

No. \_\_\_\_\_

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**In the Supreme Court of the United States**

JESUS IVAN DOMINGUEZ, *PETITIONER*,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *RESPONDENT*

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**PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
TO THE  
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT**

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MAUREEN SCOTT FRANCO  
Federal Public Defender

KRISTIN M. KIMMELMAN  
Assistant Federal Public Defender  
Western District of Texas  
727 E. César E. Chávez Blvd., B-207  
San Antonio, Texas 78206-1205  
(210) 472-6700  
(210) 472-4454 (Fax)

*Counsel of Record for Petitioner*

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**QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW**

Should the Court overrule *Almendarez-Torres v. United States*,  
523 U.S. 244 (1998)?

No. \_\_\_\_\_

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**PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
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Petitioner Jesus Ivan Dominguez<sup>1</sup> asks that a writ of certiorari issue to review the opinion and judgment entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on November 29, 2022.

**PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING**

The caption of this case names all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is sought to be reviewed.

**RELATED PROCEEDINGS**

All proceedings directly related to the case are as follows:

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<sup>1</sup> The caption lists petitioner's name as "Jesus Ivan Davila," but he filed a notice of true name in the district court that his name is "Jesus Ivan Dominguez."

- *United States v. Davila*, No. 3:21-cr-00615-FM (W.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2022) (judgment)
- *United States v. Davila*, No. 22-50136 (5th Cir. Nov. 29, 2022) (unpublished opinion)

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**DECISION BELOW**

A copy of the unpublished opinion of the court of appeals, *United States v. Davila*, No. 22-50136 (5th Cir. Nov. 29, 2022) (per curiam), is attached to this petition as Appendix A.

**JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES**

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was entered on November 29, 2022. This petition is filed within 90 days after entry of judgment or order sought to be reviewed. *See* Sup. Ct. R. 13.1, 13.3. The Court has jurisdiction to grant certiorari under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

**CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED**

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, ... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....”

The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... trial, by an impartial jury ....”

**FEDERAL STATUTE INVOLVED**

The text of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is reproduced in Appendix C.

## STATEMENT

Petitioner Jesus Ivan Dominguez<sup>2</sup> was charged with illegally reentering the country after having been removed, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Under § 1326(a), the maximum penalty for illegal reentry is two years' imprisonment. Under § 1326(b), the maximum increases to 10 years if the defendant was removed from the United States after having been convicted of a felony, and to 20 years if he was removed after having been convicted of an aggravated felony. Also, the maximum supervised release term increases from one year to three years. In *Almendarez-Torres v. United States*, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), this Court held that the enhancement-qualifying conviction under § 1326(b) is a sentencing factor, not an element of a separate offense. Dominguez's indictment did not allege a prior conviction. App. B.

Dominguez pleaded guilty as charged. The factual basis for his guilty plea admitted only the elements of § 1326(a); he did not admit to having a prior conviction that would trigger the enhanced penalties in § 1326(b).

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<sup>2</sup> The caption lists petitioner's name as "Jesus Ivan Davila," but he filed a notice of true name in the district court that his name is "Jesus Ivan Dominguez."

A probation officer prepared a presentence report. Although the indictment did not allege that Dominguez had been removed from the United States after a felony conviction, the presentence report stated that that statutory maximum penalty was 10 years' imprisonment and up to three years of supervised release, under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1).

At sentencing, defense counsel asked for a sentence of 12 months and one day. Counsel explained that Dominguez moved to the United States with his family when he was a young child. He attended school in the United States, obtained his GED, and became a lawful permanent resident. But experimentation with drugs led to a possession conviction, and Dominguez lost his lawful status and was removed. Family ties and unfamiliarity with Mexico led him to return unlawfully to the United States, where he married, fathered three U.S. citizen children, and worked as a construction laborer. Dominguez submitted letters from family members describing him as a dedicated father, loving son, and mentor. His teenage son asked the district court for leniency and to allow his father to attend his high school graduation, as Dominguez had always encouraged him to work hard at school.

Before pronouncing the sentence, the district court asked Dominguez about a last-minute addition to the presentence report

that alleged he was affiliated with gangs. Dominguez denied any such affiliation and noted that his limited criminal history did not suggest any gang affiliation. The court sentenced Dominguez to the bottom of the Guidelines range, 100 months' imprisonment and three years' supervised release.

Dominguez appealed. His appellate counsel discovered that gang assertion in the presentence report was based on a letter from a gang intelligence officer stating simply that Dominguez is a "suspected affiliate" of two gangs. The letter did not include a basis or timeframe for this suspected affiliation.

On appeal, Dominguez raised two issues. First, he argued that the district court plainly erred by providing inadequate notice of the gang-affiliation allegation, failing to disclose the facts underlying that allegation, and not providing Dominguez a meaningful opportunity to investigate and rebut the facts underlying the allegation. The court of appeals held that Dominguez did not establish that any error affected his substantial rights. App. A 3.

Second, Dominguez argued that, under the reasoning of this Court's decisions in *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and *Alleyne v. United States*, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) is unconstitutional, insofar as it permits a sentence above the otherwise-applicable statutory maximum based on facts

that are neither alleged in the indictment nor found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. He acknowledged that the argument was foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres*, but he noted that recent decisions from this Court suggested that *Almendarez-Torres* may be reconsidered. The court of appeals noted the foreclosure and affirmed Dominguez's sentence. App. A 3.

## **REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT**

### **The Court Should Grant Certiorari to Consider Whether to Overrule *Almendarez-Torres v. United States*, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).**

Section 1326(a) punishes illegal reentry after removal with a maximum term of two years' imprisonment and one year's supervised release. The district court determined, however, that Dominguez was subject to an enhanced sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b), which increases the maximum penalty if the removal occurred after a conviction for a felony or an aggravated felony. The district court's decision accorded with this Court's decision in *Almendarez-Torres v. United States*, which held that § 1326(b)'s enhanced penalty is a sentencing factor, not a separate, aggravated offense. 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). The Court further ruled that this construction of § 1326(b) did not violate due process; a prior conviction need not be treated as an element of the offense, even if it increases the statutory maximum penalty. *Id.* at 239–47.

However, the continued validity of *Almendarez-Torres* is questionable. Just two years after it was decided, the Court appeared to cast doubt on it. *See Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In *Apprendi*, the Court announced that facts that increase the maximum sentence must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. *Id.* at 490. The Court acknowledged that this general principle conflicted with the specific holding in *Almendarez-Torres* that a prior conviction need not be treated as an element under § 1326(b). The Court found it “arguable that *Almendarez-Torres* was incorrectly decided, and that a logical application of our reasoning today should apply” to prior convictions as well. *Id.* at 489. But because *Apprendi* did not involve a prior conviction, the Court considered it unnecessary to revisit *Almendarez-Torres*. *Id.* at 490. Instead, the Court framed its holding to avoid expressly overruling the earlier case. *Id.* at 489.

The Court again questioned *Almendarez-Torres*’s reasoning and suggested that the Court would be willing to revisit the decision. *Alleyne v. United States*, 570 U.S. 99, 111 n.1 (2013); *see also Sessions v. Dimaya*, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1253 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (opining that *Almendarez-Torres* should be reconsidered); *Mathis v. United States*, 579 U.S. 500, 522–23 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) (same); *Descamps v. United States*, 570 U.S. 254, 280–

81 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (same). These opinions reveal concern that the opinion is constitutionally flawed.

In *Alleyne*, the Court applied *Apprendi*'s rule to mandatory minimum sentences, holding that any fact that produces a higher sentencing range—not just a sentence above the statutory maximum—must be pleaded in the indictment and either admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. *Alleyne*, 570 U.S. at 115–16. In the opinion, the Court apparently recognized that *Almendarez-Torres* remains subject to Sixth Amendment attack. The Court characterized that decision as a “narrow exception to the general rule” that all facts that increase punishment must be alleged and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. *Id.* at 111 n.1. But because the parties in that case did not challenge *Almendarez-Torres*, the Court said it would “not revisit it for purposes of our decision today.” *Id.*

Nonetheless, the Court’s reasoning in *Alleyne* strengthens the challenge to *Almendarez-Torres*’s recognition of a recidivism exception. *Alleyne* traced the treatment of the relationship between crime and punishment, beginning in the eighteenth century, repeatedly noting how “[the] linkage of facts with particular sentence ranges … reflects the intimate connection between crime and punishment.” *Id.* at 109 (“[i]f a fact was by law essential to the penalty,

it was an element of the offense"); *see id.* (historically, crimes were defined as "the whole of the wrong to which the law affixes punishment ... including any fact that annexes a higher degree of punishment"); *id.* at 111 ("the indictment must contain an allegation of every fact which is legally essential to the punishment to be inflicted"). *Alleyne* concluded that, because "the whole of the" crime and its punishment cannot be separated, the elements of a crime must include any facts that increase the penalty. The Court recognized no limitations or exceptions to this principle.

*Alleyne*'s emphasis that the elements of a crime include the "whole" of the facts for which a defendant is punished seriously undercuts the view, expressed in *Almendarez-Torres*, that recidivism is different from other sentencing facts. *See Almendarez-Torres*, 523 U.S. at 243–44; *see also Apprendi*, 530 U.S. at 490 ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."). The *Apprendi* Court later tried to explain this difference by pointing out that, unlike other facts, recidivism "does not relate to the commission of the offense itself." *Apprendi*, 530 U.S. at 496. But the Court has since acknowledged that *Almendarez-Torres* might have been "incorrectly decided." *Id.* at 489; *see also Shepard*

*v. United States*, 544 U.S. 13, 26 n.5 (2005) (acknowledging that Court’s holding in that case undermined *Almendarez-Torres*); *Cunningham v. California*, 549 U.S. 270, 291 n.14 (2007) (rejecting invitation to distinguish between “facts concerning the offense, where *Apprendi* would apply, and facts [like recidivism] concerning the offender, where it would not,” because “*Apprendi* itself ... leaves no room for the bifurcated approach”).

Three concurring justices in *Alleyne* provide additional reasons for revisiting *Almendarez-Torres*. *See Alleyne*, 133 S. Ct. at 2164 (Sotomayor, Ginsburg, Kagan, J.J., concurring). Those justices noted that the viability of the Sixth Amendment principle set forth in *Apprendi* was initially subject to some doubt, and some justices believed the Court “might retreat” from it. *Alleyne*, 570 U.S. at 118–22. Instead, *Apprendi*’s rule “has become even more firmly rooted in the Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.” *Id.* Reversal of even recent precedent is warranted when “the reasoning of [that precedent] has been thoroughly undermined by intervening decisions.” *Id.* at 121; *see also Dimaya*, 138 S. Ct. at 1253 (“The exception recognized in *Almendarez-Torres* for prior convictions is an aberration, has been seriously undermined by subsequent precedents, and should be reconsidered.”) (Thomas, J., dissenting); *Mathis*, 579 U.S. at 522 (“I continue to believe that the exception

in *Apprendi* was wrong, and I have urged that *Almendarez-Torres* be reconsidered.”) (Thomas, J., concurring).

The growing view among members of this Court that *Almendarez-Torres* was wrongly decided is good reason to clarify whether *Almendarez-Torres* is still the law. Stare decisis is “at its weakest” when the Court interprets the Constitution. *Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.*, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2237 (2022) (quoting *Agostini v. Felton*, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997)). When “there has been a significant change in, or subsequent development of, our constitutional law,” stare decisis “does not prevent … overruling a previous decision.” *Agostini*, 521 U.S. at 236. Even if the Court were ultimately to reaffirm *Almendarez-Torres*, review is warranted. While lower court judges—as well as prosecutors, defense counsel, and criminal defendants—are forced to rely on the decision, they must speculate as to the ultimate validity of the Court’s holding. “There is no good reason to allow such a state of affairs to persist.” *Rangel-Reyes v. United States*, 547 U.S. 1200, 1201 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

The question of *Almendarez-Torres*’s validity can be resolved only in this forum. *Rangel-Reyes*, 547 U.S. at 1201 (citing *State Oil Co. v. Khan*, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)). *Almendarez-Torres* is a decision

of this country's highest court on a question of constitutional dimension; no other court, and no other branch of government, can decide if it is wrong. Regarding the Constitution, it is ultimately this Court's responsibility "to say what the law is." *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). The Court should grant certiorari to say whether *Almendarez-Torres* is still the law.

## CONCLUSION

FOR THESE REASONS, Dominguez asks that this Honorable Court grant a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted.

MAUREEN SCOTT FRANCO  
Federal Public Defender  
Western District of Texas  
727 E. César E. Chávez Blvd., B-207  
San Antonio, Texas 78206  
Tel.: (210) 472-6700  
Fax: (210) 472-4454

s/ Kristin M. Kimmelman  
KRISTIN M. KIMMELMAN  
Assistant Federal Public Defender

*Counsel of Record for Petitioner*

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