


22-5824

No. 21-13504



LIT. 1:21-CV-00013-LAG-TQL

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC

Edward Tybone Ridley — PETITIONER
(Your Name)

vs.

Warden, Antoine Caldwell — RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Edward Tybone Ridley, CDC-570139
(Your Name)

P.O. Box 344
(Address)

Wrightsville, GA 31096
(City, State, Zip Code)

229-513-3582
(Phone Number)

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

- (1) Why does Georgia Sexual Offender Registration Act OCGA 42-1-12 of 1996-2022 conflict with United States Congress Act of 2006, where Congress did away with State-by-State Registries and put in place SORNA. A violation of SORNA is a fine and up to 20 YRS in prison? Why Georgia's Sentencing ~~Act~~ Scheme conflict with SORNA? Georgia First violation is 1-20 YRS, 2nd violation 5-30 YRS. How when Congress did away with State Registries and violation is not like Georgia's illegally applying SORNA. Has Congress changed SORNA violations?
- (2) Why Georgia Appellate Courts, the Georgia Court of Appeals, the Georgia Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit does not treat Georgia Removal off the Sexual Offender Registry of OCGA 42-1-19, 42-1-19(B) as a independent law? When you appeal after being removed like Ridley was at a 42-1-19 hearing Douglas County Superior Court Case No. 16-U-01438 MARCH 17, 2017 Original opinion of Retired Judge David Emmersen, illegally for Crisp Superior violation of OCGA 42-1-12 to approve? Where the case that illegally triggered OCGA 42-1-12 Registrations was Bay Co. Fla. 14th Cir Case No. 1995-2844 not Crisp Case Ridley lived in Douglas County, Ga 42-1-19(B). When you appeal CAN'T go from Supreme Court to Eleventh Circuit without illegally having to file a federal Habeas Corpus when 42-1-19 is a independent statute, Then Court illegally apply the "IN Custody" Scheme illegally, But Refuse to Act Accordingly when as a ground and fact, state that your sentence was enhanced by several unconstitutional, uncounseled state convictions that were no longer open to direct or collateral attack in their own rights that sentence cannot stand in conflict with Coss, Custis, Gideon v. Wainwright, Why?
- (3) Why Georgia Courts Refuse to Apply Contract Law to Ridley's Florida conviction that illegally triggered Registration in Georgia? Where in his Fla 14th Cir case, Case No. 1995-2844 Ret. Judge Register only ordered Ridley to provide DNA sample to Fla. Dep't of Law Enforcement Fla. Stat. 943.325 (1995) Not Register as Any type sex offender.
- (4) Why Georgia does not with Ridley follow OCGA 42-1-12 Requirement. of "ON" or "After" July 1, 1996, In Ridley's Fla Contract he was sentenced on December 12, 1995 not "ON" or "After" July 1, 1996. Do to time served what is this Court's meaning of time served? Ridley's Fla Contract of 3 YRS nothing to follow started on December 12, 1995 ended on December 11, 1998
- (4) Why Georgia Courts do not follow the Georgia Constitution where under the Constitution and Statutory laws crimes are to be punished under the provisions of the laws in effect at the time of the commission of the original felony, In Fla case alleged December 4, 1995 so Ridley in Georgia

Questions Cont'd

(10). Don't the sexual offender Registration Act should and be like parole and probation you be sent back to the state and ~~can~~ county where the alleged felony was committed NOT violated? Why Georgia don't follow those guidelines or no state do? Why???

(11) What procedure or statute this court can put in place for investigations to be held so that no party can be placed on any registration without a due process hearing first in the state where the alleged felony was committed? or the new state and county before labeling, declaring, classifying any type sex offender.

(12) What can this court put in place for the immediate removal off any sexual offender registration when it was attempted?

(13) Why in Georgia and Florida court as Ridley contract was, that there is ^{no} crime as attempted ^{third degree} sexual battery by attempted digital ~~penetration~~ penetration only with no likely injury under FLA Stat. there is no such offense why? And How Ridley was convicted of this offense in FLA? Why not a completed offense when the state cannot prove their original case. why??

(14) Why like in Ridley's FLA contract he accepted his contract he was not ordered to register in FLA so in Georgia under a precedent none of his indictments could stand a general demurrer. Why Georgia court's convict Ridley when all District Attorney's, Judges and public defender's know these rulings? Jackson v. State, Deal, Eilers v. State, Pardon v. State, etc.?

(15) Why court's refuse to appoint counsel for Ridley to enforce his FLA contract? Judge David Emmessen Removal MARCH 17, 2017, Original Removal order? why?

(16) Why Appointed Counsel's Refuse to Challenge Ridley illegally being placed under 42-1-12 ^(943.04325) after his contract in Florida mandate issued ^{(Ph Stat) (1997)}

On the same page, list all cases in other courts that are directly related to the case in this Court. A case is "directly related" if it arises from the same trial court case as the case in this Court (including the proceedings directly on review in this case), or if it challenges the same criminal conviction or sentence as is challenged in this Court, whether on direct appeal or through state or federal collateral proceedings. Below is an example of the format that should be used for this list:

- *Smith v. Jones*, No. 18-cv-200, U. S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Judgment entered Oct. 1, 2018.
- *Smith v. Jones*, No. 18-1200, U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Judgment entered Apr. 15, 2019.

VI. Table of Contents

On the page provided, list the page numbers on which the required portions of the petition appear. Number the pages consecutively, beginning with the "Opinions Below" page as page 1.

VII. Index of Appendices

List the description of each document that is included in the appendix beside the appropriate appendix letter. Mark the bottom of the first page of each appendix with the appropriate designation, *e.g.*, "Appendix A." See Rule 14.1 pertaining to the items to be included in the appendix.

A. Federal Courts

If you are asking the Court to review a decision of a federal court, the decision of the United States court of appeals should be designated Appendix A. Appendix A should be followed by the decision of the United States District Court and the findings and recommendations of the United States magistrate judge, if there were any. If the United States court of appeals denied a timely filed petition for rehearing, a copy of that order should be appended next. If you are seeking review of a decision in a habeas corpus case, and the decision of either the United States District Court or the United States Court of Appeals makes reference to a state court decision in which you were a party, a copy of the state court decision must be included in the appendix.

B. State Courts

If you are asking the Court to review a decision of a state court, the decision of which review is sought should be designated Appendix A. Appendix A should be followed by the decision of the lower court or agency that was reviewed in the decision designated Appendix A. If the highest court of the state in which a decision could be had denied discretionary review, a copy of that order should follow. If an order denying a timely filed petition for rehearing starts the running of the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari pursuant to Rule 13.3, a copy of the order should be appended next.

Question Cont'd

(17), What was Megan Law put in place for Adults or Felony sexual offenses against children and minors, including the TUNISH ACT? SORNA? Does 1995 cases apply under 42-1-12. Adult victims?

(18) Why the Georgia Parole Board and Florida Parole Boards OR GOVERNORS refuse to GRANT Ridley a pardon when CLEAR IN RECORD this disability was placed on Ridley illegally by CRISP CO SHERIFF Detective TAMARA SEARS in 2001 without due process, why??

(19) Why convicted AND IN PRISON in Georgia when in FLA his CONTRACT WAS UNDER FLA. Nolo Contendere LAW? AND UNDER FLA LAW when ANOTHER COURT use the FLA Nolo Contendere as A CLEMENT OF ANOTHER IN ANOTHER CASE/COURT to CONVICT, UNDER FLA. LAW would be NO CONVICTION at ALL Fed. Rule 11, OCGA 33.3, So why Georgia failed to investigate, CONVICT, AND HAS Ridley IN PRISON for A FLA CASE that DO NOT EXIST UNDER FLA LAW? Why GA AND FLA WANT ENFORCE FLA Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 11, OCGA 33.3? Why? AND Ridley FLA CONTRACT UNDER CONTRACT LAW? Why?

(20) Why IN PRISON in Georgia when Florida sent a letter stating that Ridley's FLA 14th CIR case no. 1995-2844. The records were destroyed, ¹⁹⁹⁵expunged again FLA case do NOT exist. Why IN A GEORGIA PRISON FROM A FLA CASE that do NOT exist?

(21) Why when in U.S. DISTRICT COURTS I file A Habeas Magistrate change to A 1983 then in the 1983 say I failed to state A claim? Is this ~~an~~ illegal when Magistrate judge could had ruled on Habeas when CLEAR IN GROUND AND FACT I STATED the sentence was enhanced by unconstitutional, uncounseled state convictions no longer open to direct OR collateral attack in their own rights the sentence CANNOT STAND. Did not this OVERTHROW the IN custody illegal doctrine judges use to discriminate against Ridley to table his case in all Federal Courts 1983's illegally. Ridley v. F.D.U.E, 5:20-cv-126 (2020); etc? why? then use three strikes illegally, why?

As an example, if the state trial court ruled against you, the intermediate court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, the state supreme court denied discretionary review and then denied a timely petition for rehearing, the appendices should appear in the following order:

Appendix A Decision of State Court of Appeals

Appendix B Decision of State Trial Court

Appendix C Decision of State Supreme Court Denying Review

Appendix D Order of State Supreme Court Denying Rehearing

VIII. Table of Authorities

On the page provided, list the cases, statutes, treatises, and articles that you reference in your petition, and the page number of your petition where each authority appears.

IX. Opinions Below

In the space provided, indicate whether the opinions of the lower courts in your case have been published, and if so, the citation for the opinion below. For example, opinions of the United States courts of appeals are published in the Federal Reporter. If the opinion in your case appears at page 100 of volume 30 of the Federal Reporter, Third Series, indicate that the opinion is reported at 30 F. 3d 100. If the opinion has been designated for publication but has not yet been published, check the appropriate space. Also indicate where in the appendix each decision, reported or unreported, appears.

X. Jurisdiction

The purpose of the jurisdiction section of the petition is to establish the statutory source for the Court's jurisdiction and the dates that determine whether the petition is timely filed. The form sets out the pertinent statutes for federal and state cases. You need provide only the dates of the lower court decisions that establish the timeliness of the petition for a writ of certiorari. If an extension of time within which to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted, you must provide the requested information pertaining to the extension. If you seek to have the Court review a decision of a state court, you must provide the date the highest state court decided your case, either by ruling on the merits or denying discretionary review.

XI. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved

Set out verbatim the constitutional provisions, treaties, statutes, ordinances and regulations involved in the case. If the provisions involved are lengthy, provide their citation and indicate where in the Appendix to the petition the text of the provisions appears.

Question Argument Cont'd

- (21) ^{could} Helzel, 2011 WL 3475292 at *1-2; Ridley v. ~~Ford~~ ^{Ford}, No. 5:16-cv-192 (2016); Ridley v. Ford, 5:20-cv-126, Appeal dismissed, No. 20-12303-E; 2020 WL 5647736. Couldn't Coss, Gideon, Custis Ridley be in custody to challenge his conviction, since OCA 42-1-19 is a independent statute and Habeas don't apply why courts Eleventh Circuit Refuse to Accept a direct appeal for a Enforcement of Removal off OCA 42-1-19, by OCA 42-1-19 a clear Removal statute? what type of appeal can you get Relief from after Georgia Supreme Court illegally deny the Enforcement of the Removal. 16-V-01438 ^{Douglas Superior}
- Why? (22) since Ridley didn't file a 1983 wasn't it proper to just deny the federal Habeas with directions on what type of appeal is proper in Federal Court? OR that Court should had Appointed Counsel since he was legally removed on Douglas Co Superior Court case No. 16-V-01438? How to get justice in cases like this one?
- (23) Shouldn't the United States District Courts in Albany, MA, Tallahassee, Montgomery, Panama City divisions give my \$5.00 back with 185% interest AND US Dist. Ct. N. Dist. GA case No. Ridley v. Brown No. 1:96-cv-02967-RWS, give my \$150.00 filing fees back with 185% interest since these corrupt judges hrs that filing as proceeding in forma pauperis and under 1915(c) well after law was put in place. with punitive damages since this Court illegally started a Domino Effect that has denied my Right to Access to ~~the~~ Courts to file non frivolous 1983's and barrony or labing all other cases on record under 1915 illegally? why this is done? why not give my filing fees back since 1915 Apply to indigent filings?
- (24) why poor people and offenders are discriminate d by U.S. District Court under 1915 when people "Rich" like Donald J. Trump frivolous claims. Are under Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b) why? Is this discrimination, why he's treated differently than others with dozens of frivolous filing

October 2009

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20543

GUIDE FOR PROSPECTIVE INDIGENT PETITIONERS FOR WRITS OF
CERTIORARI

I. Introduction

These instructions and forms are designed to assist petitioners who are proceeding *in forma pauperis* and without the assistance of counsel. A copy of the Rules of the Supreme Court, which establish the procedures that must be followed, is also enclosed. Be sure to read the following Rules carefully:

Rules 10-14 (Petitioning for certiorari)
Rule 29 (Filing and service on opposing party or counsel)
Rule 30 (Computation and extension of time)
Rules 33.2 and 34 (Preparing pleadings on 8½ x 11 inch paper)
Rule 39 (Proceedings *in forma pauperis*)

II. Nature of Supreme Court Review

It is important to note that review in this Court by means of a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. The primary concern of the Supreme Court is not to correct errors in lower court decisions, but to decide cases presenting issues of importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved. The Court grants and hears argument in only about 1% of the cases that are filed each Term. The vast majority of petitions are simply denied by the Court without comment or explanation. The denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari signifies only that the Court has chosen not to accept the case for review and does not express the Court's view of the merits of the case.

Every petitioner for a writ of certiorari is advised to read carefully the *Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari* set forth in Rule 10. Important considerations for accepting a case for review include the existence of a conflict between the decision of which review is sought and a decision of another appellate court on the same issue. An important function of the Supreme Court is to resolve disagreements among lower courts about specific legal questions. Another consideration is the importance to the public of the issue.

III. The Time for Filing

You must file your petition for a writ of certiorari within 90 days from the date of the entry of the final judgment in the United States court of appeals or highest state appellate court or 90 days from the denial of a timely filed petition for rehearing. The issuance of a mandate or remittitur after judgment has been entered has no bearing on the computation of time and does not extend the time for filing. See Rules 13.1 and

Questions Cont'd

(24.) Why Donald J Trump former President has high profile Attorney trained in law has law degrees but Courts continue to allow Trump's Attorney's to file frivolous actions in all Courts why?? This is discrimination in its meaning.

(25.) In case 13R-149 when filed Habeas, transferred from Douglas County Superior Court case no. 16-V-01488 in with Removal 42-19, was it legal for the sentencing Judge to deny or a case lying that Ridley never showed up to Court when clear on video that he was there went to his witness magistrate Judge Gail Sims Office to ask her why Court was closed after leaving Clerk's office?

(26.) Also in a State Habeas in Wilcox County Georgia Superior Court case no. 2020-CV-077, Is it illegal for Judge Denise Frachini to have a full hearing on lower Court Crisp County Georgia case no. 13R-149 when she was the District Attorney? and why she and Chief Judge Robert W. Chasteen, Sr. Cordele Judicial Circuit in Georgia refuse to transfer the Habeas case or transcribe from that hearing held in Wilcox Superior Ct. Virtual on February 11, 2021. Why while at Washington State Prison case no. 2022-CV-00061 a out-of-time Habeas for appeal and other grounds. Judge Robert Reeves order Special Assistant Attorney General Daniel Hamilton Law office 429 Walker St, Upper Level, Augusta, Ga. I advised Reeves about Frachini and Chasteen corruptness he ordered Hamilton to get the case why Chasteen had Ridley transferred out of Washington County to a Court where their Buddies are Judges? Just like in the Wilcox case my Counselor at Wilcox State Prison, Abbeville, Ga. Kenneth Palmer advised Ridley in their computer Judge Robert Chasteen ordered Ridley to be housed there which is in the Cordele Judicial Circuit because I filed State Habeas at (Counselor Kenneth Palmer)

State Bar of Georgia Grievance

Rule 1.3 DILIGENCE

A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. Reasonable diligence as used in this Rule means that a lawyer shall not without just cause to the detriment of the client in effect willfully abandon or willfully disregard a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.

Rule 1.4 COMMUNICATION

A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation, shall keep the client reasonably informed about the status of matters and shall promptly comply with reasonable requests for information

(26) While I was at Jackson State Prison Diagnostic Prison, assigned Jackson Super Ct. Case No. 2020 HC 2 and Cobb Case 2020 HC 3. Why

(27) Further why Assistant Attorney General when Ridley was ordered to be housed at Wilcox why Meghan Hill lied to a judge in another County to consolidate Crisp and Cobb Cases while assigned Case 2020 CV-077 then say Cobb Case was successive and denied something not sure what in that but, I have it filed in Johnson Super Ct. Now Don't know yet will claim its successive when never heard, 2022-HC-11?

(28) How in 2013 Crisp County Georgia Judicial Circuit was sued by the Southern Center For Human Rights in Fulton Co Superior Court for Public Defenders Office being a Door-step to the District Attorney's Office, understaffed, too many cases, No investigators? Never advise Ridley in Case 13R-149 about CR advised? Ridley of Conflict Counsel? Assembly line justice as well.

(29). Why when TN 2010 I was sentenced as a habitual offender same as the State of Georgia's Recivist How could Georgia use my priors against me then in 13R-149 and threaten 30 yrs Recivist when Court knew I was just habitualized in the State of Alabama. at Troy, How is this possible, Then use Fla Case 1995-2844, Crisp Case CR5-158 Ala Case Against Ridley to enhance this case How?

**STATE BAR OF GEORGIA
GRIEVANCE
(SAMPLE)**

My name is _____, I am an inmate at Washington State Prison. I was arrested on _____ (day) _____ (month) _____ (year) on the charges of _____ Case Number# _____ and sentenced to confinement for a period of _____ serve _____. I have pending charges of _____ Case Number# _____ in _____ County. These charges are affecting my status while incarcerated. Because of these charges I am ineligible for county and transitional center placement. Because of these charges I am ineligible for rehabilitation and re-entry groups/ classes. Also these charges are affecting my parole and liberty. I have contacted the lawyer and have not received a response. This is in violation of Rule 1.3 Diligence and Rule 1.4 Communication. Thank you for looking into this.

LIST OF PARTIES

☒ All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

☐ All parties **do not** appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

RELATED CASES

In re Ridley, 2022 U.S. App Lexis 20661;
Ridley v. Caldwell, 2022 U.S. App Lexis 19740;
Ridley v. Caldwell, 2022 U.S. App. Lexis 4025;
Ridley v. Warden, 2022 U.S. App Lexis 22676;
Ridley v. Warden, 2021 U.S. App Lexis 24013;
Ridley v. Warden, 2021 U.S. App Lexis 25855;
Ridley v. Warden, 2021 U.S. App Lexis 25679;
Ridley v. Conley, 2019 U.S. App Lexis 36485;
Ridley v. Warden, 2021 U.S. App Lexis 124013;
Ridley v. Wilkes, 1:22-cv-63-LAG-TAL.

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1943, 325 (1995); 42-1-19, 42-1-19(B); 42-1-12; 17-10-6.2 (2019)

OTHER

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

☐ For cases from **federal courts**:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix A to the petition and is

☐ reported at _____; or,
☐ has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
☐ is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix B to the petition and is

☐ reported at _____; or,
☐ has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
☐ is unpublished.

☐ For cases from **state courts**:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at Appendix _____ to the petition and is

☐ reported at _____; or,
☐ has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
☐ is unpublished.

The opinion of the _____ court appears at Appendix _____ to the petition and is

☐ reported at _____; or,
☐ has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
☐ is unpublished.

JURISDICTION

☐ For cases from **federal courts**:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case was August 24, 2022.

☐ No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

☐ A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of Appeals on the following date: _____, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix _____.

☐ An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and including _____ (date) on _____ (date) in Application No. A _____.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

☐ For cases from **state courts**:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was _____.
A copy of that decision appears at Appendix _____.

☐ A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date: _____, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix _____.

☐ An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and including _____ (date) on _____ (date) in Application No. A _____.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

CONTRACT LAW SANTOBELLO v. NEW YORK, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Commonwealth v. Cosby, 2021 PA. Lexis 2761 (2021); ORourke v. Commonwealth, 178 A.2d 1194 (Pa. 2001); Commonwealth v. Zuber, 353 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1976); Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(A)(2); O.C.G.A. 33-3; Demurre v. Eilers v. State, 344 Ga. App. 148, 151 (4); JACKSON v. State, 301 Ga. 137; Smarty v. State, 351 Ga. App. 2 (2020); PARDON v. State, 322 Ga. App. 393; Holland v. Neal, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 184114; O.C.G.A. 17-16-6, 2 (C)(1)(D); Removal off Georgia's Sexual Offender Registration Fla case no. 1995-2848 14th Cir met OCGA 42-1-19 10 year Removal of Georgia's sexual offender registration requirements of O.C.G.A. 42-1-12 (AKA), Shannon Teresa Pope on December 4, 1995 was a 20 year old Adult not a child or minor, as OCGA 42-1-12 Required of Fla. Stat. 943.04325, I lived in Douglas Co. Georgia when Retired Judge David Emmersen removed Ridley off OCGA 42-1-12 at a 42-1-19, 42-1-19(B) Hearing, Douglas Co. Superior Court case No. 16-V-01438 Muegge v. United States, 2022 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5586, was required to have a due process hearing before the state, counties, labeled, declared, classified Ridley a violent child sexual predator, child molestor, child sex offender who all involved knew Shannon Teresa Pope was a 20 year old Adult but viciously, vindictively labeled Ridley supra, has the effects and affects of "Colonial style punishment of the 1800's" "The SCARLET LETTER" "TO KILL A MCKINLEY BIRD", see. Kramer v. Nix, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis, 10 850 (A); Kirby v. Seigelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 7292 (11th Cir, 1999); Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 1734, 737 (11th Cir, 1999); Venue and OR Jurisdiction over the validity of Ridley Fla Contract no Georgia Superior Court had to have him fastly imprisoned, maliciously prosecuted, held hostage by state and county officials acting illegal under the color of state and Federal laws and Georgia Constitution and our statutory laws, see: MANHEITZ v. State, 317 Ga. App. 856, 862; Whitman v. State, 96 Ga. App. 770 (1957), Further Contract laws see also: United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35 (9th Cir 1983); United States v. Baird, 218 F.3d 221 (3d Cir, 2001); Commonwealth v. Ginn, 537 A.2d 314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981); Government of Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d 360 (3d Cir, 1980); Commonwealth v. Stivich, 652 A.2d 1294 (Pa. 1995); Rinebaker v. Luzerne City, Cmty, 539 A.3112 98 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Enforce Georgia Statutory law and Georgia Constitution where crimes are to be construed and convicted under the provisions of the laws in effect at the time of the commission of the alleged felony conviction, In Ridley's Fla. case that illegally triggered registration in the State of Georgia was alleged in Florida on December 4, 1995. And also under OCGA 42-1-12 when Shannon Teresa Pope died April 4, 2020 must be treated as when Ridley died under OCGA 42-1-12, expunged, sealed, dismissed no alleged victim no registration in the United States of America

Constitutional and Statutory provisions involved Conflict

see Waldrop v. State, 198 Ga. 144, 145; 281 U.S.C. 27160 and 0590; Pattan v. State, 80 Ga. 714 (1839); Jackson v. State, 12 Ga. 1 (1852); Reynolds v. State, 3 Ga. 53, 56 (1) (1847); Hicks v. State, 228 Ga. App. 235 (1) (1997); BANKSTON v. State, 258 Ga. 188, 190 (1998); Diamond v. State, 247 Ga. 249, 251 (1996); Phillips v. State, 298 Ga. App. 520 (2009); Heggs v. State, 243 Ga. App. 697, 698 (2006); OCCA 17-16-G-2 (2019); Bradberry v. State, 297 Ga. App. 679 (2009); OCCA 16-6-1(A)(1)
Rape of a child or minor,
SORNA

Ridley first was never ordered in Florida to register as any type sex offender. To be convicted in ~~any~~ ANY SUPER. CT in Georgia his Fla case "did not" and "do not" meet OCCA 42-1-12 "ON" OR "AFTER" JULY 1, 1996 DO TO TIME SERVED IN FLA 14th CIR CASE NO 1995-2844 Ridley was convicted on December 12, 1995. NO MINOR OR CHILD INVOLVED AS OCCA 42-1-12 (A)(9) OR MEGAN LAWS REQUIRE IF HE HAD TO BUT WAS NOT POPE WAS A 20Y OLD ADULT. AND RIDLEY NEVER CROSSED STATE LINES AND FAILED TO REGISTER BUT HAS NOT, UNDER GEORGIA LAW IN RIDLEY 1995 CASE THAT STARTED RIDLEY'S THREE YEAR CONTRACT WITH NOTHING TO FOLLOW BEGAN DECEMBER 12, 1995 ENDED ON DECEMBER 11, 1998.

Further UNITED STATES CONGRESS DID AWAY WITH STATE-BY-STATE REGISTRATION LAWS IN 2006 AND PUT IN PLACE SORNA AND A VIOLATION OF SORNA IS A FINE AND UP TO 10 YEARS. WHICH CONFLICT WITH GEORGIA LAW OCCA 42-1-12 0-30 FIRST VIOLATION, 5-30 YRS SECOND IN WHICH RIDLEY RECEIVED 30 YRS IN 2013 AND GEORGIA SUPREME COURT SAID 1 LIFE SENTENCE FOR FAILURE TO REGISTER IS ILLEGAL. UNDER GEORGIA PAROLE GUIDELINES 30 YRS IS LIFE. GEORGIA TOOK AWAY LIFE PUT IN PLACE 30 YRS. THERE IS NO MINIMUM MANDATORY SENTENCES FOR FAILURE TO REGISTER UNDER SORNA OR THE GA. CONST. OR FED. CONST. SEE: 42 U.S.C. 16901 SECTION 14(A) OF SORNA, PUBL. L. NO. 109-248, 170 STAT. 596, CODIFIED U.S.C.S 16901, CODIFIED AT 18 U.S.C. 2750 (A) SUBSECTION A OF 16917 [V27] NOTICE OF SORNA OBLIGATIONS, UNITED STATES V. GRIFFIN, 589 F.3d 1367 (2009); UNITED STATES V. WILB. H., 664 F.3d 848 (2011); UNITED STATES V. RIVERS, COMMERCE CLAUSE Id AT 1217 ALL CONFLICT WITH OCCA 42-1-12 (A)(9)

Georgia Removal OCGA 42-1-19 off Georgia's (B)
Sex offender Reg. Regs of OCGA 42-1-12

Ridley's Florida case that illegally triggered Registration SUPRA
ended December 11, 1998 and meet OCGA 42-1-19(A)(1)(D) (10) ten YEAR
Removal Requirement, His FLA contract was Third Degree Attempted
(No Attempted Statute in FLA, Newly discovered), Sexual Battery
by attempted digital penetration only with NO likely injury
on a 204R. old Adult NOT A CHILD OR MINOR AS OCGA 42-1-12
Require or Megan Law, See DAVIS v. STATE, 340 Ga. App. 562; Jefferson
v. State, 308 Ga. App. 549; Strickland v. State, 347 Ga. App. 216; State v.
Randle, 331 Ga. App. 1 (2015); Randle II (2016) involved NO intentional
physical harm to the alleged victim, OCGA 42-1-19(A)(H), 17-10-612 (C)
104R Removal Reg. 42-1-19(C)(2)(A); 17-10-612 (C)(1)(D); OCGA
42-1-12 as was in 1996, Ellis v. State, 324 Ga. App. 492 (2013);
Holland v. Governor of Georgia, 281 Fed Appx 911; OCGA 42-1-12(e)(1)-(8)
define OCGA 42-1-12; Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505-509
(2003). A criminal defendant possesses a Sixth Amendment Right to
effective Counsel (Ridley has not since 2001 placement under OCGA
42-1-12 illegally), Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 667, 668; United
States v. Bridges, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 1586 (4th Cir. 2014) defines
Florida Attempted Sexual Battery under FLA Stat 800.04(3) (1996);
OCGA 16-6-5 (A); OCGA 17-10-612(2019) - defines now who's Required
to Register

VENUE AND JURISDICTION

As Retired Judge David Emmersen in his original opinion at
Douglas Co. SUPER. Ct. Case No 16-V-014 38, on March 17, 2017, He
stated - No Superior Court in Georgia have venue or juris-
- diction over the validity of ANY alleged felony conviction
out of another State or County, Manhertz v. State, 317 Ga.
App. 856, 862 (734 SE2d 406, 411) (2012) ("and with regard to venue,
the Georgia Constitution and our statutory law require
that a criminal defendant be tried in the County in which
the alleged original felony was committed, not violated, In
Ridley's case that would had been Bay County, Florida
14th Cir Case No. 1995-2844, Not Crisp Case No's 05R-156
or 58, 13R-149, or Cobb Co. Case No 19-9-04441-56 And

(C)

See Whitman v. State, 96 Ga. App. 770, 776 (101 S.E.2d 622) (1957)
["Criminal jurisdiction of the Superior Court [is] the County
wherein the felony was committed "Not Violated",
"ON" or "After" July 1, 1996 Reg's of OCGA 42-1-12 (1996)]

A Criminal Statutes Unambiguous words may not be altered
by judicial construction in order to extend punishment, however
deserving of the punishment a person's conduct may seem. Waldroup
v. State, 198 Ga. 145 (30 S.E.2d 875) (1999). Even if judicial construction
28 W.S.C. 27166 + 05901, was appropriate, it has long been the law
of this State, in general, a crime is to be construed and punished
according to the provisions of the law existing at the time of
its commission. The PIA alleged case that illegally triggered OCGA
42-1-12 alleged to occur on December 4, 1995 under Georgia
Law Ridley could not be convicted at all OCGA 42-1-12 did
not exist. Patton v. State, 80 Ga. 714 (1) (6 S.E.2d 273) (1888); Jackson
v. State, 12 Ga. 3, (1) (1854); Reynolds v. State, 3 Ga. 53, 56 (1) (1842);
See also Hicks v. State, 228 Ga. App. 235 (1) (b) (1997).

Also Criminal Statutes must be strictly construed against
the State. Bankston v. State, 258 Ga. 188, 190 (367 S.E.2d 305) (1998),
and when a statute imposing a penalty is capable of two (2)
constructions the statute should be interpreted in lesser
penalty. Diamond v. State, 247 Ga. 249, 251 (47 S.E.2d 562) (1996) also
See Section OCGA 17-16-6.2 (2019) Supra.

Venue further - A crime must be construed and punished
according to the provisions of the law existing at the time of
its commission (citations omitted), Riley v. State, 243 Ga. App. 687,
698 (534 S.E.2d 437) (2006), see Widner v. State, 280 Ga. 625, 627,
(2) (631 S.E.2d 675) (2006); OCGA 17-16-6.2 - was first enacted
in 2006 as part of the legislation in which the General
Assembly modified the punishment provisions related to
child molestation the change year, Bradberry v. State, 297
Ga. App. 679 (678 S.E.2d 131) (2009); OCGA 16-6-1 (A)(1) dangerous
sex offense felony rape of a child or minor only, to be on
Georgia Registration illegal statute, Hardin v. State,
810 S.E.2d 602 (2015); 344 Ga. App. 328; Rainier v. State
286 Ga. 625 (2010). The term sexual offender also

defined in OCGA 42-1-12 (A)(2)(A), As any individual who has been convicted of a felony criminal offense against a victim who is a child or minor or a felony dangerous sexual offense against a child or minor. Supra (emphasis applied).
Process of Statutory Interpretation by looking at a Statute's plain language, Brown v. Budget-Rent A-Car Systems, Inc., 119 F.3d 922, 924 (11th Cir, 1997), "As a general rule, the use of a disjunctive in a statute indicates alternatives and requires that those alternatives be treated separately. Hence, language in a clause following a disjunctive is considered inapplicable to the subject matter of the preceding clause." Id (quoting Om Hed). In other words, disjunctive language establishes alternative means of violating statutory provisions, Rine v. Imagitas Inc., 590 F.3d 1215, 1224 (11th Cir 2009); Supremacy clause, Corbion v. Ogden, 22 US 1, 6 L.Ed 23 (1824).

Under Vitek - The 11th Circuit appeared to base its decision on the stigma of sexual offender label and not the therapy requirement, which appears considering less intrusive of personal security than the psychiatric treatment at issue Vitek second.

Under Georgia Sexual Offender Registration Act, Law OCGA 42-1-12 et seq - A "sexual offender is one (1) who has been convicted of a felony criminal offense against a minor, or any felony dangerous sexual offense. OCGA 42-1-12 (A)(2) pre-2001 conviction for "A criminal felony offense against a victim who is a child or minor", OCGA 42-1-12 (A)(9)(A)(xi). Under OCGA 42-1-12 - A prisoner convicted of a non-sexual offense misdemeanor against a child or minor does not qualify as a "sexual offense" against a child or minor does not qualify as a sexual offense, simply because the non-sexual offense involves sexual conduct. See Sequre v. State, 243 Ga. App 718, 719 (2001) holding that simple battery conviction resulted from the non-sexual offense of simple battery not the sexual conduct of touching the victims breast or legs.

The disinformation knowingly by the State of Georgia County officials is similar to Monroe v. Pelt, 932 F.2d 1437, 1442 (11th Cir, 1991) OCGA 43-1-12,

ILLEGAL DENIAL OF EFFECTIVE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COUNSEL SINCE 2001 TO DATE

The sheriff of the county in which he resided, the defendant previously resided in a county and had registered the defendant's address or that the defendant changed the defendant's address to one in another county, and the indictment did not inform the defendant of what alleged actions or inactions constituted a registration statute.

Also see: Eilers v. State, 304 Ga. App. 148, 151 (4) (728 SE 2d 217) (2012) (citation omitted), see OCCA 16-1-5 ("Every person is presumed innocent until proved guilty, no person shall be convicted of a crime unless each element of such crime is proved beyond a reasonable doubt," Smart v. State, 356 Ga. App. 4 (846 SE 2d 175), 2020 Ga. App. Lexis 4071; Pardon v. State, 322 Ga. App. 393; Davis v. State, 330 Ga. App. 118).

Also Eilers states: The Record shows that Eilers [x2] plead guilty to one count of child molestation and was sentenced to (10) ten years of probation on June 27 [x608] 1995.

The judge's sentencing order did not require him to register as a sex offender.

For reasons that cannot be determined from the record before us, Eilers first registered as a sex offender in 2005.

Judgment Reversed.

United States v. Simon-Marcos, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 135288; Adams Walsh Child Protection Act of 2006; see United States v. Bensley File No. 1107-CR-115-TCB, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 85793, 2007 WL 3489999 at 17 (N.D. Ga. 2007) SORNA.

DEMURRER'S

Cole v. State, 334 Ga. App. 752, special demurrer OCCA 17-7-54 H26 - Under OCCA 17-7-54, the form of the indictment shall state with sufficient certainty the offense and the time and place of committing the same. As a general rule, an indictment which fails to allege a specific date on which the crime was committed is not perfect in form and is subject to a timely special demurrer.

OCCA 17-7-53.1 provides if, upon the return of two true bills Kimbrough v. State, 336 Ga. App. 381 H27 - In a general demurrer a defendant challenges the validity of an indictment by asserting that the substance of the indictment is legally insufficient to charge any crime, and it

SORNA Cont'd

Under SORNA A violation is up to 10 yrs or a fine, NOT 30 yrs AS Georgia statute conflict with SORNA Federal Law. 2006 Amendment 42 U.S.C.S. 16901, section 141(A) of SORNA supra, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than (10) ten years. this is the conflict. U.S. Congress 2006 Amendment subsection (A) of 16912, RIVERS 588 F. Appx 905 HALL - we further held in AMBERT that HHS 16913 of SORNA is "Reasonably adopted to the attainment of a legitimate and under the Commerce Clause Id at 1217, we found it" CLEAR that SORNA was designed to create an interstate system to counteract the danger posed by sex offenders who slip through the cracks or exploit a weak state registration system by traveling or moving to another state without registering therein. The registration requirement under 16913, we held are necessary to track those offenders who move from state jurisdiction to jurisdiction." Id,
SENTENCES BEYOND JUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONALLY AUTHORIZED POWERS

See MCCARTHAN V. DIR. Goodwill Indus-Suncast, 851 F.3d 1070, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4485; 2017 WL 97029; 66 L. Ed. 2d 3201 (1980), A defendant may not receive a greater sentence legislature authorized. Congress - Not the judiciary has the power to define crimes and their respective punishments see United States v. Kebudeaux, 135 S. Ct. 2496, 2503 (2013), So as relevant to MCCARTHAN's case, The ineffective to test filter permits consideration of those claims, that challenge a sentence imposed beyond judiciary's constitutionally authorized powers, United States v. Vineyard, 945 F.3d 1164, 2019 WL 6924965. Before SORNA sex offender registered under "a patchwork of federal and state registration systems" with loopholes and deficiencies that had resulted in an estimated 100,000 sex offenders becoming missing or lost, United States v. Kebudeaux, 570 U.S. 389, 399 (2013). SORNA was intended to correct that problem by creating a "more uniform and effective" national sex offender registration system. Reynolds v. United States, United States v. Cerant, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis. 148236; Goodwin v. United States, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis. 172810, 2014 WL 7074336,

EFFECTS OF FLORIDA NOLO CONTENDERE PLEAS CONTRACTS

See United States v. Willis, 106 F.3d 966 - A conviction under Florida law requires either an adjudication of guilt or a guilty plea. Moreover, a Nolo Contendere plea is not the equivalent of a guilty plea.

HNS - Where a Nolo plea is being used as an essential element of another offense, Florida law would not consider such a plea to be a conviction, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(A)(2)(2); OCGA 33-3, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11; United States v. AEM, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 1334. - The difference is that a plea of Nolo Contendere is viewed not as an express admission of guilt but as a consent by the defendant that he may be punished as if he was guilty and a prayer for leniency, United States v. Puellnitz, 372 F.3d 562. - A nolo contendere plea permits a judgment of conviction imposition of punishment the same as if a plea of guilty has been made, HOWEVER, such a plea is not admissible to aid proof of guilt in another proceeding.

Waiver of Right to Counsel - Burden is on prosecution to affirmatively establish valid waiver of right to counsel. A waiver may not be presumed from a silent record. Blaylock v. Hopper, 233 Ga. 504 (1985). Anything less than showing from the record that the accused was afforded counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer is not a waiver of counsel. Blaylock v. Hopper supra.

Ridley's right to removal counsel, do to public defenders office rejected counsel when Ridley begged since 2001, and their failed investigations and ineffectiveness in CASE NO. 13R-149, OSR-1566258, CRISP SUBJECT, Cobb Co. GA SUPER CT CASE NO. 19-9-04441-56 that illegally caused registration in Georgia state of, Ridley's rights to trial and appellate counsel since 2001 to date pursuant to and violated OCCA 9-14-42 (A); BLACK V. HARDEN, 255 Ga. 239 (1) (1985), STRICKLAND, SUPRA; CRAWFORD V. LUVATIAN, 243 Ga. 161, 164 (1979); STATE V. COLACK, 276 Ga. 396; DAVIS v. State, 342 Ga. App. 752 (2018); CT APP 2, 33 (2) (A); OCCA 9-14-1 (A).

Deprivation of counsel (especially already appointed) is such a fundamental and radical error that it operates to render trial/or plea, illegal, void, null, and denial of benefit of counsel constitute a ground for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Wilcox v. Aldridge, 142 Ga. 634, (155 SE2d 873) (1941), RAHES CORPUS, Appeal, 143 Ga. 661, cert denied 312 U.S. 626, 63 S. Ct 136 (1942); Wade v. Battle, 379 F.3d 1254, HN 6; Vitek v. Jones 445 U.S. 480

VOID INDICTMENTS, AFFIDAVITS, 2005, 2003, 2019

See. JACKSON V. State, 301 Ga. 137 (800 SE2d 356); 2017 Ga. Lexis 375 (2017) states - Indictment was insufficient to withstand a general demurrer because the indictment did not allege that defendant was a convicted sex offender. That the defendant was required as a sex offender to register the defendant's address with the

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

IN Bay Co. Fla, 14th Cir. Case No. 1995-2844 Ridley accepted a negotiated plea contract, Third degree attempted sexual battery, by attempted digital penetration only with no likely injury on a then 20yr old Adult who has now died April 4, 2020. Not a child or minor. And only ordered to give his DNA sample to F.D.L.E. And 3yrs to serve with time served Fla Stat 943.325 (1995). meaning his sentence began on December 12, 1995 ended December 11, 1998 with nothing to follow. After he moved home in 1998 got D.U.Z. 2001 was illegally made to register. Then for years from the FIA. Case he was declared, labled, classified A violent sexual predator, child molestar, child sex offender when all parties involved to date have copies of Ridley's FIA plea, sentencing and judgment and SHANNON TERESA Pope Age. 26 BW alleged date December 4, 1995. And in Douglas Co. Superior Court where Ridley filed a OCGA 42-1-19. And 42-1-19(B) Removal off Georgia sexual offender registration of OCGA 42-1-12 (A)(9) Crimes against children or minors under Megan Law. Ridley lived in Douglas County, Georgia as OCGA 42-1-19(B) Required and his FIA case that illegally triggered registration in Georgia ended in FIA on December 11, 1998 supra. Retired Judge, David Emmersen removed Ridley of Georgia registration for Crisp failure to register case 13R-149. Chief Judge Robert W. Chasteen, Jr to approve in violation of OCGA 42-1-19(B) Ridley lived in Douglas County and case that illegally triggered registration was Bay Co. Fla, 14th Cir. Case No. 1995-2844 Not Crisp case 13R-149. So Ridley filed to enforce this or his FIA contract under contract law, and stated that his registration or case no 13R-149 Crisp case Cobb Co. Case 19-9-04444-56, Bay Co. Fla case 14th Cir 1995-2844 were enhanced each by several unconstitutional uncounseled state convictions that was no longer open to direct or collateral attack in their own rights those sentences and registration could not stand. Coss, Gideon v. Wainwright, Custis, Al A v. O. Probation hearing I asked Chasteen did he receive the order he lied said no where Emmersen sent state Habeas 2017 he illegally denied and Rule what he was the sentencing Judge which is illegal always in Cordele Judicial Circuit. In Judge Emmersen March 17, 2017 original opinion said that no court in Georgia had jurisdiction or venue over the validity over any alleged felony conviction out of another state or county venue is in the Superior Court where the alleged felony was originally committed not violated that would had been FIA not GA. So like parole or probation I would had to been sent back to FIA not convicted in a Superior Court in Georgia. Fla case met the LDHR Removal Requirement of 42-1-19, 17-10-6, 2 (2019). Further I Ridley had to register but was not ordered to do so he would had to violate SORNA cross state lines and failed to register, Also if he did but didn't under Georgia Constitution and our statutory law crimes are to be punished and convicted in Georgia under the laws in effect on December 4, 1995. I was given 36yrs Crisp Co, now 8yrs probation revocation. I plead to 3yrs FIA which is excessive in all meanings in Crisp Co. Ga., Father under FIA law when a nolo pleas is used as a essential element of another conviction under FIA law that Nolo contract would be no conviction at all. Also in FIA offer no opinion and I completed my contract the records were destroyed and expunged in 1997 or 1998. SORNA conflict with OCGA 42-1-12 where US Congress in 2006 did away with state-by-state registration

Statement of Claim Cont'd (A)

And put in place SORNA and a violation of SORNA is a fine and up to 10 yrs in prison. Not Georgia's illegal sentencing scheme 1-30 years first violation, 5 to 30 yrs second violation. And this also 30 yrs conflict with Robinson v. State. In Georgia 30 yr is a life sentence under parole guidelines and under Georgia law a life sentence for failure to register is illegal which conflict with Georgia's precedent. Also in Crisp case no. 05R-156 or 58, 13R-149, and Cobb Co. case no. 19-9-04441-56 could not stand a general demurrer because ~~the~~ the indictment did not allege Ridley was a convicted sex offender out of Florida and was ordered by the sentencing judge register, to register Ridley's address after his release on December 11, 1998. The indictments didn't allege because Ridley was a convicted sex offender out of Fla had due process hearing first then Ridley registered his addresses in Crisp and Cobb Counties in the state of Georgia. Then Ridley moved outside Crisp and Cobb Counties in Georgia and then failed to register Ridley's address to the County where he moved. The indictments did not inform Ridley of what actions or inactions constituted a registration statute. Counsel was ineffective when he or she failed to notify Ridley of his right to appeal or have a Attorney to challenge 42-1-12 before placing Ridley under illegally since 2001 to date, nor when Ridley in Assembly line justice in Crisp and Cobb Counties act on appeal by Right or when appointed several times

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Florida Case met the Georgia Removal 10 Year Requirement
Wherein Ret-Judge David Emmersen Case No 16-V-01438 March 17, 2017 Original
Opinion Removed Ridley off Georgia Sex Offender Requirements at a
Removal Hearing pursuant to OCGA 42-1-19, for CRISP failure to register case
No 132-149 to Apprise in violation of OCGA 42-1-19 (B) SUPRA. Ridley never
violated SORNA crossed state lines and failed to register. United States
Congress took away state-by-state registries and put in place SORNA
A fine and up to 10 yrs Georgia law conflict with SORNA. Like Retired
Judge David Emmersen Douglas Co Superior Court said in his March 17, 2017
Opinion that Court in Georgia had venue or jurisdiction over the
validity of any alleged felony conviction but of another state
or county SUPRA should be treated like parole and probation
sent back to the state and county where the felony was
originally committed not violated that would have been Bay Co
Fla. Counsel was never appointed to represent Ridley to
challenge placement on registration since 2001 to date
failed to file appeals, investigate, Fla case. Failed to
know Fla laws concerning Nolo Contendere Pleas SUPRA
failed to abide by contract law which my Fla plea
is still a enforceable contract to only provide DNA
not register as a sex offender. The Fla alleged victim
died April 4, 2020 must be treated under all statutes
including SORNA as when I die, Fla records destr
ved, expunged on Dec 11, 1998 when I completed my contract.
Laws in Georgia under the constitution and statutory
laws must be construed and punished under the provisions
of the laws in effect when the original felony was
committed that would have been December 4, 1995 laws
in Georgia no felony conviction at all.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Mr. Michael James Riley 570139

Date: 9/16/2022

16 Sworn to and subscribed to before me on this
day of September 2022

Carolyn McCune
Notary Public

02/23/2026
My Comm. Exp. 02/23/2026

