

23-5124

ORIGINAL

DOCKET NO. :

SUPREME COURT of the UNITED STATES

FILED

JUN 15 2023

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

QUINCETTA Y. CARGILL — petitioner

vs.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

— Respondent

" ON PETITION for WRIT of CERTIORARI
to the UNITED STATES COURT of
APPEALS for the ELEVENTH CIRCUIT "

WRIT of CERTIORARI, PETITION

U.S. District Court Docket No. 2:17-cr-00356-ADP-JHE-1
U.S. Court of Appeals No. 22-13587-GG

Quincetta Y. Cargill
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Center (B.O.P.)

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98198

[Inmate No. # 19088-001]

Supreme Court Rule 14: Content of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

(a) Questions presented for review:

(1) Where the defendant-appellant acted pro se at trial preserving several viable issues for appeal, does the exclusion of the appellant's opinions, requests i.e. inclusion of psychiatrist's testimony, and information - as to the preserved issues' relevance, by the appellate counsel constitute ineffective assistance of counsel?

(2) Does the defendant-appellant have the right to either control or provide input or directives to the Direct Appeal?

(3) Where the defendant-appellant filed a timely petition for Re-Hearing of Direct Appeal as was based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, should proof of ineffective assistance i.e. Appellate counsel did not raise any of the issues alleged in the pro se Appellant brief, warrant re-hearing?

(4) Should not the Appellate Court have explained its reason for denial of the Petition for Re-hearing?

Supreme Court Rule 14- Content of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

(b) (i) A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is sought to be reviewed:

1. United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
2. United States District Court for the Eleventh Circuit

(ii) No corporate disclosure statement required.

(iii) A list of all proceedings in state and federal trial and appellate courts that are directly related to the case in this Court:

1. United States of America v. Quinceetta Y. Cargill
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama (Southern Division) 2:17-cr-00356-RDP-JHE-1
2. United States of America v. Quinceetta Y. Cargill
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
22-13587-GG
3. Supreme Court of the United States
Docket No.
4. United States of America v. Quinceetta Y. Cargill
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
22-13587-GG - Petition For Rehearing (Defendant-petitioner)
5. United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama (Southern Division) Petition For Release Pending Appeal (Defendant-petitioner) [2:17-cr-00356-RDP-JHE-1]

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Attached Documents: (in order as listed below)

- A.) Appellant's Brief due 12-5-2022
- B.) Petitioner's Request for Extension of Time to file NO ACTION NOTICE
- C.) Petition for Re-Hearing - Denied
- D.) Returned mail sent to Appellate Counsel and Hybrid Counsel Contact Information Insufficient
- E.) NO ACTION NOTICE "Motion to Submit Amended Complaint"
- F.) Original Opinion Affirm Conviction
- G.) OTHER NOTICES
- H.) §1746 UNSWORN DECLARATION under penalty of perjury
- I.) Proof of Service

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Table of Cited Authorities :

- (1) FRAP 35, IOP2 - Petition for Rehearing is DENIED
(No other cited authority listed)

Supreme Court Rule 14- Content of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

(d) Citations of the Official and Unofficial Reports of the Opinions and Orders entered in the Case

a.) *Farretta v. California*, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)

b.) *United States v. Garey*, 540 F.3d 1253, 1268 (11th Cir. 2008)

c.) *United States v. Hakim*, 30 F.4th 1310, 1318 (11th Cir. 2022)

d.) *United States v. Moran*, 778 F.3d 942, 958 (11th Cir. 2015)

e.) *United States v. Descent*, 292 F.3d 703, 706 (11th Cir. 2002)

f.) *United States v. Davis*, 854 F.3d 1276, 1293 (11th Cir. 2017)

g.) *United States v. Boston*, 818 F.3d 651, 663 (11th Cir. 2016)

h.) *United States v. Amirez-Flores*, 743 F.3d 816, 821 (11th Cir. 2014)

i.) *United States v. Vandergrift*, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014)

j.) *United States v. Zitron*, 810 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2016)

k.) *United States v. Baldwin*, 774 F.3d 711, 727 (11th Cir. 2014)

l.) FRAP 35, IOP 2

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(c) A Concise Statement of the basis for jurisdiction in this court.

5/19/2023,

Where the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has departed too much from the settled and usual course of judicial proceedings when it denied the petitioner's Petition for Re-Hearing of Direct Appeal which was based upon Ineffective Assistance of Counsel on Direct Appeal esp. where with the petition, the petitioner submitted a pro se brief that included over one dozen viable issues that had been preserved at trial, but were not included by the appellate counsel in his brief on Direct Appeal, and

where the petitioner had alleged being excluded from- as participant of, the Direct Appeal, despite the fact that she (the petitioner) had represented herself at trial and had in fact preserved specific issues that if left out of the Direct Appeal would be most prejudicial to the petitioner (pro se defendant (appellant)) particularly where such issues: as were preserved at trial, presented in the pro se Appellant Brief, and were excluded by the appellate counsel, included:

- a.) Competence To Stand Trial (CST),
- b.) Challenges To The Sufficiency of The Evidence,
- c.) Hobson's Choice - Forced Pro Se Representation
- d.) Due Process Violations, i.e.
 - (i) Confrontation Clause:
 - 1. Right To Cross Examine and Confront Witnesses
 - 2. Promised Witness Not Produced At Trial
- e.) Government Agent and Prosecutor Misconduct:
 - (i) Knowing Use of False Testimony
 - (ii) Government Witness' Planned Perjury Held Confidential
 - (iii) Prosecutor Misrepresents Physical Evidence (E.R. 901(A))
 - 1. Authentication of Business Records

2. Falsified Claims of Monetary Indebtedness

3. Presentation of Bank Records [Wells Fargo Bank]

(i) Alleging Sole Ownership

(ii) Forged Alterations on Documents

(iii) Exclusion of Additional Individ. Owners

(iv) Without Disclosure: Outside the Scope (Dates)

of the Indictment;

the writ will be in aid of the Court's appellate jurisdiction esp. where with the exclusion of the preserved issues listed above from the appointed appellate counsel's brief on Direct Appeal, and where the Appeals Court denied the petitioner's Petition for Re-Hearing despite the showing of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Notwithstanding the above listed issues, the petitioner had submitted an Amended Brief that included or presented additional issues that had been preserved at trial but had been erroneously omitted from the initial brief attached to the Petition for Re-Hearing of Direct Appeal, but

where before the Notice denying the petitioner's petition for re-hearing of direct appeal was received, the request to submit additional facts/factors was forwarded to the U.S. Court of Appeals, therefore it is anticipated that the motion to add additional facts will be denied also as MOOT.

(See Appendix for Related Documents)

where the additional facts and factors submitted, but is expected to be denied, included:

i. Judicial Misconduct

(i) Judge's Reliance on False Information

(ii) Abuse of Discretion:

a.) Courtroom Decorum - Use of Visible

shackles during Trial

b.) Judge Engaged in Ex Parte Communications

c.) Failure to Revisit Competence Status during

Trial 18 USC §4241(c) sue sponte

- d.) Pro se defendant's motion for Pre-sentencing Psychological Evaluation was denied
- e.) Prior Conviction Challenged as Invalid and was before the judge as a federal 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Quinceeta Cargill v. State of Alabama)
- f.) Allegation of Conflict went without Inquiry

2. Judicial Bias [Personal Bias and Prejudice § 455 & 144 J Affidavit of Personal Bias and Prejudice Filed by defendant.

- ii) Failure To Recuse (Motion to Recuse - Denied)
- iii) Refusal To Grant Evidentiary Hearings, i.e. Wade Hearing, Franks Hearing, Request for Production of Discovery: a. Falsified Claims of Monetary Indebtedness (False Claims Act), b. Challenges to Restitution, and c. Challenges to Federal Jurisdiction (Amount in Controversy)

the petitioner believes that where the Sixth Amendment guarantees a verdict by an impartial jury (in this case, an impartial judge (Bench Trial)), the bias or prejudice of a judge is enough to violate that guarantee. And where the pro se defendant raised the issue of personal bias in a motion for a New Trial alleging that the judge exemplified signs of Racial Discrimination or Allegiance with a White Supremacy Group, these issues present exceptional circumstances that warrant the exercise of the Court's discretionary powers. Adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other form, where after the district judge has certified in writing that appeals are not taken in good faith 28 USC § 1915 (a) (3) Fed. B. App. P. 24 (a) (3) despite the following existing factors:

- 1.) Declaration of Poverty submitted by the defendant,
 - 2.) Affidavit of Personal Bias and Prejudice filed by defendant,
 - and 3.) Appeals raised issues of Judicial Misconduct,
- and after the U.S. Court of Appeals has denied Motion to Reinstate Appeals for failure to pay in acceptance of / in agreement with the district court judge's actions. Therefore, it is believed that adequate relief cannot be obtained from any other court.

- The date the order sought to be reviewed was entered: May 19, 2023
- Notice of No Action Taken [Motion to Submit Amended Complaint] dated May 09, 2023 see Documents in Appendix

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(f) Constitutional Provisions

1.) The Anders mandate (Mandate of Adequate representation on appeal) *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738, 18 L. ed 2d 493, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967) "Court-appointed appellate counsel's duty to prosecute a first appeal." (indigent defendant) "...marshalling of arguments on his behalf." The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate on behalf of his client, as opposed to that of *amicus curiae*.

2.) Fourteenth Amendment's minimum requirements for indigent criminal appeals... Adequate representation (due process)

3.) Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel *Freels v. Hills*, 843 F.2d 958 (CA 6 1988) "...the 'brief' submitted by counsel did not reference to any of the claims of error alleged by Freels in the latter's own brief, nor do we know upon the record before us whether counsel was even aware of those claims or had consulted his client concerning them."

4.) *Chamberlain v. Erickson*, 744 F.2d 628, 630 (8th Cir. 1984) "...the Chamberlain court found that a criminal defendant does have a right under the Constitution to present pro se briefs or motions on appeal."

5.) *Myers v. Johnson*, 76 F.3d 1330 (CA 5 1996) "We hold that a criminal defendant who clearly and unequivocally asserts this right to present pro se briefs on the first direct appeal must be allowed to 'preserve actual control over the case he chooses to present' to the appellate court - i.e., he must be allowed to determine the content of his appellate brief."

Quincetta Y. Cargill 19088-001
SeaTac Federal Detention Center
P.O. Box 13900
Seattle, Washington 98198

Re: §1746 Unsworn Declarations Under Penalty of
Perjury

I, Quincetta Y. Cargill, do swear under penalty of perjury that I am not, nor have I been trained to be, an attorney. I only acted as legal representative on behalf of myself at trial (2:17-cr-00356-RDP-JHE-1) because of threats made by appointed counsel to withhold adequate legal representation if I chose to NOT enter a plea of guilt and provide the U.S. Attorney's Office with information in efforts to procure a different (Additional) conviction, in exchange for a plea deal. I do further declare that I am NOT GUILTY of the crimes and charges for which I have been convicted.

I do state under penalty of perjury that every effort made to gain a full and fair hearing has been blocked either by malicious tactics perpetrated by officers of the court, or based on one technicality or another.

I do believe that without the intervention of this Court, I will suffer irreparable injury by / through manifest injustice of an unlawful conviction as was based solely upon false claims of indebtedness as presented by government agents, and incentivized

false testimony of individuals hoping to minimize the punishment imposed.

Where the appointed appellate counsel failed to allow my input and control over the appeal and/or the issues to be raised on direct appeal, despite my continuous demand to be included, and

where the Petition for Re-Hearing and the Motion to Submit Amended Complaint (where other issues that existed during trial or immediately after, but had been left out of the prose brief) raised several viable issues including Competency to Stand Trial - but had not been included in the appointed appellate's brief,

I do believe the Court of Appeals Denied of the Petition for Re-Hearing due to ineffective assistance of counsel, esp. where no reason as to why the petition was Denied was provided, violated my right to a full & fair hearing. I do further believe that review of the order is warranted.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on this 14th day of June, 2023.

Queneatha Y. Cayll

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(g) A Concise Statement of the Case

1. The indigent prose defendant chose to represent herself at trial despite her inability to practice law, after court appointed counsel (Brett Bloomston) threatened to withhold adequate legal representation if the defendant chose not to enter a plea of guilt, provide information to the prosecution about another in efforts to secure an additional conviction, and become privy to a deal. The defendant was forced to make a choice between incompetent or unwilling counsel or appearing prose.

2. The magistrate judge ultimately granted the right to self-representation after Faretta Hearing, but after verbally expressing that "there shall not be another attorney appointed" where after appointing a total of four attorneys to represent the defendant. "The problem," he stated, "appears to be you." (2) "You must learn to trust someone."

3. At trial, the prose defendant preserved several issues for appeal including the Prosecutor's misrepresentation of physical evidence, i.e. Falsified Claims of monetary indebtedness in the amount of \$1,096,666.68, and Incentivized: untrue statements presented by criminals / Knowingly Used False Testimony. However, the appointed appellate counsel (J. Douglas Lloyd) refused to communicate with the prose defendant regarding the issues preserved at trial. Notwithstanding the fact that the prose defendant expressed distrust in the attorneys interest and loyalty to the government, and her desire to be fully included in the legal proceedings and any issues to be presented to the court, the prose defendant urged the appellate counsel include testimony of the psychiatrist with whom she had maintained a physician-client relationship during the trial process in the Direct Appeal but the appellate counsel failed/refused to do so. In fact, the appellate counsel's brief

did not include a single issue that was preserved and alleged by the pro se defendant. There was no indication that the appellate counsel fully reviewed the trial transcript or any of the pro se motions filed by the defendant during trial.

4. Where voluminous medical and psychological records exist and are part of the record, particularly where after the magistrate judge ORDERED psych-evaluation at the request of the first court appointed counsel (Kevin Roberts) who first raised the issue of Competence after discovering that the defendant had recently been hospitalized at the State Mental Hospital (Bryce Mental Hospital-Tuscaloosa Alabama) at the ORDER of Circuit Court Judge T. Pulliam for the issue of Competency, and after discovery of Forensic Psychological Evaluation that had deemed the defendant at the time of the incident 'NOT GUILTY due to mental defect in regards to a separate State Court case captioned State of Alabama vs. Quinceetta Y. Cargill cc: 2014-003042, the courts had prior knowledge of mental illness and prior competency concerns.

5. The petitioner asserts that, although a competence hearing was conducted and a psychological evaluation that had been conducted by order of the United States District Court resulted in the opinion of Competent to Stand Trial, the issue of competence was not fully and wholly established due to (1) the then-attorney failed to Rebut or Challenge the opinion of the forensic psychologist, and (2) there were good and logical reasons to believe that competency issues existed and would reappear on a continuous basis. The issue of competency should have been revisited during the trial proceedings esp. when after the pro se defendant had been placed on suicide watch (wellness check ordered by the court) at the Shelby County Jail, and after the pro se defendant accused the district court judge of affiliation with, in connection (connivance) with the prosecutor, a white supremacy group. However, the pro se defendant's motion Requesting Pre-Sentencing Psychological Evaluation

was Denied, and the court failed to revisit competency *sua sponte*.

6. Appellate counsel raised inadequate Faretta claim on direct appeal. He did not honor the prose defendant's desire to be involved in the 'whats' to be raised on appeal. He did not review fully the transcript of the Faretta Hearing or talk with either party that attended that hearing or was involved in that process. Hybrid counsel (J.D. Bramer) would have explained that where self-representation is a right, and where the prose defendant had put up a strong and convincing argument as to why she should be allowed to represent herself, raising such issue would be futile. Competency, on the other hand, would have been what was more accurate in terms of "the defendant's inability to assist, or trust, or work with counsel" esp. where the mental illness fosters delusional and persecutory ideology, particularly governmental collusion.

7. Instead, the appellate counsel built his strategy around his beliefs and presented his brief based solely upon his own game plan: to challenge the decision of the court to allow self-representation.

8. *Myers v. Johnson*, 76 F.3d 1330 (CA 5 1996) p.1334. [W]e hold that a criminal defendant who clearly and unequivocally asserts this right to present prose briefs on the first direct appeal must be allowed to "preserve actual control over the case he chooses to present" to the appellate court - i.e., he must be allowed to determine the content of his appellate brief.

9. Where the appellate counsel denied the prose defendant the right to present prose brief, to provide input as to what was to be presented on appeal, and to have actual control over the appeal despite the fact that she had preserved specific issues at trial for appeal, and the fact that she clearly and unequivocally expressed the need to be involved, and where the appellate counsel, in turn, neither included any of the issues/claims alleged by the prose defendant nor had he raised any arguable issues in the appellate

brief, the petitioner claims that the Appellate counsel was ineffective on appeal.

10. Further, where the United States Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's Petition for Re Hearing due to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel on Direct Appeal despite the violation of the procedure announced in *Anders v. California*, it is believed that where no other court could determine the existence of an error of law or fact, and where the U.S. Court of Appeals has decided the important question (as to whether or not an indigent defendant should be allowed to exercise control over his/her own appeal, and whether or not the appointed Appellate Attorney's brief that did not represent any or either of the issues that the pro se defendant had preserved at trial - should be determinable of the needs and rights due as remedy for an unjust conviction) of Federal Law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, it is believed that the Court has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings to warrant an interventive exercise of this Court's supervisory power.

11. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel on Direct Appeal prohibited the petitioner from receiving a full and adequate hearing of claims against the conviction in the U.S. District Court.

12. It is believed that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has entered a decision in conflict with the decisions of other U.S. Courts of Appeals on the same important matter. *Chamberlain v. Erickson*, 744 F.2d 628, 630 (8th Cir. 1984), [omitted] (1985)

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(b) A direct and concise argument

1. where other circuits such as the Ninth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have long ago settled conflicts with decisions regarding indigent inmates/defendants and their right to either control the direction of the appeal or be allowed to provide directive or input in the strategic approach and/or issues for appeal, the Eleventh Circuit's decision to deny the petitioner's Petition for Re-hearing of Direct Appeal due to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel on Appeal has decided an important federal question regarding Due Process and the substantive rights of an indigent defendant in a way that conflicts with other courts, and

2. where after the petitioner has preserved specific issues for appeal while acting pro se in representation of herself on trial, and where the appointed appellate counsel's appeal brief failed to present neither of the viable issues that were presented in the pro se brief submitted by the petitioner, the United States Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power.

3. The petitioner believes that where the above facts including Pro se defendant, indigent and the denial of the right to provide input on appeal, are relevant and warrant attention as compelling reasons for review this Court would be the best judge.

4. The Appellate Court erred by Denying Petition for Re-hearing where proof of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal is evident where neither of the issues raised and preserved by the pro se defendant-petitioner appeared in the attorney's brief. Thereafter, failing to raise issues meritorious, constitutes ineffectiveness.

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(i) Appendix:

(i) U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the Conviction (filed 09-22-2022) based upon the following opinion:

A. Whether Cargill's waiver of right to counsel was knowing and voluntary

1. "Here, the record confirms that the magistrate judge conducted a lengthy Faretti hearing and that Cargill was aware of the risks of representing herself and made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of her right to the assistance of counsel. pg. 16

2. "... the district court's Faretti inquiry was proper and the relevant factors demonstrate that Cargill's waiver of her right to counsel and election to proceed pro se was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Furthermore, we note that the district court went a step further in attempting to protect Cargill's rights by appointing "hybrid counsel" to assist her with the trial... pg. 16-17

NOTE: The petitioner agrees with the court's assessment of facts as are above detailed in the court's opinion. Therefore, no review in regards to this opinion is sought.

However where the petitioner's pro se brief did not raise the issue of waiver of right to counsel, the above issue was raised as strategic presentation of his own beliefs, opinion, or observation - alone.

B. Whether there was sufficient evidence for Cargill's attempted witness tampering conviction.

"There was sufficient evidence to convict Cargill of attempted witness tampering." pg 18

Note: The court based its opinion on a phone call in which the petitioner spoke about documents that she wanted to post on social media; and evidence that supports the claim that "Cargill's husband made threatening statements. Where the petitioner does not disagree with such facts, she does not seek review of such opinion.

However, where the petitioner presented the Affirmative Defenses:

a.) Official Document or Act (Rule 9 Pleading)

Where the documents that the petitioner attempted to expose / post on social media were provided to her by her appointed counsel(s) without restrictive instructions or directives. The appointed counsel did not warn against sharing the documents, and the petitioner believed them to be her own property detailing the case brought against her, and was authorized by counsel to use them as she please.

[Under the Authority of, as were provided by, the government]

b.) Duress

Where her husband specifically stated that his life, the life of members of the motor cycle group / club, and the petitioner's minor children's lives were in danger due to the lies that had been circulated about the neighborhood.

The petitioner testified that she feared for the lives of everyone involved particularly the lives of her minor children, and that by presenting proof that such lies existed, she could fix the situation.

The definition of duress; the requirements were met. Review of Affirmative Defense is sought for review in Petition for Rehearing. The appellate counsel failed to address it

C. Whether the district court erred in attributing the total loss amount to Cargill when calculating her base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines.

a. note: The courts reviewed for plain error, the connection between the petitioner and all of the accounts in question in her case, particularly where the appellate counsel challenged the total loss amount as was attributed to her as opposed to her being held accountable only for the total amount that came into accounts connected to her.

however, the issue preserved at trial was 'the differences' in monetary amounts - as were documented in Investigative Summary reports made by criminal investigator as being two distinctive dollar amounts, Fraud or Mistake; Condition of mind (Rule 9 Pleading) was preserved by the petitioner at trial.

1. opinion: Cargill cannot show that any error occurred, much less a plain error. "Tax loss is the total amount of loss that was the object of the offense (i.e., the loss that would have resulted had the offense been successfully completed)."

U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1 (c)(1)

b. note: In the case in question, the transactions had been successfully completed. monies found to have been deposited and withdrawn where discovered after the fact, so the U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1 (c)(1)

"Tax loss" rule is the wrong rule, but where the petitioner raised the issue of Falsified Claims and fraud, what should have been reviewed was the Fraud that was perpetrated by the criminal investigator.

But for the ineffective assistance on appeal, where the appellate counsel failed to raise meritorious claims on appeal, and failed to allow the petitioner to partake in the decision-making process, the wrong issue was raised, and that which was raised was not properly argued.

APPENDIX:

(ii) U.S. Court of Appeals Denied the prose defendant's Petition for Re-Hearing on Direct Appeal based upon Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

a. No opinion or reason was provided as for why the timely petition was denied.

b. The petition listed viable issues that had been preserved at trial by the prose defendant that the appointed appellate counsel failed to raise

c. The petitioner declared that the appointed counsel failed to allow input from the prose defendant, and failed to consult with the defendant before filing his brief

d. The petitioner adamantly and fully expressed her desire to have input and control over the appeal and the issues to be raised

e. The appellate counsel's failure to consult the defendant and allow input or control, and his failure to raise any meritorious issues on appeal, constitutes Ineffective Assistance on Appeal (Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel)

f. The Appellate Courts' denial of the Petition for Re-Hearing of Appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel is herein sought for review.

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(i) Appendix

(vi) Any other material essential to understand the Petition

a.) Appellant's brief due December 5, 2022 (see enclosed)

b.) Petitioner's request for Extension of Time to file -

NO ACTION NOTICE (The Appellant brief was filed on November 28th) (see enclosed)

c.) Petition for Rehearing DENIED (see enclosed)

d.) All mail sent to appellate Counsel J.D. Lloyd
and all mail sent to hybrid Counsel J.D. Bramer
(Attorneys on record) Returned to Sender
(see enclosed)