


No. 22-5014

ORIGINAL

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES



Rev. Willie Johnson — PETITIONER
(Your Name)

vs.

Bryan R. Stubbs, et al. — RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Rev. Willie Johnson
(Your Name)

Broad River Correctional Institution
4460 Broad River Road
(Address)

Columbia, South Carolina 29210
(City, State, Zip Code)

N/A
(Phone Number)

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

- Ground A. The District Court for the District of South Carolina "Manifest & totally disregard of the law" by referring & holding for the lawless action to use resistive acts in violation of 28 U.S.C.A. 636 (b)(7)(C).
- Ground B. The District Court for the District of South Carolina "Manifest disregard of the law" by adopting Report and Recommendation that infringe on U.S. Supreme Court Precedent set forth in Ex parte v. Howkins supra.
- Ground C. The United District Court for the District of South Carolina has misconstrued the unsigned Court order frame of reference by which this case was decided in the District Court for the District of South Carolina and the United States ... Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and constitute a denied Procedural Due Process.
- Ground D. The District Court for the District of South Carolina and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit deprived Petitioner of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments Rights.
- Ground E. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit "Manifest & totally disregard of the law" on the basis that Court of Appeals were "morally and ethically bound" to see that justice was done.

LIST OF PARTIES

☒ All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

☐ All parties **do not** appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

West Pike's SSB, A. Hudson, S.E. Wristle, Emily A. Per
Dr. Rick Toomay, Director of DHEC, Elizabeth Simmons,
Dr. Scott Smith, Lt. Kimberly Stork

RELATED CASES

- *Chelon, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.* 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (1984)
- *Flew v. Howkins*, 540 U.S. 431
- *Johnson v. Strickland*, 662 F.2d 1019 WL 2146983
- *Johnson v. Strickland*, 662 F.2d 1019 WL 156807
- *Life & Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Wilson Harris*, 33 U.S. 281 (1834)
- *In re Smith*, 559 S.E.2d 584 (2002)
- *State v. Cover*, 368 S.C. 188, 628 S.E.2d 482 (2006)
- *Davis v. Sanders*, 40 S.C. 507, 19 S.E. 138 (1895)
- *Dubose v. Dubose*, 90 S.C. 871, 72 S.E. 645 (1911)
- *Estelle v. Gumble*, 428 U.S. 97
- *Gordon v. Leake*, 574 F.2d 1147
- *South Carolina Attorney General* 1979 WL 43040 (S.E.A. 52)

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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

☒ For cases from **federal courts**:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix A to the petition and is

☐ reported at _____; or,
☐ has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
☒ is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix B to the petition and is

☐ reported at _____; or,
☐ has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
☒ is unpublished.

☐ For cases from **state courts**:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at Appendix _____ to the petition and is

☐ reported at _____; or,
☐ has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
☐ is unpublished.

The opinion of the _____ court appears at Appendix _____ to the petition and is

☐ reported at _____; or,
☐ has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
☐ is unpublished.

JURISDICTION

☒ For cases from **federal courts**:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case was November 26, 2021.

☐ No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

☒ A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of Appeals on the following date: January 3, 2022, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix 1-3-22.

☒ An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and including February 23, 2022 (date) on January 2, 2022 (date) in Application No. 21 A 437.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

☐ For cases from **state courts**:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was _____.
A copy of that decision appears at Appendix _____.

☐ A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date: _____, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix _____.

☐ An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and including _____ (date) on _____ (date) in Application No. ____ A ____.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

- Eighth Amendment
- Fourteenth Amendment
- 28 U.S.C.A. 636 (b) (1) (A)
- 5 U.S.C. 706 (2) (A) (B)
- 32 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Courts § 131 and 132
- Rule 32 (1) (B), 18 U.S.C.A.
- 18 U.S.C.A. 505
- 32 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Courts § 25 (0966 requires of Federal Judges)
- South Carolina Code of Laws SC ADC 61-16 § 505
- H.R. REP. 94-1609 (sec. 2).
- 18 U.S.C.A. 1509

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

- On November 8, 2018, the Petitioner filed a Motion to Enforce United States Supreme Court Precedent, to the extent all states must honor their consent decree state since.
- On February 11, 2019, the former magistrate Judge Bristol Merchant order the complaint be brought in proper form by March 4, 2019.
- On March 19, 2019 Petitioner send in First Amended Complaint.
- On March 19, 2019, the magistrate Judge entered the Report and Recommendation.
- On April 21, 2019, the Petitioner filed a timely objection to Magistrate Report and Recommendation.
- On March 7, 2019 Petitioner second Amended Complaint to bring Respondents Outcomes and ~~Left~~.
- On April 11, 2019 District Court Judge Giesel entered opinion and order regarding Report and Recommendation.
- The Petitioner file Motion for Reconsideration before Honorable Richard M. Giesel Order April 11, 2019.
- On April 29, 2019 the Honorable Richard M. Giesel stated Reconsideration on First Amended ~~complaint~~.
- In an order, entered April 29, 2019, Defendants did not appeal the Honorable Richard M. Giesel order to Court of Appeals for the Fourth circuit to the extent Respondents still have not comply with this order.
- On February 7, 2019 Petitioner filed Motion for Pickering motion, Motion referred to Bristol Merchant.
- On July 8, 2019 Petitioner Motion to Appoint Counsel for Rev. Willie Johnson re Motion for appointment of counsel Motion referred to Bristol Merchant.
- On January 13, 2020 Petitioner filed a Motion for recess Magistrate Judge Bristol Merchant. He decided to recess himself however to the extent on July 9, 2020 magistrate Judge decided to recess from July 9.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Ground A. The District Court of South Carolina District Court "manifestly & clearly" disrespected of the law by referring a motion for preliminary injunction to U.S. Magistrate Judge in violation of 28 U.S.C. 636 (b) (7) (C).

SUPPORTING FACTS AND ARGUMENT

Petitioner avers that it is undisputed the District Court referred a motion for preliminary injunction to U.S. Magistrate Judge, to the extent, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 1706 (17)(A) (B), District Court abused the delegated discretionary authority by having referred whatever, ex parte, cross, or not in accordance with law. See Hackler v. Chevron, 470 U.S. 811, 105 S.Ct. 1649 (1985).

As mentioned above, "A District Court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally fails to consider judicially recognized factors concerning its exercise of discretion, reliance of erroneous factual, or legal premises or commits an error of law." United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1511 (5th Cir. 2018). Specifically, the omission alone renders District Court's decision arbitrary, capricious, to the extent it is undisputed relevant facts District Court "disrespected" the law of the "law" by referring a motion for preliminary injunction to U.S. Magistrate Judge in a clear cut violation of 28 U.S.C. 636 (b) (7) (C), in conjunction with Congress' Committee "Report" H.R. Rep. 94-1609 Sec. (2), to the extent it will prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a District Court lack enumerated power to refer a motion for preliminary injunction to U.S. Magistrate Judge. See Dep't. of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, 140 S.Ct. 1891 (2020); Dep't. of Commerce v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551 (2019); Heiner v. Donnan, 385 U.S. 312, 52 S.Ct. 358 (1962); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2718 (1984).

As established above, the solution 1156 is not exhaustive, but simply informs the classification of other motions the of non-dispositive and the principle encompasses motions that are the functional equivalents of listed dispositive motions. As set forth above, the high 1156 section applies to this case.

Notably, particularly in plain readings of section 128 U.S.C.A. 6363 (b) (7)(C), in conjunction with 32 AM. Jur. 2d Federal Court 131 and 132 it has established a "binding authority upon the courts, to the extent of counsel to treat it, and result in the denial of fundamental justice, see U.S. v. Beck, 635 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir. 1980). Both now failed to address the relevant facts set forth by Petitioner as issue the District Court operated outside color of the law, by following a motion for preliminary injunction to U.S. Magistrate Judge.

As established above, the Pleur are unambiguous in 1134930 of 28 U.S.C.A. 6363 (b) (7)(C) and in conjunction with 32 AM. Jur. 2d Federal Court 131 and 132. Pleur 1156 with the decision of District Court, to the extent constitute a "manifest disregard of the law, see Well Street (2008)

Assack 2601 L.L.C. v. Well Street, Inc. 552 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 1394, (2008) See also U.S. v. Reddick, 447 U.S. 667, 100 S. Ct. 2406 (1990)

As mentioned above, there is simply no language in the statute which implies it excludes the gives District Court or any other court enumerated power to refer a motion for preliminary injunction to U.S. Magistrate Judge, if Congress had intended for Magistrate Judge to render a Report and Recommendation

~~1917-18 in the District Court, see also~~ Highway Ave. v. B.R. Co. v. Chicago
Equipment Co. 168 U.S. 627, 18 S. Ct. 240 (1898) (if Congress
intended statute to apply to certain Proceedings, it could
have done so by including such language). Little v. Streetcar
452 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 2202 (1981), to the extent these
standards govern Federal Court's due Process set forth in the
statute, see also U.S. Shunk, 359 U.S. 255, 79 S. Ct. 716
(1959).

As mentioned above, the District Court's actions
28 U.S.C. 1365 ~~to the extent~~ to the extent obstruct to
the administration of justice that constitutes a
violation of 28 U.S.C. 1365. Therefore by District
Court it is a racial disparity against those men-
tioned.

As explained above, it is well established by Frame
of the Constitution, the intent of Congress must
control in the construction of statute and the Court
is not to construe a statute so strictly
as to defeat the obvious intention. See U.S. v. Williams
18 U.S. 76 (1820).

Inasmuch as instead of District Court discharging his
responsibilities in conformity with Constitution and laws,
to the extent District Court broke his oath of office.
Consequently, the unlawful and illegal acts committed by
District Court in returning a Motion for Preliminary
injunction to Massachusetts State in violation of 28-

U.S.C.A. 636 (b)(7)(A), which constitutes a "Obstruction of Justice" for a ~~primary~~ ~~secondary~~ when you order a search and discovered a insect. ~~in the~~ ~~subject~~ so because Messer's of rest-
aunt would take to resolve ~~the~~ ~~the~~ the Company Policy given Messer's
authority to accommodate its customer and a free melibub message
selected not to follow Company Policy; then Messer's director
stop in and sanction Messer's for failing to follow Company Policy,
and Company are free with a lawsuit from its customer, this could
have been prevented, only Messer's follow the Company Policy.

As Mentioned above, District Court has "Mandatory duty" to
carry out the wish of Congress in a statute; to the extent
the district court failed to perform their duty to enforce
provisions of the statute set forth in 28 U.S.C.A. 636
(b)(7)(A). Thus, district court action was impeding the
administration of justice.

Moreover, "Administration of Justice" means perfor-
mance of acts or duties required by law in discharge of
of duty. Rosier v. U.S. 10 F.2d 673 (1928), see also U.S.
v. Cohen 202 F.2d 585 (1962) & U.S.C.A. § 1503. Thus
"Administration of Justice" within Obstruction of Justice
statute means performance of acts or duties required
by law in discharge of a duty. Therefore the statute
is broad enough to cover any acts committed Company,
in ~~order~~ ~~to~~ ~~in~~ ~~order~~ to obstruct the due admin-
istration of justice. Sampson v. United States 171 F.2d
263, 266 (9th Cir. 1947). Wright Petitioner - has filed num-
erous appeal to district court challenges the statute
and his magistrate judge official misconduct.

Ground B The District Court "Manifest disregard of the law" by adopting Magistrate Report and Recommendation that infringes on U.S. Supreme Court Precedent set forth in Frew v. Hawkins

~~SUPREMACY~~ Facts and ~~Arguments~~

Petitioner argues that the District Court abrogates Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004), by adopting Magistrate Report and Recommendation "to overrule Frew v. Hawkins, to extent Johnson v. Shillineau, 2019 WL 2146793 and see Appendix [G], it is undisputed and it will prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Magistrate Judge made a attempt to overrule a U.S. Supreme Court Precedent. Specifically, the District Court turn a blind [eye] to Magistrate Judge Official Misconduct. However to the extent District Court abrogates Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004), by infringing on U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, see also, Johnson v. Shillineau, 2019 WL 156807.

In view of this history, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically and unequivocally with and Particularity stated in Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, to the extent U.S. Supreme Court states "every state" must honor their [consent decree] that state official signed, it was unanimous decision and Justice said in 60 Court the agreement called [consent decree] that District Court has enumerated power to enforce and to see that state official live up to their promises.

As established above, the District Court were arrogant and
carries in failure carry out U.S. Supreme "order". In
addition, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically and unequivocally
with character did not give District Court enumerated power
to designated U.S. Magistrate to enforce U.S. Supreme
Court order upon state official to honor their [consent
decree], to the extent U.S. Supreme Court designated
District Court to carry out this ~~order~~ enforce
state official to honor their [consent decree]. Here, the
District Court violated 18 U.S.C.A. 1509, Obstruction of
Court Orders, by failure to comply with a Court order
from U.S. Supreme Court.

More specifically, that District Court has interference
with enforcement of the U.S. Supreme Court precedents set forth
in Frew v. Hawkins, 542 U.S. 453. Further, District Court ignored
and misapplied legal principles without justifying their
departures from U.S. Supreme Court precedents set forth
in Frew v. Hawkins, 542 U.S. 453.

As presented above, longstanding doctrine dictates that a
Court is always bound to follow a precedent established by
a Court "superior" to it. Hence a lower Court judge may
review himself as the SINGLE and perhaps SINGLEMinded
enforcer of the U.S. Supreme Court precedents. See
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
305 U.S. 833 127 S.Ct. 2791.

As established above, District Court failed to follow the precedent established by the courts directly above it. Specifically the District Court must follow both U.S. Supreme Court decisions and those issued by Whichever Court of Appeals retains jurisdiction over its decisions, and Court of Appeals must heed to U.S. Supreme Court decisions. However to the extent the Supreme inferior distribution described in Article III suggests that U.S. Supreme Court precedent would continue to bind inferior federal courts. The duty to obey arises from the inferior status of the lower courts. In addition over the Supreme Court perceived Judge "Presursors" conduct and perhaps that of other judges involved as disobedient. See Wright v. Howard, 112 S.Ct. 1713, 1714 (1992) quoting 102 Yale L.J. 2637.

As presented above, the Petitioner initially filed a "Motion to enforce" with District Court to enforce said official to comply with U.S. Supreme Court precedent set forth Frew v. Howard, specifically, U.S. Magistrate Judge refuse to entertain the "Motion", to the extent Magistrate Judge order Petitioner to bring the "Motion" in proper form. However, just as in Frew, a case involving a very similar to Petitioner case. Specifically, Frew filed a "Motion to enforce a Court Order". Further, U.S. Supreme Court, en banc in appellate scribbled onto of paper to the U.S. Supreme Court, in Boys v. McDowell, 454 U.S. 204 (1982). 13

However, here, evidence well established that the district court willfully impeded, obstructed judicial process and obstruct the administration of justice, by obstructions & legal process as established ~~state in subsection 167.~~

In view of this history, the State Official of South Carolina had know intention of honoring their "consent decree" for a primary example, comment of former state of South Carolina Attorney General Charles Condon in May of 1986, these comments were in a "newspaper" article. Per Condon states, state corrections commission Mike Moore should be allowed to "peck them in like SPIDERS" if too weak. Condon said ~~again~~ that settlers should ~~have~~ ~~some~~ ~~more~~ ~~steps~~ live to less ~~spec~~ ~~than~~ South Carolina inmates.

With respect, former Attorney General Condon was a new federal law that we unconstitutional hard-acts federal judges as far as the reforms that can order, asked the federal court to end a 1986 consent decree.

~~He said~~, Condon made a false statement with the intent to deceive the federal court to end "Nelson Consent Decree". Condon said, "With this budget I intend to free South Carolina from this embarrassment of a process," Condon told reporters. "Then we can process with real reform in our criminal justice system without B.S. Brother on our back."

All of these relevant facts, Condon were selling federal court a pipe dream of criminal justice reform. The former Attorney General Condon "Opium Pander's Boy" in South Carolina Department of Corrections.

For instance, the Supreme Court specifically and unequivocally
and clearly and particularly stated in Frew v. Hawkins
540 U.S. 421, overruled the United States Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1997) to
the extent as mentioned above, that every state must have
their "Consent Decree" that state officials sign. Specif-
cally state officials (SCDC) deliberately ignored U.S.
Supreme Court precedent set forth in Frew v. Hawkins
to the extent state officials remain in noncompliance to
U.S. Supreme Court precedent in Frew. As such, state officials
was not apply to Frew since Rule upon in 2004.

As established above District Court for the District
of South Carolina deliberately disobeyed to enforce
state officials (Respondent) to come in compliance to
this Court Mandate, to the extent without a Federal
oversight into South Carolina Department of
Corrections its has come to be a killing field
with guns violence has increased.

As explained "David" former Attorney General and Congress
has opening a "Pendone's Box" to guns violence in South
Carolina Correctional Facility. Now, ~~Pendone~~ ~~David~~ ~~like~~
to invite this Court inside operation of South Carolina
Department of Corrections Mink-Set.

Despite numerous warnings, Warden of Lee Facility
in South Carolina, to the extent Warden advise Respon-
dent Director and other SCDC officials, that Lee Facility
were short-handed of staff to accommodate a massive
guns danger.

As discussed above the second obstructive course
was the way on yellow brick road toward the "Great
Oz" to the extent the "Dictator" (District Court Judge
Richard Mark Gursel") adopted Muskrat Judge Bristol
Merchant "Report and Recommendation" dated March 19,
2019, to the extent Petitioner filed "Motion for Recon-
sideration" challenges District Court Judge Gursel order.
Obviously, the night while "Dictator" was sleeping the
angel "Gabriel" spoke to District Court "Gursel" here
to order vacated on reconsideration on April 21, 2019
See Johnson v. Seidman 2019 WL 1568067.

As explained above in first amended complaint, it
included: (1) Motion to enforce US Supreme Court
precedent set forth in Fru v. Hawkins; (2) Respondent
striking various Petitioner civil right; this Petitioner
is being illegally detained by the South
Carolina Department of Corrections under an
unsigned court order; (3) Respondent sta-
budson directed an inmate to destroy Petitioner's
1001 documents; (4) Respondent Seil-
ling hired Respondent Price EMTs to work
in capacity as a nurse in violation of
South Carolina statutory laws, included Respon-
dent Price EMTs called Petitioner "Bone Marrow Trans-
plant" that were order by MUSC and Petitioner
Doctor recommended "Bone Marrow Transplant".

Ground C. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina has misinterpreted the United States Court Order Frame of Reference by which this case was decided in the District Court for the District of South Carolina, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and constitute a denial of procedural due process.

~~Supporting Facts and Argument~~

The Petitioner avers it is undisputed that the Trial Judge failed to actually sign the Court Order to the South Carolina Department of Corrections to [invalidate] the conviction and sentence. See Appendix E.

More specifically the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Wilson v. Wilson, 33 U.S. 291 (1834), the U.S. Supreme Court has unequivocally with clarity and public-utility stated that Court Order must be signed by the Judge before an order could be executed such created approximately 100 years old doctrine establish it constitute "binding authority" that a Judge must signed their Court Order.

The Petitioner humbly contends that his Fourteenth Amendment Rights and Rights of Due Process were violated due being confined on United States Court Order, to the effect the District Court and Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit violated the spirit of law, as such, "the law is crystal clear" on this issue pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. Rule 32(c)(7), provides: the judgement shall be signed by the Judge and entered by the clerk of Court and 18 U.S.C.A.

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505, seals of Court; signatures of Judges or Court officers. Here state of South Carolina statute are parallel to Federal statute, to the extent Pursuant to Rule 77 (d), S.C.R.P., provides the judgment shall be signed by the Judge and entered by Clerk of Court. However to the extent the Federal and state statute created a liberty interest in obtaining relief from the the "mandatory language" was the word "shall". See SANDIN V. CONNER, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293. In order to understand the meaning of the statute or phrase of law, it is necessary to determine the meaning of the language as it is used in the particular context; Robinson v. Shell Oil Company, 117 S.Ct. 843, 846 (1997). Article 12 section 2 utilizes the words, "shall provide".

As discussed above, the statute Place a mandatory obligation on the district court and including the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to the extent both courts has obstructed due administration of justice. In addition, the district court and Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has deliberately committed and obstruction of justice and conspiracy to commit official misconduct and violate statute and constitutional.

Inasmuch, the district court and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit defied from their own rules and procedures, to the extent district court and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Judgment is tainted by a culture of sloppy legal
procedures and that no judgment from district court and
the courts of court for the Fourth Circuit can be relied
on as representing the results of a fair and equitable process.
When the courts decide to break their own rules and judges
refuse to abide by Constitution and laws and "Orbit"
then the courts system is no longer a court system, it's a circus.
And the Constitution doesn't give judicial powers to clowns.
Pursuant to 32 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Courts § 251 (Qualification
Required of Federal Judges):

It is clear that all federal judges are bound by a
solemn moral obligation to regulate their decisions according
to the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Every citizen entitled to have his or her case heard by
a judge mindful of this oath.

In the present case, ~~Justice~~ Judge Bishop
Marshall orchestrated a white washed to keep secret
cover up of unsolved court issue by misconstrued factual
allegations in Petitioner's complaint, to the extent
misstatements judge please this is challenge to the fact
or duration of his confinement.

Petitioner also alleges that Respondent Stirling violated
his civil rights by Stirling's failure to abide by
his own policies and procedures because he allowed
Petitioner to remain in custody on unsolved court
orders. (LDK No. 47 of 81) See Johnson v. Stirling et al.
2019 WL 7285022

- Pursuant to SCDC Policy OP-21, 04, 16 Sub B, 1A, Paragraph 4.2: The R&G Record Staff will review the Commitment Papers to ensure that the inmate has a South Carolina sentence. Inmates who do not have a valid commitment paper or a valid South Carolina sentence will not be accepted by SCDC.

As mentioned above the Mississippi incivility case law these allegations as a challenge to a factor of duration of Plaintiff's confinement, that "Robert Connor sense" without the signature it is merely an "unsigned paper."

This legal framework and foundation brings firmly in place approximately 100 years-old doctrine established in Life & Fire Insurance Company of New York v. Wilson, 188 U.S. 303 decide in 1894, that the judgment or order, without the signature of the judge cannot be enforced. It constitutes a violation of Plaintiff's 14th Amendment rights of due process of law, to be recognized on violation court order.

More specifically a unsigned judgment or order is a order that never really existed and is unsigned. However, inasmuch it doesn't become unsigned with the passage of time or inaction of defendants. As such a unsigned judgment or order has no power to bind or prohibit anyone. See also State ex rel Rhine Montgomery, 422 S.W.2d 611 (1967). Yes, any kind of proceeding to void a unsigned judgment or order is proper. And -

It is the duty of this Court to declare the order void as a matter of law.

- As discussed above when you type or write out a proposed judgment or order that is exactly what it is until it is signed. Proposed. A judgment or order does not take on any official meaning until someone with the proper authority put their "John Hancock" on it.

- As established above District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit must read this Court's precedent set forth in this case.

For example in In re Smith, 359 S.E. 2d 584 (2002), the South Carolina specifically and unequivocally with clarity and particularity stated in Smith: A judge must signed their Court Petitioner cites to State v. Cowart, 368 S.C. 188, 28 S.E. 2d 482 (2006) (holding that a search warrant is not issued until signed by an appropriate magistrate, municipal judge, or judge of a court record); Devis v. Sanders, 40 S.C. 501, 19 S.E. 138 (1804) (holding that an arrest warrant lacks the signature of the officer who issued it constitutes an "unflushed tape"); and Dubose v. Dubose, 90 S.C. 87, 72 S.E. 645 (1911) (holding that an arrest warrant did not confer authority upon a sheriff to make an arrest because the magistrate did not sign the warrant). Petitioner also claims that a type written name on a Court Order is not a

"Signature" under Federal and South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 11(c). See Becker v. McGovern, 532 U.S. 757, 121 S. Ct. 1801, Petitioner also argues that the Respondent's filings abrogate her due process and procedural due process rights in their custody or unsisted court orders see Appendix

Ground D. The District Court for District of South Carolina and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit deprived Petitioner of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

~~Summary of the Arguments~~

Petitioner argues that pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(c)(2)(A), the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit abused the delegated discretion and authority by having acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or not in accordance with law. In this case, it is undisputed that an "EMT" "Paramedic" were assigned as Petitioner's "Health Care Provider" to the extent Petitioner were diagnosed with "Myeloma & Bone Cancer" on or about December 2016.

As mentioned above Respondents Price and Simmons are not licensed nurses. However to the extent Respondents Price and Simmons abrogate 505 "All nurses employed in nursing role in a facility shall be currently licensed to practice in South Carolina. Specifically Respondent Simmons Affidavit will prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Respon-

don't SIMMONS are not licensed to practice as nurses in South Carolina. However to the extent Respondent's attorney Affidavit will prove as well Respondent Price work of correctional facilities in nurse capacity. Thus, Merriam Webster Dictionary defines "EMT" and "Paramedic" as follows:

EMT:

- A Person who is trained to provide emergency medical services to patients who are being taken to a hospital.

Paramedic:

- a person whose job is to provide emergency medical care to sick or injured people who are being taken to hospital.

As established above, per South Carolina Attorney General Emergency Medical Technicians are unlicensed personnel who are certified by the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC). Their clear function is to provide emergency medical services. The emergency medical services act South Carolina Code section 44-61-10 et seq. clearly provides that the services are not performed in an institution but rather in the field. However to the extent that an EMT and Paramedic performs acts beyond that of a nursing assistant or a patient in an institution, they would violate the law. Paramedics and nurses subject themselves to potential criminal prosecution to the extent Respondent's attorney Price and Simmons in violation of the law. Specifically the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has conspired -

Will the District Court the District of South Carolina ...
several other Federal and State Judicial Personnel to cover
up Respondent's striking officer's misconduct. See 2/50/1979.
WL 43040 (S.C. Ct. App.), and ADC 61-16 § 505

Petitioner has established that the official misconduct
of Respondents Strickland, Price and Searles were delibera-
tely indifferent to Rev. Johnson's serious medical
needs, to the extent its know cure for Rev. Johnson's
cancer, that Jesus come back. This case is controlled
by Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 108, 97 S. Ct. 225,
in which Petitioner has satisfied all three prongs set
forth by U.S. Supreme Court the standard for deliberate
indifference, including: (1) the intentional delay or
denial of necessary medical treatment ~~to medical~~ -
reasons (2) opens for an easier and less efficacious br-
eakdown of the inmate's condition's and (3) prevents
or from receiving treatment for a serious medical need.

More specifically, Rev. Johnson's serious medical needs
"reobob common sense" no one would put an ~~EMT~~ or Param-
edic over a cancer patient's serious medical needs.
To the extent the District Court for the District of
South Carolina and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit that violated "Spirit of Law" in this case
flows with Obstruction of Justice. See U.S. v. Davis,
507 U.S. 97, 113. S.Ct. 1111 and U.S. v. Singer, 963 F.2d 1144

performed by nurses and providing treatment for which they were neither licensed nor trained. Toussaint v. McCort, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir., 1986). Petitioner also argues that 91 EMTs cannot lawfully render services that are not authorized for, to the extent EMTs are not specialized or trained in treating & caring for persons such as Murray v. South Hills Health System, 501 P.2d 634, 462 A.2d 680, 685 (Pa., 1983) (ambulance paramedics were not capable of making medical diagnoses).

More specifically, the Constitution does not stop at the prison gate for Petitioner but moves to the benefit of all over to those citizens behind prison walls. See Beal v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) and Proff v. Rickett, 425 U.S. 318 (1975). Inasmuch, Petitioner and the others inmates are having their health care needs addressed EMTs who were neither licensed nor qualified to diagnose or treat serious medical conditions such as cancer.

As discussed above there is significant evidence in the record from which District Court for the District of South Carolina and Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit could conclude their decision that Respondent Stirling, Price and Simmons reduce the Petitioner health care by assigning 91 EMTs as Petitioner Health Care Provider to sub-standard level far below... contractual and constitutional obligations were

Ground E. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit "Manifestly & totally disregarded for the law" on the basis that Courts of Appeals were "Morally and ethically bound" to see that justice was done."

SUPPORTING FACTS AND ARGUMENT:

With respect to the circumstances involved in this instance, the Court of Appeals were unbiased in denying appeal on the basis of Rev. Johnson's "Appeals" the District Court's order. "Accepting the recommendations of the majority judge and denying relief on Johnson's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Complaint. We (court) have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. The Procedure Mandated by Fourth Circuit Rules was not followed by the Court of Appeals in this case to the extent the Court of Appeals decision contravenes Fourth Circuit Rules."

As a ~~prudent~~ matter, the Court of Appeals decision were not basis on Factual Allegation set forth in Petitioner's "Informal Brief" to the extent obvious decision were made outside "Fourth Circuit Rules". Enablers "On Appeal, Court of Appeals confine their review to the issues raised in the Informal Brief, see 4th Cir. 34 C.D. Because Rev. Johnson's Informal Brief are to be construed liberally, to the extent Rev. Johnson's "Informal Brief" did contain Factual Allegations sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level "and that state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). As such, the Petitioner has met "Plausibility standard" requires, to the extent

Petitioner has demonstrated to "Lower Courts" more than a sheer possibility that Respondents has acted unlawfully, to the extent "Manifest & totally disregarded for the law" including violations "Rev. Johnson" Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments on the one hand ("the intervenor brief is an important document under Fourth Circuit rules our review is limited to issues preserved in the brief") on the other hand, the "Good Ol' Boys" in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit mind-set we are the 1960s and there know incarcerated person will come in my court tell us, one of our colleagues... committed "Obstruction of Justice" and Denial of Procedural Due Process, to the extent this "New" better stay in his place, to the extent "Jim Crow" laws designed to prevent African Americans from equal justice has now left our judicial system and "racial redoubtment"

More specifically, impartial ~~judicial decision makers~~ reluctance to examine the potential that racial bias exists has to enhance judicial decision makers often stems from the profound discomfort many judges and lawyers feel in challenging the prevailing notions of impartiality in judicial decision makers and in identifying judges as representatives.

Indeed, the right to an impartial judge is secured by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. That the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and District Court impartiality has violated

Petitioner Fourteenth Amendment. Trial judges in particular must be held accountable for racial bias in the justice system because they exercise considerable direct authority over the other actors in the justice system. Specific and corroborated in present case before this Court, to the extent racial bias and judicial bias that permeates the Court of Appeals and District Court toward the Petitioner for decades. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 S. Ct. 848; Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 133 S. Ct. 2411 and Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. School Dist. of Philadelphia

557 P.2d 126 (1977). Specifically, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit words choice that was presumably designed to underscore that the District Court failed to evaluate the legal sufficiency of the ... complaint, affirms the standard articulated in Gordon v. Leck, 574 F.2d 1147. Gordon directs District Court to construe Pro. 38 complaint liberally. Moreover, the record which the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had before them embraced the record of the District Court. Here, the Court of Appeals abrogates Gordon v. Leck, 574 F.2d 1147, that failed to follow precedent set forth in Gordon v. Leck supra. However to the extent Court of Appeal has duty to follow precedent, especially Supreme Court precedent US v. Dabett, 231 F.3d 979 (5th Cir. 2000)

As the Court pointed out Paul was fortunate enough to be a "Roman" citizen when he was made the victim of Presudical charges; the Privileged status afforded him an appeal to "Rome", with a right to meet his or her accusers face to face; Act 25:16. But other Maximized disciplines were not so favored. Our Constitution has led people everywhere to hope and believe that wherever our laws control, all people, whether our citizens or not, would have an equal chance before a judicial justice system constructed by the United States, unlike constructed by many other nations, does not mean Excess, for our people chose to maintain their greatness by justice rather than violence. Our constitutional principles are such that there would be of equal justice under law.

It is important, of the outset, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth circuit action were "arbitrary and capricious." However, to the extent the Court of Appeals, including District Court committed "Mistressance".

A. Mistressance in office is committed when a Public Officer or Public employee shall: (1) intentionally refuse or fail to perform any duty lawfully required of him, as such officer.

or employee or; (2) Intentionally perform any such duty in an unlawful manner; or; (3) Knowingly permit or other Public office or Public employee under his authority to intentionally refuse or fail to perform any duty lawfully required of him; or to conspired to cover up his official misconduct by falsifying official records failed to intervene. No one is above the law or Police.

(1) Perform any such duty in an unlawful manner;

(2) Any duty lawfully required of a Public office or Public employee, when delegated by him to a Public office or Public employee shall be deemed to be lawful duty of such Public office or employee. The delegation of such lawful duty shall not relieve the Public office or employee of his lawful duty.

As explained above, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit deliberately cover-up District Court for the District of South Carolina official misconduct and Malfesence, to the extent the Court of Appeals has a obligation to consider the evidence that were presented by petitioner.

Concerns The A.B.A.'s 1905

Quote from Committee's 1906 Report "[T]he lawyer is and must ever be the high priest in the shrine of justice." Other portions of the committee's report extended this metaphor: Like God, "justice reigns," "Courts our shrines of justice," lawyers are the "Ministers of her Courts of justice robed in the priestly garments of truth, honor and integrity," the practice of law is a lawyer's "high calling," and the code of ethics is called and composed of "canons."

The committee's report began, like Alexander's paper, with the republican emphasis on the bar's politically important role in American government:

Under our form of government, unless the system for establishing and dispensing justice is so developed,

and maintained that there shall be continued confidence on the part of the public in the fairness, integrity and impartiality of its administration, there can be no lasting permanence to our republican institutions. Our

profession is necessarily the keystone of the republican arch government... [T]he future of the republic depends upon

our maintenance of the shrine of justice pure and unsullied. The committee expressed that republican view of the lawyer's special role in the administration of justice in the religious metaphor used by both Tucker

and Alexander in 1905, However to the extent Alexander's 1905 Paper must have made impression upon Tucker, because the first half of the Committee's 1906 report was drawn directly from Alexander's Paper.

Inasmuch the Court of Appeals opens the way for others to work through three circuit court judges that render the decision in this case is oppressive and abstract due administration of justice "wine is a mocker, strong drink is raging; and whosoever is deceived thereby is not wise."

Prov. 20:1. Thus it is that judgment is turned away back and . . . and he that despiseth him quit maketh himself a fool." Is. 59:14, 15. Those who have jurisdiction over the lives of their fellow men should be held guilty of a crime when they yield to intemperance. All who execute the laws should be law-keepers. They should be men and women of self-control. They need to have full command of their physical, mental, and moral powers, that they may possess wisdom of intellect, and a high sense of justice.

Despite this, the doors of the courts has been summarily closed upon "Rev. Johnson" & Veterans for decades, to the extent there is now respect for Veterans "Behind Bars" these veterans are treated as "enemy combatants" - the frame of the constitution created the federal system of government so that people's rights would be secured by the division of power.

to the extent Respondents Price and Simmons are not trained in the field dealing with cocaine products.

Simply put, there are many professions are licensed, to the extent a plumber can not practice law and work in capacity as lawyer in the courtroom, under a plumber licensed. See Appendix Affidavit of Respondents. Moreover, Respondent Price decline to put forward an "Affidavit."

It is well settled that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit does not have carte blanche to adopt any rule it may fancy, but rather that its decision must be consistent with purposes of the statute and reasonably adapted to carry out those purposes. See U.S. v. Resler, 13 U.S. 571, 61 S.Ct. 820 (1947); Strom v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 596. On the other hand the Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit prohibits 32 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Courts §25, (which required of federal judges)

It is clear that all federal judges are bound by a solemn moral obligation to regulate their decisions according to the Constitution and laws of the United States. Every citizen entitled to have his or her case heard by a judge mindful of this oath. On the one hand the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the three Circuit Judges decision were not mindful of this oath. See U.S. v. Edwards, 25 F. Cas. 259, No. 14909 C.C.D. Va. 1800; Lind v. Turner, 409 U.S. 824, 93 S.Ct. 1172, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1985, conspiracy to interfere with court rights, (1707).

not "above the law" specifically that include the Judges involved with the Petitioners case, to the extent these Judges are not "above the law".

The Fathers of Constitution agreed, without dispute, to six basic Principles: Petitioners will invoke two of them: (3) All Persons are equal before the law; and moreover, rich or poor can demand the protection of the law in the exercise of his rights. And (4) The Government is a government of law, not of men. No one is above the law. No officer of the Government can use authority unless the Constitution or the law permits. Thus, the Court of Appeals and District Court misconstrued the Framers' intent in the above statute. Justice is "biased" where Justice's conduct reflects Justice's decisions, based of extrajudicial sources to treat civil liberties unfairly. Williams v. Weaver, 326 F.3d 569 (9th Cir. 2003).

As established above the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit would's choice that was presumably designed to underscore the District Court's "Obstruction of Justice" to the extent the Court of Appeals would have to be "biased" not to see what "[3]" others can see and understand that the District Court Judge's action constituted a violation of the 1991 Act's Effect on Secretary's burden shifting scheme. As inapplicable to the extent the Framers has not given the District Court's purported power to operate outside of the law.

3
- Additionally, tempered with compassion and deeply rooted with a moral conscience to humane folk beyond the scope of self-indulgent and more toward correctness of...
- Rev. Johnson being politically used as pawns in the criminal justice system for 37 years being held in South Carolina Department of Corrections illegally before an unjust court order, to the extent the word of God said in Ps. 105: 15 "Don't hurt my chosen... servants; do not touch my prophets." Specifically, the Court of Appeals has rush pell-mell down the road to madness just for the sake of doing nothing, to describe in detail above.

More specifically it is abundantly clear that the district court proposed 28 U.S.C. 636 (b) (1) (A), in connection with 32 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Court 131 and 132 and H.R. REP. 94-1609 (Sec 2), 94th Congress (1976), including the Court of Appeals itself proposed these statute and enactment of Congress per Chief Roberts ("Judge are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules; they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited, not broad, even work to go tell some to see an umpire." Statement of John G. Roberts, Sr.). However to the extent the U.S. Supreme had held that "Trump" is



SHOUT

"Lord Spoke Through His Prophet To Chief Justice And Justices"

With respect how can this Court ignore my word? Obviously this Court did not read my word, before rendering this Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), to the extent the Federal Law defined "marriage" only as a legal union between a man and a woman and "spouse" only as a person of opposite sex who was a husband or wife. In the Lord Have spoken

In addition, this Court has deliberately disrespect my son and me by implement a law that infringed upon my word. What did the word says:

"If a man has sexual relations with another man as a man does with a woman, these two men have done a hateful sin. They must be put to death. They have brought it on themselves. Leviticus 20:13

This is my principle! Homosexual behavior is prohibited in scripture Lev. 20:13 and Ques 2 Moses came of the divine judgment against Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen. 19:4-6, 12-13). My apostle Paul listed... homosexuals among "the unrighteous" who could not inherit the kingdom God (1 Cor. 6:9-10) and declared that God's wrath stands against such behavior whether practiced by men or women (Rom. 1:26-27). As set forth, this Court decision to allow same-sex marriage, to the extent has done my word unconstitutional.

Why would this Court exalt your exhortations above
my words?

Specifically my word says:

- Do not add anything to what I command you
and do not take anything away from the commands
of the Lord your God that I have given you
Deut. 4:2

This Court took power from word and this Court decision
brought Sodom and Gomorrah to America in the
open,

- Read Deut. 12:32 "Do everything that I
have commanded you; do not add ex-
tensions to it or take extensions from it."



- Read Rev. 22:18-19 For I testify to everyone
who hears the words of the prophecy of
this book; if anyone adds the these things,
God will add to him the plagues that
are written in the book; and if
anyone takes away from the word of book
of this prophecy, God shall take away
his part from the book of life, from
the holy city, and from the things
which are written in this book.
- Read Ex 32:33 And the Lord said to Moses, "Wher-
ever has sinned against me, I will blot
him out of my book."



Now specifically, two men has no Fundamental
Rights to marriage or two women has no Fundamental
Rights to marriage and my words prohibiting same-
sex marriage, this Court decision is unconsti-
tutional. So let work through the politic to influence
this Court, my exhortation to this Court each member
of this Court attend church, but word were-

fell on deaf ears, The Supreme Court Justice
Kendall misconstrued fundamental rights, to the
extent the right to marry revised to a man
woman, specifically Frank made no provision in
Constitution for sex same-marriage, to the extent
Frank knew no one would travel and intrude
on moral standard of marriage between man
woman. Here, this Court misinterpreted the con-
stitution and Congress created a statute defined
right to marry between man and wife. Also, the
word defined to right marry between man and woman.

As mention above Beel is also the sponsor behind sexual
perversion and homosexuality, worship of Beel and his wife


Asherah in old Testament time was accomplished through
obscene sexual rituals and temple prostitution.
Pornography, which is nothing more than a form of
Perverse Beel worship, has defiled this country.
Indeed, Pornography is a primary cause for the
epidemic of fornication, homosexuality and adultery
in America today! This Court decision is a form
of Beel worship, however, to the extent Beel is a
violent, blood thirsty principle that seek to
destroy good seed and your children respect. Therefore,
the sacrifice of children is required by Beel.
For instance, Ammonite parents buried their children
in secreted worship to express Molech. Since
Question was legalized in America 1973, this court
has slaughtered more than 15 million innocent human
lives in our worship of Beel. Ps. 105:15 'don't hear my
curses, servants do not touch my prophets.'
In the Lord, have spoken

"The established powers in subsection (b)(1)(A) in connection with 32 AM. JUDGE Power Court 131 and 132. to the extent Mississippi Act provides that the authority of a Mississippi Judge to hear and determine Federal Matter is subject to an exemption to the extent a District Court may not designate a Mississippi Judge to hear and determine certain cases. In the case of a Mississippi Judge, CO for Inclusive Relief's (2) for judgment on the Pleadings (3) for summary judgment, to dismiss or grant an injunction or information which is made by defendant (4) to suppress evidence in a criminal case; (5) to dismiss or permit the maintenance of a class action; (6) to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or (8) to involuntarily dismiss an action. See Black Pages for more detail to support Ground for Relief."

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,



Date: May 23, 2022