

No. _____

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ALFREDO MARTINEZ-RUBIO,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX

/s/ Kevin Joel Page

JASON HAWKINS
Federal Public Defender
Northern District of Texas
TX State Bar No. 00759763
525 Griffin Street, Suite 629
Dallas, TX 75202
(214) 767-2746
(214) 767-2886 Fax

KEVIN J. PAGE **
Assistant Federal Public Defender
Northern District of Texas
TX State Bar No. 24042691
525 Griffin Street, Suite 629
Dallas, TX 75202
(214) 767-2746
(214) 767-2886

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Appendix B Judgment and Sentence of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, entered January 31, 2022. *United States v. Martinez-Rubio*, Dist. Court 4:21-CR-225-P.

APPENDIX A

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

No. 22-10109

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 7, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

ALFREDO MARTINEZ-RUBIO,

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:21-CR-225-1

Before HO, OLDHAM, and DOUGLAS, *Circuit Judges.*

PER CURIAM:*

Alfredo Martinez-Rubio pled guilty to illegally reentering the United States after removal. The district court sentenced him to 10 years' imprisonment and 3 years' supervised release. Martinez-Rubio claims (1) that the district court plainly erred by considering his 1995 murder conviction when enhancing the statutory maximum punishment and (2) that the

* This opinion is not designated for publication. *See 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.*

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prosecution should have alleged his murder conviction in the indictment. We disagree.

I.

In 2021, immigration officials found Alfredo Martinez-Rubio in the United States illegally. Because he had previously been removed from the United States in 2017, the Government indicted Martinez-Rubio for illegal reentry after removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He pled guilty.

Martinez-Rubio’s presentence report (“PSR”) identified a guidelines range of 84 to 105 months’ imprisonment. The PSR also noted that Martinez-Rubio had a 1995 Texas murder conviction. This prior “aggravated felony” increased the applicable statutory maximum from 2 years to 20. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). At sentencing, the district court imposed an above-guidelines yet below-statutory-maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release.

Martinez-Rubio timely appealed. Our jurisdiction is proper under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

II.

Martinez-Rubio alleges two errors. He (A) argues that his 1995 murder conviction is not an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). Then he (B) contends that because his murder conviction increased the statutory maximum, it should have been alleged in the indictment. Both claims fail.

A.

Start with Martinez-Rubio’s challenge to the § 1326(b)(2) statutory-maximum enhancement. Ordinarily, the maximum punishment for a § 1326 violation is 2 years’ imprisonment. *Id.* § 1326(a). Congress, however, increased the maximum to 10 years when the convict has a prior felony

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conviction, *id.* § 1326(b)(1), and to 20 years if that felony is “aggravated,” *id.* § 1326(b)(2). The court below applied the 20-year maximum because it considered Martinez-Rubio’s murder conviction an “aggravated felony.”

For the first time on appeal, Martinez-Rubio challenges that determination. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), an “aggravated felony” is defined in relevant part as either an enumerated offense such as “murder” or any other “crime of violence” for which a term of imprisonment of at least one year was imposed. *Id.* § 1101(a)(43)(A), (F). And an offense is a “crime of violence” if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). It might seem obvious that Martinez-Rubio’s murder conviction constitutes a “murder” conviction under *Id.* § 1101(a)(43)(A).

But in this area of law, we cannot follow obviousness and common sense. Rather, to determine whether a prior state murder conviction constitutes “murder” under § 1101(a)(43)(A), we generally apply the “categorical approach.” “The categorical approach considers only the statutory definition of the offense of conviction, rather than the underlying facts of the actual offense, to determine whether the offense meets the [federal] definition of [the corresponding] aggravated felony.” *Rodriguez v. Holder*, 705 F.3d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 2013). And to determine the definition of the relevant aggravated felony (here, murder), we consider the “generic, contemporary meaning” of that offense. *United States v. Adair*, 16 F.4th 469, 470 (5th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). How? By “looking to various sources—such as ‘the Model Penal Code, the LaFave and Scott [criminal law] treatises, modern state codes, and dictionary definitions.’” *United States v. Hernandez-Montes*, 831 F.3d 284, 288 (5th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). If Texas’s murder statute proscribes conduct outside the scope of the “generic” federal definition of murder, then the State’s offense is not

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categorically an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(A). *See Moncrieffe v. Holder*, 569 U.S. 184, 190–91 (2013).

If, however, the State statute is “divisible,” we instead apply the so-called “modified categorical approach.” *See Descamps v. United States*, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013); *United States v. Rodriguez-Flores*, 25 F.4th 385, 388 (5th Cir. 2022). Statutes are “divisible” when they “list elements in the alternative, and thereby define multiple crimes.” *Mathis v. United States*, 579 U.S. 500, 505 (2016). By contrast, “indivisible” statutes “enumerate[] various factual means of committing a single element”—thus defining only a single crime with multiple permutations. *Id.* at 506. When a defendant is convicted under a “divisible” statute, we apply the “modified categorical approach” by “look[ing] to a limited class of documents (for example, the indictment, jury instructions, or plea agreement and colloquy) to determine what crime, with what elements, [the] defendant was convicted of.” *Id.* at 505–06. We “then compare that crime . . . with the relevant generic offense.” *Id.* at 506. And just as with the categorical approach, the ultimate inquiry is whether the State crime of conviction proscribes conduct outside the ambit of the generic offense. If so, then it is not an “aggravated felony.”

Martinez-Rubio claims his murder conviction is not a murder conviction under § 1101(a)(43)(A), so the district court erred by subjecting him to a 20-year maximum. Even if Martinez-Rubio in fact committed intentional murder when he shot his sister-in-law in the head and chest, Martinez-Rubio nevertheless claims the Texas murder statute is *indivisible*—thus requiring this court to ignore the manner Martinez-Rubio killed his sister-in-law and instead view the statute as a whole.[†] Martinez-Rubio further

[†] At the time Martinez-Rubio killed his sister-in-law, the Texas Penal Code provided that a person commits “murder” if he:

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argues that the felony-murder component of the Texas statute (§ 19.02(a)(3)) sweeps more broadly than his proposed definition of generic murder and lacks “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).

Even assuming Martinez-Rubio is correct on the merits of his claim, he still cannot satisfy the relevant standard of review. “Because [Martinez-Rubio] did not object to the sentencing enhancement in the district court, we review for plain error.” *See United States v. Reyes-Ochoa*, 861 F.3d 582, 585 (5th Cir. 2017). So to prevail, Martinez-Rubio must prove (1) that the district court erred, (2) that the error was “clear or obvious,” and (3) that the error affected his “substantial rights.” *Puckett v. United States*, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (“[I]f the above three prongs are satisfied, the court of appeals has the discretion to remedy the error.”). And a district court’s error is only “clear or obvious” when the relevant legal question is beyond “reasonable dispute.” *Ibid.* Thus, we very rarely find plain error unless “controlling circuit or Supreme Court precedent has reached the issue in question”—and resolved it in defendant’s favor. *United States v. Scott*, 821 F.3d 562, 570–71 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting *United States v. Fields*, 777 F.3d 799, 802 (5th Cir. 2015));

- (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual;
- (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual; or
- (3) commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from the commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(a) (West 1974). The current Texas Penal Code is phrased identically, but § 19.02(a) is now codified at § 19.02(b).

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accord *United States v. Ceron*, 775 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 2014) (“When the case law is unsettled, we cannot say that any error is clear or obvious.”); *United States v. Evans*, 587 F.3d 667, 671 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Even where [appellant’s] argument requires only extending authoritative precedent, the failure of the district court to do so cannot be plain error.” (quotation omitted)).

Martinez-Rubio cannot clear that hurdle because his claim turns on a variety of questions that the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court have yet to resolve, including: (1) whether the Texas murder statute is “divisible” or “indivisible”; (2) whether, under the categorical and/or modified categorical approach, the Texas murder statute falls within the “generic” federal definition of murder; (3) what the “generic” federal definition of murder even is; and (4) which prongs of the Texas murder statute cover conduct that meets 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)’s articulation of “crime of violence.”

Accordingly, even if the district court erred—and Martinez-Rubio is right about the answers to all four above-mentioned and unresolved questions—there is no way any such error was “plain.” After all, “an error is considered plain, or obvious, only if the error is *clear* under existing law.” *United States v. Salinas*, 480 F.3d 750, 756 (5th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). And as we have held in various recent opinions concerning many of the same questions presented in this appeal, the governing law in this domain is not clear. *See, e.g., United States v. Quinonez-Saa*, 741 F. App’x 973, 976 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (“Given the lack of controlling precedent, we conclude that any error by the district court was not plain because . . . the relevant sources indicate that whether Texas felony murder comports with the generic definition is subject to reasonable dispute.”); *United States v. Hernandez-Morales*, 681 F. App’x 362, 366 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“[W]e have never before considered whether the Illinois first degree murder statute is broader than the enumerated offense of murder, nor have we even

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adopted a definition of generic murder. . . . In the absence of any authority on point, we therefore decline to conclude that any error committed by the district court was plain.”); *United States v. Rubio-Sorto*, 760 F. App’x 258, 259 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (same).

B.

Martinez-Rubio’s second challenge is also deficient. In his sole contemporaneous objection to the PSR, Martinez-Rubio argued that his prior murder conviction should have been alleged in the indictment. This contention is foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres v. United States*, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). Martinez-Rubio reasserts it merely to preserve it.

AFFIRMED.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

Fort Worth Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ALFREDO MARTINEZ-RUBIO

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

Case Number: 4:21-CR-00225-P(01)

U.S. Marshal's No.: 63955-509

Levi Thomas, Assistant U.S. Attorney

Michael Lehmann, Attorney for the Defendant

On September 29, 2021 the defendant, ALFREDO MARTINEZ-RUBIO, entered a plea of guilty as to Count One of the Indictment filed on August 24, 2021. Accordingly, the defendant is adjudged guilty of such Count, which involves the following offense:

<u>Title & Section</u>	<u>Nature of Offense</u>	<u>Offense Ended</u>	<u>Count</u>
8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)and (b)(2)	Illegal Reentry After Deportation	3/22/2021	One

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 5 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to Title 18, United States Code § 3553(a), taking the guidelines issued by the United States Sentencing Commission pursuant to Title 28, United States Code § 994(a)(1), as advisory only.

The defendant shall pay immediately a special assessment of \$100.00 as to Count One of the Indictment filed on August 24, 2021.

The defendant shall notify the United States Attorney for this district within thirty days of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid.

Sentence imposed January 27, 2022.



MARK T. PITTMAN
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Signed January 31, 2022.

Judgment in a Criminal Case
Defendant: ALFREDO MARTINEZ-RUBIO
Case Number: 4:21-CR-00225-P(1)

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IMPRISONMENT

The defendant, ALFREDO MARTINEZ-RUBIO, is hereby committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to be imprisoned for a term of **One Hundred Twenty (120) months** as to Count One of the Indictment filed on August 24, 2021. This sentence shall run consecutively to any future sentence which may be imposed in the parole revocation in Case No. 673368 in the 179th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas.

The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be placed on supervised release for a term of **Three (3) years** as to Count One of the Indictment filed on August 24, 2021.

As a condition of supervised release, upon the completion of the sentence of imprisonment, the defendant shall be surrendered to a duly-authorized immigration official for deportation in accordance with the established procedures provided by the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC § 1101 et seq. As a further condition of supervised release, if ordered deported or removed, the defendant shall remain outside the United States.

In the event the defendant is not deported immediately upon release from imprisonment, or should the defendant ever be within the United States during any portion of the term of supervised release, the defendant shall also comply with the standard conditions contained in the Judgment and shall comply with the mandatory and special conditions stated herein:

- 1) The defendant shall report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where he or she is authorized to reside within 72 hours of release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs the defendant to report to a different probation office or within a different time frame;
- 2) After initially reporting to the probation office, the defendant will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how and when to report to the probation officer, and the defendant shall report to the probation officer as instructed;
- 3) The defendant shall not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where he or she is authorized to reside without first getting permission from the court or the probation officer;
- 4) The defendant shall answer truthfully the questions asked by the probation officer;
- 5) The defendant shall live at a place approved by the probation officer. If the defendant plans to change where he or she lives or anything about his or her living arrangements (such as the people the defendant lives with), the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10 days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, the defendant shall notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change;

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- 6) The defendant shall allow the probation officer to visit the defendant at any time at his or her home or elsewhere, and the defendant shall permit the probation officer to take any items prohibited by the conditions of the defendant's supervision that he or she observed in plain view;
- 7) The defendant shall work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation excuses the defendant from doing so. If the defendant does not have full-time employment, he or she shall try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses the defendant from doing so. If the defendant plans to change where the defendant works or anything about his or her employment (such as the position or the job responsibilities), the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, the defendant shall notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change;
- 8) The defendant shall not communicate or interact with someone the defendant knows is engaged in criminal activity. If the defendant knows someone has been convicted of a felony, the defendant shall not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the probation officer;
- 9) If the defendant is arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, the defendant shall notify the probation officer within 72 hours;
- 10) The defendant shall not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was designed , or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person, such as nunchakus or tasers);
- 11) The defendant shall not act or make an agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant without first getting the permission of the court;
- 12) If the probation officer determines that the defendant poses a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer may require the defendant to notify the person about the risk and the defendant shall comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the person and confirm that the defendant has notified the person about the risk; and,
- 13) The defendant shall follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

In addition the defendant shall:

- not commit another federal, state, or local crime;
- not possess illegal controlled substances;
- not possess a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon;
- cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the U.S. probation officer;

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Defendant: ALFREDO MARTINEZ-RUBIO

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submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court;

pay the assessment imposed in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3013; and,

not illegally reenter the United States if deported or allowed voluntary departure.

FINE/RESTITUTION

The Court does not order a fine or costs of incarceration because the defendant does not have the financial resources or future earning capacity to pay a fine or costs of incarceration.

Restitution is not ordered because there is no victim other than society at large.

Judgment in a Criminal Case

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Defendant: ALFREDO MARTINEZ-RUBIO

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RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on _____ to _____
at _____, with a certified copy of this judgment.

United States Marshal

BY
Deputy Marshal