APPENDIX TO

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

# APPENDIX A

NO. 5-08-0459

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT



| | | |
|---|---|---|
| THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,<br><br>Plaintiff-Appellee,<br><br>v.<br><br>BOBBY O. WILLIAMS,<br><br>Defendant-Appellant. | ) | Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County.<br><br>No. 96-CF-100<br><br>Honorable John Baricevic, Judge, presiding. |



JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Welch and Stewart concurred in the judgment.

## RULE 23 ORDER

*Held*: Defendant's sentence of natural life in prison for the murder of Sharon Bushong is affirmed.

Defendant, Bobby O. Williams, *pro se*, appeals the June 17, 2008, order of the circuit court of St. Clair County sentencing him to natural life in prison for the November 3, 1994, murder of Sharon Bushong. Originally, defendant received the death penalty; however, the supreme court vacated the death sentence and remanded. *People v. Williams*, 193 Ill. 2d 1, 737 N.E. 2d 230 (2000). Defendant was resentenced after then-Governor George Ryan entered a commutation order that removed capital punishment as a sentencing option. In this appeal, defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion, (2) whether the sentence was excessive, (3) whether the circuit court's denial of defendant's motion to substitute for cause was an abuse of discretion, (4) whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant actually killed Sharon Bushong, (5) whether section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 1994)), is

unconstitutional, (6) whether defendant was entitled to a new trial under sections 5-5-4(a), and 5-5-3(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-5-4(a), and 5-5-3(d) (West 2004)), (7) whether the penalties available for first-degree murder violate the proportionate penalties clause or the equal protection clause, (8) whether the natural-life sentence is a product of double enhancement, and (9) whether defendant was denied a fair sentencing hearing because of improper closing argument by the prosecutor. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On November 3, 1994, Sharon Bushong was shot to death during a robbery at a convenience store in Belleville where she worked as a clerk. Bushong was the only clerk working at the time of the robbery. A surveillance videotape recorded by the store's security cameras recorded Bushong's murder. A spent cartridge case from a .38-caliber pistol fired during the robbery was retrieved from the scene, and a .38-caliber bullet was recovered from Bushong's body during her autopsy.

The surveillance videotape, which was played to the jury during defendant's trial, shows two African-American males entering the store at 12:49 a.m. on the morning of the murders. One of the men was wearing shorts and a short-sleeve, dark-colored shirt with piping or thin stripes around the collar, shoulders, sleeves, and bottom. He was wearing only one ankle-high sock. He was also wearing some type of light-colored garment over his head. The second man was wearing a baseball cap and covered his face with his hands and shirt. Neither man's face was visible.

The videotape shows the man with the garment over his head standing next to Bushong after she opened the cash register drawer. After Bushong opened the drawer, the man raised his left hand and shot Bushong in the head. Bushong immediately fell to the ground. The man then shifted the gun to his right hand and took cash out of the register with his left hand. During this time, the second man can be seen leaning over and reaching into

a display rack filled with potato chips. After the shooter removes the money from the cash register, the two men exit the store.

A forensic photographic examiner with the FBI provided expert testimony that after examining the videotape and photos made from the videotape, he determined that the person who shot Bushong was 6 feet 1 inch or 6 feet 2 inches in height. Additional evidence established that defendant is 6 feet 1 inch. Testimony also established that defendant is left-handed.

On February 15, 1995, defendant was arrested in Washington Park, a town near Belleville. At the time of his arrest, defendant was carrying a .38-caliber pistol, which a forensic firearms examiner later determined was the gun used to shoot Bushong. Defendant's neighbor, who had known defendant for approximately 18 years, testified that in the middle of November 1994, he saw a .38-caliber pistol on the floor of defendant's car. In court, the neighbor was shown the gun taken from defendant at the time of his arrest. The neighbor stated that it looked like the one he saw in defendant's car but that he could not be certain.

Another witness, Michael Cook, testified that he had known defendant for approximately one year and had seen defendant with a .38-caliber pistol on four or five occasions during the summer of 1994. Cook also thought the gun taken from defendant at the time of his arrest looked like the gun defendant had been carrying in the summer of 1994. Cook explained that it looked the same because it was scraped and scratched around the barrel and because it had lost some of its black coloring at the tip of the barrel. Cook also positively identified the shirt the shooter was wearing in the videotape as a shirt defendant had worn while playing basketball in the summer of 1994. Cook further testified that he had seen defendant wearing just one sock while playing basketball.

Lavarro Jenkins testified that he saw defendant with a .38-caliber handgun in January 1995 while he and defendant were driving in a car in Belleville. Jenkins identified the gun

taken from defendant at the time of his arrest as the gun defendant had shown him in the car. Jenkins knew that it was the same gun because he had offered to buy it from defendant. While discussing the possible purchase of the gun, defendant told Jenkins, "There's a hot one on it." Jenkins testified that this is slang terminology which means the gun had been used in a murder. Jenkins also testified that while driving down the part of West Main Street where the murder occurred, he and defendant passed a convenience store, at which time defendant reached over, pointed to the convenience store, and said "that's one of them." On cross-examination, Jenkins admitted that he had been convicted of theft over $10,000 for stealing a car, acknowledged there were two felony forgery counts pending against him, and admitted that defendant never said he was the one who "committed a hot one" with the .38-caliber pistol.

Fred Jones, a friend of defendant, testified for the State. In exchange for his testimony, the State agreed to dismiss a murder charge pending against him and instead recommend a 6- to 15-year prison sentence for armed robbery. Jones testified that he saw defendant sometime after midnight on November 3 or November 4, 1994, at which time defendant told him that he "and a couple more boys went up to Belleville to rob the convenience store and they shot the lady." Sometime after this admission, Jones saw defendant carrying a black .38-caliber pistol. Jones identified the gun taken from defendant at the time of defendant's arrest as the gun defendant had with him in November 1994. Jones also identified the shirt worn by the shooter in the surveillance video as the one that defendant was wearing when he saw him on November 3 or 4, 1994.

Jones was cross-examined about six separate, conflicting statements he had given to the police regarding the Bushong murder. Jones initially denied any knowledge about the murder and robbery, but by the sixth statement he gave details similar to his direct testimony at the trial. Jones explained that he initially lied to police because he "was scared and didn't

want to get [him]self further involved in it."

Defendant's cousin, Andrew Towns, testified that he saw defendant with a .38-caliber pistol in the early part of November 1994. He identified the gun taken from defendant at the time of his arrest as the one that defendant had in November, based on a worn area on the tip of the gun's barrel. He also testified that sometime around November 1994, he overheard defendant and Ricardo Spratt laughing when defendant said, "Don't forget the chips." At the trial, he described what defendant had told him when he asked defendant what the phrase meant: "[Defendant] and some more people robbed a liquor store or convenience store. And while they were running out the store, [defendant] yelled, 'Don't forget the chips' to another person." He also said defendant told him that "he shot the bitch" who worked at the convenience store. He testified that he had seen defendant wearing a shirt like the one worn by the shooter in the surveillance video. Towns acknowledged that when he was arrested along with defendant in February 1995, he was carrying his father's .38-caliber gun. The cousin was a juvenile at the time, and no charges had been filed in relation to the .38-caliber weapon. On cross-examination, Towns admitted that when he was first questioned by the police on February 15, 1995, he denied any knowledge of the Bushong murder. Towns admitted that he was given immunity with respect the charges relating to the .38-caliber gun, but he denied that the immunity was given in exchange for his testimony.

Lucille Adams, defendant's grandmother and Andrew Towns' aunt, testified for the defense that Towns did not have a good reputation in the community for truthfulness. Carvon Jones testified that sometime in November 1994, around midnight, he rode in defendant's car with defendant, Ricardo Spratt, and Fred Jones. Carvon testified that he never heard defendant say anything about robbing a convenience store or shooting anyone and did not see defendant with a gun but did see Ricardo and Fred with guns. Carvon thought the gun taken by defendant at the time of his arrest looked like the one Ricardo had

been carrying, but he could not be certain it was the same gun. On cross-examination, Carvon admitted that he had seen defendant with a .38-caliber gun in the past and admitted that in a statement he gave in February 1995 he had said that while in the car in November 1994 Fred Jones made a reference to "the white lady in Belleville."

The defense also presented evidence from various law enforcement officials. For example, Thomas Gamboe, a forensic scientist with the Illinois State Police, testified that defendant's shoes did not match any of the footwear impressions found at the convenience store. A Belleville police officer testified that he transported defendant to the police station after defendant's February 1995 arrest and that defendant's clothes and shoes were taken from him.

After hearing all the evidence, the jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder and found defendant eligible for the death penalty. Following a hearing in aggravation and mitigation, the jury found that there were no factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty, and it sentenced defendant to death. On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction for first-degree murder but vacated the death sentence and remanded for resentencing. *People v. Williams*, 193 Ill. 2d 1, 737 N.E.2d 230 (2000). The facts set forth above are recounted from that opinion.

On January 10, 2003, George Ryan issued a commutation order that removed the death penalty as a sentencing option, making natural life in prison without the possibility of parole the maximum sentence which could be imposed. On April 23, 2004, the State filed a notice that it intended to seek an extended-term sentence in this case. On July 28, 2004, defendant filed a motion to bar the imposition of an extended-term sentence. Defendant later filed an amended motion to bar the imposition of an extended-term sentence. After two judges recused themselves, the case was transferred to Judge John Baricevic. On August 2, 2005, the circuit court denied defendant's motion to bar the imposition of an extended-term

sentence. The circuit court later denied a motion to reconsider.

On January 10, 2006, the circuit court filed an application under Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994), asking this court for direction regarding whether or not a hearing on defendant's eligibility for an extended-term sentence could be held in this case. The application was dismissed on the basis that Supreme Court Rule 308 applies only to civil cases. On September 29, 2006, defendant filed another motion to bar the imposition of an extended-term sentence or for a new trial. On January 9, 2007, the circuit court denied that motion.

On November 19, 2007, defendant filed a *pro se* motion to substitute judge for cause, alleging that Judge Baricevic was prejudiced against him. On December 6, 2007, defendant filed a motion to proceed *pro se* in this case. On December 13, 2007, the circuit court granted defendant's motion to proceed *pro se*. On January 10, 2008, defendant's *pro se* motion to substitute judge was denied. Defendant later filed a motion to reconsider, which was also denied.

On March 28, 2008, a hearing was held on defendant's motion *in limine* to preclude the State's use of the original indictment returned against defendant as evidence of guilt during the sentencing eligibility hearing. That motion was taken under advisement. On April 14 and 15, 2008, the eligibility hearing was held. The circuit court informed the venire that it was a sentencing procedure, because defendant had previously been found guilty of murder. During the hearing, the State moved to admit into evidence and publish to the jury a certified copy of the indictment and the original verdict of guilt. The exhibits were admitted over defendant's objection.

The State also presented the prior testimony of Shirley Etherton, who was the store manager at the time of the murder. Etherton died after the first trial and, therefore, was unavailable to testify. Etherton explained that Bushong was an employee of the store and

that the store was equipped with a video camera security system. Etherton said she watched the videotape and knew that Bushong had been murdered. After the murder, Etherton conducted an inventory of the store and determined that $77 was missing. The parties stipulated that People's Exhibit 29 was the original videotape of the murder. The videotape was admitted into evidence, and relevant portions were played for the jury. The State rested and the defense rested without presenting any evidence.

Ultimately, the jury found defendant eligible for an extended-term sentence. On June 17, 2008, a sentencing hearing was held, after which the circuit court sentenced defendant to natural life in prison. Defendant now appeals.

## ANALYSIS

### I. Abuse of Discretion

The first issue raised by defendant is whether the circuit court abused its discretion by sentencing defendant to natural life in prison. Defendant contends that the circuit court relied on improper factors in sentencing defendant and contends his sentence should be reduced to 30 years' imprisonment or the sentence vacated and the cause remanded for resentencing. Defendant insists that the sentencing judge "attached great significance" to the sentencing factor found in section 5-5-3.2(a)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections–"the defendant's conduct caused or threatened serious harm" (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(1) (West 1994)). Defendant asserts that the court considered the death of the victim and, thus, considered conduct inherent in the offense. Defendant also maintains that, when imposing this sentence, the court improperly considered that defendant had formerly been sentenced to death. The State replies that defendant has failed to show that the court's imposition of natural life in prison was an abuse of discretion. We agree with the State.

The circuit court is vested with wide discretion in sentencing a defendant, and its decision is entitled to great deference. *People v. Perruquet*, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154, 368 N.E.2d

earliest practical moment before a judge has ruled on a substantive issue in order to permit a defendant to find a judge more favorably disposed to him. *People v. Algee*, 228 Ill. App. 3d 401, 406, 591 N.E.2d 1001, 1005 (1992). Here, defendant filed his motion to substitute after arguments on defendant's motion to bar the imposition of an extended-term sentence. While the motion to bar had not yet been ruled upon, we agree with the State that the timing of defendant's motion is suspect. Most importantly, however, defendant has failed to show that the sentencing judge demonstrated any prejudice or bias; therefore, we find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to substitute for cause.

IV. Reasonable Doubt

The fourth issue is whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant actually injured or killed Sharon Bushong during the course of an armed robbery. Defendant asserts there was insufficient evidence presented to the extended-term-qualifying jury to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the person who actually killed Sharon Bushong during the course of an armed robbery.

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. *People v. Smith*, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541, 708 N.E.2d 365, 369 (1999). We may not substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court and will not reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. *People v. Lundy*, 334 Ill. App. 3d 819, 825, 779 N.E.2d 404, 410 (2002) (citing *People v. Clemons*, 277 Ill. App. 3d 911, 923, 661 N.E.2d 476, 484 (1996)).

On direct appeal, defendant argued that the evidence produced at the trial was insufficient to prove him guilty of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the supreme court found the

evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdict finding him guilty of first-degree murder. *People v. Williams*, 193 Ill. 2d 1, 25-26, 737 N.E.2d 230, 244-45 (2000). Nevertheless, the supreme court vacated defendant's sentence of death and remanded for a new sentencing hearing at which time the State could again seek the death penalty on the felony-murder aggravating factor found in section 9-1(b)(6) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)). *Williams*, 193 Ill. 2d at 46, 737 N.E.2d at 255. The circuit court determined that the State was not precluded from seeking an extended-term sentence, and the court empaneled a jury to determine whether defendant was eligible for an extended-term sentence.

At the hearing, a certified copy of defendant's criminal indictment, which charged defendant with the first-degree murder of Sharon Bushong, was introduced into evidence, along with a certified copy of the original jury's verdict finding defendant guilty of the charge. The videotape of the murder was also introduced into evidence. We agree with the State that this evidence was sufficient. As previously noted, the supreme court already rejected defendant's claims that the evidence presented during the trial was insufficient to prove him guilty of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. In affirming defendant's conviction, the supreme court noted: (1) defendant admitted to killing Bushong, (2) at the time of his arrest defendant was in possession of the weapon used to kill Bushong, (3) defendant had been seen with the gun in his possession prior to and after the Bushong murder, and (4) defendant not only is the same height as the person who shot Bushong but also is left-handed, as was the person who shot Bushong. *Williams*, 193 Ill. 2d at 25-26, 737 N.E.2d at 244-45. We agree with the State that defendant cannot now relitigate the issue of whether he was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the question of whether he was actually and intentionally the person who killed Bushong, nor can he claim that People's Exhibit 100, the guilty verdict, is not evidence of these facts.

Furthermore, we are well aware of *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which holds that any factor used as a reason to increase a sentence must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. That standard was met here by the submission of the indictment and the guilty verdict. A rational jury could have found the qualifying factor based upon the indictment and the guilty verdict. Nevertheless, this was not the only evidence presented. At the extended-term-qualifying hearing, the State also presented the testimony of Shirley Etherton by way of transcript from defendant's trial, because Etherton was deceased by the time of the hearing. Etherton had testified that she was the manager at the store where Bushong was killed. She had testified about the videotaping system in place at the store. The parties then stipulated that People's Exhibit 29 was the original VHS tape recovered from the store after the murder. The videotape was played for the extended-term-qualifying jury. Finally, the State presented evidence that defendant was over the age of 18 at the time of the murder by admitting a copy of his birth certificate. We find that this evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the aggravating factor alleged was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

V. Constitutionality of Section 9-1

The fifth issue we are asked to consider is whether subsections 9-1(b)(6), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) (West 1994)) are unconstitutional. Defendant argues that these subsections of the Code are unconstitutional because they force defendant to choose between one of two constitutional rights–either present a defense, thereby forfeiting his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, or maintain his fifth amendment right and forfeit his fourteenth amendment due process right to present a defense. We disagree.

We first note that defendant challenged the constitutionality of this statute during his direct appeal. The supreme court rejected defendant's arguments, finding, *inter alia*, that the

(1985).

Finally, we point out that many of the arguments made during closing and complained of herein by defendant were not improper but were comments based upon the evidence. Prosecutors are generally accorded wide latitude in the content of their closing arguments. *People v. Perry*, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 347, 864 N.E.2d 196, 217 (2007). They may comment on the evidence, along with any fair and reasonable inference the evidence may yield. *Perry*, 224 Ill. 2d at 347, 864 N.E.2d at 217-18. We are to consider the argument as a whole rather than focusing on selected phrases and remarks. *Perry*, 224 Ill. 2d at 347, 864 N.E.2d at 218. In order to constitute reversible error, an error in closing argument must result in substantial prejudice such that the result would have been different absent the comments of which the defendant complains. *People v. Cloutier*, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 507, 622 N.E.2d 774, 787 (1993). Here, we find that the prosecutorial conduct of which defendant complains was either waived, cured by the sustained objections and instructions to ignore, or harmless given the evidence against defendant. Defendant has failed to convince us he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing based upon alleged errors during closing or on any other basis.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the extended-term sentence of natural life in prison imposed upon defendant for the murder of Sharon Bushong.

Affirmed.



0-11-5/n

# APPENDIX B

IN CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. CLAIR COUNTY, ILLINOIS
20TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Date of Sentence 6-17-08
Date of Birth 7-16-75
Date of Birth (Victim)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS )
vs. )
Bobby O. Williams ) Case No. 96CF100
Defendant )

FILED
ST. CLAIR COUNTY
JUN 17 2008
64
CIRCUIT CLERK

JUDGMENT - SENTENCE TO ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

WHEREAS the above-named defendant has been adjudged guilty of the offenses enumerated below.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant be and hereby is sentenced to confinement in the Illinois Department of Corrections for the term of years and months specified for each offense.

| COUNT | OFFENSE | DATE OF OFFENCE | STATUTORY CITATION | CLASS | SENTENCE | MSR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | First Degree Murder | 11-3-94 | 720/5.0 9-1(a)(1) | Sep Class | Natural Life Yrs. Mos. | Yrs |
| and said sentence shall run (concurrent with)(consecutive to) the sentence imposed on: | | | | | | |
| and said sentence shall run (concurrent with)(consecutive to) the sentence imposed on: | | | | | Yrs. Mos. | Yrs. |
| and said sentence shall run (concurrent with)(consecutive to) the sentence imposed on: | | | | | Yrs. Mos. | Yrs. |

The Court finds that the defendant is: Jury found dependant eligible for extended term

☐ Convicted of a class _____ offense but sentenced as a class X offender pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c) (8)

The Court further finds that the defendant is entitled to receive credit for time actually served in custody ~~( of _____ days as of the date of this order)~~ (specify dates) since 2-17-95.

☐ The Court further finds that the conduct leading to conviction for the offenses enumerated in counts _____ resulted in great bodily harm to the victim. (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(iii).

☐ The Court further finds that the defendant meets the eligibility requirements and is approved for placement in the impact incarceration program. If the Department accepts the defendant and determines that the defendant has successfully completed the program, the sentence shall be reduced to time considered served upon certification to the Court by the Department that the defendant has successfully completed the program. Written consent is attached.

☐ The Court further finds that offense was committed as a result of the use of, abuse of, or addiction to alcohol or a controlled substance.

☐ IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the sentence(s) imposed on count(s) _____ be (concurrent with) (consecutive to) the sentence imposed in case number _____ in the Circuit Court of _____ County.

☒ IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant serve ☐ 85% ☒ 100% of said sentence.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court deliver a certified copy of this order to the Sheriff.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Sheriff take the defendant into custody and deliver him to the Department of Corrections which shall confine said defendant until expiration of his sentence or until he is otherwise released by operation of law.

☒ IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that D/D to submit DNA if not on file.
Cause set for motions 7-31-08 @ 8:30 CTRM 410

☐ This order is ☐ effective immediately. ☒ stayed until July 31, 2008

DATE: 6-17-08

ENTER: 6-17-08

JUDGE

APPENDIX B
SD-2219

-1272

# APPENDIX C

# SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

SUPREME COURT BUILDING
200 East Capitol Avenue
SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS 62701-1721

CYNTHIA A. GRANT
Clerk of the Court

(217) 782-2035
TDD: (217) 524-8132

November 29, 2022

FIRST DISTRICT OFFICE
160 North LaSalle Street, 20th Floor
Chicago, IL 60601-3103
(312) 793-1332
TDD: (312) 793-6185

Bobby O. Williams
Reg. No. B-80463
Western Illinois Correctional Center
2500 Rt. 99 South
Mt. Sterling, IL 62353

THE COURT HAS TODAY ENTERED THE FOLLOWING ORDER IN THE CASE OF:

M.D.014812 - Williams v. Goldenhersh

Motion by Petitioner for leave to file a petition for an original writ of mandamus or for a supervisory order is denied.

Very truly yours,

Cynthia A. Grant

Clerk of the Supreme Court

cc: Attorney General of Illinois - Criminal Division

APPENDIX C

M.D.014804 Jeffrey A. Ewing, petitioner, v. Hon. Sarah D. Smith, respondent. Mandamus.

The Attorney General of Illinois is directed to file a response on or before January 3, 2023, to the motion by petitioner for leave to file an emergency petition for an original writ of mandamus.

M.D.014805 Gregory P. Robinson, Jr., petitioner, v. People State of Illinois, respondent. Habeas Corpus.

Motion by petitioner for leave to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

M.D.014806 Theodore Luczak, movant, v. Hon. Kimberly J. Kellerman, etc., respondent. Supervisory Order.

The Attorney General of Illinois is directed to file a response on or before January 3, 2023, to the motion by movant for a supervisory order.

M.D.014809 Marilyn Eason, movant, v. People State of Illinois, respondent. Supervisory Order.

Motion by movant for a supervisory order is denied.

M.D.014811 People State of Illinois, respondent, v. Rocky Richmond, movant. Supervisory Order.

Motion by movant for a supervisory order is denied.

M.D.014812 Bobby O. Williams, petitioner, v. Hon. Richard P. Goldenhersh, etc., respondent. Mandamus/Supervisory Order.

Motion by petitioner for leave to file a petition for an original writ of mandamus or for a supervisory order is denied.

Additional material from this filing is available in the Clerk's Office.