "act of physical violence" means any act involving—

(A) an assault or other infliction or threat of infliction of death or bodily harm on an individual; or

(B) damage to, or destruction of, real or personal property.

(2)DANGEROUS WEAPON.—The term "dangerous weapon" includes—

(A) all articles enumerated in section 14(a) of the Act of July 8, 1932 (ch. 465, 47 Stat. 654); and

(B) a device designed to expel or hurl a projectile capable of causing injury to individuals or property, a dagger, a dirk, a stiletto, and a knife having a blade over three inches in length.

(3)EXPLOSIVES.—
The term "explosives" has the meaning given that term in section

841(d) of title 18.

(4) FIREARM.—
The term "firearm" has the meaning given that term in section 921(3) of title 18.

(b) OBSTRUCTION OF ROADS.—
A person may not occupy the roads in the United States Capitol Grounds in a manner that obstructs or hinders their proper use, or use the roads in the area of the Grounds, south of Constitution Avenue and B Street and north of Independence Avenue and B Street, to convey goods or merchandise, except to or from the United States Capitol on Federal Government service.

(c) SALE OF ARTICLES, DISPLAY OF SIGNS, AND SOLICITATIONS.—A person may not carry out any of the following activities in the Grounds:

(1) offer or expose any article for sale.
(2) display a sign, placard, or other form of advertisement.
(3) solicit fares, alms, subscriptions, or contributions.

(d) INJURIES TO PROPERTY.—
A person may not step or climb on, remove, or in any way injure any statue, seat, wall, fountain, or other erection or

architectural feature, or any tree, shrub, plant, or turf, in the Grounds.

(e)CAPITOL GROUNDS AND BUILDINGS SECURITY.—

(1)FIREARMS, DANGEROUS WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES, OR INCENDIARY DEVICES.—An individual or group of individuals—

(A)except as authorized by regulations prescribed by the Capitol Police Board—

(i) may not carry on or have readily accessible to any individual on the Grounds or in any of the Capitol Buildings a firearm, a dangerous weapon, explosives, or an incendiary device;

(ii) may not discharge a firearm or explosives, use a dangerous weapon, or ignite an incendiary device, on the Grounds or in any of the Capitol Buildings; or

(iii) may not transport on the Grounds or in any of the Capitol

Buildings explosives or an incendiary device; or

(B) may not knowingly, with force and violence, enter or remain on the floor of either House of Congress.

(2)VIOLENT ENTRY AND DISORDERLY CONDUCT.—An individual or group of individuals may not willfully and knowingly—

(A) enter or remain on the floor of either House of Congress or in any cloakroom or lobby adjacent to that floor, in the Rayburn Room of the House of Representatives, or in the Marble Room of the Senate, unless authorized to do so pursuant to rules adopted, or an authorization given, by that House;

(B) enter or remain in the gallery of either House of Congress in violation of rules governing admission to the gallery adopted by that House or pursuant to an authorization given by that House;

(C)with the intent to disrupt the orderly conduct of official business, enter or remain in a room in any of the Capitol Buildings set aside or designated for the use of—

(i) either House of Congress or a Member, committee, officer, or employee of Congress, or either House of Congress; or

(ii) the Library of Congress;

(D) utter loud, threatening, or abusive language, or engage in disorderly or disruptive conduct, at any place in the Grounds or in any of the Capitol Buildings with the intent to impede, disrupt, or disturb the orderly conduct of a session of Congress or either House of Congress, or the orderly conduct in that building of a hearing before, or any deliberations of, a committee of Congress or either House of Congress;

(E) obstruct, or impede passage through or within, the Grounds or any of the Capitol Buildings;

(F) engage in an act of physical violence in the Grounds or any of the Capitol Buildings; or

(G) parade, demonstrate, or picket in any of the Capitol Buildings.

(3) EXEMPTION OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.—This subsection does not prohibit any act performed in the lawful discharge of official duties by—

(A) a Member of Congress;
(B) an employee of a Member of Congress;
(C) an officer or employee of Congress or a committee of Congress; or
(D) an officer or employee of either House of Congress or a committee of that House.

(f) PARADES, ASSEMBLAGES, AND DISPLAY OF FLAGS.—Except as provided in section 5106 of this title, a person may not—

(1) parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in the Grounds; or
(2) display in the Grounds a flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public

notice a party, organization, or movement.

IV. <u>CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY ON "CORRUPTLY"</u>

corruptly

adverb

UK/kəˈrʌpt.li/ **US**/kəˈrʌpt.li/

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/corruptly

in a way that dishonestly uses your position or power to get an advantage, especially for money:

He resigned in February, a day before pleading guilty to corruptly receiving illegal payments.

They insisted that the property had not been acquired corruptly.

The two detectives were in a good position to benefit corruptly.

She tried to corruptly persuade the secretary to destroy the documents.

He corruptly solicited cash from business owners in exchange for favourable treatment on city licensing matters.

(Definition of corruptly from the Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary & Thesaurus © Cambridge University Press)

V. CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY ON "CORRUPT"

corrupt

adjective

UK /kəˈrʌpt/ **US** /kəˈrʌpt/

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/corrupt

dishonestly using your position or power to get an advantage, especially for money:

Both companies are under investigation for corrupt practices.

The whole system was corrupt - every official she approached wanted money before helping her.

Deceiving others and not telling the truth

Dishonest: The press called out the campaign's dishonest tactics.

corrupt verb [T] UK /kəˈrʌpt/ US /kəˈrʌpt/

to make someone or something become dishonest or immoral:

The study claimed that violence on television corrupts the minds of children.

dishonest and willing to use your position or power to your own advantage, esp. for money:

It's been called the most politically corrupt city in the nation.

Corrupt verb [T] US /kəˈrʌpt/

to make someone dishonest and willing to use their position or power for personal advantage, esp. to get money:

Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

Don't let your friends corrupt you (= have a bad moral influence on you).

If information in a computer is corrupted,

it is damaged and can no longer be used.

corrupt verb

to change information on a computer so that it is wrong and cannot be used:

Most of the data on the hard drive was corrupted when the power went out.

corrupt adjective US /kə'rʌpt/

(Definition of corrupt from the Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary & Thesaurus © Cambridge University Press)