

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>State v. Hilbert</i> (Missouri Supreme Court, Mar. 21, 2023).....	Pet. App. 1
<i>State v. Hilbert</i> (Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Jun. 28, 2022).....	Pet. App. 16
Order Denying Motion for Rehearing, May 2, 2023	Pet. App. 41

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

STATE OF MISSOURI,

Respondent,

v.

JACOB HILBERT,

APPELLANT

Opinion issued March 21, 2023

No. SC99747

**APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
CITY OF ST. LOUIS**

Jacob Hilbert appeals the circuit court’s judgment finding him guilty of two counts of first-degree statutory sodomy and one count of first-degree child molestation. Hilbert claims the circuit court plainly erred by proceeding to a bench trial without obtaining a constitutionally sufficient waiver of his right to a jury trial. Hilbert also contends the circuit court plainly erred by admitting a video recording pursuant to section 492.304.¹ Finding no plain error, this Court affirms the circuit court’s judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

In September 2018, Hilbert was charged with

¹ All statutory references are to RSMo 2016, unless otherwise specified.

the above crimes. Hilbert's case was called for a jury trial in January 2020. Hilbert was present when voir dire commenced.

During jury selection, counsel and the prospective jurors engaged in thorough, honest, and fervent discussions of what burden of proof the jury would have to abide by and the fairness and impartiality that would be required of the jurors who were selected to hear this case involving allegations of sexual abuse of a child. On the second day of jury selection, Hilbert's counsel made an inappropriate remark to the prospective juror panel, which rendered proceeding with jury selection unfair. Consequently, the circuit court dismissed the jury panel because it was "blown" and set a new date for Hilbert's jury trial.

Several weeks later, a docket entry indicates Hilbert's case was set for a bench trial. The docket entry and record contain no indication of what prompted the shift to a bench trial. Significantly, the following exchange occurred in Hilbert's presence at a pretrial hearing:

[The Court]: So I think, [defense counsel], you've represented that you're wanting a bench trial instead of a jury trial; correct?

[Defense Counsel]: That is correct, your Honor.

[The Court]: I think today we're just here talking about – so we will do it that way starting tomorrow – talking about any motions in limine that either side has and anything else you guys have for me.

Hilbert's bench trial began the following day. Hilbert did not raise any concerns or object to proceeding without a jury. However, Hilbert was not personally questioned about waiving his right to a jury before the bench trial.

At trial, the State sought to admit a video recording of the victim's forensic interview pursuant to section 492.304.² Katherine Knudson, a forensic interviewer with the Children's Advocacy Center, testified she conducted the interview of the victim, reviewed the video recording of the interview, and found the video recording to be a true and accurate depiction of the interview. Hilbert's counsel was asked if he had any objection to the video recording's admission, to which he replied "No objection, your Honor." The court admitted the video recording at that point.

At the close of the State's evidence, in Hilbert's presence, the court and counsel discussed Hilbert's waiver of the right to a jury trial. Specifically, the following exchange took place:

[The State]: Your Honor, I don't know. Was there ever a written waiver of a jury trial filed for this? Because I want to make sure that's

² Prior to Hilbert's first trial setting, the State filed a notice of intent to admit the video recording of the victim's forensic interview pursuant to section 492.304. During a pretrial hearing on the matter, Hilbert's counsel objected to the video recording's admission because the forensic interview occurred nearly two years after the date of Hilbert's alleged crimes. The court overruled Hilbert's counsel's objection at that time.

filed for the record.

[Defense Counsel]: I'll do it.

[The Court]: There wasn't, but we will do that.

[Defense Counsel]: I think we went on the record and said it. We were on the record and said it.

[The Court]: Yeah.

Nevertheless, a written jury waiver was never filed with the court.

The court found Hilbert guilty on all counts. During the sentencing hearing, Hilbert's mother made a statement in Hilbert's presence regarding the jury trial waiver:

The stress was a major influence in the decision to go with the bench trial. [Hilbert]'s trial was moved several times, and each time, it took a toll on [Hilbert] and our family. The first, due to a death in our attorney's family. The second trial was started, but had a hung jury.³ The whole process was extremely debilitating, and we were all concerned that [Hilbert] could get a fair trial, as it seemed a huge pool of the jury had experiences that may lead to a conflict. This led us to ask whether a bench trial should be considered. After some research, our attorney advised that a judge

³ Hilbert's mother was presumably referencing the "blown" jury panel following Hilbert's counsel's inappropriate comment.

would know what proof beyond a reasonable doubt is better than anybody, and [Hilbert] decided to go that route.

Following the pronouncement of his sentence, the court examined Hilbert regarding his assistance of counsel:

[The Court]: Did [defense counsel] explain your rights in a jury trial rather than in a bench trial?

[Hilbert]: I decline to answer.

[The Court]: Was it your decision to go to trial?

[Hilbert]: I decline to answer.

Hilbert also declined to answer all other questions. Hilbert subsequently filed a motion for new trial, which did not include claims of error regarding his alleged jury waiver or the admission of the victim's forensic interview video recording. The circuit court overruled the motion. This appeal follows.⁴

Standard of Review

Hilbert concedes his arguments on appeal are not preserved for review. Accordingly, Hilbert requests plain error review pursuant to Rule 30.20. Rule 30.20 provides, in pertinent part: "Whether briefed or not, plain errors affecting substantial rights

⁴ After an opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted transfer. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.

may be considered in the discretion of the court when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom.” *See also State v. Brandolese*, 601 S.W.3d 519, 526 (Mo. banc 2020).

Plain error review is a two-step process:

The first step requires a determination of whether the claim of error facially establishes substantial grounds for believing that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted. All prejudicial error, however, is not plain error, and plain errors are those which are evident, obvious, and clear. If plain error is found, the court then must proceed to the second step and determine whether the claimed error resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice.

State v. Minor, 648 S.W.3d 721, 731 (Mo. banc 2022) (internal quotation omitted).

Analysis

I. The Sufficiency of Hilbert’s Waiver of His Right to a Jury Trial

In his first point on appeal, Hilbert argues he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial. Hilbert contends the record establishes only his counsel intended to waive the right to a jury trial. He claims that, without any affirmative actions on his part, the waiver was not constitutionally sufficient and the circuit court plainly erred.

a. Overview of Waiver of the Right to a Jury Trial

The constitutions of the United States and Missouri both guarantee a defendant in a criminal case the right to a jury trial. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Mo. Const. art. I, secs. 18(a), 22(a). A defendant may waive this right with the consent of the court. Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 22(a). Not every attempted waiver, however, is sufficient. *See State v. Baxter*, 204 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Mo. banc 2006). While a defendant may waive the right to a jury trial with the consent of the court, “such waiver by the defendant shall be made in open court and entered of record.” *Id.* at 652; Rule 27.01(b).⁵ To satisfy this standard, the waiver “must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” *Baxter*, 204 S.W.3d at 653. “The best practice for a trial court is to question the defendant personally, on the record, to ensure that the defendant understands the right, understands what is lost in the waiver, has discussed the issue with defense counsel, and voluntarily intends to waive the right.” *Id.* at 655. Even if a defendant is not personally questioned on the record, however, a valid waiver may occur if the record establishes a defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his or her right to a jury trial. *Id.* at 654-55.⁶

⁵ All references to Rule 27.01(b) are to the version of the rule effective from January 1, 1980 to June 30, 2022.

⁶ This Court previously stated a waiver must appear in the record with “unmistakable clarity.” *See Baxter*, 204 S.W.3d at 653 (quoting *State v. Bibb*, 702 S.W.2d 462, 466 (Mo. banc 1985)). Significantly, the “unmistakable clarity” language that originated in *Bibb* was only used to emphasize the constitution

This Court addressed a similar challenge in *Baxter*. *Id.* at 652. In that case, the defendant’s counsel informed the circuit court of an agreement to waive the defendant’s right to a jury trial and proceed with a bench trial, in exchange for the State’s agreement to reduce an arson charge from a class B to a class C felony. *Id.* The defendant was present and remained silent while his counsel announced the agreement and waiver. *Id.* The circuit court, however, never personally questioned the defendant about waiving his right to a jury trial or whether he had discussed the right with his attorney. *Id.* After the defendant was found guilty, he “expressed dissatisfaction with his trial counsel on two issues, neither involving the denial of a jury trial.” *Id.* The defendant appealed, arguing his waiver of a jury trial did not appear in the record with unmistakable clarity. *Id.*

This Court rejected the defendant’s argument, holding his waiver was sufficient because certain facts in the record established his waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. *Id.* at 654. Specifically, this Court relied upon two factors to reach its conclusion. *Id.* “First is the fact that Baxter has never alleged, even on appeal, that he was not informed of the right by trial counsel, that he did not

and Rule 27.01(b) require the record to show the defendant’s assent to waiver. 702 S.W.2d at 465-66. This Court’s use of the term “unmistakable clarity” did not create a new, heightened standard for establishing a valid jury waiver. An appellate court’s sole focus must be upon whether the record establishes a defendant’s waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent and, therefore, constitutionally sufficient.

understand the right, that he did not voluntarily waive the right, or that he would have asserted the right if questioned by the judge.” *Id.* Second, this Court emphasized the defendant “struck a bargain” with the State for lesser charges in exchange for his waiver, which presumably required his involvement and approval. *Id.*

Conversely, Missouri courts have repeatedly held a waiver is not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent when the only evidence of waiver comes from defense counsel’s bare assertions. *See, e.g., State v. Feldt*, 512 S.W.3d 135, 145 (Mo. App. 2017); *State v. Williams*, 417 S.W.3d 360, 362 (Mo. App. 2013); *State v. Beam*, 334 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Mo. App. 2011) (“The fact that Beam’s counsel may have requested a bench trial in her presence, without more, does not demonstrate ‘with unmistakable clarity’ that Beam ‘voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently’ waived her right to a jury.”); *State v. Freeman*, 189 S.W.3d 605, 610 (Mo. App. 2006). In *Williams*, the sole evidence of the defendant’s intent to waive his right to a jury came from a statement by his counsel in a pretrial motion and his counsel’s affirmative answer to the court’s opening question of whether the jury had been waived. 417 S.W.3d at 363. Accordingly, the court of appeals held the circuit court committed plain error by proceeding to a bench trial because the record did not contain “something more” than a bare assertion by defense counsel.⁷ *Id.*

⁷ In *Williams*, the court of appeals appears to have created a “something more” test when the waiver of a jury trial is not made by the defendant in open court and entered on the record. While there may need to be evidence in the record indicating the

b. Hilbert's Waiver Was Sufficient

Just as in *Baxter*, “[t]his case turns on whether there are facts in the record that demonstrate that [Hilbert’s] waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” See 204 S.W.3d at 654. Hilbert argues he did not personally take any affirmative action to waive his privilege. Viewing the record as a whole, however, this Court disagrees and finds Hilbert knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial.

Crucially, like in *Baxter*, Hilbert “has never alleged, even on appeal, that he was not informed of the right by trial counsel, that he did not understand the right, that he did not voluntarily waive the right, or that he would have asserted the right if questioned by the judge.” *Id.* Additionally, as in *Baxter*, Hilbert was present both times his counsel acknowledged the waiver of his right to a jury trial and never objected. *Id.*⁸ While this Court acknowledges “the failure to

defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial when his counsel waives the right on the record without comment from the defendant, there is no basis in this Court’s prior caselaw articulating a “something more” test. *Baxter* and this Court’s prior cases merely require the facts and circumstances from the record establish the waiver was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. *Baxter*, 204 S.W.3d at 653. To the extent *Williams* and other court of appeals cases suggest a “something more” test, they should no longer be followed.

⁸ See also *State v. Seibert*, 103 S.W.3d 295, 299 (Mo. App. 2003) (holding the circuit court did not plainly err because the defendant admitted to committing the underlying criminal acts and “the announcement of the waiver, and the trial court’s acceptance of it, were in the record of the proceedings, as was the

object, in many circumstances, may not be determinative,” *id.*, Hilbert did not just fail to object to his counsel’s statements during the proceedings. Following sentencing, the court directly questioned Hilbert as to whether his counsel explained the distinctions between a bench trial and jury trial. Tellingly, Hilbert neither asserted a negative answer nor expressed concern or confusion. In fact, this point weighs more heavily against Hilbert than it did in *Baxter* because of the specific questions the court asked Hilbert. This Court is not persuaded by Hilbert’s argument that it is pertinent he raised no other complaints. Regardless of whether Hilbert raised other complaints, the court examined him on a waiver-related topic, and he could have complained or expressed a lack of understanding if he never intended for his then- completed trial to have been conducted without a jury. *See State v. Groomes*, 656 A.2d 646, 655 (Conn. 1995) (“We decline to allow the defendant to preserve a ground for appeal merely by refusing to respond to the court’s questions regarding whether he waived his right to a jury trial.”).

Furthermore, when viewed collectively, several other factors also establish Hilbert’s waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. For one, the procedural history of this case is crucial. Hilbert was present for the jury selection process and the jury

fact that Defendant was present and voiced no objection”); *United States v. Leja*, 448 F.3d 86, 95 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding a valid waiver when “Leja’s counsel represented that Leja wanted a bench trial, and Leja’s conduct reflected no objection and, in fact, according to the district court, demonstrated his assent through his facial expression”).

panel's dismissal in his first trial setting. In other words, Hilbert possessed firsthand knowledge of when and how a jury was to be selected. *See United States v. Page*, 661 F.2d 1080, 1083 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding, although the defendant neither signed a written waiver nor made any affirmative statement to the court regarding waiver, his waiver was valid because, among other reasons, he was a "learned, articulate man suffering neither language nor perceptive difficulty"). This was not a situation in which Hilbert may not have realized, until too late, that his case was proceeding without a jury. Given his participation in the previous jury selection process, Hilbert necessarily understood and acquiesced to his second trial setting being conducted without a jury. Moreover, Hilbert's mother's statement provides some additional support for the notion that Hilbert knew of and discussed his right to a jury trial with his counsel.⁹

Accordingly, even though there was no sentence reduction agreement like in *Baxter*, the collective circumstances found in the record establish Hilbert's

⁹ To be clear, this Court is not placing great significance upon the testimony of Hilbert's mother and is not relying upon her statement as evidence of Hilbert's intent. Evident from the "blown" jury selection process, Hilbert's mother's statement, however, acknowledged the difficulty of selecting an impartial jury due to the offenses for which Hilbert was charged. She stated this led to a discussion with Hilbert's counsel as to whether a bench trial was a better option, which led Hilbert to take this path. At most, her statement provides additional evidence that Hilbert had been informed of his right to a jury trial and discussed the topic with his counsel.

waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. 204 S.W.3d at 654-55; *see also Groomes*, 656 A.2d at 656 (holding that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, “[w]hat is reflected on the record is not a ‘bare’ assertion by counsel, but rather a silent defendant who, through his attorney, made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial”). For these same reasons, Hilbert’s case is readily distinguishable from cases like *Williams*, 417 S.W.3d at 363-64, and *Beam*, 334 S.W.3d at 706.¹⁰ Hilbert’s waiver, therefore, was constitutionally sufficient, and the circuit court did not plainly err.

II. Admission of the Interview Recording

In his second point on appeal, Hilbert claims the circuit court plainly erred by admitting the video recording of the victim’s forensic interview pursuant to section 492.304. Specifically, Hilbert contends the State failed to provide evidence establishing the

¹⁰ This Court reiterates:

The best practice for a trial court is to question the defendant personally, on the record, to ensure that the defendant understands the right, understands what is lost in the waiver, has discussed the issue with defense counsel, and voluntarily intends to waive the right. If this is done, the defendant will have no grounds later to contend that his [or her] waiver was ineffective.

Baxter, 204 S.W.3d at 655. As in *Baxter*, “[t]he mere fact that this on-the-record exchange did not take place in this case, however, does not mean that plain error occurred.” *Id.*

recording equipment was capable of making an accurate recording, the operator of the equipment was competent, and the recording was accurate and had not been altered. See section 492.304.1(3).¹¹

This Court analyzed a similar challenge to the admission of a tape recording under the common law in *State v. McFadden*, 369 S.W.3d 727, 752-53 (Mo. banc 2012). In *McFadden*, the State sought to admit a tape recording of a jailhouse phone conversation among three individuals. *Id.* at 752. One of the three participants on the call testified the tape recording was a fair and accurate recording of their conversation. *Id.* at 753. Consequently, when examining the common law foundational requirements for the admission of a tape recording, this Court found “the fact a tape recording exists demonstrates the device was capable of recording[.]” *Id.* Additionally, the participant’s testimony about the fairness and accuracy of the recording established

¹¹ Section 492.304 states, in pertinent part:

1. In addition to the admissibility of a statement under the provisions of section 492.303, the visual and aural recording of a verbal or nonverbal statement of a child when under the age of fourteen who is alleged to be a victim of an offense under the provisions of chapter 565, 566 or 568 is admissible into evidence if:

....

(3) The recording equipment was capable of making an accurate recording, the operator of the equipment was competent, and the recording is accurate and has not been altered[.]

the recording was authentic and correct, with no changes, additions or deletions. *Id.* Finally, this Court held the existence of the recording, combined with the participant's testimony as to its fairness and accuracy, created a reasonable inference that the operator of the recording equipment was competent. *Id.*

Similar to *McFadden*, the video recording's existence, combined with Knudson's testimony, satisfied the requirements of section 492.304.1(3). First, the video recording's existence, combined with Knudson's testimony, as to its accuracy, demonstrated the recording device was capable of accurately recording. *See id.* Second, Knudson's testimony established the recording was accurate and had not been altered. *See id.* Finally, the recording's existence, combined with Knudson's testimony, created a reasonable inference that the operator of the equipment was competent. *See id.* Therefore, the circuit court did not plainly err by allowing the video recording's admission pursuant to section 492.304.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the circuit court's judgment is affirmed.

Robin Ransom, Judge

All concur.

In the Missouri Court of Appeals

Eastern District

DIVISION TWO

STATE OF MISSOURI,

Respondent,

v.

JACOB HILBERT,

APPELLANT

No. ED109608

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis

1822-CR02383-01

Filed: June 28, 2022

This bench-tryed criminal case involves whether a defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial was violated as a result of the trial court's failure to obtain an unmistakably clear and constitutionally sufficient waiver of that right from the defendant. Every criminal defendant in Missouri – including a defendant like the one in this case who has been charged with very serious felonies – has a federal and state constitutional right to have a jury decide his guilt or innocence.¹ Although a defendant in a felony

¹ See *State v. Williams*, 417 S.W.3d 360, 362 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013); see also *Duncan v. State of La.*, 391 U.S. 145, 154, 157-58

case may waive his right to a jury trial with consent of the court, the waiver is constitutionally sufficient only if the record shows with unmistakable clarity that the waiver was made by the defendant himself knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently; in other words, the record must show “[a] fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the [defendant]” and “[a] personal communication of the defendant to the court that he chooses to relinquish the right [to a jury trial].”² For the reasons discussed below, we find no such unmistakably clear and constitutionally sufficient waiver occurred in this case, and, therefore, the trial court plainly erred in holding a bench trial.³

Jacob Hilbert (“Defendant”) appeals the judgment, following a bench trial, finding him guilty of two counts of first-degree statutory sodomy and one count of first-degree child molestation, and sentencing him to a total of thirty years of imprisonment. Because we find the trial court plainly erred in holding a bench trial without an unmistakably clear and constitutionally sufficient

(1968).

² See *Taylor v. Illinois*, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18, 418 n.24 (1988) (final set of bracketed alterations in original) (partially quoting *Doughty v. State*, 470 N.E.2d 69, 70 (Ind. 1984)); *State v. Baxter*, 204 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Mo. banc 2006) (citing Mo. Const. art. 1, section 22(a)); *Williams*, 417 S.W.3d at 362-63, 364; see also Missouri Supreme Court Rule 27.01(b) (effective from January 1, 1980 to June 30, 2022).

³ See *id.*; see also U.S. Const. amends. VI and XIV; Mo. Const. art. I, sections 18(a) and 22(a); Missouri Supreme Court Rule 30.20 (2022); *State v. Mendez-Ulloa*, 525 S.W.3d 585, 595 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017); *State v. McKay*, 411 S.W.3d 295, 304 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013).

waiver from Defendant of his right to a jury trial, we vacate Defendant's convictions and sentences, and we remand this case for a new trial.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 18, 2018, Defendant was charged with the above crimes. Subsequently, on January 6, 2020, Defendant's case was called for a jury trial, and the trial court commenced voir dire. The next day, the trial court dismissed the jury panel following improper questioning by the attorneys during voir dire which the court found would render proceeding with jury selection "unfair."

After the trial court dismissed the jury, defense counsel never filed a motion indicating Defendant wished to waive his right to a jury trial; nevertheless, the trial court scheduled a bench trial for February 25. At a pre-trial hearing on February 24, which occurred in Defendant's presence, the following colloquy occurred:

[The trial court]: So I think, Mr. Goulet [, i.e., defense counsel], you've represented that you're wanting a bench trial instead of a jury trial; correct?

[Defense counsel]: That is correct, your Honor.

The trial court did not question Defendant about waiving his right to a jury trial during any pre-trial hearing or during the bench trial. At the close of the State's evidence, the prosecutor asked defense counsel if a written waiver of a jury trial had been

filed. Defense counsel replied it had not been filed, but he intended to file a written waiver at some point in the future. However, Defendant never signed a written jury waiver, nor was a written jury waiver ever filed with the trial court.

After the close of all of the evidence, the trial court found Defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree statutory sodomy and one count of first-degree child molestation. Subsequently, Defendant's sentencing hearing took place on April 12, 2021. During Defendant's mother's testimony at the hearing, she asked the court to reconsider the evidence in the case and referred to her alleged knowledge of the decision to proceed with a bench trial.

The court then questioned Defendant regarding issues that could arise during post-conviction proceedings, and the following exchange occurred:

[The trial court]: Did [your attorney] explain your rights in a jury trial rather than in a bench trial?

[Defendant]: I decline to answer.

[The trial court]: Was it your decision to go to trial?

[Defendant]: I decline to answer.

Similarly, Defendant responded "I decline to answer" to the trial court's specific questions regarding defense counsel's performance and Defendant's

decision to testify on his own behalf.

The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total of thirty years of imprisonment. Defendant now appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant raises two points. In Defendant's first point on appeal, he argues the trial court plainly erred by proceeding to a bench trial without an unmistakably clear and constitutionally sufficient waiver from Defendant of his right to a jury trial. For the reasons discussed below, we find this argument has merit and requires our Court to, *inter alia*, remand this case for a new trial.⁴

Defendant concedes his argument on appeal is not preserved for review, and, therefore, requests plain error review under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 30.20 (2022).⁵ *See id.*; *State v. McKay*, 411 S.W.3d 295, 304 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013). Under plain-error review, we will only grant a defendant relief if

⁴ Because we find Defendant's argument in his first point has merit and requires our Court to, *inter alia*, remand this case for a new trial, we need not address Defendant's second point which contends the trial court erred in admitting a specific piece of evidence. *See State v. Henderson*, 551 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) and *State v. Bristow*, 190 S.W.3d 479, 482 n.3 (Mo. App. S.D. 2006) (overruled on other grounds) (both declining to address a defendant's point on appeal under similar circumstances).

⁵ All further references to Rule 30.20 are to Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2022).

we find an evident, obvious, and clear error occurred, and such an error affected the defendant's rights so substantially that a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice resulted. *McKay*, 411 S.W.3d at 304; *see also State v. Mendez-Ulloa*, 525 S.W.3d 585, 595 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017).

A. Applicable Missouri and U.S. Supreme Court Case Law

“A criminal defendant in Missouri has both a federal and state constitutional right to have a jury decide his guilt or innocence.” *State v. Williams*, 417 S.W.3d 360, 362 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (citation omitted); *see also Duncan v. State of La.*, 391 U.S. 145, 154, 157-58 (1968); U.S. Const. amends. VI and XIV; Mo. Const. art. 1, sections 18(a) and 22(a). A defendant in a felony case may waive his right to a jury trial with the consent of the trial court, provided such waiver is “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” *Williams*, 417 S.W.3d at 362-63 (quoting *State v. Baxter*, 204 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Mo. banc 2006)) (citing Mo. Const. art. 1, section 22(a)); *see also Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann*, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942) (“an accused, in the exercise of a free and intelligent choice, and with the considered approval of the court, may waive trial by jury”); Missouri Supreme Court Rule 27.01(b) (effective from January 1, 1980 to June 30, 2022).⁶ Moreover, while a trial court is not required to question the defendant on the record, “the waiver must appear in the record with unmistakable

⁶ All further references to Rule 27.01(b) are to the version of the Rule effective from January 1, 1980 to June 30, 2022.

clarity.” *Baxter*, 204 S.W.3d at 653 (internal quotations omitted) (citing, *inter alia*, Mo. Const. art. 1, section 22(a) and Rule 27.01(b)); *see also* Rule 27.01(b) (providing in relevant part that in felony cases, a defendant’s waiver of a jury trial “shall be made in open court and entered of record”).

“[C]ertain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are of such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate.” *Florida v. Nixon*, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004). “A defendant, [the U.S. Supreme Court has] affirmed, has ‘the ultimate authority’ to [, *inter alia*,] determine ‘whether to . . . waive a jury [trial] . . .’” *Id.* (citations omitted). Accordingly, an attorney cannot waive a defendant’s right to a jury trial for him “without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the [defendant].” *Taylor v. Illinois*, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18, 418 n.24 (1988). Furthermore, in order for a waiver to be constitutionally sufficient, “[the] record must [also] show [a] personal communication of the defendant to the court that he chooses to relinquish the right [to a jury trial].” *See id.* (final set of bracketed alterations in original) (quoting *Doughty v. State*, 470 N.E.2d 69, 70 (Ind. 1984)).

Therefore, a court commits evident, obvious, and clear error by proceeding to a bench trial in the absence of any specific indication that a defendant himself knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial. *Williams*, 417 S.W.3d at 362-63, 364; *see also Florida*, 543 U.S. at 187; *Taylor*, 484 U.S. at 417-18, 418 n.24; *Adams*, 317 U.S. at 275.

Moreover, this violation of a defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial is a manifest injustice and entitles the defendant to plain-error relief. *See id.*; *see also* U.S. Const. amends. VI and XIV; Mo. Const. art. I, sections 18(a) and 22(a); Rule 30.20; *Mendez-Ulloa*, 525 S.W.3d at 595; *McKay*, 411 S.W.3d at 304.

B. The Record in This Case Does Not Contain an Unmistakably Clear and Constitutionally Sufficient Waiver of Defendant's Right to a Jury Trial

For the reasons set out in detail below, we hold the record in this case does not contain an unmistakably clear and constitutionally sufficient waiver of Defendant's right to a jury trial, (1) under the Missouri and U.S. Supreme Court case law discussed above; (2) because this Court's decision in *State v. Williams* is particularly instructive; and (3) because *State v. Baxter* – the Missouri Supreme Court case relied upon by the State – is distinguishable, and because the State's primary arguments that there was an unmistakably clear and constitutionally sufficient jury waiver in this case have no merit.

1. Applying Missouri and U.S. Supreme Court Case Law to the Record

In this case, there are only four references in the record to the decision to proceed to a bench trial, none of which (standing on their own or collectively) constitute an unmistakably clear and constitutionally sufficient waiver of Defendant's right to a jury trial under the applicable Missouri and U.S. Supreme

Court case law previously discussed in Section II.A. of this opinion.

The first reference in the record to the decision to proceed to a bench trial was an exchange between the trial court and defense counsel during the pre-trial hearing on February 24. The following colloquy occurred:

[The trial court]: *So I think Mr. Goulet [i.e., defense counsel] you've represented that you're wanting a bench trial instead of a jury trial; correct?*

[Defense counsel]: *That is correct, your Honor.*

(emphasis added).

The second reference to the decision to proceed to a bench trial took place during an exchange between the prosecutor and defense counsel at the close of the State's evidence. Specifically, the prosecutor asked defense counsel if a written waiver of a jury trial had been filed. *Defense counsel replied* it had not been filed, but *he intended to file a written waiver* at some point in the future. However, Defendant never signed a written jury waiver, nor was a written jury waiver ever filed with the trial court.

The last two references in the record to the decision to proceed to a bench trial took place during Defendant's sentencing hearing, with only Defendant's mother and the court referring to the decision. *During Defendant's mother's testimony* at

the hearing, *she referred to her alleged knowledge of the decision to proceed with a bench trial*. And finally, when the court questioned Defendant regarding issues that could arise during post-conviction proceedings, *Defendant declined to answer any questions* from the court and the following exchange occurred:

[The trial court]: Did [your attorney] explain your rights in a jury trial rather than in a bench trial?

[*Defendant*]: *I decline to answer.*

[The trial court]: Was it your decision to go to trial?

[*Defendant*]: *I decline to answer.*

(emphasis added).

Although Defendant was present when each of the above circumstances occurred, at most they collectively show that *defense counsel* wanted a bench trial instead of a jury trial, *defense counsel* intended to file a written jury waiver (but ultimately did not), *Defendant's mother* had alleged knowledge of the decision to proceed with a bench trial, and *Defendant declined to answer any questions* from the court during sentencing. Importantly, nothing in the record remotely constitutes “[a] personal communication of [Defendant] to the court that he ch[ose] to relinquish the right [to a jury trial]” or “[a] fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of [Defendant] [of the right to a jury trial].” *See Taylor*, 484 U.S. at 417-18,

418 n. 24 (fourth set of bracketed alterations in original) (partially quoting *Doughty*, 470 N.E.2d at 70). Furthermore, the record contains no specific indication that Defendant himself knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial. *See Williams*, 417 S.W.3d at 362-63, 364; *see also Florida*, 543 U.S. at 187; *Taylor*, 484 U.S. at 417-18, 418 n.24; *Adams*, 317 U.S. at 275.

Under these circumstances, and because the U.S. Supreme Court has held a defendant “has the ultimate authority to . . . determine whether to . . . waive a jury [trial] ” and that the decision is “of such moment that [it] cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate,” *Florida*, 543 U.S. at 187, we hold the trial court plainly erred in failing to obtain an unmistakably clear and constitutionally sufficient waiver of the right to a jury trial from Defendant. *See id.* (citations and internal quotations omitted); *Taylor*, 484 U.S. at 417-18, 418 n.24; *Adams*, 317 U.S. at 275; *Baxter*, 204 S.W.3d at 653; *Williams*, 417 S.W.3d at 362-63, 364; *see also* U.S. Const. amends. VI and XIV; Mo. Const. art. I, sections 18(a) and 22(a); Rule 27.01(b); Rule 30.20; *Mendez-Ulloa*, 525 S.W.3d at 595; *McKay*, 411 S.W.3d at 304.

2. This Court’s Decision *State v. Williams* is Instructive

Our holding that the trial court plainly erred in failing to obtain an unmistakably clear and constitutionally sufficient waiver of the right to a jury trial from Defendant is also particularly supported by this Court’s decision in *State v. Williams*, 417 S.W.3d 360.

In *Williams*, the record showed defense counsel submitted a written pre-trial motion asserting the defendant wished to waive his right to a jury trial; the pre-trial motion was unsigned and unattested to by the defendant; and prior to opening statements, defense counsel orally affirmed the right to a jury trial had been waived. *Id.* at 363. On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court plainly erred by proceeding to a bench trial without an unmistakably clear waiver from the defendant of his right to a jury trial. *Id.* at 362. Our Court agreed, holding “[u]pon such scant evidence [in the record], we cannot conclude . . . with unmistakable clarity that [the defendant] knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial” because, (1) “the record reflect[ed] only that counsel waived the right to a jury trial, not that [the defendant] himself made any express waiver” and (2) “the [record] provide[d] no indication that [the defendant] himself either understood or ratified [counsel’s] decision.” *Id.* at 363 (emphasis omitted).

The evidence in the instant case’s record is even more sparse than the “scant evidence” recited in *Williams*. *See id.* First, unlike in *Williams*, there was no written pre-trial motion on the issue of waiver filed in this case. *See id.* The legal file does not contain a written jury waiver signed by Defendant, nor was there ever such a waiver filed with the trial court. Second, unlike the defense counsel in *Williams* who orally affirmed the right to a jury trial had been waived, defense counsel in this case merely stated on the record that counsel wanted a bench trial instead of a jury trial and that counsel intended to file written jury waiver. *See id.*

Accordingly, and similar to the record in *Williams*, (1) the record in this case reflects – at most – that defense counsel waived the right to a jury trial, not that Defendant himself made any express waiver; and (2) the record here provides no indication that Defendant himself either understood or ratified defense counsel’s purported decision to waive the right to a jury trial. *See id.* Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude with unmistakable clarity that Defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial or that a constitutionally sufficient jury waiver occurred. *See id.*

3. *State v. Baxter* – the Missouri Supreme Court Case Relied Upon by the State – is Distinguishable, and the State’s Primary Arguments That There Was an Unmistakably Clear and Constitutionally Sufficient Jury Waiver in This Case Have No Merit

The State argues there was an unmistakably clear and constitutionally sufficient waiver of Defendant’s right to a jury trial primarily because defense counsel requested a bench trial in Defendant’s presence and because Defendant failed to object to proceeding with a bench trial. In support of this argument, the State relies on, *inter alia*, *State v. Baxter*, 204 S.W.3d 650.

In *Baxter*, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed a defendant’s convictions following a bench trial when the record showed that, *inter alia*, (1) defense counsel stated in open court that there was

an agreement to waive the defendant's right to a jury trial and the defendant did not object; and (2) the defendant and defense counsel participated in the decision to waive defendant's right to a jury trial, which was evidenced by the defendant's and his counsel's negotiation with the prosecutor and agreement to proceed with a bench trial in exchange for a reduction of the charges. *See id.* at 652, 654; *see also Williams*, 417 S.W.3d at 363-64 (similarly characterizing *Baxter*). The circumstances here are readily distinguishable because in this case Defendant and defense counsel did not negotiate with the prosecutor, Defendant and his counsel did not agree to proceed with a bench trial in exchange for a reduction of charges, and there is no other similar evidence that Defendant and defense counsel participated in the decision to waive the defendant's right to a jury trial. *See Williams*, 417 S.W.3d at 363 and *State v. Beam*, 334 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011) (both similarly distinguishing *Baxter*). Accordingly, the State's reliance on *Baxter* is misplaced.

Moreover, in decisions post-*Baxter*, our Court has rejected the State's primary arguments here – that there was an unmistakably clear and constitutionally sufficient waiver of Defendant's right to a jury trial because defense counsel requested a bench trial in Defendant's presence and because Defendant failed to object to proceeding with a bench trial. *See State v. Feldt*, 512 S.W.3d 135, 143-44 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (holding a record does not demonstrate with unmistakable clarity that a defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial where the defendant

failed to object to proceeding with a bench trial); *Beam*, 334 S.W.3d at 705 (holding a record does not demonstrate with unmistakable clarity that a defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial where defense counsel requested a bench trial in the defendant's presence). Finally, if we were to give credence to the State's arguments, it would set an untenable, unreasonable, and impracticable precedent and standard, (1) requiring defendants with no trained legal education – even those with a low IQ or minimal education level – to know and fully understand their constitutional right to a jury trial even when, as here, there is nothing in the record demonstrating such knowledge and understanding; and (2) requiring such defendants to be an advocate on their own behalf and to have the often-times-unwise initiative to speak directly to a trial judge (and possibly even interrupt court proceedings), notwithstanding having representation of legal counsel.

In sum, *Baxter* is distinguishable, and the State's primary arguments that there was an unmistakably clear and constitutionally sufficient jury waiver in this case have no merit.

C. Conclusion as to Defendant's First Point on Appeal and This Court's Guidance to Parties and Trial Courts

For the reasons discussed above, Defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial was violated as a result of the trial court's failure to obtain an unmistakably clear and constitutionally sufficient waiver of that right from Defendant, and, therefore,

the trial court plainly erred in holding a bench trial.

Importantly, the error in this case could have been avoided if, at a minimum, defense counsel had announced in open court, on the record, and in Defendant's presence, that Defendant was voluntarily waiving his right to a jury trial *and* Defendant had signed a written jury waiver which was filed with the trial court.⁷ See *Taylor*, 484 U.S. at 417-18, 418 n.24 (indicating a waiver is constitutionally sufficient if the record shows both "[a] fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the [defendant]" and "[a] personal communication of the defendant to the court that he chooses to relinquish the right [to a jury trial]") (final set of bracketed alterations in original) (partially quoting *Doughty*, 470 N.E.2d at 70); *Williams*, 417 S.W.3d at 363-64 (indicating a written jury waiver signed by the defendant in conjunction with defense counsel's oral affirmation of waiver in open court could be constitutionally sufficient to show the defendant himself knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial).⁸

⁷ Nothing in this opinion should be read to suggest defense counsel's failure to ensure there was an unmistakably clear and constitutionally sufficient jury waiver on the record in this case constitutes malfeasance or that defense counsel should be penalized if any malfeasance occurred. In fact, "[the U.S. Supreme Court] . . . ha[s] placed the entire responsibility on the prosecution to show that the claimed waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made" "in [] cases concerning the waiver of fundamental rights" including "the right[] . . . to demand a jury trial." *Barker v. Wingo*, 407 U.S. 514, 529 (1972).

⁸ But see *Feldt*, 512 S.W.3d at 145 (indicating error could be avoided if, at a minimum, "[defense] counsel noted on the record

The error in this case could have also been avoided if the trial court would have engaged in a two-step procedure which we hold is “the very best practice”: (1) “question[ing] the defendant on the record to ensure he understands what is lost in the waiver [of his constitutional right to a jury trial], has discussed the issue with defense counsel, and voluntarily intends to waive that right,” and (2) then obtaining a written signed jury waiver from the defendant on the record, in open court, and with defense counsel present.⁹ See *Taylor*, 484 U.S. at 417-

and in the defendant’s presence that the defendant was voluntarily waiving his right to a jury trial”) (citing *Beam*, 334 S.W.3d at 706).

⁹ We recommend a trial court swear a defendant in and ask the following questions of the defendant (or engage in a similar line of questioning) regarding the knowing and voluntary nature of his jury waiver in open court and on the record: (1) “Do you understand you have the right to have a jury trial in this case or you have the right to have a bench trial?”; (2) “A bench trial means that I would be the one who would hear all the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses and decide your guilt or innocence. Do you understand?”; (3) “And then only in the event that there would be a conviction, then I would determine the appropriate sentence. Do you understand?”; (4) “Do you understand you have the right to a jury trial, and a jury could determine your guilt or innocence of any charges that are against you?”; (5) “Do you understand it can only be a jury composed of twelve fair and impartial individuals?”; (6) “If you decide to have a jury trial, all twelve fair and impartial individuals must agree unanimously as to you being guilty or not guilty. Do you understand?”; (7) “In terms of sentencing, if there was a conviction after a jury trial, you could have the jury determine whatever sentence during the penalty phase, and at that penalty phase your attorney would have the right to present additional evidence, and additional instruction would be given to the jury. Do you understand?”; (8) “Do you understand that if you give up

18, 418 n.24; *Feldt*, 512 S.W.3d at 145 (emphasis omitted) (limiting “the very best practice” to (1), i.e., questioning the defendant on the record); *see also Baxter*, 204 S.W.3d at 655 and *Williams*, 417 S.W.3d at 363-64. We recommend trial courts question defendants on the record and then obtain a written signed jury waiver from defendants to ensure criminal defendants’ constitutional right to a jury trial is adequately protected.

Defendant’s first point on appeal is granted.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we vacate Defendant’s convictions and sentences, and we remand this case

your right to a jury trial and you receive a conviction at the bench trial you can’t come back later and say that you want a jury trial?”; (9) “Have you had enough time to consult with your attorney as to the decision of whether or not you want a jury trial in this case?”; (10) “And what is your decision?”; (11) “Are you waiving your right to a jury trial out of your own free will and voluntarily and do you attest that no one has threatened, forced, or promised you to do anything in exchange for you waiving your right to a jury trial?”; and (12) “Is there anything further you wish to tell the court about your decision to waive your right to a jury trial?” Moreover, after the preceding line of questioning, we recommend a trial court then obtain a written signed jury waiver from the defendant on the record, in open court, with defense counsel present, signed by the defendant, defense counsel, and the trial judge. *See Trial Judges Criminal Benchbook*, Office of State Courts Administrator, Chapter 32: “Court Tried Cases”, Section 32.7: “Waiver Form (used in St. Louis County Circuit Court)” (updated and revised April 19, 2021).

for a new trial.

/s/ Robert M. Clayton

ROBERT M. CLAYTON III, Presiding Judge

Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., J., concurs.

Thomas C. Clark II, J., dissents in a separate opinion.

In the Missouri Court of Appeals

Eastern District

DIVISION TWO

STATE OF MISSOURI,

Respondent,

v.

JACOB HILBERT,

APPELLANT

No. ED109608

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis

1822-CR02383-01

Filed: June 28, 2022

DISSENT

My opinion respectfully deviates from the opinion of the learned majority.

Understandably, the majority points to the trial court's attenuated record addressing Defendant's intention to definitively waive his right to a jury trial, but my viewpoint is the collective record satisfies the legal standard and the requirements of *State v. Baxter*, 204 S.W.3d 650 (Mo. banc 2006).

The majority provides an accurate and well-researched summary of the larger legal landscape involving this issue. A Defendant may waive his right to trial by jury in open court. Rule 27.01(b). The waiver must be “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent” and made with “unmistakable clarity.” *Baxter*, 204 S.W.3d at 653 (citing *State v. Bibb*, 702 S.W.2d 462, 466 (Mo. banc 1985) and Mo. Const. art. 1, section 22(a)); *see also State v. Williams*, 417 S.W.3d 360, 362 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013). These controlling principles are not in dispute.

Baxter and *Williams* are the two key Missouri cases applying these legal principles to facts resembling those presented in this case. In *Baxter*, the Missouri Supreme Court evaluated the specific circumstances of the defendants’ waiver of a jury trial through his counsel’s statements and held that the waiver was “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent,” which did not support the defendant’s claim of plain error. 204 S.W.3d at 653. In *Williams*, this court considered a similar claim and held that the waiver was not sufficient after evaluating the factual specifics in that case. 417 S.W.3d at 362. The disposition of this appeal turns on whether the circumstances here more closely resemble *Baxter* or *Williams*.

In my view, our matter is more similar to *Baxter*. In *Baxter*, defendant’s attorney confirmed his client’s intention to waive his right to a jury trial and proceed with a court-tried bench trial on reduced charges following negotiations with the state. *Baxter*, 204 S.W.3d at 652. The trial court did not question the defendant directly about his intended waiver or his

discussions with his attorney, but the defendant observed his attorney confirm his desire to proceed with a bench trial in open court, before the judge and in the prosecutor's presence. *Id.*

After the court found the defendant guilty and proceeded to ask the defendant about his legal representation after sentencing, the defendant complained about his representation on two different issues but did not raise the jury trial waiver. *Id.* On appeal, the defendant argued that he had not waived a jury trial with the required "clarity." *Id.* at 653. Our Supreme Court disagreed, holding that waiver was sufficient because it was "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." *Id.*

The Court identified two factors as critical to its conclusion. First, the fact that Baxter did not allege that he was not informed of the right by trial counsel, that he did not understand the right, that he did not voluntarily waive the right, or that he would have asserted the right if questioned by the judge. *Id.* Second, the Court noted that defendant and the prosecutor "struck a bargain for lesser charges in exchange for the waiver," which supported a finding that the waiver was voluntary because normally a defendant approves any plea deal. *Id.*

The first factor cited in *Baxter* is present in this matter. Like *Baxter*, Defendant's attorney initially announced to the court and on the record that Defendant intended to proceed with a bench trial instead of a jury trial. Also like *Baxter*, Defendant does not allege that he did not understand the right he was waiving or assert that he did not waive the

right to a jury trial.

Baxter's second corroborative factor involving the prosecutor agreement is not present in the current matter.

However, other circumstances present in this case demonstrate that Hilbert's waiver was fully knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Most notably, the record shows Appellant understood his right to a jury trial because he previously participated, witnessed and experienced a significant portion of the jury selection process before it was curtailed at the previous court setting. Although absent from *Baxter*, this fact is as compelling as the prosecutor agreement about lesser charges when demonstrating a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the jury trial. Following his personal experience of witnessing jury selection on the prior court setting, Defendant observed his entire court-tried bench trial begin, unfold and conclude without raising a single objection. During the trial, his attorney even reasserted his client's intention to file a written waiver, despite failing to do so.

The Missouri Supreme Court noted a further consideration relevant to our circumstances, specifically that Baxter had the opportunity to voice his dissatisfaction with counsel at the sentencing. *Id.* at 654. Although afforded his chance to complain about counsel forfeiting his right, Appellant chose not to do so. *Id.*

Here, when the trial court asked Defendant about the effectiveness of his counsel following the guilty verdict, Defendant refused to answer any questions. Defendant argues that his silence at this point cannot be held against him, but the law does not support this position. *Baxter*, 204 S.W.3d at 654. At the post-sentence proceeding, Defendant chose not to express any dissatisfaction about the jury trial waiver and, equally important, he did not disavow that he voluntarily waived the right or that he would have insisted on proceeding with a jury trial when questioned by the court. *Id* at 654. All of these factors are deserving of our consideration when reflecting on Defendant's intention to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial, in my opinion. While the facts here are not identical to *Baxter*, the collective circumstances carry equal weight when compared to the factors cited in *Baxter*, which should allow us to affirm the trial court.

The *Williams* decision is not to the contrary. *Williams* holds that a waiver through counsel, on its own, is insufficient without "something more." 417 S.W.3d at 364, *see also State v. Beam*, 334 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). In *Baxter*, that "something more" was provided by the two factors discussed above. In our case additional factors provide "something more" to an equal degree as was present in *Baxter*. Thus, the requirement of *Williams* is met and Defendant has failed to show plain error requiring reversal of the judgment.

As always, the trial court should take the initiative to question the defendant directly to "ensure that the defendant understands the right,

understands what is lost in the waiver, has discussed the issue with defense counsel and voluntarily intends to waive the right.” *Baxter*, 204 S.W.3d at 655. Regrettably, this did not happen here. My viewpoint completely coincides with the majority opinion that the trial court should be encouraged to voir dire the defendant directly to erase any doubt about defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver. In this case, however, the record adequately reflects that Defendant intended to waive his right to a jury trial after considering his collective conduct and the events unfolding in his presence.

/s/ Thomas C. Clark II

Thomas C. Clark II, J.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
OPINION RELEASE
JANUARY SESSION, 2023
COURT EN BANC
No. SC99747

State of Missouri,
Respondent,

VS.

Jacob Hilbert,
Appellant.

APPEAL FROM:

Original Proceeding in Circuit Court of St. Louis
City

Date opinion filed: March 21, 2023

Motion for Rehearing overruled: May 2, 2023

DATE MAILED: May 2, 2023.

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MISSOURI
POST OFFICE BOX 150
JEFFERSON CITY, MISSOURI
65102

May 2, 2023

Daniel McPherson via e-filing system
Assistant Attorney General for State of Missouri

Joel J. Schwartz via e-filing system
Attorney for Appellant

In Re: State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Jacob
 Hilbert, Appellant.
 Missouri Supreme Court No. SC99747

Dear Counselors:

Please be advised the Court issued the following order
on this date in the above-entitled cause:

“Appellant’s Motion for rehearing overruled.”

The opinion is available to all counsel of record via
secure case.net.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Betsy Aubuchon
BETSY AUBUCHON

Nathan Theodore Swanson via e-filing system