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**APPENDIX**

## APPENDIX A

**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS**

NO. 23-0033

TONYA PARKS §  
v. § Dallas County,  
AFFILIATED BANK, §  
AFFILIATED BANK FSB, § 5<sup>th</sup> District.  
AFFILIATED BANK FSB, , §  
INC. BANCAFFILIATED, INC.,  
JOSHUA CAMPBELL AND  
KATHERINE CAMPBELL

May 26, 2023

Petitioner's petition for review, filed herein in the above numbered and styled case, having been duly considered, is ordered, and hereby is, denied.

August 18, 2023

Petitioner's motion for rehearing of petition for review, filed herein in the above numbered and styled case, having been duly considered, is ordered, and hereby is, denied.

I, BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Texas, do hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of the orders of the Supreme Court of Texas in the case numbered and styled as

above, as the same appear of record in the minutes of said Court under the date shown.

WITNESS my hand and seal of the Supreme Court of Texas, at the City of Austin, this the 18th day of August, 2023.

Blake A. Hawthorne, Clerk

By Monica Zamarripa, Deputy Clerk

**APPENDIX B**

**DISMISS and Opinion Filed December 20, 2022**

**In The  
Court of Appeals  
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

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**No. 05-21-00411-CV**

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**TONYA PARKS, Appellant**

**V.**

**AFFILIATED BANK, AFFILIATED BANK  
FSB, AFFILIATED BANK FSB, INC.,  
BANCAFFILIATED, JOSHUA CAMPBELL  
AND KATHERINE CAMPBELL, Appellees**

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**On Appeal from the  
County Court at Law No. 2  
Dallas County, Texas  
Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-01614-B**

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**ORDER**

I voluntarily recuse from hearing any matter in this case.

/s/ CRAIG SMITH  
JUSTICE

## APPENDIX C

Order entered December 20, 2022

**In The  
Court of Appeals  
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

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**No. 05-21-00411-CV**

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**TONYA PARKS, Appellant**

**V.**

**AFFILIATED BANK, AFFILIATED BANK  
FSB, AFFILIATED BANK FSB, INC.,  
BANCAFFILIATED, JOSHUA CAMPBELL  
AND KATHERINE CAMPBELL, Appellees**

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**On Appeal from the  
County Court at Law No. 2  
Dallas County, Texas  
Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-01614-B**

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### **ORDER**

**Before the Court En Banc<sup>1</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Smith not participating.

Before the Court is appellant's December 8, 2022 motion to recuse Chief Justice Burns, III, Justice Molberg, and Justice Pedersen, III.<sup>2</sup> Initially, we question whether the motion was timely filed, but in any event, we **DENY** the motion.<sup>3</sup>

/s/ ROBERT D. BURNS, III  
CHIEF JUSTICE

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<sup>2</sup> The motion to recuse was also directed at Justice Smith, who voluntarily recused by separate order.

<sup>3</sup> After Chief Justice Burns, III, and Justices Molberg and Pedersen, III, declined to recuse themselves, the motion was certified to and decided by the remaining justices *en banc*. See TEX. R. APP. P. 16.3(b). Other than determining not to voluntarily recuse, the challenged justices did not sit with the remainder of the Court when considering the motion to recuse as to themselves. See TEX. R. APP. P. 16.3(b); *F.S. New Product, Inc. v. Strong Industries, Inc.*, 129 S.W.3d 594, 597 n.3 (Tex. App—Houston [1st. Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (*en banc*); *McCullough v. Kitzman*, 50 S.W.3d 87, 88 (Tex. App—Waco 2001, pet denied); *Sears v. Olivarez*, 28 S.W. 3d 611, 615 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 200, no pet.); *Waco* 2001, pet denied).

## APPENDIX D

Order entered November 30, 2022

**In The  
Court of Appeals  
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

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**No. 05-21-00411-CV**

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**TONYA PARKS, Appellant**

**V.**

**AFFILIATED BANK, AFFILIATED BANK  
FSB, AFFILIATED BANK FSB, INC.,  
BANCAFFILIATED, JOSHUA CAMPBELL  
AND KATHERINE CAMPBELL, Appellees**

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**On Appeal from the  
County Court at Law No. 2  
Dallas County, Texas  
Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-01614-B**

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**ORDER  
Before the Court En Banc<sup>1</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Carlyle, Goldstein, J.J., not participating

Before the Court is appellant's November 7, 2022 motion for reconsideration en banc. Appellant's motion is **DENIED**.

/s/ ROBERT D. BURNS, III  
CHIEF JUSTICE

## APPENDIX E

DISMISS and Opinion Filed November 30, 2023

**In The  
Court of Appeals  
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

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**No. 05-21-00411-CV**

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**TONYA PARKS, Appellant**

**V.**

**AFFILIATED BANK, AFFILIATED BANK  
FSB, AFFILIATED BANK FSB, INC.,  
BANCAFFILIATED, JOSHUA CAMPBELL  
AND KATHERINE CAMPBELL, Appellees**

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**On Appeal from the  
County Court at Law No. 2  
Dallas County, Texas  
Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-01614-B**

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## ORDER

Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Molberg,  
and Justice Pedersen, III

We dismissed this appeal on October 21, 2022,  
after appellant failed to file her brief as ordered to

do so. Before the Court is appellant's November 7, 2022 motion to vacate our October 21 memorandum opinion and for rehearing. We DENY the motion.

/Robert D. Burns, III/  
ROBERT D. BURNS, III  
CHIEF JUSTICE

## APPENDIX F

DISMISS and Opinion Filed October 21, 2022

**In The  
Court of Appeals  
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

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**No. 05-21-00411-CV**

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**TONYA PARKS, Appellant**

**V.**

**AFFILIATED BANK, AFFILIATED BANK  
FSB, AFFILIATED BANK FSB, INC.,  
BANCAFFILIATED, JOSHUA CAMPBELL  
AND KATHERINE CAMPBELL, Appellees**

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**On Appeal from the  
County Court at Law No. 2  
Dallas County, Texas  
Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-01614-B**

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### **MEMORANDUM OPINION**

Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Molberg, and  
Justice Pedersen, III Opinion by Chief Justice Burns

In light of the recusal of Justice Bonnie  
Goldstein, an original panel member, we **GRANT**

rehearing on the Court's own motion, VACATE our opinion and judgment of September 14, 2022, and REINSTATE the appeal. This is now the opinion of the Court. Appellant's brief in this appeal has not been filed despite the deadline being extended five times. It was first due April 25, 2022 and last due August 26, 2022. The primary reason appellant has sought the extensions is her dissatisfaction with the accuracy of the reporter's record, even though, prior to the brief deadline first being set, the trial court held a hearing to determine the record's accuracy and a corrected record was filed as ordered by the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(e)(2),(3) (together providing that disputes concerning accuracy of reporter's record arising after record has been filed may be submitted to trial court for resolution, and, if trial court finds inaccuracies, reporter must correct record).

Our orders granting the second and third extensions cautioned appellant that further extension requests would be disfavored, and our orders extending the deadline the fourth and fifth times cautioned that failure to file the brief by the new deadlines could result in the appeal being dismissed without further notice. Despite the cautionary language, appellant has filed a sixth extension motion complaining again about the reporter's record but also asserting for the first time that the clerk's record, on file since August 5, 2021, is incomplete. Appellant requests the clerk's record be supplemented and seeks an extension of at least thirty days from the date the supplemental record is filed to file her brief. For the reasons that follow, we

deny the motion and dismiss the appeal. See *id.* 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b),(c).

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.6(d) allows an appellate court to extend the time for filing a brief on motion reasonably explaining the need for an extension. See *id.* 10.5(b), 38.6(d). A “reasonable explanation” is “any plausible statement of circumstances indicating that failure to file within the [required] period was not deliberate or intentional, but was the result of inadvertence mistake, or mischance.” *Garcia v. Kastner Farms, Inc.*, 774 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Tex. 1989) (quoting *Meshwert v. Meshwert*, 549 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex. 1977)); see also *Head v. Twelfth Court of Appeals*, 811 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam) (citing, in part, *Kastner Farms* in concluding motion for leave to file late brief reasonably explained delay).

An incomplete record can be the basis for an extension of time to file the brief, see *TEX. R. APP. P.* 38.6(a), and if the clerk’s record here had recently been filed, it being incomplete might justify the extension. But the clerk’s record here has been on file for over a year.

Acknowledging the substantial amount of time that has lapsed, appellant explains in a reply to appellees’ opposition to the extension that she did not request a supplemental clerk’s record sooner because she “did not feel the need to drive to Dallas to pick up the clerk’s record because she was still waiting on the reporter’s record[,]” the reporter “has caused multiple distractions,” she assumed the clerk “would not omit” documents from the record, and she “wanted to trust the process by not having to

**check every Dallas County Department to ensure she is not being deprived of documents.”** (emphasis in original) Our case management system, however, reflects appellant was provided a copy of the clerk’s record on August 6, 2021, the day after the record was filed. Further, at the time the April 25, 2022 deadline for the filing of the brief was set, the original deadline, appellant’s concerns with the accuracy of the reporter’s record had been addressed in accordance with the rules of appellate procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(e). With the brief being first due April 25 and appellant in possession of the clerk’s record for over seven months by that point, review of the clerk’s record should have begun before the original deadline, not four months later.

We conclude appellant has failed to reasonably explain the need for a sixth extension to file her brief. See *Brown v. Bryant*, 181 S.W.3d 901, 902 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (per curiam) (noting, in dismissing appeal because appellants failed to file their brief, that appellants’ third extension motion, which complained that reporter’s record was incomplete, had been denied because “appellants waited over six months (from date record was filed) to complain”); see also *Matter of Marriage of Barron*, 13-21-00398-CV, 2022 WL 1415014, \*1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg May 5, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (granting appellee’s motion to dismiss, concluding, in part, that explanation appellant provided in motion to extend time to file brief did not “satisfy the length of the delay”); *Green v. Grimes Cent. Appraisal Dist.*, No.

12-20-00179-CV, 2021 WL 126587, \*1-2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Jan. 13, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (noting, in dismissing appeal when appellant failed to file brief after having about four months to file, that appellant’s third motion seeking extension based on “COVID-19 pandemic” was denied). Accordingly, we deny the motion. And, having previously cautioned that failure to file the brief as ordered could result in the appeal being dismissed without further notice, we dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b),(c).

/Robert D. Burns, III/  
ROBERT D. BURNS, III  
CHIEF JUSTICE

210411F.P05

**Court of Appeals  
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

**JUDGMENT**

**TONYA PARKS, Appellant**

**No. 05-21-00411-CV V.**

**AFFILIATED BANK, AFFILIATED BANK FSB,  
AFFILIATED BANK FSB, INC.,  
BANCAFFILIATED, JOSHUA CAMPBELL AND  
KATHERINE CAMPBELL,**

**Appellees**

**On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2,  
Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-  
01614- B.**

**Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Burns, Justices  
Molberg and Pedersen, III participating.**

**In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date,  
we **DISMISS** the appeal.**

**Judgment entered October 21, 2022.**

## APPENDIX G

Order entered October 21, 2022

**In The  
Court of Appeals  
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

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**No. 05-21-00411-CV**

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**TONYA PARKS, Appellant**

**V.**

**AFFILIATED BANK, AFFILIATED BANK  
FSB, AFFILIATED BANK FSB, INC.,  
BANCAFFILIATED, JOSHUA CAMPBELL  
AND KATHERINE CAMPBELL, Appellees**

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**On Appeal from the  
County Court at Law No. 2  
Dallas County, Texas  
Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-01614-B**

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### ORDER

I voluntarily recuse myself from hearing any matter involving Tonya Parks as a party.

/s/ BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN  
JUSTICE

## APPENDIX H

DISMISS and Opinion Filed September 14, 2022

**In The  
Court of Appeals  
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

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**No. 05-21-00411-CV**

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**TONYA PARKS, Appellant**

**V.**

**AFFILIATED BANK, AFFILIATED BANK  
FSB, AFFILIATED BANK FSB, INC.,  
BANCAFFILIATED, JOSHUA CAMPBELL  
AND KATHERINE CAMPBELL, Appellees**

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**On Appeal from the  
County Court at Law No. 2  
Dallas County, Texas  
Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-01614-B**

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### **MEMORANDUM OPINION**

Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Molberg, and

Justice Goldstein

Opinion by Chief Justice Burns

Appellant's brief in this appeal has not been filed despite the deadline being extended five times. It was first due April 25, 2022 and last due August 26, 2022. The primary reason appellant has sought the extensions is her dissatisfaction with the accuracy of the reporter's record, even though, prior to the brief deadline first being set, the trial court held a hearing to determine the record's accuracy and a corrected record was filed as ordered by the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(e)(2),(3) (together providing that disputes concerning accuracy of reporter's record arising after record has been filed may be submitted to trial court for resolution, and, if trial court finds inaccuracies, reporter must correct record).

Our orders granting the second and third extensions cautioned appellant that further extension requests would be disfavored, and our orders extending the deadline the fourth and fifth times cautioned that failure to file the brief by the new deadlines could result in the appeal being dismissed without further notice. Despite the cautionary language, appellant has filed a sixth extension motion complaining again about the reporter's record but also asserting for the first time that the clerk's record, on file since August 5, 2021, is incomplete. Appellant requests the clerk's record be supplemented and seeks an extension of at least thirty days from the date the supplemental record is filed to file her brief. For the reasons that follow, we deny the motion and dismiss the appeal. See *id.* 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b),(c).

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.6(d) allows an appellate court to extend the time for filing a brief on motion reasonably explaining the need for an extension. See *id.* 10.5(b), 38.6(d). A “reasonable explanation” is “any plausible statement of circumstances indicating that failure to file within the [required] period was not deliberate or intentional, but was the result of inadvertence mistake, or mischance.” *Garcia v. Kastner Farms, Inc.*, 774 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Tex. 1989) (quoting *Meshwert v. Meshwert*, 549 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex. 1977)); see also *Head v. Twelfth Court of Appeals*, 811 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam) (citing, in part, *Kastner Farms* in concluding motion for leave to file late brief reasonably explained delay).

An incomplete record can be the basis for an extension of time to file the brief, see TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(a), and if the clerk’s record here had recently been filed, it being incomplete might justify the extension. But the clerk’s record here has been on file for over a year.

Acknowledging the substantial amount of time that has lapsed, appellant explains in a reply to appellees’ opposition to the extension that she did not request a supplemental clerk’s record sooner because she “did not feel the need to drive to Dallas to pick up the clerk’s record because she was still waiting on the reporter’s record[,]” the reporter “has caused multiple distractions,” she assumed the clerk “would not omit” documents from the record, and she “wanted to trust the process by not having to check every Dallas County Department to ensure she is not being deprived of

**documents.”** (emphasis in original) Our case management system, however, reflects appellant was provided a copy of the clerk’s record on August 6, 2021, the day after the record was filed. Further, at the time the April 25, 2022 deadline for the filing of the brief was set, the original deadline, appellant’s concerns with the accuracy of the reporter’s record had been addressed in accordance with the rules of appellate procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(e). With the brief being first due April 25 and appellant in possession of the clerk’s record for over seven months by that point, review of the clerk’s record should have begun before the original deadline, not four months later.

We conclude appellant has failed to reasonably explain the need for a sixth extension to file her brief. See *Brown v. Bryant*, 181 S.W.3d 901, 902 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (per curiam) (noting, in dismissing appeal because appellants failed to file their brief, that appellants’ third extension motion, which complained that reporter’s record was incomplete, had been denied because “appellants waited over six months (from date record was filed) to complain”); see also *Matter of Marriage of Barron*, 13-21-00398-CV, 2022 WL 1415014, \*1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg May 5, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (granting appellee’s motion to dismiss, concluding, in part, that explanation appellant provided in motion to extend time to file brief did not “satisfy the length of the delay”); *Green v. Grimes Cent. Appraisal Dist.*, No. 12-20-00179-CV, 2021 WL 126587, \*1-2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Jan. 13, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam)

(noting, in dismissing appeal when appellant failed to file brief after having about four months to file, that appellant's third motion seeking extension based on "COVID-19 pandemic" was denied). Accordingly, we deny the motion. And, having previously cautioned that failure to file the brief as ordered could result in the appeal being dismissed without further notice, we dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b),(c).

/Robert D. Burns, III/  
ROBERT D. BURNS, III  
CHIEF JUSTICE

210411F.P05

**Court of Appeals  
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

**JUDGMENT**

TONYA PARKS, Appellant

No. 05-21-00411-CV V.

AFFILIATED BANK, AFFILIATED BANK FSB,  
AFFILIATED BANK FSB, INC.,  
BANCAFFILIATED, JOSHUA CAMPBELL AND  
KATHERINE CAMPBELL,

Appellees

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2,  
Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-  
01614- B.

Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Burns, Justices  
Molberg and Goldstein participating.

In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date,  
we **DISMISS** the appeal.

Judgment entered September 14, 2022.

## APPENDIX I

## CAUSE NO. CC-19-01614-B

**Tonya Parks and § In the County Court**  
**Parks Realty Firm, LLC §**  
v. §  
§  
§  
**Affiliated Bank, §**  
**Affiliated Bank FSB, § At Law No. 2**  
**Affiliated Bank FSB, Inc. §**  
**Bancaffiliated, Inc., §**  
**Joshua Campbell §**  
**Katherine Campbell § Dallas County, Tx**

**ORDER ON DEFENDANTS AFFILIATED**  
**BANK, AFFILIATED BANK FSB,**  
**AFFILIATE BANK FSB, INC AND**  
**BANCAFFILIATED'S PLEA TO THE**  
**JURISDICTION**

On this day, the court considered Defendants Affiliated Bank, Affiliated Bank FSB, Affiliated Bank FSB, Inc., and BancAffiliated's Plea (the "Plea") to the Jurisdiction in the above— entitled and numbered cause. After reviewing said Plea, responses, replies, documents on file with the Court, and hearing arguments, the Court finds that the Plea is hereby GRANTED.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' Plea to the Jurisdiction is hereby GRANTED.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED Plaintiff Tonya Parks" claims, allegations. requests. and causes of action are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

This ORDER disposes of all claims and causes of action asserted in this case. **SIGNED** this 8 day of March, 2021.

/ Melissa J. Bellan  
Judge Presiding

## APPENDIX J

Dismissed and Opinion Filed May 3, 2018

**In The  
Court of Appeals  
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

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**No. 05-16-00784-CV**

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**TONYA PARKS, Appellant**

**V.**

**AFFILIATED BANK, AFFILIATED BANK  
FSB, AFFILIATED BANK FSB, INC.,  
BANCAFFILIATED, JOSHUA CAMPBELL  
AND KATHERINE CAMPBELL, Appellees**

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**On Appeal from the  
County Court at Law No. 3  
Dallas County, Texas  
Trial Court Cause No. CC-15-04540-C**

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### **MEMORANDUM OPINION**

Before Justices Lang-Miers, Fillmore, and Stoddart  
Opinion by Justice Fillmore

Tonya Parks and Parks Realty Firm, LLC  
(PRF) appealed from a trial court order signed by the

Honorable Sally Montgomery that dismissed appellants' claims against Affiliated Bank pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act, see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.011(West 2015) (the TCPA), and awarded Affiliated Bank \$29,876.40 in attorneys' fees. The record, however, reflects that Parks, individually and on behalf of PRF, orally agreed on the record not to appeal the order. Because Judge Montgomery did not modify the order to reflect that agreement, we abated this appeal and remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether Parks, individually and on behalf of PRF, voluntarily entered into an agreement under rule of civil procedure 11,<sup>1</sup> pursuant to which appellants forfeited their right to bring this appeal, and whether any agreement was enforceable.

The Honorable Ted Akin conducted an evidentiary hearing and determined Parks agreed in open court not to appeal the order dismissing appellants' claims and the agreement was enforceable pursuant to rule of civil procedure 11. Appellants filed a supplemental brief asserting (1) this Court erred by abating this appeal because any agreement made by Parks is unenforceable due to Judge Montgomery's violation of appellants' right to procedural due process, and (2) Judge Akin abused

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<sup>1</sup> Rule of civil procedure 11 states that, unless otherwise provided in the rules of civil procedure, "no agreement between attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and file with the papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of record." TEX.R.CIV.P.11.

his discretion by entering findings of fact and conclusions of law when there had not been a trial and by determining Parks did not enter into the agreement due to coercion or duress, the agreement was enforceable, Affiliated Bank complied with the agreement, and appellants breached the agreement. We dismiss this appeal.

### **Background**

Appellants sued Joshua A. Campbell and his former employer, Affiliated Bank, asserting a number of causes of action based on an internet posting by Campbell concerning Parks's work as a real estate agent. Campbell filed a motion to dismiss under the TCPA on grounds the claims against him were based on statements he made in connection with a matter of public concern and appellants could not establish by clear and specific evidence a *prima facie* case for each essential element of their claims. Campbell requested the dismissal of the claims against him and the award of reasonable attorneys' fees. At the hearing on Campbell's motion, Affiliated Bank argued it "should be included as far as being dismissed" because there was no evidence to support the causes of action asserted against it. Affiliated Bank also requested that it be awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to the TCPA. On March 24, 2016, Judge Montgomery signed an Order on Defendant Joshua Campbell's Motion to Dismiss (the March 24th Order), dismissing with prejudice appellants' claims against both Campbell and Affiliated Bank and awarding \$62,297.50 to Campbell and \$29,876.40 to Affiliated Bank for court costs,

reasonable attorneys' fees, and other expenses incurred in defending the litigation.

Appellants filed a motion for new trial. At the hearing on the motion, the parties agreed on the record that (1) Campbell and Affiliated Bank would not seek to recover the fees and expenses awarded in the March 24th Order, and (2) appellants would not appeal the March 24th Order. However, Parks subsequently filed a pro se notice of appeal for both herself and PRF. Affiliated Bank moved to dismiss the appeal based, in part, on Parks's agreement not to appeal the March 24th Order.<sup>2</sup> Parks and PRF responded Parks was "coerced by the trial court" into nonsuiting their claims under "extreme duress."

After retaining counsel, appellants filed an appellate brief arguing in four issues that the trial court erred by dismissing appellants' claims against Affiliated Bank and the dismissal violated appellants' right to procedural due process. Following oral argument, we abated this appeal and remanded the case to the trial court for findings relating to whether Parks, individually and on behalf of PRF, voluntarily entered into an agreement under rule of civil procedure 11, pursuant to which appellants forfeited their right to bring this appeal, and whether any agreement was enforceable.

In compliance with our order, Judge Akin conducted an evidentiary hearing on February 16,

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<sup>2</sup> On December 2, 2016 we dismissed appellant's appeal against Campbell because the notice of appeal was untimely as to him.

2018. Judge Akin admitted into evidence pleadings from the underlying proceedings as well as the transcript of the hearing on appellants' motion for new trial. Parks also testified about the hearing on appellants' motion for new trial and her state of mind at the time she agreed to the settlement. On February 26, 2018, Judge Akin entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. Judge Akin specifically found:<sup>3</sup>

1. Parks is at least forty-two years old, has a B.B.A. degree from the University of North Texas, is a licensed realtor, owns and operates her own company, and is a sophisticated businesswoman;
2. In the underlying case, appellants' motion for new trial was heard on June 13, 2016, more than seventy-five days after the March 24th Order was signed;
3. Appellants were represented by counsel during the hearing, and appellants' counsel was among the counsel who represented to Judge Montgomery that appellants' motion for new trial had been overruled by operation of law;
4. During the hearing, Judge Montgomery directed the parties to confer regarding potential settlement at three separate junctures, including one break that lasted for more than thirty minutes;
5. After the final break, during which Parks conferred with her counsel, the parties announced they had reached an agreement;

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<sup>3</sup> The numbering of the findings set out in this opinion do not correspond with the numbering of the findings in Judge Akin's findings of fact and conclusions of law.

6. Counsel for all parties agreed on the record that Campbell and Affiliated Bank would forego seeking to recover the attorneys' fees awarded in the March 24th Order in exchange for a "full waiver of any appeal or further filings" by appellants;

7. The agreement constituted a "dismissal with prejudice" with appellants "giving a full and complete release of all claims" against Affiliated Bank and Campbell;

8. Defense counsel requested that Parks give her verbal assent to the agreement on the record;

9. Appellants' counsel "made it clear to his client that it was her decision, stating 'I'm not telling you what to do. I'm not pressuring you. It's your decision'"

10. After Parks expressed reluctance about the agreement, Judge Montgomery asked her whether she was going to dismiss the case with prejudice;

11. Parks stated "whatever you guys want," and Judge Montgomery advised Parks that she was the only one who could make the agreement and Judge Montgomery could not do it for her;

12. Parks responded that she would accept the settlement, but indicated she had been "put in this position" and had not had the "representation she wanted to have";

13. Judge Montgomery advised Parks that she needed to say yes or no to the agreement and that Judge Montgomery could not make the choice for her;

14. Parks “tried to claim she was ‘forced’ to accept the settlement,” and Judge Montgomery cautioned her that the settlement “would not hold” under those circumstances;

15. Parks stated in open court, “I accept the deal”;

16. Affiliated Bank and Campbell complied with the agreement and did not pursue collection of the attorneys’ fees awarded in the March 24th Order; and

17. Appellants breached the agreement by filing a notice of appeal.

Judge Akin concluded Parks did not enter into the agreement due to coercion or duress from her counsel, the other parties, or Judge Montgomery, and the parties’ agreement was enforceable under rule of civil procedure 11.

We granted appellants’ request to file supplemental briefing, but specifically limited the supplemental briefing to “issues relating to the trial court’s rulings on objections at the February 16, 2018 hearing and the trial court’s February 27, 2018 findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Appellants filed a supplemental brief complaining in six issues, numbered five through ten, that this Court erred by abating this appeal because any agreement made by Parks was unenforceable due to Judge Montgomery’s violation of appellants’ right to procedural due process and Judge Akin abused his discretion by (1) entering findings of fact and conclusions of law in a case in which there was not a trial, and (2) determining Parks did not enter into the rule 11 agreement due to coercion or duress, the

rule 11 agreement was enforceable, Affiliated Bank and Campbell complied with the agreement, and appellants breached the agreement.

#### **Abating the Appeal**

In their fifth issue, appellants complain this Court erred by abating this appeal and remanding the case to the trial court for findings pertaining to any agreement between the parties. This complaint is outside the limited scope of issues on which we allowed supplemental briefing. Accordingly, we will not address appellants' fifth issue.

#### **Authority to Enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law**

In their sixth issue, appellants assert Judge Akin abused his discretion by entering findings of fact and conclusions of law because findings of fact and conclusions of law may be made only pursuant to rules of civil procedure 296 through 299a following a bench trial. Rule of civil procedure 296 provides that “[i]n any case tried in the district or county court without a jury, any party may request the court to state in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 296. “A case is ‘tried’ when the court’s judgment is based on an evidentiary hearing containing conflicting testimony.” R.H. v. Smith, 339 S.W.3d 756, 761 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.); see also Shanklin v. Shanklin, No. 13-15-00392-CV, 2016 WL 3962707, at \*2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 21, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). “Findings and conclusions are appropriate if there is an evidentiary hearing and the trial court is called upon to determine questions of fact based on conflicting evidence.” Ezy-Lift of Ca.,

Inc. v. EZY Acquisition, LLC, No. 01-13-00058-CV, 2014 WL 1516239, at \*3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 17, 2014, pet. denied) (quoting Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace Agric. Implement Workers of Am.-UAW v. Gen. Motors Corp., 104 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)).

Judge Akin held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether there was an agreement between the parties and whether any agreement was enforceable, and conflicting evidence was presented at the hearing. Accordingly, Judge Akin did not err by entering findings of fact and conclusions of law. See My Three Sons, Ltd. v. Midway/Parker Med. Ctr., L.P., No. 05-15-01068- CV, 2017 WL 2351082, at \*7 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting trial court is permitted to make findings of fact and conclusions of law following evidentiary hearing); R.H., 339 S.W.3d at 761 (concluding that, on proper request of party, trial court was required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law following hearing on motion at which conflicting evidence was presented). We resolve appellants' sixth issue against them.

**Findings of Fact and Conclusions of  
Law**

In their seventh through tenth issues, appellants argue Judge Akin abused his discretion by ruling Parks did not enter into the settlement agreement due to coercion or duress, the agreement is enforceable pursuant to rule of civil procedure 11, Affiliated Bank and Campbell complied with the agreement, and appellants breached the agreement.

*Standard of Review*

Findings of fact entered in a case tried to the court have the same force as a jury verdict upon questions. *Anderson v. City of Seven Points*, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991); *Scott Pelley P.C. v. Wynne*, No. 05-15-01560-CV, 2017 WL 3699823, at \*8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 28, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We thus review findings of fact by the same standards that are applied in reviewing the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury finding. *Anderson*, 806 S.W.2d at 794; *Scott Pelley P.C.*, 2017 WL 3699823, at \*8. Unchallenged findings of fact are binding on this Court unless the contrary is established as a matter of law or there is no evidence to support the finding. *Walker v. Anderson*, 232 S.W.3d 899, 907 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.); see also *Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC*, 437 S.W.3d 518, 526 (Tex. 2014) (concluding unchallenged findings supported by some evidence were binding on appellate court); *McGalliard v. Kuhlmann*, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986). We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. *BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand*, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794–95 (Tex. 2002); *Credit Suisse AG v. Claymore Holdings, LLC*, No. 05-15-01463-CV, 2018 WL 947902, at \*4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 20, 2018, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). We may not reverse a trial court’s conclusion of law unless it is erroneous as a matter of law. *Credit Suisse AG*, 2018 WL 947902, at \*4.

*Duress or Coercion*

Citing to paragraphs twenty-five and twenty-eight of Judge Akin's findings of fact and conclusions of law, appellants argue in their seventh issue that the "trial court abused its discretion in ruling that Parks, individually and on behalf of PRF, did not enter into the rule 11 agreement due to coercion or duress[.]" The standard of review relied on by appellants is not applicable to our review of either the trial court's findings of fact or conclusions of law. See BMC Software Belgium, N.V., 83 S.W.3d at 794-95; Anderson, 806 S.W.2d at 794. However, whether an agreement is voluntary is generally a question of law. See Tower Contracting Co., Inc. of Tex. v. Burden Bros, Inc., 482 S.W.2d 330, 335 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("What constitutes duress is a question of law but whether the facts exist to make up the elements of duress may be an issue of fact."); see also Dallas Cty. Cnty. Coll. Dist. v. Bolton, 185 S.W.3d 868, 880 (Tex. 2005) ("Where the facts are undisputed, determination of whether a payment is voluntary or involuntary is a question of law."); Park Plaza Solo, LLC v. Benchmark-Hereford, Inc., No. 07- 16-00004-CV, 2016 WL 6242824, at \*2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 24, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("[W]hether or not circumstances of duress are established is generally a question of fact, but whether established facts constitute duress is a matter of law to be determined by the court."). Paragraphs twenty-five and twenty-eight of Judge Akin's findings of fact and conclusions of law state "[t]here was no coercion," and "[t]here was no coercion or duress." We conclude these are conclusions of law that we review *de novo*.

“Coercion exists when a party by the unlawful conduct of another, is induced to enter into a contract which deprives him of the exercise of his free will.” *Man Indus. (India), Ltd. v. Midcontinent Express Pipeline, LLC*, 407 S.W.3d 342, 367 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (quoting *Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v. Cocke*, 56 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1933, no writ)). Generally, under Texas law, the term “duress” rather than “coercion” is used when parties are seeking to avoid a contract. *Id.* “A common element of duress in all its forms (whether called duress, implied duress, business compulsion, economic duress or duress of property) is improper or unlawful conduct or threat of improper or unlawful conduct that is intended to and does interfere with another person’s exercise of free will and judgment.” *Bolton*, 185 S.W.3d at 878–79; see also *McCord v. Goode*, 308 S.W.3d 409, 413 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). “The threat must be imminent and the party must have no present means of protection.” *McCord*, 368 S.W.3d at 413. Further, “[d]uress must be shown from the acts or conduct of the party accused of duress, not the emotions of the purported victim.” *Id.* There can be no duress when the threatened conduct is not unlawful. *In re C.E.W.*, No. 05-14-00459- CV, 2015 WL 5099336, at \*3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 31, 2015, pet. denied).

Appellants argue they established Parks entered into the agreement under duress because Judge Montgomery falsely represented that she no longer had jurisdiction to grant appellants’ motion

for new trial and threatened to leave an “unlawful judgment” in place and sanction appellants for bringing a frivolous lawsuit if Parks did not agree to settle the case; these “threats” were “of such a character as to destroy the free agency” of Parks to refuse the settlement; and these “threats” “overcame Parks’[s] will and caused her to do that which she would not otherwise have done.”

Judge Akin found that Parks was at least forty-two years old, has a college degree, runs her own business, and is a sophisticated businesswoman. He also found that Parks was represented by counsel at the motion for new trial hearing, had an opportunity to confer with her counsel about the proposed settlement agreement on multiple occasions, was cautioned by Judge Montgomery that she was the only one who could make the decision to accept the offer of Campbell and Affiliated Bank to settle the case, and agreed in open court to the settlement. These facts are supported by evidence admitted at the hearing, including the transcript of the motion for new trial hearing and Parks’s testimony.<sup>4</sup> The record also reflects that, although she was highly emotional at the hearing on the motion for new trial, Parks

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<sup>4</sup> In order to challenge Judge Akin’s findings of fact, Parks was required to attack specific findings under the appropriate legal and factual sufficiency standards. See *Defense Resource Servs., LLC v. First Nat'l Bank of Cent. Tex.*, No. 10-14-00327-CV, 2015 WL 4064781, at \*4 (Tex. App.—Waco July 2, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Because Parks has failed to do so and the referenced findings of fact are supported by the evidence, they are binding on this Court. See *Tenaska Energy*, 437 S.W.3d at 526; *Walker*, 232 S.W.3d at 907.

understood the consequences of accepting or refusing the settlement and agreed to the settle in order to avoid a “\$96,000 judgment” against her.

Based on the unchallenged findings and the evidence at the hearing before Judge Akin, we conclude Judge Akin did not err by determining Parks did not enter into the settlement agreement due to coercion or duress. We resolve appellants’ seventh issue against them.

*Enforceability of Rule 11 Agreement*

Relying on *Rymer v. Lewis*, 206 S.W.3d 732 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.), appellants argue in their eighth issue that Judge Akin erred by concluding the rule 11 agreement entered into by the parties was enforceable. *Rymer* involved the appeal to the county court of a forcible detainer judgment in the amount of \$5,000 in favor of *Rymer*’s landlord. *Id.* at 733–34. Both *Rymer* and her landlord appeared pro se in the county court. *Id.* at 734 n.1. During the pendency of the appeal, *Rymer* paid \$1,200 into the registry of the county court. *Id.* at 734. *Rymer* and her landlord subsequently agreed *Rymer* would vacate the property and the landlord would receive the \$1,200. *Id.* at 734. Before an order memorializing the agreement was presented to the trial court, the landlord moved *Rymer*’s property from the house into the garage. *Id.* *Rymer* alleged the landlord caused thousands of dollars of damage to the property. *Id.*

*Rymer* informed the trial court that she no longer consented to the original terms of the parties’ agreement because the landlord had damaged her property. *Id.* After the trial court expressed concern

about the landlord's actions, Rymer informed the trial court that she wanted the case dismissed to allow her to recover the money in the registry of the court. Id. The trial court stated the case was dismissed. Id. The landlord then asked what would happen to the money in the registry of the court, and the trial court asked an attorney in the courtroom to mediate the parties' dispute. Id. The attorney subsequently informed the trial court the parties had "some sort of fact issues" that needed to be resolved concerning the property the landlord removed from the house. Id. Rymer told the trial court that she wanted the case dismissed and she would file another lawsuit for property damages. Id. The landlord indicated that Rymer could keep the \$1,200 she paid into the registry of the court to "end this entire matter." Id. Rymer stated she was "not agreeing to not do anything later down the road." Id. at 735. The trial court indicated it was "going to let [the landlord] have the \$1200, and I'll do an order right now. It's your choice." Id. Rymer responded, "I'll take the [\$]1200, and we'll go –." Id. The trial court indicated it needed "to have an answer." Id. Rymer responded, "Okay, that's fine," and indicated she would "agree to what you're doing." Id.

The trial court signed a final judgment that stated the parties had reached an agreement on the record, all issues of fact and law were tried to the court, and "after receiving the evidence presented and the testimony of the witnesses," the trial court awarded possession of the house to the landlord and awarded Rymer the \$1,200 from the registry of the court. Id. The judgment also stated Rymer would not

pursue any cause of action against the landlord for issues relating to Rymer's personal property. Id. Rymer appealed, arguing the trial court acted improperly by forcing her to choose between relinquishing either the \$1,200 in the registry of the court or her right to pursue a claim against her landlord for damages to her personal property. Id. at 736.

We concluded there was no evidence to support the trial court's apparent conclusion that the \$1200 would offset Rymer's claim for the damage to her property or to award relief to the landlord. Id. We noted the case had been dismissed when the landlord asked what would happen to the money in the registry of the court and, "[w]ithout saying so, the trial court essentially reopened the case after the landlord agreed to let Rymer have the \$1200 if Rymer agreed to drop all claims against him." Id. This required Rymer to "agree to forego any claim for damages she may have had against her landlord" in order to recover the \$1,200. Id.

In this case, the hearing on appellants' motion for new trial was held more than seventyfive days after the March 24th Order, and counsel, including appellants' counsel, represented to Judge Montgomery that the order was final. Judge Montgomery did not reopen the case and did not make a decision about the value of appellants' claims without any evidence. Judge Montgomery gave the parties three opportunities to discuss settling the case and did not attempt to force a settlement by stating she would withhold money in the registry of the court from appellants or award any such money

to the other side if Parks refused to settle the dispute. Finally, appellants, who were represented by counsel, did not relinquish any claims that could have been asserted against Affiliated Bank or Campbell in a subsequent lawsuit. Rather, appellants agreed not to appeal the March 24th Order in exchange for Affiliated Bank's and Campbell's agreement not to pursue the attorneys' fees awarded by the trial court in the March 24th Order. All parties waived a right relating to the March 24th Order in order to settle the dispute.

We conclude Rymer is distinguishable and does not control whether the agreement entered into by Parks is enforceable. We resolve appellants' eighth issue against them.

*Compliance with Agreement*

In their ninth and tenth issues, appellants assert Judge Akin abused his discretion by determining Affiliated Bank<sup>5</sup> complied with the parties' agreement and appellants breached the settlement agreement. However, we remanded this case for a determination of whether Parks, individually and on behalf of PRF, voluntarily entered into an agreement under rule of civil procedure 11, pursuant to which appellants forfeited their right to bring this appeal, and whether any agreement was enforceable. Any subsequent compliance with the agreement by either Affiliated Bank or appellants is not relevant to the issues

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<sup>5</sup> Appellants also complain Judge Akin abused his discretion by ruling Campbell complied with the rule 11 agreement. Campbell is no longer a party to this appeal. Accordingly, his conduct is not relevant to our analysis.

before Judge Akin. Accordingly, we will not address appellants' ninth and tenth issues.

### Conclusion

An agreement to settle a case is enforceable if it complies with rule 11. *Padilla v. LaFrance*, 907 S.W.2d 454, 460 (Tex. 1995); *In re Barton*, No. 05-17-00364-CV, 2017 WL 6275920, at \*1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 11, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). As relevant to this appeal, an agreement complies with rule 11 if the agreement is made in open court and entered of record. TEX. R. CIV. P. 11. Judge Akin found the parties' agreement to settle this case was made in open court and entered of record, and concluded the agreement was enforceable under rule 11. One of the terms of the agreement was that Parks and PRF forfeited their right to bring this appeal. See *Estate of Crawford*, No. 14-17-00703-CV, 2017 WL 5196309, at \*2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 9, 2017, pet denied) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (“The right to appellate review may be waived by agreement.” (citing *Rodriguez v. Villarreal*, 314 S.W.3d 636, 645 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.)). Because Parks and PRF entered into an enforceable rule 11 agreement pursuant to which they agreed not to appeal from the March 24th Order, we will enforce the terms of their agreement. *Estate of Crawford*, 2017 WL 5196309, at \*2; *In re Marriage of Long*, 946 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997, no writ). Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

/Robert M. Fillmore/  
ROBERT M. FILLMORE

**JUSTICE**

**160784F.P05**

**Court of Appeals  
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

**JUDGMENT**

**TONYA PARKS AND PARKS REALTY FIRM, LLC,  
Appellants**

**V.**

**AFFILIATED BANK, Appellee**

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3,  
Dallas County, Texas,  
Trial Court Cause No. CC-15-04540-C.  
Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore, Justices  
Lang-Miers and Stoddart participating.

In accordance with this Court's opinion of this  
date, the appeal is **DISMISSED**.

It is **ORDERED** that appellee Affiliated  
Bank recover its costs of this appeal from appellants  
Tonya Parks and Parks Realty Firm, LLC.

Judgment entered May 3, 2018.

## APPENDIX K

CAUSE NO. CC-15-045540-C

**Tonya Parks and § In the County Court**  
**Parks Realty Firm, LLC §**  
§  
v. §  
§  
**Affiliated Bank, §**  
**Affiliated Bank FSB, § At Law No. 3**  
**Affiliated Bank FSB, Inc. §**  
**Bancaffiliated, Inc., §**  
**Joshua Campbell §**  
**Katherine Campbell § Dallas County, Tx**

**ORDER ON DEFENDANTS JOSHUA**  
**CAMPBELL'S MOTION TO DISMISS**

Cam on to be heard Defendant Joshua Campbell's Motion to Dismiss Under the Texas Citizens' Participation Act. After considering Defendant Joshua Campbell's Motion to Dismiss this suit under the Citizens' Participation Act (the "Motion to Dismiss"), the response of the Plaintiffs Tonya Parks and Parks Realty Firm, LLC ("Plaintiffs"), the pleadings, the competent evidence properly before the Court, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss has merit and should in all things be GRANTED.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED  
AND DECREED that:

1. all claims and causes of action against Defendant Joshua Campbell are dismissed with prejudice to the refilling of the same;
2. All claims and causes of action against Defendant Affiliated Bank are dismissed with prejudice to the re-filling of the same;
3. Defendant Joshua Campbell is awarded \$62,297.50 from Plaintiffs Tonya Parks and Parks Realty Firm, LLC, jointly and severally, in courts costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and other expenses incurred in defending against the legal action as justice and equity require; and
4. Defendant Affiliated Bank is awarded \$29,876.40 from Plaintiffs Tonya Parks and Parks Realty Firm, LLc, jointly and severally, in court cost, reasonable attorney's fees, and other expenses incurred in defending against the legal action as justice and equity require.

The Court notes that Plaintiffs entered a non-suit of Defendant Katherine Campbell on and effective Monday, March 21, 2016, and that Plaintiffs entered a non-suit of Defendants Affiliated Bank FSB, Affiliated Bank FSB, Inc., and Bancaffiliated Inc. before and effective before the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss on March 22, 2016. Accordingly,

this Order disposes of claims and causes of action and all parties before the Court and is final and appealable.

SINGNED ON THIS 24 day of March, 2016

/ Sally L. Montgomery  
HONORABLE JUDGE PRESIDING