


No. 22-5937



IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PRINCE JONES — PETITIONER
(Your Name)

vs.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA — RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS D.C. CIRCUIT
(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PRINCE JONES - 32455-007
(Your Name)

USP ADMAX P.O. BOX 8500
(Address)

Florence CO. 81226
(City, State, Zip Code)

(Phone Number)

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

1. Can D.C. Superior Court Judges exercise Statutory Jurisdiction under the color of Article III judicial Power, when Article III does not provide a Statutory Jurisdiction.
2. Can D.C. Superior Court Judges exercise Statutory Jurisdiction over petitioner personally when petitioner is not a statutory person, is a people under the Common Law and Article III judicial power does not provide a statutory jurisdiction.
3. Can D.C. Superior Court Judges and the government conceal its Article III jurisdiction, its Article III Standing and the true nature and cause of action against petitioner and its judgments be lawful and binding.
4. Can Congress deposit Article I legislative power into a non constitutional entity, (D.C. Council) and such deposit not be in violation of Article I section 8 Clause 17 exclusive legislation clause over the District
5. Can petitioner Apply his individual Tenth Amendment Right to the Defacto State government of the D.C. Corporation Council and Mayor, who enact D.C. CODE without a Congress or Senate.
6. Is petitioner entitled to recover damages from D.C. government after it has been determined by D.C. Court of Appeals, that the government violated petitioners Fourth Amendment Right.
7. Is petitioner entitled to recover compensation and damages from D.C. government who seized without warrant petitioners private property and then Forfeited it from petitioner without Due process of a civil Forfeiture hearing or compensation.

LIST OF PARTIES

[] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

All parties **do not** appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

District of Columbia
Muriel Bowser
Jodi Lazarus
Jennifer M. Anderson
John Ramsey Johnson
Danya A. Dayson
Todd Perkins
Rachel Polliam
Douglas Carlson
Elbert Griffin
Respondents

Prince Jones
Petitioner

RELATED CASES

United States v. Jones, 168. A.3d 703 (DCCA 2017)
Judgement entered September 18, 2017

Jones v. District of Columbia, et al., 1:20-cv-2797
Judgment entered October 30, 2020

Jones v. District of Columbia, et al., No. 21-7011
U.S. District Court of Appeal For D.C. Circuit
Judgment entered July 14, 2022

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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

For cases from **federal courts**:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix 7 to the petition and is

reported at _____; or,
 has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
 is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix 1 to the petition and is

reported at _____; or,
 has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
 is unpublished.

For cases from **state courts**:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at Appendix _____ to the petition and is

reported at _____; or,
 has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
 is unpublished.

The opinion of the _____ court appears at Appendix _____ to the petition and is

reported at _____; or,
 has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
 is unpublished.

JURISDICTION

For cases from **federal courts**:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case was July 14, 2022.

No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of Appeals on the following date: _____, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix _____.

An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and including _____ (date) on _____ (date) in Application No. A _____.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

For cases from **state courts**:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was _____. A copy of that decision appears at Appendix _____.

A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date: _____, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix _____.

An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and including _____ (date) on _____ (date) in Application No. A _____.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves Article I section 7 clause 2, and section 8 clause 17 to the American Constitution, which provides;

Section 7. clause 2. Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate shall ... two thirds of the House shall agree to pass the Bill... in all such cases the votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays ...

Section 8. clause 17. To exercise exclusive legislative power in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square)

This case involves Article III section 2 of the American Constitution, which provides;

Section 1. The Judicial Power of United States, Shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as Congress may ordain...

Section 2. The Judicial Power, shall extend to all cases, in Law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States and Treaties made, or which shall be made... To all cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; To controversies...

This case involves Amendment IV to the American Constitution which provides;

The Right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable Searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

This case involves Amendment V to the American Constitution which provides;

No persons shall be, deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.

This case involves Amendment VI to the American Constitution which provides;

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the Right to... be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation..

This case involves Amendment X to the American Constitution which provides;

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner's complaint alleged that respondents D.C. Metropolitan Police officers, Todd Perkins, Rachel Pulliam, Douglas Carlson, and Elbert Griffin deprived petitioner of his FOURTH and FIFTH AMENDMENT Right when they used a cell phone hacking device against petitioner's cell phone without a warrant causing petitioner's cell phone to become disabled and transmit to respondents, petitioner's real time location where respondents conducted a warrantless stop search and seizure of petitioner's person and private property. Respondents Jodi Lazarus (U.S. Attorney), and Respondents Jennifer A. Anderson, John Ramsey Johnson and Danya A. Dayson (D.C. Superior Court Judges) Forfeited petitioner's private property without giving petitioner due process of a civil forfeiture hearing. Respondents further, acted against petitioner without Article III Jurisdiction, and Article III standing which deprived petitioner of his Sixth Amendment Right to be informed.

of the true nature and cause of action that Respondents initiated against petitioner.

Respondent Muriel Bowser Mayor of District of Columbia acted against petitioner as a State Governor where respondent not only lacked an Enumerated Constitutional power respondent also lacked a Tenth Amendment relationship with petitioner and that the D.C. local government of the Municipal Corporation Council legislate and enact D.C. CODE SECTIONS outside of the provisions and requirements of Article I section 7 clause 2 and in violation of Article I section 8 Clause 17

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

A. CONFLICTS WITH ARTICLES AND ACTS

The Congress over stepped their Power and Authority when it elected to enact within the Federal District of Columbia the Reorganization Act or the D.C. HOME RULE ACT which illegally deposited Sovereign Power into a Non-Constitutional Entity. Because Home Rule in general only applies to a STATE. The HOME RULE ACT violates and intrudes upon petitioners Fifth Amendment to Due process [procedural and substantive]; EIGHT Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment; and the TENTH Amendment Right to separation of Powers [Instruction Protection]. The creation of the HOME RULE ACT is the result of Congress intent or attempt to reinvent the application of the Constitution within the Boundaries of the Federal District of Columbia. Congress is prohibited from depositing Enumerated Constitutional Powers into a entity to perform a Function that requires the exercise of a power vested elsewhere

by the Constitution. SEE WHIT MAN V. AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSO. INC, 540,531 U.S. 457, 472, 121 S.Ct 903, 149 L.ed 2d 1 (2001)... SESSIONS V. DIMAYA, 138 S.Ct 1204; 200 L.ed 2d, 549: 2018. The 1973 D.C. HOME RULE ACT - which created the D.C. Municipal Corporation Council and deposited into it - Sovereign Power- That it can not Constitutionally receive, and is only available to a State, It is an Act that clearly conflicts with established Law. SEE, MARTIN V. HUNTERS LESSEE, 14 U.S. 304, 4 L.ed 97 (1816)... As well as the articulated Language of the Constitutional Article-1 section 8 clause 17. exclusive legislation clause. There in the Constitution expressly prohibits all others save for the Congress to exercise legislative Power in the Federal District of Columbia. SEE also DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION V. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, 575, U.S. 135, S.Ct. 1225, 191 L.ed 2d, 153 (2015).

Accordingly, The Federal District of Columbia is not a STATE, and the (13) member Municipal Corporation Council and Mayor has NO Senate has NO VOTE in Congress. Therefore The D.C. Corporation Council and Mayor can not Constitutionally enact Laws, which regulate, direct, control or prohibit, petitioners conduct SEE, [GREGORY V. ASHCRAFT, 501 U.S. 452: 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.ed 2d 410]. Petitioner has been Subjected to the D.C. CODE SECTIONS which the D.C. Council and Mayor enact, to such a degree that he has been arrested convicted and sentenced to prison terms pursuant to the provisions of the D.C. CODE. Congress has Knowingly Ignored the Laws and Constitutional Articles, and Amendment TEN, which prohibits the deposit of legislative Function into a non-constitutional entity by its creation of the HOME RULE ACT. The D.C. CODE SECTIONS are NOT ACTS of Congress, The Congress Do NOT Never VOTE on any of the D.C. CODE SECTIONS TO become Law as required

by Article -1 section 7 clause 2. of the Constitution. Whereof, petitioners priceless LIBERTIES have been compromised by the continue enforcement of these D.C. CODE SECTIONS - Petitioner is not only being deprived of his many liberties, he is also being deprived of his TENTH AMENDMENT Right to protection against an illegal, unlawful, unconstitutional government and Defacto STATE, which continue to intrude beyond Constitutional Protections, and deprive petitioner of his individual TENTH AMENDMENT right. The D.C. HOME RULE ACT and its provisions upset the Constitutional Balance between the National Government and STATE. This Court must take judicial Notice of the fact that the Federal District of Columbia IS NOT a STATE, and the EXCLUSIVE LEGISLATIVE POWER clause prohibits any entity to exercise legislative Authority in behalf of or along with the Congress in or over The Federal District of Columbia.

THE D.C. COUNCIL'S IMITATED ENACTED VERSIONS
UNITED STATES STATUTES

OF

Movant contends that the D.C. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION COUNCIL and MAYOR'S legislated enacted imitated versions of UNITED STATES D.C. STATUTES are CONSTITUTIONALLY invalid laws and have no lawful CONSTITUTIONAL force against Movant criminally as charged by U.S. ATTORNEYS indictment.

The D.C. HOME RULE ACT delegating CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICAL I Legislative soveregin power to a 13 member D.C. CORPORATION COUNCIL and MAYOR for it to lagislate and direct U.S. CITIZENS who have no CONSTITUTIONAL relationship with it for the District of Columbia is a STATUTE beyond the powers of CONGRESS authorithy "for any reason, is ''no law at all"..."NIGRO v. UNITED STATES, 276 U.S. 332, 341, 48 S. Ct. 388, 72 L.ED 600 (1928).

The UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION does not provide that the CONGRESS has the authority or right to legislate the delegation of its exclusive right of legislation for the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA away to third parties (ie D.C. COUNCIL and MAYOR under the D.C. HOME RULE ACT).

The Congress exclusive Right of legislation cannot Constitutionally be delegated to third parties.

The CONGRESS is without Authority to delegate its exclusive Right to a MUNICIPAL CORPORATION COUNCIL and MAYOR for it to do its job for it.

The D.C. COUNCIL and MAYOR'S legislated imitated enacted versions of the Congress UNITED STATES law the D.C. STATUTES cannot be Constitutionally enforced as UNITED STATES law within the boundries of the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

The D.C. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION COUNCIL and MAYOR have no CONSTITUTIONAL relationship with Movant to legislate imitated versions of UNITED STATES law D.C. STATUTES to direct control or prohibit the actions of Movant.

Movant has a CONSTITUTIONAL Due Process Right to only be charged and convicted under a CONSTITUTIONALLY valid law...see FALLON, AS-APPLIED and FACIAL CHALLENGES and THIRD-PARTY STANDING, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1331-1333 (2000); MONAGHAN, OVERBREADTH, 1981 SUP. Ct. REV. 1, 3. see also NORTH CAROLINA v. PEARCE, 395 U.S. 711, 739, 89 S. Ct. 2072. 23 L.ED 2d 656 (1969).

The D.C. COUNCIL and MAYOR'S enacted versions of UNITED STATES laws which Movant was charged and convicted of can not be made to be violated as was declared by the U.S. Attorneys collusive indictment, such laws deprive the D.C. SUPERIOR COURT jurisdiction over all offenses alleged to violated by indictment which it believes it has where the D.C. COUNCILS versions of D.C. STATUTES offenses are not UNITED STATES law.

Where...ARTICALE I SECTION 8 CLAUSE 17 PROVIES

THE CONGRESS SHALL HAVE POWER.....

TO EXERCISE EXCLUSIVE LEGISLATION

IN ALL CASES WHATSOEVER OVER SUCH
DISTRICT(NOT EXCEEDING TEN MILES
SQUARE)

The U.S. CONSTITUTION'S ARTICAL I section 8 clause 17 and the Bill of rights 10th amendment forbids the D.C. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION COUNCIL and MAYOR from legislating for the DISTRICT of COLUMBIA.

Consequently, the Supreme Court declared that any law beyond the powers of CONGRESS, for any reason is no law at all... NIGRO v. UNITED STATES 276, U.S. 332, 48 S. Ct. 388, 72 L.ED 600 (1928) .

Federalism protects the liberty of all persons by ensuring that Laws enacted in excess of Governmental Powers cannot direct or control their actions... CAROL ANN BOND v. UNITED STATES 180 L.ED 2d 269. (2011) .

The D.C. COUNCIL and MAYOR for the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA legislated enactments Known as D.C. CODE SECTIONS created in contravention of FEDERALISM which Movant cannot Apply his individual 10th Amendment Right to the D.C. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION COUNCIL and MAYOR'S local Government nor did Movant delegate the transfer or surrender Authority to the D.C. COUNCIL within the boundries of the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA as to whether the D.C. COUNCIL'S Government is FEDERAL or STATE.

The D.C. COUNCIL and MAYOR'S versions of UNITED STATES Law cannot be made to be violated on matter how long its been enforced.

QUESTIONS FOR THE COURT

1. CAN THE D.C. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION COUNCIL AND MAYOR CONSTITUTIONALLY LEGISLATE AND ENACT ITS OWN IMITATED VERSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES LAW (D.C. STATUTES) WHEN ARTICALE I SECTION 8 CLAUSE 17 EXCLUSIVE RIGHT ONLY TO CONGRESS?
2. CAN A U.S. CITIZEN HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE D.C. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION COUNCIL LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WHERE UNDER HIS/HER 10th AMENDMENT RIGHT DID NOT TRANSFER OR SURRENDER AUTHORITY TO IT RIGHTS NOT SURRENDERED?
3. CAN THE D.C. COUNCIL AND MAYOR LEGISLATE AND ENACT UNITED STATES LAW?
4. CAN THE D.C. COUNCIL AND MAYOR'S VERSIONS OF UNITED STATES LAW BE CONSTITUTIONAL UNITED STATES LAW ?
5. CAN THE STATEMENT EXCLUSIVE EXPRESSED IN ARTICALE I SECTION 8 CLAUSE 17 OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION IN ANY WAY BE INTERPENTATED AS THIRD PARTIES?
6. CAN A U.S. CITIZEN APPLY HIS 10th AMENDMENT INDIVIDUAL

RIGHT TO THE D.C. COUNCL AND MAYOR'S NON FEDERAL NON STATE
LOCAL HOME RULE POWER IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA?

B. FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION OF ARTICLE III JURISDICTION

This case presents the question of Article III Jurisdiction of the D.C. Superior Court, and the respondent Jodi Lazarus U.S. Attorney Failure to invoke any Article III jurisdiction or establish and show Article III Standing For its cause of action in a criminal case it initiated. And the concealment by Respondents Jennifer M. Anderson, Dayna A. Dayson, and John Ramsey Johnson (Judges) who failed to Satisfy itself of Article III Jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of Respondent Jodi Lazarus case, against petitioner. The D.C. Superior Court is an Article -I legislative Court created by Congress with Article-III judicial Power deposited upon their Judges. The D.C. Superior Courts jurisdiction is limited to those judicial Powers granted to it under Article III section 2 of the Constitution. A court of United judicial power can only extend to cases and controversy under Article III.

A plaintiff seeking redress must first invoke the courts Article III jurisdiction and show Standing to bring the action. SEE LUJAN V. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.ed. 2d 351 (1992).

Additionally, An official must act within the scope of his jurisdiction, to be entitled to enjoy immunity, from civil action. SEE DAVIS V. BURRIS, 51 Ariz. 220, 75 P.2d 689 (1938); ABLEMAN V. BOOTH, 21 HOWARD, 506 (1859).

Respondents, D.C. Superior Court Judges Jennifer M. Anderson, Danya A. Dayson, and John Ramsey Johnson ignored their Article III duties to establish Article III Standing and Article III Jurisdiction over Respondent U.S. Attorney Jodi Lazarus case, against petitioner. Because Respondents proceeded to the merits of the case in clear absence of Article III jurisdiction

personally over petitio[n]er, and the subject matter
Respondents lose only claim of entitlement to
judicial or official immunity. SEE ZELLER V.
RANKIN, 101 S. Ct 2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68
L. ed 2d 386. Furthermore was
arrested by Respondents D.C. Police officers
Todd Perkins, Rachael Pulliam, Elbert Griffin and
Douglas Carlson pursuant to an illegal process
who also lose official immunity because their
actions against petitioner were outside of the
scope and limit of their duty and found to
be in violation of the Fourth Amendment
by the D.C. Court of Appeals SEE JONES V.
UNITED STATES, 168 A.3d 703 (D.C. Ct 2017).

THE D.C. SUPERIOR COURT Committed Manifest Constitutional errors. when it failed to satisfy it self of Article III Jurisdiction;

Subject matter jurisdiction concerns a courts very power to hear a case, and becaus a COURTS power to hear a case can never be forfitted or waived, " the lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction is not subject to parties' consent or doctrines of estoppel in any case (except to) announce the fact and dismiss the action. see Ex Parte McCardle 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1869) .

The Court held in STEEL CO. that a federal Court must determin that it has subject matter over the case before it can reach the marits of a case. Id. at 89-101. Rejecting the practice of some appellate Courts to decide the merits of a case based on "hypothetical jurisdiction", the Court reaffirmed the principle that subject matter jurisdiction is a necessary pre-requisite to any merits decision by a Court exercising Article III Judicial Power; "The Statutoty and (especially) CONSTITUTIONAL elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation of equilibration of powers, restraining the Courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from acting permanently regarding certain subjects." Id . 101. thus a Court necessarily acts "ultra vires" when it considers the merits of a case over which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction... is an Article III as well as a Statutory

requirement; it functions as a restriction on federal power, and contributes to the characterization of the federal sovereign. INSURANCE Corp. of IRELAND, Ltd. 456 U.S. 694, 702(1982). Because a federal Courts subject matter jurisdiction is created -- and limited--by Article III and federal ststutes, ''no action of parties can confer subject matter jurisdiction upon Article 1 Court's, ''the principles of consent ,waiver and estoppal do not apply.Id. A Article 1 Court with article III judicial power has a independent obligation to assess its subject matter jurisdiction ,and it will raise a lack of subject matter jurisdiction on its own motion. ''Because subject matter limitations ''serve institutional interests, '' thay''must be policed by the Courts on their own initiative even at the highest level.''Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. 526 U.S. 547, 583(1999).

Movant brings to the attention of this Court and asks that it takes Judicial Notice. That its subject matter jurisdiction is an Article III requirement first , and then a Statutory requirement.see Insurance Corp...456 U.S.at 702, and that the D.C. SUPERIOR COURTS jurisdiction is created and limited (emphasis added) by Article III section 2 of the Constitution. As part of D.C. SUPERIOR COURTS special obligations it must satisfy itself of Article III jurisdiction before reaching the merits of the allegations against Movant.

Article III requires a triad of elememts that must be proven and they are as follows; 1)injury; 2)causation; and redressability. see Lujan V. Defenders of Wildlife 504 us 555, 560(1992).

The record in this case(in the D.C. SUPERIOR COURT) will

disclose beyond all doubt that no complainant/litigant in there personal private capacity even as much as alleged injury, causation, and redressability. Instead the record will reflect that the D.C. SUPERIOR COURT;1) INVOKED A HYPOTHETICAL JURISDICTION;2) JUDICIALLY DECREED JURISDICTION; AND 3)relied upon the ''statutory permission approach'' in order to reach the merits of the case against Movant . All of which the SUPREME COURT has condemned and has stated without equivocation that a Article 1 legislative COURT can not do.

A) HYPOTHETICAL JURISDICTION:

Standing is a federal jurisdictional question ''determining the power of the Court to entertain the suit'' WARTH V. SELDIN 422 U.S. 490(1975). [A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for its claim. BAUER V. VENEMAN 352 F3d 625, 642 n . 15(2nd 2003). Article III standing is a threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the Court to entertain the suit. ROSS v. BANK OF AM. 524 F3d 217,222(2nd 2008). The Second Circuit has stated in CARVER v. NASSAU COUNTY INTERIM FIN. AUTH. 730 F3d at 156(2nd 2013) (Normally, in cases involving the issue of Article III subject matter jurisdiction , this issue must be addressed first.see STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR A BETTER ENV'T., 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (striking down the ''doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction'' by which difficult subject matter questions were ignored to allow the D.C. SUPERIOR COURT to rule on the merits of the case when the merits were easily resolved)).

Because there is no doctrin of hypothetical jurisdiction. Id. at 101. And because standing , the most importan of all jurisdictional doctrines was never proven much less alleged in

this case or on appeal. Movant asks that this Court announce the fact that jurisdiction never existed in this case and move to dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. see Ex PARTE McCARDLE 74 U.S. 506,514(1868).

B) JUDICIALLY DECREEEING JURISDICTION:

The D.C. SUPERIOR COURT is a Court of limited jurisdiction, it possess only the power granted to it by the CONSTITUTION and ststutes, which are not to be expanded by judicial decree.

KOKKONEN v. GUARDIAN LIFE INS. CO. OF AM. 511 U.S.

375,377(1994).A Court is to presume therefore, that a case lies outside its limited jurisdiction unless and until jurisdiction is shown to be proper . see also BRADNER CORPS. v. V- FOUNDATION 75 Fed Appx. 830 at 831-32(2nd 2003). The facts in this case are indisputable; no litigant/complainant ever proved or even as much alleged injury, causation and redressability. Because this is easily substantiated by a review of this record, this Court was without jurisdiction to bypass on to the merits of this case. However it is equally clear that the D.C. SUPERIOR Court did expand its limited jurisdiction by judicially decreeing it. It now becomes this courts undeniable duty to announce this fact and move to dismiss this case for lack of Article III/subject matter jurisdiction. see Ex PARTE McCARDLE 74 U.S. 506 ,514(1868); and BENDER v. WILLIAMSPORT AREA SCHOOL DIST. 475 U.S. 534,541(1986).

C) STATUTORY PERMISSION APPROACH:

The D.C. SUPERIOR COURTS jurisdiction extends only to cases and controversies, U.S. Const. Art.3 sec.2 see also STEEL CO. 118 S. Ct. at 1016; LUJAN v. WILDLIFE 504 U.S. 555(1992).

standing is an essential and Constitutionally mandated part of a case or controversy requirement of Article III, see LUJAN, 112 S. Ct. at 2136, which prevents the judicial process from merely being a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders.'' VALLEY FORGE CHRISTIAN 454 U.S. 464(1982). Although standing may be informed by some prudential considerations as well, the Supreme Court has unambiguously defined three indispensable elements that comprise the ''irreducible constitutional minimum'' required to establish Article III standing. see LUJAN 112 S. Ct. at 2136 IN EFFECT 1) INJURY; 2) CAUSATION; and 3) REDRESSABILITY. A few Courts have relied upon the ''statutory permission approach ''in order to obtain jurisdiction over a particular case, in the past. As it is plain that the D.C. SUPERIOR COURT has relied wholly on the ''Statutory permission approach'' in this case and especially when on litigant/complainant, in there personal capacity ever alleged the 3 mandated elements of Article III, standing. The statutory permission approach fails because Congress is itself constrained by the Constitution. The Constitution (emphasis added) requires a personalized injury and Congress cannot by legislation, waive that requirement. see RAINES v. BYRD 521 U.S. 811(1997) (It is well settled that Congress cannot erase Article III'S requirement by statutorily granting the right to sue a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.''). Those Courts like the D.C. SUPERIOR COURT , that have adopted the statutory permission approach likely viewed the injury element as a prudential standing requirement that Congress could waive. Indeed, earlier Supreme Court opinion referred to waiveable

prudential standing requirements. see WARTH v. SELDIN 422 U.S. 490, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2206 N. 12(1975).

However the Court has now stated, without equivoaction, that a particularized and personal injury is a Constitutional-- not a prudential-- standing requirement, which cannot be waived by legislation. see LUJAN 112 S.Ct. at 2135. The D.C. SUPERIOR COURT adoption of the statutory permission approach may have also confused Congress's power to create rights with the power to create standing. In no event, however, ''may Congress abrogate the Article III minimal; A plaintiff must always have suffered' a distinct and palpable injury to himself'... that is likely to be redressed if the requested relief is granted.

'' GLADSTONE RELTORS v. VILLAGE OF BELLWOOD 441 U.S. 91(1979).

In light of more recent Supreme Court authority, such as STELL CO. and LUJAN, those cases relying upon the statutory permission theory and the statutory permission theory itself, must fail.

The record in this case is clear; 1)no litigant or complainant in his/her personal capacity, ever proved or even alleged injury, causation and redressability; 2) THE D.C. SUPERIOR COURT ,failed to adhere to its obligation and satisfy itself with subject matter jurisdiction under Article III SECTION 2) Invoking its hypothetical jurisdiction; A) judicially decreeing jurisdiction; and B) relied upon the statutory permission approach in order to pass on to the merits of the case against Movant and 3) in the process issued orders and judgments in a case wherein subject matter/Article III jurisdiction was wholly lacking. Thereby requiring this court to enter an order dismissing the case for its lack of

Article III , subject matter jurisdiction. see McCARDLE 74 U.S. 506,514(1868) (Without jurisdiction a Court cannot proceed at all in any case [except to] announce the fact and dismiss the case for lack of standing and jurisdiction); also ORNER v. SHALALA 30 F3d at 1310(10th 1994) (Where judgment is void, relief is not discretionary matterit is mandatory) .

THE D.C. SUPERIOR COURT IS WITHOUT STATUTORY POWER TO HEAR AND DETERMIN.

Movant contends that the D.C. SUPERIOR COURT acted without statutory power to hear and determin the UNITED STATES Attorneys collusive action indictment. The D.C. SUPERIOR COURT is a Artical I section 8) court with executive legislative judicial power granted by the District of Columbia Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of (1970) which deposited Article III Judicia Power upon D.C. SUPERIOR COURT judges tha t hear and determin trials with exclusive jurisdiction over all criminal cases brought under UNITED STATES D.C. STATUES legislated and enacted exclusivly by Congress.

The D.C. SUPERIOR COURT being an Article I Legislative Court which ~~can~~ not Constitutionally receive Article III Judicial Power... Ex PARTE BAKELITE... ARON v. COOPER... MOOKINI v. UNITED STATES had it deposited into it ... However those accused and tried by D.C. SUPERIOR COURT Judges exercising Article III Judicial Power in its judicial functions may not deprive the accused of the guranteed protection of Article III and the Bill of Rights... D.C. v. COLTS,282 U.S. 63, 74 ,LED

127,51 S.Ct. 52; CALLAN v. WILSON, 127 U.S. 540, 32 LED 223, 8 S.Ct. 1301.

Movant contends that it is an essential requirement that D.C. SUPERIOR COURT Judges reach the showing of Article III standing for a case and controversy when the Courts jurisdiction is invoked and that it establish its statutory authority on the face of the record before it proceeds to the merits of a case ... LANCE v. COFFMAN 549 U.S. 437 439 167 L.ed 2d 29 (2007).

The D.C. SUPERIOR COURT failed to establish its statutory authority and reach the UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS Article III requirements of right to standing for initiating the criminal proceeding which must be established before the court can take jurisdiction over a case and proceed to the merits ... NORFLET V. JOHN HANDCOCK FIN SERV 422 F .SUPP 2d 346(2d Cir 2006).

Any Court exercising Article III Judicial Power as it is defined by the CONSTITUTION and the Supreme Court , must conform to all required standers that Article III defindes in it Judicial Functions ... GLIDDEN CO. v. ZDANOK 370 U.S. 530, 589,598,8 LED 2d 671,82,S.Ct.1459.

The requirement of a case or controversy is derived from the Constitutions Article III it may not be ignored or evaded... UNITED STATES v. ALASKA

If a case loses its character as an Article III case or controversy which must exist ... HALL v. BEALS

the Court loses its power to hear and determin as the Court can only decide cases or controversy and not collusive actions.

WHERE THE D.C. SUPERIOR COURT HAS NO CRIMINAL JURISDICTION TO TRY THE OFFENSES CHARGED

Movant contends that the CONSTITUTION clearly reveals only jurisdiction to all cases in law and equity , in which the D.C. SUPERIOR COURT clearly convicted Movant under its alleged criminal jurisdictional authority by its case, Where there is no authority, under the CONSTITUTION which could give it.

Whereas, Article III section(2) to the U.S. CONSTITUTION provides;

.....JUDICAL POWER SHALL EXTEND TO ALL
CASES IN LAW AND EQUITY ... OF
ADMIRALITY AND MARTIME JURISDICTION...
TO CONTROVERSIES TO WHICH THE
UNITED STATES SHALL BE A PARTY.....

Consequently, the D.C. SUPERIOR COURT has no jurisdiction criminally or at common law to proceed either expressly or impliedly. UNITED STATES v. HUDSON 7 CRANCH 32, 3 L.ED 259(1812) ... TENNESSEE v. DAVIS 100 U.S. 257 ,25 L.ED 648(1880) ... YOUNG v. EX REL VUITTON ET F.LS S.A 481 U.S. 787.55 L.ED 2d 740 (1987) CUNNINGHAM v. NEAGLE 135, U.S. 614,619,35 L.ED 2d 36 (1973) ...GODFREY v. COMMONWEALTH 3d Cir (2013) .

Thus, No Criminal Jurisdiction can not be made or expanded

which the CONSTITUTION does not give ... REID v. COVERT 354 U.S. 11 L.ED 2d 1148 (1956) ... VERLINDEN B.V. v. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA 461 U.S. 480 76 L.ED 2d 81 (1983) ... AMERICAN FIRE & GAS CO. v. FINN 341 U.S. 6, 95 L.ED 702(1951).

Additionally limits on federal jurisdiction cannot be disregarded or evaded... OWENS EQUIPMENT & ERECTION v. KROGER 437 U.S. 374 57 L.ED 2d 274 (1978).

WHERE THE D.C. SUPERIOR COURT STATUTORY AUTHORITY FAILS TO APPEAR ON THE FACE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Movant , contends that the D.C. SUPERIOR COURT judgment is wholly void and could in no way proceed against the body of his/her person as to detain and imprison for liability for any violation of any offenses in the indictment because the Courts record of its proceedings fails to render the statutory authority in which it has Power to proceed against Movant to render a lawful binding judgment on its record.

Consequently , "Federal Courts must determin that they have jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits ." LANCE v. COFFMAN 549 U.S. 473 167 L.ED 2d 29 (2007).

Moreover, "Recitals in the record are *prima facie* evidence of the facts recited to show the jurisdiction of the Court and the record of the proceedings must show that the statutory authority has been pursued, which must appear on the record by a statement in legal and logical form or the judgment is void and must be reversed. "... COMSTOCK v. CRAWFORD 3 WALL 396 18

L.ED 34(1866) ... RICH v. TOWN OF MENTZ 134 U.S. 632 33 L.ED 1074(1890) ... COWDERY v. CANEADEA 16 F. 532 (2d Cir 1883) ... MENPHIS v. CUMBERLAND TELIPH & TELECO. 218 U.S. 624 54 L.ED 1185(1910) ... BALTIMORE COUTY v. HECHINGER LIQUIDATION TRUST 335 F.3d 243(3d Cir 2002) ... TRAVIS MILLS v. SQUARE D CO. 67 F.R.D. 22(3d Cir 1975) ... JOYCE v. UNITED STATES 474 F.2d 215(3d Cir 1973) ... MITCHELL v. MAURER 293 U.S. 237 79 L.ED 388(1934) ... MENNEN CO v. ATL MUT INS CO. 147 F.3d 312 ... O'CONNOR v. SANDY LANE HOTEL CO. 496 F.3d 312 (3d Cir 2006) ... GENERAL ELEC CO. v. DEUTZ AG 270 F.3d 144 150 (3d Cir 2001) ... ROBERTSON v. CEASE 97 U.S. 648 24 L.ED 1057 ... PITTS CINN & St LOUIS RAILWAY CO. v. RAMSEY 89 U.S. 322 22 L.ED 832 (1875) ... CHASIS v. PROGRESS MFG CO. 382 F.2d 772 (3d Cir 1967) ... PATTON v. BALTIMORE & O.R. CO. 197 F. 2d 732 (3d Cir 1952) ... THE LESSE OF GRIGNON et al v. ASTOR et al 2 HOWARD 319 11 L.ED 283 ... BIGHAM v. CABOT 3 DALL 382 1 L.ED 646 ... PIRONI & SLATRI 141 U.S. 121 35 L.ED 657(1895) BENDER v. WILLIAMSPORT AREA SCHOOL 475 U.S. 534 89 L.ED 2d 501 ... TURNER v. BANK OF NORTH AMERICA 4 DALL 8 1 L.ED 718 ... TURNER v. ENRILLE 4 DALL 7 L.ED 717 ... Ex PARTE WATKINS 3 PETERS 193 7 L.ED 650 (1830) ... PEPER v. FORDYCE 119 U.S. 469 30 L.ED 435 (1886) ... KEMPE'S LESSEE v. KENNEDY et al 5 CRANCH 173 3 L.ED 70 (1799) ... ROBERT v. LEWIS 144 U.S. 653 36 L.ED 579 (1892) ... MANSFILED C&L M.R. CO. v. SWAN 111 U.S. 379 28 L.ED 452 ... CUNNINGHAM v. RRB 392 F.3d 567(3d Cir 2004) ... Ex PARTE SMITH 94 U.S. 455 24 L.ED 165(1877) ... FISHBACK v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. 161 U.S. 96 40 L.ED 630 (1896) ... METCALF v. CITY OF WATERTOWN 128 U.S. 586 32 L.ED 543(1888) ... HARRIS v. HARDEMAN et al 14 HOWARD 334 14 L.ED 444 WESTMORE v.

KARRICK 205 U.S. 141 81 L.ED 745 (1907) ... FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER CO. v. RISJIRD 449 U.S. 368 66 L.ED 2d 571(1981) .

Movant contends in addition to the Court being and acting without jurisdiction over the act in indictment which it seeks to punish , the following will clearly demonstrate the courts abuse of power or discretion within 18 U.S.C. 401 under which such statute determines the court and its officials enumerated authorized authority upon specific crimes allowing the court and its officials enumerated authority upon specific crimes allowing the court to act upon as only committed within their presence and not in accordance in which Movant is presently held for... Whereas, the Supreme Court in DONNELL v. UNITED STATES 276, U.S. 505 72 L.ED 676(1928) declared that ,the federal government has ''NO COMMON LAW CRIMES'' and the Judges are not permitted to define crimes for they rest solely in statute... VIEDRICK v. UNITED STATES 318 U.S. 236 241 87 L.ED 734(1943) .

QUESTION FOR THE COURT

1. CAN THE D.C. SUPERIOR COURT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER AND MOVANT WITHOUT ESTABLISHING IT ON THE RECORD OF ITS PROCEEDINGS AND THE JUDGMENT BE LAWFUL AND BINDING AGAINST MOVANT ?
2. CAN A D.C. SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE GRANT JUDGMENT OF RELIEF TO THE UNITED STATES COLLUSIVE ACTION WITHOUT IT STATING ANY

RELIEF TO BE SOUGHT OR DEMONSTRATING ARTICLE III STANDING
INJURY IN FACT?

3. CAN THE ARTICAL I D.C. SUPERIOR COURT WHO'S JUDGES EXERCISE
ARTICLE III JUDICAL POWER IGNOR AND EVADE THE REQUIRED
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE III STANDING IN CRIMINAL CASES AND THEIR
JUDGMENTS BE LAWFUL AND BINDING?

4. DO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS REQUIRE JUDICIAL DETERMINATION FROM
JUDGES WHO HAVE ARTICLE III SECTION 2 POWER ?

THE GOVERNMENT HAS NO ARTICAL III CASE AND CONTROVERSY
STANDING TO PROSECUTE THE ACTION

Movant contends that it is a relivent requirement that the UNITED STATES attorney demonstrate Aritical III standing in a case where it initiated the criminal procedure invoking the jurisdiction of the D.C. SUPERIOR COURT before it can proceed to the merits of its complaint which it seeks a judgment.

The requirements of a continuing case or controversy is derived from the CONSTITUTION...LINER v. JAFCO 375 U.S. 301, 11 L.ED 2d 347, 84 S.CT. 391 (1964) it may not be ignored or evaded...UNITED STATES v. ALASKA 503 U.S. 569, 118 L.ED 2d 569, 112 S.Ct 1606 (1992).

The UNITED STATES and its attorney lack the right and standing to initiate the criminal proceeding. Where the SUPREME COURT has determin that in order for a plaintiff to satisfy Artical III standing it must show; 1) it has suffered an injury infact (a) that is concret and particularized (b) that is actual or imminent not conjectual or hypothetical; 2)the injury is farly tracable to the actions of the defendant.

Movant contends that the UNITED STATES attorney had no right to initiate the criminal procedure adainst him for a Civil Rights violation of privete persons not named party to the action, who lacks a judicial congnizable interest in the outcome of the UNITED STATES attorneys collusive prosecution of

MOVANT.

Further the U.S. attorney only duties defined under 28 U.S.C. 547 is to prosecute and defend for the government all civil actions or proceedings in which the UNITED STATES is concerned. The U.S. attorney is without right and standing to initiate the criminal proceeding.

It is immaterial whether by law that the prosecution of Movant must be by indictment or action, in whatever form the state pursues her right to punish for offenses against her sovereignty ever step of the proceeding tends to one end ,the compelling the defender to pay a pecuniary fine by way of punishment for the offense... WISCONSIN v. PELICANTINS CO. OF NEW ORLEANS 127 U.S. 265 32 L.ED 239 The government must have something at stake in the out come of any action for the action to survive, if the action was for the interest of the public the government must show standing like the private individual, that it has an interest in the relief sought as entitles it to move with the action... CUTLER v. UNITED STATES 149 U.S. 662, 37 L.ED 890... UNITED STATES v. YOUNGER 92 F. 672 9th Cir(1899).

The U.S. attorney did not demonstrate any injury or crime committed against the sovereignty of the UNITED STATES it failed to state any interest to be sought in the outcome and it had no standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the D.C. SUPERIOR COURT pursuasion to the existance of Artical III standing...LUJAN v. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE 549 U.S. 555 560 119 L.ED 2d 351 (1982). No case can proceed to the merits in

subsequant to its initiation the dispute loses its character as an Artical III case and controversy, of the kind that must exist ... HALL v. BEALS 396 U.S. 45, 24 L.ED 2d 214, 90 S.Ct 200 (1969) .

The Government has failed to allege or meet the CONSTITUTIONAL burden under Artical III as to any injury or intrests of its own which could give it a right to initiate and bring forth the action against Movant by the alleged wrongful conduct believed to be committed by Movant, which there can be no standing for the Government or for any official to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court in which to prosecute the alleged Criminal case Not only between the Government, but by the cause between the Movant and the public.

Whereas, " Standing is a prerequisite for a party to invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction, and its fundamental restriction on the D.C. SUPERIOR COURT'S authority that in the ordinary course, a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interest of third parties, and a generalized grievance no matter how sincere, is insufficient to confer standing. A litigant raising only a generally available grievance about government-claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the CONSTITUTION and laws and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large does not state an Articale III case or Controversy. "STALLEY v. CATHOLIC HEALTH INITIATIVES 509 F.3d 517 521 (8th Cir 2007)...ALLEN v.

WRIGHT 468 U.S. 737 750 82 L.ED 2d 556 (1984) ... NORFLET v. JOHN HANCOCK FIN SERV 422 F.Supp 2d 346 (2d Cir 2006) ... LUAGAN v. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE 549 U.S. 555 560 119 L.ED 2d 351 (1982) ... HOLLINGSWORTH v. PERRY 570 U.S. 187 L.ED 2d 768 (2013) ... DIAMOND v. CHARLRS 476 U.S. 62 90 L.ED 2d 48 ... LANCE v. COFFMAN 549 U.S. 437 439 167 L.ED 2d 29 (2007) ... ARIZONANS FOR OFF ENG v. ARIZONA 520 U.S. 43 137 L.ED 2d 170 (1997) .

Thus , the Third Circuit court of appeals , "Has consistantly refused to confer standing on plaintiffs seeking to vindicate merely their own generalized view regarding Constitutionlity, Legality or the Public intrest, failure to set forth any injury, therefore, even in the presence of a case or controversy deprives litigant of Standing.''...AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPERATION OF CHURCH & STATE INC v. UNITED STATES DEPT OF HEALTH ED 619 F.2d 252 (3d Cir 1979) ... PREISER v. NEWKIRK 422 U.S. 395 45 L.ED 2d 272 (1975) ... DIAMLER CHRYSLER CORP v. CUNO 547 U.S. 332 352 164 L.ED 2d 589 (2006) ... FRIENDS OF EARTH v. LAID LAW ENV. S 528 U.S. 167 145 L.ED 2d 600 (2000) ... WARTH v. SELDIN 422 U.S. 498 45 L.ED 2d 343 (1975) .

QUESTIONS FOR THE COURT

----- 1. CAN THE GOVERNMENT HAVE THE RIGHT TO BRING THE CRIMINAL ACTION AGAINST MOVANT OF A CAUSE BETWEEN MOVANT AND THE PUBLIC WITHOUT ESTABLISHING ANY INJURY OF ITS OWN ?

WHERE THE GOVERNMENT HAS NO STANDING TO BRING OR INITIATE SAID CRIMINAL ACTION

Movant contends the Government is without right not only by the consent of Congress to initiate said criminal proceeding , but for which said criminal proceeding was brought against Movant was for an immoral decietful purpose, which was only for, if anything ,brought against Movant for the purpose only for the Government to collect monetary penalties civil in nature, and not to imprison Movant for such .

Whereas, the following authorities provides:

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEEDURE 2- THERE IS ONE FORM OF ACTION CIVIL ACTION also see 28 U.S.C.S. 547 28 U.S.C.S. 1345 28 U.S.C.S. 607 28 U.S.C.S 454 CUNNINGHAM v. NEAGLE 135 U.S. 614 43 L.ED 2d 36(1973) ... GODFREY v. COMMONWEALTH (3d Cir 2013) ... UNITED STATES v. URSERY 518 U.S. 267 135 L.ED 2d 549 (1996) ... KLINE v. CONSTRUCTION CO. 200 U.S. 226 232 467 L.ED 226(1922) ... UNITED STATES v. ZUCKER 161 U.S. 475 40 L.ED 777(1896) ... PACKAGES OF PANAMA HATS v. UNITED STATES 231 U.S. 358 58 L.ED 267 (1913) UNITED STATES v. ONE SILK RUG 158 F. 974(3d Cir 1908) ... UNITED STATES v. CASTRO 883 F.2d 1018 (5th & 11th Cir 1989) ... UNITED STATES v. YOUNGER 92 F. 672 (9th Cir 1899) ... McCRONE v. UNITED STATE 307 U.S. 61 83 L.ED 1108(1939) see also PRIGG v. PENNSYLVAINA 16 PET 339 10 L.ED 1068 ... H.K & SHANGHAI BANKING CORP. v. SIMON (IN RE SIMON) 153 F.3d 991(9th Cir 1998) .

ON RIGHT OF GOVERNMENT TO INITIATE
CRIMINAL PROCEEDING

Movant contends that the UNITED STATES Government through its Attorney for the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA had no right to initiate the criminal proceedings against Movant not only because it had no standing but for a civil rights violation of private persons not partie to the action of its complaint indictment , charging the violation of D.C. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION COUNCIL versions of UNITED STATES LAW the D.C. STATUTE as criminal offenses for violating the civil rights of private persions.

The U.S. Attorney is without authority to initiate a collusive action as a criminal proceeding, it stated no crime against the UNITED STATES traceable to the actions of Movant ,it stated no interest in the outcome, sought no fine or performance as relief in its complaint indictment ,it had no right to initiate a collusive action as a criminal proceeding.

The U.S. Attorney constructed and filed a legally frivolous false claim collusive action by indictment Nameing the UNITED STATES as Plaintiff against Movant bringing a collusive action as a criminal offense or crime against the sovereginty of the UNITED STATES.

The U.S. Attorney exceeded its statutory duty as defined under 28 U.S.C.S. 547 when it went outside the scope and limits of its empolment constructing and filing a collusive action by

indictment initiating the criminal proceeding against Movant for the alleged civil rights violation of private persons not partie to the action of its complaint indictment.

The U.S. Attorneys collusive action indictment is without standing , without right or merit, it is associated with a fraudulent undisclose schem to unlawfully collect, its action has no character as an Artical III case and controversy which must exist.

QUESTION FOR THE COURT

1. DOES THE D.C. COUNCIL LOCAL GOVERNMENT HAVE RIGHT TO INITIATE THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO VIOLATES THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF PRIVATE PERSONS ?

2. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THROUGH ITS ATTORNEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO INITIATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN FOR VIOLATING A PRIVATE CITIZENS CIVIL RIGHTS?

3. CAN THE U.S. ATTORNEY NAME THE UNITED STATES AS PLAINTIFF AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN TO INITIATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS FOR A CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION OF PRIVATE PERSON NOT NAMED PARTIE TO ITS ACTION?

4. CAN THE UNITED STATES BE NAMED AS PLAINTIFF IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING WITHOUT DEMONSTRATING ARTICALE III STANDING, OR THAT A CRIME WAS COMMITTED AGAINST ITS SOVEREGINTY?

D. THE LOWER COURTS MISAPPLICATION OF HECK V. HUMPHREY

The lower Courts seriously misapplied the application of HECK V. HUMPHREY, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)

When it applied those standards to petitioner complaint, where petitioners Fourth Amendment claims do not rest upon his current conviction.

Additionally, Petitioner's conviction was reversed on direct Appeal. SEE JONES V. UNITED STATES 168, A 3.d 703 (CCA 2017).

E. THE LOWER COURTS FAILED TO RESOLVE OR EVEN ADDRESS PRIVATE PROPERTY CLAIMS

The lower Courts failed to resolve petitioners private property claims. Respondents seized and Forfeited petitioners Automobile, cell phones, Clothing, Shoes Eye glasses, and Art Collection without a civil Forfeiture Process depriving petitioner of his Fifth AMENDMENT Right to Due process, and compensation for the governments use of his private property which has not been returned.

Moreover, " The Compensation for private property taken for public use must under the 5th Amendment of the Constitution be a full and perfect equivalent for the property taken. " Monongahela Navigation Co v. United States 148 U.S. 312 37 L.ed 403 (1893).

" The just compensation to which the owner of property taken for public purposes is constitutionall entitled is the market value of the property at the time of the taking Contemporaneously paid in money. " Olson v. United States 292 U.S. 246 79 L.ed 1236 (1934).

" ... It rests on equitable principles and it means substantially that the owner shall be put in as good position pecuniary as he would have been if his property had not been taken. " United States v. Rogers (C.C.A. 8th Cir) 168 C.C.A. 437 257 Fed 397 400.

" He is entitled to the damages inflicted by the taking. " Sea Board Air Liner R Co v. United States 261 U.S. 299 67 L.ed 664 (1923).

Additionally, " Where property to which the United States asserts no title is taken by its officers or agents pursuant to an act of Congress as private property for the public use the Government is under an implied obligation to make just compensation to the owner. " United States v. Great Falls Co 112 U.S. 645 28 846 (1884).

Thus, " A trustee in Bankruptcy has no greater right to recover back money or interest paid to discharge usurious loans than the bankrupt himself." Tiffany v. Boatman's Institution 18 Wall 290 21 L.ed 868 (1874).

For the foregoing reasons, certiorari
should be granted in this case.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Prince Jones

Date: October 5, 2022