

FOR PUBLICATION

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JONATHAN WELLS,
Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-10451
D.C. No.
5:18-cr-00567-
LHK-1
OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Lucy H. Koh, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 18, 2021
San Francisco, California

Filed March 22, 2022

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Ronald M. Gould, and
Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Wallace;
Dissent by Judge Bea

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel dismissed in part an appeal from the district court's judgment and order imposing sentence and conditions of supervised release, vacated the judgment in part, and remanded with instructions to the district court to clarify a special condition of supervised release to avoid a constitutional violation.

The panel wrote that because the language of the waiver of the right to appeal in the plea agreement is unambiguous, and the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal, the panel was obligated to enforce the waiver and would not exercise the jurisdiction to review the merits of the appeal unless any exceptions to the appeal waiver apply.

Explaining that a waiver of the right to appeal does not bar a defendant from challenging an "illegal sentence," which has a very limited and precise meaning in this context, the panel observed that the defendant does not have any statutory basis for challenging the terms of his sentence as illegal. The panel declined to extend the meaning of an "illegal sentence" to encompass sentences that potentially violate 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), which governs imposition of conditions of supervised release, and 18 U.S.C. § 3553, which sets forth factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

In light of potential ambiguity in this court’s caselaw regarding when an appeal-waiver exception based on constitutional challenges applies or on the scope of the exception, the panel attempted to clarify. Guided by *United States v. Bibler*, 495 F.3d 621 (9th Cir. 2007), and its progeny, the panel concluded that a waiver of the right to appeal a sentence does not apply if (1) the defendant raises a challenge that the sentence violates the Constitution; (2) the constitutional claim directly challenges the sentence itself; and (3) the constitutional challenge is not based on any underlying constitutional right that was expressly and specifically waived by the appeal waiver as part of a valid plea agreement. Following that precedent, the panel wrote that it must address the defendant’s constitutional claims that directly challenge the terms of his supervised release, where the defendant waived his general right to appeal “any aspect” of his sentence but did not expressly waive any specific constitutional right. Except for the defendant’s constitutional challenges to the terms of his supervised release, the panel enforced the waiver and dismissed the appeal.

The panel addressed on the merits the defendant’s three constitutional challenges: (1) Special Condition No. 3 (computer ban) is unconstitutionally vague; (2) Special Condition No. 5 (internet ban) violates his First Amendment rights; and (3) both conditions are an unconstitutional delegation of authority because the conditions contain language that specify that the restrictions are subject to the approval of the probation officer.

The panel held that Special Condition No. 3, whose definition of “computer” potentially could be understood to encompass household objects, is unconstitutionally vague. The panel wrote that because Special Condition No. 3

violates a constitutional right, it is an “illegal” sentence and the waiver in the defendant’s plea agreement does not bar the appeal. The panel declined to apply the appeal waiver, and exercised its jurisdiction to consider the issue. Because the condition is *a fortiori* unconstitutionally vague on the merits, the panel vacated and remanded with instructions for the district court to delineate explicitly that the prohibition only covers computers and computer-related devices that can access sexually explicit conduct.

Because the use of the internet was essential and integral to the offense of conviction, the receipt of child pornography, the panel rejected the defendant’s First Amendment challenges to Special Condition No. 5. Because Special Condition No. 5 does not violate the Constitution, it is not an “illegal” sentence, and in light of waiver of the right to appeal, the panel dismissed the defendant’s challenges to that condition.

As to the defendant’s contention that Special Condition Nos. 3 and 5 unconstitutionally delegate authority to the probation officer, which the defendant did not argue in the district court, the panel wrote that it did not need to reach this issue because the special conditions are not manifestly unjust. It concluded that even considering the merits, the special conditions are not an unconstitutional delegation of authority.

Dissenting, Judge Bea wrote that this case should be decided by the court sitting en banc because *Bibler*, 495 F.3d 621 (holding that an exception to valid appeal waivers exists if the appellant claims a violation of a constitutional right), and *United States v. Joyce*, 357 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissing an appeal based on a valid appeal waiver even though the defendant claimed his sentence violated his First

Amendment rights), both control this case yet are entirely irreconcilable with one another.

COUNSEL

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Merry Jean Chan (argued), Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Section, Criminal Division; David L. Anderson, United States Attorney; United States Attorney's Office, San Francisco, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

WALLACE, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Jonathan Wells appeals from the district court's judgment and order imposing sentence and conditions of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 3742. We review *de novo* “[w]hether an appellant has waived his right to appeal” pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement, *United States v. Joyce*, 357 F.3d 921, 922 (9th Cir. 2004), and “[w]hether a supervised release condition illegally exceeds the permissible statutory penalty or violates the Constitution,” *United States v. Watson*, 582 F.3d 974, 981 (9th Cir. 2009). Because Wells has waived his right to appeal, we refuse to exercise jurisdiction over his claims—except for his constitutional violation claims—and we dismiss his appeal. However, we vacate in

part and remand with instructions to the district court to clarify Special Condition No. 3 to avoid a constitutional violation.

I.

On April 28, 2016, police officers executed a search warrant for Wells' residence for evidence relating to possession of child pornography. Wells was subsequently arrested and interviewed by detectives, and he admitted to using peer-to-peer (P2P) applications to seek child pornography by means of keyword search for the past several years. Wells estimated he had downloaded approximately 20,000 files of child pornography, which were stored in various computers and external hard drives. Officers also found 69 compact discs or digital file discs that included files of child pornography.

On November 27, 2018, Wells was charged with one count of receipt of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (b)(1). In a written plea agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(A)–(B), Wells pled guilty to the receipt of child pornography. He was sentenced to 76 months' imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. In addition to the standard conditions of supervised release, the district court imposed 16 special conditions of supervised release. In this appeal, Wells challenges Special Condition Nos. 3 and 5. Special Condition No. 3 bans the possession and use of any computer without prior approval of the probation officer and Special Condition No. 5 bans the access to any internet or on-line computer service without approval of the probation officer.

II.

A.

We first turn to whether Wells knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal the conditions of his supervised release. “A defendant’s waiver of his appellate rights is enforceable if the language of the waiver encompasses his right to appeal on the grounds raised, and if the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made.” *Joyce*, 357 F.3d at 922–23 (citation omitted). “Plea agreements are contracts between a defendant and the government,” which can contain a waiver of a defendant’s right to appeal. *Id.* at 923 (citation omitted). Since “[p]lea agreements are contractual by nature and are measured by contract law standards,” we “enforce the literal terms of the plea agreement” but generally “construe ambiguities in favor of the defendant.” *United States v. Franco-Lopez*, 312 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Thus, when the language of a plea agreement is clear and “[a]bsent some miscarriage of justice,” we “will not exercise [the] jurisdiction to review the merits of [an] appeal if we conclude that [the defendant] knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to bring the appeal.” *United States v. Harris*, 628 F.3d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In this case, the plea agreement language is clear. The plea agreement states: “I agree to give up my right to appeal the judgment and all orders of the Court. I also agree to give up my right to appeal any aspect of my sentence.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 10 ¶ 4. We have repeatedly held that “any aspect” of a sentence includes “not only any term of imprisonment, but also fines and conditions of supervised release.” *Joyce*, 357 F.3d at 923; *see also Watson*, 582 F.3d at 986 (“We determined that the reference to ‘any aspect of the sentence’

unambiguously encompassed supervised release terms.”). In addition, the plea agreement expressly acknowledges that special conditions of supervised release will be part of the sentence imposed. The plea agreement states that “based on the nature of the offense, the Court should impose” two specific special conditions of supervised release, which require Wells to submit to searches and refrain from accessing or using any file-sharing P2P network or software. Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 10 ¶ 8.

Wells knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the plea agreement and the waiver to appeal his sentence. The plea agreement was signed by both Wells and his counsel, which acknowledges that his “decision to plead guilty is made voluntarily, and no one coerced or threatened [him] to enter into this Agreement.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 10 ¶ 19. His counsel also confirmed that he “fully explained to [Wells] all the rights that a criminal defendant has and all the terms of this Agreement,” and that Wells “understands all the terms of this Agreement and all the rights [he] is giving up by pleading guilty . . . [and his] decision to plead guilty is knowing and voluntary.” *Id.* Moreover, at the sentencing hearing, the district judge provided Wells with “final advisement” and stated: “Mr. Wells, there was a plea agreement in your case, and in paragraph 4 of your plea agreement, you gave up your right to appeal your conviction, the judgment, orders of the court, any aspect of your sentence, including any forfeiture or restitution order.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 29 at 58:22–59:2. Because the language of the waiver is unambiguous and Wells knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to bring the appeal, we are obligated to enforce the waiver and will not exercise the jurisdiction to review the merits of the appeal unless any exceptions apply. *See Harris*, 628 F.3d at 1205.

B.

We next turn to whether any exceptions to the waiver of the right to appeal apply. Even if a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to appeal his sentence, we have held that “[a] waiver of the right to appeal does not bar a defendant from challenging an *illegal sentence*.” *Watson*, 582 F.3d at 977 (emphasis added). In this context, an “illegal sentence” has a very limited and precise meaning. We have defined “illegal sentence” to mean “one not authorized by the judgment of conviction or in excess of the permissible statutory penalty for the crime.” *United States v. Lo*, 839 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir. 2016), quoting *United States v. Vences*, 169 F.3d 611, 613 (9th Cir. 1999). We have also held that a sentence is “illegal” if it “violates the Constitution.” *United States v. Torres*, 828 F.3d 1113, 1125 (9th Cir. 2016), quoting *United States v. Bibler*, 495 F.3d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, an appeal waiver does not apply to a sentence “if it exceeds the permissible statutory penalty for the crime or violates the Constitution.” *Bibler*, 495 F.3d at 624.

In this case, Wells does not have any statutory basis for challenging the terms of his sentence as illegal. Wells does not argue that the sentence exceeds the permissible statutory penalty for the crime. Instead, Wells argues that Special Condition Nos. 3 and 5 are “illegal” because the conditions violate 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), as they are not “reasonably related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D)” and involve “greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B).” Dkt. No. 7 at 14–19. But our definition of “illegal sentence” in the context of an appeal waiver does not extend so far. Indeed, we have held that a “district court’s failure to comply with § 3553

does not make [a defendant's] sentence ‘illegal.’” *Vences*, 169 F.3d at 613. We again decline to extend the meaning of an “illegal sentence” to encompass sentences that potentially violate section 3583(d), which governs the district court’s imposition of conditions of supervised release, and section 3553, which sets forth the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence. Otherwise, a valid appeal waiver as part of a bargained-for plea agreement would be meaningless and it would allow defendants to circumvent any plea agreement and appeal waiver. Accordingly, Wells fails to challenge the terms of his sentence as “illegal” under any valid statutory grounds. We decline to overreach and exercise our jurisdiction to entertain an appeal when the plea agreement effectively waived the right to appeal his sentence.

Wells also raises several constitutional challenges to his sentence. Since *Bibler*, we have held that an exception to an appeal waiver applies to sentences that are unlawful or violate the Constitution. *See Bibler*, 495 F.3d at 624; *Watson*, 582 F.3d at 987; *Torres*, 828 F.3d at 1125; *United States v. Pollard*, 850 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2017). But our caselaw has not been entirely clear on when the exception based on constitutional challenges applies or on the scope of the exception. In light of the potential ambiguity in our caselaw, we attempt to clarify the *Bibler* rule by addressing our various circuit precedent.

First, in *Joyce*, we dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction when the defendant challenged his sentence on First Amendment grounds.¹ *See Joyce*, 357 F.3d at 925

¹ Although *Joyce* held that we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of a challenge, *see Joyce*, 357 F.3d at 925, the en banc court in *United States v. Jacobo Castillo* subsequently made clear that a plea

(holding that because the defendant “validly waived his right to appeal any aspect of his sentence, including the district court’s imposition of special conditions of supervised release, we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of his challenge to the computer and Internet use restrictions” on First Amendment grounds). Our holding in *Joyce* would seem to conflict with our language in *Bibler* stating that an “appeal waiver will not apply if . . . the sentence violates the law,” which includes a sentence that “exceeds the permissible statutory penalty for the crime or violates the Constitution.” *Bibler*, 495 F.3d at 624. But *Joyce* was decided three years prior to *Bibler* and did not address the issue of whether an appeal waiver applies to challenges that a sentence is unconstitutional. The issue was not raised by parties and the defendant in *Joyce* “agree[d] that the appeal waiver he signed prevents him from challenging the 27-month term of imprisonment.” *Joyce*, 357 F.3d at 922.²

agreement’s appeal waiver does not divest our court of jurisdiction to hear an appeal, *see* 496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2007). Rather, we generally apply the appeal waiver’s preclusive effect and choose not to exercise our jurisdiction. *See Castillo*, 496 F.3d at 957 (“The preclusive effect we give to the plea agreement may depend on the nature of the plea and the circumstances in which it is brought to our attention.”). Thus, we discuss *Joyce* in the context of “address[ing] the *preclusive effect* to be given the plea agreement, not the *jurisdiction* of the court.” *Id.* at 956.

² The dissent believes that *Joyce* necessarily reached the issue of whether the appeal waiver applies to constitutional challenges to the sentence. But that is not supported by the record. Again, the issue was never presented to the *Joyce* panel, and the defendant in *Joyce* explicitly “agrees that the appeal waiver he signed prevents him from challenging the 27-month term of imprisonment” on First Amendment grounds and only “argues that the special conditions of release are not part of his ‘sentence.’” *Joyce*, 357 F.3d at 922. Therefore, the court never explicitly reached the issue of whether the appeal waiver applied to the

Rather, the only issue addressed was the argument that “the special conditions of release are not part of his ‘sentence,’ and thus that the language of his appellate waiver does not bar this challenge.” *Id.* *Joyce* is therefore silent on whether a constitutional challenge to a sentence survives an appeal waiver. Indeed, when deciding whether an intervening higher authority is clearly irreconcilable with our precedent, we look to “the *reasoning* and *analysis* in support of a holding, rather than the holding alone.” *United States v. Lindsey*, 634 F.3d 541, 550 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original). In that context, we have reiterated that the only time a three-judge panel may depart from circuit precedent is when it is “clearly irreconcilable” with intervening authority. *Lair v. Bullock*, 697 F.3d 1200, 1207 (9th Cir. 2012). Considering that *Joyce* is not even from an intervening higher authority, it is difficult to say that a previous decision such as *Joyce* that is completely silent on a legal issue is “clearly irreconcilable” with other published opinions confronting the issue.

Second, the scope of the *Bibler* exception requires some clarification. Although “a waiver of appellate rights generally does not preclude review of a sentence that violates the Constitution,” we have held that if a defendant expressly waives a certain constitutional right in the plea agreement, the waiver will still apply to any challenges based on that specific constitutional right. *Pollard*, 850 F.3d at 1043–44 (declining to address the defendant’s Eighth Amendment excessive fine claim because the defendant “specifically waived ‘any claim or defense under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, including, but not limited to, any claim or defense of excessive fine in any

defendant’s constitutional challenges. Nor was it necessary to do so for the disposition of that case.

proceedings concerning the property’’’). After all, plea agreements are bargained-for contracts ‘‘measured by contract law standards’’ and we ‘‘enforce the literal terms of the plea agreement.’’ *Franco-Lopez*, 312 F.3d at 989 (citations omitted).

The *Bibler* exception, however, clearly carved out challenges that the sentence is illegal when a plea agreement waives ‘‘all right to appeal the sentence imposed by the Court.’’ *Bibler*, 495 F.3d at 624. This was based on the rationale that an appeal waiver will not apply if the sentence subsequently imposed by the court is inherently unlawful. If exceptions to an appeal waiver include ‘‘an appeal where the sentence imposed is not in accordance with the negotiated agreement’’ or an appeal where the sentence is ‘‘not authorized by the judgment of conviction or in excess of the permissible statutory penalty for the crime,’’ *Lo*, 839 F.3d at 785 (citations omitted), an appeal arguing that a sentence violates the Constitution certainly should also fall under the general exception that an appeal waiver does not apply to an unlawful sentence, as the Constitution is the ‘‘supreme law of the land,’’ *Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). Consequently, we have stated that the ‘‘analogy between plea agreements and private contracts is imperfect . . . because the Constitution imposes a floor below which a defendant’s plea, conviction, and sentencing may not fall.’’ *Torres*, 828 F.3d at 1124–25.

Balancing the interest of preventing the district court from imposing an unlawful sentence with the interest of enforcing a plea agreement’s explicit language, we interpret our precedent to limit the *Bibler* exception to constitutional challenges involving appeal waivers that waive only a defendant’s ‘‘general right to appeal’’ and not to any constitutional challenges based on a constitutional right

specifically waived by the plea agreement. *See, e.g.*, *Pollard*, 850 F.3d at 1043; *cf. Torres*, 828 F.3d at 1124 (defendant generally waiving “the right to appeal any sentence” and “the right to appeal any other aspect of the conviction or sentence”). Indeed, *Bibler* stated that “[i]f defendants intend to preserve a larger subset of their appellate rights, this must be bargained for in the plea agreement.” *Bibler*, 495 F.3d at 624. Similarly, if the government wishes to exclude a subset of a defendant’s right to challenge an unconstitutional sentence, it must also be specifically bargained for in the plea agreement.

Finally, we caution that constitutional challenges to a sentence surviving an appeal waiver under the *Bibler* exception are limited to challenges that the terms of the sentence itself are unconstitutional. The exception does not allow any constitutional challenges *per se*, such as the Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy and public trial or right to confront witnesses, which are not challenges that the sentence is unconstitutional. This is consistent with cases where we have applied an appeal waiver to constitutional challenges based under the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. *Cf. United States v. Shehadeh*, 962 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2020) (affirming the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw plea agreement because the defendant’s “plea was knowing and voluntary, [and] the waiver in his plea agreement bars his remaining claims that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial”).

Guided by *Bibler* and its progeny, we conclude that a waiver of the right to appeal a sentence does not apply if (1) the defendant raises a challenge that the sentence violates the Constitution; (2) the constitutional claim directly challenges the sentence itself; and (3) the constitutional

challenge is not based on any underlying constitutional right that was expressly and specifically waived by the appeal waiver as part of a valid plea agreement.³ Here, Wells brings several constitutional claims that directly challenge the terms of his supervised release. Wells waived his general right to appeal “any aspect” of his sentence but did not expressly waive any specific constitutional right, such as any First Amendment challenges. Following our precedent, we must address the constitutional challenges on the merits.

Except for Wells’ constitutional challenges to the terms of his supervised release, which are addressed below, we enforce the appeal waiver and dismiss this appeal.

III.

The only issues that survive the appeal waiver are Wells’ challenges that the special conditions violate a constitutional right. Specifically, Wells raises three constitutional challenges: (1) Special Condition No. 3 (computer ban) is unconstitutionally vague; (2) Special Condition No. 5 (internet ban) violates his First Amendment rights; and

³ The dissent critiques the *Bibler* rule as problematic and suggests that it should not be followed. But it is not our role as a panel to decide whether *Bibler* and the line of cases that have followed its rule are incorrect. *See Bibler*, 495 F.3d at 624; *Watson*, 582 F.3d at 987; *Torres*, 828 F.3d at 1125; *Pollard*, 850 F.3d at 1041. Certainly, if this case is heard en banc, the en banc court can decide if *Bibler* and its progeny should be overturned and adopt a new rule. However, we as a panel are bound by the prior published decisions of our court. *See Oregon Nat. Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 550 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Typically, we are bound by earlier published decisions of our court” except for when “circuit precedent may be effectively overruled by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.”). Unless *Bibler* is overturned by the en banc court or by the Supreme Court, we must faithfully apply its rule to this case.

(3) both conditions are an unconstitutional delegation of authority because the conditions contain language that specify that the restrictions are subject to the approval of the probation officer.

For the following reasons, we hold that Special Condition No. 3 is unconstitutionally vague, and we vacate and remand with instructions for the district court to clarify the condition. Special Condition No. 5 does not violate a constitutional right and we dismiss Wells' challenges to that condition. For both conditions, the district court's imposition of the restrictions subject to the approval of the probation officer is not an unconstitutional delegation of authority.

A.

Special Condition No. 3 states: "You must not possess or use a computer without the prior approval of the probation officer. 'Computer' includes any electronic device capable of accessing the internet or processing or storing data as described at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) (including cell phones), and all peripheral devices." As part of the statute governing computer fraud crimes, section 1030(e)(1) defines "computer" as "an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1).

In a footnote, Wells argues that to the extent Special Condition No. 3 (computer ban) includes a "reasonableness" limitation, it is "unconstitutionally vague." Dkt. No. 7 at 19

n.13. Specifically, Wells argues that the condition is unconstitutionally vague because he “has no way of knowing which items a probation officer will deem reasonable.” *Id.* Unlike Wells’ other arguments that the condition is overbroad or overly harsh, which would be barred from the appeal waiver, a challenge that a condition of supervised release is unconstitutionally vague is rooted in a defendant’s fundamental right to due process. “A condition of supervised release violates due process ‘if it either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’” *United States v. Evans*, 883 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2018), quoting *United States v. Hugs*, 384 F.3d 762, 768 (9th Cir. 2004).

We conclude that Special Condition No. 3 requires clarification. The definition of “computer” under the condition potentially could be understood to encompass common household objects. An “electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions” can include devices such as smart kitchen appliances that contain microprocessors, even though such appliances are not capable of receiving, storing, or otherwise processing materials of child pornography. To be clear, we do not make any determination on whether the special condition is overbroad, as it is an issue that is barred by the waiver. Certainly, the district court could have simply imposed a condition that bars the use of any device that uses electricity, which perhaps would be problematic for other reasons but is not “unconstitutionally vague.” But the definition for “computer” without any clarification here can lead to a situation where “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” *Evans*, 883 F.3d at 1160 (citation omitted).

For instance, one would have to guess whether a digital watch fits under the definition of computer provided by section 1030(e)(1). A digital watch would seem to be an electronic device that performs logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, as it could store alarm times and other data. Furthermore, adding to the confusion is the statute's exclusion of "automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device" from the definition of "computer." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1). A digital watch could also be said to be similar to a calculator or typewriter as it performs basic time calculations and displays the time. Unless it is exactly a typewriter or calculator, a defendant would not be able to tell for certain whether an electronic device with a microprocessor is considered a "computer" for the purposes of the special condition.

Moreover, we have previously held, albeit in an unpublished disposition, that similar special condition language referencing section 1030(e)(1) is unconstitutionally vague.⁴ Although *Peterson* has no precedential value, its reasoning is helpful. In *Peterson*, we considered whether a special condition of supervised release that directs the defendant to not "use or possess any computer [or] computer-related devices ... which can communicate data via modem, dedicated connections or cellular networks" is unconstitutionally vague. *United States v. Peterson*, 776 F. App'x. 533, 534 (9th Cir. 2019). We determined that the "limiting language referencing

⁴ A memorandum disposition is not precedential and may not be cited to the court. See, e.g., *United States v. Peterson*, 776 F. App'x. 533 (9th Cir. 2019). The quotation from the above memorandum disposition has been helpful to the panel in considering the issue before us. However, we have not given it any more consideration than a well-reasoned law review article.

18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) does not provide sufficient guidance” and is impermissibly vague. *Id.* There, we expressed the concern that “references were made to numerous items which would seemingly fall within the ambit of the condition, but which a reasonable person might be unaware – *e.g.* refrigerators with Internet connectivity, Fitbit™ watches, etc. Also, for example, all automobiles manufactured after 2008 are required to be equipped with computers that can send digital messages concerning the vehicle’s operations through a ‘controller area network.’” *Id.* at 534 n.3 (citation omitted). Thus, we remanded the special condition “for the district court to explicitly delineate that the prohibition only covers computers and computer-related devices that can access” materials with depictions of sexually explicit conduct involving children, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) or deemed inappropriate by the probation officer. *Id.* at 534.

To be sure, a limiting instruction that excludes only computer devices that are capable of accessing materials of sexually explicit conduct would also limit the scope of the special condition. On the other hand, one can also argue that there are presumably electronic devices that can communicate data but are not sophisticated enough to transmit any sexually explicit material. Such devices would have been banned from the special condition in its current form but would not be included with a limiting instruction. Again, we do not base our analysis and determination on whether the special condition is overly broad or not. We simply hold that a limiting instruction similar to the one we required in *Peterson* would help clarify the meaning of what devices count as a “computer” for purposes of the special condition. Such a limiting instruction would clearly indicate to Wells whether a device is barred or not. For instance, a digital watch that is only capable of displaying time would

not be barred but a smartwatch that can send and receive images, browse the internet, or otherwise access sexually explicit material would clearly be barred. It would be much more reasonable to require “men of common intelligence” to know whether a device is capable of transmitting or storing a digital file that includes materials depicting sexually explicit conduct than to decipher the meaning of “computer” under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1). *Evans*, 883 F.3d at 1160 (citation omitted).

Because Special Condition No. 3 violates a constitutional right, it is an “illegal” sentence and “the waiver in his plea agreement does not bar this appeal.” *Torres*, 828 F.3d at 1125. We decline to apply the appeal waiver and exercise our jurisdiction to consider this issue. *A fortiori*, the condition is unconstitutionally vague on the merits as well. Therefore, we vacate and remand Special Condition No. 3 for the district court to delineate explicitly that the prohibition only covers computers and computer-related devices that can access sexually explicit conduct.

B.

Special Condition No. 5 states: “You must not access the Internet or any ‘on-line computer service’ at any location (including employment) without the prior approval of the probation officer. ‘On-line services’ include any Internet service provider, or any other public or private computer network. As directed by the probation officer, you must warn your employer of restrictions to your computer use.” Wells argues that this special condition violates the Constitution because it unnecessarily restricts his First Amendment rights.

“While a district court’s discretion to set conditions of supervised release is broad even when those conditions

affect fundamental rights, restrictions infringing upon fundamental rights are reviewed carefully.” *United States v. Soltero*, 510 F.3d 858, 866 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To determine whether conditions of supervised release impermissibly infringe upon a defendant’s rights, “a reviewing court must inquire whether the limitation[] [is] primarily designed to affect the rehabilitation of the probationer or insure the protection of the public.” *United States v. Bee*, 162 F.3d 1232, 1235 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, even if a condition infringes a defendant’s fundamental right, “[a] restriction on a defendant’s [constitutional right] is nonetheless valid if it”:

- (1) is reasonably related to the goals of deterrence, protection of the public, and/or defendant rehabilitation; (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve these goals; and (3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a).

Soltero, 510 F.3d at 866 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

For the following reasons, we reject Wells’ First Amendment challenges to Special Condition No. 5. The special condition no doubt infringes on Wells’ right to free speech by restricting his internet access.⁵ But the district

⁵ To be clear, Wells’ reliance on *Packingham v. North Carolina*, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017), is misguided. *Packingham* involved “severe restrictions on persons who already have served their sentence and are no longer subject to the supervision of the criminal justice system.” 137

court imposed the condition for purposes of rehabilitation and to “insure the protection of the public.” *Bee*, 162 F.3d at 1235. Wells was convicted for possession of child pornography and the sheer volume of the material he possessed is especially troubling (approximately 20,000 files). Even though internet access clearly enables individuals to engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment activity, it is also clearly what enables Wells to gain access to child pornography. Moreover, Wells not only used the internet to use P2P applications to obtain child pornography, but also used search terms related to child pornography to browse the web and various social media accounts. At the sentencing hearing, the district court considered Wells’ objections and imposed the special condition because “there is a strong link between child pornography and the internet, and the need to protect the public, particularly children, from sex offenders; but also to protect the victims of these child pornography offenses from being revictimized every time they keep getting these hundreds and hundreds of victim witness letters saying yet someone else has viewed your image of you being raped when you were two years old.”

Indeed, we have repeatedly held that “a defendant’s free speech rights may be infringed to ‘effectively address [his] sexual deviance problem.’” *United States v. Gnírke*, 775 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2015), quoting *United States v. Rearden*, 349 F.3d 608, 619 (9th Cir. 2003). In *Rearden*, a defendant challenged a special condition that prohibited him from “possession or use of a computer with access to any online service at any location without prior approval of

S. Ct. at 1737. On the other hand, Wells is an individual currently subject to the supervision of the criminal justice system and specific supervised release conditions tailored to his conviction and circumstances.

the probation officer.” *Rearden*, 349 F.3d at 620. Although we recognized “the importance of the Internet for information and communication,” we held that “limiting [a defendant’s] Internet access without prior approval of the Probation Office is reasonably related to the offense that involved e-mail transmissions of quite graphic child pornography, and to the important goal of deterring him during the period of supervision from reverting to similar conduct, and thus, to rehabilitation and protecting the public.” *Id.* at 620–21. To be sure, we have also held that “because access to the Internet has become so vital, courts have upheld conditions prohibiting all use of the Internet only in limited circumstances.” *United States v. LaCoste*, 821 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2016). But one of the limited circumstances that allow for a broad internet restriction is “when use of the Internet was ‘essential’ or ‘integral’ to the offense of conviction.” *Id.*; see also *United States v. Antelope*, 395 F.3d 1128, 1142 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming conditions of supervised release prohibiting access to any on-line computer service because “the Internet was nevertheless essential to the commission of [defendant’s] crime: He first contacted the federal agents through joining a child pornography-oriented online group”). Here, the use of the internet was essential and integral to the offense: the receipt of child pornography.

Because Special Condition No. 5 does not violate the Constitution, it is not an “illegal” sentence. In light of Wells’ waiver of the right to appeal, we dismiss this claim. See *Watson*, 582 F.3d at 988 (dismissing appeal on waiver grounds because the “condition of supervised release . . . did not make [the defendant’s] sentence illegal”).

C.

Finally, both Special Condition Nos. 3 and 5 provide that the restrictions apply only when it is “without the prior approval of the probation officer.” Wells challenges that the district court’s decision to subject restrictions to the approval of the probation officer is an unconstitutional delegation of authority. For the following reasons, we reject this challenge.

Since “[u]nder our constitutional system[,] the right to . . . impose the punishment provided by law is judicial,” “a probation officer may not decide the nature or extent of the punishment imposed upon a probationer.” *United States v. Stephens*, 424 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). But once “the court makes the determination of whether a defendant must abide by a condition, and how . . . a defendant will be subjected to the condition, it is permissible to delegate to the probation officer the details of where and when the condition will be satisfied.” *Id.* at 880.

The record shows that Wells did not challenge the special conditions on this basis before the district court. In his written objections to the proposed special conditions of supervised release, Wells only argued that the blanket prohibition on computers and access to the internet was improper. Nor did he raise this argument at any time during the sentencing hearing. In general, we do not “review an issue not raised below unless necessary to prevent manifest injustice.” *Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen Loc. Union No. 20, AFL-CIO v. Martin Jaska, Inc.*, 752 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985). Here, we need not do so because the special conditions are not manifestly unjust.

But even considering the merits of the challenge, the special conditions are not an unconstitutional delegation of

authority to the probation office. When a defendant “did not raise the issue before the district court, we review for plain error.” *United States v. Yijun Zhou*, 838 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The ordinary rule in criminal cases—established by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) and by Supreme Court precedent—is that ‘plain error’ review applies to arguments raised for the first time on appeal. *See* Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).”). The district court imposed conditions that Wells may not use any computer or access the internet (whether it is appropriate to have computer and internet access) and delegated to the probation office the implementation of this condition (when it may be appropriate to allow an exception). Moreover, the added limitation of requiring prior approval of the probation officer to Special Conditions Nos. 3 and 5 ensures that the conditions are no more restrictive than necessary. The requirement for the approval of the probation officer gives the flexibility to allow for some exceptions to the total ban on computers and internet access if the probation office deems the use safe and without risk of obtaining child pornography.

Our decision in *Blinkinsop* is instructive. *See United States v. Blinkinsop*, 606 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2010). There, we vacated a condition requiring the defendant “not go to or loiter near school yards, parks, play grounds, arcades, or other places [sic] primarily used by children under the age of 18” to allow the district court to consider amending the provision and allow an exception for school events involving the defendant’s own children with the “written permission of his probation officer prior to each such attendance.” *Id.* at 1119–22. This is because the “probation officer, who has regular contact with a sex offender on supervised release, . . . is in the best position to determine the appropriate contact with minors for a released defendant convicted of a child-

pornography crime.” *Id.* at 1121. Similarly, the probation officer here is in the best position to determine when a use of computer devices or internet service is appropriate for Wells. Thus, we have repeatedly followed *Blinkinsop* and summarily rejected similar arguments that a district court abuses its discretion by delegating to the probation office the implementation of a condition of supervised release. *See, e.g., United States v. Stewart*, 671 F. App’x 614 (9th Cir. 2016).

DISMISSED in part; **VACATED** and **REMANDED** in part.

BEA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

A case controlled by contradictory precedents must be decided by the court sitting en banc. *Atonio Wards Cove Packing Co.*, 810 F.2d 1477, 1478–79 (9th Cir. 1987). *United States v. Bibler*, 495 F.3d 621 (9th Cir. 2007) and *United States v. Joyce*, 357 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2004), both control this case yet are entirely irreconcilable with one another. Therefore, this case should be decided by the court sitting en banc, not by a three-judge panel. For this reason, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.

I. *Joyce* and *Bibler* are irreconcilable.

In *Joyce*, our court dismissed an appeal based on a valid appeal waiver even though the defendant claimed his sentence violated his First Amendment rights. *Joyce*, 357 F.3d at 925. In the words of Judge Gould’s dissent in *Joyce*, “what a court *does* is a more important statement of its holding for *stare decisis* purposes than what it merely *saysId.* at 927 (Gould, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). By

dismissing the appeal on the basis of a valid appeal waiver, even where the appellant claimed a violation of his constitutional rights, the *Joyce* panel necessarily held that no “exception” to the appeal waiver applied because of the claim that the sentence violated the appellant’s constitutional rights. Thus, *Joyce*’s holding stands for the proposition that a claimed violation of a constitutional right cannot except an appellant from being bound by his valid appeal waiver. When confronted with these facts, the court must dismiss the appeal.

Bibler, which was decided three years after *Joyce* but failed to cite it, reached the merits of the appeal, despite the appellant’s valid appeal waiver, because it held that an exception to valid appeal waivers exists if the appellant claims a violation of a constitutional right. *Bibler*, 495 F.3d at 624.

“Where a panel confronts an issue germane to the eventual resolution of the case and resolves it after reasoned consideration in a published opinion, that ruling becomes the law of the circuit” *United States v. Johnson*, 256 F.3d 895, 914 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). The panel is therefore bound simultaneously by the contradictory precedents of *Joyce* and *Bibler*.

The majority attempts to escape this result by distinguishing *Joyce* from *Bibler*, but its efforts are unavailing. The only difference between *Joyce* and *Bibler* is that *Bibler*’s counsel styled the constitutional claim as an “exception” to the valid appeal waiver instead of challenging the validity of the appeal waiver directly. But two holdings are irreconcilable based on their facts and the law, not whether attorneys in the cases styled their arguments with different words.

Essentially, the majority claims that *Joyce*'s holding is not binding precedent because the parties in that case did not argue that the First Amendment challenge created an exception to the appeal waiver, and therefore *Joyce* did not reach the issue. That conclusion is simply incorrect. *Joyce* necessarily reached the issue of whether the appeal waiver was effective when it dismissed the appeal on waiver grounds. For this reason, *Joyce* cannot be persuasively distinguished from *Bibler*, and this irreconcilable conflict must be resolved by the en banc court.

II. The en banc court should follow *Joyce*.

In the event this case is heard en banc, there are good reasons to follow *Joyce* over *Bibler*.

First, the *Bibler* rule is a chimera.¹ For the proposition that appeal waivers are not valid to bar challenges to illegal sentences, *Bibler* cites to four cases: *United States v. Portillo-Cano*, 192 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that an appeal waiver was not valid because the defendant had not been given a description of the nature of the charges against him in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure), *United States v. Buchanan*, 59 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that an appeal waiver was not valid because the judge repeatedly told the defendant that he had the right to appeal his sentence after the defendant had signed the appeal waiver), *United States v. Bolinger*, 940 F.2d 478, 479–80 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that an appeal waiver was valid but recognizing an exception to a valid

¹ “A fabled fire-breathing monster of Greek mythology, with a lion’s head, a goat’s body, and a serpent’s tail,” or “[a]n organism . . . in which tissues of genetically different constitution co-exist as a result of grafting, mutation, or some other process.” *Chimera*, Oxford English Dictionary Online (2020).

appeal waiver where the sentence imposed is not in accordance with the negotiated plea agreement), and *United States v. Gordon*, 393 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that an appeal waiver was not valid to waive an appeal of a restitution order which violated a federal statute). Note that none of these cases involved an appeal of a sentence on constitutional grounds which rendered the sentence “illegal.”

For the proposition that a sentence is illegal if it violates the constitution, *Bibler* cited to *United States v. Fowler*, 794 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1986). In *Fowler*, the district court ordered the defendant to pay the costs of his prosecution, as authorized by the statute of conviction, after he was convicted of three counts of willfully filing false income tax returns. *Id.* at 1448. The defendant appealed, arguing that the imposition of costs was an unconstitutional burden on his right to cross-examination, jury trial, and compulsory process. *Id.* at 1449. The *Fowler* court held that requiring the defendant to pay the costs of his prosecution was not unconstitutional and affirmed the sentence as legal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35.² *Id.* at 1450.

Fowler decided whether a sentence was illegal for purposes of a Rule 35 motion. It did not decide what constitutes an illegal sentence for the purpose of rendering an otherwise valid appeal waiver ineffective.

² When *Fowler* was decided, Rule 35 allowed a criminal defendant to move the court to “correct an illegal sentence” or “correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner.” *Id.* at 1449 (internal citations omitted). However, Rule 35 has since been amended to allow a defendant to move the district court to correct a defendant’s sentence within fourteen days if the sentence resulted from “arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.” Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 35.

Thus, *Bibler* combined two distinct lines of cases to create a hybrid rule that appeal waivers are never valid to bar appeals of sentences when those appeals are brought on constitutional grounds.

This rule is problematic for several reasons. There is nothing about waiving the right to appeal, even on constitutional grounds, that is entitled to special protections from this court. Waiver of constitutional rights is a common occurrence in the criminal law context; every time a defendant takes the stand in his own defense, he waives his right not to testify. And “[t]here is, of course, no constitutional right to an appeal.” *Jones v. Barnes*, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).

But most importantly, the *Bibler* rule puts judges in the awkward position of reaching the merits of an appellant’s constitutional claims before deciding whether the appeal should be dismissed on waiver grounds. This backwards analysis is reflected in the majority’s own opinion and has the unintended consequence of essentially nullifying all appeal waivers. Under *Bibler*, all a defendant must do is *argue*, even baselessly, in an appellate brief that his sentence violates the Constitution, and he can evade what was an otherwise valid and binding appeal waiver.

Reaching the merits of an appeal before dismissing it forces judges to answer more questions than necessary to dispose of a case, which violates the cardinal principle of judicial restraint that “if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.” *PDK Labs. Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Admin.*, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (C.A.D.C. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

The *Bibler* rule is also like the two-step qualified immunity analysis from *Saucier v. Katz*, 533 U.S. 194

(2001), which required courts to determine first whether the plaintiff alleged a violation of a constitutional right and next determine whether that right was clearly established, in that order. The Supreme Court overruled *Saucier* in *Pearson v. Callahan*, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009), holding that courts could answer these two questions in any order. The court so held because, like the *Bibler* rule, *Saucier* “require[d] courts unnecessarily to decide difficult constitutional questions when there is available an easier basis for the decision” *Brosseau v. Haugen*, 543 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2004) (Breyer, J., joined by Scalia and Ginsburg, JJ., concurring).

The majority’s efforts to “clarify” *Bibler* unfortunately only muddy the waters. The majority sets forth a new rule which would limit the scope of the *Bibler* exception to apply only in cases where appellants have waived a “general right to appeal” and not an appeal based on a “specific” constitutional right. But this is a distinction without a difference. Prosecutors will easily avoid the majority’s new rule by incorporating by reference the Constitution and its amendments in the text of each appeal waiver—or perhaps they will begin attaching the Bill of Rights as an addendum to their plea agreements.

If *Joyce* were the applicable rule in this case, I would concur in the judgment to the extent that it dismisses Wells’s appeal. However, because it is not within my authority to apply *Joyce* where *Bibler*’s irreconcilable holding simultaneously binds the court, I respectfully dissent.

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MAY 16 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JONATHAN WELLS,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-10451

D.C. No.
5:18-cr-00567-LHK-1Northern District of California,
San Jose

ORDER

Before: WALLACE, GOULD, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

The Petition for Panel Rehearing is DENIED. *See* Dkt. No. 50.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Northern District of California

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

Jonathan Wells

) **JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE**

)
) USDC Case Number: CR-18-00567-001 LHK
) BOP Case Number: DCAN518CR00567-001
) USM Number: None Assigned
) Defendant's Attorney: Dejan Gantar (AFPD)

THE DEFENDANT:

pleaded guilty to count: One of the Information
 pleaded nolo contendere to count(s): _____ which was accepted by the court.
 was found guilty on count(s): _____ after a plea of not guilty.

The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:

Title & Section	Nature of Offense	Offense Ended	Count
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)	Receipt of Child Pornography	April 28, 2016	One


The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 9 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s): _____
 Count(s) _____ is/are dismissed on the motion of the United States.

It is ordered that the defendant must notify the United States attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution, the defendant must notify the court and United States attorney of material changes in economic circumstances.

12/11/2019

Date of Imposition of Judgment



Signature of Judge

The Honorable Lucy H. Koh
 United States District Judge

Name & Title of Judge

12/13/2019

Date

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of:
76 months

The appearance bond is hereby exonerated, or upon surrender of the defendant as noted below. Any cash bail plus interest shall be returned to the owner(s) listed on the Affidavit of Owner of Cash Security form on file in the Clerk's Office.

The Court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:
The defendant is to participate in a sex offender treatment program and be designated to an institution close to Chico, California, to facilitate visits with his mother.

The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:

at _____ am/pm on _____ (no later than 2:00 pm).

as notified by the United States Marshal.

The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:

by 2:00 pm on 2/13/2020 (no later than 2:00 pm).

as notified by the United States Marshal.

as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on _____ to _____ at _____
_____, with a certified copy of this judgment.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

By _____
DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on supervised release for a term of: Five (5) Years.

MANDATORY CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

- 1) You must not commit another federal, state or local crime.
- 2) You must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.
- 3) You must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. You must submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.
 The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that you pose a low risk of future substance abuse. *(check if applicable)*
- 4) You must make restitution in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A or any other statute authorizing a sentence of restitution. *(check if applicable)*
- 5) You must cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. *(check if applicable)*
- 6) You must comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (34 U.S.C. § 20901, et seq.) as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in which you reside, work, are a student, or were convicted of a qualifying offense. *(check if applicable)*
- 7) You must participate in an approved program for domestic violence. *(check if applicable)*

You must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any other conditions on the attached page.

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

As part of your supervised release, you must comply with the following standard conditions of supervision. These conditions are imposed because they establish the basic expectations for your behavior while on supervision and identify the minimum tools needed by probation officers to keep informed, report to the court, and bring about improvements in your conduct and condition.

- 1) You must report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside within 72 hours of RELEASE, unless the probation officer instructs you to report to a different probation office or within a different time frame.
- 2) After initially reporting to the probation office, you will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how and when you must report to the probation officer, and you must report to the probation officer as instructed.
- 3) You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside without first getting permission from the court or the probation officer.
- 4) You must follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.
- 5) You must answer truthfully the questions asked by your probation officer.
- 6) You must live at a place approved by the probation officer. If you plan to change where you live or anything about your living arrangements (such as the people you live with, for example), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
- 7) You must allow the probation officer to visit you at any time at your home or elsewhere, and you must permit the probation officer to take any items prohibited by these and the special conditions of your supervision that he or she observes in plain view.
- 8) You must work at least part-time (defined as 20 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment unless excused from doing so by the probation officer for schooling, training, community service or other acceptable activities. If you plan to change where you work or anything about your work (such as your position or your job responsibilities), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10 days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
- 9) You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged in criminal activity. You must not associate, communicate, or interact with any person you know has been convicted of a felony, unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer.
- 10) If you are arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours.
- 11) You must not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant without first getting the permission of the court.
- 12) You must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as nunchakus or tasers).

If the probation officer determines that you pose a risk to a third party, the probation officer may require you to notify the person about the risk and you must comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the person and confirm that you have notified the person about the risk. (check if applicable)

U.S. Probation Office Use Only

A U.S. probation officer has instructed me on the conditions specified by the court and has provided me with a written copy of this judgment containing these conditions. I understand that the court may (1) revoke supervision, (2) extend the term of supervision, and/or (3) modify the conditions of supervision upon a finding of a violation of probation or supervised release.

(Signed)

Defendant_____
Date_____
U.S. Probation Officer/Designated Witness_____
Date

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

1. You must pay any restitution and special assessment that is imposed by this judgment and that remains unpaid at the commencement of the term of supervised release.
2. You must submit your person, residence, office, vehicle, electronic devices and their data (including cell phones, computers, and electronic storage media), and any property under your control to a search. Such a search must be conducted by a United States Probation Officer or any federal, state or local law enforcement officer at any time with or without suspicion. Failure to submit to such a search may be grounds for revocation. You must warn any residents that the premises may be subject to searches.
3. You must not possess or use a computer without the prior approval of the probation officer. "Computer" includes any electronic device capable of accessing the internet or processing or storing data as described at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) (including cell phones), and all peripheral devices.
4. As directed by the probation officer, you must enroll in the probation office's Computer and Internet Monitoring Program (CIMP) and must abide by the requirements of the CIMP program and the Acceptable Use Contract.
5. You must not access the Internet or any "on-line computer service" at any location (including employment) without the prior approval of the probation officer. "On-line services" include any Internet service provider, or any other public or private computer network. As directed by the probation officer, you must warn your employer of restrictions to your computer use.
6. You must consent to the probation officer conducting periodic unannounced examinations of your computer equipment which may include retrieval and copying of all data from your computer(s) and any peripheral device to ensure compliance with this condition, and/or removal of any such equipment for the purpose of conducting more thorough inspection. You must also consent to the installation of any hardware or software as directed by the probation officer to monitor your Internet use.
7. You must not possess or use any data encryption technique or program.
8. You must not access or use any file-sharing P2P network or software, including but not limited to, eMule, Gnutella, G2, eDonkey, Kazaa, Limewire, BearShare, Morpheus, and Acquisition, without the consent of the Probation Officer.
9. You must not possess, in any form, materials depicting child pornography, child erotica, or nude or sexual depictions of any child; or any materials described at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8).
10. You must not frequent or loiter within 100 feet of any location where children are likely to gather, or have contact with any child under the age of 18 unless otherwise approved by the probation officer. Children are likely to gather in locations including, but not limited to, playgrounds, theme parks, public swimming pools, schools, arcades, children's museums or other specific locations as designated by the probation officer. This provision does not encompass persons under the age of 18, such as waiters, cashiers, ticket vendors, etc., with whom you must deal in order to obtain ordinary and usual commercial services.
11. Your employment must be approved by the Probation Officer, and any change in employment must be pre-approved by the Probation Officer. You must submit the name and address of the proposed employer to the Probation Officer at least 10 days prior to any scheduled change.
12. Your residence must be approved by the probation officer, and any change in residence must be pre-approved by the Probation Officer. You must submit the address of any proposed residence to the Probation Officer at least 10 days prior to any scheduled change.
13. You must register with the state sex offender registration agency as required by state law. You must provide proof of registration to the Probation Officer within three days of release from imprisonment/placement on supervision. In any state that has adopted the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (42 USC sec. 16901 et seq.), you must also comply with all such requirements as directed by the Probation Officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in which you reside, are a student, or were convicted of a qualifying offense.

14. You must participate in sex offender-specific treatment, as directed by the probation officer. You are to pay part or all of the cost of this treatment, at an amount not to exceed the cost of treatment, as deemed appropriate by the probation officer. The actual co-payment schedule must be determined by the probation officer. The probation officer may release all previous mental health evaluations to the treatment provider.
15. As part of the treatment program, you must submit to polygraph testing as recommended by the treatment provider. However, you retain your Fifth Amendment right to refuse to answer questions asked during the course of treatment absent a grant of use and derivative-use immunity.
16. As part of the treatment program, you must submit to psychological testing as recommended by the treatment provider.

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments.

<u>Assessment</u>	<u>Fine</u>	<u>Restitution</u>	<u>AVAA Assessment*</u>	<u>JVTA Assessment**</u>
TOTALS	\$ 100	Waived	To Be Determined	N/A

The determination of restitution is deferred until 02/26/2020. An *Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case* (AO 245C) will be entered after such determination.

The defendant must make restitution (including community restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below.

If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportioned payment, unless specified otherwise in the priority order or percentage payment column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i), all nonfederal victims must be paid before the United States is paid.

Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea agreement \$ _____

The defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine of more than \$2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 6 may be subject to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

The court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:

the interest requirement is waived for the fine/restitution.

the interest requirement is waived for the fine/restitution is modified as follows:

* Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-299.

** Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22.

*** Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows*:

- A** Lump sum payment of _____ due immediately, balance due
 - not later than _____, or
 - in accordance with C, D, or E, and/or F below); or
- B** Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with C, D, or F below); or
- C** Payment in equal _____ (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of _____ over a period of _____ (e.g., months or years), to commence _____ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment; or
- D** Payment in equal _____ (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of _____ over a period of _____ (e.g., months or years), to commence _____ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment to a term of supervision; or
- E** Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within _____ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant's ability to pay at that time; or
- F** Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:
It is further ordered that the defendant shall pay to the United States a special assessment of \$100. Payments shall be made to the Clerk of U.S. District Court, 450 Golden Gate Ave., Box 36060, San Francisco, CA 94102. During imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties are due at the rate of not less than \$25 per quarter and payment shall be through the Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, are made to the clerk of the court.

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

Joint and Several

Case Number Defendant and Co-Defendant Names (including defendant number)	Total Amount	Joint and Several Amount	Corresponding Payee, if appropriate

- The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.
- The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s): _____
- The defendant shall forfeit the defendant's interest in the following property to the United States:
 - a. Hewlett Packard laptop, serial number 5CH1211E2W;
 - b. Western Digital internal hard drive, serial number WCANK2192392;
 - c. Western Digital internal hard drive, serial number WCANK2192459;
 - d. Western Digital internal hard drive, serial number WCAZA4410917T;
 - e. Seagate external hard drive, serial number NA5JGZ14;
 - f. Antec computer tower, serial number VN643ECDEATU1D; and
 - g. Sixty-nine (69) compact discs.

* Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) AVAA assessment, (5) fine principal, (6) fine interest, (7) community restitution, (8) JVTA assessment, (9) penalties, and (10) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.

The Court gives notice that this case involves other defendants who may be held jointly and severally liable for payment of all or part of the restitution ordered herein and may order such payment in the future, **but such future orders do not affect the defendant's responsibility for the full amount of the restitution ordered.**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSE DIVISION

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE LUCY H. KOH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

A P P E A R A N C E S:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
BY: SCOTT SIMEON
150 ALMADEN BOULEVARD, SUITE 900
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA 95113

FOR THE DEFENDANT: FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
BY: DEJAN M. GANTAR
55 SOUTH MARKET STREET, SUITE 820
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA 95113

PROBATION OFFICER: KAREN MAR

OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER: LEE-ANNE SHORTRIDGE, CSR, CRR
CERTIFICATE NUMBER 9595

PROCEEDINGS RECORDED BY MECHANICAL STENOGRAPHY
TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED WITH COMPUTER

1 DEFENDANT, PROVIDE THE DEFENDANT WITH ANY NEEDED MEDICAL CARE,
2 BUT MOST IMPORTANTLY, THIS VARIANCE IS TO AVOID UNWARRANTED
3 SENTENCE DISPARITIES AMONG DEFENDANTS WITH SIMILAR RECORDS WHO
4 HAVE BEEN FOUND GUILTY OF SIMILAR CONDUCT, AND THE NEED TO
5 PROVIDE RESTITUTION TO ANY VICTIMS OF THE OFFENSE.

6 AND I HOPE THAT THEY DO GET RESTITUTION BECAUSE A LOT OF
7 THEM NEED A LOT OF COUNSELLING AND THERAPY.

8 SO ON THAT BASIS, PURSUANT TO THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF
9 1984, IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT THAT MR. JONATHAN WELLS
10 IS HEREBY COMMITTED THE CUSTODY OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS TO BE
11 IMPRISONED FOR A TERM OF 76 MONTHS.

12 THE COURT RECOMMENDS THAT THE DEFENDANT PARTICIPATE IN A
13 SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT PROGRAM.

14 UPON RELEASE FROM IMPRISONMENT, HE SHALL BE PLACED ON
15 SUPERVISED RELEASE FOR A TERM OF FIVE YEARS.

16 WITHIN 72 HOURS OF RELEASE FROM CUSTODY OF THE BUREAU OF
17 PRISONS, HE SHALL REPORT IN PERSON TO THE PROBATION OFFICE IN
18 THE DISTRICT TO WHICH HE IS RELEASED.

19 WHILE ON SUPERVISED RELEASE, THE DEFENDANT SHALL NOT
20 COMMIT ANOTHER FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL CRIME; SHALL COMPLY
21 WITH THE STANDARD CONDITIONS THAT HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY THIS
22 COURT, EXCEPT THAT THE MANDATORY DRUG TESTING PROVISION IS
23 SUSPENDED.

24 MR. WELLS, YOU SHALL COMPLY WITH THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL
25 CONDITIONS:

1 YOU MUST PAY ANY RESTITUTION AND SPECIAL ASSESSMENT THAT
2 IS IMPOSED BY THIS JUDGMENT AND THAT REMAINS UNPAID AT THE
3 COMMENCEMENT OF THE TERM OF SUPERVISED RELEASE.

4 YOU MUST COOPERATE IN THE COLLECTION OF DNA AS DIRECTED BY
5 THE PROBATION OFFICER.

6 YOU MUST SUBMIT YOUR PERSON, RESIDENCE, OFFICE, VEHICLE,
7 ELECTRONIC DEVICES AND THEIR DATA, INCLUDING CELL PHONES,
8 COMPUTERS, AND ELECTRONIC STORAGE MEDIA, AND ANY PROPERTY UNDER
9 YOUR CONTROL TO A SEARCH. SUCH A SEARCH MUST BE CONDUCTED BY A
10 UNITED STATES PROBATION OFFICER OR ANY FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL
11 LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER AT ANY TIME, WITH OR WITHOUT SUSPICION.
12 FAILURE TO SUBMIT TO SUCH A SEARCH MAY BE GROUNDS FOR
13 REVOCATION. YOU MUST WARN ANY RESIDENTS THAT THE PREMISES MAY
14 BY SUBJECT TO SEARCHES.

15 NOW, LET ME TALK ABOUT THE OBJECTIONS TO THE CONDITIONS 4
16 AND 6 THAT WERE MADE IN THE DEFENDANT'S SENTENCING MEMO.

17 SO UNITED STATES VERSUS BARSUMYAN, B-A-R-S-U-M-Y-A-N,
18 517 F.3D 1154, IT'S A NINTH CIRCUIT CASE FROM 2008, I'M JUST
19 GOING TO READ FROM FOOTNOTE 11. QUOTE, "WHEN THIS COURT HAS
20 UPHELD CONDITIONS RESTRICTING INTERNET ACCESS IN CASES
21 INVOLVING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, IT HAS DONE SO CITING THE STRONG
22 LINK BETWEEN CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE INTERNET AND THE NEED TO
23 PROTECT THE PUBLIC, PARTICULARLY CHILDREN, FROM SEX OFFENDERS."

24 UNITED STATES VERSUS REARDEN, R-E-A-R-D-E-N, 349 F.3D 608,
25 621, NINTH CIRCUIT, 2003, QUOTING UNITED STATES VERSUS ZINN,

1 Z-I-N-N, 321 F.3D 1084, 1093, ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, 2003: "WE ARE
2 AWARE OF NO PUBLISHED CASES APPROVING INTERNET RESTRICTIONS
3 IMPOSED ON A DEFENDANT CONVICTED OF A NON-SEXUAL OFFENSE, LET
4 ALONE A RESTRICTION ON ALL COMPUTER-RELATED DEVICES, WHETHER
5 INTERNET CAPABLE OR NOT."

6 SO IN THIS CASE IT'S CLEARLY SAYING THAT YOU CAN RESTRICT
7 INTERNET ACCESS IN CASES INVOLVING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY. I'M
8 CITING THAT THERE IS A STRONG LINK BETWEEN CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
9 AND THE INTERNET, AND THE NEED TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC,
10 PARTICULARLY CHILDREN, FROM SEX OFFENDERS; BUT ALSO TO PROTECT
11 THE VICTIMS OF THESE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES FROM BEING
12 REVICTIMIZED EVERY TIME THEY KEEP GETTING THESE HUNDREDS AND
13 HUNDREDS OF VICTIM WITNESS LETTERS SAYING YET SOMEONE ELSE HAS
14 VIEWED YOUR IMAGE OF YOU BEING RAPED WHEN YOU WERE TWO YEARS
15 OLD.

16 LET ME READ ALSO FROM UNITED STATES VERSUS LACOSTE, 821
17 F.3D 1187. IT'S A NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION FROM 2016. I'M
18 CITING FROM PAGE 1191. QUOTE, "PUBLISHED DECISIONS IN OUR
19 CIRCUIT HAVE UPHELD CONDITIONS BARRING ALL INTERNET USE ONLY
20 WHEN THE OFFENSES AT ISSUE INVOLVE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OR SEXUAL
21 ABUSE OF MINORS."

22 IT CITES THE BARSUMYAN CASE, AND IT ALSO CITES ANOTHER
23 NINTH CIRCUIT CASE, UNITED STATES VERSUS SALES, S-A-L-E-S,
24 476 F.3D 732 AT 736, NOTE 2, NINTH CIRCUIT, 2007.

25 SO, I MEAN, I HAVE RECENT NINTH CIRCUIT CASES FROM 2016

1 SAYING THAT YOU CAN BAR ALL INTERNET USE IN CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
2 CASES INVOLVING MINORS, FOR SEXUAL ABUSE OF MINORS, WHICH THIS
3 CASE DOES.

4 SO I AM GOING TO IMPOSE THESE CONDITIONS.

5 NUMBER 4. YOU MUST NOT POSSESS OR USE A COMPUTER WITHOUT
6 THE PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE PROBATION OFFICER. COMPUTER INCLUDES
7 ANY ELECTRONIC DEVICE CAPABLE OF ACCESSING THE INTERNET OR
8 PROCESSING OR STORAGE DATA AS DESCRIBED AT U.S.C. SECTION
9 1030 (E) (1), INCLUDING CELL PHONES, AND ALL PERIPHERAL DEVICES.

10 SO THIS DOESN'T MEAN YOU CAN'T HAVE ONE. IT JUST MEANS
11 THAT THE PROBATION OFFICER HAS TO APPROVE IT BEFORE YOU POSSESS
12 OR USE IT.

13 NUMBER 5. AS DIRECTED BY THE PROBATION OFFICER, YOU MUST
14 ENROLL IN THE PROBATION OFFICE'S COMPUTER AND INTERNET
15 MONITORING PROGRAM AND MUST ABIDE BY THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
16 CIMP PROGRAM AND THE ACCEPTABLE USE CONTRACT.

17 YOU MUST NOT ACCESS THE INTERNET OR ANY ONLINE COMPUTER
18 SERVICE AT ANY LOCATION, INCLUDING EMPLOYMENT, WITHOUT THE
19 PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE PROBATION OFFICER. ONLINE SERVICES
20 INCLUDE ANY INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER, OR ANY OTHER PUBLIC OR
21 PRIVATE COMPUTER NETWORK. AS DIRECTED BY THE PROBATION
22 OFFICER, YOU MUST WARN YOUR EMPLOYER OF RESTRICTIONS TO YOUR
23 COMPUTER USE.

24 YOU MUST CONSENT TO THE PROBATION OFFICER CONDUCTING
25 PERIODIC UNANNOUNCED EXAMINATIONS OF YOUR COMPUTER EQUIPMENT,

1 WHICH MAY INCLUDE RETRIEVAL AND COPYING OF ALL DATA FROM YOUR
2 COMPUTERS, AND ANY PERIPHERAL DEVICE TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH
3 THIS CONDITION, AND/OR REMOVAL OF ANY SUCH EQUIPMENT FOR THE
4 PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING MORE THOROUGH INSPECTION. YOU MUST ALSO
5 CONSENT TO THE INSTALLATION OF ANY HARDWARE OR SOFTWARE AS
6 DIRECTED BY THE PROBATION OFFICER TO MONITOR YOUR INTERNET USE.

7 YOU MUST NOT POSSESS OR USE ANY DATA ENCRYPTION TECHNIQUE
8 OR PROGRAM.

9 YOU MUST NOT ACCESS OR USE ANY FILE-SHARING P2P NETWORK OR
10 SOFTWARE, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, EMULE, GNUTELLA, G2,
11 EDONKEY, CAZAA, LIMEWIRE, BEARSHARE, MORPHEUS, AND ACQUISITION,
12 WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE PROBATION OFFICER.

13 YOU MUST NOT POSSESS, IN ANY FORM, MATERIALS DEPICTING
14 CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, CHILD EROTICA, OR NUDE OR SEXUAL DEPICTIONS
15 OF ANY CHILD OR ANY MATERIALS DESCRIBED AT 18 U.S.C.
16 SECTION 2256, SUBSECTION 8.

17 YOU MUST NOT FREQUENT OR LOITER WITHIN 100 FEET OF ANY
18 LOCATION WHERE CHILDREN ARE LIKELY TO GATHER, OR HAVE CONTACT
19 WITH ANY CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 18, UNLESS OTHERWISE APPROVED
20 BY THE PROBATION OFFICER. CHILDREN ARE LIKELY TO GATHER IN
21 LOCATIONS INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PLAYGROUNDS, THEME
22 PARKS, PUBLIC SWIMMING POOLS, SCHOOLS, ARCADES, CHILDREN'S
23 MUSEUMS, OR OTHER SPECIFIC LOCATIONS AS DESIGNATED BY THE
24 PROBATION OFFICER. THIS PROVISION DOES NOT ENCOMPASS PERSONS
25 UNDER THE AGE OF 18 SUCH AS WAITERS, CASHIERS, TICKET VENDORS,

1 ET CETERA, WITH WHOM YOU MUST DEAL IN ORDER TO OBTAIN ORDINARY
2 AND USUAL COMMERCIAL SERVICES.

3 YOUR EMPLOYMENT MUST BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATION OFFICER,
4 AND ANY CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT MUST BE PREAPPROVED BY THE
5 PROBATION OFFICER. YOU MUST SUBMIT THE NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE
6 PROPOSED EMPLOYER TO THE PROBATION OFFICER AT LEAST TEN DAYS
7 PRIOR TO ANY SCHEDULED CHANGE.

8 YOUR RESIDENCE MUST BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATION OFFICER,
9 AND ANY CHANGE IN RESIDENCE MUST BE PREAPPROVED BY THE
10 PROBATION OFFICER. YOU MUST SUBMIT THE ADDRESS OF ANY PROPOSED
11 RESIDENTIAL TO THE PROBATION OFFICER AT LEAST TEN DAYS PRIOR TO
12 ANY SCHEDULED CHANGE.

13 YOU MUST REGISTER WITH THE STATE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
14 AGENCY AS REQUIRED BY STATE LAW. YOU MUST PROVIDE PROOF OF
15 REGISTRATION TO THE PROBATION OFFICER WITHIN THREE DAYS OF
16 RELEASE FROM IMPRISONMENT/PLACEMENT ON SUPERVISION. IN ANY
17 STATE THAT HAS ADOPTED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SEX OFFENDER
18 REGISTRATION NOTIFICATION ACT, 42 U.S.C. SECTION 6901, ET SEQ.,
19 YOU MUST ALSO COMPLY WITH ALL SUCH REQUIREMENTS AS DIRECTED BY
20 THE PROBATION OFFICER, THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, OR ANY STATE SEX
21 OFFENDER REGISTRATION AGENCY IN WHICH YOU RESIDE, ARE A
22 STUDENT, OR WERE CONVICTED OF A QUALIFYING OFFENSE.

23 YOU MUST PARTICIPATE IN SEX OFFENDER SPECIFIC TREATMENT AS
24 DIRECTED BY THE PROBATION OFFICER. YOU ARE TO PAY PART OR ALL
25 OF THE COST OF THIS TREATMENT, AT AN AMOUNT NOT TO EXCEED THE

1 COST OF TREATMENT, AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE BY THE PROBATION
2 OFFICER. THE ACTUAL COPAYMENT SCHEDULE MUST BE DETERMINED BY
3 THE PROBATION OFFICER. THE PROBATION OFFICER MAY RELEASE ALL
4 PREVIOUS MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATIONS TO THE TREATMENT PROVIDER.

5 AS PART OF THE TREATMENT PROGRAM, YOU MUST SUBMIT TO
6 POLYGRAPH TESTING AS RECOMMENDED BY THE TREATMENT PROVIDER.
7 HOWEVER, YOU RETAIN YOUR FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO REFUSE TO
8 ANSWER QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE COURSE OF TREATMENT ABSENT A
9 GRANT OF USE AND DERIVATIVE USE IMMUNITY.

10 AS PART OF THE TREATMENT PROGRAM, YOU MUST SUBMIT TO
11 PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING AS RECOMMENDED BY THE TREATMENT PROVIDER.

12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE DEFENDANT SHALL PAY TO THE
13 UNITED STATES A SPECIAL ASSESSMENT OF \$100. PAYMENTS SHALL BE
14 MADE TO THE CLERK OF U.S. DISTRICT COURT, 450 GOLDEN GATE
15 AVENUE, BOX 36060, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, 94102. DURING
16 IMPRISONMENT, PAYMENT OF CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES ARE DUE AT
17 THE RATE OF NOT LESS THAN \$25 PER QUARTER, AND PAYMENTS SHALL
18 BE THROUGH THE BUREAU OF PRISONS INMATE FINANCIAL
19 RESPONSIBILITY PROGRAM.

20 THE COURT FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE THE
21 ABILITY TO PAY THE FINE -- WHAT IS THE JVTA ASSESSMENT?

22 OFFICER MAR: THAT'S FOR SEX OFFENSE CASES, AND IT'S
23 USUALLY \$5,000 PER COUNT, UNLESS THE COURT FINDS THAT THE
24 DEFENDANT IS INDIGENT. AND BASED ON HIS LACK OF INCOME AND THE
25 FACT THAT HE'S BEING SUPPORTED --