

## APPENDIX

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A-1

UNITED STATES of America,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Thomas P. THAYER, Defendant-  
Appellee.

No. 21-2385

United States Court of Appeals,  
Seventh Circuit.

Argued March 29, 2022

Decided July 21, 2022

**Background:** Defendant, who had pled guilty to fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota law for groping his 14-year-old daughter while she slept, moved to dismiss indictment for failing to register as a sex offender upon move from Minnesota to Wisconsin, as required under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, James D. Peterson, District Judge, 546 F.Supp.3d 808, adopted report and recommendation of Stephen L. Crocker, United States Magistrate Judge, and granted motion. Government appealed.

**Holdings:** The Court of Appeals, St. Eve, Circuit Judge, held that:

- (1) as a matter of first impression, courts should employ a circumstance-specific approach when determining whether an offender's conduct was by its nature a sex offense against a minor, as would render the conviction arising from that conduct a "sex offense" under SORNA;
- (2) *Chevron* deference did not apply to Department of Justice's implementing regulations; and
- (3) circumstance-specific approach applied when determining whether defendant's sexual conduct fell under "Romeo and Juliet" exception to SORNA.

Vacated and remanded.

Jackson-Akiwumi, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting opinion.

### 1. Mental Health ~~§~~469(2)

The formal categorical approach and the modified categorical approach for determining whether a prior conviction constitutes a sex offense within the meaning of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) require courts to ignore the defendant's actual conduct and look solely to whether the elements of the crime of conviction match the elements of the federal statute. 34 U.S.C.A. § 20901 et seq.

### 2. Mental Health ~~§~~469(2)

Only where the elements of the state law mirror or are narrower than the federal statute can the prior conviction qualify as a predicate offense requiring compliance with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). 34 U.S.C.A. § 20901 et seq.

### 3. Mental Health ~~§~~469(2)

The circumstance-specific approach for determining whether a prior conviction constitutes a sex offense within the meaning of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) focuses on the facts, not the elements, of a prior conviction; courts applying the circumstance-specific approach look to the specific way in which an offender committed the crime on a specific occasion to determine whether the prior conviction qualifies as a predicate offense under SORNA. 34 U.S.C.A. § 20901 et seq.

### 4. Mental Health ~~§~~469(2)

Determining whether Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) calls for categorical or circumstance-specific approach when determining whether prior conviction constitutes a sex

offense within the meaning of SORNA is question of statutory interpretation. 34 U.S.C.A. § 20901 et seq.

#### 5. Criminal Law ⚖1139

Court of Appeals reviews district court's interpretation of federal statute de novo.

#### 6. Statutes ⚖1082

In interpreting a statute, court begins with text, attending also to structure of statute as a whole and any relevant legislative history.

#### 7. Mental Health ⚖469(4)

In interpreting Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), court considers any potential constitutional implications arising from applying circumstance-specific analysis when determining whether a prior conviction constitutes a sex offense within the meaning of SORNA. 34 U.S.C.A. § 20901 et seq.

#### 8. Mental Health ⚖469(4)

In interpreting Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), court examines practical difficulties and potential unfairness of circumstance-specific approach for determining whether a prior conviction constitutes a sex offense within the meaning of SORNA. 34 U.S.C.A. § 20901 et seq.

#### 9. Mental Health ⚖469(2)

Courts should employ a circumstance-specific approach which allows court to examine particular circumstances in which offender committed the crime on a particular occasion, rather than categorical approach, when determining whether an offender's conduct was by its nature a sex offense against a minor, as would render the conviction arising from that conduct a "sex offense" under Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA); Congress was clearly capable of tethering

the definition of "sex offense" to the elements of a crime but elected not to do so and legislative record suggested that Congress intended provisions to apply to a broad range of conduct by child predators. 34 U.S.C.A. §§ 20911(5)(A)(ii), 20911(7)(I).

#### 10. Statutes ⚖1377

Courts do not lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text the same requirements it nonetheless intends to apply, and the court's reluctance is even greater when Congress has shown elsewhere in the same statute that it knows how to make such a requirement manifest.

#### 11. Statutes ⚖1211

As a general matter, when statutory language is obviously transplanted from other legislation, courts have reason to think it brings the old soil with it.

#### 12. Administrative Law and Procedure ⚖2210

*Chevron* deference to agency interpretations of federal statutes is warranted only where the tools of statutory construction fail to reveal a clear meaning.

#### 13. Administrative Law and Procedure ⚖2285

##### Mental Health ⚖469(2)

*Chevron* deference did not apply to Department of Justice's regulations implementing Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) that favored a categorical approach to determining whether an offender's conduct was by its nature a sex offense against a minor, as would render conviction arising from that conduct a "sex offense" under SORNA; the tools of statutory construction revealed a clear meaning of SORNA, specifically that courts should employ a circumstance-specific approach that allows court to examine particular circumstances in which offender committed the crime on a particular occa-

sion. 34 U.S.C.A. §§ 20911(5)(A)(ii), 20911(7)(I).

**14. Jury** ⇨34(6)

Where defendant’s punishment may be increased based on facts not found by jury, such as when dealing with sentencing enhancements or mandatory minimums, Sixth Amendment often compels categorical approach. U.S. Const. Amend. 6.

**15. Mental Health** ⇨469.5

The government bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant was previously convicted of a sex offense under Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), an essential element of statute requiring compliance with SORNA. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2250(a); 34 U.S.C.A. §§ 20911(5)(A)(ii), 20911(7)(I).

**16. Mental Health** ⇨469(2)

Circumstance-specific approach which allows court to examine particular circumstances in which offender committed the crime on a particular occasion, rather than categorical approach, applied in determining whether defendant’s sexual conduct with 14-year-old daughter fell under “Romeo and Juliet” exception to Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) relating to consensual sex between minors; exception relied on fact-based qualifiers rather than elements of an offense. 34 U.S.C.A. § 20911(5)(C).

West Codenotes

**Recognized as Unconstitutional**

18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. No. 20-cr-88 — **James D. Peterson**, *Chief Judge*.

Julie Suzanne Pfluger, Megan R. Stellas, Attorneys, Office of the United States

Attorney, Madison, WI, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Joseph Aragorn Bugni, Jessica Arden Ettinger, Attorneys, Federal Defender Services of Wisconsin, Inc., Madison, WI, for Defendant-Appellee.

Roy T. Englert, Jr., Attorney, Kramer Levin Robbins Russell, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae.

Before FLAUM, ST. EVE, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judges.

ST. EVE, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Thomas Thayer pled guilty to fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota law for groping his 14-year-old daughter while she slept. When Thayer later moved to Wisconsin without registering as a sex offender, the government indicted him for failing to comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 34 U.S.C. § 20901, *et seq.*, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). The district court dismissed the indictment, finding § 20911(5)(A)(ii), applied through § 20911(7)(I), and § 20911(5)(C) of SORNA were categorically misaligned with Thayer’s Minnesota statute of conviction. The government appeals, arguing the district court erred in analyzing these provisions of SORNA under the categorical method. We agree with the government and vacate and remand the judgment of the district court.

**I.**

**A.**

Before delving into the factual and procedural background, we review a few relevant legal principles.

SORNA establishes a comprehensive national system of registration for sex offenders, the purpose of which is to “protect the public from sex offenders and

offenders against children.” *Id.* § 20901. SORNA defines a “sex offender” as “an individual who was convicted of a sex offense.” *Id.* § 20911(1). “Sex offense” in turn encompasses both “a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another” and “a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor.” *Id.* § 20911(5)(A)(i)–(ii). As relevant to the latter definition of “sex offense,” a “specified offense against a minor” includes “an offense against a minor that involves . . . [a]ny conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)(I). Certain categories of consensual sexual conduct are exempted from the definition of “sex offense,” specifically “if the victim was an adult, unless the adult was under the custodial authority of the offender at the time of the offense, or if the victim was at least 13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the victim.” *Id.* § 20911(5)(C). The clause of § 20911(5)(C) relating to consensual sex between minors is colloquially referred to as the “Romeo and Juliet” exception. SORNA obligates sex offenders to register as such in each state in which they reside, work, or are a student. *Id.* § 20913(a).

Although itself a civil regulatory scheme, noncompliance with SORNA is a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 2250. Criminal liability under § 2250 turns upon whether a prior conviction constitutes a “sex offense” within the meaning of SORNA. Answering this question requires courts to examine the underlying conviction and determine whether it satisfies SORNA’s statutory definition. The Supreme Court has identified three analytical frameworks to guide the lower courts, and to limit the universe of materials upon which they may rely, in making this determination.

[1, 2] The first and the second—the formal categorical approach and the modi-

fied categorical approach—require courts to ignore the defendant’s actual conduct and “look solely to whether the elements of the crime of conviction match the elements of the federal [ ] statute.” *Gamboa v. Daniels*, 26 F.4th 410, 415 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations omitted); see also *Shular v. United States*, — U.S. —, 140 S. Ct. 779, 783, 206 L.Ed.2d 81 (2020). Only where “the elements of the state law mirror or are narrower than the federal statute can the prior conviction qualify as a predicate . . . offense.” *Gamboa*, 26 F.4th at 415 (internal quotations omitted).

[3] By contrast, the third method, the circumstance-specific approach, focuses on the facts—not the elements—of a prior conviction. Courts applying the circumstance-specific approach “look[] to ‘the specific way in which an offender committed the crime on a specific occasion’ to determine whether the prior conviction qualifies as a predicate offense under the federal statute at issue.” *United States v. Elder*, 900 F.3d 491, 498 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting *Nijhawan v. Holder*, 557 U.S. 29, 34, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009)).

## B.

Now to the specifics of this appeal. In a November 2003 criminal complaint, minor J.B. accused her father, appellant Thomas Thayer, of molesting her when she was 14 years old. According to J.B., she and Thayer fell asleep after a Christmas party in 2001. J.B. awoke to find her bra unhooked, her pants and underwear pulled aside, and Thayer touching her vagina. Upon noticing J.B. waking up, Thayer rolled over and went to sleep. During a subsequent law enforcement interview, Thayer admitted he was drunk on the night in question, “[found] himself in a bad position” with his daughter, and must have mistaken J.B. for his wife. Thayer ultimately pled guilty to

fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota law. Minn. Stat. § 609.345(1)(b). Thayer was sentenced to 33 months’ imprisonment (stayed for 10 years) and 10 years’ probation and was required by Minnesota law to register as a sex offender for 10 years. Minn. Stat. §§ 243.166(1)(a)(i)(iii), 243.166(6)(a).

Thayer moved to Wisconsin sometime between August 2017 and February 2020. Thayer did not register as a sex offender in Wisconsin. On July 9, 2020, the government indicted Thayer for failing to register as a sex offender as required by SORNA. Thayer moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing his Minnesota conviction did not qualify as a “sex offense” triggering an obligation to register. Applying a categorical analysis to the definition of “sex offense” under 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(i) and to the Romeo and Juliet exception housed in 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(C), Thayer identified a mismatch between SORNA and the Minnesota statute underlying his conviction.

In a January 4, 2021 report, the magistrate judge recommended granting Thayer’s motion to dismiss the indictment. Apparently looking to § 20911(5)(A)(i), the magistrate judge applied a categorical analysis and determined there was a mismatch between the Minnesota statute and SORNA’s definition of “sexual contact.” While the magistrate judge also identified an “elemental distinction” between the Minnesota statute and SORNA’s Romeo and Juliet exception, he questioned whether that distinction satisfied the realistic probability of application threshold. The government objected to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, reiterating its views that (1) the court should look to § 20911(5)(A)(ii) to define sex offense and that (2) § 20911(5)(C) and §§ 20911(5)(A)(ii) and (7)(I) should be analyzed under a circumstance-specific method.

The district court overruled the government’s objections and, while it disagreed with the magistrate judge’s analysis, accepted the report’s ultimate conclusion. The district court held § 20911(5)(A)(ii), operating through § 20911(7)(I), provided the relevant definition of “sex offense” under SORNA—not, as Thayer suggested, § 20911(5)(A)(i). Nonetheless, the district court agreed § 20911(5)(A)(ii), applied through § 20911(7)(I), and the § 20911(5)(C) Romeo and Juliet exception called for a categorical approach and were misaligned with the Minnesota statute of conviction. The district court dismissed the indictment against Thayer on June 29, 2021.

## II.

The government raises two narrow issues on appeal. First, the government contends the district court erred in analyzing § 20911(5)(A)(ii), as applied through § 20911(7)(I), under a categorical method. Second, the government claims the district court’s application of a categorical approach to the Romeo and Juliet exception in § 20911(5)(C) runs afoul of *United States v. Rogers*, 804 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 2015), which requires a circumstance-specific approach.

[4,5] Determining whether a federal statute calls for a categorical or circumstance-specific approach is a question of statutory interpretation. *United States v. Davis*, — U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2327, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019). We review a district court’s interpretation of a federal statute de novo. *White v. United Airlines, Inc.*, 987 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2021).

[6–8] As with any issue of statutory interpretation, we begin with the text, attending also to the structure of the statute as a whole and any relevant legislative history. *Nijhawan*, 557 U.S. at 36–40, 129



S.Ct. 2294; *see also Taylor v. United States*, 495 U.S. 575, 600–01, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). Next, we consider any potential constitutional implications arising from applying a circumstance-specific analysis. *Descamps v. United States*, 570 U.S. 254, 267, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013). Finally, we examine the “practical difficulties and potential unfairness” of the circumstance-specific approach. *Taylor*, 495 U.S. at 601–02, 110 S.Ct. 2143.

### A.

#### 1.

For the purposes of SORNA, a “sex offender” is “an individual who was convicted of a sex offense.” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(1). “Sex offense” is a defined term meaning:

- (i) a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another; [or]
- (ii) a criminal offense that is a *specified offense against a minor*.[.]

*Id.* § 20911(5)(A) (emphasis added). A “specified offense against a minor” is itself defined to mean:

[A]n offense against a minor that involves any of the following:

- (A) An offense (unless committed by a parent or guardian) involving kidnapping.
- (B) An offense (unless committed by a parent or guardian) involving false imprisonment.
- (C) Solicitation to engage in sexual conduct.
- (D) Use in a sexual performance.
- (E) Solicitation to practice prostitution.
- (F) Video voyeurism as described in section 1801 of Title 18.
- (G) Possession, production, or distribution of child pornography.

(H) Criminal sexual conduct involving a minor, or the use of the Internet to facilitate or attempt such conduct.

(I) *Any conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.*

*Id.* § 20911(7) (emphasis added).

[9] This appeal requires us to evaluate whether the definition of “sex offense” in § 20911(5)(A)(ii), as applied through § 20911(7)(I)—not § 20911(5)(A)(ii) broadly—is analyzed under a categorical approach or the circumstance-specific approach. This is an issue of first impression in this circuit. Every other court of appeals to consider this question—the Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits—has concluded the circumstance-specific approach applies. *United States v. Dailey*, 941 F.3d 1183 (9th Cir. 2019); *United States v. Hill*, 820 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2016); *United States v. Price*, 777 F.3d 700 (4th Cir. 2015); *United States v. Dodge*, 597 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2010). We join our sister circuits and hold that § 20911(5)(A)(ii), as applied through § 20911(7)(I), demands a circumstance-specific analysis.

The text of SORNA, with its layered, cascading definitions, is not a model of clarity. The word “offense” on its own may refer either to “a generic crime” or to “the specific acts in which an offender engaged on a specific occasion.” *Davis*, 139 S. Ct. at 2328 (quoting *Nijharwan*, 557 U.S. at 33–34, 129 S.Ct. 2294). The meaning of “offense” depends upon its context within the surrounding statutory language. *See id.* The text of §§ 20911(5)(A)(ii) and (7)(I) makes clear “offense” refers to the “specific acts in which an offender engaged on a specific occasion.” *Id.* As noted, § 20911(7)(I) provides that a “specified offense against a minor” means an “offense” against a minor that involves “[a]ny conduct that by its nature is a sex offense

against a minor.” Thus, whether a given “offense” constitutes a “sex offense” under §§ 20911(5)(A)(ii) and (7)(I) turns upon the “nature” of the “conduct” that “offense” “involve[d].” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)(I). Explicit focus on the “conduct” underlying the prior offense, as opposed to the elements of that offense, refers to the specific circumstances of how a crime was committed, not to a generic offense. *See Nijhawan*, 557 U.S. at 37–39, 129 S.Ct. 2294; *see also Sessions v. Dimaya*, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1218, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 (2018). The term “by its nature”—which typically denotes something’s “normal and characteristic quality” or “basic or inherent features”—reinforces this conclusion. *Davis*, 139 S. Ct. at 2329 (internal quotations omitted).

Section 20911(7)(I) directs courts to evaluate the nature of an individual’s conduct, not the nature of an offense or of a conviction. This grammatical structure distinguishes § 20911(7)(I) from 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), the statute at issue in *Leocal v. Ashcroft*, 543 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004) and *Sessions v. Dimaya*, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 (2018), and from 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), the statute at issue in *United States v. Davis*, — U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019). *See Davis*, 139 S. Ct. at 2329 (describing “the language of § 924(c)(3)(B) [a]s almost identical to the language of § 16(b)”). Section 16(b) defines a “crime of violence” as, in relevant part, an “offense that . . . by its nature[ ] involves a substantial risk” of the application of physical force. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). The Supreme Court held a categorical analysis applied, observing the term “by its nature” modified “offense” and concluding the provision “requires us to look to the elements and the nature of the offense of conviction, rather than to the particular facts relating to the petitioner’s crime.” *Leocal*, 543 U.S. at 7, 125 S.Ct.

377; *see also Davis*, 139 S. Ct. at 2329; *Dimaya*, 138 S. Ct. at 1217. While SORNA’s highest-level definition of “sex offender” in § 20911(1) refers to a conviction—a term typically signifying a “crime as generally committed” and a categorical analysis—it is furthest in terms of proximity from the language of the specific sections at issue. *Dimaya*, 138 S. Ct. at 1217 (cleaned up); *see also, e.g., Taylor*, 495 U.S. at 600–01, 110 S.Ct. 2143. Whatever trivial ambiguity created by the use of “convicted” in § 20911(1) is consistently resolved in favor of a circumstance-specific analysis by the plain text of §§ 20911(5)(A)(ii) and (7)(I). *Dailey*, 941 F.3d at 1193.

[10] The juxtaposition of § 20911(5)(A)(i) and § 20911(5)(A)(ii) strengthens this conclusion. Section 20911(5)(A)(i) defines sex offense as “a criminal offense that has an *element* involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another.” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(i) (emphasis added). It refers explicitly to the “elements” of a crime in its definition of a sex offense, pointing conclusively to a categorical analysis. *United States v. Taylor*, — U.S. —, 142 S.Ct. 2015, 2020, 213 L.Ed.2d 349 (2022); *Rogers*, 804 F.3d at 1237. Section 20911(5)(A)(ii), in contrast, does not mention the elements of a crime. Instead, it defines a sex offense as “a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor.” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(ii). Congress was clearly capable of tethering the definition of “sex offense” to the elements of a crime but elected not to do so in § 20911(5)(A)(ii). “We do not lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply, and our reluctance is even greater when Congress has shown elsewhere in the same statute that it knows how to make such a requirement manifest.” *Jama v. Immigr.*

& Customs Enft, 543 U.S. 335, 341, 125 S.Ct. 694, 160 L.Ed.2d 708 (2005).

[11] SORNA's legislative history and purpose support a circumstance-specific approach to §§ 20911(5)(A)(ii) and (7)(I). SORNA's predecessor, the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 *et seq.* (1994 ed.) (the "Wetterling Act"), conditioned federal funding to the states upon adoption of sex offender registration laws.<sup>1</sup> *Id.* § 14071(g)(2); *Gundy v. United States*, — U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121, 204 L.Ed.2d 522 (2019). Congress quickly realized the Wetterling Act did not achieve the desired effect and passed SORNA as a "comprehensive bill to address the growing epidemic of sexual violence against children" to "address loopholes and deficiencies" created by the resultant patchwork of inconsistent and varied state registration laws. H.R. Rep. No. 109-218 at 22 (2005). Of particular concern to Congress were "missing" or "lost" sex offenders who evaded registration require-

ments. *Gundy*, 139 S. Ct. at 2121. Congress intended, then, to fashion a wide net ensnaring as many child sex offenders as possible. *See id.* Accordingly, the declared purpose of SORNA is to "protect the public from . . . offenders against children." 34 U.S.C. § 20901. Sections 20911(5) and 20911(7) are framed as expansions of the definitions of "sex offense" and "specified offense against a minor," respectively. 34 U.S.C. §§ 20911(5), (7). The legislative record suggests Congress intended §§ 20911(5)(A)(ii) and (7)(I) to apply to a broad range of conduct by child predators.

[12, 13] Thayer directs our attention to the Department of Justice's regulations implementing SORNA, which favor a categorical approach to §§ 20911(5)(A)(ii) and (7)(I). *See* Office of the Attorney General, National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,030, 38,052 (Jul. 2, 2008) [the SMART Guidelines]. *Chevron* deference to agency interpretations of federal statutes is warranted only where the tools of statutory

1. Thayer points to structural and linguistic similarities between the Wetterling Act's definition of "criminal offense against a victim who is a minor" and SORNA's definition of "specified offense against a minor" to suggest both refer to categories of criminal offenses, meaning §§ 20911(5)(A)(ii) and (7)(I) must be analyzed categorically. *Compare* 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7), *with* 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(A). The dissent, too, points to § 14071(a)(3)(A)'s broad characterization of "criminal offense against a victim who is a minor" as "any criminal offense in a range of offenses specified by State law which is comparable to or exceeds" the subsequent enumerated offenses as evidence the Wetterling Act demanded a categorical analysis and §§ 20911(5)(A)(ii) and (7)(I) require the same treatment. Thayer and the dissent disregard the Wetterling Act's and SORNA's distinct structure and functions. Unlike SORNA, the Wetterling Act did not itself form the basis of independent criminal liability. Instead, the Wetterling Act merely established minimum conditions state registration laws had to meet to receive federal

funding. *Gundy*, 139 S. Ct. at 2121. There was no reason to analyze, categorically or otherwise, whether a prior conviction constituted a "criminal offense against a victim who is a minor," so the statutory language upon which the dissent relies does not bear the desired weight. It is entirely unsurprising, then, that Thayer fails to point to any precedent suggesting § 14071(a)(3)(A) itself was analyzed categorically. It is true that, as a general matter, "when statutory language 'is obviously transplanted from . . . other legislation,' we have reason to think 'it brings the old soil with it.'" *Davis*, 139 S. Ct. at 2331 (quoting *Sekhar v. United States*, 570 U.S. 729, 733, 133 S.Ct. 2720, 186 L.Ed.2d 794 (2013)). When drafting § 20911(7), however, Congress expressly omitted the portion of § 14071(a)(3)(A) cited by the dissent. Even if we are to understand § 14071(a)(3)(A) amounted to a legislative preference for a categorical analysis of the Wetterling Act (and we are not convinced), Congress elected to leave this "soil" in the past when drafting § 20911(7).

construction fail to reveal a clear meaning, and Thayer concedes that is not the case here. *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Consequently, we decline to accord the SMART Guidelines interpretive weight. Whatever the preference of the Department of Justice, the text of §§ 20911(5)(A)(ii) and (7)(I) controls: a circumstance-specific analysis applies. *See, e.g., Dailey*, 941 F.3d at 1190–93; *Hill*, 820 F.3d at 1006; *Price*, 777 F.3d at 709 n.9.

[14, 15] Applying a circumstance-specific analysis to §§ 20911(5)(A)(ii) and (7)(I) does not implicate the same practical and Sixth Amendment concerns present in other contexts. Where a defendant’s punishment may be increased based on facts not found by a jury, such as when dealing with sentencing enhancements or mandatory minimums, the Sixth Amendment often compels a categorical approach. *See Davis*, 139 S. Ct. at 2327; *Descamps*, 570 U.S. at 269–70, 133 S.Ct. 2276. Even applying the circumstance-specific approach, the government bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant was previously convicted of a sex offense under SORNA, an essential element of § 2250(a). If Thayer elects to go to trial, he is entitled to put the government to its burden before a jury. Should Thayer decide to plead guilty, he will concede the elements of § 2250(a) and waive his Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of same. *Descamps*, 570 U.S. at 269–70, 133 S.Ct. 2276.

Thayer points to various practical difficulties under the circumstance-specific approach in determining whether the factual

circumstances underlying his Minnesota conviction constitute a sex offense. Again, the government bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, Thayer is a sex offender. Any practical difficulties in meeting this threshold, evidentiary or otherwise, favor Thayer. *See Nijhawan*, 557 U.S. at 42, 129 S.Ct. 2294 (“[S]ince the Government must show the amount of loss by clear and convincing evidence, uncertainties created by the passage of time are likely to count in the alien’s favor.”). The dissent is concerned about the possibility of a defendant admitting to underlying conduct when pleading guilty to a state crime being held to his affirmation under oath in a subsequent SORNA proceeding. Of course, pleading guilty and avoiding the uncertainty of a trial generally presents benefits to both defendants and the government. The chance a defendant may later regret his decision to avail himself of these advantages or realize he misjudged the consequences does not alter our assessment of whether a categorical or circumstance-specific analysis applies to these provisions of SORNA.

Like the Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, we conclude § 20911(5)(A)(ii), as applied through § 20911(7)(I), must be analyzed under the circumstance-specific method.

## 2.

The foregoing analysis is fully consistent with the Supreme Court’s precedent in *Taylor v. United States*, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (and its progeny, *Johnson v. United States*, 576 U.S. 591, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015)<sup>2</sup>) and our precedent in *United*

2. *Johnson* briefly summarizes and reiterates the Supreme Court’s holding and reasoning in *Taylor*. 576 U.S. at 596, 604–05, 135 S.Ct. 2551. Ultimately, *Johnson* examines whether § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s residual clause is unconsti-

tutionally vague, holding it is. *Id.* at 597–606, 135 S.Ct. 2551. For our purposes, *Johnson* presents little additional analytical value. *Taylor* provides the relevant precedent for interpreting § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).

*States v. Walker*, 931 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2019). In *Taylor*, the Supreme Court analyzed § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), which provides for sentencing enhancements for those with “three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). ACCA defines the term “violent felony” to mean “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that” “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). This provision of ACCA shares rough parallels with the provisions of SORNA at issue here: § 20901(1) and § 924(e)(1) both refer to convictions and § 20911(7) and § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) both deal with crimes or offenses that involve specific conduct. Despite the superficial similarity between §§ 20911(5)(A)(ii) and (7)(I) and § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), however, *Taylor*’s application of a categorical analysis to the latter does not mandate similar treatment for the former.

First, unlike § 20911(7)(I), § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) includes a list of generic crimes, such as burglary, arson, and extortion. The Supreme Court determined these generic crimes demanded generic treatment. *Taylor*, 495 U.S. at 589–90, 600–01, 110 S.Ct. 2143. By contrast, while other portions of § 20911(7) refer to generic crimes—such as solicitation in § 20911(7)(E) or voyeurism under 18 U.S.C. § 1801 in § 20911(7)(F)—§ 20911(7)(I) addresses specific conduct alone. While the dissent considers this structural distinction (which it omits from its chart comparing the two statutes) insignificant and urges us to disregard it and treat the two statutes similarly, we are limited to considering the statute as drafted by Congress. Unlike § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), when drafting § 20911(7),

Congress separated generic crimes and specific conduct into isolated subsections, and we must interpret § 20911(7)(I) accordingly. Second, ACCA’s legislative history unequivocally demonstrates “the enhancement provision has always embodied a categorical approach to the designation of predicate offenses.” *Id.* at 588–89, 601, 110 S.Ct. 2143. As previously discussed, SORNA’s legislative history points decisively in the opposite direction. Third, applying a circumstance-specific analysis to a sentencing enhancement raises practical difficulties and Sixth Amendment concerns that are not at issue when dealing with SORNA. *Id.* at 601–02, 110 S.Ct. 2143; *see also Johnson*, 576 U.S. at 605, 135 S.Ct. 2551.

In *Walker*, we concluded the Tier II and Tier III provisions in §§ 20911(3)–(4) of SORNA—which determine how long a sex offender must register—require a hybrid categorical and circumstance-specific analysis. 931 F.3d at 580. Tier classifications differ from the definition of “sex offender” in several crucial respects that render *Walker* inapplicable in this case. Unlike §§ 20911(5)(A)(ii) and (7)(I), SORNA’s tiering provisions instruct the court to compare a predicate offense to enumerated federal crimes. 34 U.S.C. §§ 20911(3)–(4). This compels a categorical approach. *Walker*, 931 F.3d at 579–80. Moreover, we did not conclude a hybrid approach applies throughout SORNA or preclude an entirely circumstance-specific inquiry in a different section of the statute. Sections 20911(5)(A)(ii) and 20911(7)(I) are wholly distinct from §§ 20911(3)–(4). Finally, the tiering provisions come into play only after a jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt a defendant committed a sex offense or after a defendant admits as much in a guilty plea. Thayer therefore overreads *Walker*.

## B.

SORNA’s Romeo and Juliet exception excludes from the definition of “sex of-

fense” consensual sex where “the victim was at least 13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the victim.” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(C). The Minnesota statute under which Thayer was convicted criminalizes sexual conduct both where (1) “the complainant is at least 13 but less than 16 years of age and the actor is more than 48 months older than the complainant” and where (2) “the actor is . . . in a current or recent position of authority over the complainant.” Minn. Stat. § 609.345(1)(b). Applying a categorical analysis to SORNA’s Romeo and Juliet exception, the district court held that, because Minnesota criminalizes sex where one actor is in a position of authority over the other irrespective of the age differential between the two, the Romeo and Juliet exception and the Minnesota statute are categorically misaligned.

The district court’s analysis runs headlong into our precedent in *Rogers*, which held § 20911(5)(C) requires a circumstance-specific approach. 804 F.3d at 1237. Indeed, in a subsequent, unrelated case over which he presided, the district judge appears to have realized his error. See *Harder v. United States*, No. 21-cv-188-jdp, 2021 WL 3418958, at \*6 & n.2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 5, 2021) (noting “the SORNA carve-out for a close-in-age defendant does not call for categorical analysis” which “is a point that I missed in my decision in [*United States v.*] *Thayer* [546 F.Supp.3d 808 (W.D. Wis. 2021)]”). On appeal, Thayer asks us to overrule *Rogers* and find § 20911(5)(C) calls for a categorical analysis. We decline Thayer’s invitation, both because the holding in *Rogers* is correct and because doing so would compound the error by creating a direct circuit split with the Fifth Circuit. See *United States v. Gonzalez-Medina*, 757 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2014).

Section 20911(5)(C) delineates the Romeo and Juliet exception based on “offense[s] involving . . . conduct.” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(C). As noted above, depending on the context of the statute and the surrounding language, “offense” may refer either to “a generic crime” or to “the specific acts in which an offender engaged on a specific occasion.” *Davis*, 139 S. Ct. at 2328 (quoting *Nijhawan*, 557 U.S. at 33–34, 129 S.Ct. 2294). The Romeo and Juliet exception’s focus on conduct, as opposed to elements, indicates “offense” refers to specific acts instead of to a generic crime. See *Dimaya*, 138 S. Ct. at 1218; *Nijhawan*, 557 U.S. at 37–39, 129 S.Ct. 2294; see also *Rogers*, 804 F.3d at 1237. The subsequent string of granular, fact-based qualifiers reinforces this conclusion. Section 20911(5)(C) applies only “‘if the victim was an adult,’ ‘unless the adult was under the custodial authority of the offender at the time of the offense,’ ‘if the victim was at least 13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the victim.’” *Rogers*, 804 F.3d at 1237 (quoting § 20911(5)(C)) (emphasis in original). These modifiers refer to the specific, individualized facts and circumstances of an offense, not the general elements. In *United States v. Gonzalez-Medina*, which predates *Rogers*, the Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion based on much the same reasoning. 757 F.3d at 428–32.

Thayer suggests subsequent Supreme Court decisions in *Mathis v. United States*, 579 U.S. 500, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), *Dimaya*, and *Shular v. United States*, — U.S. —, 140 S. Ct. 779, 206 L.Ed.2d 81 (2020) compel the opposite result. These cases offer little relevant guidance on determining whether § 20911(5)(C) requires a circumstance-specific approach at the outset and alter neither our analysis nor our ultimate conclusion. Both *Mathis* and *Shular* deal with provisions of ACCA already established to operate under a cat-

egorical framework and analyze, instead, which of the two potential categorical methods (formal or modified) applies. *Shular*, 140 S. Ct. at 783–84; *Mathis*, 579 U.S. at 506–07, 136 S.Ct. 2243. The text of the ACCA provisions at issue in *Mathis* and *Shular*—§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), respectively—differ materially from § 20911(5)(C). Neither includes a list of factual qualifiers to the degree of specificity and nuance seen in § 20911(5)(C). Indeed, § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)—thoroughly analyzed in *Taylor* and discussed above—enumerates a series of generic offenses. Similarly, *Dimaya* analyzes the definition of “crime of violence” in § 16(b), which focuses on the nature of the offense. *Dimaya*, 138 S. Ct. at 1217; see also *Leocal*, 543 U.S. at 7, 125 S.Ct. 377. Section 20911(5)(C), on the other hand, places conduct at the forefront of the analysis.

[16] We affirm our prior holding in *Rogers*; the text of § 20911(5)(C) compels a circumstance-specific analysis.

### III.

For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Jackson-Akiwumi, Circuit Judge,  
dissenting.

The issue presented in this case is a close one; both sides have good arguments. The majority opinion thoroughly lays out

the best reasons for adopting the government’s position. Ultimately, however, I disagree with my colleagues’ conclusion that 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)(I) calls for a circumstance-specific approach. As I see it, only when read in isolation does subsection (7)(I)’s reference to “conduct” suggest that courts should look at the underlying facts of a prior conviction. When viewed in context with the rest of the statute, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act’s definition for “specified offense against a minor” closely mirrors other statutes that the Supreme Court has held require a categorical approach. And although I recognize that my reading of the statute would create a circuit split, I disagree with the opinions of our sister circuits for the same reasons that I disagree with the majority opinion.

In particular, I see stronger parallels than the majority opinion does between § 20911(7)(I) and the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition for “violent felony.” See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); *Johnson v. United States*, 576 U.S. 591, 604, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) (holding that residual clause is categorical). Both provisions are part of cascading statutory definitions. Both statutes start with a reference to the defendant’s prior convictions, before laying out different definitions for the qualifying convictions. And in defining the relevant offenses, both § 20911(7)(I) and § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) refer to the offender’s “conduct.” Indeed, the relevant sections of each statute are strikingly similar:

	34 U.S.C. § 20911	18 U.S.C. § 924(e)
<b>Reference to prior convictions</b>	“The term ‘sex offender’ means an individual who was <i>convicted</i> of a sex offense.” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(1) (emphasis added).	Mandatory minimum applies to any offender who “has three previous <i>convictions</i> . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (emphasis added).
<b>Relevant subsection defining those prior convictions</b>	Sex offense includes “an offense against a minor that involves . . . [a]ny <i>conduct</i> that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(ii) and (7)(I) (emphasis added).	“[T]he term ‘violent felony’ means any [felony] crime . . . that . . . involves <i>conduct</i> that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).

Beyond the provisions at issue here and in *Johnson*, the statutes have additional similarities. Just as a categorical interpretation of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is consistent with the categorical approach used elsewhere in the ACCA, *see Taylor v. United States*, 495 U.S. 575, 600–01, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), a categorical interpretation of § 20911(7)(I) is consistent with the categorical approach used by other parts of SORNA. We have said that the definition of “sex offense” used in § 20911(5)(A)(i) is categorical, *United States v. Rogers*, 804 F.3d 1233, 1237 (7th Cir. 2015), as are the definitions for “Tier II” and “Tier III” sex offender used in § 20911(3) and (4), *United States v. Walker*, 931 F.3d 576, 581 (7th Cir. 2019)

(adopting hybrid approach that starts with categorical method). Sections 20911(5)(A)(iii) and (iv) likewise use a categorical approach because they instruct courts to compare a predicate offense to enumerated federal and military crimes. The only outlier is § 20911(5)(C)’s “Romeo and Juliet” provision, which I agree with the majority opinion refers to underlying conduct. But that provision refers to an *exception* that applies only after a court has already concluded that a prior conviction qualifies as a sex offense. *See Rogers*, 804 F.3d at 1237. It would be odd for Congress to require the categorical approach for all definitions of “sex offense” found in § 20911 except for “specified offense against a minor” under



§ 20911(5)(A)(ii). See *United States v. Davis*, — U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2328, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019) (assuming that the word “offense” in § 924(c)(3) carries the same meaning throughout that subsection).

Other textual markers that the majority opinion insists are evidence of a circumstance-specific approach for § 20911(7)(I) are also present in § 924(e)(2)(B). The majority opinion emphasizes that a different subsection of SORNA, § 20911(5)(A)(i), explicitly defines “sex offenses” to include offenses with an “element” involving a sexual act. Thus, my colleagues believe, Congress’s exclusion of similar language in § 20911(5)(A)(ii) and (7)(I) should be seen as a conscious decision to eschew the categorical method. But the same argument could be made about § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (defining violent felony to include offenses with an “element” of force) with *id.* § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (lacking any reference to “elements”). Yet the Supreme Court still concluded that the latter provision required a categorical approach, despite the absence of elemental language Congress put elsewhere in the statute. *Johnson*, 576 U.S. at 604, 135 S.Ct. 2551; *Taylor*, 495 U.S. at 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143.

The majority opinion also notes that, unlike § 20911(7)(I), section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) includes several generic crimes that require a categorical approach. (In full, the statute defines violent felony to include any conviction that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”) But again, no meaningful distinction between the two statutes exists. Subsection (7)(I) is only one clause of § 20911(7), which like § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) enumerates several generic offenses like solicitation and voyeurism. The only difference is that Congress chose to enumerate

the offenses in § 20911(7) with the letters (A) through (I) instead of separating them with commas. I do not see this difference as significant, mainly because the Supreme Court already rejected the explanation that § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires a categorical approach only because of the presence of generic offenses. *Johnson*, 576 U.S. at 604, 135 S.Ct. 2551.

Although *Johnson* was primarily about whether the residual clause was unconstitutionally vague, Justice Alito’s dissent urged the Court to save the provision by jettisoning the categorical method and adopting a circumstance-specific approach. In response, the Court carefully explained why the residual clause required a categorical approach apart from the clause’s proximity to the enumerated generic offenses:

*Taylor* had good reasons to adopt the categorical approach, reasons that apply no less to the residual clause than to the enumerated crimes. *Taylor* explained that the relevant part of the Armed Career Criminal Act “refers to ‘a person who . . . has three previous convictions’ for—not a person who has committed—three previous violent felonies or drug offenses.” 495 U.S. at 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143. This emphasis on convictions indicates that “Congress intended the sentencing court to look only to the fact that the defendant had been convicted of crimes falling within certain categories, and not to the facts underlying the prior convictions.” *Ibid.* *Taylor* also pointed out the utter impracticability of requiring a sentencing court to reconstruct, long after the original conviction, the conduct underlying that conviction. For example, if the original conviction rested on a guilty plea, no record of the underlying facts may be available. “[T]he only plausible interpretation” of the law,

therefore, requires use of the categorical approach. *Id.*, at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143. *Id.* at 604, 110 S.Ct. 2143.

My colleagues believe that on the topic of the categorical method, *Johnson* provides little analytical value beyond what the Court already said in *Taylor*. But I do not read the passage quoted above as superfluous. The Court’s rejection of the circumstance-specific approach was necessary to its holding because it had to explain why it refused to abandon the categorical method even when doing so would have allowed the Court to avoid an unconstitutional interpretation. *See id.* at 631–32, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (Alito, J., dissenting) (collecting authorities describing canon of constitutional avoidance); *United States v. Crawley*, 837 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1988) (defining dictum as statements that are “unnecessary to the decision” or “could have been deleted without seriously impairing the analytical foundations of the holding”). Because *Johnson* holds that the residual clause requires a categorical approach, we should assume that the Supreme Court would say the same about the text in § 20911(7)(I).

In addition to the text of the statute, the majority opinion reasons that a circumstance-specific approach is supported by (1) SORNA’s legislative history and (2) the lack of practical and Sixth Amendment concerns present in other contexts. I disagree with the majority opinion’s analysis on both grounds.

First, the legislative history is, at best, ambiguous. True, Congress intended SORNA to cast a “wide net.” Ante at 804. But even the most expansive interpretation of a statute must have clear delineations; a criminal law that “fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes” is “standardless.” *Johnson*, 576 U.S. at

595, 135 S.Ct. 2551. And here, Congress lifted § 20911(7)(I) from a list of enumerated offenses that previously existed under the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act. *Compare* 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)(I) and 42 U.S.C. § 14071(3)(A)(vii) (2002). “[W]hen statutory language is obviously transplanted from other legislation, we have reason to think it brings the old soil with it.” *United States v. Davis*, — U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2331, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019) (cleaned up). The old soil in this case is prefatory text that appeared with the list of qualifying offenses in the Wetterling Act, and which specified that a categorical approach applied. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 14071(3)(A) (2002) (explaining that a qualifying offense was “any criminal offense in a range of offenses specified by State law which is comparable to or which exceeds the following range of offenses”). The majority opinion dismisses this part of the legislative history by citing a lack of precedent confirming that the Wetterling Act was analyzed categorically. But as the majority opinion recognizes, litigants lacked cause to test the Wetterling Act’s definitions in court because that act did not include a criminal-liability component. Nonetheless, the Wetterling Act was not dead letter; states needed to construe the act’s definitions to determine which offenses they must make registrable to receive federal funding. *See* Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 15110-02, 15113 (Apr. 4, 1996) (instructing states on how to construe the Wetterling Act). Accordingly, I do not see why a dearth of judicial opinions on the subject should lead us to ignore the Wetterling Act’s clear text—an important part of SORNA’s legislative history that sup-

ports Thayer's position.<sup>1</sup>

Second, a circumstance-specific approach to § 20911(7)(I) is more impractical than the majority opinion suggests. Unless prior victims are forced to come back and testify—perhaps decades after the fact—any evidence the government would rely on to prove the underlying circumstances of a prior conviction could raise evidentiary or constitutional concerns. For example, the Eighth Circuit has adopted a circumstance-specific test for § 20911(7)(I), and in at least one case the government satisfied its burden by admitting at trial an old video of the victim's police interview. *United States v. KT Burgee*, 988 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 2021). That strategy worked only because the defendant failed to challenge the video's admissibility. *Id.* at 1060. But upon proper objection, this type of evidence could raise concerns about hearsay and a defendant's right to cross examine witnesses under the Confrontation Clause. See *Delaware v. Van Arsdall*, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).

The majority opinion insists that any practical difficulties under a circumstance-specific approach will benefit Thayer because the government has the burden to prove the facts underlying his prior conviction. Other defendants, however, will be unfairly punished under this approach. In many cases, the government is likely to rely on plea agreements to establish the underlying conduct of a conviction. But the facts put in the record at a plea hearing may not accurately reflect the strength of the government's case as to conduct outside the elements of conviction, especially since a defendant “may not wish to irk the

prosecutor or court by squabbling about superfluous factual allegations.” *Descamps v. United States*, 570 U.S. 254, 270, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013). And for defendants who negotiated a plea deal, it would “seem unfair” to sandbag them with a duty to register after they thought they had pled down to a conviction that did not carry a registration requirement. *Taylor*, 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143.

Additional impracticalities stem from how SORNA's “sex offender” definition creates registration requirements as part of a civil regulatory scheme. As amicus points out, a circumstance-specific approach will create confusion about who is required under federal law to register. Will a pre-registration hearing be necessary to determine whether the state could have proven additional facts not included in the plea? These administrative headaches are not present under a categorical approach because, when the only issue is the existence of a prior conviction, adequate notice and an opportunity to challenge the registration requirement has typically already been provided through the prior criminal prosecution. See *Connecticut Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe*, 538 U.S. 1, 7, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003).

Finally, although I agree with the majority opinion that § 20911 does not invoke the same Sixth Amendment concerns as the ACCA, see *Davis*, 139 S. Ct. at 2327, I do not see that as a reason to choose a circumstance-specific approach. Not every statute requiring a categorical approach has a Sixth Amendment component; the Supreme Court has adopted a categorical

1. The majority opinion also points out that when Congress enacted SORNA, it omitted the prefatory text from the Wetterling Act. But the exclusion of this text in SORNA does not change the fact that when Congress drafted the phrase “any conduct that by its nature

is a sexual offense against a minor” as a definition in the Wetterling Act, it did so knowing the phrase would be construed categorically. It then copied this categorical definition essentially unchanged into SORNA.

approach for appropriate statutes even when no constitutional concerns are present. *See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder*, 569 U.S. 184, 200, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013) (adopting categorical approach to promote “judicial and administrative efficiency” for removal proceedings in which an immigration judge must determine whether a prior conviction is an “aggravated felony”). Indeed, the Court cited practical considerations rather than constitutional concerns when it reaffirmed the categorical approach in *Johnson*, 576 U.S. at 604, 135 S.Ct. 2551. After considering the text of § 20911(7)(I), the legislative history, and the other practical difficulties associated with a circumstance-specific approach, I would adopt the categorical method for § 20911(7)(I).

On that basis, I respectfully dissent.



David LANE, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Michael PERSON, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 21-2710

United States Court of Appeals,  
Seventh Circuit.

Submitted July 20, 2022 \* —

Decided July 21, 2022

**Background:** Inmate brought § 1983 action against jail doctor, alleging deliberate indifference. After doctor prevailed at summary judgment, the United States District Court for the Northern District of

Indiana, Robert L. Miller, Jr., Senior District Judge, 2021 WL 4147027, awarded doctor \$4,017.59 in costs. Inmate appealed.

**Holdings:** The Court of Appeals held that:

- (1) district court abused its discretion by awarding witness’s full fee of \$2,750, and
- (2) witness fee was not recoverable as expert’s fee.

Affirmed as modified.

### 1. Federal Courts ⇌3617

Court of Appeals asks two questions when reviewing award of costs: (1) whether cost imposed on losing party is recoverable and (2) if so, whether amount assessed for that item was reasonable.

### 2. Federal Courts ⇌3617

In reviewing award of costs, Court of Appeals reviews carefully whether expense is recoverable, but will disturb decision on reasonableness only when there is clear abuse of discretion.

### 3. Costs, Fees, and Sanctions ⇌881

There is a presumption that a prevailing party recovers costs; the presumption applies only to those costs that are enumerated in statute governing taxation of costs, however. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1920; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d).

### 4. Costs, Fees, and Sanctions ⇌725

When prevailing party seeks witness fees, federal court is bound by statute limiting daily amount of such fees, absent contract or explicit statutory authority to contrary. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1821(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54.

\* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal argu-

ments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

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## FINAL JUDGMENT

July 21, 2022

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, *Circuit Judge*

AMY J. ST. EVE, *Circuit Judge*

CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, *Circuit Judge*

No. 21-2385	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellant  v.  THOMAS P. THAYER, Defendant - Appellee
<b>Originating Case Information:</b>	
District Court No: 3:20-cr-00088-jdp-1 Western District of Wisconsin District Judge James D. Peterson	

For the foregoing reasons, we **VACATE** the judgment of the district court and **REMAND** for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The above is in accordance with the decision of this court entered on this date.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Christopher Conway".

Clerk of Court



United States Court of Appeals  
For the Seventh Circuit  
Chicago, Illinois 60604

October 31, 2022

**Before**

JOEL M. FLAUM, *Circuit Judge*

AMY J. ST. EVE, *Circuit Judge*

CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, *Circuit Judge*

No. 21-2385

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
*Plaintiff-Appellant,*  
*v.*

THOMAS P. THAYER,  
*Defendant-Appellee.*

Appeal from the United States District  
Court for the Western District of  
Wisconsin.

No. 3:20-cr-00088-jdp-1

James D. Peterson,  
*Judge.*

**ORDER**

On September 27, 2022, the appellee filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc, and on October 14, 2022, the appellant filed an answer to the petition. No judge in regular active service has requested a vote on the petition for rehearing en banc, and the judges on the original panel have voted to deny rehearing. The petition is therefore DENIED.





Heart Hospital should not be dismissed from this case.



**UNITED STATES of America,**  
**Plaintiff,**

v.

**Thomas P. THAYER, Defendant.**

**20-cr-88-jdp**

United States District Court,  
W.D. Wisconsin.

Signed 06/29/2021

**Background:** Defendant moved to dismiss indictment for failing to register as required under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, Stephen L. Crocker, United States Magistrate Judge, issued a report and recommendation that the motion be granted, to which the government objected.

**Holdings:** The District Court, James D. Peterson, J., held that Minnesota offense of criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree was not a “sex offense” as term is used in SORNA, such that defendant was under no obligation to register as a sex offender.

Motion granted.

#### **1. Mental Health ⚡469(4)**

Other than a prior conviction, any fact that exposes a defendant to increased statutory punishment under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) must be found, beyond a reasonable

doubt, by a jury. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2250; 34 U.S.C.A. § 20911.

#### **2. Mental Health ⚡469(2)**

Minnesota offense of criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree was not a “sex offense” as term is used in Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), such that defendant was under no obligation to register as a sex offender, even though aggressive intent element of Minnesota offense was a categorical match to abusive intent element in federal criminal statute defining sexual contact; Minnesota statute would have criminalized sexual contact between a 13 to 15 year old victim and an offender in a position of authority, even if the offender was less than 48 months older, but that offense would not have been a sex offense requiring registration under SORNA, such that there was a categorical mismatch, and defendant’s conduct was immaterial under required categorical analysis. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2246(3), 2250, 34 U.S.C.A. § 20911(7)(I); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.345.

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Julie Suzanne Pfluger, Government,  
United States Attorney’s Office, Madison,  
WI, for Plaintiff.

#### **OPINION and ORDER**

JAMES D. PETERSON, District Judge

Defendant Thomas P. Thayer is charged in a single-count indictment with failing to register as required under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250. Thayer moves to dismiss the indictment, contending that his Minnesota conviction for Fourth Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct is not a predicate “sex offense” under SORNA, so he was under no obligation to register. Dkt. 12.

After briefing, Magistrate Judge Crocker issued a Report and Recommendation that the motion be granted. Dkt. 22. The government objects to the Report and Recommendation. Dkt. 30. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and this court's standing order, I am required to review de novo the objected-to portions of the Report and Recommendation.

The underlying facts are undisputed. In 2003, Thayer pleaded guilty in Minnesota state court to Fourth Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. 609.345(b). According to the sworn probable cause statement attached to the state-court complaint, Thayer was sleeping on the floor of his trailer next to his daughter JB, who was a minor at the time. At some point during the night, JB awoke to find her pants and underwear pulled aside and Thayer touching her vaginal area. Thayer told the investigating officers that he must have mistaken his daughter for his wife.

Thayer's motion presents a question of law: whether his Minnesota conviction is a predicate "sex offense" under SORNA. Guided primarily by *United States v. Walker*, 931 F.3d 576, 578 (7th Cir. 2019), Judge Crocker concluded that, to answer the question, the court must apply the "categorical" approach. Under that approach, the court compares the elements of the Minnesota statute to the SORNA definition of sex offense without consideration of Thayer's actual offense conduct. Judge Crocker concluded that the Minnesota statute criminalizes conduct that would not fall within the SORNA definition of sex offense. Because the Minnesota statute sweeps more broadly than the SORNA definition, Judge Crocker recommends that I dismiss the indictment. The government objects to every step of Judge Crocker's analysis. Dkt. 30.

My analysis differs from Judge Crocker's, but I reach the same conclusion. I

adopt the recommendation and dismiss the indictment.

#### A. Categorical vs. circumstance-specific approach

The government objects to the use of the categorical approach in the first place, basing its argument in the text of SORNA's complex definition of "sex offense." The government agrees that the categorical approach would be appropriate for those sex crimes defined in 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(i). That provision defines a "sex offense" as "a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another." That language, phrased in terms of whether a prior offense has a certain "element," calls for an analysis of the elements, which is to say, the categorical approach. But, the government's argument goes, the definition in § 20911(5)(A)(ii) is phrased in a way that calls for a "circumstance-specific" approach in which the court considers the underlying offense conduct. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit has endorsed this approach. But the government cites half a dozen cases outside the Seventh Circuit that it says call for the circumstance-specific approach, most notably *United States v. Dodge*, 597 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2010). Dkt. 30, at 5.

Section 20911(5)(A)(ii) defines "sex offense" to include, among other definitions, "a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor." "Specified offense against a minor" is defined in § 20911(7), a subsection with the heading "Expansion of definition of 'specified offense against a minor' to include all offenses by child predators." The defined specified offenses include, as is pertinent here, "an offense against a minor that involves . . . any conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor." § 20911(7)(I). The government contends that the definition calls

for a circumstance-specific examination of the underlying offense conduct because the definition is phrased in terms of offenses that “involve any conduct.”

I am persuaded, as was the *Dodge* court, that Congress intended to sweep very broadly with § 20911(7). The heading of the section makes that clear. And purely as a matter of textual reading, the definition in paragraph (I) would include pretty much everything under the sun that could reasonably be considered a sex offense against a minor. But for several reasons I’m not persuaded that this section calls for the court to look at the underlying offense conduct.

The statutory text is ambiguous about whether it calls for the examination of the actual individual offense conduct. It might; the *Dodge* court read the text that way. But asking whether an “offense” involves some specific conduct could be a question about whether the offense as statutorily defined requires proof of that conduct, which would call for the examination of the criminal statute, not the actual offense conduct. I don’t find the text as clear and compelling as the government contends. But I don’t need to resolve the textual ambiguity, because there are other reasons to reject the circumstance-specific approach.

Reading § 20911(7)(I) to allow the court to look at the underlying offense conduct for anything that would be a sex offense would render most of SORNA’s definitions of sex offense mere surplusage. *Walker*, following *Nijhawan v. Holder*, 557 U.S. 29, 38–39, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009), allows consideration of the actual age of the victim only after a strictly categorical analysis of the statute of conviction. Why bother with the exacting categorical analysis called for in *Walker* when § 20911(7)(I) would cover the vast majority of putative SORNA predicate convictions?

I can’t reconcile the *Dodge* approach with Seventh Circuit precedent, particularly *Walker*, that calls for an initial categorical analysis of SORNA predicate convictions.

[1] The most fundamental problem with the government’s position is that categorical analysis is not merely matter of interpreting the statutory text to ascertain congressional intent. It is also rooted in constitutional principles that circumscribe judicial factfinding to protect a defendant’s rights to due process and a jury trial. *Mathis v. United States*, 579 U.S. 500, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2246, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016). Other than a prior conviction, any fact that exposes a defendant to increased statutory punishment must be found, beyond a reasonable doubt, by a jury. *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). The government’s position finds arguable support in SORNA’s text, but it invites expansive judicial factfinding that cannot be easily squared with *Mathis* and the many subsequent cases applying the categorical approach to predicate convictions in many contexts. Thayer’s case illustrates the problem vividly: under the government’s approach, to convict Thayer for the SORNA violation, the court would have to find the facts underlying an 18-year-old conviction with a sleeping minor victim and an intoxicated offender, presumably based on hearsay—the investigator’s probable cause statement. I decline to take a circumstance-specific approach that would consider Thayer’s actual offense conduct in deciding whether he was required to register under SORNA.

## **B. Categorical analysis of Thayer’s predicate conviction**

[2] The government contends that even if the court takes the categorical approach, Thayer’s Minnesota conviction for criminal sexual contact is a “sex offense”

under SORNA. In conducting the categorical analysis, the first question is: what must the court compare the Minnesota statute to?

The Supreme Court has recently clarified that there are two categorical methodologies depending on the provision of the federal statute at issue. *Shular v. United States*, — U.S. —, 140 S. Ct. 779, 206 L.Ed.2d 81 (2020); *see also United States v. Ruth*, 966 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2020), *cert. denied*, — U.S. —, 141 S. Ct. 1239, 208 L.Ed.2d 630 (2021). Some statutes require the “generic-offense” approach, in which the court must come up with the generic version of a crime. For example, the Armed Career Criminal Act says that a conviction for “burglary” counts as a predicate violent felony. This requires the court to identify the elements of generic burglary and compare those elements to the statute under which the defendant was previously convicted. Other statutes call for a “conduct-based” approach, in which the court more directly examines the elements of the statute of the prior conviction to determine whether that statute meets the criteria specified in the federal law. For example, the Immigration and Naturalization Act provides consequences for an alien convicted of a crime that “involves fraud or deceit.” This calls for the court to directly examine the elements of the statute of the prior conviction to determine whether it necessarily entails fraud or deceit. To be clear: the conduct-based method is strictly categorical, and it does not call for or permit any evaluation of the actual offense conduct.

Neither side directly addresses which categorical approach I should take here, but the definition of “sex offense” in SORNA calls for the conduct-based categorical approach. In *Ruth*, the court of appeals considered the Armed Career Criminal Act concept “serious drug offense,” which

is defined as “an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” The court of appeals held that “serious drug offense” called for the conduct-based categorical analysis. The SORNA definition language is phrased in terms similar to the definition of “serious drug offense.” SORNA does not refer to generic offenses, but to conduct that must be an element of the prior convictions. So the conduct-based categorical approach is the appropriate method here. With that background, I turn to the government’s arguments about why I should find a categorical match between Minnesota Fourth Criminal Degree Sexual Contact and the SORNA definition of “sex offense.”

The government’s first argument on this issue is that the court should eschew any federal statutory definition and use a plain-language definition of “sexual contact.” Sexual contact is not expressly defined under SORNA. The government suggests that, using dictionary definitions, the term means simply “touching of a sexual nature,” and that’s a match with the Minnesota statute because the statute involves touching of the intimate parts of the victim. I’m not persuaded that this is the right approach, because SORNA expressly refers to some federal offenses, and other courts have suggested that the federal sex offenses provide the proper starting point. *See, e.g., Walker*, 931 F.3d at 578; *United States v. George*, 223 F. Supp. 3d 159, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).

Besides, the proposed plain-language approach would not necessarily produce the result the government intends. The Minnesota statute also applies to touching with “aggressive” intent, so it would apply to touching that was not intended to be sexual, and thus it would sweep more broadly than SORNA, producing a categorical mis-

match. If the government means to say that any touching of the intimate parts is inherently sexual, then the government is reading the intent element out of the Minnesota statute and the federal definition, and its categorical analysis would be fundamentally flawed because it would reach touching of the intimate parts for purposes of health care or hygiene.

The government's second argument is more directly targeted to the analysis in the Report and Recommendation, which used the definition of "sexual contact" in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3). According to the government, Fourth Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct under Minnesota law is a categorical match to "sexual contact" as defined in § 2246(3). Judge Crocker disagreed. The Minnesota offense and the federal offense match with respect to the body parts whose touching is potentially prohibited. But the Minnesota statute criminalizes touching with either sexual or aggressive intent, whereas § 2246(3) requires "an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person." Judge Crocker saw no equivalent to aggressive touching in § 2246(3), but the government contends that Judge Crocker was wrong.

The government's argument is succinct, essentially relying on the unpublished decision from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which concluded that "[t]he intent to 'abuse' in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3) is analogous to the aggressive intent required by the Minnesota statute." *United States v. Coleman*, 681 F. App'x 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2017). I considered essentially the same issue in *United States v. Geasland*, No. 15-CR-132 (W.D. Wis., filed July 7, 2016). I won't repeat the entire analysis from *Geasland* here. But I took a close look at the concept "abuse" under federal sex crime law, and I reached the same conclusion as did the Fifth Circuit:

Given the necessarily broad notion of "abuse" as that term is used in federal sex crime statutes, I conclude that the touching of a minor's intimate parts for the purpose of inflicting physical pain—such as a battery to the genitals or breast—would constitute sexual contact within the meaning of the federal sex abuse statutes.

*Id.*, at 8. So I part ways with the Report and Recommendation on this point: I conclude that the aggressive intent element of Minnesota Fourth Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct is a categorical match to the abusive intent element in § 2246(3).

But that's not the end of the categorical analysis, because there is a second categorical mismatch identified in the Report and Recommendation, involving what Judge Crocker referred to as the "Romeo and Juliet" carve-out. SORNA excludes from "sex offense" two categories of offenses involving consensual sexual conduct. The first category includes offenses with adult victims not under the custodial authority of the offender. The second category includes offenses with victims at least 13 years old, if the offender was no more than four years older than the victim at the time of the offense. The Minnesota statute under which Thayer was convicted criminalizes sexual contact with a victim 13–15 years old if the offender is *either* more than 48 months older than the victim *or* the offender is "in a position of authority" over the victim. Minn. Stat. § 609.345(b). As Judge Crocker pointed out, there is a categorical mismatch here: Minnesota would criminalize sexual contact between a 13–15 year old victim and an offender in a position of authority, even if the offender was less than 48 months older. But that offense would not be a sex offense under SORNA.

Judge Crocker questioned whether this categorical mismatch would meet the "re-

alistic probability of application threshold” in *Walker*. Dkt. 22, at 9 n.3. But he didn’t have to resolve that point, because he concluded that the mismatch on the intent element resolved Thayer’s motion. Because I disagree with Judge Crocker on the intent element, I have to address the realistic probability of application issue in more depth.

In *Walker*, the Court of Appeals described the matching called for under the categorical approach in this way:

If the elements of the predicate offense are the same (or narrower) than the federal offense, there is a categorical match. . . . But if the elements of the state conviction sweep more broadly such that there is a “realistic probability . . . that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside” the definition of the federal crime, then the prior offense is not a categorical match. *Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S. Ct. 815, 166 L. Ed. 2d 683 (2007).

931 F.3d at 579. This comment from *Walker* suggests that the categorical approach requires something more than a strict element-by-element analysis, but nothing in *Walker* required the Court of Appeals to explain or apply the realistic probability test.

The case cited in *Walker*, *Duenas-Alvarez*, involved the categorical analysis of a state-law offense to determine whether it qualified as a “theft offense” under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, which would result in the defendant’s removal from the United States. 549 U.S. at 185, 127 S.Ct. 815. The Court said that it was not enough to point to a minor elemental discrepancy between the state statute and the generic definition of the offense:

Moreover, in our view, to find that a state statute creates a crime outside the generic definition of a listed crime in a

federal statute requires more than the application of legal imagination to a state statute’s language. It requires a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime. To show that realistic probability, an offender, of course, may show that the statute was so applied in his own case. But he must at least point to his own case or other cases in which the state courts in fact did apply the statute in the special (non-generic) manner for which he argues.

549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. As the court of appeals explained in *Ruth*, the generic-offense approach “must allow for some margin of inconsequential discrepancy.” 966 F.3d at 647–48. Under the generic-offense approach, it’s enough for the government to show substantial correspondence between the state statute and the generic crime. It’s up to the defendant to show a realistic probability that the state would apply its statute in the non-generic way by pointing to a specific case.

But the margin of inconsequential discrepancy does not apply under the conduct-based categorical approach. Under that approach, “[t]here are no minor deviations in offense elements to assess, only enumerated conduct.” *Id.* Thus, in *Ruth*, the criminalization of “positional isomers” of cocaine under Illinois law was enough to create a categorical mismatch with the federal definition of “felony drug offense.” The government adduced evidence that the DEA had never encountered a case involving positional isomers of cocaine, but that did not matter under the conduct-based categorical approach. *Id.* at 648.

The strict *Ruth* approach is applicable here because we are operating under the conduct-based categorical approach. The minor discrepancy in the Romeo-and-Juliet carve-out creates a categorical mismatch,

which means that Minnesota Fourth Criminal Degree Sexual Contact is not a “sex offense” as that term is used under SORNA. Thayer was under no obligation to register as a sex offender. The result is counterintuitive, in light Thayer’s actual offense conduct, but that conduct is immaterial under the required categorical analysis.

#### ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that defendant’s motion is GRANTED; the indictment is dismissed.



**Rich ELBERT, Jeff A. Kosek, Reichmann Land & Cattle LLP, Ludowese A.E. Inc., and Michael Stamer, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs,**

**v.**

**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Risk Management Agency, and Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, Defendants.**

**Civil No. 18-1574 (JRT/TNL)**

United States District Court,  
D. Minnesota.

Signed 06/29/2021

**Background:** Dark red kidney bean farmers from Minnesota brought action individually and on behalf of class of similarly situated persons against the Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Risk Management Agency (RMA) and Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) under Administrative Procedure Act (APA), alleging that it was arbitrary and capricious for de-

fendants to allow dry bean revenue endorsement, which farmers had purchased to protect against decline in bean prices, to convert farmers’ revenue coverage into yield protection. Parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The District Court, John R. Tunheim, Chief Judge, granted summary judgment to defendants (2020 WL 4926635), and farmers moved for reconsideration.

**Holdings:** The District Court, John R. Tunheim, Chief Judge, held that:

- (1) RMA violated APA by failing to resubmit significant changes to endorsement to FCIC, and
- (2) RMA violated APA by implementing changes to endorsement.

Motion granted.

#### **1. Federal Civil Procedure** ⇌613.9, 613.11

Motions to reconsider serve limited function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. D. Minn. L.R. 7.1(j).

#### **2. Insurance** ⇌1021

Post-approval changes to dry bean revenue endorsement, which bean farmers purchased to protect against decline in bean prices, were significant, affecting pricing methodology, amount of coverage, farmers’ interests, and amount of loss to be paid, and thus Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Risk Management Agency (RMA) violated Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by failing to resubmit post-approval changes as new submission; changes converted revenue coverage into yield protection, resulting in no recompense for farmers after decline in bean prices as measured by difference between spring projected price and fall harvest price, given that there was not enough published pricing data to establish a har-





IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

Plaintiff,

THOMAS THAYER,

Defendant.

REPORT AND  
RECOMMENDATION

20-cr-88-jdp

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REPORT

On July 9, 2020, the grand jury returned a one-count indictment (dkt. 2) charging Thomas Thayer with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2250 by unlawfully failing to update his registration as a sex offender as required by the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) after he moved from Minnesota to Wisconsin. Thayer has moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that his state conviction in Minnesota does not qualify as a “sex offense” as defined by SORNA, which means that he had no duty to register in the first place, let alone update his registration. *See* dkt. 12. The government disagrees, contending that Thayer’s conviction *does* qualify as a sex offense under SORNA. *See* dkt. 16. For the reasons stated below, I am recommending that the court grant Thayer’s motion to dismiss.

The parties do not dispute the facts underlying Thayer’s state conviction or the wording of the Minnesota statute(s) that criminalized Thayer’s conduct. What they dispute is *how* this court should determine whether Thayer’s state conviction qualifies as a “sex offense” under SORNA. Relying primarily (but not exclusively) on *United States v. Walker*, 931 F.3d 576 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2019), Thayer contends that this court must use the categorical approach to make this determination: if there’s not a categorical match between the statute of conviction and SORNA’s definition of a sex offense, then the analysis is over and Thayer prevails.

Not so fast, counters the government: it is appropriate in this case to use the circumstance-specific approach to determine whether the elements of Thayer's state conviction is a sex offense under SORNA. Under that approach, contends the government, the answer is "yes," and this court must deny Thayer's motion.

As discussed below, it appears that Thayer is correct: this court must determine if there is a categorical match between the elements of Thayer's state court conviction and SORNA's definition of a sex offense, without regard to the underlying facts. Because there is no match, Thayer's conviction does not require him to register as a sex offender under SORNA.

#### BACKGROUND FACTS AND STATUTES

On November 20, 2003, Thayer pled guilty in Minnesota state court to one count of Fourth Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. 609.345(b). The plea hearing documents included the three-count criminal complaint filed against Thayer, which included a law enforcement officer's sworn probable cause statement for the count to which Thayer pled guilty. According to this statement, Thayer's daughter (JB) had reported that

On the night in question, she was with her father at a relative's home near Brainerd. At some point in the evening, they left that residence and drove to the defendant's trailer in Mille Lacs County. JB stated that they slept on the floor, and at one point she awoke to find her pants and underwear pulled aside, her bra unhooked and the defendant had his hand down her pants and was touching her vaginal area. JB was unsure whether she was penetrated or not. . . .

Officers interviewed the defendant on two occasions . . . During the course of those interviews, the defendant admitted to being drunk on the night in question and "finding himself in a bad position" with his daughter. The defendant told officers that he must have mistaken his daughter for his wife.

Dkt. 16-1 at 3.

Minn. Stat. 609.345(b) states:

A person who engages in sexual contact with another person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree if any of the following circumstances exists:

(b) the complainant is at least 13 but less than 16 years of age and the actor is more than 48 months older than the complainant or in a position of authority over the complainant. Consent by the complainant to the act is not a defense.

Minn. Stat. 609.341(10) states:

“Current or recent position of authority” includes but is not limited to any person who is a parent or acting in the place of a parent . . . or a person charged with or assumes any duty or responsibility for the health, welfare, or supervision of a child, either independently or through another, no matter how brief.

Minn. Stat. 609.341(11)(a) states:

“Sexual contact,” for the purposes of section[ ] 609.343, includes any of the following acts committed without the complainant’s consent, except in those cases where consent is not a defense, and committed with sexual or aggressive intent:

(i) the intentional touching by the actor of the complainant’s intimate parts;

\* \* \*

(iv) in any of the cases above, the touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the intimate parts.

Minn. Stat. 609.341(5) states:

“Intimate parts” includes the primary genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttocks or breast of a human being.

Pursuant to Minn. Stats. 243.166(1)(a)(iii) & (6)(a), Thayer was required to register as a “predatory offender” for a period of ten years.

SORNA provides these definitions at 34 U.S.C. § 20911:

(1) The term “sex offender” means an individual who was convicted of a sex offense.

(5) (A) Except as limited by subparagraph (B) or (C), the term “sex offense” means—

(i) a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another;

(ii) a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor;<sup>1</sup>

\* \* \*

- (C) An offense involving consensual sexual conduct is not a sex offense for the purposes of this subchapter if the victim was an adult, unless the adult was under the custodial authority of the offender at the time of the offense, or if the victim was at least 13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the victim.

The term “sexual contact” is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3) as

the intentional touching, either directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.

#### ANALYSIS

Thayer argues that this court must use the categorical approach to compare and contrast the statutory terms definitions of the Minnesota statutes to the SORNA statutes. Once this is done, contends Thayer, it will be clear that there is no match: Thayer’s conviction does not qualify as a sex offense under SORNA. In *United States v. Walker*, 931 F.3d 576, the determination whether the defendant was required to register under SORNA hinged on determining how his state court conviction fit into SORNA’s tier classifications. The court employed the categorical approach:

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<sup>1</sup> § 20911(7) defines a “specified offense against a minor” to mean an offense against a minor that includes non-parental kidnapping, non-parental false imprisonment, solicitation to engage in prostitution or sexual conduct, use in a sexual performance, video voyeurism, possession, production, or distribution of child pornography, criminal sexual conduct involving a minor, or “any conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.”

Because SORNA instructs us to compare Walker’s offense to the “offenses” described in corresponding sections of the Federal Criminal Code, we employ the “categorical approach.” Under the categorical approach, the actual facts underlying the defendant’s conviction don’t matter. Instead, the court compares the elements of the predicate offense—i.e., the facts *necessary* for conviction—to the elements of the relevant federal offense. If the elements of the predicate offense are the same (or narrower) than the federal offense, there is a categorical match. But if the elements of the state conviction sweep more broadly such that there is a realistic probability that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the definition of the federal crime, then the prior offense is not a categorical match.

931 F.3d at 579, emphasis in original, citations omitted.

As far as Thayer is concerned, that’s game, set, match on his dismissal motion because there is no categorical match in this case.

Thayer notes first that Minnesota’s “Romeo & Juliet” carve-out for consensual sexual conduct does not match SORNA’s carve-out: although the age parameters of the statutes match, Minnesota imposes a limitation that SORNA does not: Minnesota does not give a pass to a defendant who is in a position of authority over the complainant regardless of the proximity of their ages. This limitation would apply only to the narrowest of circumstances: the defendant would have to be no more than four years older than a 13- to 15-year old victim *and* be in a position of authority over that victim. But as Thayer points out, Minnesota courts have found that an (adult) after-school tutor was in a position of authority over his 13-year old victim. *State v. Gabrelcik*, 2009 WL 25956093 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).

Is there a realistic probability that an assistant county attorney in Minnesota actually would charge fourth degree sexual contact against a teenaged tutor who had consensual sexual contact with his close-in-age tutee? I doubt it. If this was the only categorical difference that Thayer flagged in his motion, then he would be on thin ice.

Thayer's second point has more traction. Thayer notes that Minnesota's mens rea requirement for fourth degree sexual contact is disjunctive: the state must prove *either* sexual intent *or* aggressive intent, it does not have to prove both. *See, e.g. State v. Austin*, 788 N.W.2d 788, 791-92 (Minn. App. 2010) ("because 'sexual' and 'aggressive' are stated as alternatives, either is sufficient"); *State v. Ahmed*, 782 N.W.2d 253, (Minn. App. 2010) (the requirement of sexual or aggressive intent is disjunctive); *Cf. State v. Chandler*, 2013 WL 5612549 (Minn. App. 2013) (defendant is guilty of second degree sexual conduct for belt-whipping toddler across his genitals and buttocks in anger: sexual intent was not required; aggressive intent was enough). Two points are clear from this: (1) the elements of fourth degree sexual contact sweep more broadly than SORNA's definition of a sex offense, and (2) Minnesota *does* apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the definition of the federal crime. As a result, there is no categorical match here. That should be the end of the analysis.

The government concedes nothing, although it does not cite, let alone distinguish, *Walker*.<sup>2</sup> Instead, the government cites to *United States v. Rogers*, 804 F.3d 1233 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2015), in which the court held that the "fact-specific language" of SORNA's "Romeo & Juliet" carve-out at § 20911(5)(C) required interpretation through a conduct-based inquiry rather than the categorical approach. *Id.* at 1237. The government then observes that some of the acts constituting a "specified offense against a minor" (see footnote one, above) use fact-specific language that describes conduct. *A fortiori*, argues the government, "a fact-based inquiry should

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<sup>2</sup> Thayer contends that the government's failure to address this point constitutes waiver, citing *United States v. Barr*, 960 F.3d 906, 916 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2020), *see* dkt. 19 at 2. Thayer is technically correct and Judge Peterson could deem the point conceded if he chooses; on the other hand, 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) allows Judge Peterson to declare a mulligan upon receipt of this report and recommendation, so it's best to address this dispute on its merits.

be used to determine if the defendant's prior conviction requires him to register as a sex offen[der] under SORNA, and not a mere comparison of elements of the state and federal statutes." Dkt. 16 at 6.

This argument doesn't hold up. As the government concedes, the Seventh Circuit has never used this approach. Indeed, even the court in *Rogers* did not start with a conduct-based inquiry. To the contrary, the court explicitly limited its use of the conduct-based inquiry to the language of § 20911(5)(C)'s carve-out, noting that "the basic definition of 'sex offense' in § 16911(A)(I) requires a categorical, elements-based inquiry." 804 F.3d 1237. Picking up on this, the court in *Walker* brushed aside the government's argument in that case that the court should begin with a circumstances-specific inquiry into the ages of defendant's victims in his prior convictions, which would, said the government, resolve the dispute in its favor. This is pretty much what the government is asking this court to do in Thayer's case. The court in *Walker* would have none of it:

That approach is inconsistent with both the text of SORNA—which, as we already have said, calls for a categorical approach—and the Supreme Court's precedent on conducting a categorical analysis. The Court has made clear that in a categorical analysis, there are no exceptions to the elemental comparison. *See Mathis v. United States* \_\_\_ U.S. \_\_\_, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 2257 (2016) ("For more than 25 years, we have repeatedly made clear that application of the [categorical approach] involves, and involves only, comparing elements.") While it may seem counterintuitive, it isn't enough to know that Walker's victims were four and six—nor is it enough to know that he satisfies the "against a minor who has not attained the age of 13" requirement of Tier III. We must first consider whether his Colorado conviction is a categorical match to "abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 of title 18)." 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)(A)(iv) & (4)(A)(ii). If it is, we *then* consider the age of the victim to complete the tier-classification determination.

931 F.3d at 581, emphasis in original.

The Supreme Court in *Mathis*, an Armed Career Criminal Act case involving the definition of “burglary,” broke this out further:

Courts must ask whether the crime of conviction is the same as, or narrower than, the relevant generic offense. They may not ask whether the defendant’s conduct—his particular means of committing the crime—falls within the generic definition. And that rule does not change when a statute happens to list possible alternative means of commission: Whether or not made explicit, they remain as they ever were—just the facts, which ACCA (so we have held, over and over) does not care about.

136 S.Ct. at 2257.

As if more were needed on this point, in Thayer’s reply he cites *Sessions v. Dimaya*, \_\_\_ U.S. \_\_\_, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1217-18 (2018), and *Shular v. United States*, \_\_\_ U.S. \_\_\_, 140 S.Ct. 779, 784 (2020), for the proposition that it is inappropriate to apply the circumstances-specific approach in place of the categorical approach. These cases don’t advance the instant analysis much. In *Sessions*, an immigration case, the Court looked at the wording of the statute at issue to determine which interpretive approach to employ. 138 S.Ct. at 1217 (“§ 16(b)’s text creates no draw: best read, it demands a categorical approach”). In *Shular*, an ACCA case, the parties *agreed* that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) required a categorical approach. 140 S.Ct. at 784. The dispute was over what type of comparison was proper. Using the categorical approach, the Court held that the definition of “serious drug offense”—which was further defined as an offense under State law “involving” specified types of drug trafficking—required only that the underlying state offense involve the conduct specified in the federal statute; it did not require that the state offense match certain generic offenses. *Id.* at 782. Worth noting in this case, the federal statute’s use of the word “involving” did not cause the Court to employ a circumstances-specific analysis. This undermines the government’s contention that use of the verb “involves” in §



20911(5)(A)(ii) requires a fact-based inquiry to determine if Thayer’s state conviction qualifies as a “sex offense” under SORNA.

Third, and most critically, the elements of Minnesota’s fourth degree sexual contact statute *do not require sexual conduct*. Aggressive intent is enough, and it is categorically separated from sexual intent, as demonstrated by the cases cited above. The state has convicted defendants for the non-sexual intentional touching of their victims’ intimate parts with aggressive intent. There is no categorical match between the Minnesota statute under which Thayer was convicted and SORNA’s definition of “sex offense.”<sup>3</sup> Therefore Thayer is not a “sex offender” for the purposes of SORNA, which means he had no duty to register.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> To be clear, I also have found that Thayer has established an elemental distinction between the two “Romeo & Juliet” carve-out statutes, but I question whether that elemental distinction, by itself, meets the realistic probability of application threshold noted by the court in *Walker*.

<sup>4</sup> In the interest of completeness, I note that in *United States v. Linngren*, 652 F.3d 868 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2011), a divided court used the approach urged by the government in the instant case to determine that the defendant’s prior conviction under Minn. Stat. § 609.3541(1)—criminal sexual conduct in the fifth degree—qualified as a sentence-enhancing predicate offense following defendant’s federal conviction for distributing child pornography. The court held that “because the Minnesota statute criminalizes both conduct that qualifies as a predicate offense and conduct that does not, we may refer to the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement, . . . and other comparable judicial records to determine the basis for the guilty plea or verdict.” *Id.* at 870.

In dissent, Judge Bye acknowledged that Eighth Circuit law allowed the court to look beyond the dichotomous mens rea language of Minnesota’s statute, but that pursuant to *Taylor v. United States*, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) and *Shepard v. United States* 544 U.S. 13 (2005), it was error for the court to look at the probable cause statement submitted at the defendant’s state court guilty plea. *Id.* at 872 (Bye, J., dissenting). Judge Bye also noted that the state charging document “provides no express indication as to which intent underlies Linngren’s prior conviction,” and that the statute’s disjunctive language on sexual intent versus aggressive intent implied that the types of sexual contact engaged in by Linngren “do not necessarily involve sexual intent purely because of the type of conduct mentioned.” *Id.* at 877, emphasis in original.

In light of *United States v. Walker*, 931 F.3d at 581, it seems that the law of this circuit aligns with the dissent in *Linngren*.

To pick up on then-Judge Barrett’s observation in *Walker*, 931 F.3d at 581, it seems counterintuitive to ignore the facts known to this court from the criminal complaint to which Thayer pled guilty in Minnesota. It seems obvious enough that Thayer was convicted of touching his daughter with sexual intent, not aggressive intent (although Judge Bye might disagree, *see* note 4, above). But the law is clear and well-settled: this court is to employ a categorical approach to comparing the relevant statutes. “Under the categorical approach, the actual facts underlying the defendant’s conviction don’t matter.” *Id.* at 579.

#### RECOMMENDATION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), I respectfully recommend that this court grant defendant Thomas Thayer’s motion to dismiss, dkt. 12.

Entered this 4<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2021.

BY THE COURT:

/s/

---

STEPHEN L. CROCKER  
Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN  
120 N. Henry Street, Rm. 540  
Madison, Wisconsin 53703

Chambers of  
STEPHEN L. CROCKER  
U.S. Magistrate Judge

Telephone  
(608) 264-5153

January 4, 2021

Julie Suzanne Pfluger  
United States Attorney's Office  
222 West Washington Avenue, Ste. 700  
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Joseph Bugni  
Federal Defender Services  
22 East Mifflin Street, Ste. 1000  
Madison, WI 53703

Re: United States v. Thomas P. Thayer  
Case No. 20-cr-88-jdp

Dear Counsel:

The attached Report and Recommendation has been filed with the court by the United States Magistrate Judge.

The court will delay consideration of the Report in order to give the parties an opportunity to comment on the magistrate judge's recommendations.

In accordance with the provisions set forth in the memorandum of the Clerk of Court for this district which is also enclosed, objections to any portion of the report may be raised by either party on or before January 21, 2021, by filing a memorandum with the court with a copy to opposing counsel.

If no memorandum is received by January 21, 2021, the court will proceed to consider the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation.

Sincerely,

/s/

Connie A. Korth  
Secretary to Magistrate Judge Crocker

Enclosures

## MEMORANDUM REGARDING REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the district judges of this court have designated the full-time magistrate judge to submit to them proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition by the district judges of motions seeking:

- (1) injunctive relief;
- (2) judgment on the pleadings;
- (3) summary judgment;
- (4) to dismiss or quash an indictment or information;
- (5) to suppress evidence in a criminal case;
- (6) to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action;
- (7) to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted;
- (8) to dismiss actions involuntarily; and
- (9) applications for post-trial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses.

Pursuant to § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), the magistrate judge will conduct any necessary hearings and will file and serve a report and recommendation setting forth his proposed findings of fact and recommended disposition of each motion.

Any party may object to the magistrate judge's findings of fact and recommended disposition by filing and serving written objections not later than the date specified by the court in the report and recommendation. Any written objection must identify specifically all proposed findings of fact and all proposed conclusions of law to which the party objects and must set forth

with particularity the bases for these objections. An objecting party shall serve and file a copy of the transcript of those portions of any evidentiary hearing relevant to the proposed findings or conclusions to which that party is objection. Upon a party's showing of good cause, the district judge or magistrate judge may extend the deadline for filing and serving objections.

After the time to object has passed, the clerk of court shall transmit to the district judge the magistrate judge's report and recommendation along with any objections to it.

The district judge shall review de novo those portions of the report and recommendation to which a party objects. The district judge, in his or her discretion, may review portions of the report and recommendation to which there is no objection. The district judge may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the magistrate judge's proposed findings and conclusions. The district judge, in his or her discretion, may conduct a hearing, receive additional evidence, recall witnesses, recommit the matter to the magistrate judge, or make a determination based on the record developed before the magistrate judge.

**NOTE WELL:** A party's failure to file timely, specific objections to the magistrate's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law constitutes waiver of that party's right to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals. *See United States v. Hall*, 462 F.3d 684, 688 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006).



NICHOLAS GILMAN

*Massachusetts*

NATHANIEL GORHAM  
RUFUS KING

*Connecticut*

WM. SAM<sup>L</sup>. JOHNSON  
ROGER SHERMAN

*New York*

ALEXANDER HAMILTON

*New Jersey*

WIL<sup>L</sup>. LIVINGSTON  
DAVID BREARLEY.  
WM. PATERSON.  
JONA: DAYTON

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THOMAS MIFFLIN  
ROBT MORRIS  
GEO. CLYMER  
THO<sup>S</sup>. FITZSIMONS  
JARED INGERSOLL  
JAMES WILSON.  
GOUV MORRIS

*Delaware*

GEO: READ  
GUNNING BEDFORD jun  
JOHN DICKINSON  
RICHARD BASSETT  
JACO: BROOM

*Maryland*

JAMES M<sup>C</sup>HENRY  
DAN OF S<sup>T</sup> THO<sup>S</sup>. JENIFER  
DAN<sup>L</sup>. CARROLL.

*Virginia*

JOHN BLAIR—  
JAMES MADISON Jr.

*North Carolina*

WM BLOUNT  
RICH<sup>D</sup>. DOBBS SPAIGHT.  
HU WILLIAMSON

*South Carolina*

J. RUTLEDGE  
CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY  
CHARLES PINCKNEY  
PIERCE BUTLER.

*Georgia*

WILLIAM FEW  
ABR BALDWIN

Attest WILLIAM JACKSON *Secretary*

ARTICLES IN ADDITION TO, AND AMENDMENT OF, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PROPOSED BY CONGRESS, AND RATIFIED BY THE LEGISLATURES OF THE SEVERAL STATES, PURSUANT TO THE FIFTH ARTICLE OF THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup>The first ten amendments to the Constitution of the United States (and two others, one of which failed of ratification and the other which later became the 27th amendment) were proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the First Congress on September 25, 1789. The first ten amendments were rati-

ARTICLE [I.]<sup>13</sup>

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

ARTICLE [II.]

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

ARTICLE [III.]

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

ARTICLE [IV.]

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

ARTICLE [V.]

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

ARTICLE [VI.]

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

fied by the following States, and the notifications of ratification by the Governors thereof were successively communicated by the President to Congress: New Jersey, November 20, 1789; Maryland, December 19, 1789; North Carolina, December 22, 1789; South Carolina, January 19, 1790; New Hampshire, January 25, 1790; Delaware, January 28, 1790; New York, February 24, 1790; Pennsylvania, March 10, 1790; Rhode Island, June 7, 1790; Vermont, November 3, 1791; and Virginia, December 15, 1791.

Ratification was completed on December 15, 1791.

The amendments were subsequently ratified by the legislatures of Massachusetts, March 2, 1793; Georgia, March 18, 1793; and Connecticut, April 19, 1793.

<sup>13</sup>Only the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th articles of amendment had numbers assigned to them at the time of ratification.





§ 2250. Failure to register

(a) IN GENERAL.—Whoever—

(1) is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act;

(2)(A) is a sex offender as defined for the purposes of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act by reason of a conviction under Federal law (including the Uniform Code of Military Justice), the law of the District of Columbia, Indian tribal law, or the law of any territory or possession of the United States; or

(B) travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or enters or leaves, or resides in, Indian country; and

(3) knowingly fails to register or update a registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act;

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

(b) INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL REPORTING VIOLATIONS.—Whoever—

(1) is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (42 U.S.C. 16901 et seq.);<sup>1</sup>

(2) knowingly fails to provide information required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act relating to intended travel in foreign commerce; and

(3) engages or attempts to engage in the intended travel in foreign commerce;

shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

(c) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.—In a prosecution for a violation under subsection (a) or (b), it is an affirmative defense that—

(1) uncontrollable circumstances prevented the individual from complying;

(2) the individual did not contribute to the creation of such circumstances in reckless disregard of the requirement to comply; and

(3) the individual complied as soon as such circumstances ceased to exist.

(d) CRIME OF VIOLENCE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—An individual described in subsection (a) or (b) who commits a crime of violence under Federal law (including the Uniform Code of Military Justice), the law of the District of Columbia, Indian tribal law, or the law of any territory or possession of the United States shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years and not more than 30 years.

(2) ADDITIONAL PUNISHMENT.—The punishment provided in paragraph (1) shall be in addition and consecutive to the punishment provided for the violation described in subsection (a) or (b).

(Added Pub. L. 109-248, title I, § 141(a)(1), July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 602; amended Pub. L. 114-119, § 6(b), Feb. 8, 2016, 130 Stat. 23.)

Editorial Notes

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, referred to in subsecs. (a)(1), (2)(A), (3) and (b)(1), (2), is title I of Pub. L. 109-248, July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 590, which was classified principally to subchapter I (§ 16901

<sup>1</sup> See References in Text note below.

et seq.) of chapter 151 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, prior to editorial reclassification as chapter 209 (§ 20901 et seq.) of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title of 2006 Act note set out under section 10101 of Title 34 and Tables.

The Uniform Code of Military Justice, referred to in subsecs. (a)(2)(A) and (d)(1), is classified generally to chapter 47 (§ 801 et seq.) of Title 10, Armed Forces.

AMENDMENTS

2016—Subsecs. (b) to (d). Pub. L. 114-119 added subsec. (b), redesignated former subsecs. (b) and (c) as (c) and (d), respectively, and in subsecs. (c) and (d), substituted “subsection (a) or (b)” for “subsection (a)” wherever appearing.

CHAPTER 110—SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF CHILDREN

Sec.

2251.

Sexual exploitation of children.

2251A.

Selling or buying of children.

2252.

Certain activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors.

2252A.

Certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child pornography.

2252B.

Misleading domain names on the Internet.

2252C.

Misleading words or digital images on the Internet.

2253.

Criminal forfeiture.

2254.

Civil forfeiture.

2255.

Civil remedy for personal injuries.

2256.

Definitions for chapter.

2257.

Record keeping requirements.

2257A.

Recordkeeping requirements for simulated sexual conduct.<sup>1</sup>

2258.

Failure to report child abuse.

2258A.

Reporting requirements of providers.

2258B.

Limited liability for providers or domain name registrars.

2258C.

Use to combat child pornography of technical elements relating to reports made to the CyberTipline.

2258D.

Limited liability for NCMEC.

2258E.

Definitions.

2259.

Mandatory restitution.

2259A.

Assessments in child pornography cases<sup>2</sup>

2259B.

Child pornography victims reserve<sup>2</sup>

2260.

Production of sexually explicit depictions of a minor for importation into the United States.

2260A.

Increased penalties for registered sex offenders.<sup>1</sup>

Editorial Notes

AMENDMENTS

2018—Pub. L. 115-395, § 7, Dec. 21, 2018, 132 Stat. 5294, substituted “Reporting requirements of providers” for “Reporting requirements of electronic communication service providers and remote computing service providers” in item 2258A, “Limited liability for providers or domain name registrars” for “Limited liability for electronic communication service providers and remote computing service providers” in item 2258B, “Use to combat child pornography of technical elements relating to reports made to the CyberTipline” for “Use to combat child pornography of technical elements relating to images reported to the CyberTipline” in item 2258C, and “Limited liability for NCMEC” for “Limited liability for the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children” in item 2258D.

Pub. L. 115-299, § 5(d), Dec. 7, 2018, 132 Stat. 4388, added items 2259A and 2259B.

2008—Pub. L. 110-401, title V, § 501(b)(3), Oct. 13, 2008, 122 Stat. 4251, added items 2258A to 2258E.

<sup>1</sup> So in original. Does not conform to section catchline.

<sup>2</sup> So in original. Probably should be followed by a period.



Stat. 587, known as the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title of 2006 Act note set out under section 10101 of this title and Tables.

CODIFICATION

Section was formerly classified to section 16901 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering as this section.

§ 20902. Establishment of program

This chapter establishes the Jacob Wetterling, Megan Nicole Kanka, and Pam Lychner Sex Offender Registration and Notification Program.

(Pub. L. 109-248, title I, § 103, July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 591.)

Editorial Notes

REFERENCES IN TEXT

This chapter, referred to in text, was in the original "this Act", meaning Pub. L. 109-248, July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 587, known as the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title of 2006 Act note set out under section 10101 of this title and Tables.

CODIFICATION

Section was formerly classified to section 16902 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering as this section.

§ 20903. Tribal registry

(1) Establishment

The Attorney General shall contract with any interested Indian tribe, tribal organization, or tribal nonprofit organization to develop and maintain—

(A) a national tribal sex offender registry; and

(B) a tribal protection order registry containing civil and criminal orders of protection issued by Indian tribes and participating jurisdictions.

(2) Authorization of appropriations

There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section \$1,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2014 through 2018, to remain available until expended.

(Pub. L. 109-162, title IX, § 905(b), Jan. 5, 2006, 119 Stat. 3080; Pub. L. 113-4, title IX, § 907(b), Mar. 7, 2013, 127 Stat. 125.)

Editorial Notes

CODIFICATION

Section is comprised of subsec. (b) of section 905 of Pub. L. 109-162. Subsec. (a) of section 905 of Pub. L. 109-162 amended section 534 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.

Section was enacted as part of the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, and not as part of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act which comprises this subchapter, or as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 which comprises this chapter.

Section was formerly classified as a note under section 534 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering as this section.

AMENDMENTS

2013—Par. (2). Pub. L. 113-4 substituted "fiscal years 2014 through 2018" for "fiscal years 2007 through 2011".

PART A—SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION

§ 20911. Relevant definitions, including Amie Zyla expansion of sex offender definition and expanded inclusion of child predators

In this subchapter the following definitions apply:

(1) Sex offender

The term "sex offender" means an individual who was convicted of a sex offense.

(2) Tier I sex offender

The term "tier I sex offender" means a sex offender other than a tier II or tier III sex offender.

(3) Tier II sex offender

The term "tier II sex offender" means a sex offender other than a tier III sex offender whose offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year and—

- (A) is comparable to or more severe than the following offenses, when committed against a minor, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such an offense against a minor:
  - (i) sex trafficking (as described in section 1591 of title 18);
  - (ii) coercion and enticement (as described in section 2422(b) of title 18);
  - (iii) transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity (as described in section 2423(a))<sup>1</sup> of title 18;
  - (iv) abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 of title 18);

(B) involves—

- (i) use of a minor in a sexual performance;
- (ii) solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution; or
- (iii) production or distribution of child pornography; or

(C) occurs after the offender becomes a tier I sex offender.

(4) Tier III sex offender

The term "tier III sex offender" means a sex offender whose offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year and—

- (A) is comparable to or more severe than the following offenses, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such an offense:
  - (i) aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse (as described in sections 2241 and 2242 of title 18); or
  - (ii) abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 of title 18) against a minor who has not attained the age of 13 years;

(B) involves kidnapping of a minor (unless committed by a parent or guardian); or

(C) occurs after the offender becomes a tier II sex offender.

(5) Amie Zyla expansion of sex offense definition

(A) Generally

Except as limited by subparagraph (B) or (C), the term "sex offense" means—

<sup>1</sup>So in original. The second closing parenthesis probably should follow "18".

(i) a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another;

(ii) a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor;

(iii) a Federal offense (including an offense prosecuted under section 1152 or 1153 of title 18) under section 1591, or chapter 109A, 110 (other than section 2257, 2257A, or 2258), or 117, of title 18;

(iv) a military offense specified by the Secretary of Defense under section 115(a)(8)(C)(i) of Public Law 105-119 (10 U.S.C. 951 note); or

(v) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in clauses (i) through (iv).

#### **(B) Foreign convictions**

A foreign conviction is not a sex offense for the purposes of this subchapter if it was not obtained with sufficient safeguards for fundamental fairness and due process for the accused under guidelines or regulations established under section 20912 of this title.

#### **(C) Offenses involving consensual sexual conduct**

An offense involving consensual sexual conduct is not a sex offense for the purposes of this subchapter if the victim was an adult, unless the adult was under the custodial authority of the offender at the time of the offense, or if the victim was at least 13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the victim.

#### **(6) Criminal offense**

The term "criminal offense" means a State, local, tribal, foreign, or military offense (to the extent specified by the Secretary of Defense under section 115(a)(8)(C)(i) of Public Law 105-119 (10 U.S.C. 951 note)) or other criminal offense.

#### **(7) Expansion of definition of "specified offense against a minor" to include all offenses by child predators**

The term "specified offense against a minor" means an offense against a minor that involves any of the following:

(A) An offense (unless committed by a parent or guardian) involving kidnapping.

(B) An offense (unless committed by a parent or guardian) involving false imprisonment.

(C) Solicitation to engage in sexual conduct.

(D) Use in a sexual performance.

(E) Solicitation to practice prostitution.

(F) Video voyeurism as described in section 1801 of title 18.

(G) Possession, production, or distribution of child pornography.

(H) Criminal sexual conduct involving a minor, or the use of the Internet to facilitate or attempt such conduct.

(I) Any conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.

#### **(8) Convicted as including certain juvenile adjudications**

The term "convicted" or a variant thereof, used with respect to a sex offense, includes ad-

judicated delinquent as a juvenile for that offense, but only if the offender is 14 years of age or older at the time of the offense and the offense adjudicated was comparable to or more severe than aggravated sexual abuse (as described in section 2241 of title 18), or was an attempt or conspiracy to commit such an offense.

#### **(9) Sex offender registry**

The term "sex offender registry" means a registry of sex offenders, and a notification program, maintained by a jurisdiction.

#### **(10) Jurisdiction**

The term "jurisdiction" means any of the following:

(A) A State.

(B) The District of Columbia.

(C) The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

(D) Guam.

(E) American Samoa.

(F) The Northern Mariana Islands.

(G) The United States Virgin Islands.

(H) To the extent provided and subject to the requirements of section 20929 of this title, a federally recognized Indian tribe.

#### **(11) Student**

The term "student" means an individual who enrolls in or attends an educational institution, including (whether public or private) a secondary school, trade or professional school, and institution of higher education.

#### **(12) Employee**

The term "employee" includes an individual who is self-employed or works for any other entity, whether compensated or not.

#### **(13) Resides**

The term "resides" means, with respect to an individual, the location of the individual's home or other place where the individual habitually lives.

#### **(14) Minor**

The term "minor" means an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years.

(Pub. L. 109-248, title I, § 111, July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 591.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

##### **REFERENCES IN TEXT**

This subchapter, referred to in text, was in the original "this title", meaning title I of Pub. L. 109-248, July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 590, known as the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. For complete classification of title I to the Code, see Short Title of 2006 Act note set out under section 10101 of this title and Tables.

##### **CODIFICATION**

Section was formerly classified to section 16911 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering as this section.

#### **§ 20912. Registry requirements for jurisdictions**

##### **(a) Jurisdiction to maintain a registry**

Each jurisdiction shall maintain a jurisdiction-wide sex offender registry conforming to the requirements of this subchapter.

##### **(b) Guidelines and regulations**

The Attorney General shall issue guidelines and regulations to interpret and implement this subchapter.





# Office of the Revisor of Statutes

## Office of the Revisor of Statutes

### 2003 Minnesota Statutes

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**609.345 Criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree.**

Subdivision 1. **Crime defined.** A person who engages in sexual contact with another person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree if any of the following circumstances exists:

(a) the complainant is under 13 years of age and the actor is no more than 36 months older than the complainant. Neither mistake as to the complainant's age or consent to the act by the complainant is a defense. In a prosecution under this clause, the state is not required to prove that the sexual contact was coerced;

(b) the complainant is at least 13 but less than 16 years of age and the actor is more than 48 months older than the complainant or in a position of authority over the complainant. Consent by the complainant to the act is not a defense. In any such case, it shall be an affirmative defense which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the actor believes the complainant to be 16 years of age or older;

(c) the actor uses force or coercion to accomplish the sexual contact;

(d) the actor knows or has reason to know that the complainant is mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless;

(e) the complainant is at least 16 but less than 18 years of age and the actor is more than 48 months older than the complainant and in a position of authority over the complainant. Neither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the complainant is a defense;

(f) the actor has a significant relationship to the complainant and the complainant was at least 16 but under 18 years of age at the time of the sexual contact. Neither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the complainant is a defense;

(g) the actor has a significant relationship to the complainant, the complainant was at least 16 but under 18 years of age at the time of the sexual contact, and:

(i) the actor or an accomplice used force or coercion to accomplish the contact;

(ii) the complainant suffered personal injury; or

(iii) the sexual abuse involved multiple acts committed over an extended period of time.

Neither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the complainant is a defense;

(h) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a patient of the psychotherapist and the sexual contact occurred:

(i) during the psychotherapy session; or

(ii) outside the psychotherapy session if an ongoing psychotherapist-patient relationship exists. Consent by the complainant is not a defense;

(i) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a former patient of the psychotherapist and the former patient is emotionally dependent upon the psychotherapist;

(j) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a patient or former patient and the sexual contact occurred by means of therapeutic deception. Consent by the complainant is not a defense;

(k) the actor accomplishes the sexual contact by means of deception or false representation that the contact is for a bona fide medical purpose. Consent by the complainant is not a defense;

(l) the actor is or purports to be a member of the clergy, the complainant is not married to the actor, and:

(i) the sexual contact occurred during the course of a meeting in which the complainant sought or received religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort from the actor in private; or

(ii) the sexual contact occurred during a period of time in which the complainant was meeting on an ongoing basis with the actor to seek or receive religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort in private. Consent by the complainant is not a defense;

(m) the actor is an employee, independent contractor, or volunteer of a state, county, city, or privately operated adult or juvenile correctional system, including, but not limited to, jails, prisons, detention centers, or work release facilities, and the complainant is a resident of a facility or under supervision of the correctional system. Consent by the complainant is not a defense; or

(n) the actor provides or is an agent of an entity that provides special transportation service, the complainant used the special transportation service, the complainant is not married to the actor, and the sexual contact occurred during or immediately before or after the actor transported the complainant. Consent by the complainant is not a defense.

Subd. 2. **Penalty.** A person convicted under subdivision 1 may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to a payment of a fine of not more than \$20,000, or both.

Subd. 3. **Stay.** Except when imprisonment is required under section [609.109](#), if a person is convicted under



subdivision 1, clause (f), the court may stay imposition or execution of the sentence if it finds that:

(a) a stay is in the best interest of the complainant or the family unit; and

(b) a professional assessment indicates that the offender has been accepted by and can respond to a treatment program.

If the court stays imposition or execution of sentence, it shall include the following as conditions of probation:

(1) incarceration in a local jail or workhouse;

(2) a requirement that the offender complete a treatment program; and

(3) a requirement that the offender have no unsupervised contact with the complainant until the offender has successfully completed the treatment program unless approved by the treatment program and the supervising correctional agent.

HIST: [1975 c 374 s 6](#); [1976 c 124 s 9](#); [1979 c 258 s 14](#); [1981 c 51 s 4](#); [1983 c 204 s 4](#); [1984 c 588 s 8](#); [1984 c 628 art 3 s 11](#); [1985 c 24 s 8](#); [1985 c 286 s 18](#); [1985 c 297 s 7](#); [1986 c 351 s 9](#); [1986 c 444](#); [1Sp1986 c 3 art 1 s 81](#); [1987 c 94 s 2](#); [1989 c 290 art 4 s 15](#); [1992 c 571 art 1 s 18,19](#); [1993 c 326 art 4 s 21](#); [1994 c 636 art 2 s 36](#); [1998 c 367 art 3 s 10](#); art 6 s 15; [2000 c 437 s 13](#); [2001 c 210 s 23](#); [2002 c 381 s 4](#)

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## Office of the Revisor of Statutes

### 2003 Minnesota Statutes

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**609.341 Definitions.**

Subdivision 1. For the purposes of sections 609.341 to [609.351](#), the terms in this section have the meanings given them.

Subd. 2. "Actor" means a person accused of criminal sexual conduct.

Subd. 3. "Force" means the infliction, attempted infliction, or threatened infliction by the actor of bodily harm or commission or threat of any other crime by the actor against the complainant or another, which (a) causes the complainant to reasonably believe that the actor has the present ability to execute the threat and (b) if the actor does not have a significant relationship to the complainant, also causes the complainant to submit.

Subd. 4. (a) "Consent" means words or overt actions by a person indicating a freely given present agreement to perform a particular sexual act with the actor. Consent does not mean the existence of a prior or current social relationship between the actor and the complainant or that the complainant failed to resist a particular sexual act.

(b) A person who is mentally incapacitated or physically helpless as defined by this section cannot consent to a sexual act.

(c) Corroboration of the victim's testimony is not required to show lack of consent.

Subd. 5. "Intimate parts" includes the primary genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttocks, or breast of a human being.

Subd. 6. "Mentally impaired" means that a person, as a result of inadequately developed or impaired intelligence or a substantial psychiatric disorder of thought or mood, lacks the judgment to give a reasoned consent to sexual contact or to sexual penetration.

Subd. 7. "Mentally incapacitated" means that a person under the influence of alcohol, a narcotic, anesthetic, or any other substance, administered to that person without the person's agreement, lacks the judgment to give a reasoned consent to sexual contact or sexual penetration.

Subd. 8. "Personal injury" means bodily harm as defined in section [609.02](#), subdivision 7, or severe mental anguish or pregnancy.

Subd. 9. "Physically helpless" means that a person is (a) asleep or not conscious, (b) unable to withhold consent or to withdraw consent because of a physical condition, or (c) unable to communicate nonconsent and the condition is known or reasonably should have been known to the actor.

Subd. 10. "Position of authority" includes but is not limited to any person who is a parent or acting in the place of

a parent and charged with any of a parent's rights, duties or responsibilities to a child, or a person who is charged with any duty or responsibility for the health, welfare, or supervision of a child, either independently or through another, no matter how brief, at the time of the act. For the purposes of subdivision 11, "position of authority" includes a psychotherapist.

Subd. 11. (a) "Sexual contact," for the purposes of sections [609.343](#), subdivision 1, clauses (a) to (f), and [609.345](#), subdivision 1, clauses (a) to (e), and (h) to (m), includes any of the following acts committed without the complainant's consent, except in those cases where consent is not a defense, and committed with sexual or aggressive intent:

(i) the intentional touching by the actor of the complainant's **intimate parts**, or

(ii) the touching by the complainant of the actor's, the complainant's, or another's **intimate parts** effected by a person in a position of authority, or by coercion, or by inducement if the complainant is under 13 years of age or mentally impaired, or

(iii) the touching by another of the complainant's intimate parts effected by coercion or by a person in a position of authority, or

(iv) in any of the cases above, the touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the **intimate parts**.

(b) "Sexual contact," for the purposes of sections [609.343](#), subdivision 1, clauses (g) and (h), and [609.345](#), subdivision 1, clauses (f) and (g), includes any of the following acts committed with sexual or aggressive intent:

(i) the intentional touching by the actor of the complainant's **intimate parts**;

(ii) the touching by the complainant of the actor's, the complainant's, or another's **intimate parts**;

(iii) the touching by another of the complainant's intimate parts; or

(iv) in any of the cases listed above, touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the **intimate parts**.

(c) "Sexual contact with a person under 13" means the intentional touching of the complainant's bare genitals or anal opening by the actor's bare genitals or anal opening with sexual or aggressive intent or the touching by the complainant's bare genitals or anal opening of the actor's or another's bare genitals or anal opening with sexual or aggressive intent.

Subd. 12. "Sexual penetration" means any of the following acts committed without the complainant's consent, except in those cases where consent is not a defense, whether or not emission of semen occurs:

(1) sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, or anal intercourse; or

(2) any intrusion however slight into the genital or anal openings:

(i) of the complainant's body by any part of the actor's body or any object used by the actor for this purpose;

(ii) of the complainant's body by any part of the body of the complainant, by any part of the body of another person, or by any object used by the complainant or another person for this purpose, when effected by a person in a position of authority, or by coercion, or by inducement if the child is under 13 years of age or mentally impaired; or

(iii) of the body of the actor or another person by any part of the body of the complainant or by any object used by the complainant for this purpose, when effected by a person in a position of authority, or by coercion, or by inducement if the child is under 13 years of age or mentally impaired.

Subd. 13. "Complainant" means a person alleged to have been subjected to criminal sexual conduct, but need not be the person who signs the complaint.

Subd. 14. "Coercion" means words or circumstances that cause the complainant reasonably to fear that the actor will inflict bodily harm upon, or hold in confinement, the complainant or another, or force the complainant to submit to sexual penetration or contact, but proof of coercion does not require proof of a specific act or threat.

Subd. 15. **Significant relationship.** "Significant relationship" means a situation in which the actor is:

(1) the complainant's parent, stepparent, or guardian;

(2) any of the following persons related to the complainant by blood, marriage, or adoption: brother, sister, stepbrother, stepsister, first cousin, aunt, uncle, nephew, niece, grandparent, great-grandparent, great-uncle, great-aunt; or

(3) an adult who jointly resides intermittently or regularly in the same dwelling as the complainant and who is not the complainant's spouse.

Subd. 16. "Patient" means a person who seeks or obtains psychotherapeutic services.

Subd. 17. **Psychotherapist.** "Psychotherapist" means a person who is or purports to be a physician, psychologist, nurse, chemical dependency counselor, social worker, marriage and family therapist, licensed professional counselor, or other mental health service provider; or any other person, whether or not licensed by the state, who performs or purports to perform psychotherapy.

Subd. 18. "Psychotherapy" means the professional treatment, assessment, or counseling of a mental or emotional illness, symptom, or condition.

Subd. 19. "Emotionally dependent" means that the nature of the former patient's emotional condition and the nature of the treatment provided by the psychotherapist are such that the psychotherapist knows or has reason to know that the former patient is unable to withhold consent to sexual contact or sexual penetration by the psychotherapist.

Subd. 20. "Therapeutic deception" means a representation by a psychotherapist that sexual contact or sexual penetration by the psychotherapist is consistent with or part of the patient's treatment.

Subd. 21. **Special transportation.** "Special transportation service" means motor vehicle transportation provided on a regular basis by a public or private entity or person that is intended exclusively or primarily to serve individuals who are vulnerable adults, handicapped, or disabled. Special transportation service includes, but is not limited to, service provided by buses, vans, taxis, and volunteers driving private automobiles.

HIST: [1975 c 374 s 2](#); [1977 c 130 s 8](#); [1979 c 258 s 9-11](#); [1981 c 51 s 1](#); [1982 c 385 s 1](#); [1982 c 469 s 9](#); [1984 c 525 s 3](#); [1984 c 588 s 5,6](#); [1985 c 24 s 3,4](#); [1985 c 286 s 14](#); [1985 c 297 s 1-5](#); [1986 c 351 s 6,7](#); [1986 c 444](#); [1987 c 198 s 1-3](#); [1987 c 347 art 1 s 22](#); [1988 c 413 s 1](#); [1989 c 290 art 4 s 11](#); [1993 c 326 art 4 s 17-19](#); [1994 c 636 art 2 s 30-33](#); [1995 c 226 art 2 s 18](#); [1998 c 367 art 3 s 5,6](#); [2001 c 210 s 21](#); [2002 c 379 art 1 s 106](#); [2002 c 381 s 1](#); [2003 c 118 s 22](#)

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