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7. Public Employment Relations Board Dismissal of Case SA-CO-618-E APPENDIX F
8. Public Employment Relations Board Dismissal of Case SA-CO-618-E APPENDIX G
9. Copy of the California Government Codes 3545 a, b.1, 3540, 3542, 3544.9, 3543, 3543.1,3543.2 3543.5, 3543.6,3543.7, Copy of the CCP 1085 and CCP 1094.5 APPENDIX H
10. Copy of the emails in the Writ of Mandate showing Wu was requested by the union to be reclassified EXHIBIT I

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

DATE: July ~~23~~₂₄, 2023

Rebecca Wu

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT OR PAGE COUNT

I CERTIFY THAT THE PAGE COUNT IS 40 PAGES OR LESS NOT INCLUDING BEFORE THE PETITION OR THE BELOW APPENDIX AND ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENTS.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Court of Appeals, California.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on 7/28/2023

REBECCA WU ²⁴ Rebecca Wu.


REBECCA WU

APPENDIX

11. ORDER/ Judgement on State Supreme Court of California Denial of the Petition for Review. Denied 1/26/2023. Rebecca Wu vs Public Employment Relations Board Case S278551 APPENDIX A
12. OPINION Judgement by Third Court of Appeals 12/28/2023 CASE C092640 APPENDIX B
13. Order on Publishing (ORDER after request for Publishing) CASE C092640 APPENDIX B
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20. Copy of the emails in the Writ of Mandate showing Wu was requested by the union to be reclassified EXHIBIT I

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on 7/21/2023

REBECCA WU .

45

EXHIBIT A

SUPREME COURT
FILED

APR 26 2023

Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District - No. C092640

Jorge Navarrete Clerk

S278551

Deputy

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

En Banc

REBECCA WU, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, Defendant and Respondent;

TWIN RIVERS UNITED EDUCATORS, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

The petition for review is denied.

GUERRERO

Chief Justice

SUPREME COURT
FILED

Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District - No. C092640

APR 12 2023

S278551

Jorge Navarrete Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA Deputy

REBECCA WU, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, Defendant and Respondent;

TWIN RIVERS UNITED EDUCATORS, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

The time for granting or denying review in the above-entitled matter is hereby extended to and including May 22, 2023, or the date upon which review is either granted or denied.

GUERRERO

Chief Justice

EXHIBIT B

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)

REBECCA WU,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD,

Defendant and Respondent;

TWIN RIVERS UNITED EDUCATORS,

Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

C092640

(Super. Ct. No. 34-2019-
80003289-CU-WM-GDS)

This case involves our review of the Public Employment Relations Board's (Board) refusal to file an unfair labor practice complaint on behalf of plaintiff Rebecca Wu, a substitute teacher representing herself in propria persona, against real party in interest Twin Rivers United Educators (Union), a teachers' union. In her unfair practice charge filed with the Board, Wu alleged the Union breached its duty to represent her in

her claim against Twin Rivers Unified School District (School District), wherein she claimed to be misclassified as a substitute teacher. The Board declined to file a complaint against the Union based on Wu's charge because Wu, as a substitute teacher, was not entitled to union representation given that substitute teachers were excluded from representation by virtue of the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the School District.

In cases involving the Board's refusal to file an unfair practice complaint, our review is limited to whether the Board violated the Constitution, misinterpreted a statute, or exceeded its authority. (*International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 188, AFL-CIO v. Public Employment Relations Bd.* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 271 (*Fire Fighters*).) Wu argues she has a constitutional right to union representation as a misclassified teacher and as a substitute teacher. She further argues she has a statutory right to representation by the Union that could not be circumvented by a collective bargaining agreement.

We disagree with Wu that she has a constitutional or statutory right to representation by the Union as an alleged misclassified employee or as a substitute teacher. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In her unfair practice charge filed with the Board, Wu alleged she was a substitute teacher and home hospital instructor with the School District. While the School District classified her as a substitute teacher, Wu alleged her position as a home hospital instructor required a different classification under the Education Code. She sought to remedy this problem with the School District and contacted the Union for representation in doing so. The Union declined to represent Wu because she was classified as a substitute teacher and substitute teachers are excluded from the Union's membership per the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the School District. Wu alleged that, because she was a teacher under the Education Code, she was entitled to representation by the Union in the dispute with the School District as to her demand to be

placed into the proper classification. Because the Union refused to represent her, Wu argued, the Union breached its duty of fair representation to her.

The Board's general counsel dismissed Wu's charge finding that, because Wu was classified as a substitute teacher, she was excluded from the bargaining unit the Union represented. Further, "[a]lthough [Wu] alleges the [School] District misclassified her, the facts are that she was classified as a substitute. Accordingly, [the Union] did not owe [Wu] any duty to represent her." Wu filed an appeal with the Board. The Board adopted its general counsel's dismissal letter as its decision and ordered Wu's unfair practice charge dismissed without leave to amend.

Wu filed a petition for preemptory writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1085 and 1086 against the Board as respondent and the Union as real party in interest. Wu alleged the Board erred because it ignored the Education and Employment Relations Act¹ (Act) when finding she did not have a right to union membership as a misclassified employee or a substitute teacher.

The Union demurred to the petition and the Board later joined in that demurrer. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend because Wu did not "state a claim for relief that [the Board] committed an error falling within the *International Assn. of Fire Fighters* exceptions when it dismissed [Wu]'s unfair practice charge."

Wu appeals.

DISCUSSION

On review of an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, we exercise independent judgment in assessing whether the petition states a cause of action as a matter of law. (*Walgreen Co. v. City and County of San Francisco* (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 424, 433.) " " "We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts

¹ Government Code section 3540 et seq. Further undesignated section references are to the Government Code.

properly ple[d], but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.” ’ ’ (*Zelig v. County of Los Angeles* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.) “We affirm if any ground offered in support of the demurrer was well taken but find error if the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory. [Citations.] We are not bound by the trial court’s stated reasons, if any, supporting its ruling; we review the ruling, not its rationale.” (*Mendoza v. Town of Ross* (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 625, 631.) It is appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court committed an error justifying reversal. (*Jameson v. Desta* (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.)

I

Wu’s Claims Are Reviewable To The Extent They Challenge The Board’s Ruling On Constitutional And Statutory Grounds

Wu contends the trial court should have reviewed her constitutional and statutory challenges to the Board’s order. She argues *Fire Fighters* was wrongly decided and judicial review of Board determinations to not issue a complaint should be unlimited. She also argues her challenges to the Board’s determination fall within the recognized exceptions articulated in *Fire Fighters*. We agree Wu’s statutory challenge is reviewable, as is her constitutional challenge to the extent she raised one in the trial court. We do not address Wu’s claim that *Fire Fighters* was wrongly decided because we are bound by our Supreme Court’s precedent even if we disagree with its holding. (*Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)

Our Supreme Court has noted that, generally, the Board’s decision to decline to issue a complaint is not reviewable. (*Fire Fighters, supra*, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 267-268.) Our Supreme Court, however, held that the Legislature did not preclude trial courts from exercising traditional mandate jurisdiction to consider challenges to such Board determinations. (*Id.* at p. 271.) “[A] superior court may exercise mandamus jurisdiction to determine whether [the Board’s] decision violates a constitutional right, exceeds a

specific grant of authority, or is based on an erroneous statutory construction. We stress, however, that it remains true that a refusal by [the Board] to issue a complaint . . . is not subject to judicial review for ordinary error, including insufficiency of the evidence to support the agency's factual findings and misapplication of the law to the facts, or for abuse of discretion. Also, to avoid undue interference with the discretion that the Legislature has intended [the Board] to exercise, courts must narrowly construe and cautiously apply the exceptions we here recognize." (*Ibid.*)

Applying this standard, our Supreme Court analyzed the Board's refusal to issue a complaint against the City of Richmond for instituting layoffs when it was alleged that the Board's refusal to file a complaint was based on an erroneous construction of the governing act. (*Fire Fighters, supra*, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 271-277.) While our Supreme Court found it had jurisdiction to consider the claim, it concluded the Board's refusal to file the complaint was not the result of an erroneous statutory construction because, under the governing act, the institution of layoffs did not constitute an unfair labor practice when done for financial reasons. (*Id.* at p. 277.)

With this rule and example in mind, we look to the trial court's order, which provides that Wu did not "state a claim for relief that [the Board] committed an error falling within the *International Assn. of Fire Fighters* exceptions when it dismissed [Wu]'s unfair practice charge." From this language, it is unclear whether the trial court considered the substance of Wu's arguments or simply believed it lacked jurisdiction to rule on those substantive arguments. In the end, however, it does not matter on what ground the trial court sustained the demurrer because Wu cannot demonstrate the trial court erred by rejecting her arguments that the Union owed her a duty of fair representation.

II

Wu Does Not Have A Constitutional Right To Be Represented By The Union

Wu contends, for the first time on appeal, that she has a constitutional right to union representation under the Sixth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We note that this contention is forfeited because Wu did not assert it in the trial court. “[I]t is fundamental that a reviewing court will ordinarily not consider claims made for the first time on appeal which could have been but were not presented to the trial court.” (*Asbestos Claims Facility v. Berry & Berry* (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 9, 26.) “Appellate courts are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider.” (*JRS Products, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America* (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 168, 178.)

Regardless, Wu has not demonstrated she is entitled to union representation through a constitutional mandate. Regarding her Sixth Amendment argument, Wu cites to *Gideon v. Wainwright* (1963) 372 U.S. 335. Wu’s reliance on this authority is misplaced. The Sixth Amendment, as well as *Gideon*, pertains to a person’s right to representation during a *criminal trial*, and thus does not support her claim that she is entitled to union representation whenever she has a dispute with her school-district employer. (*Gideon*, at pp. 339-340, 343-345.)

Further, Wu has not established a property interest in her position as a substitute teacher or as a misclassified employee such that *the Union* owes her a duty of representation. Wu acknowledges that the School District provided her with a procedure to challenge its classification of her employment. Wu has not explained how that procedure fails to comply with due process or how union representation during that procedure is vital to ensuring she is heard by the School District. (See generally *Goldberg v. Kelly* (1970) 397 U.S. 254, 263-265 [procedural due process requires an evidentiary hearing before a government agency can terminate essential resources that

have provided the basis upon which the recipient has subsisted].) Accordingly, Wu cannot demonstrate she has a constitutional right to union representation as a substitute teacher or as a misclassified employee.

III

Wu Does Not Have A Statutory Right To Be Represented By The Union

In her petition for writ of mandate and in her appellate briefing, Wu contends the Act extends a union's duty of fair representation to misclassified and substitute teachers in addition to full-time classroom teachers. Not so.

California law permits state employees "to select one employee organization as the exclusive representative of the employees in an appropriate unit, and to permit the exclusive representative to receive financial support from those employees who receive the benefits of this representation." (§ 3512.) It is "unlawful for an employee organization to: [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [i]mpose or threaten to impose reprisals on employees, to discriminate or threaten to discriminate against employees, or otherwise to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees because of their exercise of rights guaranteed by [the Act]." (§ 3543.6, subd. (b).) The exclusive representative must "fairly represent each and every employee in the appropriate unit." (§ 3544.9.) Breach of a union's duty to fairly represent a member constitutes an unfair practice. (*Paulsen v. Local No. 856 of Internat. Brotherhood of Teamsters* (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 823, 830-831.)

We defer to the Board's interpretation of the Act unless the interpretation is erroneous. (*Fire Fighters, supra*, 51 Cal.4th. at pp. 269-270.) This standard "allows courts to correct a clearly erroneous construction of the [Act] by [the Board] when that erroneous construction potentially affects a large class of cases and threatens to frustrate an important policy that the [Act] was enacted to further. Judicial review under this ground furthers the Legislature's purpose in creating the [Board] and defining the scope of its authority." (*Ibid.*)

Wu contends that because she worked the same hours and performed the same functions as a represented classroom teacher, the Union is required to represent her under the Act. The Board disagreed. Necessary to the Board's finding was that section 3544.9 extends a union's duty of fair representation to employees classified into the unit it represents and not to employees claiming to belong in the unit by virtue of their employment duties. This is not an erroneous interpretation of section 3544.9.

"The purpose of the [Act] is set forth in section 3540: 'to promote the improvement of personnel management and employer-employee relations within the public school systems in . . . California by providing a uniform basis for recognizing the right of public school employees to join organizations of their own choice, to be represented by such organizations in their professional and employment relationships with public school employers, to select one employee organization as the exclusive representative of the employees in an appropriate unit, and to afford certificated employees a voice in the formulation of educational policy.' " (*San Mateo City School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd.* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 850, 855-856, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in *California School Employees Assn. v. Bonita United School Dist.* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 387.) The Act "shall not supersede other provisions of the Education Code and the rules and regulations of public school employers which establish and regulate tenure or a merit or civil service system or which provide for other methods of administering employer-employee relations, so long as the rules and regulations or other methods of the public school employer do not conflict with lawful collective agreements." (§ 3540.)

The Board's interpretation furthers these stated purposes by providing certainty to the Union and the school-district employer of the employees subject to the collective bargaining unit between them. As Wu acknowledges, the Union has no control over the classification of any given teacher upon a teacher's hiring. That job is left to the school district that hired the teacher. (Ed. Code, § 44916.) Thus, if the Union was empowered

to determine the classification of teachers by virtue of its placing them into a specific unit of representation, the Union could potentially change the tenure, merit, or civil service rules applicable to teachers simply by placing them into a specific unit of representation that excludes the classification given to them by the school district. This was something the Act explicitly declared was outside its purpose. (§ 3540.)

Wu's reliance on *Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co.* (1944) 323 U.S. 192 is misplaced. Wu relies on this case to support her claim the Legislature intended the duty of fair representation to extend to employees performing work similar to union members. In *Steele*, the United States Supreme Court determined whether the Railway Labor Act imposed on a union, acting under its authority "as the exclusive bargaining representative of a craft or class of railway employees, the duty to represent all the employees in the craft without discrimination [based on] their race." (*Steele*, at pp. 193-194.) The Supreme Court concluded that the Railway Labor Act required the union to represent all employees during labor negotiations whose job classification fell within the class of employees represented by the union regardless of the employees' race or official union membership. (*Id.* at pp. 194, 204.)

We note the Supreme Court was interpreting a different act when concluding Congress (not the California Legislature) intended unions to represent all members of a craft when negotiating with an employer. Further, the Supreme Court's holding applies to a union's duty to represent all employees, regardless of union membership, during labor negotiations with an employer (*Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co.*, *supra*, 323 U.S. at p. 199), not to represent nonmember employees during individual disputes with an employer. A union's duties are different in these situations, at least under the Act. (See §§ 3543, subd. (b), 3543.1, subd. (a).) Finally, in *Steele*, the union refused to represent employees classified into union positions based on their race. (*Id.* at pp. 193-194.) Race is irrelevant to labor negotiations and does not meaningfully distinguish one employee from another in that context. Job classification, on the other hand, as is the case here,

does meaningfully distinguish employees from one another and is relevant to determining an appropriate unit of employees under the Act. (§ 3545.) Thus, *Steele* does not support Wu's contention that the Legislature intended for the Act to extend a union's duty of fair representation to misclassified employees.

Wu also contends she is entitled to union representation given her status as a substitute teacher. The Board and the Union point out that the Board has repeatedly and consistently permitted substitute teachers to be excluded from bargaining units containing teacher members. Neither the Board nor the Union, however, provide us with an analytical framework from which to conclude the Act provides for such an outcome. Regardless, upon our own analysis, we conclude it is not an erroneous interpretation of the Act to find that the Act permits substitute teachers to be excluded from units in which classroom teachers belong.

Section 3545, subdivision (a) provides: "In each case where the appropriateness of the unit is an issue, the board shall decide the question on the basis of the community of interest between and among the employees and their established practices including, among other things, the extent to which such employees belong to the same employee organization, and the effect of the size of the unit on the efficient operation of the school district." Subdivision (b) provides that "[i]n all cases: [¶] . . . [a] negotiating unit that includes classroom teachers shall not be appropriate unless it at least includes all of the classroom teachers employed by the public school employer" with certain exceptions not applicable here. (§ 3545, subd. (b)(1).)

The Board has interpreted this section "as creating a rebuttable presumption that all classroom teachers should be placed in the same unit. To rebut the presumption, [the Union] has the burden to show that its proposed unit is more appropriate than one including day-to-day substitutes, based on three factors [contained in subdivision (a)]: (1) community of interest; (2) established practices . . . ; and (3) employer efficiency." (*St. HOPE Public Schools* (2018) PERB Order No. Ad-472 [43 PERC ¶ 86, pp. 4-5].)

The Board's construction provides for exceptions to the general rule that all classroom teachers (including substitutes) must be represented by the same union. The fact that there are exceptions demonstrates, at least in the Board's view, that the Act does not require a union to represent substitute teachers when it represents other types of classroom teachers.

This is not a clearly erroneous construction of section 3545. Subdivision (b)'s seemingly broad mandate applicable to "all cases" is tempered by subdivision (a)'s more nuanced approach when the appropriateness of a unit is at issue in an individual case. Only then does the Board consider the relevant employee groups' community of interest, established practices, and employer efficiency. The Board put it perfectly in *Peralta Community College District*: "There can be no dispute that a primary purpose of the [Act] is to promote improved employer-employee relations through the medium of collective negotiations. We believe it to be well established that productive and stabilizing bilateral decision-making is dependent, in part, on the essential cohesiveness and compatibility of the various employee constituents of the negotiating unit. While differences and disagreements are unavoidable and are to be expected, they cannot be so severe, so out of joint, as virtually to promise disruption and final frustration of the negotiating process. Certainly, this is the import of the statutory requirement of community of interest and the reason for the preoccupation with that criterion in the pertinent literature.

"A literal interpretation of [section 3545, subdivision] (b)(1) is unlikely to serve the statutory purpose if resulting units, designed to be the vehicles for advancing the legislative aspiration, prove instead to be the dissension-torn carriers of the system's failures. Thus, other theories have been developed.

"One theory simply turns its back on [section 3545, subdivision] (b)(1) and would establish teacher units solely on the basis of the statutory criteria in [subdivision] (a). This approach, unfortunately, ascribes to the Legislature, in creating [subdivision] (b)(1),

the commission of a meaningless act, a conclusion abhorrent to standard principles of statutory construction and devoutly to be avoided here.

“Another approach to the dilemma of section 3545 is to concede that all classroom teachers must be in the same unit—and then to define classroom teachers in a manner which satisfies one’s own view of which teachers should be included in the unit. This, as we understand it, is the circular reasoning of [some Board decisions] which has given us a parochial definition limiting the statutory embrace to those considered to be the ‘core’ of the district’s faculty.

“[¶] . . . [¶]

“Section 3545 remains a burdensome provision. . . . [¶] There seems to be little doubt that the Legislature meant to minimize the dispersion of school district faculty into unnecessary negotiating units. It is apparent that unit configurations based on geographical, or campus considerations, or split along lines of academic disciplines and teaching specializations are proscribed by [subdivision] (b)(1). But that is not to say that the Legislature rejected the possibility that critical, negotiation-related differences between groups of teachers might compel unit separation. We believe that to reduce those possibilities the Legislature directed this Board to combine all classroom teachers into a single unit except where an issue of appropriateness is raised and the requirements of [subdivision] (a), which are then invoked, leave the Board with no other option.”

(*Peralta Community College District* (1978) PERB Dec. No. 77 [2 PERC ¶ 2214, pp. 7-10], underscoring & fns. omitted.)

We agree with this reasoning, especially considering the nature of substitute teachers. There are drastic differences in the Education Code between permanent and substitute teachers that weaken their community of interest or severely effect employer efficiency. For example, “[i]n the case of permanent and probationary employees, the employer’s power to terminate employment is restricted by statute. Substitute and temporary employees, on the other hand, fill the short range needs of a school district and

generally may be summarily released.” (*Taylor v. Board of Trustees* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 500, 504-505.) Indeed, the Board noted in *St. HOPE Public Schools*, that substitute and regular teachers share enough of the same working conditions to establish a community of interest with one another, but the community of interest is weakened by disparate pay structures and the limited schedule of substitute teachers. (*St. HOPE Public Schools*, *supra*, PERB Order No. Ad-472, p. 5.)

Accordingly, it is not an erroneous statutory construction to find that section 3545 allows for the exclusion of substitute teachers from representation by teachers’ unions. Because section 3545 does not require the Union to represent substitute teachers, the Board properly found Wu’s status as a substitute teacher excluded her from representation by the Union by virtue of the collective bargaining unit between the Union and the School District. Whether substitute teachers should be included within the unit the Union represents is not a question before us. That question would be addressed by the Board in a unit modification petition. (See *Hemet Unified School District* (1990) PERB Dec. No. 820 [14 PERC ¶ 21132, pp. 1-2, fn. 1].) We hold only that the Board did not commit constitutional or statutory error by finding the Union did not breach its duty of fair representation to Wu when it refused to represent her as a misclassified employee or as a substitute teacher.

DISPOSITION

The trial court's order is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

/s/
Robie, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
Hull, J.

/s/
Duarte, J.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)

REBECCA WU,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD,

Defendant and Respondent;

TWIN RIVERS UNITED EDUCATORS,

Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

C092640

(Super. Ct. No. 34-2019-
80003289-CU-WM-GDS)

ORDER CERTIFYING
OPINION FOR
PUBLICATION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County,
Shellyanne Wai Ling Chang, Judge. Affirmed.

Rebecca Wu, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

J. Felix De La Torre, Wendi L. Ross, Laura Z. Davis, David S. Crossen, for
Defendant and Respondent.

Jacob F. Rukeyser, for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on December 28, 2022, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause, it now appears that the opinion should be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

BY THE COURT:

/s/
Robie, Acting P. J.

/s/
Hull, J.

/s/
Duarte, J.

EXHIBIT C

IN THE
Court of Appeal of the State of California
IN AND FOR THE
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

REBECCA WU,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
BOARD,
Defendant and Respondent;
TWIN RIVERS UNITED EDUCATORS,
Real Party in Interest and Respondent.



C092640
Sacramento County
No. 34201980003289CUWMGDS

BY THE COURT:

Appellant's petition for rehearing is denied.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Robie".

ROBIE, Acting P.J.

cc: See Mailing List




EXHIBIT D

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3 Deputy General Counsel

4 LAURA DAVIS, Bar No. 196494

Supervising Regional Attorney

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12 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
13 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

14 REBECCA WU,

15 Petitioner,

16 v.

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18 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
19 BOARD,

20 Respondent.

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25 TWIN RIVERS UNITED EDUCATORS,

26 Real Party in Interest.

FILED / ENDORSED

JUL 10 2020

By E. Higginbotham, Deputy Clerk

Case No.: 34-2019-80003289

Hon. Shelleyanne WL Chang

**[PROPOSED] JUDGMENT OF
DISMISSAL AFTER SUSTAINING
DEMURRER TO PETITIONER'S
"VERIFIED PETITION FOR
PREEMPATORY WRIT OF MANDATE"
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND
(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10)**

Date: June 23, 2020

Time: 1:30 p.m.

Dept.: 21

Petition filed: January 3, 2020

**Exempt from Fees
(Gov. Code, § 6103)**

1 The Court, having sustained the demurrer of Real Party in Interest Twin Rivers United
2 Educators (incorrectly identified in the Petition as Twin Rivers Unified Educators), joined by
3 Respondent Public Employment Relations Board to Petitioner Rebecca Wu's "Verified Petition
4 for Preemptory Writ of Mandate" without leave to amend, and having ordered that judgment of
5 dismissal of the entire above-entitled action be entered in favor of Respondent and Real Party in
6 Interest and against Petitioner,

7 **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED** that the entire above-
8 entitled action be and hereby is dismissed and that Petitioner take nothing as against Respondent
9 and Real Party in Interest.

10 **IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED** that Real
11 Party in Interest shall recover its costs as against Petitioner Rebecca Wu according to proof.

12
13 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

14
15 DATED: 7-10-20


16 
17 HONORABLE SHELLEYANNE WL CHANG
18 JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
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EXHIBIT E

1 J. FELIX DE LA TORRE, Bar No. 204282
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11 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD

12 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
13 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

14 REBECCA WU,
15
16 Petitioner,

17 v.

18 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
19 BOARD,

20 Respondent.

21
22
23 TWIN RIVERS UNITED EDUCATORS,
24
25 Real Party in Interest.

Case No.: 34-2019-80003289

Hon. Shelleyanne WL Chang

**~~[PROPOSED]~~ ORDER SUSTAINING
DEMURRER TO PETITIONER'S
"VERIFIED PETITION FOR
PREEMPATORY WRIT OF MANDATE
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND**

Date: June 23, 2020


Time: 1:30 p.m.

Dept.: 21

Petition filed: January 3, 2020

**Exempt from Fees
(Gov. Code, § 6103)**

26
27 The demurrer of Real Party in Interest Twin Rivers United Educators (incorrectly
28 identified as Twin Rivers Unified Educators in the Petition), in which Respondent Public



BY FAX


1 Employment Relations Board joined, to Petitioner Rebecca Wu's "Verified Petition for
2 Preemptory Writ of Mandate" came on regularly for hearing upon notice on June 23, 2020 in
3 Department 21 of the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Shelleyanne WL Chang, Judge
4 presiding. Laura Davis and Daniel Crossen appeared on behalf of Respondent Public
5 Employment Relations Board, Jacob Rukeyser appeared on behalf of Real Party in Interest Twin
6 Rivers United Educators, and Petitioner Rebecca Wu appeared in pro per. The Court, after having
7 the day prior published its Tentative Ruling sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, and
8 after having considered the Parties' further oral arguments, and GOOD CAUSE APPEARING,
9 THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

10 1. The Court adopts its Tentative Ruling, a true and correct copy of which is attached
11 hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference, as its final ruling, and **SUSTAINS**
12 the demurrers of Real Party in Interest Twin Rivers United Educators and Respondent Public
13 Employment Relations Board **WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND**;

14 2. Judgment of dismissal be entered against Petitioner Rebecca Wu and in favor of
15 Respondent Public Employment Relations Board and Real Party in Interest Twin Rivers United
16 Educators; and

17 3. Real Party in Interest Twin Rivers United Educators is entitled to costs.
18 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

19
20 DATED: 7-10-20


HONORABLE SHELLEYANNE WL CHANG
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT



22 APPROVED AS TO FORM:

23 /s/Jacob F. Rukeyser
24 Jacob F. Rukeyser
25 Attorney for Real Party in Interest
26 TWIN RIVERS UNITED EDUCATORS

27 (See attached letter from Petitioner.)
28 Rebecca Wu
Petitioner, In Pro Per

EXHIBIT A

**SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO**

DATE/TIME	June 23, 2020, 1:30 p.m.	DEPT. NO	21
JUDGE	HON. SHELLEYANNE W. L. CHANG	CLERK	E. HIGGINBOTHAM
REBECCA WU, Petitioner, v. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent, TWIN RIVERS UNIFIED EDUCATORS, Real Party in Interest.		Case No.: 34-2019-80003289 REL. STAMP 2020 JUL 26 PM 12:26 HEADQUARTERS OF JUDICIAL BRANCH	
Nature of Proceedings:		RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER RE: DEMURRER	

This matter came on for hearing on June 23, 2020. Having considered the filings and arguments of the parties, the Court now rules as set forth herein. For ease of review, the Court has restated its tentative ruling, but rules as stated in its "final ruling" section.

THE COURT'S TENTATIVE RULING

I. Factual And Procedural Background

As this is a demurrer, the Court accepts the factual allegations pled in the petition to be true. (*Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Ass'n* (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 677)

Petitioner was an employee of Twin Rivers Unified School District from 2007 to 2017. (Pet., p. 4.) Petitioner was misclassified as a substitute instead of as a "teacher under probationary or permanent status" during this time, even though she was working the same hours as a full-time teacher. Real Party in Interest Twin Rivers Unified Educators ("TRUE") declined to file a grievance on Petitioner's behalf as they claimed her substitute classification prevented them from representing her. In August 2017, Petitioner filed an "Unfair Practice Charge" against TRUE for "[m]isclassification and for not filing greivence [sic] and representing or acknowledging membership for [Petitioner.]" (*Id.* at 7.)

On July 3, 2019, Petitioner received a letter from Respondent informing her that her unfair practice charge was dismissed. (*Id.* at 9.) The letter indicated that Petitioner was not “in the bargaining unit and therefore [Petitioner] could not be represented and that [TRUE] did not have an obligation to [Petitioner.]” On August 12, 2019, Petitioner filed an appeal with the Appeals Board. On October 29, 2019 Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed without leave to amend. Respondent maintained that TRUE’s dismissal was accurate and “no detailed description [was] given.”

Petitioner seeks, among other relief, that “employees undisputed by the local exclusive bargaining association (union) as members misclassified improperly placed or classified outside of the local union Association have a right of duty of fair representation and a right to have a grievance [sic] started for a district not providing the name of the employee as a member and not providing membership to the employee as well as a grievance [sic] for misclassification, and or wrongful termination if they are let go without due process provided in a CBA.” (*Id.* at 14.)

II. Legal Standard

A defendant may demur to the entire complaint or any of the causes of action within it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.50(a).) In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a demurrer, the trial court considers the properly pleaded material facts and matters that may be judicially noticed and tests their sufficiency. (*Cedar Fair, L.P. v. County of Santa Clara* (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1158-59.) A court should not sustain a demurrer unless the complaint, liberally construed, fails to state a cause of action on any theory. Doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (*Kramer v. Intuit, Inc.* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 574, 578.) In reviewing a demurrer, the Court will not “assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law and may disregard allegations that are contrary to the law or to a fact of which judicial notice may be taken.” (*Cochran v. Cochran* (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 493.)

In the event a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend is routinely granted where there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state a viable cause of action. (*Goodman v. Kennedy* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) However, “[l]eave to amend should be denied where the facts are not in dispute and the nature of the claim is clear, but no liability exists under substantive law.” (*Lawrence v. Bank of America* (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 431, 436; *see also Jenkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.* (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 497, 535; *Schonfeldt v. State of Calif.* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1465.) Similarly, permitting leave to amend serves no useful purpose where the actions of a plaintiff, as set forth in the original complaint, cannot give rise to a cause of action. (*Mercury Cas. Co. v. Superior Court* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1035; *see also Banis Restaurant Design, Inc. v. Serrano* (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1044.)

III. Discussion

A. Notice

This matter was initially set for a hearing which date had to be vacated in light of the Court’s closure due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The Court then re-set this matter for the current

hearing date. Petitioner argues both Respondent and TRUE did not serve her with notice of the new hearing date. Petitioner argues she “did receive emails with typed information about the new date, but it was not filed properly nor served to show a motion by PERB nor a new proper notice.” (Oppo., p. 7.) However, the Court served all parties with notice of the current hearing date on May 4, 2020. (ROA, #30.) Further, Petitioner timely filed an opposition with the current hearing date included in her caption. Accordingly, the court finds Petitioner has not been prejudiced by any purported failure to receive the hearing date, time, and location.

B. Demurrer

Government Code section 3542(b) provides, “Any charging party, respondent, or intervenor aggrieved by a final decision or order of the board in an unfair practice case, *except a decision of the board not to issue a complaint* in such a case, may petition for a writ of extraordinary relief from such decision or order. (Emphasis added.) TRUE acknowledges that there are three exceptions to this statutory rule, (1) when the decision violates a constitutional right, (2) exceeds a specific grant of authority, or (3) is based on an erroneous construction of an applicable statute. (*International Assn. of Fire Fighters v. Public Employee Relations Bd.* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 268.) Refusal to issue a complaint is not subject to judicial review for ordinary error, including insufficiency of the evidence to support the agency’s factual findings and misapplication of the law to the facts, or for abuse of discretion. (*Id.* at 271.) “[C]ourts must narrowly construe and cautiously apply” the judicially recognized exceptions. (*Id.*)

TRUE has filed the instant demurrer¹ on the basis that Petitioner fails to state a legally actionable claim because her allegations do not fall within “any of the very narrow exceptions to the general rule” that the Board’s decision to not issue a complaint is exempt from judicial review. TRUE argues Petitioner has failed to allege Respondent’s decision not to issue a complaint violated a constitutional right. “To the contrary, she bases her petition on the claim that PERB’s decision violated what she alleges to be ‘just and fair Public Policy.’” (Oppo, p. 7.) TRUE further argues the second judicially-recognized exception (that the decision exceeded Respondent’s statutory powers) is entirely absent from the petition as Petitioner does not even “suggest” that Respondent exceeded its specific grant of authority by declining to issue a complaint. (*Id.*) Lastly, with regard to the third exception, TRUE argues that the petition alleges only that “in declining to issue a complaint on [Petitioner’s] unfair practice charge, [Respondent] ignored what [Petitioner] believes to be the animating *spirit* of the EERA². Thus, [Petitioner] grounds her challenge on what she understands to be ‘just and fair Public Policy’ and her subjective interpretation of the EERA.” (*Id.*)

Respondent contends Respondent’s decision was based on the correct interpretation of the EERA. Respondent cites to Government Code section 3544.9, which provides,

The employee organization recognized or certified as the exclusive representative for the purpose of meeting and negotiating shall fairly represent each and every employee in the *appropriate unit*. (Emphasis added.)

¹ Respondent has filed a joinder in the demurrer.

² The EERA refers to the Educational Employment Relations Act.

Accordingly, Respondent argues, TRUE does not owe a duty of representation to Petitioner because she is an employee outside the subject bargaining unit. In support of this argument Respondent cites to the exhibit 20 submitted in support of the petition which states that the Collective Bargaining Agreement between TRUE and the District states,

Recognition: The District recognizes the Association [i.e., TRUE] as the exclusive representative for all certificated employees not designated as management or confidential by action of the Board of Trustees of the District or otherwise agreed to by the Parties except as follows:

1.4.1 Substitute employees

1.4.2 Adult Education teachers employed less than 20 hours per week.

(Wu Decl. in support of Petition, 20-4.)

Respondent then points to the petition's acknowledgment that substitutes are not included in the TRUE bargaining unit. Petitioner alleges "The District recognizes the Association as the exclusive representative for all certificated employees. (Regular Substitutes are excluded." (Pet., p. 12.) Respondent concludes that because the petition so admits, there is no allegation that TRUE erroneously construed an applicable statute as the law requires TRUE to represent each employee in the bargaining unit, and as an employee classified as a substitute, Petitioner was not part of the subject bargaining unit.

Petitioner argues she is entitled to inclusion in TRUE's bargaining unit pursuant to Government Code section 3545, subdivision (b)(1), which provides,

(b) In all cases: (1) A negotiating unit that includes classroom teachers shall not be appropriate unless it at least includes all of the classroom teachers employed by the public school employer, except management employees, supervisory employees, and confidential employees.

Contrary to this assertion, the petition alleges,

Rebecca Wu was misclassified as a substitute *instead of as a teacher* under probationary or permanent status. Wu was paid and filled out timesheets as a substitute with no Temporary, Probationary, Permanent contract under the local exclusive association. (Pet., p. 4.)

The Court's review of the petition demonstrates that it admits that Petitioner was not classified as a classroom teacher, and instead was classified as a substitute with no contract "under the local exclusive association." Accordingly, Petitioner, in her position as a substitute teacher, is not covered by the plain language of Government Code section 3545, subdivision. (b)(1).³ In light of this admission, the Court finds Petitioner fails to state a claim for relief to the extent she appears to allege the CBA violates the law.⁴

³ The court acknowledges Petitioner's claims that she was misclassified. However, the Court agrees with TRUE that TRUE must consider an employees' current classification in determining representation, and Respondent is under no legal obligation to determine whether an individual who falls outside of a bargaining unit's representation should

As the petition also admits that the CBA does not provide coverage for substitute employees, the Court finds Petitioner fails to state a claim for relief that Respondent committed an error falling within the *International Assn. of Fire Fighters* exceptions when it dismissed Petitioner's unfair practice charge.

While the court recognizes that Petitioner has not yet attempted to amend the petition, the burden is on Petitioner to show in what manner she can amend the pleading and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading. (*Goodman v. Kennedy* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) "Leave to amend *should be denied* where the facts are not in dispute and the nature of the claim is clear, but no liability exists under substantive law." (*Lawrence v. Bank of America* (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 431, 436 (emphasis added).)

Petitioner has failed to show a manner in which she could amend the petition to properly state a claim for relief. The Court finds it is appropriate to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend.

IV. Conclusion

The demurrer is **SUSTAINED, without leave to amend.**

THE COURT'S FINAL RULING

Having taken this matter under submission, the Court affirms the tentative ruling.

Counsel for Respondent shall prepare an order incorporating this ruling as an exhibit to the order, and a judgment; Petitioner shall receive a copy for approval as to form in accordance with Rule of Court 3.1312(a); and thereafter submit them to the Court for signature and entry in accordance with Rule of Court 3.312(b).

instead be re-classified such that they would be entitled to representation. Petitioner has not identified any legal authority to challenge support a contrary finding.


⁴ The Court recognizes Petitioner is proceeding *in pro per* and has attempted to give the petition as liberal a construction as possible.

Declaration of Mailing

I hereby certify that I am not a party to the within action and that I deposited a copy of this document in sealed envelopes with first class postage prepaid, addressed to each party or the attorney of record in the U.S. Mail at 720 Ninth Street, Sacramento, California.

Dated: June 24, 2020

E. Higginbotham, Deputy Clerk /s/ E. Higginbotham



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RELATIONS BOARD
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