

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FILED

OCT 26 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK  
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

DANIEL RAY LOYD,

No. 21-16139

Petitioner-Appellant,

D.C. No. 4:18-cv-07228-HSG  
Northern District of California,  
Oakland

v.

NEIL McDOWELL, Warden

ORDER

Respondent-Appellee,

Before: SCHROEDER and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

The request for a certificate of appealability (Docket Entry No. 3) is denied because appellant has not made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); *see also Miller-El v. Cockrell*, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).

Any pending motions are denied as moot.

**DENIED.**

## DANIEL RAY LOYD.

Petitioner,

V.

NEIL McDOWELL, Warden,

**Respondent.**

Case No. 18-cv-07228-HSG (PR)

**ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR  
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;  
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF  
APPEALABILITY**

## I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Daniel Ray Loyd, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Ironwood State Prison, brings this *pro se* petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the validity of a judgment obtained against him in state court which involved multiple offenses, including first-degree felony murder based on a finding that Petitioner killed a woman named Cindy Quiett during an attempted robbery.

Respondent has filed an answer to the petition. Dkt. Nos. 25, 25-1. Petitioner has filed a traverse. Dkt. No. 36. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.

## II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A Lake County jury found Petitioner guilty of first degree murder, assault with a firearm, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of ammunition by a felon. 5 Clerk's Transcript ("CT") 1540-1544. The jury also found true a special circumstance allegation that the murder was committed during an attempted robbery as well as multiple gun-use allegations. 5 CT at 1542. The Lake County Superior Court found true the prior conviction and prior prison term allegations, 7 CT 1885, and sentenced Petitioner to a term of life in prison without the possibility of parole plus an additional term of twenty-six years and four months, 7 CT 2814-2190.

1       On December 5, 2017, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions and  
2 sentence. *People v. Loyd*, No. A149159, 2017 WL 6014413 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2017).

3       On January 12, 2018, Petitioner submitted a petition for review to the California Supreme  
4 Court. Dkt. No. 26-13; Resp't Ex. 10. On March 14, 2018, the California Supreme Court denied  
5 the petition for review. Dkt. No. 26-13 at 121; Resp't Ex. 11.

6       On May 4, 2018, Petitioner filed a habeas petition, Case No. A154216, in the California  
7 Court of Appeal, which was denied on May 16, 2018, without prejudice to the petition first being  
8 filed in the state superior court. Dkt. No. 26-13; Resp't Ex. 12.

9       On July 9, 2018, Petitioner filed another habeas petition, Case No. A154744, in the  
10 California Court of Appeal, which was denied on July 12, 2018. Dkt. No. 26-13; Resp't Ex. 13.

11       On September 24, 2018, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme  
12 Court seeking review of the California Court of Appeal's July 12, 2018 denial of his state habeas  
13 petition. Dkt. No. 26-13; Resp't Ex. 14.

14       On September 26, 2018, the clerk of the California Supreme Court returned the petition for  
15 review to Petitioner unfiled with the following cover letter:

16       We hereby return unfiled your petition for review, which we received on September 26,  
17 2018. A check of the Court of Appeal docket shows that an order denying petition for writ  
18 of habeas corpus [was] filed on July 12, 2018. This court lost jurisdiction to act on any  
19 petition for review after August 13, 2018. (See Cal Rules of Court, rule 8.500(e).)  
20       Without this jurisdiction, this court is unable to consider your request for legal relief.

21       Dkt. No. 26-13 at 151; Resp't Ex. 15 (brackets added).

22       On November 8, 2018,<sup>1</sup> Petitioner filed the instant petition in the United States District  
23 Court for the Eastern District of California. Dkt. No. 1. On November 29, 2018, this case was  
24 transferred from the Eastern District to this District. Dkt. No. 3. The case was reassigned to the  
25 undersigned judge on December 21, 2018. Dkt. No. 9. On January 31, 2019, the Court found that

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26       <sup>1</sup> According to the proof of service, Petitioner handed his letter to prison officials for mailing on  
27 November 8, 2018. Dkt. No. 1 at 12. Therefore, the Court considers the petition as deemed filed  
28 on that date. See *Saffold v. Newland*, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2001), *vacated and remanded*  
on other grounds, *Carey v. Saffold*, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) (holding that a federal or state habeas  
petition is deemed filed on the date the prisoner submits it to prison authorities for filing, rather  
than on the date it is received by the court).

1 the petition stated the following cognizable claims for federal habeas relief: (1) the trial court erred  
2 by failing to correctly instruct the jury on the causation required for felony murder and by failing  
3 to instruct the jury that if the felony-murder rule did not apply, the murder charge was governed by  
4 the provocative act murder rule; (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on lesser  
5 included offenses; (3) the trial court erred in failing to reread defense counsel's closing argument  
6 regarding proximate cause as requested by the jury; (4) the trial court erred by admitting  
7 Petitioner's custodial statements made after he invoked his right to counsel; (5) ineffective  
8 assistance of counsel ("IAC") claims against trial counsel on multiple grounds; and (6) trial  
9 counsel's errors resulted in cumulative error. Dkt. No. 10.

10 On January 1, 2020, the Court granted Respondent's motion to dismiss based on  
11 Petitioner's failure to exhaust his state court remedies for his IAC and cumulative error claims.  
12 Dkt. No 18. Because the petition contained both exhausted and unexhausted claims and was  
13 therefore what is referred to as a "mixed" petition under *Rhines*,<sup>2</sup> the Court allowed Petitioner to  
14 elect how to proceed with his "mixed" petition. Dkt. No. 18 at 7-10. On January 28, 2020,  
15 Petitioner elected to proceed by filing a motion for stay of the proceedings while he exhausted his  
16 unexhausted claims in the California Supreme Court. Dkt. No. 19-20.

17 On March 6, 2020, the Court stayed the petition to allow Petitioner to exhaust his state  
18 court remedies. Dkt. No. 22.

19 On March 19, 2020 and April 2, 2020, Petitioner filed state habeas petitions in the  
20 California Supreme Court, in which he raised his IAC and cumulative error claims. Resp't Exs.  
21 18 & 20. The state supreme court summarily denied the state habeas petition filed on March 19,  
22 2020, and denied the state habeas petition filed on April 2, 2020, because it was repetitive. Resp't  
23 Exs. 19 & 21.

24 On May 23, 2020, Petitioner notified the courts that his claims had been exhausted. Dkt.  
25 No. 23. On July 6, 2020 the stay was lifted, the original petition remained the operative petition,  
26 and Petitioner's case was reopened. Dkt. No. 24.

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2 <sup>2</sup> *Rhines v. Weber*, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005).

1       On October 5, 2020, Respondents filed an answer. Dkt. Nos. 25-1. On November 20,  
2 2020, Petitioner filed a traverse. Dkt. No. 36.

3       On November 23, 2020, the Court denied Petitioner leave to file the petition originally  
4 filed in Case No. 20-cv-7659 HSG (PR)<sup>3</sup> and docketed in this action as Dkt. No. 33, which  
5 challenged the same conviction as in this action, but alleged a new claim for federal habeas relief:  
6 the denial of right to counsel (distinguished from Petitioner's IAC claims). Dkt. No. 35. The  
7 denial was without prejudice to Petitioner filing an amended petition that contained both the six  
8 claims already found cognizable and the claim of denial of counsel. *Id.* at 3. The Court advised  
9 Petitioner that the failure to file an amended petition would result in Dkt. No. 1 remaining the  
10 operative petition. *Id.*

11       On December 17, 2020, instead of filing an amended petition, Petitioner filed a motion  
12 seeking to withdraw the petition originally filed in C No. 20-cv-7659 HSG (PR), and to proceed  
13 on the original petition filed in this action. Dkt. No. 37. The Court denied this motion as moot,  
14 stating that pursuant to the Court's November 23, 2020 order (see Dkt. No. 35), the operative  
15 petition in this action remained Dkt. No. 1 (see Dkt. No. 39 at 1).

16       This matter is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.

17       **III. STATEMENT OF FACTS**

18       The state appellate court handled the direct appeal filed by Petitioner in an unpublished  
19 opinion and described the relevant facts as follows:<sup>4</sup>

20  
21  
22       <sup>3</sup> On October 2, 2020, Petitioner filed a separate *pro se* habeas petition. *Loyd v. McDowell*, C No.  
23 20-cv-07695 HSG (PR) ("*Loyd II*"), Dkt. No. 1 (filed Oct. 2, 2020). Because this action was  
24 already pending, the Court administratively closed *Loyd II*, and construed the petition filed in  
25 *Loyd II* as a motion for leave to file an amended petition. *See Woods v. Carey*, 525 F.3d 886, 887–  
90 (9th Cir. 2008) (when *pro se* petitioner files new petition in the district court where an earlier-  
filed petition is still pending, district court must construe new petition as motion to amend the  
pending petition rather than as unauthorized second or successive petition).

26       <sup>4</sup> The Court has independently reviewed the record as required by AEDPA. *Nasby v. McDaniel*,  
27 853 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2017). Based on its independent review, the Court finds that it can  
28 reasonably conclude that the state appellate court's summary of facts is supported by the record  
and that this summary is therefore entitled to a presumption of correctness, *Taylor v. Maddox*, 366  
F.3d 992, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2004), *abrogated on other grounds*, *Murray v. Schriro*, 745 F.3d  
984, 1000 (9th Cir. 2014), unless otherwise indicated in this order.

**A. The September 2011 Shooting of Cindy Quiett**

In September 2011, Cindy Quiett and her boyfriend Joey Ryden were staying with friends at a home on Kensington Way in Lucerne, Lake County. On the morning of September 13, at around 3:30 a.m., the couple walked to a nearby intersection where Ryden had made arrangements via text messages to sell methamphetamine to his ex-girlfriend, Angel Spring. Ryden told Quiett to hide by a tree on the opposite side of the road, so she would be out of sight if police happened to appear during the drug deal. As Ryden approached the intersection, a van travelled across the road and stopped in front of him. At that point, Quiett was on the other side of the van, approximately 12 feet away.

Appellant, who Ryden recognized as Spring's new boyfriend, got out of the van and pointed a revolver in Ryden's face. With his finger on the cocked trigger, appellant said "Give me your shit, Joey. Give me your shit." The first time appellant issued his command, Ryden listened. The second time, Ryden tried to disarm appellant by knocking the gun away from his face. Appellant's arm moved toward the other side of the road, and then the gun went off. Ryden took off running. When he glanced back over his shoulder he saw the van backing down the street.

Then Ryden heard Quiett call his name, saw that "she was down," and ran back to her. He tried to pick her up, but when she kept collapsing he realized she had been shot in the stomach. Ryden ran to his friends' house to get help and then returned to Quiett's side to wait for medical personnel. Quiett went into cardiac arrest while she was in the ambulance. Doctors performed emergency surgery but were unable to save her life.

A forensic pathologist employed by the coroner division of the Lake County Sheriff's Office concluded that Quiett died from a single gunshot wound; the bullet entered her right lower chest, perforated her aorta, traveled through her abdomen and exited her lower left back. The entrance wound was 2.5 inches higher than the exit wound, which was an indication that she was either standing on a slope or leaning forward about 10 to 15 degrees when the bullet hit her body. The bullet that travelled through Quiett's body was never found.

**B. Appellant's Travel Companions**

Two women were in the van when Quiett was shot, Angel Spring and Cynthia Downing. Just prior to the shooting, they spent several hours driving around with appellant while they were high on methamphetamine. Both women testified at appellant's 2015 trial.

Spring testified that when appellant drove to the intersection where he met Ryden, she knew appellant was going to buy meth, but she did not know that Ryden was the seller, and she did not know appellant had a gun until she saw him point it in Ryden's face. According to Spring, after appellant ordered Ryden to "[g]ive me your shit" the second time, Cindy Quiett "came out of nowhere and said something to [appellant], and [appellant] looked at her. And when he did, [Ryden] hit the gun to get it out of his face and it went off." Spring testified that when appellant got back in the van, he said the gun went off but nobody was shot. As appellant backed the van down the street, Spring saw Quiett on the ground. It was dark and Spring did not have her glasses on, but it appeared to her that Quiett was sitting upright. She asked appellant if Quiett was shot and he said no, but he may have run over her foot.

1 Downing testified that when appellant met Ryden on the morning of September 13, 2011,  
2 she was asleep in the van until a loud noise woke her. Then appellant got in the van and  
3 Downing noticed he had a gun. She was frightened and disoriented. But she later  
4 recalled that Spring was crying and asked appellant, "Did you shoot him?" Appellant  
5 responded, "No. I shot her." Downing also recalled that appellant said "Oh my God," and  
6 that it was an accident. As appellant backed down the street, Downing saw Quiett, who  
7 was her good friend, standing on the street clutching her purse. Quiett said "Oh my God,"  
8 as she dropped to her knees. Downing was extremely upset and demanded to be let out of  
9 the van, so appellant dropped her off at her friend's house.

10 Spring testified that after they left Downing, she and appellant picked up their friend  
11 Micheal [sic] Santos and drove out to Reclamation Road. The van appellant had been  
12 driving belonged to another friend, Jody Young. Santos agreed to return Young's van and  
13 drive back in Spring's van. While they waited, Spring found a place to sleep near some  
14 blackberry bushes. Appellant was "freaking out" and held the gun while they waited. He  
15 woke Spring several times because he was so afraid. As it turned out, Santos never  
16 returned with Spring's van, but Downing called and told them that Quiett had died. After  
17 hearing that news, appellant and Spring made a plan to hide the gun in the blackberry  
18 bushes and turn themselves in, so Spring initiated contact with law enforcement.

### 12 **C. Appellant's Incriminating Statements**

13 Detectives Drewrey and Herdt from the Lake County Sheriff's Department were  
14 dispatched to meet appellant and Spring near Reclamation Road. The detectives talked  
15 with Spring via cell phone to get directions, and created an audio recording of their  
16 interactions with the distraught couple.<sup>[FN 1]</sup> After the couple was placed in handcuffs  
17 and advised of their *Miranda* rights,<sup>[FN 2]</sup> they talked with the detectives about whether it  
18 would help their situation to turn in the gun and the public safety concerns associated with  
failing to do that. Then appellant and Spring led the detectives to the area where appellant  
tossed the gun into a blackberry bush, but they were not able to find it. The detectives  
thanked them for narrowing the search area, and made arrangements for other officers to  
continue the search.

19 [FN 1:] The audio recordings were admitted into evidence at trial.

20 [FN 2:] See *Miranda v. Arizona* (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (*Miranda*).

21 While the group walked back to the road, appellant asked Herdt for "a little input" about  
22 his "situation." Herdt responded that he did not know "the whole situation." Appellant  
23 and Spring both urged Herdt to tell them what he knew about what was going on. Herdt  
24 responded "You would have to tell me what happened, man." Drewrey added "You're the  
25 one that knows what's up, Dan." To that, appellant responded: "Joey . . . fucking had a  
26 gun in his face and he fucking hit the gun—and the fucking gun went that way and went  
27 off, dude. Exactly what the fuck happened." Drewrey said "All right," and appellant  
continued "Okay? That's exactly what the fuck happened. Stupid ass mother fucker. Oh  
my God. (INAUDIBLE). Fucking ruined a life for what? For what?" Spring urged  
appellant to calm down, but he continued: "Fucking human life for what. Three human  
lives . . . and maybe even more. What the fuck."

28 Drewrey told the couple they could ride to the sheriff's office together, where he would

1 talk with them about what had happened. Spring said that it was "really an accident" and  
2 that she could not believe that Ryden had reached out for the gun. Appellant said the  
3 whole situation was just too much for him to handle and said "I've killed an innocent lady  
4 over—oh my God." Spring repeated that it was an accident and that appellant needed to  
5 calm down. Appellant repeatedly apologized to both Spring and the detectives for what he  
6 had done. When Spring asked if she was going to be arrested, appellant told the detectives  
7 that she was not responsible. Appellant said that Spring knew he had the pistol with him  
8 that night, but "I just fucking called him up, decided to rob him. She didn't know nothing  
9 until I stopped the fucking thing, put it in park, and jumped out. She didn't know shit,  
10 okay. From there, that's it, bro. She didn't know." Appellant continued to talk to the  
11 detectives as they arranged for an officer to drive the couple back to town.  
12

13 Officers continued their search of the area around Reclamation Road, and eventually found  
14 a gun in a blackberry bush. The revolver was loaded with four live rounds, one spent  
15 round with an empty casing in the cylinder, and one empty chamber. The gun was traced  
16 to Jody Young, the same man who had let appellant borrow his van. Young reported that  
17 he had purchased the gun from an acquaintance, but when appellant saw it, he said he  
18 recognized it and that it had been stolen from their mutual acquaintance. Young let  
19 appellant return the gun to its owner, but he had a bad feeling about the matter, so he took  
20 one of the bullets from the chamber before he gave it to appellant. Young gave that unused  
bullet to the detectives. The spent bullet from the gun was never found.

21 After the gun was recovered, Detective Drewrey interviewed appellant at the sheriff's  
22 office. Drewrey said that he understood there had been some sort of accident and asked  
23 appellant to tell him what happened. Appellant began to cry, explaining that he knew  
24 Quiett. Appellant made several incoherent remarks, and then said he did not want to hurt  
25 anybody, but just went there "to put him in check about something." Drewrey asked if  
26 Ryden was "messing with" Spring. Appellant said "No, he's disrespecting her."

27 Then appellant said he had called Ryden and arranged to buy \$40 worth of dope and that it  
28 was "a spur of the moment thing" to "go fuckin take his shit." Drewrey asked how Ryden  
had disrespected Spring. Appellant said that it was "just the way" Ryden talked to her,  
trying to be friends or not enemies. Appellant added that he had a lot of other things going  
on in his life at the time.

29 After discussing other issues, Drewrey returned to the events of the previous night, asking  
30 if appellant had contacted Ryden "to get a forty sack." Appellant said he had, and then  
31 described what he did before he met Ryden: He borrowed Young's van, spent some time  
32 "hanging out at a friend's house," and then went to "go, go rob a couple people in  
33 Clearlake," but one guy was not home and he could not find the other person. Appellant  
34 said that Spring "didn't know that," but then immediately said "[w]e had no secrets."  
Drewrey asked whether appellant or Spring had called Ryden. Appellant said that he  
35 called Ryden, tried to get a "gram," but Ryden agreed to supply a "forty sack," so he,  
36 Spring and another woman went to meet him on Sixth Street.

37 Appellant told Drewrey that when he arrived at the meeting place, Ryden and Quiett were  
38 walking down the hill on Sixth. Appellant pulled the van over at the corner. He grabbed  
39 the pistol and jumped out of the van as Ryden approached the driver's side door, and told  
40 Ryden "Give me all your shit, give me the money and just pour the dope on the fuckin

1 street.’” Ryden responded, “What the fuck are you doing Danny?” Appellant stated that  
2 he was right in Ryden’s face with the gun pointed at him, and he expected Ryden would  
3 try to run and he would hit him with the pistol. Ryden made a move as if he was going to  
4 run, but then stopped, changed his mind and hit the gun, the gun went off, and Quiett, who  
5 was off to the side, said “I’m shot dude, I’m shot.”

6 Appellant admitted to Drewrey that he had the gun in Ryden’s face with his finger on the  
7 trigger, but said he did not mean to shoot Quiett, explaining “He’s fuckin, he hit me, my  
8 arm went like that. I’m like totally not expecting none of this shit. I just fuckin put a  
9 pistol in his fuckin face . . . I’m not expecting none of this. I’m not even.” Appellant  
10 described the incident several times without changing the material details: he knew the gun  
11 was loaded; he pointed it at Ryden and told him to give appellant the money and dump his  
12 dope out; Ryden started to run but changed his mind; Ryden hit appellant and the gun went  
13 off.

14 Appellant assured Drewrey that he did not mean to shoot Quiett, and said that he did not  
15 understand how the bullet hit her when she was on the other side of the van. Appellant  
16 recalled that when he pointed the gun at Ryden, he heard Quiett say something like “What  
17 are you doing Danny? Fuck dude.” Drewrey asked if the idea was to “rob” Ryden, to  
18 which appellant responded “Yeah . . . I didn’t go there to shoot him. I might of hit him  
19 with it . . .”

20 Near the end of the interview, Drewrey asked appellant to explain how Ryden had  
21 disrespected him. Appellant responded, “Oh he just would.” Drewrey asked again if  
22 appellant had a problem with the way Ryden treated Quiett, but appellant responded that  
23 was “not the issue at all.”

#### 24 **D. Appellant’s Trial Testimony**

25 At his 2015 jury trial, appellant testified that many statements he made during his  
26 September 2011 interview with Detective Drewrey were false. According to appellant’s  
27 trial testimony, Spring made arrangements to buy drugs from Ryden and appellant decided  
28 to go along with her because Ryden owed him money. Appellant testified that several  
days before the shooting, he had “fronted” Ryden an ounce of meth with the agreement  
that Ryden would pay him \$1,200 in a week. However, Ryden did not pay and then did  
not respond to appellant’s calls and text messages.[FN 3] When appellant put the gun in  
Ryden’s face on September 13, 2011, he did not think Ryden had the money, but he did  
want “to get [his] dope back.”

29 [FN 3:] Ryden testified on rebuttal that appellant never “fronted” him an ounce of  
30 methamphetamine, and that he did not owe appellant any money prior to the shooting of  
31 Cindy Quiett.

32 Appellant testified that he never demanded or intended that Ryden turn over his money.  
33 Rather, when he told Ryden to “[g]ive me your shit,” he was only telling him to turn over  
34 the methamphetamine. Appellant explained that the reason he lied during the September  
35 2011 interview was to hide the fact that he was a drug supplier; he did not want the  
36 detective to know that he had gone to get his “dope back” from Ryden because Ryden had  
37 failed to pay him for it.

1 At trial, appellant admitted that he told Drewrey that he had robbed some other people  
2 before he confronted Ryden, but explained that he had not robbed those people either.  
3 They owed him money because he had fronted drugs to them, and he was simply going  
4 around collecting debts. Appellant testified that he also lied when he told Drewrey that  
Ryden disrespected Spring, explaining to the jury that he “was just making stuff up to—to  
basically put all the blame on myself and not let them know that on top of everything else,  
I was also dealing drugs.”

5 Under cross-examination, appellant admitted that the reason he borrowed Young’s van was  
6 because he “[was] going to be driving around engaged in criminal behavior.” However,  
7 appellant explained that when he told Drewrey that he used the van to “rob people,” that  
8 was just a “figure of speech.” He was simply referring to a “part of the dope game” in  
9 which “you get dope fronted to you, you don’t pay, people come take your money—come  
take their dope back.” Appellant also testified that the reason he used the revolver was to  
make his “presence known” so that he could recover things that he believed were rightfully  
his.

10 The prosecutor asked appellant about a letter he wrote to his friend Phyllis Newton  
11 approximately a month before trial. In the letter, appellant asked Newton to contact  
12 Spring, Young, and “everyone,” and explain the felony-murder rule to them. He also  
13 asked Newton to make sure Spring understood that if she showed up to testify at trial, he  
14 would be sentenced to life in prison. The prosecutor asked appellant if he wrote the letter  
to discourage witnesses from testifying at trial. Appellant acknowledged that he was  
hoping that “[i]f they understood the felony[-]murder rule, they wouldn’t show up.”

#### 15 **E. Appellant’s Defense to the Murder Charge**

16 Several issues on appeal pertain to procedural rulings regarding appellant’s defense that he  
17 was not guilty of felony murder because he did not cause Quiett’s death. As background,  
we briefly summarize the pertinent proceedings here.

##### 18 *1. Closing Arguments Regarding Felony-Murder*

19 The prosecutor acknowledged there was evidence that Quiett’s death was an accident and  
20 that appellant did not intend to kill Quiett or anyone else. However, he argued these  
21 circumstances were irrelevant under California law because appellant killed Quiett while  
22 committing an attempted robbery of Ryden, which made him guilty of first degree murder  
23 under the felony-murder rule. In describing the requirements for applying the felony-  
murder rule, the prosecutor stated that he had to prove that appellant committed or  
attempted to commit robbery, that he intended to commit robbery, and that he caused the  
death of another person during that attempt. The prosecutor explained that there could be  
more than one cause of death, described the “substantial factor” test, and then presented an  
evidence-based argument that appellant’s conduct caused Quiett’s death under that test.

25 Defense counsel conceded during his closing argument that appellant was guilty of  
26 multiple offenses, but argued he was not guilty of murder. Under the defense theory, the  
27 prosecutor failed to carry his burden of proving the causation element of murder. Defense  
counsel urged the jury to focus on the legal definition of causation, which provides that “an  
act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act.”  
28 He argued that appellant’s altercation with Ryden was not a legal cause of Quiett’s death

1 because it was not something a reasonable person would know was likely to happen if  
2 nothing unusual intervened. By way of comparison, defense counsel suggested that  
3 Ryden's death would have been a direct, natural and probable consequence of appellant's  
4 conduct, but Quiett's death was not: "Something could happen, the gun goes off, it hits Mr.  
5 Ryden, he dies, it would be a whole different story. But this is someone that's standing far  
6 off on the side that's not involved in the altercation. In this case, something unusual  
7 happened to cause [Quiett's] death. And that was Mr. Ryden knocking the gun away, the  
8 gun going off, and then it hitting [Quiett]."

9 Defense counsel concluded his summation by urging the jury to focus on jury instructions  
10 pertaining to the causation element of murder, putting aside any desire to punish appellant:  
11 "And, again, you're not going to like what [appellant] did. You're not going to be happy  
12 that a convicted felon is running around with a gun, high on meth, committing robberies.  
13 But you can't let that interfere with your job as a—and duties as jurors. If you look at the  
14 evidence and you look at the jury instructions, you're going to find that that causation  
15 element wasn't met. You may not like the result. You may not like the fact that you have  
16 to return a verdict of not guilty. But you have a duty to follow the law even if you disagree  
17 with it. [¶] And if you look at the evidence in this case, you apply it to the law, you look  
18 at those two instructions regarding causation . . . and murder . . . you're going to find that  
19 [appellant] is not guilty of murder."

## 2. *Jury Instructions Regarding the Murder Charge*

20 Following closing arguments, the jury was instructed. Using CALCRIM No. 240, the  
21 court gave the jury the following instruction regarding the legal definition of an act causing  
22 death: "An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of  
23 the act and the death would not have happened without the act. A natural and probable  
24 consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing  
25 unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider  
26 all the circumstances established by the evidence. [¶] There may be more than one cause  
27 of death. An act causes death only if it is a substantial factor in causing the death. A  
28 substantial factor is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not have to be  
the only factor that causes the death."

20 The jury was instructed regarding the elements of felony-murder with a version of  
21 CALCRIM No. 540A, which stated: "The defendant is charged in Count I with murder  
22 under a theory of felony murder. To prove that the defendant is guilty of first degree  
23 murder under this theory, the People must prove that, one, the defendant committed or  
24 attempted to commit a robbery; two, the defendant intended to commit robbery; and three,  
25 while committing or attempting to commit robbery, the defendant caused the death of  
26 another person. [¶] A person may be guilty of felony murder even if the killing was  
27 unintentional, accidental, or negligent. [¶] To decide whether the defendant committed or  
28 attempted to commit robbery, please refer to the separate instructions that I will give you  
on that crime. You must apply those instructions when you decide whether the People  
have proved first degree murder under a theory of felony murder. [¶] The defendant must  
have intended to commit the felony of robbery before or at the time that he cause the death.  
[¶] It is not required that the person die immediately as long as the act causing death  
occurred while the defendant was committing the felony. [¶] It is not required that the  
person killed be the intended victim of the felony."

1                   Immediately following this felony-murder instruction, the jury received another causation  
2                   instruction, a version of CALCRIM No. 640, which stated: "There may be more than one  
3                   cause of death. An act causes death only if it is a substantial factor in causing the death. A  
4                   substantial factor is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be  
5                   the only factor that causes the death. The failure of Cindy Quiett or another person to use  
6                   reasonable care may have contributed to the death. But if the defendant's act was a  
7                   substantial factor causing the death, then the defendant is legally responsible for the death  
8                   even though Cindy Quiett or another person may [have] failed to use reasonable care. [¶]  
9                   If you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant's act caused the death, you must find  
10                   him not guilty."

### 3. *Jury Verdicts and Appellant's Sentence*

11                   After the instructions were delivered, the jury deliberated for approximately 90 minutes  
12                   before requesting to adjourn for the day and submitting the following note to the court:  
13                   "On reconvening at 9AM 3 jurors would like to hear the argument of defense counsel  
14                   regarding the proximate cause jury instruction, if the judge approves."

15                   The following morning, the jury continued deliberating while the court and counsel  
16                   discussed the jury's note. Ultimately, the court decided to respond by rereading the  
17                   causation jury instructions. The court advised trial counsel that if the jury was not satisfied  
18                   with that response, it would consider other options including, for example, reopening the  
19                   case and allowing both sides to give a short supplemental argument. After the court  
20                   repeated the causation instructions, the jury continued deliberations and returned verdicts  
21                   less than an hour later.

22                   Appellant was found guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)[FN 4]);  
23                   attempted robbery (§§ 211, 664); assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)); possession of  
24                   a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)); and possession of ammunition by a felon  
25                   (§§ 12316, subd. (b)(1)). The jury found true a special circumstance allegation that the  
26                   murder was committed during an attempted robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), as well as  
27                   multiple gun use allegations (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd.  
28                   (b)).

29                   [FN 4:] Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise stated.

30                   Following a court trial, the trial court found that appellant had a prior conviction for a  
31                   serious or violent felony (§§ 667, subds. (a)-(b), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), and had served  
32                   two prior prison terms for felony convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellant was sentenced  
33                   to life in prison without the possibility of parole and an additional term of 26 years 4  
34                   months.

35                   Loyd, 2017 WL 6014413, at \*1-7 (brackets and footnotes in original).

**IV. DISCUSSION****A. Standard of Review**

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); *Williams (Terry) v. Taylor*, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, *see id.* at 407-09, while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, *see Miller-El v. Cockrell*, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). Additionally, habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue “ ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’ ” *Penry v. Johnson*, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting *Brecht v. Abrahamson*, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).

Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established Federal law to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. “[C]learly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” *Williams*, 529 U.S. at 412. A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases,” or if it “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” *Williams*, 529 U.S. at 405-06. “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

1 court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but  
2 unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” *Id.* at 413. “[A] federal  
3 habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent  
4 judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously  
5 or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” *Id.* at 411. “A federal court  
6 may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the  
7 precedent from [the Supreme Court] is, at best, ambiguous.” *Mitchell v. Esparza*, 540 U.S. 12, 17  
8 (2003).

9 Under the second prong, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a  
10 factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in  
11 light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” *Miller-El*, 537 U.S. at 340; *Torres*  
12 *v. Prunty*, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, “a determination of a factual issue  
13 made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct,” and the petitioner “shall have the burden  
14 of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C.  
15 § 2254(e)(1).

16 On federal habeas review, AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating  
17 state-court rulings” and “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”  
18 *Renico v. Lett*, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). In applying the  
19 above standards on habeas review, the Court reviews the last reasoned decision by the state court.  
20 *See Wilson v. Sellers*, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018); *Cannedy v. Adams*, 706 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th  
21 Cir.), *amended*, 733 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2013).

22 In its unpublished disposition issued on December 5, 2017, the state appellate court  
23 addressed the merits of Petitioner’s Claims 1 to 4.<sup>5</sup> *See Loyd*, 2017 WL 6014413, at \*1-20.  
24 Therefore, the last reasoned decision as to these claims is the California Court of Appeal’s  
25

26 <sup>5</sup> Petitioner raised an IAC claim on appeal, but it was limited to a contention that his “attorney  
27 failed to defend the murder charge by arguing that a second shooter fired the bullet that killed  
28 Cindy Quiett.” *See Loyd*, 2017 WL 6014413, at \*17. He did not include this IAC claim, or any  
IAC claim, in his petition for review. *See* Dkt. No. 26-13; Resp’t Ex. 10.

1 unpublished disposition. *See Wilson*, 138 S. Ct. at 1192; *Canedy*, 706 F.3d at 1156.

2 Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support  
3 its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether  
4 habeas corpus relief is available under section 2254(d). *Stanley v. Cullen*, 633 F.3d 852, 860 (9th  
5 Cir. 2011). Here, Petitioner presented his IAC claims (Claim 5) and his cumulative error claim  
6 (Claim 6) in his state habeas petition (Resp’t Ex. 18), which the state supreme court summarily  
7 denied (Resp’t Ex. 20). As such, these claims may be reviewed independently by this Court to  
8 determine whether that decision was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established  
9 federal law. *Plascencia v. Alameida*, 467 F.3d 1190, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Because there is  
10 no reasoned state court decision denying this claim, we ‘perform an independent review of the  
11 record to ascertain whether the state court decision was objectively unreasonable.’”) (citation  
12 omitted); *see Himes v. Thompson*, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Independent review of the  
13 record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we  
14 can determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.”). “Where a state  
15 court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be  
16 met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” *Harrington v.*  
17 *Richter*, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011).

18 The Supreme Court has vigorously and repeatedly affirmed that under AEDPA, there is a  
19 heightened level of deference a federal habeas court must give to state court decisions. *See Hardy*  
20 *v. Cross*, 565 U.S. 65, 66 (2011) (per curiam); *Richter*, 562 U.S. at 97-100; *Felkner v. Jackson*,  
21 562 U.S. 594, 598 (2011) (per curiam). As the Court explained, “[o]n federal habeas review,  
22 AEDPA ‘imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings’ and ‘demands  
23 that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” *Felkner*, 562 U.S. at 598 (citation  
24 omitted). With these principles in mind, the Court addresses Petitioner’s claims.

25 **B. Petitioner’s Claims**

26 **1. Claim 1: Erroneous Felony Murder Instruction Regarding Causation**

27 Petitioner claims that the trial court erred by failing to correctly instruct the jury on the  
28 causation required for felony murder and by failing to instruct the jury that if the felony-murder

1 rule did not apply, the murder charge was governed by the provocative act murder rule. Dkt. No.  
 2 1 at 4.

3 **a. State Court Opinion**

4 The state appellate court based its denial of Claim 1 on the following analysis:

5 ***1. Issues On Appeal***

6 Appellant contends he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial because the trial  
 7 court “erroneously removed” the causation element of murder from the jury’s  
 8 consideration. Appellant does not argue, however, that the causation jury instructions  
 9 quoted above were incorrect or otherwise improper. Instead, he claims these instructions  
 were incomplete because the jury was not told that (1) they could not convict appellant of  
 felony murder if “Ryden’s conduct” caused Quiett’s death; and (2) if the felony-murder  
 rule did not apply, the murder charge was governed by the provocative act murder rule.

10 “ ‘Generally, a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and  
 11 responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested  
 12 appropriate clarifying or amplifying language.’ [Citation.]’ (*People v. Hudson* (2006) 38  
 13 Cal. 4th 1002, 1011-1012.) In this case, the defense did not request that the trial court give  
 any additional instruction regarding the causation element of murder. Therefore, appellant  
 must demonstrate that the court had a *sua sponte* duty to give one or both of the causation  
 instructions he advocates for on appeal.

14 “ ‘It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must  
 15 instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence.  
 16 [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely  
 17 and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the  
 18 jury’s understanding of the case. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]’ (*People v. Smith* (2013) 57 Cal.  
 19 4th 232, 239.) The court’s *sua sponte* duty extends to defenses “when ‘ ‘it appears that the  
 20 defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of  
 such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the  
 case.’’ [Citation.] Yet this duty is limited: ‘the trial court cannot be required to anticipate  
 every possible theory that may fit the facts of the case before it and instruct the jury  
 accordingly. [Citation.] Thus, the court is required to instruct *sua sponte* only on general  
 principles which are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.’’’ (*People v.*  
*Garvin* (2003) 110 Cal. App. 4th 484, 488-489.)

21 ***2. Ryden’s Conduct***

22 As noted, appellant contends the jury should have been instructed that if it found that  
 23 “Ryden’s conduct” caused Quiett’s death, appellant could not be convicted of felony-  
 24 murder. This proposed instruction is a pinpoint instruction; it specifically addresses  
 25 alleged evidence that Ryden caused Quiett’s death and purports to identify a legal principle  
 26 relevant to that specific evidence. The trial court “ ‘need not instruct on specific points or  
 27 special theories which might be applicable to a particular case, absent a request for such an  
 instruction.’ [Citations.] Alternatively expressed, ‘[i]f an instruction relates “particular  
 facts to the elements of the offense charged,” it is a pinpoint instruction and the court does  
 not have a *sua sponte* duty to instruct.’ [Citation.]’ (*People v. Garvin, supra*, 110 Cal.  
 App. 4th at p. 489.) Thus, appellant’s failure to request his pinpoint causation instruction  
 during the trial court proceedings is reason alone for rejecting this claim of error.

28 Furthermore, appellant was not entitled to this pinpoint instruction even upon request

1 because it mischaracterizes the legal significance of evidence that a third party played a  
2 causal role in Quiett's death. "Facts attacking legal causation are only relevant if the  
3 defendant's act was not a substantial factor in producing the harm or injurious situation.  
4 [Citation.] The defendant is liable for a crime irrespective of other concurrent causes  
5 contributing to the harm [citation] . . ." (*People v. Wattier* (1996) 51 Cal. App. 4th 948,  
6 953, italics omitted.) Thus, contrary to the directive in appellant's pinpoint instruction, the  
7 jury was not precluded from finding appellant guilty of murder if it believed that Ryden's  
8 conduct was a contributing cause of harm. Rather, in order to convict appellant of Quiett's  
9 murder, the jury had to find that appellant's conduct was a substantial factor causing her  
10 death.

11 Appellant argues that evidence Ryden "caus[ed] appellant's firearm to point at [Quiett] and  
12 discharge without appellant relinquishing contact with it" raised a "jury question as to  
13 whether appellant or Ryden caused the fatal shot." (Fn. omitted.) This argument conflates  
14 two distinct issues: the commission of the fatal act and the legal cause of Quiett's death.  
15 Only one person committed the fatal act of pulling the trigger and shooting the gun—that  
16 person was appellant. Nevertheless, there could have been more than one legal cause of  
17 death. Thus, the question for this jury was whether appellant's act of shooting the gun  
18 constituted a legal cause of Quiett's death under the somewhat unique facts presented by  
19 the evidence. The two CALCRIM causation instructions the trial court gave addressed that  
20 issue. By contrast, appellant's pinpoint instruction is based on his false premise that he  
21 was entitled to an acquittal of the murder charge if Ryden's act was also a substantial  
22 factor causing death.

23 Appellant mistakenly relies on a Bench Note accompanying CALCRIM No. 540A, which  
24 states: "If the evidence indicates that someone other than the defendant or coparticipant  
25 committed the fatal act, then the crime is not felony murder." This principle does not  
26 apply here because there is no evidence that Ryden committed the fatal act of shooting  
Quiett. In each case cited in the Bench Note accompanying CALCRIM No. 540A, a third  
party shot and killed someone during the course of a felony committed by the defendant.  
(*People v. Washington* (1965) 62 Cal. 2d 777, 782-783 [robbery victim used his own gun  
to kill defendant's accomplice]; *People v. Caldwell* (1984) 36 Cal. 3d 210, 216 [police  
killed co-felon who was attempting to flee scene of the robbery]; see also *People v.*  
*Gardner* (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 473, 475, 477 [victim of shootout could have died as a  
result of bullet fired by defendant's adversary].) In the present case, by contrast, Ryden  
did not shoot anybody or even have a gun.

27 Appellant insists that this case is "a variation of the factual scenario" in which a third party  
28 "fired the fatal shot from the third party's own firearm" because, although appellant was  
holding the gun, his discharge of the weapon was not intentional or volitional. Appellant  
does not explain his distinction between intentional and volitional. We note for the record  
that the evidence is undisputed that appellant put his own finger on the trigger of a loaded  
revolver and pointed it in Ryden's face. In any event, appellant's intent is not relevant to  
the causation element of murder. Appellant's characterization of this case as a variant of  
the third-party shooter scenario is simply not plausible in light of the fact that appellant  
was the only shooter here.

29 We accept for purposes of argument appellant's premise that the jury could reasonably  
30 have found that Ryden's act of hitting appellant's arm was a legal cause of Quiett's death.  
31 But that finding would not exonerate appellant. Rather, as the jury was properly  
32 instructed, the causation issue was whether appellant's conduct was a substantial factor in  
33 causing Quiett's death.

### 3. *Provocative Act Murder*

34 Appellant makes the separate but related claim that "the trial court was obligated to instruct

1 on provocative conduct murder as an alternative to felony murder under the evidence  
 2 presented.” This argument is based on a fundamental misconception of these two murder  
 3 doctrines.

4 “Under the felony-murder doctrine, when the defendant or an accomplice kills someone  
 5 during the commission, or attempted commission, of an inherently dangerous felony, the  
 6 defendant is liable for either first or second degree murder, depending on the felony  
 7 committed. If the felony is listed in section 189, the murder is of the first degree; if not,  
 8 the murder is of the second degree. [Citations.] Felony-murder liability does not require  
 9 an intent to kill, or even implied malice, but merely an intent to commit the underlying  
 10 felony. [Citation.]” (*People v. Gonzalez* (2012) 54 Cal. 4th 643, 654, italics omitted  
 11 (*Gonzalez*)).

12 “When someone other than the defendant or an accomplice kills during the commission or  
 13 attempted commission of a crime, the defendant is not liable under felony murder  
 14 principles but may nevertheless be prosecuted for murder under the provocative act  
 15 doctrine.” (*Gonzalez, supra*, 54 Cal. 4th at p. 654, italics omitted.) The provocative act  
 16 doctrine is a “variation on the law of transferred intent,” which holds the defendant  
 17 vicariously liable for a killing by a third party, often a police officer of a victim. (*Ibid.*)  
 18 The provocative act doctrine applies when the third party killing is a reasonable response  
 19 to a malicious act committed by the defendant or his accomplice during the course of a  
 20 violent felony. (*Ibid.*) “‘In such a case, the killing is attributable, not merely to the  
 21 commission of a felony, but to the intentional act of the defendant or his accomplice  
 22 committed with conscious disregard for life.’ [Citation.]” (*Id.* at p. 655.) In contrast to  
 23 the felony-murder rule, malice is an element of provocative act murder. “When the  
 24 defendant acts with express malice alone or with implied malice, provocative act murder is  
 25 of the second degree. When the defendant acts with express malice and is also willful,  
 26 deliberate, and premeditated, it is murder of the first degree. [Citations.]” (*People v.*  
 27 *Mejia* (2012) 211 Cal. App. 4th 586, 604.)

28 Here, appellant argues that the trial court had a *sua sponte* duty to instruct the jury  
 regarding both of these doctrines because “[w]ithout the provocative conduct instruction,  
 the jury was forced into an all or nothing choice between first degree murder or acquittal,  
 and was erroneously deprived of a second degree murder alternative via the provocative  
 conduct route.”

19 Appellant cites no authority for his novel claim. Conceivably, there may be a scenario in  
 20 which a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed regarding both felony-murder and  
 21 provocative act murder, for example, if there is conflicting evidence regarding the identity  
 22 of the shooter. However, the provocative act doctrine does not apply in the case at bar  
 23 because appellant himself committed the fatal act—regardless whether Ryden’s defensive  
 24 act of pushing appellant’s arm away was a contributing cause of death. Thus, this case  
 25 falls within the rubric of the felony-murder doctrine. During the commission of an  
 26 attempted armed robbery of Ryden, appellant shot and killed Quiett, a third party  
 27 bystander.

28 Appellant argues that the absence of evidence that he intentionally or volitionally  
 1 discharged the firearm that killed Quiett makes this case a mere “variant” of provocative  
 2 act murder cases in which the victim was killed by a third party. This is the same  
 3 argument appellant advances in support of his pinpoint instruction, and it fares no better in  
 4 this context. Under the felony-murder doctrine, “inadvertent or accidental killings are first  
 5 degree murders when committed by felons in the perpetration of [a] robbery. [Citations.]”  
 6 (*People v. Washington, supra*, 62 Cal. 2d at p. 781.) Appellant cannot circumvent this law  
 7 by mischaracterizing Quiett’s death as a provocative act murder.

8 In his reply brief, appellant insists that the provocative act doctrine should apply to these

1 facts, arguing: "Obviously, if Ryden had wrested the gun from appellant's possession,  
2 attempted to shoot appellant, and fatally struck Quiett instead, the provocative act  
3 instruction would be required. The instant facts merely provide a variation on that aspect  
4 of the provocative act murder theory." As appellant implicitly concedes, Ryden did not  
5 wrest the gun from appellant or attempt to shoot anyone. Appellant shot the gun that  
6 fatally struck Quiett. Therefore, the provocative act murder doctrine does not apply as a  
7 matter of law.

8 *Loyd*, 2017 WL 6014413, at \*7-10.

9 **b. Applicable Federal Law**

10 A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a claim  
11 cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. *See Estelle v. McGuire*, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72  
12 (1991). To obtain federal habeas relief for error in the jury charge, the petitioner must show actual  
13 prejudice from the error, i.e., that the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in  
14 determining the jury's verdict. *See Calderon v. Coleman*, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998) (per curiam)  
15 (citing *Brecht*, 507 U.S. at 637). The error may not be judged in artificial isolation but must be  
16 considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. *See Estelle*, 502 U.S.  
17 at 72.

18 On federal habeas review, the district court must defer to a state court's reasonable  
19 application of these principles. *Smith v. Spisak*, 558 U.S. 139 (2010); *Waddington v. Sarausad*,  
20 555 U.S. 179, 191 (2009). Where a state court expressly held that a jury instruction correctly set  
21 forth state law, it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine the state-court  
22 determination that rests on state-law grounds. *Waddington*, 555 U.S. at 192 n.5 (once federal  
23 habeas court concludes that state court reasonably found an instruction was unambiguous, federal  
24 habeas court should end its inquiry). A state court's interpretation of state law, including one  
25 announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas  
26 corpus. *Bradshaw v. Richey*, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (per curiam) (citing *Estelle*, 502 U.S. at 67-  
27 68).

28 **c. Analysis**

29 In Claim 1, Petitioner asserts that he was:

30 deprived of due process, a fair trial, and a jury verdict under the Sixth and Fourteenth  
31 Amendments by the trial court's erroneous instructions on felony murder causation and by  
32 the court's failure to instruct on provocati[ve] [act] murder, the failure to instruct that  
33 felony murder does not apply if the evidence supports an inference is [sic] prejudice and

1 deprived Petitioner of a fair trial.

2 Dkt. No. 1 at 4 (brackets added). Petitioner's contention appears not to be that the jury received  
3 incorrect instructions, but rather that two instructions were missing: (i) a pinpoint instruction  
4 relating to felony murder causation and (ii) a general instruction on the provocative act doctrine.

5 *Id.*

6 **i. Felony Murder Causation Pinpoint Instruction**

7 The jury received instructions relating to felony murder which said in pertinent part:

8 The defendant is charged in Count I with murder under a theory of felony murder. To  
9 prove that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder under this theory, the People must  
10 prove that, one, the defendant committed or attempted to commit a robbery; two, the  
defendant intended to commit robbery; and three, while committing or attempting to  
commit robbery, the defendant caused the death of another person.

11 A person may be guilty of felony murder even if the killing was unintentional, accidental,  
12 or negligent.

13 7 Reporter's Transcript ("RT") 1751.

14 As noted by the state appellate court, Petitioner does not appear to argue "that the  
causation jury instructions . . . were incorrect or otherwise improper." *Loyd*, 2017 WL 6014413,  
15 at \*7. Rather, he argues that the jury should have received a pinpoint instruction relating to felony  
16 murder causation. On federal habeas review, this Court applies a high level of deference when  
17 evaluating state-court rulings, giving those decisions the benefit of the doubt. *See Renico*, 559  
18 U.S. at 773. A state court's determination that the instructions are correct as a matter of state law  
19 is binding on this Court. *Waddington*, 555 U.S. at 192 n.5; *Bradshaw*, 546 U.S. at 76. Here, the  
20 state appellate court found that Petitioner "was not entitled to this pinpoint instruction even upon  
21 request because it mischaracterize[d] the legal significance of evidence that a third party played a  
22 causal role in Quiett's death." *Loyd*, 2017 WL 6014413, at \*8. The state appellate court  
23 determined that in order to convict Petitioner of Quiett's murder under a theory of felony murder,  
24 the jury had only to find that Petitioner's conduct was a substantial factor in causing her death,  
25 regardless of whether Ryden's conduct was a contributing cause. *See id.* at \*8. As the state  
26 appellate court found, even if it accepted Petitioner's premise that the jury reasonably could have  
27 found that Ryden's act of hitting Petitioner's arm was a legal cause of Quiett's death, such a  
28

1 finding would not exonerate Petitioner. *Id.* The state appellate court added: “Rather, as the jury  
2 was properly instructed, the causation issue was whether [Petitioner’s] conduct was a substantial  
3 factor in causing Quiett’s death.” *Id.* By ruling that the causation instructions were correct, the  
4 state appellate court necessarily determined that they did not deprive Petitioner of a fair trial. *See*  
5 *Johnson v. Williams*, 568 U.S. 289, 301 (2013) (“When a state court rejects a federal claim  
6 without expressly addressing that claim, a federal habeas court must presume that the federal  
7 claim was adjudicated on the merits,” and thus the claim must be reviewed deferentially under 28  
8 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). Because the state appellate court determined that the instructions on felony  
9 murder causation were correct under state law, federal habeas relief is unavailable.

10 **ii. Provocative Act Doctrine Instruction**

11 As the state appellate court noted, Petitioner’s argument that the trial was unconstitutional  
12 due to the trial court’s failure to instruct on the provocative act doctrine as an alternative to felony  
13 murder is “based on a fundamental misconception of these two murder doctrines.” *Loyd*, 2017  
14 WL 6014413, at \*9. In accordance with state law, the state appellate court reasoned that while  
15 instruction on both felony murder and the provocative act doctrine may be appropriate if there is  
16 conflicting evidence about the identity of the shooter, those circumstances were not present in  
17 Petitioner’s case. *Id.* As the state appellate court explained, “[t]he provocati[ve] act doctrine is a  
18 ‘variation on the law of transferred intent,’ which holds the defendant vicariously liable for a  
19 killing by a third party, often a police officer o[r] a victim.” *Id.* (quoting *People v. Gonzalez*, 54  
20 Cal. 4th 643, 654 (2012) (brackets added)). The state appellate court concluded that an instruction  
21 on the provocative act doctrine was unwarranted because there was no factual dispute as to who  
22 committed the fatal act. *Loyd*, 2017 WL 6014413, at \*10. This Court is bound by the state  
23 appellate court’s interpretation of state law. *See Bradshaw*, 546 U.S. at 74; *Hicks v. Feiock*, 485  
24 U.S. 624, 629 (1988). Moreover, the state appellate court’s factual findings as to the nature of the  
25 evidence are presumed correct, unless Petitioner rebuts them by clear and convincing evidence.  
26 *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). In particular, the state appellate court’s determination is entitled to a  
27 presumption of correctness and “should be the final word on the subject.” *See Menendez v.*  
28 *Terhune*, 422 F.3d 1012, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner has made no showing to rebut that

1 presumption.

2 Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on Claim 1.

3 **2. Claim 2: Failure to Instruct on Lesser Included Offense of Second  
4 Degree Murder**

5 Petitioner claims that his constitutional rights were denied by the trial court's failure to  
6 instruct on the lesser included offense of second degree murder. Dkt. No. 1 at 4.

7 **a. State Court Opinion**

8 The state appellate court found as follows in rejecting Claim 2:

9 Appellant contends that even if the provocative conduct murder rule did not apply, the trial  
10 court erred by failing to instruct on second degree implied malice murder as a necessarily  
11 included offense of the first degree murder charge.[FN 5] In the trial court, defense  
12 counsel objected to giving a second degree murder instruction, arguing it was not  
13 supported by the evidence and also acknowledging a tactical objective of wanting to force  
14 the jury into an all or nothing decision with respect to the first degree murder charge.  
15 Appellant now contends that the trial court had a *sua sponte* duty to instruct on second  
16 degree implied malice murder notwithstanding his defense counsel's objection.

17 [FN 5:] Under the accusatory pleading test, second degree implied malice murder was a  
18 necessarily included offense of the first degree murder charge because the information  
19 alleged that appellant murdered Quiett "unlawfully, and with malice aforethought."  
20 (See *People v. Banks* (2014) 59 Cal. 4th 1113 (*Banks*), disapproved on another point  
21 in *People v. Scott* (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 363, 391, fn. 3.) This fact was not disputed in the  
22 trial court.

23 The trial court's *sua sponte* duty to instruct on general principles closely and openly  
24 connected to the case " 'extends to necessarily included offenses when the evidence raises  
25 a question as to whether all the elements of the charged offense are present. . . . [¶]  
26 Nevertheless, "the existence of 'any evidence, no matter how weak' will not justify  
27 instructions on a lesser included offense . . . ." [Citation.] Such instructions are required  
28 only where there is "substantial evidence" from which a rational jury could conclude that  
the defendant committed the lesser offense, and that he is not guilty of the greater offense.'  
[Citation.] 'Substantial evidence,' in this context, 'is evidence sufficient to "deserve  
consideration by the jury," that is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive.'  
[Citation.]" (*People v. Williams* (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 1244, 1263.)

29 Appellant argues that the jury could have convicted him of second degree murder rather  
30 than first degree felony murder because attempted robbery was the only predicate felony  
31 supporting the first degree charge and the trial evidence did not foreclose a finding that he  
32 lacked the requisite intent to commit that predicate felony.

33 Robbery is "the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his  
34 person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or  
35 fear." (§ 211.) Thus, "a felonious taking, that is, a taking done with the intent to steal

1 another's property, is a required element at the core of every robbery." (*People v.*  
 2 *Tufunga* (1999) 21 Cal. 4th 935, 948 (*Tufunga*).) However, contrary to appellant's claim  
 3 here, we find no trial evidence that raised a question as to whether the intent element of  
 4 robbery was established. Rather, the evidence of appellant's intent to steal property that  
 5 was not his own was overwhelming. Every percipient witness including appellant  
 6 confirmed that when appellant confronted Ryden with a loaded revolver, he said "[g]ive  
 7 me *your* shit." (Italics added.) Furthermore, appellant confessed to the detectives who  
 8 investigated this case that he intended to commit a robbery.

9 Appellant contends his trial testimony was substantial evidence that he lacked the intent to  
 10 commit robbery. As our factual summary reflects, after appellant learned about the felony-  
 11 murder rule, he testified at trial that his intent was not to steal from Ryden, but rather to  
 12 collect money that was owed to him and to retrieve his own property, i.e., the drugs that he  
 13 fronted to Ryden the previous week. Even if the jury was persuaded by this testimony, it  
 14 was not substantial evidence that appellant lacked the intent to commit a robbery. A  
 15 "claim-of-right defense can negate the *animus furandi* element of robbery where the  
 16 defendant is seeking to regain specific property in which he in good faith believes he has a  
 17 bona fide claim of ownership or title." (*Tufunga, supra*, 21 Cal. 4th at p. 950, original  
 18 italics.) However, the claim of right defense to robbery "may not be raised when the  
 19 defendant is attempting to collect on an unliquidated debt or damages claim. [Citations.]"  
 20 (*Id.* at pp. 953-954, fn. 5, italics omitted.) Furthermore, the claim of right defense "is not  
 21 available where the claim of right to the property is founded in a 'notoriously illegal'  
 22 transaction. [Citations.]" (*Ibid.*)

23 Moreover, the relevant question is not whether the jury could have found that appellant  
 24 lacked the intent to steal, but whether they could have found that he harbored some  
 25 criminal intent, which would have made him guilty of a crime other than robbery.  
 26 Appellant suggests the jury could have found that his only intent was to assault Ryden for  
 27 disrespecting Spring. As our factual summary reflects, Detective Drewrey explored that  
 28 issue with appellant during the September 2011 interview, but appellant disavowed any  
 intent to punish Ryden for mistreating Spring. Furthermore, he did not change this part of  
 his story when he testified at trial except to clarify that he made false statements during the  
 2011 interview because he did not want to get Spring in trouble. Thus the trial record does  
 not contain substantial evidence that Ryden's relationship with Spring had any bearing on  
 appellant's decision to brandish a loaded revolver in Ryden's face.

21 Alternatively, appellant contends the jury could have found that he confronted Ryden in  
 22 order to intimidate him and "make his presence known" to Ryden and other dealers to  
 23 whom he supplied drugs, so that they would pay their debts to him. Appellant reasons that  
 24 this "type of intimidation may support a charge of extortion, but "intent to extort is not  
 25 cognizable under the Penal Code section 189 felonies."

26 Extortion is defined in relevant part as "the obtaining of property from another, with his [or  
 27 her] consent, . . . induced by a wrongful use of force or fear . . ." (§ 518.) "The statutory  
 28 definitions of robbery and extortion are structurally similar. [Citation.] Both offenses  
 have their roots in common law larceny and both share a common element—acquisition by  
 means of force or fear. [Citation.]" (*People v. Kozlowski* (2002) 96 Cal. App. 4th 853,  
 866.) The key distinction between these two offenses is that "in an extortion, the property  
 is taken with the victim's consent, while in a robbery, the property is taken against the

1 victim's will. [Citation.]" (*Ibid.*)

2 In this case, evidence that appellant intimidated Ryden is consistent with the force or fear  
3 element of both robbery and extortion. But the nature of that intimidation—brandishing a  
4 loaded gun in a victim's face and ordering that the victim turn over his "shit"—negates the  
5 intent element of extortion, which requires an intent to take property *by consent*.  
Therefore, the record does not contain substantial evidence from which the jury could have  
found that appellant committed extortion rather than robbery.

6 Appellant mistakenly relies on *Banks*, *supra*, 59 Cal. 4th at page 1160. In that case, the  
7 defendant confronted a man named Foster at an ATM machine, shot him in the head and  
8 walked away. Witnesses testified that the defendant and Foster may have exchanged  
9 words, but nobody heard what was said, and there was no evidence that the defendant took  
any property from Foster before he fled the scene. The *Banks* trial court stated that what  
happened was "probably" a robbery, but there was evidence "that something else could  
have been going on," like a "verbal argument" of some sort. (*Id.* at p. 1158.)

10 Nevertheless, the court did not give a second degree murder instruction because the  
11 defense objected to it. (*Ibid.*) The Supreme Court concluded this was error, finding that  
12 the trial court violated a *sua sponte* duty to instruct on second degree murder because "the  
evidence permitted the inference that defendant shot Foster with malice in the course of an  
argument or fight, not necessarily in the course of a robbery." (*Id.* at p. 1161.)

13 *Banks* is distinguishable on its facts because that defendant's altercation with his victim  
14 could have been unrelated to an attempted robbery. Here, by contrast, we know what  
15 appellant said to Ryden when he pointed a loaded gun in his face: "Give me your shit  
16 Joey." As discussed, this was not the only direct evidence of an intent to steal the property  
17 of another. Furthermore, as a matter of law, appellant's trial testimony that he only meant  
18 to collect a debt or recover his own illegal narcotics did not negate the evidence of his  
felonious intent to take property that was not his own. Thus, the trial court did not have a  
sua sponte duty to instruct on second degree implied malice murder because the evidence  
did not support it.

19 *Loyd*, 2017 WL 6014413, at \*10-12 (emphasis in original).

#### 20 b. Applicable Law

21 The failure to instruct on a lesser-included offense in a capital case is constitutional error if  
22 there was evidence to support the instruction. *See Beck v. Alabama*, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980).  
23 But the failure of a state trial court to instruct on lesser-included offenses in a non-capital case  
24 does not present a federal constitutional claim. *See Solis v. Garcia*, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir.  
25 2000). However, "the defendant's right to adequate jury instructions on his or her theory of the  
26 case might, in some cases, constitute an exception to the general rule." *Id.* (citing *Bashor v.*  
27 *Risley*, 730 F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir. 1984)). *Solis* suggests that there must be substantial  
28 evidence to warrant the instruction on the lesser-included offense. *See* 219 F.3d at 929-30 (no

1 duty to instruct on voluntary manslaughter as lesser-included offense to murder because evidence  
2 presented at trial precluded a heat of passion or imperfect self-defense instruction; no duty to  
3 instruct on involuntary manslaughter because evidence presented at trial implied malice).

4 **c. Analysis**

5 Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of a fair trial by the trial court's failure to instruct on  
6 lesser-included offenses, arguing: "Where there are conflicting inferences as to the existence of  
7 felonious intent to support a felony murder charge, the trial court is obligated to instruct on at least  
8 second-degree murder and perhaps manslaughter, depending on the facts of the case." Dkt. No. 1  
9 at 4.

10 Federal habeas relief is unavailable on Claim 2 because the case at bar is not a capital case,  
11 and no Supreme Court case clearly establishes that the failure of a state trial court to instruct on  
12 lesser-included offenses in a noncapital case violates the Constitution. Accordingly, the state  
13 appellate court's rejection of Petitioner's claim was not "contrary to," or "an unreasonable  
14 application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United  
15 States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner is not entitled to the writ on Claim 2.<sup>6</sup>

16 **3. Claim 3: Refusal to Reread Defense Proximate Cause Argument**

17 Petitioner asserts that the trial court's refusal to have defense counsel's proximate cause  
18 argument reread at the jury's request resulted in the deprivation of his constitutional due process  
19 rights. Dkt. No. 1 at 5.

20 **a. State Court Opinion**

21 The state appellate court summarized the circumstances of the jury's request in Claim 3 as  
22 follows:

23 After the instructions were delivered, the jury deliberated for approximately 90 minutes  
24 before requesting to adjourn for the day and submitting the following note to the court:  
25 "On reconvening at 9AM 3 jurors would like to hear the argument of defense counsel  
regarding the proximate cause jury instruction, if the judge approves.

26 The following morning, the jury continued deliberating while the court and counsel  
27 discussed the jury's note. Ultimately, the court decided to respond by rereading the

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28 <sup>6</sup> In addition, to the extent the *Solis* standard is relevant, Petitioner has not made any persuasive  
showing that the facts here satisfy that exception.

1 causation jury instructions. The court advised trial counsel that if the jury was not  
2 satisfied with that response, it would consider other options including, for example,  
3 reopening the case and allowing both sides to give a short supplemental argument. After  
4 the court repeated the causation instructions, the jury continued deliberations and returned  
5 verdicts less than an hour later.

6 *Loyd*, 2017 WL 6014413, at \*6. The state appellate court then rejected Claim 3 as follows:

7 As noted in our factual summary, three members of the jury submitted a request to “hear  
8 the argument of defense counsel regarding the proximate cause jury instruction, if the  
9 judge approves.” The trial court responded to this request by reinstructing the jury  
10 regarding causation. Appellant contends he was entitled to a rereading of defense  
11 counsel’s closing argument.

12 A deliberating jury has the statutory right to rehear evidence and instructions on request,  
13 but that right “does not extend to argument of counsel.” [Citation.]” (*People v. Gurule*  
14 (2002) 28 Cal. 4th 557, 649; see § 1138.[FN 6]) Instead, the “trial court’s inherent  
15 authority regarding the performance of its functions includes the power to order argument  
16 by counsel to be reread to the jury or to be furnished to that body in written form. The  
17 exercise of such power must be entrusted to the court’s sound discretion. As a result,  
18 review must be conducted under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” (*People v.*  
19 *Gordon* (1990) 50 Cal. 3d 1223, 1260, overruled on another point as stated in *People v.*  
20 *Tully* (2012) 54 Cal. 4th 952, 1031.)

21 [FN 6:] Section 1138 states: “After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there be any  
22 disagreement between them as to the testimony, or if they desire to be informed on any  
23 point of law arising in the case, they must require the officer to conduct them into court.  
24 Upon being brought into court, the information required must be given in the presence of,  
25 or after notice to, the prosecuting attorney, and the defendant or his counsel, or after they  
26 have been called.”

27 Here, the trial court made a detailed record of its discretionary ruling. Preliminarily, the  
28 court recognized it had “inherent authority and discretion” to order that defense counsel’s  
argument either be read back to the jury or provided to it in transcript form. Then, the  
court focused on crafting an answer that not only addressed the causation issue, but was  
fair to both sides. In considering options proposed by counsel, the court found that  
repeating the closing arguments in their entirety would be time consuming and  
counterproductive. On the other hand, it was not possible to parse the causation arguments  
because that element was intertwined with everything else. For example, the court pointed  
out, CALCRIM No. 240 states that all of the circumstances established by the evidence are  
relevant to the determination whether something is a natural and probable consequence of  
an act, and in this case, the jury would have to make credibility findings in order to discern  
the circumstances surrounding the shooting. The court also rejected the idea of simply  
denying the request because it would be inappropriate to throw up its hands and tell the  
jury they were on their own. Accordingly, as noted in our factual summary, it reread the  
jury instructions that addressed the causation element of the murder charge, with the caveat  
that if this response proved insufficient, it would revisit the issue.

29 Appellant argues the court erred by failing to reread the defense argument to the jury  
30 because causation was the most important issue to the defense and it was so complex that it  
31 was probably difficult for the jury to understand. The causation issue was not as  
32 complicated as appellant attempts to make it—the question presented to the jury was  
33 whether appellant’s conduct was a substantial cause of Quiett’s death. The court reminded  
34 the jury of the definition of substantial cause by reading the pertinent instructions. If the  
35 jury was confused about the evidence relevant to this determination, it had the right to

1           rehear that evidence, but it made no such request. Defense counsel's closing remarks were  
2           not evidence but argument, which raised a reasonable concern about repeating that specific  
3           argument without the context of the overall presentation by both counsel. The trial court  
4           resolved this concern without ignoring the jury's request by focusing on the pertinent legal  
5           principles. Appellant fails to identify any part of the trial court's ruling that could be  
6           characterized as an abuse of discretion.

7           Appellant mistakenly relies on *People v. Sims* (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 405, criticized on another  
8           ground in *People v. Storm* (2002) 28 Cal. 4th 1007, 1031-1032 (*Sims*). In that murder  
9           case, the trial court erred by finding that it lacked the "authority to order closing  
10           summations read back to the jury." (*Sims*, at p. 452.) However, the error was harmless  
11           because it was not reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a different verdict  
12           if the summation had been read back. (*Id.* at p. 453.) Appellant analogizes this case to  
13           *Sims*, arguing that the denial of the jury request in this case was prejudicial because his  
14           lack of causation defense was more complex than the defense in *Sims*. However, appellant  
15           cannot jump to a prejudice analysis without first proving error, which he has not done. In  
16           contrast to *Sims*, the trial court in this case was well aware of its authority to order the  
17           reading back of defense counsel's closing argument, but properly exercised its discretion  
18           by concluding that it would reconstruct the jury regarding the legal principles governing the  
19           causation element rather than attempt to parse the closing arguments addressing that issue.

20           Even if appellant could show that the trial court abused its discretion, the record does not  
21           show that the jury was confused about the causation element of murder, particularly after  
22           the court reread the instructions regarding the pertinent legal principles. Under these  
23           circumstances, it is not reasonably likely that the outcome of this case would have been  
24           more favorable to appellant if the trial court had repeated part of defense counsel's closing  
25           argument.

26           *Id.* at \*12-13.

27           **b. Applicable Law**

28           To obtain habeas relief following an allegedly erroneous response to a jury question, a  
1           petitioner must show: (1) constitutional error resulted; and (2) the error was not harmless. *Morris*  
2           *v. Woodford*, 273 F.3d 826, 833 (9th Cir. 2001). The test for "constitutional error" is set out in  
3           *Boyde v. California*, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990). To determine whether constitutional error  
4           occurred, the district court asks "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied  
5           the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant  
6           evidence." *Id.* That inquiry also can be described as having two parts: (1) whether there is a  
7           reasonable likelihood that the jury understood an assertedly ambiguous instruction to mean what  
8           the defendant suggests it means; and (2) if so, "whether the instruction, so understood, was  
9           unconstitutional as applied to the defendant." *Morris*, 273 F.3d at 833 (quoting *Calderon*, 525  
10           U.S. at 147).

11           "When a jury makes explicit its difficulties a trial judge should clear them away with

1 concrete accuracy.” *Bollenbach v. United States*, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13 (1946). The trial judge  
2 has a duty to respond to the jury’s request for clarification with sufficient specificity to eliminate  
3 the jury’s confusion. *See Beardslee v. Woodford*, 358 F.3d 560, 574-75 (9th Cir. 2004) (due  
4 process violation occurred, but was harmless, when court, in responding to request for  
5 clarification, refused to give clarification and informed jury that no clarifying instructions would  
6 be given); *United States v. Frega*, 179 F.3d 793, 808-11 (9th Cir. 1999) (trial judge’s confusing  
7 response to jury’s questions raised possibility that verdict was based on conduct legally inadequate  
8 to support conviction). However, the trial judge has wide discretion in charging the jury, which  
9 carries over to the judge’s response to a question from the jury. *Arizona v. Johnson*, 351 F.3d 988,  
10 994 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding trial court acted within its discretion by, in response to juror question,  
11 simply referring the jury to the instructions they had already been given); *Allen v. United States*,  
12 186 F.2d 439, 444 (9th Cir. 1951) (“the giving of additional instructions has always been held to  
13 be within the discretion of the trial court”).

14 The precise manner by which the court fulfills its obligation to address a jury question “is a  
15 matter committed to its discretion.” *Johnson*, 351 F.3d at 994. For example, where the original  
16 instruction was correct and the judge directs the jury to a precise paragraph that answers the  
17 question clearly, this approach comports with due process. *Weeks v. Angelone*, 528 U.S. 225, 234  
18 (2000). Also, just as a jury is presumed to follow its instructions, it is presumed to understand a  
19 judge’s answer to a question. *Id.* at 234. “To presume otherwise would require reversal every  
20 time a jury inquires about a matter of constitutional significance, regardless of the judge’s  
21 answer.” *Id.*

22 **c. Analysis**

23 In Claim 3, Petitioner argues that:

24 The trial court’s refusal to permit the jury to have defense counsel’s argument regarding  
25 proximate cause re-read after the jury instructions had been given deprived Petitioner of  
26 his due process, the jury had no foreknowledge of the principles of causation, that ruling  
27 was error because the causation issue was the most important defense issue.

28 Dkt. No. 1 at 5.

29 In determining whether or not to grant the jury’s request and reread the defense closing, the

1 trial court considered *People v. Sims*, 5 Cal. 4th 405 (1993), noting that “[T]he Court should be  
2 looking to the theory argued by the defense. Was it of such complexity that its repetition was  
3 necessary in order for the defendant to receive the full benefit of the adversarial process?” 7 RT  
4 1784. In assessing this question, the trial court said:

5 When faced with questions from the jury, I can't just throw up my hands and tell the jury,  
6 “I cannot help.” I've got to consider how we can best aid the jury in responding to them,  
responding in a way that's both legal and obviously fair to both sides.

7 *Id.* The trial court then heard arguments from both sides regarding whether or not to reread the  
8 defense closing argument, then found:

9 The jury instruction for causation, CALCRIM [No.] 240, does say that in deciding whether  
10 a consequence is natural and probable, consider all the circumstances established by the  
evidence. While there were certain segments of arguments that dealt with causation,  
11 strictly dealt with causation, the arguments did deal with all the circumstances shown by  
the evidence. It would be very difficult for the court to start taking out just parts and not  
allow the full explication of the evidence because it's that evidence, you know, what  
12 happened, you know, credibility, what exactly happened, that has got to be considered by  
the jury. So you're not only talking about a discussion of the evidence that surrounds the  
act that causes death, but you're talking about credibility and what you believe about those  
13 circumstances. . . . ¶ This question came early on in the deliberations. When we read  
14 those jury instructions and portrayed them on the screen, it was like taking a sip of water  
out of a fire hose. And I think at this particular point, I would read to them 540A, then  
240, then 620, and then the instruction that says if I repeat something, it doesn't mean it  
15 gets added emphasis because I know part of 620 repeats what is in 240. I think I would do  
that and say, you know, “In response to your question at this point, this is what I can do,”  
16 and go ahead and do that. And then we'll just see how this proceeds. . . . So that's what  
17 I'm going to do. I'm going to have them come in here, and I'm going to say “At this  
point,” and I'm going to use those exact words, “At this point in response to request No. 2,  
18 I am simply going to read back to you applicable instructions.” . . . ¶ And by doing this,  
19 using my analogy, they're not going to be taking a sip of water out of a fire hose. They're  
going to be taking a sip of water out of a fountain. And then we'll see where they go. I'm  
20 not saying that I won't read everything back. But I'm not even going to address that with  
them. If they ask me that question, “Really, are you going to allow us to have that read  
21 back,” I'll say “Hey this is my response at this point.” I'm just going to leave it at that. . . .  
¶ I just can't—I can't just restrict it to their rebuttal. And I don't know that I can just  
22 parse it out for the reasons I've said. And they're going to end up getting, again, using my  
analogy, a sip of water out of a fire hose because that argument's going to come in, and it's  
23 going to be talking about all sorts of stuff. Most of it is germane, but they're not going  
to—I just think it's better to read that law back to them at this point.

24 7 RT 1787-1790 (brackets added).

25 As the state appellate court noted, the trial court diligently considered the jury request  
26 before determining that the best course of action was to reread relevant jury instructions already  
27 given rather than reread defense counsel's argument. *Loyd*, 2017 WL 6014413, at \*12-13; 7 RT  
28 1781-1793. The original jury instructions, including the proximate cause jury instruction

1 (CALCRIM No. 240), are accurate statements of the law. The trial court also appropriately read  
2 to the jury the elements of felony murder (CALCRIM No. 540A), as well as the special issues  
3 regarding causation (CALCRIM No. 620), then pointed the jury to the instruction clarifying that a  
4 repeated instruction does not get added emphasis (CALCRIM No. 200). These instructions were  
5 also accurate and appropriate. Following the submission of this question, the jury deliberated  
6 further and then returned verdicts less than an hour later.

7 Petitioner fails to show that the trial court's response to the jury question was  
8 unconstitutional. *See Morris*, 273 F.3d at 833. As an initial matter, the Court is bound by the state  
9 appellate court's determination that the trial court's response to the jury's question was adequate  
10 as a matter of state law. *See Bradshaw*, 546 U.S. at 74 (federal court must accept state court's  
11 interpretation of state law); *Hicks*, 485 U.S. at 629 (same). In addition, no constitutional error  
12 resulted because the jury was not reasonably likely to interpret the trial court's response in the  
13 manner that Petitioner claims when viewed in the context of the overall charge. *See United States*  
14 *v. Harrison*, 34 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that a single jury instruction may not be  
15 judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.).

16 Even if constitutional error had occurred, such error was harmless because, as the state  
17 appellate court reasonably found, no favorable outcome would have resulted otherwise. *See*  
18 *Morris*, 273 F.3d at 833. The state appellate court reasonably concluded that the trial court  
19 properly acted within its discretion in responding to the jury question. *Loyd*, 2017 WL 6014413,  
20 at \*13. The state appellate court further reasonably concluded that even if the trial court had  
21 abused its discretion, "the record does not show that the jury was confused about the causation  
22 element of murder, particularly after the court reread the instructions regarding the pertinent legal  
23 principles." *Id.* Finally, the state appellate court concluded that the record demonstrates that "it is  
24 not reasonably likely that the outcome of this case would have been more favorable to appellant if  
25 the trial court had repeated part of defense counsel's closing argument." *Id.*

26 Accordingly, the state appellate court's denial of Claim 3 was not objectively  
27 unreasonable. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief for this claim relating to the  
28 trial court's allegedly inadequate response to a jury question.

#### 4. **Claim 4: Admission of Custodial Statements**

Petitioner claims that his custodial statements to Detectives Drewrey and Herdt from the Lake County Sheriff's Department were improperly admitted despite his having invoked his right to counsel. Dkt. No. 1 at 5.

**a. State Court Opinion**

The state appellate court gave the following background and rejected this claim as follows:

In a pretrial motion, the defense argued that when appellant was first advised of his *Miranda* rights on Reclamation Road, he invoked his right to counsel, but the detectives “ignored” his request for an attorney and continued to interrogate him. As a remedy for the alleged *Miranda* violation, he sought to suppress all statements he made to law enforcement from that point forward. Appellant now contends that the denial of his *Miranda* motion was reversible error.[FN 7]

[FN 7:] In this court, appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress evidence of the gun. However, the record shows that the defense never requested suppression of the weapon itself.

### **1. *Appellant's Recorded Statements***

As noted in our factual summary, the meeting on Reclamation Road and Drewrey's subsequent interview of appellant were both recorded. The trial court admitted the recordings into evidence at the *Miranda* hearing. That evidence showed that when the detectives met appellant and Spring they searched the couple for weapons and handcuffed them. Appellant was upset that he could not hold onto Spring, and Spring asked if handcuffs were necessary since they were trying to cooperate. While the detectives gave an update to dispatch and requested a transport unit, appellant asked for a little more time and Spring said they wanted to go someplace where they could talk to the detectives about what had happened. Spring, who recognized Detective Drewrey from a prior encounter, asked if she had to go to jail "too." After Drewrey said they would both be taken to the jail later, appellant apologized to Spring and professed his love for her, and asked the detectives if they could go to the office before they were taken to jail. The detective agreed to that request and then the following exchange occurred:

"[DREWREY]: Just—I just want to ask this question real quick just so that nobody gets hurt. Is that gun somewhere where somebody's going to find it and get hurt with it?

[APPELLANT]: No. (INAUDIBLE). Oh, excuse me.

[DREWERY]: No? I want to make sure—

[APPELLANT]: Dude, we'll get the gun. We'll get the gun, okay. Just let me fucking—

[DREWERY]: Okay

[APPELLANT]: (INAUDIBLE)

[DREWERY]: I just want to make sure nobody gets hurt with it.

[APPELLANT]: Fuck no. Nobody's going to get hurt with it.

1 [DREWERY]: Okay. Well, if I had it, then nobody's going to get hurt with it, and that's  
2 important.

3 [APPELLANT]: I understand that. I understand that. I think—I think I need a little bit of  
4 time, please.

5 [DREWREY]: Okay. Yeah, no problem.

6 [APPELLANT]: I mean, just fucking give me a fucking couple hours, man, fucking  
7 whatever.”

8 Then Spring asked whether it would be “helpful” for them to “cooperate and get it in.”  
9 Appellant asked the detectives to tell him “straight up” if what he was doing “right now”  
10 was the right thing to do. Herdt responded that appellant knew as well as he did that “a  
11 judge will give you more mercy if you cooperate,” but that “it all depends . . .”

12 Drewrey said that he assumed the couple had heard their *Miranda* rights before. Appellant  
13 said yes and Spring became upset that she was being arrested. The detectives explained  
14 that she was in handcuffs but not under arrest “right now.” Then Drewrey advised the  
15 couple of their *Miranda* rights. During the advisement, appellant made a few side remarks  
16 about his physical discomfort and wanting to stand next to Spring. When Drewrey  
17 finished, Herdt asked appellant whether he wanted his rights “re-explain[ed],” and  
18 appellant responded “No, I got them dude. I got them.” Then the following exchange  
19 occurred:

20 “[HERDT]: Keeping those rights in mind, bud, we got to get that gun off the street, dude.  
21 We got to get it gone now.

22 “[APPELLANT]: Okay. Those rights in mind, don't you think I should talk to an  
23 attorney? I mean, just fucking can you call one so I can just ask him a question? Or what?

24 “[SPRING]: Danny, it's not going to make a difference.

25 “[APPELLANT]: I'm going to go by your—you're going to treat me right like you  
26 fucking, you know, give me your word that's fucking—

27 “[DREWREY]: Well, the—

28 “[APPELLANT]: To turn the gun in. I mean, you have a murder weapon, dude. I don't  
know.

29 “[SPRING]: Just wait, Danny. Just wait. Just wait.

30 “[APPELLANT]: I want to—it was—. . . Just wait.

31 “[DREWREY]: It being—it being a murder weapon—

32 “[APPELLANT]: It was an accident.

33 “[DREWREY]: —is not my concern.

34 “[APPELLANT]: It was an accident, Steve.

35 “[DREWREY]: And it could be an accident.

36 “[SPRING]: It was an accident.

1 [APPELLANT]: Oh my God."

2 The conversation continued in this vein, with appellant and Spring attempting to convince  
3 Drewrey that the shooting was an accident and Drewrey responding that there would be  
4 time to talk about that later, after the gun was off the street so that "little kids" would not  
5 be hurt by it. Appellant said that he understood that the detectives wanted the gun off the  
6 streets but asked how that situation was going to hurt him. Drewrey said that if somebody  
7 else was hurt by the gun, that would create more "issues." He said they would talk about  
8 everything that happened, but his immediate concern was to get the gun. Appellant asked  
9 Spring what he should do and she responded that she was confused and did not know.  
10 Then appellant said, "Come on. Let's go." Walking together, appellant and Spring then  
11 attempted to find their way back to the blackberry bush where appellant had tossed the  
12 gun.

13 As discussed in our factual summary, after the group stopped looking for the gun,  
14 appellant and Spring made incriminating statements in an effort to convince the detectives  
15 that the shooting was an accident. Later, when Drewrey interviewed appellant at the  
16 sheriff's office, he reminded appellant of his *Miranda* rights and appellant reiterated that  
17 he understood them. Then, appellant repeated the story he had told on Reclamation Road,  
18 sharing additional details about his attempted robbery of Ryden and his accidental shooting  
19 of Quiett.

### 2. Detective Herdt's Testimony

3 Detective Herdt was the only witness at the *Miranda* hearing.[FN 8 omitted] He testified  
4 that when he first made contact with appellant and Spring, his primary concern was officer  
5 safety because he knew they had a weapon. Furthermore, Herdt explained, after the couple  
6 was placed in handcuffs, he was still focused on securing the weapon. Herdt testified at  
7 length about public activities in that specific area, including jogging and blackberry  
8 picking, as well as gambling and recreation activities at venues nearby.

9 Herdt also recalled that while Drewrey was advising appellant of his *Miranda* rights,  
10 appellant interrupted him, so when the advisement was complete, Herdt asked if appellant  
11 needed to have any of his rights explained to him and appellant responded that he did not.  
12 Herdt testified that the transcript of their conversation does not reflect the fact that when  
13 they were discussing the need to get the gun off the street, appellant rambled on for some  
14 time while he was contemplating whether to talk to an attorney. Furthermore, Herdt stated  
15 that he and Drewrey did not do anything to encourage appellant to keep talking. Rather, it  
16 seemed to Herdt that appellant was thinking out loud, so he just let him continue to speak.

### 3. The Trial Court's Ruling

21 The defense argued that appellant's statement about wanting to ask a lawyer a question  
22 was an unequivocal request for an attorney and that every statement he made after that was  
23 inadmissible. The prosecutor responded, among other things, that under the totality of the  
24 circumstances a reasonable officer would not have concluded appellant was asking for a  
25 lawyer. Rather, appellant was thinking out loud, weighing his options, and trying to get  
26 advice from the officers about what he should do. The prosecutor also observed that the  
27 audio recording captured the "tenor of the defendant's voice," the "inflection in his voice  
28 as he's making these statements," and the appellant "think[ing] out loud and weigh[ing] his  
options in a manner so that we are able to know exactly what was going on in his head."

29 The trial court denied the *Miranda* motion during a break in the evidence phase of the trial.  
30 The court found, among other things, that appellant was properly advised of his *Miranda*  
31 rights; appellant understood his rights; and appellant voluntarily waived those rights.

1       Concluding that appellant did not invoke his right to counsel, the court reasoned that the  
 2       two brief references to an attorney were ambiguous and equivocal. The court also found  
 3       that appellant's primary objectives were to get things off his chest, to make it clear that the  
 4       shooting was an accident, and to assure the detectives that Spring was not involved in his  
 5       crime(s). Furthermore, appellant's "two references to counsel involve[d] [him] asking  
 6       questions and weighing options out loud, but [he] never unequivocally stated that he  
 7       wanted to speak to an attorney before any questioning and he never unequivocally stated  
 8       that he wanted to have an attorney present during any questioning." Under these  
 9       circumstances, the court concluded, "[a] reasonable officer under the circumstance would  
 10       not conclude that the defendant was invoking his right to counsel."

11       4. *Analysis*

12       "The principles of law applicable to [a] defendant's *Miranda* claim are well established.  
 13       Questioning remains an important part of any criminal investigation. Police officers may  
 14       legitimately endeavor to secure a suspect's participation in the interrogation process so  
 15       long as constitutional safeguards are honored. [Citation.] ¶ Once an in-custody suspect  
 16       invokes his right to either silence or counsel, interrogation must cease. [Citation.] If the  
 17       right to counsel is invoked, the suspect cannot be interrogated further, unless counsel is  
 18       provided [citation] or the suspect reinitiates contact with the police. [Citations].  
 19       Interrogation includes both express questioning and 'words or actions . . . the police should  
 20       know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.'  
 21       [Citation.] ¶ After a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, police officers may  
 22       nonetheless resume their interrogation if "the suspect '(a) initiated further discussions with  
 23       the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.'"  
 24       [Citations.] The waiver must be " 'knowing and intelligent . . . under the totality of the  
 25       circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the  
 26       dialogue with the authorities.' " [Citation.] The prosecution has the burden of proof on  
 27       these points. [Citation.]

28       " ' 'In reviewing constitutional claims of this nature, it is well established that we accept  
 29       the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of  
 30       credibility, if supported by substantial evidence. We independently determine from the  
 31       undisputed facts and the facts properly found by the trial court whether the challenged  
 32       statement was illegally obtained.' " [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (*People v. Enraca* (2012) 53  
 33       Cal. 4th 735, 752-753.)

34       Applying these principles here, we affirm the trial court's ruling that when appellant was  
 35       advised of his *Miranda* rights on Reclamation Road, he did not invoke his right to counsel.  
 36       Substantial evidence supports the factual components of the trial court's analysis,  
 37       including that appellant consistently expressed a desire to communicate with the detectives  
 38       in order to convince them that the shooting was an accident, and that appellant briefly  
 39       contemplated asking for an attorney, but elected instead to engage the detectives in an  
 40       ongoing dialogue about what had happened and what consequences he faced. Under these  
 41       facts, a reasonable officer in the detectives' situation would not have concluded that  
 42       appellant was invoking his right to counsel.

43       Appellant contends that his statements were "less than knowing and voluntary" because  
 44       Detective Herdt exerted "pressure" on him by invoking public safety concerns. In its  
 45       ruling, the trial court stated that the defense was not contending that "that the statements of  
 46       the defendant were involuntary," and then went on to find that "the evidence in the Court's  
 47       view does not support such a contention." We agree. The record shows that public safety  
 48       was not a pretense but a legitimate concern.[FN 9] Furthermore, the detectives did not use  
 49       that concern to coerce appellant to talk about the shooting incident. Rather, from the  
 50       beginning, appellant was anxious to talk about what happened while the detectives were  
 51       focused on the need to recover the gun.

[FN 9:] When Herdt and Drewrey first saw appellant and Spring, they were walking down a small dirt road toward an asphalt area near Reclamation Road. An elderly man was jogging within 200 feet of the couple. The meeting place was approximately a mile away from the Robinson Rancheria, a casino and entertainment venue that employed a large number of the 60,000 residents of Lake County. In close proximity to the casino, there was also a youth recreation center, a recycling center, a tribal office, and a residential community of about 20 homes. [¶] At or near the blackberry bushes where the gun was recovered, there was a piece of plywood that had been used as a makeshift sleeping area. As appellant and Spring led the detectives to this area, Herdt noticed that someone had essentially created a path in the tall weeds by trampling through them on their way to the blackberry bushes. Herdt testified that people often collected blackberries from the bushes.

Appellant intimates that when he asked “Those rights in mind, don’t you think I should talk to an attorney,” Detective Herdt had some obligation to say “yes.” Characterizing his remark as a “consensus-seeking effort” to convince the detectives that he should first talk to an attorney, appellant argues that if Herdt had agreed with him then appellant would then have been in a position to “decline further conversation with the detectives without seeming oppositional or obstreperous to them.” Appellant’s legal premise that Detective Herdt was required to advise or encourage him to invoke his right to counsel is unsupported by authority. Furthermore, the record does not support appellant’s factual argument. Although appellant contemplated consulting an attorney before turning over the gun, he *never* suggested that he did not want to talk to the detectives. To the contrary, he was anxious to explain what had happened. There is no evidence appellant had any concern about appearing oppositional or obstreperous.

Appellant contends that after he broached the subject of talking to an attorney, he “rephrased his position in a more straightforward and clear demand to speak to an attorney” by stating “[j]ust fucking can you call one so I can just ask him a question?” We are not persuaded by this interpretation of appellant’s conversation with the detectives. As the trial court found, appellant was considering his options and wondering whether or not to turn over the weapon that everybody knew he had. Spring was also considering her own options and, indeed, may have turned the gun over with or without appellant’s consent. (*People v. Carpenter* (1999) 21 Cal. 4th 1016, 1040 [“Evidence need not be suppressed if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information would inevitably have been discovered by lawful means.”].) In any event, the evidence before the trial court supported its finding that a reasonable officer in the detectives’ position would not have interpreted appellant’s remarks as an invocation of his right to an attorney.

Finally, appellant insists the fact that his statement took the form of an “interrogatory” does not mean his demand was equivocal. (See *United States v. Hunter* (7th Cir. 2013) 708 F.3d 938, 942 [“Can you call my attorney?”]; *United States v. Wysinger* (7th Cir. 2012) 683 F.3d 784, 795-796 [“[C]an I call one now? [T]hat’s what I’m saying.”].) This argument is a red herring; the record shows that the trial court’s *Miranda* ruling did not hinge on grammar. The court had an audio recording of the entire interaction between appellant and the detectives, starting from when he first contacted them and ending with the completion of his office interview. During that period appellant was unequivocal about his desire to tell the detectives exactly what happened in order to convince them that the shooting was an accident and that Spring had not been involved in appellant’s plan to rob Ryden. By contrast, his brief remarks about talking to an attorney were equivocal, contemplative of an option that he decided not to pursue.

1 Loyd, 2017 WL 6014413, at \*13-17 (footnote 8 omitted and footnote 9 in original).

2 **b. Applicable Law**

3 Claims that custodial statements were improperly admitted are analyzed under *Miranda*.  
4 The requirements of *Miranda* are “clearly established” federal law for purposes of federal habeas  
5 corpus review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). *Juan H. v. Allen*, 408 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2005).  
6 Habeas relief should be granted if the admission of statements in violation of *Miranda* “had a  
7 substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” *Calderon*, 525 U.S.  
8 at 146.

9 *Miranda* requires that a person subjected to custodial interrogation be advised prior to  
10 questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that statements made can be used against him,  
11 that he has the right to counsel, and that he has the right to have counsel appointed. 384 U.S. at  
12 444. Once properly advised of his rights, an accused may waive them voluntarily, knowingly and  
13 intelligently. *Id.* at 475. Such a waiver need not be express. *Id.* Whether there has been a valid  
14 waiver of *Miranda* rights depends upon the totality of the circumstances, including the  
15 background, experience and conduct of the defendant. *United States v. Bernard S.*, 795 F.2d 749,  
16 751 (9th Cir. 1986).

17 The government must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant was  
18 aware of “the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon  
19 it.” *Moran v. Burbine*, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). A showing that there was a proper recitation of  
20 *Miranda* rights and that the defendant knew his rights generally is sufficient to establish a  
21 knowing and intelligent waiver. *Paulino v. Castro*, 371 F.3d 1083, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2004).

22 A suspect who has expressed a desire to have counsel present during custodial  
23 interrogation is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel is made  
24 available to him.<sup>7</sup> See *Edwards v. Arizona*, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). Continued responses to  
25 questions from interrogators after a suspect invokes his right to have counsel present do not

26  
27 <sup>7</sup> In addition, once a defendant has invoked the right to counsel, the Sixth Amendment prohibits  
28 government initiated interrogation regarding that offense. See *United States v. Harrison*, 213 F.3d  
1206, 1211-12 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing *Michigan v. Jackson*, 475 U.S. 625, 627-28 (1986)  
overruled on other grounds by *Montejo v. Louisiana*, 556 U.S. 778, 796-97 (2009)).

1 constitute a waiver of the right. *See Alvarez v. Gomez*, 185 F.3d 995, 998 (9th Cir. 1999). This  
2 “prophylactic rule [is] designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his  
3 previously asserted *Miranda* rights.” *Michigan v. Harvey*, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990). The  
4 applicability of the “‘rigid’ prophylactic rule” of *Edwards* requires a court to determine whether  
5 the accused actually invoked his right to counsel. *Smith v. Illinois*, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984)  
6 (quoting *Fare v. Michael C.*, 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979)). In *Davis v. United States*, the Supreme  
7 Court held that “[t]o avoid difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting  
8 interrogations,” the determination of whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel is  
9 “an objective inquiry.” 512 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1994). The suspect must “unambiguously request  
10 counsel.” *Id.* at 459. “Although a suspect need not speak with the discrimination of an Oxford  
11 don, he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable  
12 police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.”  
*Id.* (citation omitted).

13 In *Davis*, the Supreme Court found that the statement “[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer”  
14 was ambiguous, and thus was not a request for counsel. *Id.* at 462. The Supreme Court in *Davis*  
15 specifically declined to extend the *Edwards* prophylactic rule to situations where a suspect makes  
16 a vague or ambiguous reference to an attorney. *Id.* at 459 (“If the statement fails to meet the  
17 requisite level of clarity, *Edwards* does not require that the officers stop questioning the suspect.”).  
18 In sum, unless the accused makes an unambiguous request for counsel, the authorities are free to  
19 continue questioning.

20 While only the Supreme Court’s precedents must be considered in evaluating the state  
21 court’s compliance with clearly established federal law, the Court may look to circuit precedents  
22 for guidance. *See Duhaime v. Ducharme*, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 2000); *see, e.g., United*  
23 *States v. Younger*, 398 F.3d 1179, 1187 (9th Cir. 2005) (defendant’s statement “[b]ut, excuse me,  
24 if I am right, I can have a lawyer present through all this, right?” does not constitute unambiguous  
25 invocation of right to counsel); *Paulino*, 371 F.3d at 1087-88 (defendant’s statements “Where’s  
26 the attorney?” and “You mean it’s gonna take him long to come?” plus his failure to fill in item on  
27 waiver form asking whether suspect wishes to give up right to counsel, was not unequivocal  
28 request for counsel); *cf. Alvarez*, 185 F.3d at 998 (finding suspect’s questions “(1) Can I get an

1 attorney right now, man? (2) You can have attorney right now? and (3) Well, like right now you  
2 got one?" constituted an unambiguous request).

3 The Supreme Court has held that a confession is voluntary if it is "the product of an  
4 essentially free and unconstrained choice"; it is involuntary where the suspect's "will has been  
5 overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired." *Culombe v. Connecticut*,  
6 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961). To make this determination, the court must consider the totality of the  
7 surrounding circumstances, including "the characteristics of the accused and the details of the  
8 interrogation." *Schneckloth v. Bustamonte*, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). The court then asks  
9 whether the government obtained the statement by physical or psychological coercion or by  
10 improper inducement so that the suspect's will was overborne. *United States v. Leon Guerrero*,  
11 847 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1988). "While each confession case has turned on its own set of  
12 factors justifying the conclusion that police conduct was oppressive, all have contained a  
13 substantial element of coercive police conduct." *Colorado v. Connelly*, 479 U.S. 157, 163-64  
14 (1986). Where a suspect's statement is not coerced, "little justification exists for permitting the  
15 highly probative evidence of a voluntary confession to be irretrievably lost to the factfinder."  
16 *Oregon v. Elstad*, 470 U.S. 298, 312 (1985).

17 The erroneous admission of a coerced confession is subject to harmless error analysis.  
18 *Arizona v. Fulminante*, 499 U.S. 279, 306-12 (1991). In other words, habeas relief is appropriate  
19 only if the coerced confession had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining  
20 the jury's verdict." *Brecht*, 507 U.S. at 637.

21 **c. Analysis**

22 Petitioner asserts that he was

23 deprived of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom from self-incrimination  
24 by the trial court's erroneous admission of his custodial statement[s] notwithstanding his  
25 invocation of his right to counsel. Petitioner initially responded to Miranda warnings with  
26 the question "Do you think I should have a lawyer." Then followed up with "Just fucking  
call one for me.["]

27 Dkt. No. 1 at 5 (brackets added).

28 As mentioned above, unless the accused makes an unambiguous request for counsel, the

1 authorities are free to continue questioning. *Davis*, 512 U.S. at 459. Here, Petitioner made two  
2 relevant statements. First, Petitioner questioned: “Don’t you think I should talk to an attorney?” 5  
3 CT 1346. The state appellate court reasonably determined that, as in *Davis*, *see* 512 U.S. at 462,  
4 this question did not rise to the level of an unambiguous invocation, *see Loyd*, 2017 WL 6014413,  
5 at \*16. Petitioner’s framing of his second statement is slightly, but significantly, different from  
6 the statement in the record: “I mean, just fucking can you call one so I can just ask him a question?  
7 Or what?” 5 CT 1346. The state appellate court reasonably found that the evidence before the  
8 trial court supported its finding that a reasonable officer in the detectives’ position would not have  
9 interpreted Petitioner’s remark [“can you call one so I can just ask him a question?”] as an  
10 invocation of his right to an attorney. *Loyd*, 2017 WL 6014413, at \*17; *see also Paulino*, 371 F.3d  
11 at 1088 (Ninth Circuit reasoned that stating: “Where’s the attorney?” could be construed as an  
12 inquiry into the location of the attorney “rather than the assertion of Paulino’s subjective desire for  
13 a lawyer at that time”).

14 In making its determination that the trial court reasonably found that Petitioner’s  
15 statements were not coerced, the state appellate court stated that:

16 [Petitioner] consistently expressed a desire to communicate with the detectives in order to  
17 convince them that the shooting was an accident, and that [Petitioner] briefly contemplated  
18 asking for an attorney, but elected instead to engage the detectives in an ongoing dialogue  
about what had happened and what consequences he faced.

19 *Id.* at \*16. The state appellate court therefore reasonably determined that the trial court’s rejection  
20 of Petitioner’s *Miranda* motion was proper since “[Petitioner’s] brief remarks about talking to an  
21 attorney were equivocal, contemplative of an option that he decided not to pursue.” *Id.* at \*17.

22 In addition, the state appellate court reasonably determined that the detectives’ expressed  
23 desire to locate the gun was a “legitimate” public safety concern. *Id.* at \*16. The *Miranda* rule is  
24 subject to several exceptions, including the public safety exception, which allows police officers to  
25 “ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety” before giving *Miranda*  
26 warnings. *New York v. Quarles*, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984). In order for the public safety  
27 exception to apply, there must have been “an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or  
28 the public from any immediate danger associated with [a] weapon.” *Id.* at 659 n.8; *see, e.g., id.* at

1 657-58 (trial court erred in excluding defendant's statement that "the gun is over there" in  
2 response to officer's question as to the location of the gun when he caught defendant after a brief  
3 chase; "the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety  
4 outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against  
5 self-incrimination"). Here, the detectives gave *Miranda* warnings shortly after asking about the  
6 location of the gun.<sup>8</sup> 4 CT 1134-1137. The state appellate court reasonably noted that the  
7 detectives did not use their concern for public safety "to coerce [Petitioner] to talk about the  
8 shooting incident." *Loyd*, 2017 WL 6014413, at \*16. The state appellate court thus reasonably  
9 concluded that "from the beginning" Petitioner "was anxious to talk about what happened while  
10 the detectives were focused on the need to recover the gun." *Id.*

11 Having carefully reviewed the record, the Court concludes that the state appellate court's  
12 rejection of this claim was neither an unreasonable application of, or contrary to, Supreme Court  
13 precedent, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence  
14 presented in the state court proceeding.

15 Even if admitting Petitioner's custodial statements resulted in error, it did not have a  
16 substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. Both Ryden and Spring testified about the largely  
17 undisputed circumstances of the shooting. 3 RT 674-677; 4 RT 897-899. Additionally,  
18 Petitioner's non-custodial statements to Spring and Downing were incriminating, as were his non-  
19 custodial statements to law enforcement before being read his *Miranda* rights and those he made  
20 to Spring while at the sheriff's office. 3 RT 600, 602; 4 RT 900; 4 CT 1001-1006, 1030-1031.  
21 Petitioner's post-*Miranda* statements were also admissible to impeach his trial testimony. *See*  
22 *Elstad*, 470 U.S. at 306-07 (The "Miranda exclusionary rule" requires exclusion of unwarned  
23 statements in prosecution's case-in-chief but not when used for impeachment.); *Harris v. New*  
24

25 

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<sup>8</sup> While in the process of adjusting the handcuffs on Petitioner and Spring, Detective Drewrey  
26 asked: "Just—I just want to ask this question real quick just so that nobody gets hurt. Is that gun  
27 somewhere somebody's going to find it and get hurt with it?" 4 CT 1134. Petitioner responded,  
28 "Dude, we'll get the gun." 4 CT 1134. Spring then inquired whether it would be "helpful" for  
them to "cooperate and get [the gun] in." 4 CT 1143. Petitioner asked the detectives if they could  
tell him "straight up" if what he was doing "right now" was "the right thing to do." 4 CT 1135.  
Detective Drewrey then initiated *Miranda* warnings shortly after. *See* 4 CT 1135-1137.

1 *York*, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (“The shield provided by *Miranda* cannot be perverted into a  
2 license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior  
3 inconsistent utterances.”). Therefore, any error in the admission of Petitioner’s custodial  
4 statements was not prejudicial.

5 Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim 4.

6 **5. Claim 5: IAC Claims**

7 In Claim 5, Petitioner asserts multiple IAC violations by his trial counsel, David Markham,  
8 Esq., including: (a) failure to present evidence; (b) acknowledgment of guilt during closing  
9 argument, failure to investigate defenses, and failure to cross-examine effectively; (c) improper  
10 closing argument; (d) inadequate investigation; (e) inadequate knowledge of the law; (f) failure to  
11 assert a legal defense; (g) admission of guilt without a tactical reason; (h) failure to assert a second  
12 shooter defense; and (i) calling Petitioner to testify in support of defense trial counsel had  
13 abandoned. Dkt. No. 1 at 6-11.

14 **a. State Court Opinions**

15 Petitioner raised on direct appeal his IAC claim relating to Markham’s failure to defend the  
16 murder charge by arguing that a second shooter fired the bullet that killed Quiett, and the state  
17 appellate court outlined the following background and rejected it as follows:

18 Appellant contends he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial  
19 because his attorney failed to defend the murder charge by arguing that a second shooter  
20 fired the bullet that killed Cindy Quiett. Appellant made this same claim below, in his  
unsuccessful motions for new appointed counsel and for a new trial.

21 **1. Motions for New Appointed Counsel**

22 On September 15, 2011, the trial court appointed counsel to represent appellant. Eleven days  
23 later, defense counsel declared a conflict and the court appointed new counsel for appellant.  
24 Two weeks later, appellant’s counsel declared an ethical conflict, the nature of which he  
could not disclose without violating the attorney-client privilege, and a third attorney was  
25 appointed to represent appellant. Approximately three years later, in September 2014,  
appellant’s trial counsel declared a conflict during a trial readiness conference, resulting in  
the appointment of defense counsel David Markham.

26 At a March 13, 2015 trial readiness conference, appellant made a motion for new appointed  
27 counsel pursuant *People v. Marsden* (1970) 2 Cal. 3d 118 (*Marsden*). Appellant complained  
that Markham was refusing to conduct a sufficient investigation of his case. Markham  
disagreed, explaining that he had struggled to develop a defense because appellant had made  
28 devastating admissions, and the witnesses were not helpful to the defense. Markham also  
explained that the ballistics expert retained by the defense had concluded that the fact that the

1 exit wound on [Quiett's] body was lower than the entrance wound did not exclude appellant  
2 as [Quiett's] killer. Because of this conclusion, appellant wanted Markham to retain a  
3 different expert, which was why Markham had filed a request to continue the jury trial. The  
4 court denied appellant's *Marsden* motion and the defense request to continue the jury trial.

5 At a March 27, 2015 trial readiness conference, appellant made a second *Marsden* motion for  
6 new appointed counsel. Appellant complained that Markham had refused to build a defense  
7 around the ballistic evidence, which showed the bullet that killed Quiett travelled through her  
8 body at a downward angle. According to appellant, the opinion of his ballistic expert that the  
9 lethal bullet could have been shot from appellant's gun hinged on the premise that Quiett was  
10 leaning forward when she was shot. Appellant wanted Markham to argue that Quiett was  
11 standing erect when she was shot by a second unknown assailant. Markham explained that  
12 he did not have sufficient evidence to present this theory because nobody saw Quiett before  
13 she was shot and there was no evidence of a second shooter. Appellant's second *Marsden*  
14 motion was denied.

15 On April 14, 2015, the first day of trial, appellant made another *Marsden* motion. Appellant  
16 complained that Markham was refusing to declare that he had a conflict of interest  
17 notwithstanding the fact that he did not have an attorney-client relationship with appellant.  
18 Appellant argued that Markham had taken on the role of an adversary by poking holes in  
19 appellant's second shooter theory, and that the defense was not ready for trial because  
20 Markham refused to investigate the second shooter theory. Markham disagreed with  
21 appellant on every count. He explained that appellant's theory was based on misperceptions  
22 about the evidence; for example, witnesses who said they saw Quiett standing did not see her  
23 when she was shot. Markham also disputed the notion that he did not have an attorney-client  
24 relationship with appellant, pointing out that he had met with appellant at the jail 24 times  
25 and that appellant never questioned their relationship until two weeks before trial. Markham  
26 described his extensive experience as a criminal defense lawyer in capital cases and stated  
27 that his disagreement with appellant about trial tactics did not create a conflict for him or  
28 cause a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. Again, the trial court denied  
appellant's *Marsden* motion.

## 2. *The New Trial Motion*

1 After the jury returned their guilty verdicts, Markham was relieved as appellant's appointed  
2 counsel and the trial court appointed William Conwell to assist appellant in evaluating  
3 whether to file a motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

4 In a January 2016 motion for new trial, appellant argued he was denied the effective  
5 assistance of counsel because, among other things, Markham failed to pursue the potentially  
6 meritorious defense that Quiett was shot and killed by a second shooter. Opposing the  
7 motion, the prosecutor relied on the dearth of credible evidence to support appellant's second  
8 shooter theory and a detailed declaration from Markham, who described his investigation of  
9 the case and strategies regarding how to best defend appellant.

10 At an April 2016 evidentiary hearing, the defense elicited testimony from a new expert who  
11 opined that if Cindy Quiett was standing erect when she was shot, appellant's bullet could  
12 not have killed her, but she could have been killed by an assailant shooting down at her from  
13 a higher area. Appellant's new attorney also conducted an extensive examination of  
14 Markham, who provided detailed information about his investigation of the case, his efforts  
15 to respond to appellant's requests, and his strategies at trial.

16 On July 1, 2016, the trial court denied the new trial motion. In a 30-page analysis, the court  
17 made findings of fact and law in support of its conclusion that appellant was not denied the  
18 effective assistance of counsel during his jury trial. Preliminarily, the court made this brief  
19 observation about the quality of Markham's declaration: "Mr. Markham's declaration

1 gives a very thorough and cogent explanation for his tactical decisions through his  
 2 representation of Defendant. . . . I'm not going to repeat what he said, but he gave a very  
 3 thorough and cogent explanation." That stated, the court went on to address each objection  
 4 to Markham's representation in order to evaluate any prejudicial effect.

5 In response to appellant's objection that Markham did not argue a second shooter theory, the  
 6 trial court conducted an extensive review of the trial evidence before concluding that this  
 7 theory was not a potentially meritorious defense, pointing out that, among other things,  
 8 nobody reported hearing two shots; there was no evidence that Quiett was standing erect  
 9 when she was shot; and there was "no other shooter suspect." In light of the evidentiary  
 10 record, the court concluded that using the location of the exit wound on Quiett's body to  
 11 argue there was a second shooter was speculative and fanciful. Furthermore, because the  
 12 other shooter theory was "a country mile away from being a potentially meritorious defense,"  
 13 it was not reasonably probable that the outcome would have been more favorable to the  
 14 defense if that theory had been presented at trial.

15 **3. Analysis**

16 To prove his ineffective assistance claim, appellant has the burden of rebutting, by a  
 17 preponderance of the evidence, a presumption that he received effective assistance, first by  
 18 showing that trial counsel's performance was deficient, and then by establishing prejudice.  
 19 (*People v. Lucas* (1995) 12 Cal. 4th 415, 436 (*Lucas*); see also *People v. King* (2010) 183  
 20 Cal. App. 4th 1281, 1298 (*King*).) "Where, as here, defendant is represented by different  
 21 counsel at the motion for a new trial and the issue is called to the trial court's attention, the  
 22 trial judge's decision is especially entitled to great weight and we defer to his [or her] fact  
 23 finding power." (*People v. Wallin* (1981) 124 Cal. App. 3d 479, 483.) Ultimately, though,  
 24 the question "[w]hether counsel's performance was deficient, and whether any deficiency  
 25 prejudiced [defendant], are both mixed questions subject to independent review. [Citation.]"  
 26 (*In re Hardy* (2007) 41 Cal. 4th 977, 993.)

27 In this court, appellant contends Markham's representation was constitutionally inadequate  
 28 because he failed to (1) investigate the second shooter theory, and (2) present that theory at  
 trial. In addressing these contentions under the first prong of our analysis, we ask whether  
 appellant has carried his burden of proving that Markham's representation of him was  
 deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing  
 professional norms. (*Lucas, supra*, 12 Cal. 4th at p. 436; *King, supra*, 183 Cal. App. 4th at p.  
 1298.) "In reviewing counsel's performance, we 'exercise deferential scrutiny.'  
 [Citations.]" (*King*, at p. 1298.) We "defer to counsel's reasonable tactical decisions in  
 examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel [citation], and there is a 'strong  
 presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional  
 assistance.' [Citation.]" (*Lucas*, at pp. 436-437.)

29 The record shows that Markham's investigation of the second shooter theory was thorough  
 30 and reasonable under the circumstances. In his declaration, Markham explained that this  
 31 theory was conceived by a defense investigator who worked on the case before Markham  
 32 was appointed to represent appellant. The investigator was not a ballistics expert and the  
 33 expert that Markham retained was unable to offer an opinion that the lethal bullet was not  
 34 shot from appellant's gun. Nevertheless, Markham arranged for two investigators to  
 35 continue to search for evidence of a second shooter, but nothing could be found. Markham  
 36 also had Quiett's clothing tested for gunshot residue or other evidence, but the test results did  
 37 not suggest there was a second shooter or eliminate appellant's gun as the source of the  
 38 bullet that killed Quiett.

39 This record also provides a sound reason for Markham's decision not to present a second  
 40 shooter theory to the jury. As Markham explained in his declaration: "Based on the evidence  
 41 in the case, including the statements of witnesses and [appellant's] thorough and detailed

1 confession, I did not believe there was any way I could convince the jury there was a second  
2 shooter, let alone that a second, unidentified shooter killed Ms. Quiett, without some  
3 evidence corroborating such a theory.” Beyond that, Markham explained, the prosecutor  
4 presented expert testimony that the likely explanation for the location of the exit wound on  
Quiett’s body was that she was “slightly bent over when she was shot.” This opinion, which  
was shared by the defense’s original ballistics expert, was another barrier to the second  
shooter defense because there was no witness who could testify that Quiett was standing  
erect when she was shot.

5 Appellant argues that the absence of evidence of a second shooter would not have prevented  
6 competent counsel from presenting this theory to the jury because the prosecution rather than  
the defense had the burden of proving that the bullet came from appellant’s gun. According  
7 to appellant, presenting the second shooter theory was a risk-free way of reminding the jury  
they could not convict appellant of felony murder unless they believed that the bullet came  
from his gun. However, Markham offered a sound tactical reason for his decision not to  
8 present this theory. Concerned by the overwhelming evidence against appellant, Markham  
decided that it was crucial to establish his own credibility with the jury. To do this,  
9 Markham elected not to argue (1) the second shooter theory because it lacked evidence  
support; or (2) the claim of right defense because of the criminal nature of the drug  
transaction. Instead, Markham made the decision to focus on the causation element of  
murder, which was the most serious charge. Markham’s hope was that by maintaining his  
10 credibility with the jury and giving them the opportunity to hold appellant responsible for his  
conduct by finding him guilty of some serious charges, they would be more inclined to  
11 acquit him of murder. This tactical decision was reasonable under prevailing professional  
12 norms.

13 Finally, even if appellant could show that Markham performed deficiently, he would also  
14 have to demonstrate that Markham’s failure to argue the second shooter theory caused him  
15 prejudice. To make this showing, appellant must demonstrate “ ‘there is a ‘reasonable  
16 probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would  
have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine  
confidence in the outcome.’ ’ ’ [Citation.]” (*Lucas, supra*, 12 Cal. 4th at p. 436.) Like the  
17 trial court, we conclude that appellant cannot carry this burden here. There was  
18 overwhelming evidence that the bullet that killed Quiett came from appellant’s gun.  
Furthermore, there was no evidence that anybody other than appellant had or used a gun at  
the time that Quiett was shot and killed. If Markham had argued otherwise, it is not  
19 reasonably probable that the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable to  
appellant.

20 *Loyd*, 2017 WL 6014413, at \*18-20 (brackets added). In summary, the state appellate court  
21 rejected the IAC claim upon finding that Markham’s investigation was thorough and reasonable  
22 under the circumstances; he had a sound reason not to present the second shooter defense; his  
23 tactical decision to focus on the causation element instead of the second shooter or claim of right  
24 defenses was reasonable under prevailing professional norms; and there was no reasonable  
25 probability of a different result if he had argued otherwise. *See id.*

26 The record shows that Petitioner did not raise any IAC claims in his petition for review in  
27 the California Supreme Court, and thus he did not exhaust his IAC claims on direct appeal. *See*  
28 Dkt. No. 26-13; Resp’t Ex. 10. Instead, Petitioner raised IAC claims for the first time before the

1 California Supreme Court in his state habeas petitions filed on March 19, 2020. *See* Resp't Ex.  
2 18. On June 10, 2020, the California Supreme Court summarily denied the state habeas petition  
3 filed on March 19, 2020. *See* Resp't Ex. 19 & 21.

4 **b. Applicable Law**

5 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are examined under *Strickland v. Washington*,  
6 466 U.S. 668 (1984). “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether  
7 counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial  
8 cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” *Id.* at 686. In order to prevail on a claim of  
9 ineffectiveness of counsel, a petitioner must establish two factors. First, he must establish that  
10 counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an “objective standard of  
11 reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms, *id.* at 687-88, “not whether it deviated from  
12 best practices or most common custom,” *Richter*, 562 U.S. at 105 (citing *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at  
13 690). “A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a ‘strong presumption’  
14 that counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance.”  
15 *Id.* at 104 (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 689).

16 Second, a petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient  
17 performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional  
18 errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 694. A  
19 reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. *Id.*  
20 “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” *Richter*, 562 U.S.  
21 at 112 (citing *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 693). It is unnecessary for a federal court considering an  
22 ineffective assistance of counsel claim on habeas review to address the prejudice prong, i.e., the  
23 second factor of the *Strickland* test, if the petitioner cannot establish incompetence, as required  
24 under the first prong. *Siripongs v. Calderon*, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998).

25 The standards of both 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and *Strickland* are “highly deferential,” and  
26 “when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.” *Richter*, 562 U.S. at 105 (internal quotation  
27 marks omitted). “[T]he question [under § 2254(d)] is not whether counsel’s actions were  
28 reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied

1 *Strickland's* deferential standard." *Id.*

2 **c. Analysis**

3 Petitioner raises multiple IAC claims related to Markham allegedly rendering ineffective  
4 assistance on several grounds in the investigation and presentation of the defense. One IAC claim  
5 was raised on direct appeal and addressed by the state appellate court. *See Loyd*, 2017 WL  
6 6014413, at \*18-20. However, Petitioner did not include any IAC claims in his petition for  
7 review. *See* Dkt. No. 26-13; Resp't Ex. 10. Thus, his IAC claims were raised for the first time in  
8 his state habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court. *See* Resp't Exs. 18 & 20. Because  
9 the state supreme court gave no reasoned explanation of its decision on Petitioner's IAC claims,  
10 this Court should conduct "an independent review of the record" to determine whether the state  
11 supreme court's decision was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established  
12 federal law. *Plascencia*, 467 F.3d at 1197-98; *Himes*, 336 F.3d at 853. Specifically, the Court  
13 "must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state  
14 court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that  
15 those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of th[e] [Supreme]  
16 Court." *Richter*, 562 U.S. at 102.

17 Here, in conducting its independent review of the record, the Court focuses on the state  
18 supreme court's summary denial of all the IAC claims, *see* Resp't Ex. 20, to determine whether  
19 the state supreme court's decision was objectively reasonable, *Plascencia*, 467 F.3d at 1197-98;  
20 *Himes*, 336 F.3d at 853. Because the record also contains a reasoned decision from the state  
21 appellate court on one of the IAC claims, this Court will at times look to the reasoning of the state  
22 appellate court on direct appeal and determine whether that reasoning could have also supported  
23 the state supreme court's summary denial on state habeas.

24 **i. Claim 5(a): Failure to Present Evidence**

25 Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by Markham's  
26 "failure to present evidence and argue that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable  
27 doubt that the bullet that inadvertently discharged from the firearm was the bullet that killed Cindy  
28 Quiett." Dkt. No. 1 at 6.

1       Failure to present probative, noncumulative evidence in support of a chosen defense  
2 strategy is deficient performance absent a reasonable tactical justification. *Alcala v. Woodford*,  
3 334 F.3d 862, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding deficient performance and prejudice where counsel  
4 failed to present most probative evidence in support of alibi defense, including the only evidence  
5 that established time and date of alibi). Where counsel's deficient performance is based on the  
6 failure to present evidence, this Court "compare[s] the evidence that actually was presented to the  
7 jury with the evidence that might have been presented had counsel acted differently." *Clark v.*  
8 *Arnold*, 769 F.3d 711, 728 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). A lack of direct evidence that  
9 counsel gave constitutionally inadequate advice cannot overcome the presumption that counsel's  
10 conduct was within the range of reasonable professional advice. *Burt v. Titlow*, 571 U.S. 12, 23  
11 (2013). "[T]he failure to take a futile action can never be deficient performance." *Rupe v. Wood*,  
12 93 F.3d 1435, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996).

13       The state supreme court did not unreasonably apply the principles of *Strickland* in rejecting  
14 this IAC claim. First, Petitioner did not describe the evidence that Markham purportedly could  
15 have presented. Because no evidence was proffered indicating that a bullet other than the one  
16 Petitioner fired might have killed Quiett, Petitioner has not overcome the "strong presumption that  
17 counsel's conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." *Strickland*,  
18 466 U.S. at 689.

19       Additionally, the record shows that substantial evidence was offered to prove Petitioner's  
20 gun fired the fatal bullet. The forensic pathologist testified that the downward trajectory of the  
21 bullet in Quiett's body did not confirm the location of the shooter since it could be explained by  
22 Quiett being slightly bent forward when she was shot. 4 CT 811-812. The pathologist's  
23 testimony was consistent with the forensic scientist's opinion, positing that the trajectory of the  
24 bullet could not confirm the location of the shooter because it could show either that a shooter was  
25 across the street from Quiett (bent over), or that a shooter was on the same street as Quiett  
26 (standing erect). 7 CT 2039. Ryden testified that he told Quiett to "get down by the tree" (3 RT  
27 698), suggesting that she would have been hiding rather than in an erect, exposed position.  
28 Finally, as Markham explained in his declaration presented during the motion for new trial, there

1 was no evidence of a second shooter, and this was confirmed through the testimony of Defense  
2 Investigator Thomas Clements. 7 CT 2014; 8 RT 2010-2011. In its analysis of this claim, the  
3 state appellate court found “reasonable under prevailing professional norms” Markham’s “tactical  
4 decision” not to argue the second shooter theory “because it lacked evidence support.” *See Loyd*,  
5 2017 WL 6014413, at \*19. The state supreme court also could have also reasonably determined  
6 that Markham’s failure to present evidence of a second shooter did not amount to deficient  
7 performance for the same reason.

8        Accordingly, the state supreme court reasonably rejected Petitioner's IAC claim relating to  
9 the failure to present evidence, and he is not entitled to habeas relief on Claim 5(a).

ii. **Claim 5(b): Acknowledgment of Petitioner's Guilt During Closing Argument; Failure to Investigate Defenses; Failure to Cross-Examine Effectively**

12 Petitioner asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because Markham  
13 “acknowledged [Petitioner’s] guilt during closing arguments, failed to investigate potentially  
14 meritorious defense, and failed to cross examine witnesses effectively.” Dkt. No. 1 at 6.

With respect to Petitioner’s first assertion that Markham acknowledged his guilt during closing, the Court notes that conceding a client’s guilt during closing does not necessarily amount to ineffective representation. *See McDowell v. Calderon*, 107 F.3d 1351, 1358 (9th Cir.) (no ineffective assistance where counsel’s decision at closing argument to concede guilt of felony murder but contest defendant’s intent to kill was “best choice from a poor lot”), *amended*, 116 F.3d 364 (9th Cir.), *vacated in part on other grounds by* 130 F.3d 833, 835 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) *overruled in part on other grounds by Weeks v. Angelone*, 528 U.S. 225 (2000); *People v. Jackson*, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 293 (1980) (counsel who conceded defendant’s guilt in closing argument was not incompetent in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt), *overruled on other grounds, People v. Cromer*, 24 Cal. 4th 889, 901 n.3 (2001). Here, three independent sources (including Petitioner) testified that Petitioner held a loaded gun in Ryder’s face and said, “Give me your shit.” 3 RT 675; 4 RT 898; 6 RT 1414. Given this overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s guilt as to the attempted robbery, assault, and possession of a firearm, the state supreme court could have determined that Markham’s strategy was reasonably aimed at enhancing his credibility.

1 with the jury by not arguing that the prosecution failed to meet its burden as to these crimes during  
2 closing arguments. 7 CT 2017-2018. Although the right to effective assistance of counsel extends  
3 to closing arguments, “counsel has wide latitude in deciding how best to represent a client, and  
4 deference to counsel’s tactical decisions in his closing presentation is particularly important  
5 because of the broad range of legitimate defense strategy at that stage.” *Yarborough v. Gentry*,  
6 540 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2003). Because credibility with the jury is a legitimate consideration, Markham’s  
7 decision fell within the wide range of reasonably professional assistance, and thus the state  
8 supreme court’s rejection of this claim was not unreasonable. In any event, the record shows that  
9 Markham did not concede Petitioner’s guilt of felony murder, but instead zealously argued that  
10 Petitioner was not guilty of that offense because Quiett’s death was not reasonably likely to have  
11 happened based on Petitioner’s conduct. 7 RT 1723. Petitioner fails to show that this strategy fell  
12 below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. *See*  
13 *Strickland*, 466 at 687-88.

14 Petitioner next asserts that Markham was ineffective because he failed to investigate a  
15 potentially meritorious defense. Dkt. No. 1 at 6. However, in Claim 5(b) Petitioner fails to  
16 specify what Markham allegedly failed to investigate. *See id.* The state supreme court could have  
17 reasonably denied this claim for failure to provide specific facts as to why and how counsel’s  
18 investigation was lacking. *See James v. Borg*, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Conclusory  
19 allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”).  
20 Further, Markham’s declaration confirms that he conducted a thorough but ultimately unfruitful  
21 investigation into possible alternative defenses. 7 CT 2013-2018. In its analysis of this IAC  
22 claim, the state appellate court found that “Markham’s investigation of the second shooter theory  
23 was thorough and reasonable under the circumstances” and that the record “also provide[d] a  
24 sound reason for Markham’s decision not to present a second shooter theory to the jury.” *Loyd*,  
25 2017 WL 6014413, at \*19. “[T]he duty to investigate does not force defense lawyers to scour the  
26 globe on the off chance something will turn up; reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when  
27 they have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste.” *Rompilla v. Beard*, 545  
28 U.S. 374, 382 (2005). The state supreme court likewise could have reasonably rejected this claim

1 for the same reason. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this basis.

Finally, Petitioner argues that Markham failed to cross examine witnesses effectively. Dkt. No. 1 at 6. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that in criminal cases the accused has the right to “be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The federal confrontation right applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. *Pointer v. Texas*, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). For purposes of federal habeas corpus review, the standard applicable to violations of the Confrontation Clause is whether the inadmissible evidence had an actual and prejudicial effect upon the jury. See *Hernandez v. Small*, 282 F.3d 1132, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing *Brecht*, 507 U.S. at 637).

0           Here again, Petitioner fails to explain how Markham’s cross-examination of witnesses was  
1 lacking. To assert a successful claim of ineffective assistance, Petitioner is required to “identify  
2 the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable  
3 professional judgment.” *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 689. Because he failed to do so, the state  
4 supreme court could have reasonably rejected Petitioner’s claim on this basis.

5 In sum, the state supreme court could have reasonably rejected this claim considering that  
6 (1) Markham's acknowledgment of Petitioner's guilt of certain offenses during closing was a  
7 reasonable tactical approach, (2) Petitioner failed to specify the ways in which Markham's  
8 investigation was lacking, and the record demonstrates that his investigation was thorough, and  
9 (3) Petitioner failed to satisfy his burden of identifying how Markham's cross examination was  
10 insufficient.

21 Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on Claim 5(b).

iii. **Claim 5(c): Improper Closing Argument**

23 Petitioner asserts that:

[D]uring closing argument, Defense counsel asked the jury to find Mr. Loyd guilty by agreeing “Danny Loyd” committed the crime of robbery, assault with a firearm, felon in possession of a firearm, and felon in possession of ammunition. By admitting Mr. Loyd was guilty of all crimes consequently by admitting the Robbery then the elements of Felony murder was [sic] met, trial counsel did the [S]tate’s job.

27 Dkt. No. 1 at 7 (brackets added).

8 This IAC claim mirrors a portion of the claim addressed above under Claim 5(b). As

1 previously explained, the state supreme court could have reasonably concluded that Markham's  
2 closing argument was a reasonable strategy to maintain credibility, with the goal of persuading the  
3 jury to acquit on the felony murder charge despite the overwhelming evidence as to the other  
4 offenses. The state supreme court therefore could have reasonably concluded that the closing  
5 argument did not result in Petitioner receiving ineffective assistance. Accordingly, Petitioner is  
6 not entitled to habeas relief on Claim 5(c).

7 **iv. Claim 5(d): Inadequate Investigation**

8 Petitioner asserts that Markham's actions in investigating the second shooter defense were  
9 inadequate because “[d]efense counsel did not secure a[n] expert witness who could testify Mr.  
10 Loyd's pistol could not have shot Ms. Quiett if she were standing erect, [and] [d]efense counsel  
11 was unprepared when ‘Cynthia Downing’ testified Ms. Quiett was standing erect at the time of the  
12 shooting.” Dkt. No. 1 at 7 (brackets added).

13 As the state appellate court explained, the second shooter theory was first conceived by a  
14 defense investigator who worked on the case before Markham was appointed, and who was not a  
15 ballistics expert. *See Loyd*, 2017 WL 6014413, at \*19. Markham determined that he could not  
16 establish the presence of a second shooter without assistance from a ballistics expert witness. 7  
17 CT 2013. He therefore retained Peter Barnett, a qualified ballistics expert, to examine the  
18 “information concerning the slope of the scene and distances between various landmarks and  
19 locations.” 7 CT 2013-2014. Based on the available evidence, Barnett was unable to testify that  
20 Petitioner could not have been the shooter. 7 CT 2014. Markham determined that, without  
21 Barnett’s affirmative testimony that Petitioner could not have been the shooter, a second shooter  
22 defense could not reasonably be brought since there was no other evidence of a second shooter. 7  
23 CT 2014. Hoping to uncover such evidence, Markham worked with Defense Investigator Venturi  
24 and Petitioner in order to “try to find some evidence that there was a second shooter.” 7 CT 2014.  
25 Barnett’s report indicated that the downward trajectory of Quiett’s injury could be explained either  
26 by her being bent forward when hit by a bullet fired across the street or standing erect when hit by  
27 a bullet fired from the same side of the street. 7 CT 2039. If the bullet was fired from the same  
28 side of the street as Quiett, Barnett concluded that he would expect to find gunpowder residue on

1 her clothing. 7 CT 2040. Markham therefore sought and received authorization to test Quiett's  
2 clothing for gunpowder residue to support the theory that a second shooter shot Quiett from a  
3 range much closer than where Petitioner was standing. 7 CT 2015. Barnett determined that "[t]he  
4 conclusions based on the testing did nothing to establish the presence of another shooter [or]  
5 exclude [Petitioner] as a shooter." 7 CT 2015. The state supreme court could have reasonably  
6 found that Markham was entitled to rely on the opinions of Barnett as a well-qualified ballistics  
7 expert. *Hendricks v. Calderon*, 70 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) ("If an attorney has the burden  
8 of reviewing the trustworthiness of a qualified expert's conclusion before the attorney is entitled to  
9 make decisions based on that conclusion, the role of the expert becomes superfluous.").

10 In addition, Markham took extra steps to obtain additional authorization to hire a second  
11 investigator, Defense Investigator Clements, to conduct further investigation into the possible  
12 discovery of a second shooter, but "no evidence of a second shooter was found." 7 CT 2014.  
13 Based on this fact, Markham concluded:

14 It is my professional opinion that I have done everything reasonably possible to investigate  
15 the existence of a second shooter. However, despite everything that was done, no evidence  
16 was discovered to support that theory. Based on the evidence in the case, including the  
17 statements of witnesses and Mr. Loyd's thorough and detailed confession, I did not believe  
18 there was any way I could convince the jury there was a second shooter, let alone that a  
19 second, unidentified shooter killed Ms. Quiett, without some evidence corroborating such a  
20 theory.

21 7 CT 2015. Finally, Markham noted in his declaration that:

22 During the trial, two key pieces of evidence reinforced my opinion that [it] would be  
23 impossible to convince a jury that a second shooter was responsible for Ms. Quiett's death.  
24 First, the prosecution's pathologist testified that the downward path of the bullet was likely  
25 caused by the fact that Ms. Quiett was slightly bent over when she was shot. This same  
26 opinion was shared by Mr. Barnett. Second, nobody was able to testify Ms. Quiett was  
27 erect when she was shot. Cynthia [D]owning testified she saw Ms. Quiet[t] standing at  
28 some point but did not see her get shot. Unfortunately, she was very clear that she did not  
see Ms. Quiett's position precisely at the time she was shot.

7 CT 2015 (brackets added).

29 In summary, Markham hired two separate investigators to search for evidence that might  
30 allow a ballistics expert to testify as to the possibility of a second shooter. Just as the state  
31 appellate court reasonably concluded that Markham conducted a "thorough and reasonable"  
32 investigation of the second shooter defense, *see Loyd*, 2017 WL 6014413, at \*19, the state  
33

1 supreme court reasonably could have reached the same conclusion. After having uncovered no  
2 such evidence, Markham believed it to be to Petitioner's tactical advantage not to advance a  
3 second shooter defense without any basis in evidence. Applying the deferential standard required  
4 of a review of an IAC claim, it is not unreasonable for the state supreme court to have rejected this  
5 claim because Markham's strategy "was within the 'wide range' of reasonable professional  
6 assistance." *Richter*, 562 U.S. at 104 (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 689).

7 Petitioner also contends that Markham was deficient in being unprepared when Downing  
8 testified that Quiett was standing erect at the time of the shooting. Dkt. No. 1 at 7. On direct,  
9 Downing testified that she was sleeping in a van driven by Petitioner when she was woken up by a  
10 loud sound, and as the van was driving away, she saw Quiett "holding her purse like this and . . .  
11 saying 'Oh my God.'" 3 RT 592. Downing added that when she turned around as they were  
12 pulling away, she saw Quiett "drop[] to her knees." 3 RT 592-593. Downing made no other  
13 statement indicating that Quiett was standing erect at the time of the shooting. 3 RT 583-604.  
14 During cross, Markham highlighted the unreliability of Downing's memory due to her  
15 methamphetamine use as well as the fact that she did not see Quiett get shot. 3 RT 605-606. The  
16 state supreme court reasonably could have determined that Markham did not question Downing  
17 further about Quiett's position at the time she was shot because Downing testified that she did not  
18 see the shooting occur. 3 RT 605-606.

19 Accordingly, the state supreme court had an objectively reasonable basis for rejecting  
20 Petitioner's IAC claim that Markham's actions in investigating the second shooter defense were  
21 inadequate, and Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim 5(d).

22 **v. Claim 5(e): Inadequate Knowledge of the Law**

23 Petitioner claims that:

24 Defense counsel rested his case on a faulty premise, namely, he could admit the robbery  
25 and then argue "Daniel Loyd" did not cause the death of Ms. Quiett, because her shooting  
26 was unintentional, accidental or negligent, this is faulty, because this is a Felony Murder  
Rule case and the felony is robbery.

27 Dkt. No. 1 at 8.

28 The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee defendants the right to error-free representation.

1 *See, e.g., Featherstone v. Estelle*, 948 F.2d 1497, 1507 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]rial counsel’s

2 performance, although not error-free, did not fall below the *Strickland* standard. Thus, petitioner

3 was not prejudiced by appellate counsel’s decision not to raise issues that had no merit.”). Rather,

4 the Sixth Amendment guarantees a representation that is free from serious error. *Strickland*, 466

5 U.S. at 687. Counsel’s conduct constitutes serious error where it undermines the proper

6 functioning of the adversarial process such that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced

7 a just result. *Id.* at 686.

8           A defense attorney can make reasonable strategic decisions to maintain credibility with the  
9       jury and advance legal argument aimed at “something akin to jury nullification.” *Gallegos v.*  
10      *Ryan*, 820 F.3d 1013, 1029-1030 (9th Cir.), *amended*, 842 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that,  
11      given the circumstances, defense counsel “could have seen his best hope as being that the jury  
12      might get lost in the morass of evidence and legal theories and convict Gallegos of some offense  
13      less than first-degree murder out of mercy or confusion, ignoring the charge of first-degree felony  
14      murder.”)

15 Defense counsel's performance is not deficient where, as here, counsel "did what he could  
16 with what he had to work with, which was not much." *Gerlaugh v. Stewart*, 129 F.3d 1027, 1033  
17 (9th Cir. 1997). Given the circumstances and lack of a viable defense, the state supreme court  
18 reasonably could have determined that Markham strategically and competently performed his duty  
19 to Petitioner. The fact that this strategy did not result in an acquittal does not mean counsel was  
20 ineffective.

21 Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim 5(e).

**vi. Claim 5(f): Failure to Assert a Legal Defense**

23 Petitioner claims that Markham “tried to assert a defense that because the killing during a  
24 felony murder was not foreseeable, therefore ‘Daniel Loyd’ must not be convicted of murder, it is  
25 clear black letter law that the facts in this case do not support such a defense and other defenses  
26 were available.” Dkt. No. 1 at 8.

27 As discussed with respect to Claims 5(b) and 5(d), the state supreme court reasonably  
28 could have concluded that Markham's defense strategy was "within the wide range of reasonable

1 professional assistance.” *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 689. Additionally, as to Claim 5(f), Petitioner  
2 fails to specify what other defenses may have been available to him. *See* Dkt. No. 1 at 8. Having  
3 failed to provide specific facts other than a conclusory allegation, *see James*, 24 F.3d at 26, and  
4 affording counsel’s decisions the required deference, *see Yarborough*, 540 U.S. at 5-6, the state  
5 supreme court reasonably rejected this IAC claim.

6 Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on Claim 5(f).

7 **vii. Claim 5(g): Counsel Admitted Guilt without a Tactical  
8 Reason**

9 Petitioner alleges that Markham admitted that Petitioner was guilty without a tactical  
10 reason. Dkt. No. 1 at 9.

11 As addressed above with respect to Claims 5(b) and 5(c), the state supreme court could  
12 have reasonably concluded that Markham’s admission of Petitioner’s guilt of the other offenses  
13 (i.e., attempted robbery, assault, and possession of a firearm) was a reasonable tactical approach.  
14 Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on Claim 5(g).

15 **viii. Claim 5(h): Failure to Assert Second Shooter Defense**

16 Petitioner contends that Markham withdrew the use of an expert witness to testify  
17 regarding a second shooter without any other valid defense in its place. Dkt. No. 1 at 9. Petitioner  
18 argues that “[c]onsequently, counsel’s actions amounted to virtual abandonment of his client[’]s  
19 defense, ‘structural error at it’s [sic] best.’” *Id.* (brackets added).

20 As addressed above with respect to Claims 5(a), 5(b) and 5(d), the state supreme court did  
21 not unreasonably reject this claim of ineffective assistance relating to Markham’s investigation of  
22 or failure to present a second shooter defense because Markham’s representation was within the  
23 wide range of professional competence. *See Richter*, 562 U.S. at 104. Accordingly, Petitioner is  
24 not entitled to habeas relief on Claim 5(h).

25 **ix. Claim 5(i): Calling Petitioner to Testify in Support of  
26 Defense Trial Counsel Had Abandoned**

27 Petitioner asserts that Markham rendered ineffective assistance by calling Petitioner to  
28 testify in support of a defense Markham supposedly had abandoned, stating that:

29 Trial counsel was ineffective for calling [Petitioner] to testify regarding a defense that trial

1 counsel chose to abandon. Here, “David Markham’s” decision to not rely upon a claim of  
 2 right<sup>9</sup> defense after “Daniel Loyd” testified can be analogized to Lucy Van Pelt pulling the  
 3 football away from Charlie Brown. There was no new evidence that came to light that  
 4 might have justified his sudden withdrawal of this defense after counsel made the decision  
 5 for him to testify.

6 Dkt. No. 1 at 10 (footnote added).

7 Markham explained in his declaration that at the time trial started, he believed that the  
 8 claim of right defense (that Petitioner’s testimony supported) could result in an acquittal or a hung  
 9 jury. 7CT 2016. Markman was concerned about this defense because it contradicted what  
 10 Petitioner had initially told the police and there was a possibility the trial court could decide to  
 11 instruct the jury that the claim of right defense does not apply when contraband is the subject of  
 12 the taking. 7CT 2016. Markham provided the relevant background on available defenses and  
 13 details on his strategic decision-making process as follows:

14 Prior to trial, Mr. Loyd informed me [he had] intended to take from Mr. Ryden, drugs that  
 15 he had loaned to Mr. Ryden. A necessary element of the charge of robbery is that the  
 16 property taken belong to another. When trial started, I believed defending the charges of  
 17 felony murder and robbery by attacking this single element of robbery was Mr. Loyd’s best  
 18 chance of obtaining an acquittal to the murder charge or at least, a hung jury. I handled the  
 19 case with this defense in mind. I cross examined witnesses with this defense in mind and  
 20 presented evidence with this defense in mind. However, I was concerned about arguing  
 21 this theory for two reasons. First, Mr. Loyd appeared incredibly honest and sincere when  
 22 he spoke to the investigating officer. However, his statements to the officer during his  
 23 confession contradicted the theory that the drugs he was attempting to take were loaned to  
 24 Mr. Ryden. Second, I believed that there was a possibility that after argument the Judge  
 25 would instruct the jury that this defense was not available because a claim of right defense  
 26 is not available when contraband is the subject of the taking. If that happened, Mr. Loyd  
 27 would have no chance of success at trial. It appeared to be a very risky approach.  
 28 Furthermore, I was concerned that presenting such a defense could be considered  
 ineffective assistance of counsel if I was not successful . . . .

29 Because the second shooter defense was not viable, and because of the risks of the missing  
 30 element defense relating to robbery, I wanted to defend the case based on causation  
 31 (foreseeability) argument. I believe[d] a jury would feel that this was truly an accident,  
 32 Mr. Loyd’s remorse was sincere, and that he would have no reason to believe Ms. Quiet  
 33 risked death by his conduct. I believed, based on my experience, that an argument based  
 34 on foreseeability offered Mr. Loyd the greatest chance of success in beating the most  
 35 serious charge. However, the Judge indicated early on that CALCRIM [No.] 240 would  
 36 not be given, although he left open the possibility that he could change his mind.

37 During the course of the trial I handled the case keeping both the “missing element”  
 38 defense and the “foreseeability” defense in mind. On the morning of closing arguments, I

39 \_\_\_\_\_  
 40 <sup>9</sup> California’s claim of right defense “provides that a defendant’s good faith belief, even if  
 41 mistakenly held, that he has a right or claim to property he takes from another negates the  
 42 felonious intent necessary for conviction of theft or robbery.” *People v. Tufunga*, 21 Cal. 4th 935,  
 43 938 (1999).

1 had two Power Point presentations and two closing arguments prepared. One for the  
2 “missing element” defense and one for the “foreseeability” defense. On the morning of  
3 closing arguments the Judge determined that he was going to give the foreseeability  
4 instruction, CALCRIM [No.] 240. When the judge stated this I had the option of arguing  
5 either defense. For the reasons previously stated I decided that the “foreseeability”  
6 argument gave Mr. Loyd the best chance of success. My opinion was further supported by  
7 the fact that if I argued “foreseeability,” Mr. Loyd would not appear to have been dishonest  
8 in his testimony. Nothing he said appeared to be calculated to help his defense if the  
9 defense was based on foreseeability. This would not have been the case if I argued that  
10 “missing element” defense.

11 I did consider arguing both defenses. However, I decided not to do so because I believed  
12 and still believe I would have lost credibility with the jury had I argued the “missing  
13 element” defense given the inconsistencies between Mr. Loyd’s confession and his  
14 testimony at trial.

15 Because my defense was based on the lack of “foreseeability” I was unable to credibly  
16 argue that defendant did not commit robbery or the other charges. I saw this as a benefit to  
17 Mr. Loyd. As previously stated, I believed by conceding these charges, it would have the  
18 effect of (1) enhancing my credibility thereby causing the jury to give more credence to my  
19 argument and (2) allowing the jury to hold Mr. Loyd responsible for his conduct even if  
20 they acquit him of the murder charges.

21 As the case stands now, Mr. Loyd will never get out of custody. Had my argument  
22 persuaded the jury, even though he would have been incarcerated for a long period of time,  
23 he would have had an out date. Bearing in mind the overwhelming evidence against him,  
24 that is what I was fighting for. Every decision I made in this case was a tactical one based  
25 on my experience and designed to give Mr. Loyd an opportunity to be released some day.

26 7 CT 2016-2018 (brackets added). The record shows that the trial court did ultimately instruct that  
27 the “claim of right defense does not apply if the claim arose from an activity commonly known to  
be illegal or known by the defendant to be illegal.” 7 RT 1756.

28 As evident from the trial strategy outlined in his declaration, Markham called Petitioner to  
29 testify to keep all defense options open until his closing argument. 7 CT 2016-2018. Thus, the  
30 record demonstrates that Markham had not abandoned the claim of right defense at the time  
31 Petitioner testified. 7 CT 2016-2018. The state supreme court could have determined that  
32 Markham reasonably believed that having Petitioner testify in support of a claim of right defense  
33 was a viable defense option, especially since the prosecution had introduced overwhelming  
34 evidence of Petitioner’s guilt. *See Richter*, 562 U.S. at 106 (“Rare are the situations in which the  
35 ‘wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions’ will be limited to any one technique  
36 or approach.”). Considering the “wide latitude” Markham had in making tactical decisions about  
37 how best to represent a client, *see Yarborough*, 540 U.S. at 5-6, the state supreme court could have

1 found reasonable Markham's tactical decision to eventually abandon the claim of right defense.  
2 Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim 5(i).

3 **x. Summary**

4 In sum, the state supreme court could have reasonably concluded that there was no  
5 deficient performance or resulting prejudice from Markham's investigation and presentation of the  
6 defense. Petitioner has made no showing that the state supreme court's summary denial of his  
7 IAC claims was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of *Strickland*. Therefore,  
8 Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claims 5(a) through 5(i).

9 **6. Claim 6: Cumulative Error Relating to IAC Claims**

10 In Claim 6, Petitioner argues that Markham's errors outlined above in Claim 5 resulted in  
11 cumulative error. Dkt. No. 1 at 10. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that Markham's cumulative  
12 errors "are 'many' and all together they are a breakdown of the adversary process caused by  
13 deficiency in counsel's assistance, the structural error has affected the framework within which the  
14 trial proceeds." *Id.*

15 The Ninth Circuit has held that in exceptional cases, although no single trial error is  
16 sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of several trial errors may  
17 prejudice a defendant so much that his conviction must be overturned. *See Alcala*, 334 F.3d at  
18 893-95 (reversing conviction where multiple constitutional errors hindered defendant's efforts to  
19 challenge every important element of proof offered by prosecution). Cumulative error is more  
20 likely to be found prejudicial when the government's case is weak. *See id.*

21 However, where there is no single constitutional error existing as to Petitioner's claims,  
22 including his IAC Claims (Claim 5), nothing can accumulate to the level of a constitutional  
23 violation. *See Hayes v. Ayers*, 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th Cir. 2011) (if "no error of constitutional  
24 magnitude occurred, no cumulative prejudice is possible"). Because no single constitutional error  
25 existed and no performance by counsel was deficient, there is no cumulative error either. *See id.*

26 Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim 6.

27 **V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY**

28 The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court

1 that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of  
2 appealability. *See Rules Governing § 2254 Case, Rule 11(a).*

3 A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a  
4 substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the  
5 certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard, *id.* § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district  
6 court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c)  
7 is straightforward: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district  
8 court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” *Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S.  
9 473, 484 (2000).

10 Here, Petitioner has not made such a showing, and, accordingly, a certificate of  
11 appealability will be denied.

12 **VI. CONCLUSION**


13 For the reasons stated above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED, and a  
14 certificate of appealability is DENIED.

15 The Clerk of the Court shall close the file.

16 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

17 Dated: 6/3/2021

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HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.  
United States District Judge