## In the Supreme Court of the United States

Brian Duane Brookins,

Petitioner,

v.

State of Georgia,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Georgia Supreme Court

#### **BRIEF IN OPPOSITION**

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#### CAPITAL CASE

#### **QUESTIONS PRESENTED**

At Brian Duane Brookins' trial, the Sheriff testified to an uncontroverted matter and gave very limited and general testimony about Brookins' mental health. The Sheriff was also in charge of the logistics of handling the jury. Brookins did not object to the Sheriff's testimony. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the issue was waived and, based on its plenary sentence review, the court also found that the testimony did not affect the sentence.

- 1) Should this Court grant certiorari review on a claim that was denied on a state law basis?
- 2) Based on the limited testimony and the non-personal nature of the contacts with the jury, did the state court decision holding there was no constitutional error conflict with *Turner v. Louisiana*, 379 U. S. 466, 471-474 (1965)?

#### TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED	i
INTRODUCTION	1
STATEMENT	2
A. Factual Background	2
B. Proceedings Below	3
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION	5
I. There is no federal constitutional issue before the Court	5
II. The Georgia Supreme Court's decision does not conflict with <i>Turner</i> or any other decisions.	6
CONCLUSION	11

#### TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	Page(s)
Cases	
Barral v. State, 353 P.3d 1197 (Nev. 2015)	10
Boylan v. United States, 898 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1990)	9
Brookins v. State, 315 Ga. 86 (2022)	2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10
Cummings v. Martel, 796 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2015)	10
Enriquez v. State, 429 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968)	9.
Gonzales v. Beto, 405 U.S. 1052 (1972)	8
Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989)	5
Hudson v. State, 250 Ga. 479 (1983)	5
Jenkins v. State, 825 A.2d 1008 (Md. 2003)	10
Johnson v. Wainwright, 778 F.2d 623 (11th Cir. 1985)	9
Majors v. State, 252 P.3d 435 (2011)	9
Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259 (2015)	2
McNeil v. State, 2019 Ida. App. Unpub. LEXIS 293 (Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2019)	9
Mills v. Commonwealth,	8

People v. Cummings,           850 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1993)	9
People v. Williams, 641 N.E.2d 296 (Ill. 1994)	9
Ex parte Pierce, 851 So.2d 606 (Al. 2000)	10
Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954)	8
Satterwhite v. Collins, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 39656 (4th Cir. July 8, 1993)	9
Shepherd v. Wingo, 414 F.2d 274 (6th Cir. 1969)	10
State v. Kelley, 451 S.E.2d 425 (W.Va. 1994)	9
State v. Martinez, 641 P.2d 1087 (N.M. 1982)	9
State v. Soto, 513 P.3d 684 (Utah 2022)	9
Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 466 (1965)	6, 7, 8, 9, 10
United States v. Chicarelli, 445 F.2d 1111 (3d Cir. 1971)	10
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)	8
Williams v. Thurmer, 561 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2009)	9

#### INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Brian Duane Brookins killed his wife and 15-year-old stepdaughter by shooting them both in the head. He was rightfully convicted—indeed, he did not contest his guilt—and he now seeks, at most, alleged error correction regarding an issue that involves no split of authority.

At Brookins' trial, the Sheriff testified about speaking with Brookins immediately after the crimes, trying to persuade Brookins to turn himself in to law enforcement. The Sheriff also testified generally that he had known Brookins for years and had never had problems communicating with him. Brookins did not object to this testimony.

The record also shows that during the trial the Sheriff was responsible for the logistics of handling the jury during their sequestration, including transportation and meals. There was no evidence that the Sheriff had any close or personal interaction with the jury.

Brookins raised a claim (for the first time on appeal) that the Sheriff's role as custodian of the jury and as a witness violated *Turner v. Louisiana*, 379 U. S. 466 (1965), on the theory that the jury could not be impartial. The Georgia Supreme Court determined that Brookins had failed to preserve this issue for review and the claim was waived based on state law.

The Georgia Supreme Court then, as part of its review in ensuring the sentence was not imposed based on passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor, also found, regardless, the sentence was not unconstitutionally

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "This form of review in death penalty cases arises not from any ordinary appellate review principle; instead, it arises from the statutory mandate for this Court to ensure that no death sentence is 'imposed under the influence of

imposed because the nature of the testimony and the Sheriff's interaction with the jury was limited. This holding does not conflict with other courts' rulings, is correct, and there is no reason to grant review.

#### **STATEMENT**

#### A. Factual Background

On October 14, 2005, Brookins shot and killed his wife, Suzanne Brookins, and his fifteen-year-old stepdaughter, Samantha Giles. *Brookins v. State*, 315 Ga. 86, 87 (2022). At that time, Brookins and Suzanne were separated and not living together. "The couple had been having marital difficulties, and they had started divorce proceedings that were later stopped." *Id*.

Nine days before the murders, Brookins was released from jail on bond following his arrest for stealing four-wheelers. His release from jail caused Suzanne to be concerned for her safety because Brookins was angry at her and believed that she told the police that he stole the four-wheelers. At the time of his release, a stay-away order had been issued and Brookins was informed that he was not allowed to have any contact with Suzanne.

On the day of the murders, Brookins went to the victims' home and waited for Suzanne and Samantha to arrive. *Id.* at 88. Once they did, he approached the two and shot Suzanne in the head. *Id.* He then kicked Suzanne, who was lying on the ground, and shot her a second time. *Id.* at 88-89. As Samantha ran toward a neighbor's house, Brookins shot her in the back of the head. *Id.* at 89. Neighbors of the victims who observed the

passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor." *Martin v. State*, 298 Ga. 259, 278 (2015) (citing OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (1)).

murders identified Brookins as the shooter and reported he left the scene in Suzanne's car. *Id*.

Soon after, the police learned that Brookins had traveled to his mother's residence. *Id.* at 96. The Sheriff went to the mother's home and talked with Brookins attempting to defuse the situation and keep Brookins from killing himself. *Id.* Brookins surrendered and was taken into custody. *Id.* 

#### B. Proceedings Below

In October 2007, Brookins was convicted and sentenced to death for the murders of Suzanne and Samantha.<sup>2</sup> At that trial, the Sheriff testified to his interactions with Brookins at Brookins' mother's house. *Brookins*, 315 Ga. at 96.<sup>3</sup> He also "gave two responses indicating that Brookins had appeared coherent and lucid in the Sheriff's past conversations with him and that the Sheriff 'never had a problem communicating with him." *Id.*; *see also* Respondent's Appendix ("RA"), pp. 19-21.<sup>4</sup> In addition to this testimony, throughout trial the Sheriff was responsible for the logistics of the jurors' transportation, sequestration, and meals. *Brookins*, 315 at 96.

Following several hearings on motions for a new trial (the motions were denied), Brookins filed a notice of appeal with the Georgia Supreme Court on January 18, 2022. As part of that appeal, Brookins claimed for the first time that the Sheriff "impermissibly served both as a key witness and as a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> He was also convicted of aggravated stalking of Suzanne, cruelty to children in the third degree with regard to Samantha, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. (R. 19-21).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Brookins did not contest his guilt, but did claim to be intellectually disabled, which Georgia law requires to be proven in the guilt phase of trial. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Corresponding numbers are in the upper right hand corner of the exhibits.

caretaker of the jury in violation of his constitutional rights to an impartial jury and to a fair trial" in contravention of *Turner*. *Brookins*, 315 Ga. at 96.

In denying relief, the Georgia Supreme Court found that the record established that throughout the trial the Sheriff was "responsible, at least ultimately, for arranging the jurors' transportation, for arranging their meals, and for logistical matters such as their access to telephones, televisions, and computers." *Id.* The court further found that "[t]o no one's surprise, the Sheriff was called to testify," but Brookins "raised no objection at trial to his testimony or to his service with regard to the care of the jury." *Id.* As a result, the court concluded, as an initial matter, that "[b]ecause Brookins failed to raise an objection as to this issue, it is waived for the purposes of ordinary appellate review." *Id.* (citing *Martin*, 298 Ga. at 278-279; *Hudson v. State*, 250 Ga. 479, 484-485 (5) (1983) (determining that no reversible error existed where no objection was made to the trial court's "sending the jury to lunch with the Sheriff")).

The Georgia Supreme Court then, as part of its review to ensure that the death penalty was not "imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor," OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (1), also examined the testimony given by the Sheriff and found that it "was largely focused on the details of the standoff" at the home of Brookins' parents. *Brookins*, 315 Ga. at 96. The court also noted that "the Sheriff, who knew both the victims and Brookins, gave two responses indicating that Brookins had appeared coherent and lucid in the Sheriff's past conversations with him and that the Sheriff 'never had a problem communicating with him." *Id.* (emphasis added). The court held that, based on this testimony being limited, taken in conjunction with the fact that Brookins was not contesting his guilt, "the sentence of death in this case was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor." *Id.* at 114.

#### REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

Nothing in the Georgia Supreme Court's decision warrants this Court's review. *First*, the court denied the claim based on state law—the failure to preserve the objection for appeal. *Second*, the Georgia Supreme Court's decision does not conflict with any holding of this Court or any other courts. Brookins seeks only error correction, and futile error correction at that.

#### I. There is no federal constitutional issue before the Court.

"This Court long has held that it will not consider an issue of federal law [] from a judgment of a state court if that judgment rests on a state-law ground that is both 'independent' of the merits of the federal claim and an 'adequate' basis for the court's decision." Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). In denying Brookins' claim that the Sheriff was allowed to testify and have custody of the jury in violation of Turner, the Georgia Supreme Court relied on state law and concluded that Brookins waived this claim for ordinary appellate review based on his failure to object at trial. Brookins, 315 Ga. at 96.

Although Brookins claimed in state court that he had preserved this issue by filing a motion for an order appointing an impartial *witness* monitor, Pet. at 40, the Georgia Supreme Court dismissed this argument holding that "in response to Brookins' motion for an 'impartial witness monitor,' the State agreed that bailiffs in plain clothes and not sworn Sheriff's deputies would monitor the *witnesses*. However, we do not regard this motion as constituting any objection to the Sheriff's testimony or his role in caring for the *jury*." *Brookins*, 315 Ga. at 96 n. 5 (emphasis in original).

Because there is no federal constitutional issue, this Court should deny the request for review.

### II. The Georgia Supreme Court's decision does not conflict with *Turner* or any other decisions.

In *Turner v. Louisiana*, 379 U.S. 466 (1965), relied on by Brookins, this Court held that Turner's Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the State's two principal witnesses in the case also acting as custodian and caretakers of the jury throughout the trial. The Court found "it would be blinking reality not to recognize the extreme prejudice inherent in this continual association throughout the trial between the jurors and these two key witnesses for the prosecution." *Id.* at 473.

The facts here are nothing like *Turner*, and this Court need not wade into the dispute. Turner's jury was sequestered during his three-day trial and "placed in charge of the Sheriff by the trial judge." *Id.* at 467-68. During that time, the jury was "continuously in the company of deputy sheriffs." *Id.* at 468. "The deputies drove the jurors to a restaurant for each meal, and to their lodgings each night. The deputies ate with them, conversed with them, and did errands for them." *Id.* Two of the deputies performing these functions were the State's *principal* witnesses. *Id.* 

When the deputies testified at trial, Turner's attorney made motions for a mistrial. *Id*. The hearings on these motions showed that both deputies "had in fact freely mingled and conversed with the jurors in and out of the courthouse during the trial." *Id*. The trial court denied the motions for mistrial because "there was no showing that either deputy had talked with any member of the jury about the case itself." *Id*. at 468-69.

On review, this Court first held that the trial testimony of the deputies "was not confined to some uncontroverted or merely formal aspect of the case for the prosecution." *Id.* at 473. The deputies were critical witnesses for the prosecution. *Id.* Second, this Court held that the deputies' interactions with the jury was not a "brief encounter," but a "continuous and intimate

association throughout a three-day trial." *Id.* at 473. This Court reversed Turner's convictions. *Id.* at 474.

Unlike the critical testimony given in *Turner*, the Sheriff in this case testified to uncontroverted facts and stated very briefly and generally that he never had a problem communicating with Brookins. When asked by the prosecutor whether those previous communications were logical, lucid conversations, the Sheriff said, "yes." *See* RA, pp. 19-21. The state court's finding that this brief testimony was not key to the case is supported by the fact that the Sheriff's testimony was very short in contrast to the lay and expert testimony given by both sides concerning Brookins' mental health and intelligence. *See Brookins*, 315 Ga. at 89-95 (summarizing the extensive testimony from both sides concerning IQ scores, adaptive functioning, and various mental health diagnoses).

As to the Sheriff's association with the jurors, the record shows that the jury was introduced to the Sheriff, and the court informed them that they would be under his direction, which included the availability of their internet and television access. RA, pp. 3-6. The trial court also asked the Sheriff if he wanted to address the jury, but Brookins did not establish that the Sheriff actually did so. RA, pp. 5-6. The record also shows that during the trial the Sheriff made arrangements for the jurors' meals and had supervisory control of their entry and exit of the courtroom as noted by the Georgia Supreme Court. *Brookins*, 315 Ga. at 96. However, nothing in the record even implies that the Sheriff had any one-on-one contact with the jurors or interacted with them at all beyond the ministerial and logistical duties of ensuring: there were no outside media influences; they received meals; and their transportation. Instead, the record reflects that bailiffs were sworn to take charge of the jurors, with additional bailiffs being added during the trial, and

assisting throughout trial. *See, e.g., RA*, pp. 1-18.<sup>5</sup> In fact, Brookins does not even set forth any instances of personal interactions or familiarity between the jurors and Sheriff, much less interactions rising to the level of *Turner*.

Although Brookins argues that neither this Court nor any state court has required a defendant to show actual prejudice and infers such errors are structural, Pet. at 12, that is plainly not correct. Justice Stewart noted in his concurrence in *Gonzales v. Beto*, 405 U.S. 1052 (1972), *Turner* did not establish a "per se rule automatically requiring the reversal of any conviction whenever any Government witness comes into any contact with the jury." *Gonzales* at 1054-55. Justice Stewart explained that a witness who testified about an "uncontroverted or merely formal aspect of the case for the prosecution would hardly present a constitutional problem." *Id*.

Brookins cites *United States v. Olano*, 507 U.S. 725, 739 (1993), Pet. at 12, but that opinion did not even address the issue, it simply said there *may* be circumstances where prejudice can be presumed. And even if it were the case that prejudice were presumed, it would be a rebuttable presumption. *Remmer v. United States*, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954).

The holding of the Georgia Supreme Court is also in line with other state courts. For example, in *Mills v. Commonwealth*, 170 S.W. 3d 310, 338

You shall take all juries committed to your charge in the present term to the jury room or some other private and convenient place where you shall keep them without meat or drink, water excepted, unless otherwise directed by the Court. You shall make no communication with them yourself nor permit allow anyone to communicate with them expect by leave of the Court. You shall discharge all other duties which may devolve upon you as a bailiff to the best of your skill and power, so help you, God.

RA, p. 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The bailiff oath as given by the trial court is as follows:

(2005), the Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed a similar claim of error based on the fact that the deputies that had initially arrested Mills also served as juror bailiffs at trial. Mills claimed that Turner applied and there was error. In conducting its review, the state court conducted a prejudice analysis and denied relief. Id. Likewise, the Wyoming Supreme Court in Majors v. State, 252 P.3d 435, 440 (2011), conducted the same analysis in determining that the defendant did not suffer any prejudice from an investigating officer in the case also acting as a bailiff. Numerous other state courts have analyzed *Turner* claims under the same harmless error standard. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 641 N.E.2d 296, 326 (Ill. 1994) (same); McNeil v. State, No. 45766, 2019 Ida. App. Unpub. LEXIS 293, at \*22 (Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2019) ("McNeil's allegations do not raise a credible risk of having affected the jury's guilty verdict."); State v. Kelley, 451 S.E.2d 425, 426 (W.Va. 1994) (applying harmless error analysis); State v. Soto, 513 P.3d 684, 705 (Utah 2022) (noting rebuttal presumption of prejudice based on the facts); People v. Cummings, 850 P.2d 1, 37 (Cal. 1993) (finding no prejudice from deputy acting as a bailiff and a witness because contact was "minimal" and "professional" association with jurors and he was the "principal" witness); Enriquez v. State, 429 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (prejudice analysis); State v. Martinez, 641 P.2d 1087, 1092 (N.M. 1982) (same).<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> This same analysis is also applied in the federal courts. The First Circuit Court of Appeals has presumed prejudice "only where there is an egregious tampering or third party communication which directly injects itself into the jury process." *Boylan v. United States*, 898 F.2d 230, 261 (1st Cir. 1990). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held "[w]hen either the individual's official contact with the jury or his participation in the prosecution is so minimal in the jurors' eyes as to have a *de minimis* impact on the jury's deliberations for all apparent purposes, some showing of actual prejudice must be made." *Johnson v. Wainwright*, 778 F.2d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1985)). *See also Williams v. Thurmer*, 561 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2009); *Satterwhite v. Collins*, Case No. 91-1767, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 39656, at

Brookins cites three state cases, none of which conflict with the Georgia Supreme Court's decision here. First, in *Ex parte Pierce*, 851 So.2d 606, 612 (Al. 2000), the Alabama Supreme Court found error based on the facts that the sheriff had been a "key" witness in the prosecution and had "close and continual contact with the jurors." These are not the facts before this Court. Similarly, in *Jenkins v. State*, 825 A.2d 1008, 1027-29 (Md. 2003), the court held that it would only presume prejudice in cases of "*egregious* juror and witness *misconduct*." *Id.* at 1028, 1034-35 (emphasis in original). The Nevada Supreme Court in *Barral v. State*, 353 P.3d 1197, 1198-99 (Nev. 2015), cited by Brookins, did not concern juror and witness interactions. Instead, in *Barral*, the court found structural error based on the court's failure to administer an oath to the jury. Again, that has nothing to do with the facts here.

The facts in *Brookins* are not comparable to those in *Turner* or the other decisions Brookins identifies; there was no close interaction between the Sheriff and the jurors, Brookins' guilt was uncontested, and the Sheriff's communication experience with Brookins was hardly critical to Brookins' defenses. The Georgia Supreme Court correctly found there was no prejudice. *Brookins*, 315 Ga. at 96-97. This Court should deny review.

<sup>\*13-14 (4</sup>th Cir. July 8, 1993); *United States v. Chicarelli*, 445 F.2d 1111, 1114 (3d Cir. 1971); *Shepherd v. Wingo*, 414 F.2d 274 (6th Cir. 1969); *Cummings v. Martel*, 796 F.3d 1135, 1145 (9th Cir. 2015) (review under AEDPA).

#### CONCLUSION

For the reasons set out above, this Court should deny the petition. Respectfully submitted,

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# RESPONDENT'S APPENDIX

#### IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF BALDWIN COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA

STATE OF GEORGIA, CASE NO: 06CR45776 v. VOLUME 1 of 8 BRIAN DUANE BROOKINS, Pages 2-168 Defendant. Day 1, October 8, 2007

#### JURY TRIAL

HEARD BEFORE THE HONORABLE HUGH V. WINGFIELD, III JUDGE, SUPERIOR COURTS OCMULGEE JUDICIAL CIRCUIT BALDWIN COUNTY COURTHOUSE MILLEDGEVILLE, GEORGIA OCTOBER 8 - 16, 2007

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DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT BALDWIN COUNTY, GEORGIA

she'll include in the envelope an excuse for work in the But it could take several days for event you need that. 2 you to get a check, so I'd ask you just to continue to 3 show the patience that you have this past week. I do want to sincerely thank each and every one of you for your 5 service as jurors today and last week. I appreciate you 6 7 I appreciate your patients. I particularly being here. appreciate you being on time each time you were asked to 8 Now, I do apologize for any convenience that you 9 come. I know that a lot of this process seems 10 suffered. cumbersome, hurry up and wait. But there's simply no way 11 around it, ladies and gentlemen. There are a lot of 12 13 inefficiencies built into our jury system. 14

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In any event, we do all thank you again for your You are now free to go. If you have any questions or need anything, the Sheriff will be outside the door. Thank you very much.

(Potential jurors excused.)

(Selected jurors seated in jury box.)

THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, if I can have your attention for just a few more minutes. just a moment, I'm going to turn all of you over to the Sheriff of Baldwin County and he'll give you further instructions as needed. He'll meet with you here in the courtroom.

In general, though, we will retrieve your suitcases from your automobiles. You'll be given directions on where you should park, and that won't take very long.

You'll be allowed to make phone calls or whatever else you need to do to let someone know that you're on this jury.

If you need to make some arrangements for somebody to pick up your car, you'll be instructed on how that should be done.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, from this point forward, you're going to be under the control of the Sheriff of Baldwin County. You'll be housed in the Holiday Inn Express in Milledgeville. That's the city where this case will be tried. Each of you will have an individual room. You'll only be allowed to make phone calls at the direction of the Sheriff.

You're going to be allowed to watch television, except you'll not be allowed to watch any news programs whatsoever or certain other stations. You'll receive further instructions on that from the Sheriff.

You may bring with you any books and magazines that you wish. If you find that you like a book or magazine that you didn't bring this morning, if you'll let the Bailiffs know, when you get to Milledgeville, I'll try to take care of that for you if I can.

Ladies and gentlemen, you may not have in your

possession any communication device, that includes pages, cell phones and so forth, except as approved by the Sheriff.

You may bring a computer with you -- I remember last week a few of you asked if you could bring computers. You may do that, except you may not connect to the internet except under the instructions established by the Sheriff. Other than that, you're free to use both of them, phones and computers as you wish.

You'll generally eat as a group. If you require a special menu, just you need to let the bailiffs know that and they'll take care of you. And aside from the time that you're in court, you'll be under the control -- or under the direction of the Sheriff.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, as soon as all your personal effects and so forth have been loaded, you'll be taken to the hotel and we'll commence the trial early this afternoon.

I'll assure you I will do nothing that will waste your time in any way. This trial has been carefully planned and we'll move forward as efficiently as our justice system allows.

I want to thank you in advance for your patience and cooperation.

Now, I'm going to ask you, again, at this time not to

discuss the case among yourselves, or at any time, until I authorize you to do that. That would include at all times during the trial. Do not allow anyone to communicate with you concerning this case, that includes conversations during any phone calls you make.

Ladies and gentlemen, do not talk to any witnesses or anyone you think is a witness. No matter how innocent that is, it causes a lot of problems and it certainly would cause us some delays.

So remember, the simple rule is, from now until the end of this trial, is that you're jurors. And you need to just bear that in mind at all times.

Now, what I just told you, ladies and gentlemen, is going to remain throughout the trial, whether I remember to remind you or not.

I think the best rule is simply don't talk to anyone except the bailiffs and myself.

Now, with those instructions in mind, I'm going to introduce you and turn you over to the Sheriff of Baldwin County, Mr. Bill Massee. He's going to meet with you in here. I think that will be much easier and he'll tell you what to do at that point. And I will see you in Milledgeville as soon as that can be arranged.

Sheriff Massee, if you want to address the jury.

And gentlemen, we will adjourn now and meet back in

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Milledgeville and begin no earlier than 1:00.
MR. FRANCIS: Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you.
(Whereupon, the foregoing matter was adjourned for
the morning.)

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(Whereupon, voir dire having been conducted and a jury duly empaneled in Morgan County, Georgia, and Counsel for the State and the Defendant having announced ready, with Defendant Brookins being present, the proceedings began at 2:05 p.m., in Baldwin County, Georgia, outside the presence of the jury.)

THE COURT: All right, at this time, ladies and gentlemen, I'll ask all bailiffs who have not been sworn to raise their right hands, please.

You shall take all juries committed to your charge in the present term to the jury room or some other private and convenient place where you shall keep them without meat or drink, water excepted, unless otherwise directed by the Court. You shall make no communication with them yourself, nor permit anyone to communicate with them except by leave of the Court. You shall discharge all other duties which may devolve upon you as bailiffs to the best of your skill and power, so help you, God. Please lower your hands.

Thank you. Mr. Bright and Mr. Francis, if I could see you one second.

I got cross messages here. You want the alternates to be identified.

MR. BRIGHT: It doesn't matter. If he does not want to, that's fine. Whatever he wants is fine.

THE COURT:

I'm inclined to agree with him.

1	MR. BRIGHT:	That's fine.
2	THE COURT:	Any other matters we need to take
3	up now?	
4	MR. FRANCIS:	No matters I can think of, Judge.
5	THE COURT:	All right. You got witnesses
6	ready?	
7	MR. BRIGHT:	We do. We do. With opening, on
8	the rule of sequestratio	n, what we agreed on
9	MR. FRANCIS:	I got some people that are only
10	gonna testify in the pen	alty.
11	MR. BRIGHT:	That's fine. I'm fine.
12	THE COURT:	Do they need to testify today?
13	MR. FRANCIS:	No, they're only gone testify in
14	penalty. We had an agre	ement about if they could stay in
15	here.	
16	THE COURT:	I don't know if you got that or
17	not.	
18	MR. FRANCIS:	Yeah, I got that.
19	THE COURT:	All right. I'll swear them in and
20	we'll get ready to go.	·
21	MR. BRIGHT:	We're ready to go.
22	THE COURT:	Any other instructions we need to
23	speak of?	•
24	MR. FRANCIS:	Nothing else I can think of.
25	THE COURT:	All right.
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MR. BRIGHT:

We're ready to rock and roll.

THE COURT:

All right. Sheriff, if you will,

show the jury in, please.

(Whereupon, the jury entered the Courtroom at 2:07 p.m.)

THE COURT: Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, now that you've been seated I need you to stand one more time and raise your right hands.

You shall well and truly try the issue formed upon this bill of indictment between the State of Georgia and Brian Duane Brookins, who is charged in counts one and three with murder, counts two and four, with felony murder, count five of aggravated stalking, and count six with cruelty to children in the third degree, and a true verdict give according to the evidence produced to you, so help you, God.

Please lower your hands and be seated.

I want to now, before we begin, give you some very brief instructions on the procedure that we're going to follow from this point forward. And ladies and gentlemen, this is the same procedure that's followed in all criminal cases in this circuit. All of these trials can be divided into parts. The first part is what's known as an opening statement. Both the State and the Defense will have the opportunity to make an opening statement to you. Now, the opening statement in itself is not evidence. And it may not be considered by you as evidence. The purpose of the

opening statement is to allow each side to outline what they believe the evidence will show as it develops during the trial.

After the opening statements are completed, the next part is when the State will present its case to you. This will be done by witnesses who take the stand and testify under oath in your presence. There may or may not be certain documentary or tangible evidence offered and admitted for your consideration as well.

Following that, the next part, after the State rests, the Defendant will have an opportunity to present his case to you if he chooses to do so. Ladies and gentlemen, I want you to keep in mind at all times that this is a criminal trial. The Defendant is under no duty whatsoever to present any evidence or to testify in your presence. If the Defendant elects not to present any evidence or testify, you may not hold that against him in any way hurtful or harmful as that is his absolute right to make that decision.

The burden of proof is on the State throughout this trial to prove the Defendant's guilt on each charge contained in the indictment beyond reasonable doubt. Now if the Defendant elects to present evidence, when he rests, and again, that's if he elects to present evidence, that will be done though the testimony of witnesses, again, who testify under oath in your presence from the witness stand and there

may or may not be documentary evidence.

When the Defendant rests, if he has elected to present evidence, the State may offer what is called rebuttal evidence. Rebuttal evidence is rarely given and if it's offered at all, it's always very short.

Following that, in the next part, the attorneys will have the opportunity to make what is known as a closing statement to you. Now, again, the closing statements, just like the opening statements, are not evidence and you may not consider them as evidence. The closing statement is simply a summary of the evidence that has been introduced in the course of the trial. The attorneys may outline any inferences they want you to draw from that evidence.

After those statements are completed, I'll give you what we call the charge of the Court, and that is simply me reading to you the law that I find applies to this case. Prior to my doing that, the attorneys and I will have met to discuss what that law is going to be.

You'll then retire to the jury room, apply the law that I've given you in charge to the facts as you find them to be from the evidence presented and by that process you will reach a verdict that speaks the truth.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, I have said this a couple of times already, but I repeat it now, because it's so very important. I do not want you, from this point forward to

discuss this case among yourselves nor allow anyone to discuss it with you. If that should happen I want you to let me know immediately. As I told you this morning, the simplest thing to do is just not talk to anybody except the bailiffs or myself.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, throughout the course of the trial, there are going to be times when the attorneys come up here and we discuss things that you can't hear and more rarely there'll be times that I ask you to leave the courtroom so that we can discuss things not only out of your hearing, but also completely out of your presence. Those conferences are perfectly normal. They're a part of every trial, whether civil or criminal, and when they occur I don't want you to ascribe any fault to either side, because there's not any. Actually it allows us to move much more efficiency through the trial.

Now, you should have been, or you will be, provided a pad and a pencil, those are to be used by you to take notes if you want to do that. You don't have to if you don't want to. Put your name on the outside of the pad and leave it in your chair when we retire for the night. The bailiffs will give them to you early the next morning.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, it's my practice to take a break every hour to an hour and a half, depending on how the testimony is given. Sometimes it will be longer than that.

If any of you find you need a break sooner, get my attention or one of the bailiffs and we'll certainly take a break at that time. All right. Thank you.

Mr. Bright, you may open to the jury.

BAILIFF HARTRY:

Should I give them pads?

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

(Whereupon, pads and pencils were given to the jury.)

MR. BRIGHT: May it please the Court, fellow counsel. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, two years ago on Wednesday, October 5<sup>th</sup>, 2005, the Defendant, Brian Duane Brookins, was released from the Baldwin County Jail. He'd been accused of stealing some four-wheelers. He was released on bond. And among the conditions of bond, he signed a stay-away order, which means exactly what it says. Mr. Brookins, the Defendant, you are to stay away completely from your wife, Suzanne Brookins, and her double-wide, the house at 251 Merry Drive, Milledgeville, Baldwin County, Georgia.

Suzanne started getting worried when he was out and so she went to stay with her parents. When the Defendant Brookins was in the Baldwin County Jail, and he had been in there for three weeks, he told other inmates that he was going to kill that bitch. Those are his words. His old lady, when he got out. We didn't know it at the time. We found out about it afterwards.

1	MR. BRADLEY: That's all I have for Mr. Spivey.
2	Thank you.
3	MR. FRANCIS: No questions, Your Honor.
4	THE COURT: All right. Mr. Spivey, you are
5	excused with our thanks.
6	Ladies and gentlemen, that is going to conclude the
7	testimony for today. If you will, Sheriff, would you like
8	them to go into the jury room. If you would, just go with
9	Sharon Vance.
10	(Whereupon, the jury was excused for the day at 6:02 p.m.)
11	THE COURT: Mr. Francis and Mr. Bradley or Mr.
12	Bright. Mr. Francis, you've got to tender something. You
13	might want to talk to Jennifer about that.
14	MR. FRANCIS: I forgot to tender 6?
15	COURT REPORTER: Three was not tendered and he never
16	said that 6 was admitted
17	MR. BRADLEY: Which one was 6 specifically?
18	COURT REPORTER: because Mr. Bradley objected to
19	it.
20	MR. FRANCIS: Well, Judge, may we tender 3 at
21	this
22	THE COURT: Any objections to 3?
23	MR. BRADLEY: Judge, I don't remember 6, but I
24	trust you. Whatever
25	MR. FRANCIS: Right, I remember you
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MR. BRADLEY: -- Mr. Francis talked about with Ms. Blackwell, I have no objection.

THE COURT:

All right, 3 and 6 are in.

MR. FRANCIS:

Okay.

(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibits 3 and 6 are ADMITTED into evidence.)

SHERIFF MASSEE: Your Honor, we have several bailiffs we need to swear in.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Francis. All right, folks, if you will, please raise your right hands.

You shall take all juries committed to your charge in the present term to the jury room or some other private and convenient place where you shall keep them without meat or drink, water excepted, unless otherwise directed by the Court. You shall make no communication with them yourself nor permit anyone to communicate with them except by leave of the Court. You shall discharge all other duties which may devolve upon you as bailiffs to the best of your skill and power, so help you, God. Thank you.

(Whereupon, additional BAILIFFS were duly sworn.)

THE COURT: Gentlemen, anything else we need to take up now? Mr. Francis?

MR. FRANCIS: Nothing from the defense, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Bright?

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THE COURT:

Finish up.

MR. BRIGHT:

Yeah.

(Whereupon, the bench conference was concluded.)

THE COURT: You shall take all juries committed to your charge in the present term to the jury room or some other private and convenient place where you shall keep them without meat or drink, water excepted, unless otherwise directed by the Court. You shall make no communication with them yourself, nor permit anyone to communicate with them except by leave of the Court. You shall discharge all other duties which may devolve upon you as bailiff to the best of your skill and power, so help you God.

MS. MOSS:

I do.

(Whereupon, JODY MOSS was sworn in as a bailiff.)

(Whereupon, a break was taken, after which

Court resumed at 4:13 p.m., outside the presence of the jury.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, can we have quiet, please. Mr. Brookins, I anticipate that the State is going to rest its case tomorrow, which means that they will have finished presenting all the evidence in this phase of the trial and at time you're going to have the opportunity to present whatever evidence you want to.

MR. BROOKINS:

Uh-huh.

THE COURT:

And I understand from Mr. Francis

there'll be several witnesses.

1 thanks. Milledgeville is also a nice place --2 MR. FRANCIS: That's true. I didn't mean to say 3 it wasn't. THE COURT: 4 All right. Mr. Bradley, could I 5 see you one second, and Mr. Francis. Mr. Francis. 6 (Whereupon, the following discussion was held/ 7 at the bench between the Court and Counsel, 8 outside the hearing of the jury.) 9 THE COURT: Are you (inaudible) --10 MR. BRADLEY: No. I've got Keith Thompson before 11 that but he's probably twenty minutes. I can put him up and then take a break or whatever the Court's pleasure. 12 13 THE COURT: Let's take a break. 14 MR. BRADLEY: Okay. 15 THE COURT: And then you have what after that? 16 MR. BRADLEY: Judge, we've got a couple of 17 witnesses after Mary, but it won't be long. 18 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 19 MR. FRANCIS: Okay. 20 (Whereupon, the bench conference was concluded.) 21 THE COURT: Y'all okay over there? All I mean 22 by that is do you need a break? 23 BAILIFF: They need to take a break. 24 THE COURT: All right. We'll take about a 25 twenty minute break.

1	A I do not remember that.
2	Q You don't remember it, okay. And you made a you
3	referred Duane to a Mr. Mark Morris for intellectual testing.
4	A Yes.
5	Q Okay. And do you do that with all of your special
6	education students?
7	A I don't remember that I did.
8	Q You don't remember. Okay. And we talked before and
9	you told me that you thought Duane was learning disabled as to
10	all subjects.
11	A Learning disability in language art subjects, which
12	would be reading, spelling and English.
13	Q Okay. Okay. So, just tell us in general how Duane was
14	when he was in your class.
15	A What I remember is that he was respectful in my
16	classroom. We did several he was able to work he had a
17	good work relationship
18	THE COURT: Ms. Gaines, one second.
19	BAILIFF: They can't all hear. If she could
20	speak up a little bit.
21	MR. FRANCIS: Just a little bit. Are you
22	nervous?
23	MS. BREINER: Uh-huh.
24	CONTINUATION BY MR. FRANCIS:
25	Q Okay. Speak up just a little bit.
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- Yeah, they took him. They took him there. Yes, sir. Α
- Right. You went --Q
- Α I went to GMC.
- Okay. All right. To walk your daughter. Did you get Q to do that that night?
  - Α Yes, sir.
- I think you've described -- anything, the Q Okay. Defendant's demeanor during that -- sometime -- I referred in my opening statement as a Mexican stand-off. His demeanor, his attitude, how would you -- use whatever words you want to use.
- He was excitable but I was talking to him like you and I are talking right now. I mean, we've known each other for I mean, we have never had any problem communicating. years.
  - Q Okay.
- In fact, I'd seen him that week or the week before. He'd come to see me and I ran into him at the courthouse and spoke with him outside these doors.
- That's -- I'll tell you what, let's lay All right. 0 this incident aside. That's what I was gonna ask you about. You said, small town, you've known Duane a long time. You've dealt with him before.
  - Α Yes, sir.
- When I say describe Duane, his -- does he, when you talk to him, I'm talking previous occasions, let's lay Friday, October 14th, 2005, to the side. Do you have -- when I say

normal conversations with him, does he appear coherent, understand what you're saying, lucid, things of that nature?

- A Yes, sir. Sure he does.
- Q Describe his demeanor, I'm talking about his mental capacity from what your observations are.

A Well, I've never had any problem communicating with him. In fact, you know, I ran into him outside the courthouse and he told me he was having a problem, he was going to Magistrate Court and I can't remember if he -- somebody didn't pay him for working on a car or somebody bought a car from him, but he was going to Magistrate Court and he also told me -- asked me, I mean, if I would send a deputy sheriff with him. He said he needed to go get some tools and get some of his equipment and I said, well -- he said and I -- he said, I'm not supposed to go back to Suzanne's house.

And I said, well, I said I'll be glad to send a deputy sheriff with you. And said I'll be glad to send a deputy sheriff with you where we don't have a problem. And he said, well, I don't want Steve McDade going with me. I said, Duane, don't worry about that. I said we're not gone send somebody that's got family issues with you. I said we'll be glad to send a deputy sheriff with you where there won't be any kind of conflict, nobody will get in trouble.

Q Could you tell there was lot of animosity between the Defendant toward Steve McDade?

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A Yeah, very much so.

Q Okay. You realize one of the issues in this case is whether or not Defendant's mentally retarded. I'm not asking you that because I know you're not a psychologist, but what I'm getting at is observations you've seen and anything else you can think of about his mental capacity from a lay -- a Sheriff or a layperson's perspective. You said when you talked to him it's normal --

- A I've never had a --
- Q -- lucid conversations.

A -- problem communicating with him. He's always communicated with me whether it's an issue of him being in court or the day he asked me about going to get his property from their house on Merry Drive.

- Q Are these logical, intelligent conversations that you have --
  - A Yes, sir.
  - Q -- with him?
  - A Yes, sir.
- Q Okay. And his mother -- point his mother out to me. She's in the courtroom?
  - A Yes.
- 23 Q The lady in the purple here.
- 24 A Right.
  - Q In the --