NO. 22-

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

DKYLE BRIDGES

Petitioner

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 21-1679

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES,
Appellant

_____

No. 21-2122

_____

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

KRISTIAN JONES,
Appellant

_____

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Crim Nos. 2:18-cr-00193-001 and 002)
District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro

_____

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 11, 2022

_____

Before: GREENAWAY, JR., MATEY, and RENDELL, *Circuit Judges*

_____

JUDGMENT

_____

This cause came to be considered on the record from the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and was submitted pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on July 11, 2022. On consideration whereof, it is now hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED by this Court that the judgments of said District Court entered on March 31, 2021 and June 7, 2021 are hereby AFFIRMED. All of the above in accordance with the Opinion of this Court.

No costs shall be taxed.

ATTEST:

s/ Patricia S. Dodszuweit
Clerk

Dated: September 15, 2022

Certified as a true copy and issued in lieu of a formal mandate on October 7, 2022

Teste: Patricia A Dodszuweit

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

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(Opinion Filed: September 15, 2022)

OPINION*

GREENAWAY, JR., *Circuit Judge*.

Appellants Dkyle Jamal Bridges and Kristian Jones were convicted of sex-trafficking offenses. On appeal, they bring various challenges to their judgments of conviction, including the District Court's pre-trial and evidentiary rulings. In addition, Bridges challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed. For the following reasons, we will affirm.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

From 2012 to 2017, Appellants and an additional co-defendant ran a sex trafficking scheme whereby they forcibly trafficked several minor and adult female victims in motels located in Pennsylvania and Delaware. Bridges was responsible for organizing the scheme, whereas Jones was responsible for logistics. In trafficking these victims, Appellants subjected the girls and women to harsh conditions and violence.

The Government charged Appellants with forcibly sex trafficking five minor and adult female victims. After a jury trial, Appellants were convicted based on, *inter alia*, the trial testimony of three victims (N.G., Z.W., and J.S.). The two remaining named victims, B.T., and L.C., did not testify; however, statements attributed to them were admitted at trial.

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent.

Specifically, Appellants were found guilty of conspiracy to commit forcible sex trafficking of adults and minors in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c) for conduct that spanned from 2012 to 2017 (Count 1); and forcible sex trafficking of minors, B.T. (Count 4), N.G. (Count 5), and L.C. (Count 6), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 15914(a)(1) and (b)(1)-(2), and (c). Bridges was also convicted of forcible sex trafficking of two adults, Z.W. (Count 2) and J.S. (Count 3), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 15914(a)(1) and (b)(1). The District Court sentenced Bridges to 420 months' imprisonment and Kristian Jones to 240 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, the following rulings from the District Court are being challenged: (1) the denial of Appellants'[1] motions for severance; (2) the denial of Bridges's suppression motion and request for a *Franks* hearing; (3) the denial of Jones's suppression motion; (4) the admission of hearsay statements from B.T., L.C., and H.N. (a man who had solicited prostitution), none of whom testified at trial, JA1905-15; (5) the admission of evidence purportedly showing Bridges's uncharged prior bad acts, JA1356-59; (6) the admission of expert testimony; and (7) Bridges's sentence.[2]

[1] Where we use the term "Appellants" we are referring to challenges brought by both Bridges and Jones. The use of "Bridges" and "Jones" denotes that that particular defendant is bringing a challenge.

[2] The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Severance

Appellants each filed pretrial motions for severance. On appeal, they contend the District Court erred in denying their motions for severance because they suffered unfair prejudice. "We review the District Court's denial of a severance for abuse of discretion." *United States v. Heatherly*, 985 F.3d 254, 271 (3d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Where, as here, there are codefendants charged in a single conspiracy, "[w]e presume that courts will try codefendants jointly." *Id.* (citation omitted). "A defendant seeking a new trial due to the denial of a severance motion must show that the joint trial led to clear and substantial prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair trial[,]" which is "a demanding standard that requires more than [m]ere allegations of prejudice[.]" *United States v. Scarfo*, 41 F.4th 136, 182 (3d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Appellants have not met their heavy burden to demonstrate "clear and substantial prejudice." *Id.* (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). They essentially assert "that some evidence applied to some defendants more than others or was more damaging to some defendants." *Heatherly*, 985 F.3d at 271 (citation omitted). As we have previously held, this is insufficient. *Id.*

Importantly, Appellants have failed to demonstrate that a jury would be unable to compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to each defendant. *Scarfo*, 41 F.4th at 182 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (The "critical issue" is "not whether the

evidence against a co-defendant is more damaging but rather whether the jury will be able to compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to separate defendants in view of its volume and limited admissibility."). Considering each count involved a distinct victim, a jury would not have had difficulty compartmentalizing the evidence. Moreover, the District Court appropriately instructed the jury to keep the evidence and defendants separate.

B. Motions to Suppress

Bridges challenges the District Court's denial of his suppression motion and request for a *Franks* hearing related to the search of his vehicle. Additionally, Jones appeals the District Court's denial of his suppression motion related to the search of a motel room where he was found with N.G. and L.C. "We review the denial of a motion to suppress under a mixed standard: clear error for factual findings and de novo for issues of law." *United States v. Jarmon*, 14 F.4th 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2021), *cert. denied,* 142 S. Ct. 930 (2022) (citation omitted).

1. Search of Bridges's Vehicle

Based on information from a confidential informant, the police conducted a sting operation at the Motel 6 in Northeast Philadelphia on July 12, 2017. The police had learned from a confidential informant that Bridges was trafficking a young woman. Law enforcement traced the young woman's phone number, which had been provided by the confidential informant, and arranged an undercover commercial sexual encounter. While at the Motel 6, the police found Bridges and a young woman in a Taurus. Inside the Taurus, there were multiple cellphones and boxes of condoms in plain view. The police

subsequently detained Bridges. After determining that Bridges had a suspended license, the police impounded Bridges's vehicle.

The following day, FBI Special Agent Nicholas Grill prepared a search warrant where he described a sex trafficking investigation and identified Bridges as the main suspect. Special Agent Grill explained how the confidential informant had provided information about a young woman, who he referred to as Victim Three.[3] He then described the sting operation, noting that the Taurus Bridges and the young woman arrived in had been previously associated with Bridges. Finally, Special Agent Grill indicated that during an interview of Victim Three, she stated that Bridges was her pimp and had driven her to the Motel 6.

The District Court correctly denied Bridges's motion to suppress. The police had probable cause to stop Bridges, impound his vehicle, and search it. As an initial matter, law enforcement was justified in stopping Bridges because there was a reasonable suspicion, based on the ongoing investigation and undercover sting operation, that Bridges was at the Motel 6 to traffic victims. This pre-existing suspicion combined with the objects in plain view in the vehicle gave rise to probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of sex trafficking. Thus, the police were justified in towing the vehicle to search it at a later time under the automobile exception. *See California v. Acevedo*, 500 U.S. 565, 570 (1991) ("[I]f the police have probable cause to justify a warrantless seizure of an automobile on a public roadway, they may conduct either an

[3] Victim Three was later identified as B.T.

immediate or a delayed search of the vehicle."). The search warrant was thus "prudent . . . [but] unnecessary," given the automobile exception already justified a warrantless search. *See United States v. Riedesel*, 987 F.2d 1383, 1392 (8th Cir. 1993).

2. *Franks* Hearing

Bridges argues that he was entitled to a *Franks* hearing because the search warrant affidavit contained false statements.

> We review for clear error a district court's determination regarding whether false statements in a warrant application were made with reckless disregard for the truth. Next, after putting aside any false statements made with reckless disregard for the truth, we review de novo a district court's substantial-basis review of a magistrate judge's probable cause determination.

United States v. Desu, 23 F.4th 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2022).

For a defendant to obtain an evidentiary hearing challenging the validity of a search warrant under *Franks v. Delaware*, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), he "must establish (1) that a warrant application contained false statements made with reckless disregard for the truth and (2) that the remaining truthful statements, standing alone, do not establish probable cause." *Desu*, 23 F.4th at 234 (citing *Franks*, 438 U.S. at 171–72). To do so, a "defendant must prove his allegations by a substantial preliminary showing." *Id.* (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

We have held that false statements may include both omissions and assertions. *Id.* Whereas "omissions are made with reckless disregard for the truth when an officer recklessly omits facts that any reasonable person would know that a judge would want to know, . . . assertions are made with reckless disregard for the truth when an officer has

obvious reasons to doubt the truth of what he or she is asserting." *Wilson v. Russo*, 212 F.3d 781, 783 (3d Cir. 2000).

Bridges's primary argument on appeal is that Special Agent Grill's affidavit falsely stated that a confidential source had provided the statements about Victim Three when in fact the source was Victim Three's mother. He contends that such an omission was significant because a judge might view information provided by a family member differently than information by a confidential informant. *Id.* We reject this argument. The disclosure of the confidential informant's identity was not material and thus would not constitute an omission. *Russo*, 212 F.3d at 783; *Desu*, 23 F.4th at 236. Bridges's remaining arguments purporting to show that the statements about Victim Three were false or unreliable, are meritless. He has neither demonstrated that Special Agent Grill recklessly omitted material facts nor that he made statements that he had obvious reasons to doubt. *Russo*, 212 F.3d at 783. Thus, the District Court did not err by not granting Bridges a *Franks* hearing.

3. Search of Jones's Room

As described in further detail below, Jones was arrested after the Tinicum police interviewed H.N., a man who had solicited prostitution at a Motel 6 near the Philadelphia airport. Based on information provided during this interview, the Tinicum police went to the Motel 6, entered a room registered to Jones's brother, and detained, frisked, and ordered Jones to empty his pockets without a warrant. Jones argues that the Tinicum police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting this warrantless search. He further contends the search warrant for his cell phone following his arrest was too general

and that the scope of information extracted from his cell phone was overly broad. Before reaching the merits of Jones's arguments we must consider whether he has standing.

"[S]tanding in the Fourth Amendment context is shorthand for a legitimate expectation of privacy." *United States v. Jackson*, 849 F.3d 540, 550 n.7 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "An individual challenging a search has the burden of establishing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property searched and the item seized." *United States v. Burnett*, 773 F.3d 122, 131 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). In determining whether a defendant has standing, we analyze whether the defendant's expectation of privacy was both subjectively and objectively reasonable. *Id.*

Although we have not squarely addressed whether a defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room under someone else's name, our case law in other contexts is instructive. For example, we have concluded that defendants lacked standing where there was "no evidence that the [defendants] were at [the third-party's] apartment for any purpose other than to engage in drug-related activities." *United States v. Perez*, 280 F.3d 318, 338 (3d Cir. 2002). We have also held that "a passenger in a car that he neither owns nor leases typically has no standing to challenge a search of the car." *Burnett*, 773 F.3d at 131. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, Jones primarily contends he has standing because the room was registered to a family member, he had a key to the hotel room, and he was an overnight guest. Jones Br. 21-40. Jones has not met his burden in establishing standing. He has not offered any evidence suggesting that he had a legitimate purpose in staying in the room (in fact, H.N.

confessed to having a commercial sexual encounter there moments earlier), that he paid for the room, or that his personal belongings were found there. *Id.* *See United States v. Carr,* 939 F.2d 1442, 1446 (10th Cir.1991) (holding a defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a hotel room that was not registered to him or anyone he was sharing it with); *see also United States v. Cooper*, 203 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (in determining "whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room, courts have looked to such indicia as whether the individual paid and/or registered for the room or whether the individual's personal belongings were found inside the room"). Hence, the District Court correctly determined that Jones lacked standing to challenge the search of the motel room and the motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search.

Although Jones does not have standing to contest the entry into the motel room, he does have standing to contest the seizure of his cell phone, which had been in his pocket. Despite having standing, this claim also fails. The police arrested Jones following their discovery of an outstanding warrant for his arrest. The police thus were permitted to conduct the search of Jones's phone as a search incident to arrest. *United States v. Nasir*, 17 F.4th 459, 466 (3d Cir. 2021). Furthermore, the warrant for the search of the phone was sufficiently particularized, as it specified the item to be searched and the crime for which police were seeking evidence. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Palms*, 21 F.4th 689, 699 (10th Cir. 2021).

C. Admission of Hearsay Statements

Appellants contend that the statements from the two victims who did not testify, B.T. and L.C., and statements from H.N. were testimonial and should not have been admitted. As support for their position, they argue that these statements were either given to law enforcement or introduced to prove the elements of the offenses.

"We review the district court's evidentiary rulings principally on an abuse of discretion standard." *United States v. Green*, 617 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). "Where, however, a party fails to object in a timely fashion or fails to make a specific objection, our review is for plain error only." *United States v. Moore*, 375 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). "[T]o the extent [the District Court's rulings] are based on a legal interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence" we "exercise plenary review." *Green*, 617 F.3d at 239 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Pursuant to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant "shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. In determining whether to admit an out-of-court statement by a non-testifying witness, we first consider whether the statement was testimonial. *Rolan v. Coleman*, 680 F.3d 311, 327 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). In this context, a statement is testimonial if it is "made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact," which is "potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." *United States v. Gonzalez*, 905 F.3d 165, 201 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "If the absent witness's statement is testimonial, then the Confrontation Clause requires unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination." *United States v.*

Moreno, 809 F.3d 766, 774 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

1. B.T.'s Statements to her Mother and Grandmother

B.T.'s mother and grandmother testified that on several occasions B.T. called them while crying and told them about Bridges's treatment of her. They explained that B.T. would often ask them to pick her up whenever Bridges kicked her out of a car or otherwise left her. Moreover, B.T.'s mother testified that B.T. had told her that Bridges was her boyfriend and that Bridges was J.S.'s pimp.

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting B.T.'s mother's and grandmother's testimony concerning Bridges's treatment of B.T. These statements were not made "with the primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony." *Lambert v. Warden Greene SCI*, 861 F.3d 459, 470 (3d Cir. 2017). Rather, B.T. made these statements for the purpose of obtaining assistance from her family members and confiding in them.

2. H.N.'s Statements to Officer Lis

Officer Lis, a Tinicum police officer, testified about statements from H.N., who as described above was stopped and questioned following a commercial sexual encounter. Officer Lis testified that H.N. told him that H.N. had solicited prostitution services by responding to an ad from Backpage and that such services were performed at the Motel 6. Although H.N.'s statements were testimonial, the District Court did not plainly err in admitting Officer Lis's testimony. *See United States v. Dukagjini*, 326 F.3d 45, 59 (2d Cir. 2003) (where a defendant "failed to preserve [his] objection to the Confrontation

Clause violation . . . , we evaluate the district court's admission of testimony in violation of the Confrontation Clause for plain error"). Considering Officer Lis's testimony played a small role in the Government's case, there was no violation of a substantial right.

3. B.T.'s and L.C.'s Statements to Law Enforcement

Corporal Joseph Kendrick and FBI Agent C.J. Jackson testified about an interview conducted following L.C.'s and B.T.'s arrests for prostitution. Specifically, Corporal Kendrick testified that B.T. provided her ex-boyfriend's name and contact information. Corporal Kendrick then ran this information through the police database and discovered it matched the information for Bridges. Agent Jackson testified that B.T. mentioned Bridges's name during her interview. He also testified that L.C. had identified Bridges as the person who had brought her to the hotel. While B.T.'s and L.C.'s complete statements may have been testimonial, Corporal Kendrick's and Agent Jackson's testimony just vaguely described the information obtained—such as Bridges's name and phone number—they did not quote any *assertion* by B.T. or L.C. Thus, the statements attributed to B.T. and L.C. were not testimonial.

D. Admission of Evidence Purportedly Subject to 404(b)

Appellants contend that testimony from other women not named in the indictment constituted impermissible Rule 404(b) evidence. Bridges likewise argues that testimony about his confrontation with R.S. (another man who had solicited prostitution), and law enforcement's investigation into Bridges constituted impermissible Rule 404(b) evidence.

Pursuant to Rule 404(b), "[e]vidence of . . . [a] crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the

person acted in accordance with the character." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). However, it may be admitted for "proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." *Id.* In determining whether evidence is properly admissible under Rule 404(b), we apply the Supreme Court's test from *Huddleston v. United States*, 485 U.S. 681 (1988), which requires that the "evidence of uncharged crimes or wrongs must (1) have a proper evidentiary purpose; (2) be relevant; (3) satisfy Rule 403; and (4) be accompanied by a limiting instruction (where requested) about the purpose for which the jury may consider it." *Green*, 617 F.3d at 249.

Rule 404(b) does not apply to evidence of acts that are intrinsic to the offense because such evidence is "part and parcel of the charged offense." *United States v. Williams*, 974 F.3d 320, 357 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Evidence is considered intrinsic "if it is inextricably intertwined with the charged offense." *United States v. Cross*, 308 F.3d 308, 320 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[C]ourts have afforded the prosecution considerable leeway to present evidence, even of unalleged acts within the indictment period, that reflects a conspiratorial agreement or furtherance of the conspiracy's illegal objectives." *Williams*, 974 F.3d at 357 (citations omitted).

1. Testimony from Other Women Not Named in the Indictment

The District Court permitted testimony from women not named in the Indictment, but limited such testimony to the women's observations of Appellants' treatment of the named victims; they could not testify as to their status. Appellants challenge the testimony of Z.W., M.T., and D.W. They argue that Z.W.'s and D.W.'s testimony

impermissibly identified other women not named in the indictment and that M.T.'s and D.W.'s testimony impermissibly identified themselves as victims.

However, the testimony from Z.W., M.T., and D.W. was permissible as intrinsic evidence. It demonstrated both how Appellants trafficked the named victims and how other women played a role in such activities. For example, M.T.'s testimony about training Z.W. and D.W.'s testimony about B.T.'s commercial sexual encounters were directly relevant for proving that Z.W. and B.T. were sex trafficked, Counts 2 and 4 respectively. *See id.* (citation omitted). Moreover, M.T.'s and D.W.'s testimony about their interactions with Appellants established Appellants' modus operandi for trafficking the named victims. *See United States v. Carson*, 870 F.3d 584, 600 (7th Cir. 2017) (permitting testimony from other women not named in the indictment as direct evidence of the crime or corroborating evidence).[4]

2. Bridges's Confrontation with R.S.

At trial, Z.W., R.S. (a man who had solicited prostitution), and a state detective testified about a confrontation between Bridges and R.S. that occurred following a commercial sexual encounter. In short, after R.S. attempted to take back some money when Z.W. denied him more sex, Bridges entered the room and brandished his knife in R.S.'s face. R.S., fearing for his life, retreated and offered to return the money. In

[4] We also reject Bridges's argument that the testimony necessarily inferred that these other women were prostitutes. Given the tenor and substance of the testimony, the jury could have just as easily surmised they were mere observers or co-conspirators.

response, Bridges took $140 from R.S.'s wallet and his cell phone. Following the confrontation, R.S. contacted his employer and asked them to contact the police

The District Court admitted the evidence concerning the confrontation but excluded evidence that Bridges pleaded guilty to a state misdemeanor theft charge as a result of it. It did not abuse its discretion in doing so. As Bridges seemingly concedes in objecting to Probation Office's calculation of his criminal history score in his Presentence Report (the "PSR"), such evidence was intrinsic as to Count 2. PSR at 41 ("The defense contends that [the theft conviction] was included as part of the instant offense"). It established that Bridges provided security to Z.W. and that he had control over the financial aspects of her commercial sexual encounters. *See Williams*, 974 F.3d at 357 (citation omitted). It also established that Bridges used force in sex trafficking Z.W.

3. Investigation Into Bridges

At trial, three law enforcement officers, Corporal Kendrick, Corporal Odom, and FBI Agent Jackson testified that Bridges was being investigated for sex trafficking and they described how they obtained information about him. To the extent, as Bridges now argues, the District Court failed to both conduct a *Huddleston* analysis concerning Corporal Kendrick's and Corporal Odom's testimony that Bridges objected to during trial and to issue a limiting instruction to the jury, such errors were harmless. Corporal Kendrick's and Corporal Odom's testimony constituted a minor portion of the Government's case. Three of the named victims testified and the Corporals' testimony simply explained the course of the investigation. *United States v. Brown*, 765 F.3d 278, 295 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) ("The test for harmless

error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment."). Moreover, the testimony itself was not unduly prejudicial because it was brief and did not detail the prior investigation.

Similarly, the District Court did not plainly err in admitting the unobjected testimony from Corporal Odom and Agent Jackson. Given that "one proper purpose under Rule 404(b) is supplying helpful background information to the finder of fact" such as evidence explaining why a criminal defendant was under investigation, *Green*, 617 F.3d at 250 (citation omitted), it cannot be said that any error was "clear or obvious." *Wilkerson v. Superintendent Fayette SCI*, 871 F.3d 221, 238 n.17 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).

E. Admission of Expert Testimony

Appellants argue that the District Court erred in admitting the expert testimony of Dr. Shannon Wolf, Ph.D. We review the admissibility of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. *United States v. 68.94 Acres of Land*, 918 F.2d 389, 392 (3d Cir. 1990). If we determine that the District Court abused its discretion, "we review de novo whether that error was prejudicial or harmless." *United States v. Schneider*, 801 F.3d 186, 200 (3d Cir. 2015).

As relevant here, Dr. Wolf testified about the psychological effects of sexual abuse. She explained that sexual abuse victims sometimes experience trauma bonds whereby they are loyal to their abusers or feel a strong sense of attachment to their abusers. Dr. Wolf further testified that she did not know the Appellants or victims in the case and that she was not opining on the credibility of any of the victims.

Pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, expert testimony may be admitted if the expert's "specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue." We have held that "Rule 702 has three major requirements: (1) the proffered witness must be an expert, *i.e.,* must be qualified; (2) the expert must testify about matters requiring scientific, technical or specialized knowledge [, *i.e.,* reliability]; and (3) the expert's testimony must assist the trier of fact [, *i.e.,* fit]." *United States v. Schiff*, 602 F.3d 152, 172 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). These requirements are met here.

Dr. Wolf was qualified to provide expert testimony concerning the psychological effects of sexual trauma given her educational background and experience. For example, in obtaining her Ph.D. in psychology and counselling, she wrote a dissertation that focused on "the effects of . . . sexual trauma." JA2403. She has also counseled over 100 sex trafficking victims.

Appellants' argument that Dr. Wolf lacks experience regarding the psychological aspects of sex trafficking is unpersuasive. Although Dr. Wolf is not a licensed psychologist, she has relevant experience in psychology. In addition to her Ph.D., she is a professor of counselling and psychology at B.H. Carroll Theological Institute and is a member of the American Psychological Association. Considering we have interpreted Rule 702's requirements concerning specialized knowledge fairly liberally and have held "that a broad range of knowledge, skills, and training qualify an expert as such," *In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.*, 35 F.3d 717, 741 (3d Cir. 1994), the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding Dr. Wolf was qualified to testify in this case.

Likewise, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Wolf's testimony. Dr. Wolf's testimony satisfies reliability because it is experience based testimony. *Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael*, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999). It also satisfies the fit requirement.[5] As our sister courts have recognized, an expert educating a jury on general principles of sex trafficking and sexual abuse can be helpful to the fact finder in assessing fact witnesses' credibility. *See United States v. Robinson*, 993 F.3d 839, 849 (10th Cir. 2021), *cert. denied,* 142 S. Ct. 243 (2021); *United States v. Brooks*, 610 F.3d 1186, 1195–96 (9th Cir. 2010); *United States v. Taylor*, 239 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2001); *United States v. Anderson*, 851 F.2d 384, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Furthermore, Dr. Wolf's testimony aided the jury with assessing how the Appellants recruited, enticed, harbored, or maintained the victims or used "force, fraud, [or] coercion . . . to cause the [victims] to engage in a commercial sex act." 18 U.S.C. § 1591.

F. Bridges's Sentence

Bridges challenges his sentences on two bases. First, he argues that his criminal history score was improperly calculated. He contends that his theft conviction should not have been included in his criminal history score because it was relevant to his sex trafficking conviction. Second, he asserts his sentence of 420-months' imprisonment was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

1. Criminal History Score Calculation

[5] The Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 amendment to the Rules state that "it might also be important in some cases for an expert to educate the factfinder about general principles, without ever attempting to apply these principles to the specific facts of the case." Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee's note to 2000 Amendment.

"We exercise plenary review over the District Court's interpretation and application of the Guidelines" and "review determinations of fact for clear error." *United States v. Zabielski*, 711 F.3d 381, 386 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing *United States v. Thomas*, 327 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2003)).

Pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant receives criminal history points for each prior sentence. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2. "The term 'prior sentence' means any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere, for conduct not part of the instant offense." *Id.* The Guidelines further "define[] relevant conduct as all acts and omissions committed . . . by the defendant; and that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, . . . or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense." *United States v. Washington*, 549 F.3d 905, 920 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, the Probation Office calculated a criminal history score of five, which established a criminal history category of III. PSR 24 ¶ 119. This score included three points based on prior criminal convictions, one of which was for his conviction based on his confrontation with R.S. for which he was sentenced to two years of imprisonment and suspended one year probation. As the Government concedes, the District Court erred in adopting the Probation Office's calculation of Bridges's criminal history score. The theft occurred during Bridges's trafficking of Z.W., Count 2. *See* U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(A)). "However, the error was completely harmless because even with the one point reduction, [Bridges] would remain in criminal history category [III] and the

same Guideline range would have applied." *United States v. Isaac*, 655 F.3d 148, 158 (3d Cir. 2011).

2. Reasonableness of the Sentence

In determining whether a sentence is reasonable, "we must first ensur[e] that the [D]istrict [C]ourt committed no significant procedural error, such as . . . failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors . . . or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence." *United States v. Pawlowski*, 27 F.4th 897, 911–12 (3d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Second, we consider whether the sentence "is s substantively reasonable given the totality of the circumstances." *Id.* (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Absent significant procedural error, 'we will affirm [the sentence as substantively reasonable] unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on th[e] particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.'" *United States v. Douglas*, 885 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, "if the sentence is within the applicable Guidelines range, we may presume it is reasonable." *Pawlowski*, 27 F.4th at 911–12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The District Court's sentence was procedurally sound. It adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors and explained why it was imposing a sentence of 420 months' imprisonment. Bridges's arguments on appeal are unpersuasive. For example, he argues that the District Court did not consider his age or his other personal characteristics. However, in imposing the sentence, the District Court described his personal history, family ties, and employment history. He also argues that the District Court did not

address avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities. But the District Court did reference § 3553(a)(6) in imposing its sentence. It further heard Bridges's arguments that other sex traffickers, including Jeffrey Epstein, received lenient sentences.

The District Court's sentence was substantively reasonable. Bridges's Guidelines range was life imprisonment. Because his sentence of 420 months' imprisonment was below that, we presume that his sentence was reasonable. *See Pawlowski*, 27 F.4th at 911–12; *see also United States v. Susi*, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding a "below-Guidelines sentence is . . . entitled to a presumption of reasonableness"). Moreover, we cannot conclude that "no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence." *Douglas*, 885 F.3d at 150. Bridges was convicted of forcibly trafficking several adult and minor, female victims. Even if we were to agree that Bridges's sentence amounts to a *de facto* life sentence, such a sentence would not be *per se* unreasonable. *United States v. Ward,* 732 F.3d 175, 186 (3d Cir. 2013) ("The fact that [a defendant] may die in prison does not mean that his sentence is unreasonable.").

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgments of Appellants' convictions.

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

PATRICIA S. DODSZUWEIT

CLERK

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
21400 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE
601 MARKET STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106-1790
Website: www.ca3.uscourts.gov

TELEPHONE
215-597-2995

October 7, 2022

Mr. George V. Wylesol
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
James A. Byrne United States Courthouse
601 Market Street
Room 2609
Philadelphia, PA 19106

RE: USA v. Dkyle Bridges
Case Number: 21-1679
District Court Case Number: 2-18-cr-00193-001
RE: USA v. Kristian Jones
Case Number: 21-2122
District Court Case Number: 2-18-cr-00193-002

Dear District Court Clerk,

Enclosed herewith is the certified judgment together with copy of the opinion in the above-captioned case(s). The certified judgment is issued in lieu of a formal mandate and is to be treated in all respects as a mandate.

Counsel are advised of the issuance of the mandate by copy of this letter. The certified judgment

is also enclosed showing costs taxed, if any.

Very truly yours,
Patricia S. Dodszuweit, Clerk

By: Timothy McIntyre
Timothy McIntyre, Case Manager
267-299-4953

cc: Thomas E. Booth
Vernon Z. Chestnut Jr.
Priya Desouza
Jessica L. Urban
Luther E. Weaver III
Robert A. Zauzmer

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	:	CRIMINAL NO. 18-193-01
	:	
v.	:	
	:	
DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES	:	

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Notice is hereby given that the Defendant in the above-captioned matter, Dkyle Jamal Bridges, hereby appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit from the March 29, 2021, Imposition of Sentence, and from the Final Judgment of Sentence filed on March 31, 2021 (ECF Doc. No. 414) in this Action by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Respectfully submitted,

LUTHER E. WEAVER, III, ESQUIRE
Weaver & Associates, P.C.
123 S. Broad Street, Suite 2102
Philadelphia, PA 19109-1024
(215) 790-0600
Attorneys for Defendant Dkyle Jamal Bridges

Dated: April 7, 2021

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that on this date, I served by ECF notification, a true and correct copy of the Notice of Appeal upon the following:

The Honorable Nitza I. Quinones-Alejandro
United States District Courthouse
601 Market Street-Room 5613
Philadelphia, PA 19106

Jessica L. Urban, Esquire
United States Department of Justice
Criminal Division
1400 New York Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 2005

Priya T. De Souza, Esquire
Assistant United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street
Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106



LUTHER E. WEAVER, III, ESQUIRE

Dated: April 7, 2021

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19) Judgment in a Criminal Case
Sheet 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Eastern District of Pennsylvania

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

Case Number: DPAE2:18CR000193-001

USM Number: 76642-066

Luther E. Weaver, III, Esquire
Defendant's Attorney

THE DEFENDANT:

☐ pleaded guilty to count(s) _____

☐ pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) _____
which was accepted by the court.

☑ was found guilty on count(s) 1s, 2s, 3s, 4s, 5s, 6s
after a plea of not guilty.

The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:

Title & Section	Nature of Offense	Offense Ended	Count
18:1594(c)	Conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking via force, fraud, and coercion, and sex trafficking of minors;	9/30/2017	1s

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 10 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

☐ The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s) _____

☐ Count(s) _____ ☐ is ☐ are dismissed on the motion of the United States.

It is ordered that the defendant must notify the United States attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution, the defendant must notify the court and United States attorney of material changes in economic circumstances.

3/29/2021
Date of Imposition of Judgment

/s/ Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro, J.
Signature of Judge

Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro, J., U.S.D.C., E. D. of PA
Name and Title of Judge

3/30/3021
Date

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19) Judgment in a Criminal Case
Sheet 1A

DEFENDANT: DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES
CASE NUMBER: DPAE2:18CR000193-001

ADDITIONAL COUNTS OF CONVICTION

Title & Section	Nature of Offense	Offense Ended	Count
18:1591(a)(1),1591(b)(1) 18:2	Sex trafficking via force, threats, and coercion; and Aiding and abetting	9/30/2017	2s, 3s
18:1591(a)(1),1591(b)(1) 18:1591(b)(2),1591(c), 18:2	Sex trafficking via force, fraud, and coercion; and Aiding and abetting	9/30/2017	4s, 5s, 6s

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19) Judgment in Criminal Case
Sheet 2 — Imprisonment

DEFENDANT: DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES
CASE NUMBER: DPAE2:18CR000193-001

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of:

420 MONTHS on each of Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, such terms to be served CONCURRENTLY.

☑ The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:
The defendant participate in the Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.
The defendant be designated to a facility as close as possible to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
The defendant participate in a program for alcohol and drug treatment, abide by the rules until satisfactorily discharged.
The defendant participate in a mental health and sex offender program until satisfactorily discharged.

☑ The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

☐ The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:

☐ at _____ ☐ a.m. ☐ p.m. on _____.

☐ as notified by the United States Marshal.

☐ The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:

☐ before 2 p.m. on _____.

☐ as notified by the United States Marshal.

☐ as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on _____ to _____

at _____, with a certified copy of this judgment.

_____
UNITED STATES MARSHAL

By _____
DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19) Judgment in a Criminal Case
Sheet 3 — Supervised Release

DEFENDANT: DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES
CASE NUMBER: DPAE2:18CR000193-001

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, you will be on supervised release for a term of:

TEN YEARS on each of COUNTS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, such terms to run CONCURRENTLY.

While on supervised release, the defendant shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime, shall be prohibited from possessing a firearm or other dangerous device, shall not possess an illegal controlled substance, shall submit to the collection of a DNA sample at the direction of the United States Probation Office, and shall comply with the other standard conditions that have been adopted by this Court. The defendant must submit to one drug test within 15 days of commencement of supervised release and at least two tests thereafter as determined by the probation officer.

In addition, the defendant shall comply with the following special conditions:

- The defendant shall participate in a mental health program for evaluation and/or treatment and abide by the rules of any such program until satisfactorily discharged.

- The defendant shall refrain from the use of alcohol and drugs, and shall submit to testing to ensure compliance. It is further ordered that the defendant shall participate in alcohol and drug treatment, and abide by the rules of any such program until satisfactorily discharged.

- The defendant shall submit to an initial inspection by the U.S. Probation Office and to any examinations during supervision of the defendant's computer and any devices, programs, or application. The defendant shall allow the installation of any hardware or software systems which monitor or filter computer use. The defendant shall abide by the standard conditions of computer monitoring and filtering that will be approved by this Court. The defendant is to pay the cost of the computer monitoring not to exceed the monthly contractual rate, in accordance with the probation officer's discretion.

- The defendant shall report to the U.S. Probation Office any regular contact with children of either sex under the age of 18. The defendant shall not obtain employment or perform volunteer work which includes regular contact with children under the age of 18.

MANDATORY CONDITIONS

1. You must not commit another federal, state or local crime.
2. You must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.
3. You must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. You must submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.
   - ☐ The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that you pose a low risk of future substance abuse. *(check if applicable)*
4. ☐ You must make restitution in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A or any other statute authorizing a sentence of restitution. *(check if applicable)*
5. ☑ You must cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. *(check if applicable)*
6. ☑ You must comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (34 U.S.C. § 20901, *et seq.*) as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in the location where you reside, work, are a student, or were convicted of a qualifying offense. *(check if applicable)*
7. ☐ You must participate in an approved program for domestic violence. *(check if applicable)*

You must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any other conditions on the attached page.

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

As part of your supervised release, you must comply with the following standard conditions of supervision. These conditions are imposed because they establish the basic expectations for your behavior while on supervision and identify the minimum tools needed by probation officers to keep informed, report to the court about, and bring about improvements in your conduct and condition.

1. You must report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside within 72 hours of your release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs you to report to a different probation office or within a different time frame.
2. After initially reporting to the probation office, you will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how and when you must report to the probation officer, and you must report to the probation officer as instructed.
3. You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside without first getting permission from the court or the probation officer.
4. You must answer truthfully the questions asked by your probation officer.
5. You must live at a place approved by the probation officer. If you plan to change where you live or anything about your living arrangements (such as the people you live with), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
6. You must allow the probation officer to visit you at any time at your home or elsewhere, and you must permit the probation officer to take any items prohibited by the conditions of your supervision that he or she observes in plain view.
7. You must work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from doing so. If you do not have full-time employment you must try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from doing so. If you plan to change where you work or anything about your work (such as your position or your job responsibilities), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10 days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
8. You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged in criminal activity. If you know someone has been convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the probation officer.
9. If you are arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours.
10. You must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as nunchakus or tasers).
11. You must not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant without first getting the permission of the court.
12. If the probation officer determines that you pose a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer may require you to notify the person about the risk and you must comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the person and confirm that you have notified the person about the risk.
13. You must follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

U.S. Probation Office Use Only

A U.S. probation officer has instructed me on the conditions specified by the court and has provided me with a written copy of this judgment containing these conditions. For further information regarding these conditions, see *Overview of Probation and Supervised Release Conditions*, available at: www.uscourts.gov.

Defendant's Signature _____ Date _____

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19) Judgment in a Criminal Case
Sheet 3B — Supervised Release

DEFENDANT: DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES
CASE NUMBER: DPAE2:18CR000193-001

ADDITIONAL SUPERVISED RELEASE TERMS

- The defendant shall participate in a sex offender program for evaluation and treatment and abide by the rules of any such program until satisfactorily discharged. While in the treatment program, the defendant shall submit to risk assessment, psychological testing, and physiological testing, which may include, but is not limited to, polygraph or other specific tests to monitor compliance with supervised release and treatment conditions.

- The defendant shall comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (42 U.S.C., Section 16901, et seq.) as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in which he resides, works, is a student, or was convicted of a qualifying offense.

- The defendant shall provide the U.S. Probation Office with full disclosure of his financial records to include yearly income tax returns upon the request of the U.S. Probation Office. The defendant shall cooperate with the probation officer in the investigation of his financial dealings and shall provide truthful monthly statements of his income.

- The defendant is prohibited from incurring any new credit charges or opening additional lines of credit without the approval of the probation officer, unless the defendant is in compliance with a payment schedule for any restitution or financial obligation. The defendant shall not encumber or liquidate interest in any assets unless it is in direct service of the restitution or financial obligation or otherwise has the express approval of the Court.

It is further ordered that the defendant shall pay restitution in the total amount of $53,000. The Court will waive the interest requirement in this case. Payments should be made payable to Clerk, U.S. District Court, for distribution to the victims.

The Court finds that the defendant does not have the ability to pay a fine. The Court will waive the fine in this case.

The Court ordered that the defendant shall pay an assessment of $30,000 in accordance with the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act (JVTA) of 2015.

It is further ordered that the defendant shall pay to the United States a total special assessment of $600.

The special assessment and restitution are due immediately. It is recommended that the defendant participate in the Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial Responsibility Program and provide a minimum payment of $25 per quarter towards the financial obligations. In the event the entire balances are not paid prior to the commencement of supervision, the defendant shall satisfy the amounts due in monthly installments of not less than $25, to commence 30 days after release from confinement.

DEFENDANT: DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES
CASE NUMBER: DPAE2:18CR000193-001

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

	Assessment	Restitution	Fine	AVAA Assessment*	JVTA Assessment**
TOTALS	$ 600.00	$ 53,000.00	$	$	$ 30,000.00

☐ The determination of restitution is deferred until _____. An *Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case (AO 245C)* will be entered after such determination.

☐ The defendant must make restitution (including community restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below.

If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportioned payment, unless specified otherwise in the priority order or percentage payment column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i), all nonfederal victims must be paid before the United States is paid.

Name of Payee	Total Loss***	Restitution Ordered	Priority or Percentage
Payments should be made payable to, Clerk, United States District Court, for distribution to the following victims:			
Z. W.	$21,840.00	$21,840.00	
c/o FBI Philadehphia			
Attn: SA CJ Jackson			
600 Arch Street, 8th Floor			
Philadelphia, PA 19106			

TOTALS	$ 53,000.00	$ 53,000.00

☐ Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea agreement $ _____

☐ The defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine of more than $2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 6 may be subject to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

☐ The court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:

☑ the interest requirement is waived for the ☐ fine ☑ restitution.

☐ the interest requirement for the ☐ fine ☐ restitution is modified as follows:

* Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-299.
** Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22.
*** Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

DEFENDANT: DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES
CASE NUMBER: DPAE2:18CR000193-001

ADDITIONAL RESTITUTION PAYEES

Name of Payee	Total Loss*	Restitution Ordered	Priority or Percentage
J. S. c/o FBI Philadelphia Attn: SA CJ Jackson 600 Arch Street, 8th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19106	$16,000.00	$16,000.00	
B. T. c/o FBI Philadelphia Attn: SA CJ Jackson 600 Arch Street, 8th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19106	$12,800.00	$12,800.00	
N. G. c/o FBI Philadelphia Attn: SA CJ Jackson 600 Arch Street, 8th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19106	$1,860.00	$1,860.00	
L. C. Attn: SA CJ Jackson 600 Arch Street, 8th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19106	$500.00	$500.00	

* Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

DEFENDANT: DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES
CASE NUMBER: DPAE2:18CR000193-001

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:

A ☐ Lump sum payment of $ due immediately, balance due

☐ not later than _____, or
☐ in accordance with ☐ C, ☐ D, ☐ E, or ☐ F below; or

B ☐ Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with ☐ C, ☐ D, or ☐ F below); or

C ☐ Payment in equal *(e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly)* installments of $ over a period of *(e.g., months or years)*, to commence *(e.g., 30 or 60 days)* after the date of this judgment; or

D ☐ Payment in equal _____ *(e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly)* installments of $ _____ over a period of _____ *(e.g., months or years)*, to commence _____ *(e.g., 30 or 60 days)* after release from imprisonment to a term of supervision; or

E ☐ Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within _____ *(e.g., 30 or 60 days)* after release from imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant's ability to pay at that time; or

F ☑ Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:
The defendant is ordered to pay to the United States a special assessment in the amount of $600, which is due immediately. The defendant is also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $53,000. It is recommended that the defendant participate in the Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial Responsibility Program and provide a minimum payment of $25 per quarter towards his financial obligations.

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during the period of imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, are made to the clerk of the court.

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

☑ Joint and Several

Case Number Defendant and Co-Defendant Names *(including defendant number)*	Total Amount	Joint and Several Amount	Corresponding Payee, if appropriate
Dkyle Jamal Bridges 18cr193-1; Kristian Jones (2); Anthony Jones (3)	53,000.00	53,000.00	

☐ The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.

☐ The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):

☑ The defendant shall forfeit the defendant's interest in the following property to the United States:
[SEE NEXT PAGE]

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) AVAA assessment, (5) fine principal, (6) fine interest, (7) community restitution, (8) JVTA assessment, (9) penalties, and (10) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.

DEFENDANT: DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES
CASE NUMBER: DPAE2:18CR000193-001

ADDITIONAL FORFEITED PROPERTY

1. All right, title, and interest of all persons, their heirs and assigns, in the property listed in the Judgment an Preliminary Order of Forfeiture entered by this Court on January 17, 2020, and described below, is hereby fully and finally forfeited to the United States of America pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section1594(d):

a) One (1) black Alcatel One Touch A571VL (Pixi Avion) cell phone (IMEI 354161070731312), with SanDisk 8GB MicroSD Card (seized from Dkyle Bridges' vehicle on July 12, 2017; identified by RCFL as QPH3 & QPH3_1; and admitted at trial as GX 97);

b) One (1) black Samsung SM-G950U Galaxy S8 cell phone (IMEI 355982080202179) (seized from Dkyle Bridges' vehicle on July 12, 2017; identified by RCFL as QPH4; and admitted at trial as GX 99);

c) One (1) black Alctel 4060A cell phone (IMEI 014699002736729) (seized from Dkyle Bridges' vehicle on July 12, 2017; identified by RCFL as QPH5; and admitted at trial as GX 95);

d) One (1) red iPhone7 A1778 (IMEI unknown) (seized from Dkyle Bridges' vehicle on July 12, 2017; identified by RCFL as QPH8; and admitted at trial as GX 101);

e) One (1) black iPhone7 A1778 (IMEI unknown) (seized from Dkyle Bridges' vehicle on July 12, 2017; identified by RCFL as QPH9; and admitted at trial as GX 102);

f) One (1) black Alcatel One Touch A570BL cell phone (IMEI 01454001571367) (seized from Dkyle Bridges' vehicle on July 12, 2017; identified by RCFL as QPH7; and admitted at trial as part of GX 103):

g) One (1) red iPhone7 A1784 (IMEI unknown) (seized from Dkyle Bridges' vehicle on July 12, 2017; identified by RCFL as QPH10; and admitted at trial as part of GX 103);

h) One (1) Alcatel One Touch 2017B cell phone (MEID 270113184302812731) (seized from Dkyle Bridges' vehicle on July 12, 2017; identified by RCFL as QPH2; and admitted at trial as part of GX 103; and

i) One (1) ZTE Z981 cell phone (IMEI 863461032427957) (seized from Dkyle Bridges' vehicle on July 12, 2017; identified by RCFL as QPH6; and admitted at trial as part of GX 103).

2. All right, title and interest of all persons, their heirs and assigns in the property described above, is hereby vested in the United States of America.

3. The government, or its designee, shall dispose of the subject assets listed above and in paragraph 1 of the Final Order of Forfeiture in accordance with the law and the rules of this Court.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	:	**CRIMINAL ACTION**
	:	
v.	:	**NO. 18-193-1**
	:	
DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES	:	
Defendant	:	

ORDER

AND NOW, this 19th day of March 2019, upon consideration of Defendant Dkyle Jamal Bridges' ("Defendant") *motion to suppress physical evidence*, (Doc. 55), the Government's response in opposition, (Doc. 81), the evidence and oral argument heard at the motion to suppress hearing held on February 15, 2019, Defendant's post-hearing brief, (Doc. 164), the Government's post-hearing brief, (Doc. 167), and the Government's post-hearing response brief, (Doc. 170), and, it is hereby **ORDERED** that Defendant's motion to suppress is **DENIED**.[1]

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[1] In the underlying motion, Defendant requests the suppression of all physical evidence seized on July 12, 2017, from a Ford Taurus, including several cellphones, a laptop computer, and the information contained thereon, on the grounds, *inter alia*, that the initial seizure of the Ford Taurus was not supported by reasonable suspicion and that the warrant issued thereafter was overly general and lacked probable cause.

At the evidentiary hearing, the Government presented Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Christopher Jackson ("Agent Jackson"), a three-year agent of the force who worked in a unit dealing with violent crimes against children, including human trafficking, child exploitation, and labor trafficking. Agent Jackson described Backpage as a website that is utilized to sell legitimate goods and services, as well as illegal escort services involving sex trafficked victims. According to Agent Jackson, in November 2016, two minors were recovered from a sex trafficking operation in Tinicum Township, Pennsylvania. A man named Kristian Jones (a co-defendant in this case) was found in the room with the two minors. The minors relayed to the law enforcement authorities that a friend of Jones, named "D," had driven them "up" in a black car. Interviews with the victims, the victims' mothers, the hotel managers and staff, and other surveillance led to the conclusion that "D" was Defendant Dkyle Jamal Bridges. Additionally, Defendant's name was found in text messages in cellphones seized in the Tinicum arrest.

On November 23, 2016, FBI Baltimore informed FBI Philadelphia that Defendant's name was mentioned in an interview of a minor (B.T.) recovered during a prostitution sting in Delaware. Agent Jackson came to know what Defendant looked like from seeing his mug shot. Agent Jackson performed surveillance in Delaware, during which he, at least twice, saw a black Ford Taurus with license plates registered to Camille Bridges (Defendant's mother). Although Agent Jackson saw a black male exit the car in daylight hours, from his vantage point, he could not positively identify the male as Defendant.

In May 2017, Tinicum Township Police Department Sergeant James Simpkins contacted Agent Jackson to inform him of an altercation in a hotel in Tinicum between Defendant and a female named Jordan

Lopez-Ervin. As part of that investigation, Agent Jackson was made aware of an outstanding warrant for Lopez-Ervin's arrest, and that according to her mother, Lopez-Ervin was working for Defendant as a prostitute. In June 2017, in an interview with Agent Jackson, B.T.'s mother stated that: B.T. started working for Defendant as a prostitute around the age of 16, he was violent towards her, he would force her to perform oral sex on him, he had taken her across state lines to Baltimore to perform dates as a prostitute, and that "he would also threaten with firearms as well and that he was known to carry them." Agent Jackson showed B.T.'s mother a Backpage ad, and she confirmed that it was B.T. in the ad. Agent Jackson further testified that the FBI waited for another Backpage ad with the same picture "to pop up wherever it might be advertised on the Backpage website," and it eventually did, leading to a sting operation, at a Motel 6 in Northeastern Philadelphia in July 2017.

As part of that sting operation, an undercover Philadelphia Police Department ("PPD") officer made contact via the Backpage ad on July 11, 2017, for a date with B.T. the following day. Agent Jackson advised the law enforcement officers involved with the sting that Defendant drove a black Ford Taurus with Delaware license plates. During the sting operation, the FBI served as backup for the PPD. Once the undercover PPD officer made contact with B.T. inside the Motel 6, he signaled to the law enforcement officers who were stationed nearby. Law enforcement converged into the Motel 6 parking lot closest to the room that the undercover officer had entered. Upon entering the parking lot, they observed a black Ford Taurus with Delaware license plates parked near the room the undercover officer had entered. Defendant sat in the driver's seat and Lopez-Ervin was in the passenger front seat. Officers, including Agent Jackson, converged on the Ford Taurus and ordered Defendant and Lopez-Ervin to keep their hands up and to exit the vehicle. A pat-down for officer safety was conducted (Agent Jackson testified that in his experience, pimps often carried firearms), and the two individuals were questioned. A visual inspection noted two boxes of magnum condoms inside the vehicle. It was later determined that Defendant's driver's license was suspended. The Ford Taurus was impounded as a result and an inventory search was conducted. Agent Jackson interviewed B.T. the following morning, and she told him that she had worked for Defendant as a prostitute; he was violent; he assaulted her; he assaulted another female; he would give her whatever money he deemed necessary, if any, for performing dates; and she did not feel free to leave. On July 13, 2017, the FBI applied for a warrant to search the Ford and the contents inside, including the digital information on the cellphones. Agent Jackson believed that cellphone evidence was relevant to the investigation of sex trafficking because cellphones are always used for trafficking to communicate with the victims and the johns, and are often used to place Backpage ads. He also opined that the search history of the cellphones was relevant for ascertaining Backpage information. Agent Jackson testified that he generally requested everything on a cellphone because there are different ways in which people hide files and information on cellphones, including with apps that disguise files. The warrant was executed on July 14, 2017.

In his motion to suppress, Defendant argues that: the investigatory seizure of the Ford Taurus was not supported by reasonable suspicion nor evidence of a traffic violation, the search warrant was not supported by probable cause to believe evidence of sex trafficking would be found in the Ford Taurus, the search of the cellphones was based on an unconstitutionally general search warrant, and the towing and impounding of the vehicle was in contravention of local procedure. The Government disagrees and argues that there was more than reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory seizure of the vehicle, there was in fact probable cause; the warrant was supported by probable cause; the warrant was not unconstitutionally general given that the search was for evidence related to trafficking; and the local procedures pertaining to towing cars is a red herring because there was probable cause to search the Ford Taurus, and that violations of local procedure are not grounds for suppression of evidence in a federal criminal case.

As to the seizure of the Ford Taurus, it is well-settled that such a seizure constitutes a permissible *Terry* stop when "supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot." *United States v. Ramos*, 443 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2006) (describing "reasonable suspicion" standard); *see also*

United States v. Hester, 910 F.3d 78, 87 (3d Cir. 2018) (treating the act of police cars boxing in parked car as a *Terry* stop). Based upon the credible evidence offered, this Court finds that the seizure of the Ford Taurus was proper, as Agent Jackson's lengthy and thorough investigation amply demonstrated that there was "reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot," and that Defendant was involved. Notably, Agent Jackson's investigation had led him to believe that Defendant was B.T.'s pimp and that Defendant was responsible for scheduling the date with B.T. that had been set up as part of the sting operation. Defendant was detained inside the Ford Taurus parked just outside of the motel room. Based on his investigation and experience, Agent Jackson had more than reasonable suspicion; he had probable cause to conclude that Defendant was committing a sex trafficking offense. *See United States v. Myers*, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002) ("Probable cause exists whenever reasonably trustworthy information or circumstances within a police officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been committed by the person being arrested.") (citing *Beck v. Ohio*, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).

To the extent Defendant argues that evidence of a traffic violation was required to be able to seize the Ford Taurus, he is mistaken. Although "the Supreme Court established a bright-line rule that any technical violation of a traffic code legitimizes a stop, even if the stop is merely a pretext for an investigation of some other crime," *United States v. Mosley*, 454 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing *Whren v. United States*, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)), where, as here, an officer has "reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot," *Ramos*, 443 F.3d at 308, a traffic violation or other pretext is not needed to stop the car in question. Accordingly, because law enforcement had *at least* reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure of the Ford Taurus, the existence or non-existence of a traffic violation is irrelevant.

With regard to Defendant's argument that there was not probable cause to support the search warrant, as set forth above, this Court finds there was probable cause at the time of the initial seizure of the vehicle, which in and of itself would supply the requisite probable cause for the warrant. Further, at the time Agent Jackson applied for the search warrant, he had additional supporting facts he learned from his subsequent interview with B.T. on July 13, 2017, in which she advised him that she worked for Defendant as a prostitute, Defendant assaulted her, and she did not feel free to leave Defendant's employ. *See Myers*, 308 F.3d at 255 (probable cause standard).

This Court also notes that with regard to the recovery of the actual physical devices inside the vehicle, a warrant was not necessary in this case, pursuant to the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment. *See United States v. Donahue*, 764 F.293, 299-300 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting generally that "[t]he automobile exception permits vehicle searches without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime."). Further, "the government can search an impounded vehicle without a warrant even though it has secured the vehicle against the loss of evidence and it has the opportunity to obtain a warrant for the search." *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Salmon*, 944 F.2d 1106, 1123 (3d Cir. 1991)).

With regard to Defendant's argument that the warrant was unconstitutionally general as to the search of the cellphones and laptop for data, this Court finds that the scope of the warrant was permissible, given that the search was for files associated with sex trafficking which, as Agent Jackson explained, could come in many forms, including under disguised names or applications. *See, e.g., United States v. Gorny*, 2014 WL 2860637 (W.D. Pa. June 23, 2014) (rejecting argument that warrant for search of cellphone was unconstitutionally general where phone was used in the drug trade); *see also United States v. Stabile*, 633 F.3d 219, 236-46 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing warrants for, and searches of, electronic devices).

Finally, Defendant contends that when the law enforcement authorities do not comply with state or local procedures in towing vehicles, an inventory search is impermissible under state or local procedures

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro
NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO
Judge, United States District Court

and should be suppressed. Defendant is mistaken; such violations do not result in suppression in a federal case. *See United States v. Bedford*, 519 F.2d 650, 655 n.11 (3d. Cir. 1975) ("[E]ven though evidence may have been obtained unlawfully under state standards, it may be admissible in a federal prosecution if all federal standards are met."). Accordingly, for the reasons discussed, Defendant's motion is denied.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	:	**CRIMINAL ACTION**
	:	
v.	:	**NO. 18-193-1**
	:	
DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES	:	
Defendant	:	

ORDER

AND NOW, this 20th day of March 2019, upon consideration of Defendant Dkyle Jamal Bridges' request, pursuant to *Franks v. Delaware*, 483 U.S. 154 (1978), to suppress all physical evidence obtained from the July 12, 2017 search of the 2013 Ford Taurus, (Doc. 121), the Government's response in opposition thereto, (Doc. 147), and the evidence and oral argument presented at the hearing held on February 15, 2019, it is hereby **ORDERED** that Defendant's request is **DENIED**.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro
NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO
Judge, United States District Court

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	**:**	**CRIMINAL NO. 18-193**
v.	**:**	**DATE FILED: November 1, 2018**
DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES **KRISTIAN JONES** **ANTHONY JONES** **a/k/a "Ears"**	**:**	**VIOLATIONS:** **18 U.S.C. § 1594(c) (conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking via force, fraud, and coercion, and in sex trafficking of minors – 1 count)** **18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(1) (sex trafficking via force, fraud, and coercion – 2 counts)** **18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(2), (c) (sex trafficking of minors and via force, fraud, and coercion – 3 counts)** **18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and abetting)** **Notice of forfeiture**

SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT

COUNT ONE

THE GRAND JURY CHARGES THAT:

From in or around 2012, through on or about September 21, 2017, in Philadelphia and Delaware County, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, the defendants,

DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES,
KRISTIAN JONES, and
ANTHONY JONES,
a/k/a "Ears,"

conspired and agreed with each other and with other persons known and unknown to the Grand Jury to knowingly recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide, obtain and maintain a person, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, knowing, and in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, and coercion would be used to cause such person to engage in a commercial sex act, and knowing, and in reckless disregard of the fact, that such persons had

not attained the age of 18 years and would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, and having had a reasonable opportunity observe such persons, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1591(a)(1) and 1591(c).

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1594(c).

COUNT TWO

THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT:

From in or around 2012, through on or about September 17, 2017, in Delaware County, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, the defendant,

DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES

knowingly, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, and maintained Z.W., and aided and abetted the same, knowing, and in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, and coercion would be used to cause Z.W. to engage in a commercial sex act.

In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1591(a)(1), 1591(b)(1) and 2.

COUNT THREE

THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT:

From in or around November 2015, through in or around May 2016, in Delaware County, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, the defendants,

DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES and
ANTHONY JONES,
a/k/a "Ears,"

knowingly, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, and maintained J.S., and aided and abetted the same, knowing, and in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, and coercion would be used to cause J.S. to engage in a commercial sex act.

In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1591(a)(1), 1591(b)(1) and 2.

COUNT FOUR

THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT:

From in or around November 2015, through on or about September 21, 2017, in Philadelphia and Delaware County, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, the defendants,

DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES,
KRISTIAN JONES, and
ANTHONY JONES,
a/k/a "Ears,"

knowingly, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, and maintained B.T., a minor, and aided and abetted the same, knowing, and in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, and coercion would be used to cause B.T. to engage in a commercial sex act, and, knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact, that B.T. had not attained the age of 18 years, and would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, and further having had a reasonable opportunity to observe B.T.

In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1591(a)(1), 1591(b)(1), 1591(b)(2), 1591(c) and 2.

COUNT FIVE

THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT:

From in or around October 2016, through on or about November 15, 2016, in Delaware County, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, the defendants,

DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES,
KRISTIAN JONES, and
ANTHONY JONES,
a/k/a "Ears,"

knowingly, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, and maintained N.G., a minor, and aided and abetted the same, knowing, and in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, and coercion would be used to cause N.G. to engage in a commercial sex act, and, knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact, that N.G. had not attained the age of 18 years, and would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, and further having had a reasonable opportunity to observe N.G.

In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1591(a)(1), 1591(b)(1), 1591(b)(2), 1591(c) and 2.

COUNT SIX

THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT:

From in or around October 2016, through on or about November 15, 2016, in Delaware County, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, the defendants,

DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES,
KRISTIAN JONES, and
ANTHONY JONES,
a/k/a "Ears,"

knowingly, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, and maintained L.C., a minor, and aided and abetted the same, knowing, and in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, and coercion would be used to cause L.C. to engage in a commercial sex act, and, knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact, that L.C. had not attained the age of 18 years, and would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, and further having had a reasonable opportunity to observe L.C.

In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1591(a)(1), 1591(b)(1), 1591(b)(2), 1591(c) and 2.

NOTICE OF FORFEITURE

THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT:

1. As a result of the violations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1594(c), 1591(a)(1), 1591(b)(1), 1591(b)(2) and 1591(c), as set forth in this indictment, defendants

DKYLE JAMAL BRIDGES,
KRISTIAN JONES, and
ANTHONY JONES,
a/k/a "Ears"

shall forfeit to the United States of America:

(a) any property, real or personal, constituting or derived from, any proceeds obtained by the defendants, directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation, or any property traceable to such property; and

(b) defendants' interest in any property, real or personal, that was involved in, used, or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the property of any such violation, and any property traceable to such property.

All pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1594(d).

A TRUE BILL:

_____
GRAND JURY FOREPERSON

_____
WILLIAM M. MCSWAIN
United States Attorney