

No. **22-7472**

**ORIGINAL**

---

# In The United States Supreme Court

---

THE EXCELLENT THE EXCELLENT RAJ K. PATEL,  
from all capacities,

Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner

Supreme Court, U.S.  
FILED  
MAY 03 2023  
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee-Respondent.

---

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the  
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in No. 23-1325.

---

## PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

T.E., T.E. Mr. Raj K. Patel, AA, BA (*pro se*)  
The Basis of the United States  
Indiana | Georgia | New Jersey  
6850 East 21<sup>st</sup> Street  
Indianapolis, IN 46219  
Marion County  
[rajp2010@gmail.com](mailto:rajp2010@gmail.com)  
[www.rajpatel.live](http://www.rajpatel.live)  
317-450-6651

5 pages

May 3, 2023

**RECEIVED**  
MAY -5 2023  
OFFICE OF THE CLERK  
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

## QUESTIONS PRESENTED

- I. Whether the judiciary, via the United States Court of Federal Claims or the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, must *de novo* reverse and allow for a trial of a sufficiently alleged Bounty Clause contract under the dictate of Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) which is also governed through the Big Tucker Act (1887), 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a). Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 290 (1884) (state officials are not the same as governmental officials; “the distinction between [them]...is important, and should be observed;” and state officials may make “promises” independent of the Big Tucker Act). Contra. Patel v. United States, No. 22-2251 (Fed. Cir. 2022), ECF 31.
- II. Whether the United States Court of Federal Claims or the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit abused its discretion by not providing Petitioner Patel a “reasonable opportunity” to “adduce supportive facts” through discovery, including under the Presidential Records Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2202, which regulates material communications from Petitioner to the President of the United States since at least 2006, or trial, sufficient for this court to reverse. Crist v. Republic of Turkey, 995 F. Supp. 5, 12 (D.D.C. 1998) and Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 115 n. 31 (1979) cited in Tinton Falls Lodging Realty, LLC v. United States, 800 F.3d 1353, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
- III. Whether the United States Court of Federal Claims or the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit clearly erred in finding parole and abused its discretion by not holding that petitioner’s religious “look” has been unduly burdened by the breach of contract which was purposefully crafted and expressed as a mandatory and immutable term by the petitioner to prevent burden on his religious free exercise or Ordered Liberty for this the reasonably risky term and accepted by respondent. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb *et seq.* EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 575 U.S. 768, 770-71, 781-82 (2015).

- IV. Whether the judiciary should prioritize relief of this matter because it relates to the enjoyment of property and Ordered Liberties under sections 1981-1982 of Title 42 of the United States Code.
- V. Whether the interference on the contract itself is an illegal exaction sections 1981-1982 of Title 42 of the United States Code. Taylor v. United States, 959 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2020). See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Hazelhurst Oil Mill Fertilizer Co. v. United States, 42 F.2d 331, 340 (Fed. Cir. 1930) (want of “equal terms” include choice of monetary compensation, i.e. money or stamps, and political power).
- VI. Whether the United States Court of Federal Claims or the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit abused its discretion when not allowing the complaint on the RCFC 8(a)(1) affirmative defense to compel accord and satisfaction. First Nat’l City Bank v. United States, 537 F.2d 426, 440 (Fed. Cir. 1976). District of Columbia v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 292 (2005). Cf. Hazelhurst Oil Mill, 42 F.2d at 340.
- VII. Whether the United States Court of Federal Claims or the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit abused its discretion or clearly erred by not transferring the venue to the President of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2).
- VIII. Whether Petitioner Raj K. Patel “‘abuse[d]’ the [law]” by coming before the United States judiciary. H. J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989) (internal citations omitted).

## **LIST OF PARTIES**

1. Raj K. Patel, Appellant-Petitioner.
2. United States, Appellee-Respondent.
3. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
4. United States Court of Federal Claims.
5. The Honorable Loren A. Smith, Senior Judge of the C.F.C.
6. The President of the United States.
7. President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
8. President Barack H. Obama, Jr.
9. President George W. Bush, Jr.
10. President Donald J. Trump.
11. Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General of the United States.
12. Robert Kiepura, Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice.

**RULE 29.6 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE**

Not applicable. Raj Patel has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns 10% or more of their stock.

**OPINIONS BELOW**

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit appears at Addendum A to the petition and is unpublished. See also Adds. B-C.

The opinion of the United States Court of Federal Claims appears at Addendum D the petition and is unpublished. See also Add. E.

## JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims was founded upon 28 U.S.C. Section 1491(a).

The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is founded upon 28 U.S.C. Section 1295(a)(3), and is based upon the judgment entered on March 7, 2023.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States is founded upon 28 U.S.C. Section 1254, and is based upon the judgment entered on March 7, 2023.

The Federal Tort Claims Act supports jurisdiction in the United States Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Taylor v. United States, 959 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2020).

Ft. Sill Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 355 F.2d 636, 637-38 (Fed. Cir. 1966) (“In a connected tort-contract claim, an action may be maintained in this court which ‘arises *primarily* from a contractual undertaking regardless of the fact that the loss resulted from the negligent manner in which defendant performed its contract’ or from a tortious breach of contract.”) (italics added).

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The lower court found that petitioner and respondent have an enforceable promise, and, like the district courts, it also found that the claims do not sound in tort. There is at least one express, immutable term that mandates respondent to perform a duty which the breach of has caused harm.

The promise was made by actual authority of the President of the United States who is also the Chief of State and Chief Executive of the respondent. 44 U.S.C. § 2202. The President's Big Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a), powers of actual authority were used independently, together, and concurrently with the President's powers to form headhunting contracts under the Bounty Clause of the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment. U.S. const. amend. XIV, § 4.

While petitioner is performing his contract, it also seems to frustrate the purpose and is impossible to perform, even though the contract is not terminated.

Respondent is contractually required to articulate to me particularly the motive of the happenings of the interest-at-hand. See Compl.

## FACTUAL BACKGROUND

- I. The previous filings and this filing includes only the necessary facts and are not exhaustive. RCFC 8. See Compl.
- II. On or about the 2007, plaintiff and defendant entered into agreement by which defendant promised, under the Big Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a), plaintiff to have certain protections, including aid with defendant's, technology for the consideration of bounty and other state matters, including but not limited to social and political. See U.S. const. amend. XIV, § 4 ("The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.").
- III. While in office, upon plaintiff's initiation of a communication with the defendant, President Trump ratified the contract-at-hand to end this glorious metaphoric maiming.
- IV. Defendant breached the agreement by not enforcing its technology in aid of plaintiff when their express, immutable promised term required to do so.
- V. The contract was formed inside a building of a corporation where the defendant is undisputedly, including after raising the corporate veil or as alter ego, the corporation's "control." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 388-9 & 393 (1981) ("zone of silence;" "control group;" and "substantial role").
- VI. Defendant breached the agreement by violating plaintiff's religion's requirements of self-expression or "look," which is also a part of Ordered Liberty and 5<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment Due Process. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 575 U.S. at 770-71 & 781-82.
- VII. Petitioner did not expect respondent to deny the contract-at-hand and believes that counselor Mr. Kiepora's filings not only were unwarranted and arguments unreasonable but also is acting without getting the proper security, information clearance, i.e. top-top secret, from the Federal Government. Hence, this court would be proper by *sua sponte* contacting President Biden, [potus@who.eop.gov](mailto:potus@who.eop.gov). C. Conduct U.S. JJ. Canons 1-3.

- VIII. Petitioner also believes that the Solicitor General is acting without the proper security, information clearance, i.e. top-top secret, from the President in order to faithfully and reasonably argue before this court. Hence, this court would be proper by *sua sponte* contacting President Biden, [potus@who.eop.gov](mailto:potus@who.eop.gov).
- IX. In the alternative, both Mr. Kiepora and Ms. Prelogar are blatantly and knowingly lying.
- X. Particularly, Ms. Prelogar, BA, JD is simultaneously duty bound to Petitioner as a fellow alumnus of Emory University as her United States Constitutionally Ordered rank but purported intra-corporate politics might have Ms. Prelogar, at this Seat, double-dealing.

### RULES

It is Constitutional black-letter law that this court and other Federal courts may not hold against the person claiming a public debt by a Big Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, contract under the Bounty Clause without trying the person. U.S. const. amend. XIV, § 4 (“The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.”).

“Federal courts have a ‘virtually unflagging obligation...to exercise the jurisdiction given them.’” Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)) cited in E. Trans-Waste of Md., Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 05-CV-0032-PLF \* 3 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2006). “Demonstrating [the C.F.C.’s] jurisdiction is generally a low bar.” Columbus Reg’l Hosp. v. United States, 990 F.3d 1330, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The FTCA does not apply. Taylor, 959 F.3d at 1081. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).

When federal courts give contrary holdings on similar issues, even when the claims and “identity” are different, for matters of laws which are clearly established, a holding otherwise would be unduly procedurally unfair. See e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 415, 420, 422, & 425 (2010) and Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 575 U.S. at 770-71 & 781-82 (Elur does not have follow her religious doctrine strictly, i.e. *sharia jihad* (struggle) (implicitly held that Elur is not required to do *jihad* because *sharia* headscarf not welcomed), and religious piety and veneration is subjective). 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. (in Hinduism, “look” is regulated under Vedic *kama* (subjective pleasure) and *artha* (material wealth)). In addition, the principle of equal justice under law would also be violated. Holmes v. U.S. Postal Serv., 987 F.3d 1042, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 20 (1958); and Johnson v. Eisentrager 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950). The right to recover damages also becomes a part of the party’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The right to recover damages is also under the principle of equal justice under law. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 368 (1982) and Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 389 (1971). Thus, when a holding permits the more powerful party, because of access of arms, to escape liability, especially without a constitutionally interpreted mandated trial, equal justice under the law and Ordered Liberty will be violated; and judge’s ruling will play an additional factor in weaker party’s Ordered Liberty. Hazelhurst Oil Mill, 42 F.2d at 340.

The Big Tucker Act (1887) statutorily extends the power, which originally belonged only to “state” officials of the United States, to make “promises” on behalf of the United States to “government[al]” officials of the United States. Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 270, 284, 290 & 296 (state officials making “promises” on behalf of the United States) (“the distinction between the

government of a State and the State itself is important, and should be observed...The State itself is an ideal person, intangible, invisible, immutable. The government is an agent, and, within the sphere of the agency, a perfect representative; but outside of that, it is a lawless usurpation. The Constitution of the State is the limit of the authority of its government, and both government and State are subject to the supremacy of the Constitution of the United States, and of the laws made in pursuance thereof.”). Ordered Liberty will always aid in tipping the scales of justice so “[p]leadings [are] construed so as to do justice.” RCFC 8(e). See also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (all documents submitted by pro se litigants are to be liberally construed). United States v. Winstar Corp., 64 F.3d 1531, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (*en banc*), cert. granted, 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (contract breaches due to change in government are fairly money-mandating, including for efficient breaches).

And, when this court or a federal court questions the necessary facts or claims, the Supreme Court requires that a “reasonable opportunity” be given to “adequately” acquire “evidence adduced at trial.” Crist, 995 F. Supp. at 12; Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 115 n. 31 cited in Tinton Falls Lodging Realty, 800 F.3d at 1364. RCFC 8(e). See also e.g., United States v. Tsarnaev, 142 S. Ct. 1024, 1045 (2022) (*dicta* on discretion standards). Lenity and *quantum meruit* may also apply.

When the judiciary is met at an unusual nexus of countervailing branch responsibilities because of ethics regulations or persuasive ethics principles, the court may assign independent counsel to investigate the matter. L. Gordon Crovitz, *How Separation of Powers Protects Individual Liberties*, 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 785-86, 789-90 (1988-89) citing Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). C. Conduct U.S. JJ. Canons 1-3.

Matters regarding Ordered Liberty, including for the matters of social “status,” “image,” and “stigma,” including but not limited to amongst the ruling-state class and intellectuals are secured Constitutional rights,<sup>1</sup> are reviewed for “abuse,” “[un]sound” or “[not] sound” use of discretion. U.S. const. amend. I, II, V, & XIV. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296, 315 (1989) & Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.3d 1346, 1350 & 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Madison will not be lame.

### **REASONS TO GRANT THE PETITION**

Because this Court, like all Federal courts, may not constitutionally question the validity of the public debt liable to Patel, this court must allow for a trial to adequately adduce supportive evidence and facts. Crist, 995 F. Supp. at 12; Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 115 n. 31 cited in Tinton, 800 F.3d at 1364. The “reasonable opportunity” should include allowing Patel to exercise his constitutional right to subpoena the National Achieves under the Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2202, because of the political ideological, intra-party, party, and interests at play; the records may show not only direct contact with Presidents Bush, Obama, and Biden but also Oval Office and/or Executive Offices of the President and/or Presidential personnel working on the contract-at-hand. Crist, 995 F. Supp.at 12 and Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 115 n. 31 cited in Tinton, 800 F.3d at 1364. Federalist 70. Therefore, this Court should reverse and remand.

Because this Court, like all Federal courts, may not constitutionally access Patel’s religious royal piety, veneration, and other expressions, including but not limited to religious “look,” like, in Islam, where “look” is regulated under *sharia*, in Hinduism, where “look” is regulated under

---

1. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 130, & 148 (1961) (lawyers’ status); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 100 (1947); NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 161 (1941); & Ka-Hur Enters. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 676 N.E.2d 838, 841 (Mass. 1997).

Vedic *kama* and *artha*, this court must allow for a trial to adequately adduce supportive evidence and facts. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 575 U.S. at 768-89; Crist, 995 F. Supp. at 12; Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 115 n. 31 cited in Tinton Falls Lodging Realty, 800 F.3d at 1364; and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb *et seq.* Not only does this aid Ordered Liberty pertaining to religious free exercise but also constitutionally protects one's own image/look which may be triggered by saying a person's name, including but not limited to over social media. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758, 769, & 787 (1985) ("his own good name"). The Constitution is entirely sensitive that the statutory and information scheme should not be used to prevent the application, hinder, or deprive the protection of the judiciary merely because holdings and adjudication of issues, i.e. bounty contract, Big Tucker Act contract, religious free exercise, Ordered Liberty, differ only on the claims raised. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 415, 420, 422, & 425. Rebecca L. Brown, *Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty*, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1513, 1513-14, 1563 & 1566 (1991). Therefore, this Court should reverse and remand.

Because this Court, like all Federal courts, are required to take very seriously complaints and stipulations raised by not only United States Basis officials, like Patel, but also Bounty headhunters, like Patel, this court must allow for a trial to adequately adduce supportive evidence and facts. Crist, 995 F. Supp. at 12 and Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 115 n. 31 cited in Tinton Falls Lodging Realty, 800 F.3d at 1364. Brown, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1513-17, 1563 & 1566. Therefore, this Court should reverse and remand.

Because this Court, like all Federal courts, is required to make sure that the United States Department of Justice is not only performing its statutorily assigned duties but also loyal to the Constitution through the Pleasure of the President, this court must allow for a trial to adequately adduce supportive evidence and facts because Ordered Liberty countervails and overcomes executive privilege, which must be elected, and is a part of the 5<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> Due Process rights and privileges and the law of damages. Brown, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1563. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 448 (1977); 44 U.S.C. § 2202; LeBlanc, 50 F.3d at 1030; and *cf.* Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 752-54 (1982) ("It is settled law that the separation-of-powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of the United States.") (immunity when civil damages recovery is sought directly from the President in his personal capacity); Crist, 995 F. Supp. at 12; and Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 115 n. 31 cited in Tinton Falls Lodging Realty, 800 F.3d at 1364. Patel should also have the "reasonable opportunity" to make a stronger evidentiary case by supportive facts adduced at trial for communications tracing back to President George W. Bush's (2001-2009) administration and other agencies. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 683; Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 448; 44 U.S.C. § 2202; and LeBlanc, 50 F.3d at 1030. Administering and overseeing contracts and specific commitments made by the United States and by and for its Chief Executive who is also the Chief of State is a state affair that is precedential to national security and upholds at succession and accession of the Oval Office; all three branches of the Federal Government has used much of its authority to waive and retain the waiver of sovereign immunity as applied to the Defendant-United States and the authorizing party of the Defendant-United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a); Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 448; and Winstar Corp., 64 F.3d at 1542 (*en banc*), *cert. granted*, 518 U.S. at 839. Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 270, 284, 290 & 296 (The President, the Chief of State, i.e. a state official, may make "promises" on behalf of the United States, independent of the Big Tucker Act).<sup>2</sup> A

---

2. Hence, Patel, No. 22-2251 at ECF 31 runs afoul to the mandatory rule of Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 290 because the Petitioner never stated that he entered into a contract with the Federal Government Official of the United States

contract, a lot like Bounty Clause contracts, itself comes along with a privilege to challenge executive privilege, including by subpoenaing Presidential records and witness testimony. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896) (privilege extends to all matters “committed by law to [an official’s] control or supervision”). Because the United States Constitution is the king, who is also the main seat, Basis officials of the United States are state officials of the United States and come along with a countervailing constitutional privilege to overcome executive privilege for seat officials of the United States, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803), under the social contrarian theory of devolved delegation of power and secured and reversed powers, see generally Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 774 (1999) (“Now although promises and pacts are as binding upon the conscience of a [seat] as upon that of any private citizen...), Adamson, 332 U.S. at 100, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Alden, 527 U.S. at 716 & 766 (higher and lower courts in an empire), and 42 U.S.C. § 1491(a), to avoid tyranny on and at the Bases.<sup>3</sup> Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498; Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 448; and Federalist Nos. 42, 47, 70, 78, & 80. See generally Johnson, 339 U.S. at 791 & 798. Tyranny through illegal exaction must also be avoided. Hazelhurst Oil Mill, 42 F.2d at 340. Presidential duties, responsibilities, rights, honors, privileges, and immunities extends to past or “former president[s].” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 733, & 752-54. Compare Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 733 (“former president”) with ex-president. Therefore, this Court should reverse and remand.

What is social; our stateness is at around 58%;<sup>4</sup> that does mean what is against the United States Constitution, Our Civilization; more data is needed for repugnancy; see compl., nonapplication and misapplication by those who are actually socially, intellectually disabled; Fully Faithfully, I know. See generally Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). This Court has a duty to increase stateness to 100% and by granting reversal, and further judicial relief, will aid its duty. Law cannot be “abuse[d],” even though law is oft said to be built against the perils which only belong to humanity, and the ideology is unconstitutional and pervades lower court business. H. J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 249. Cf. U.S. const. amend. I & XIV and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq.

This Supreme Court should allow for trial and further litigation upon reversal, including but not limited to for abuse, unsound use of discretion and with aid from independent counsel assigned for Patel. Crovitz, 41 Rutgers L. Rev. at 786 citing Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2597. Teague, 489 U.S. at 296 & 315 and Precision, 315 F.3d at 1350 & 1354.

### CONCLUSION

Litigants should have been given a chance to the debate the matters herein. C. Conduct U.S. JJ. Canons 1-3. A denial of trial will be prejudicial to Patel’s constitutional rights. RCFC 8(a)(1). 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 requires judges to opine quickly when the enjoyment of property, including personal property and its happiness, is greatly at play because of foreseeable Madisonian change in residence. Id. Compel parties to compromise under accord and satisfaction. RCFC 8(a)(1) & First Nat’l, 537 F.2d at 440. Transfer to the Chief of State. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b). Affirm H. J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 249. *De novo* reverse and remand. Issue § 1651 mandamus. It is Ordered!

---

but, rather, the State Official of the United States who is the Chief of State. This constitutional difference with a distinction cannot be muted.

3. Cf. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948); cf. United Bldg. Constr. Trades v. Mayor, 465 U.S. 208, 225 (1984) (the “basis of the union” is meant as the “basis of society”); Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. 133, 139-40, 142, 153, 160, 162, 164 (1795) (“law of society” (little green men running around) v. law of the state) (when the State and State figures are affronted and prevented from being) (right to contract/compact is the highest law and human right!); and see Federalist Nos. 42 & 80.

4. Id.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Raj K. Patel  
T.E., T.E. Mr. Raj K. Patel, AA, BA  
6850 East 21<sup>st</sup> Street  
Indianapolis, IN 46219  
Marion County  
317-450-6651 (cell)  
[rajp2010@gmail.com](mailto:rajp2010@gmail.com)  
[www.rajpatel.live](http://www.rajpatel.live)

*pro se*

T.E. President/Student Body President, Student Gov't Ass'n of  
Emory U., Inc. 2013-2014 (corp. sovereign 2013-present)

T.E. Student Body President, Brownsburg Cmty. Sch.  
Corp./President, Brownsburg High Sch. Student Gov't 2009-  
2010 (corp. sovereign 2009-present)

Rep. from the Notre Dame L. Sch. Student B. Ass'n to the Ind. St.  
B. Ass'n 2017

Deputy Regional Director, Young Democrats of Am.-High Sch.  
Caucus 2008-2009

Co-Founder & Vice Chair, Ind. High Sch. Democrats 2009-2010

Vice President of Fin. (Indep.), Oxford C. Republicans of Emory U.,  
Inc. 2011-2012

Intern, Jill Long Thompson for Governor (2008)

Volunteer, Barack Obama for Am. (2008)

Intern, Marion Cnty. Clerk Elizabeth "Beth" White for Sec'y of St.  
of the St. of Ind. (2014)

Former J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame L. Sch.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

RAJ K. PATEL, from all capacities,

*Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner*

v.

UNITED STATES,

*Defendant-Appellee-Respondent*

No. \_\_\_\_\_

Dated: May 3, 2023

**CERTIFICATE OF COMPLAINE**

I, Raj K. Patel (pro se), hereby certify that, according to the word-count tool in Microsoft, the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari does not exceed five (5) pages, including footnotes and excluding the sections enumerated in Rule 33.1(d). The writ therefore complies with Rule 33.1(g) and 33.2(b), 34, and 39(d).

Respectfully submitted,

T.E., T.E. Mr. Raj K. Patel (*pro se*)  
6850 East 21<sup>st</sup> Street  
Indianapolis, IN 46219  
317-450-6651 (cell)  
[rajp2010@gmail.com](mailto:rajp2010@gmail.com)  
[raj@rajpatel.live](mailto:raj@rajpatel.live)  
[www.rajpatel.live](http://www.rajpatel.live)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

RAJ K. PATEL, from all capacities,

*Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner*

v.

UNITED STATES,

*Defendant-Appellee-Respondent*

No. \_\_\_\_\_

Dated: May 3, 2023

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I certify that I served three copies of the foregoing filing on 05/3/2023 by the method in brackets on the below individuals at the following locations:

Elizabeth B. Prelogar [USPS]  
Office of the Solicitor General  
United States Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Rm. 5616  
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001  
[SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov](mailto:SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov)

Dated: May 3, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

T.E., T.E. Mr. Raj K. Patel (*pro se*)  
6850 East 21<sup>st</sup> Street  
Indianapolis, IN 46219  
317-450-6651 (cell)  
[rajp2010@gmail.com](mailto:rajp2010@gmail.com)  
[raj@rajpatel.live](mailto:raj@rajpatel.live)  
[www.rajpatel.live](http://www.rajpatel.live)