

Nos. 21A243, 21A244, 21A245, 21A246, 21A247, 21A248, 21A249, 21A250,
21A251, 21A252, 21A258, 21A259, 21A260, and 21A267

In the Supreme Court of the United States

IN RE: MCP NO. 165, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION, INTERIM FINAL RULE: COVID-19
VACCINATION AND TESTING; EMERGENCY TEMPORARY
STANDARD 86 FED. REG. 61402, ISSUED ON NOVEMBER 4, 2021

*On Applications for Stays of Injunctions Issued by the United States District Courts
for the Western District of Louisiana and Eastern District of Missouri Pending
Appeals to the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits*

**MOTION OF LIBERTY, LIFE AND LAW FOUNDATION LEAVE TO FILE
ATTACHED BRIEF AS *AMICUS CURIAE* IN SUPPORT OF APPLICANTS**

DEBORAH J. DEWART
Counsel of Record
ATTORNEY AT LAW
111 Magnolia Lane
Hubert, NC 28539
(910) 326-4554
lawyerdeborah@outlook.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

December 30, 2021

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN *AMICUS* BRIEF

Liberty, Life, and Law Foundation (“LLLF”) is a North Carolina tax-exempt nonprofit organization established to provide scholarly analysis to preserve and protect the liberties guaranteed to American citizens by the U.S. Constitution, including free speech, religious liberty, association, and other liberties, including – in this case – the fundamental right to make individual medical decisions free of government coercion.

In view of this Court’s expedited consideration and the national significance of the issues, LLLF has given notice of its intent to file and requested consent from Petitioners’ counsel for Docket Nos. 21A243, 21A244, 21A245, 21A246, 21A247, 21A248, 21A249, 21A250, 21A251, 21A252, 21A258, 21A259, 21A260, 21A267. Counsel for 21A244 does not oppose, and all other Petitioners have consented. Because of the numerous Petitioners and expedited timing, LLLF submits this Motion with its *amicus curiae* brief.

LLLF’s brief will be an in-depth analysis of *Jacobson v. Massachusetts*, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). That case has been cited since the outset of the pandemic in connection with various medical mandates, including some of the church closing cases considered by this Court. *See, e.g., South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom*, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020); *Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak*, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020); *Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo*, 141 S. Ct. 63 (Nov. 25, 2020). A closer look reveals that *Jacobson* does not support the OSHA Mandate currently at issue—or numerous other harsh medical mandates issued in the wake of COVID-19. *Jacobson*

did not assault the structure of the Constitution: *Jacobson* involved *state* action, not federal; *Jacobson* involved the *legislature* branch, not executive. *Jacobson* recognized the potential for government overreach and the necessity for medical exemptions to the mandate. *Jacobson* foreshadowed the tiered constitutional scrutiny developed in later cases by serving a compelling state interest through narrowly tailored means. *Jacobson*'s vaccine mandate was based on a century of medical knowledge, not on a vaccine developed at "warp speed" with no possibility to foresee all of the long-term effects. Finally, the small financial penalty *Jacobson* imposed on non-compliant persons pales in comparison to the loss of livelihood faced by Petitioners and their employees.

It is possible this Court's decision will be based on statutory grounds, but if it does reach the constitutional questions, this detailed analysis of *Jacobson* will be especially helpful.

To the extent that leave is required, the proposed *amicus* respectfully moves for leave to file the attached brief on 8½- by 11-inch paper rather than in booklet form, given the expedited briefing. Should the Clerk's Office or the Court so require, the proposed *amicus* commit to re-filing expeditiously in booklet format. See S. Ct. Rule 21.2(c).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the proposed *amicus curiae* respectfully requests that the Court grant leave to file the attached *amicus* brief.

Respectfully submitted,

DEBORAH J. DEWART

Counsel of Record

ATTORNEY AT LAW

111 Magnolia Lane

Hubert, NC 28539

(910) 326-4554

lawyerdeborah@outlook.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	v
INTEREST OF <i>AMICUS CURIAE</i>	1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT	1
I. UNLIKE THE OSHA MANDATE, <i>JACOBSON</i> DID NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION’S STRUCTURAL PROTECTIONS.....	3
A. <i>Jacobson</i> ’s mandate was a <i>law</i> enacted by the state <i>legislature</i> . The OSHA Mandate was crafted through unauthorized <i>executive</i> action	4
B. <i>Jacobson</i> involved action by a <i>state</i> government, based on a <i>local</i> determination of necessity—not the <i>federal</i> government.....	6
C. <i>Jacobson</i> did not rely on an abuse of emergency government powers	8
II. <i>JACOBSON</i> ANTICIPATED LATER LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS PROTECTING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AGAINST GOVERNMENT INTRUSION.....	10
A. Subsequent precedent in this Court confirms that bodily autonomy is a fundamental right “deeply rooted” in America’s history and traditions	11
1. <i>Jacobson</i> acknowledged the potential for government overreach.....	15
2. <i>Jacobson</i> acknowledged the need for mandatory medical exemptions in appropriate cases.....	17
B. <i>Jacobson</i> foreshadowed the “compelling interest” standard later developed in cases involving fundamental rights	17
C. <i>Jacobson</i> anticipated the “narrow tailoring” developed in later cases	20
CONCLUSION.....	22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

<i>Ala. Ass'n of Realtors v. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs.</i> , 141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021)	4
<i>BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin.</i> , 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 33698 (5th Cir. 2021).....	1, 3, 8, 11, 20
<i>Buck v. Bell</i> , 274 U.S. 200 (1927)	16
<i>Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak</i> , 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020)	4, 7, 8
<i>Commonwealth v. Pear</i> , 66 N.E. 719 (Mass. 1903)	22
<i>Compagnie Francaise De Navigation A Vapeur v. Louisiana State Board of Health</i> , 186 U.S. 380 (1902)	6
<i>Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health</i> , 497 U.S. 261 (1989)	11, 12, 13, 14, 19
<i>Doe v. Mills</i> , 211 L. Ed. 2d 243 (2021).....	17
<i>Downes v. Bidwell</i> , 182 U. S. 244 (1901)	22
<i>Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin</i> , 570 U.S. 297 (2013)	19
<i>Gibbons v. Ogden</i> , 22 U.S. 1 (1824)	6
<i>Globe School District v. Board of Health of City of Globe</i> , 179 P. 55 (Ariz. 1919)	4, 9
<i>Griswold v. Connecticut</i> , 381 U.S. 479 (1965)	14

<i>Grutter v. Bollinger</i> , 539 U.S. 306 (2003)	19
<i>Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.</i> , 471 U.S. 707 (1985)	6
<i>Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell</i> , 290 U.S. 398 (1934)	5
<i>Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party</i> , 440 U.S. 173 (1979)	21
<i>In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig.</i> , 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995).....	15, 20
<i>In re Storar</i> , 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1982), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).....	12
<i>Jacobson v. Massachusetts</i> , 197 U.S. 11 (1905)	<i>passim</i>
<i>Korematsu v. United States</i> , 323 U.S. 214 (1944)	9
<i>Kusper v. Pontikes</i> , 414 U.S. 51 (1973)	21
<i>Marshall v. United States</i> , 414 U.S. 417 (1974)	5
<i>MCP No. 165 v. United States DOL</i> , 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 37024 (6th Cir. 2021).....	4, 7, 8, 9, 10
<i>Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr</i> , 518 U.S. 470 (1996)	6
<i>Midwest Inst. of Health, PLLC v. Governor of Mich. (In re Certified Questions from the United States Dist. Court)</i> , 958 N.W.2d 1 (2020)	9
<i>Mills v. Rogers</i> , 457 U.S. 291 (1982)	12
<i>Mitchum v. Foster</i> , 407 U.S. 225 (1972)	18

<i>Mugler v. Kansas</i> , 123 U.S. 623 (1887)	18
<i>New York v. United States</i> , 505 U.S. 144 (1992)	3
<i>Palko v. Connecticut</i> , 302 U.S. 319 (1937)	14
<i>Railroad Company v. Husen</i> , 95 U.S. 465 (1878)	15
<i>Reno v. Flores</i> , 507 U.S. 292 (1993)	20
<i>Robinson v. Attorney General</i> , 957 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2020)	2
<i>Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo</i> , 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020)	5, 17, 23
<i>San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez</i> , 411 U.S. 1 (1973)	19
<i>Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital</i> , 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).....	12
<i>Shelton v. Tucker</i> , 364 U.S. 479 (1960)	21
<i>Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson</i> , 316 U.S. 535 (1942)	16
<i>Snyder v. Massachusetts</i> , 291 U.S. 97 (1934)	13, 14
<i>South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom</i> , 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020)	6, 17
<i>South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom</i> , 141 S. Ct. 716 (2021)	5
<i>Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R. Co.</i> , 27 Vt. 140 (1855).....	6

<i>Union P. R. Co. v. Botsford</i> , 141 U.S. 250 (1891)	11
<i>United States v. Carolene Products Co.</i> , 304 U.S. 144 (1938)	18
<i>United States v. Morrison</i> , 529 U.S. 598 (2000)	3
<i>Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA</i> , 573 U.S. 302 (2014)	4
<i>Washington v. Glucksberg</i> , 521 U.S. 702 (1997)	14
<i>Washington v. Harper</i> , 494 U.S. 210 (1990)	12, 13, 14
<i>Wilson v. New</i> , 243 U.S. 332 (1917)	8
<i>Wisconsin, M. & P. R.R. Co. v. Jacobson</i> , 179 U.S. 287 (1900)	15
<i>Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer</i> , 343 U.S. 579 (1952)	8, 9
<i>Zablocki v. Redhail</i> , 434 U.S. 374 (1978)	19, 20
<i>Zucht v. King</i> , 260 U.S. 174 (1922)	7
Constitutional Provisions	
Art. I, § 1	4
Other Authorities	
54 Fed. Reg. 23,042 (May 30, 1989)	11
54 Fed. Reg. 23,045 (May 30, 1989)	11

William M. Brooks, <i>Reevaluating Substantive Due Process as a Source of Protection for Psychiatric Patients to Refuse Drugs</i> , 31 Ind. L. Rev. 937 (1998)	11, 12, 13, 18, 21
Kathy L. Cerminara, <i>Cruzan’s Legacy in Autonomy</i> , 73 SMU L. Rev. 27 (Winter 2020).....	12, 14
Daniel Farber, <i>The Long Shadow of Jacobson v. Massachusetts: Public Health, Fundamental Rights, and the Courts</i> , 57 San Diego L. Rev. 833 (November-December 2020)	1, 5, 18, 19, 20
Lawrence O. Gostin, <i>Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint</i> 68 (1st ed. 2000)	22
B. Jessie Hill, <i>Article: The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines</i> , 86 Tex. L. Rev. 277 (December 2007)	5, 11, 14, 15, 16
James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence I. Gostin, <i>School Vaccination Requirements: Historical, Social and Legal Perspectives</i> , 90 KY. L.J. 831 (2001)	19
W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, <i>Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 9</i> (5th ed. 1984)	12
Jason Marisam, <i>Local Governance and Pandemics: Lessons from the 1918 Flu</i> , 85 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 347 (Spring 2008).....	4, 7, 16
Wendy E. Parmet, <i>Rediscovering Jacobsen in the Era of Covid-19</i> , 100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 117 (2020)	2, 3, 10, 21, 22
Kellen Russoniello, <i>Article: The End of Jacobson’s Spread: Five Arguments Why an Anti-intoxicant Vaccine Would Be Unconstitutional</i> , 43 Am. J. L. and Med. 57 (2017).....	2, 13, 18, 20
Antonin Scalia, <i>Foreword: The Importance of Structure in Constitutional Interpretation</i> , 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1417 (2008).....	3
Lindsay F. Wiley and Stephen I. Vladeck, <i>Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the Courts: The Case Against “Suspending” Judicial Review</i> , 133 Harv. L. Rev. F. 179 (July 2020)	<i>passim</i>

INTEREST OF *AMICUS CURIAE*¹

Liberty, Life and Law Foundation (“LLLF”), as *amicus curiae*, respectfully urges this Court to reverse the Sixth Circuit decision.

LLLF is a North Carolina nonprofit corporation established to defend constitutional liberties. LLLF is gravely concerned about the growing expansion of government power. LLLF’s founder is the author of a book, *Death of a Christian Nation* (2010) and many *amicus curiae* briefs in this Court and the federal circuits.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The federal government has used a dubious “work-around” process to issue a “sweeping pronouncement[] on [a] matter[] of public health affecting every member of society in the profoundest of ways.” *BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin.*, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 33698, *8 (5th Cir. 2021). The resulting Mandate “purports to definitively resolve one of today’s most hotly debated political issues.” *Id.* at 23. This massive overreach assaults the structure of the Constitution and encroaches on treasured American liberties.

COVID-19 has “prompted public health mandates without precedent for at least a century.” Daniel Farber, *The Long Shadow of Jacobson v. Massachusetts: Public Health, Fundamental Rights, and the Courts*, 57 San Diego L. Rev. 833, 833 (November-December 2020). Officials often rely on “emergency” powers to issue

¹ A Motion for Leave to File accompanies this brief. *Amicus curiae* certifies that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part and no person or entity, other than *amicus*, its members, or its counsel, has made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.

mandates. *Jacobson v. Massachusetts*, decided over a century ago, is often cited to justify this unprecedented expansion of government power. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). But *Jacobson* “is not an absolute blank check for the exercise of governmental power.” *Robinson v. Attorney General*, 957 F.3d 1171, 1179 (11th Cir. 2020). *Jacobson* does not grant any level or branch of government carte blanche to issue medical mandates. *Jacobson* respected separation of powers and federalism. *Jacobson* relied on a century of medical knowledge to craft a narrowly tailored mandate to address a compelling interest. And the penalty for violation—a small fine—pales in comparison to the life-altering loss of livelihood facing Petitioners’ employees.

The judiciary is perhaps “the only institution . . . in any structural position to push back against potential overreaching by the local, state, or federal political branches.” Lindsay F. Wiley and Stephen I. Vladeck, *Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the Courts: The Case Against “Suspending” Judicial Review*, 133 Harv. L. Rev. F. 179, 183 (July 2020). But courts reviewing COVID-related claims often “disregard[] both the complexity and nuance of Justice Harlan’s opinion.” Wendy E. Parmet, *Rediscovering Jacobson in the Era of Covid-19*, 100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 117, 129 (2020).

Prior to the pandemic, *Jacobson* was typically met with “unwavering adherence.” Kellen Russoniello, *Article: The End of Jacobson’s Spread: Five Arguments Why an Anti-intoxicant Vaccine Would Be Unconstitutional*, 43 Am. J. L. and Med. 57, 83 (2017). But now, the sweeping mandates—lockdowns, masks, distancing, vaccines—should alarm Americans and prompt courts to take a closer

look at *Jacobson*. That case did not give easy answers. While affirming the government’s general authority to protect public health, this Court also warned that “public health powers can be abused,” so courts “must be vigilant” and “alert to pretext or abuse of power.” Parment, *Rediscovering Jacobson*, 100 B.U. L. Rev. Online at 132.

I. UNLIKE THE OSHA MANDATE, *JACOBSON* DID NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION’S STRUCTURAL PROTECTIONS.

“Those who seek to protect individual liberty ignore threats to th[e] constitutional structure at their peril.” Antonin Scalia, *Foreword: The Importance of Structure in Constitutional Interpretation*, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1417, 1419 (2008).

The OSHA Mandate jeopardizes the Constitution’s structure. It is an executive branch decree that evades the normal procedures followed by legislatures and executive agencies. *Jacobson*, on the contrary, conformed to structural constitutional requirements, including separation of powers and federalism. The American public is best served by “maintaining our constitutional structure and maintaining the liberty of individuals to make intensely personal decisions according to their own convictions—even, or perhaps *particularly*, when those decisions frustrate government officials.” *BST*, *26. “[T]he Framers crafted the federal system of Government so that the people’s rights would be secured by the division of power.” *United States v. Morrison*, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000); *see also New York v. United States*, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (federal-state division of authority is “for the protection of individuals [S]tate sovereignty is not just an end in itself.”).

A. *Jacobson’s* mandate was a *law* enacted by the state *legislature*. The OSHA Mandate was crafted through unauthorized *executive* action.

Legislative power belongs solely to the *legislative* branch—not the executive. *See, e.g.*, Art. I, § 1. This Court requires Congress to “speak clearly” to grant an agency power to make decisions of “vast economic and political significance.” *Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA*, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014). *See BST*, *23. Congress must use “*exceedingly clear* language if it wishes to significantly alter the balance between federal and state power.” *Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.*, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). *See MCP No. 165 v. United States DOL*, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 37024, *7 (6th Cir. 2021) (Sutton, J., dissenting from denial of initial hearing en banc).

This is not the first time the executive branch has encroached on legislative territory during a health crisis. The Arizona Supreme Court, considering a school closing case during the Spanish influenza epidemic, “was troubled that the board of health had gone beyond clear *executive* enforcement powers and exhibited *legislative* tendencies.” Jason Marisam, *Local Governance and Pandemics: Lessons from the 1918 Flu*, 85 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 347, 364 (Spring 2008) (emphasis added); *see Globe School District v. Board of Health of City of Globe*, 179 P. 55, 57 (Ariz. 1919) (explaining that the board of health could not be granted legislative powers).

This Court has “a duty to defend the Constitution, and even a public health emergency does not absolve [it] of that responsibility.” *Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak*, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2604 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting). “*Jacobson* didn’t seek to depart from normal legal rules during a pandemic, and it supplies no precedent for

doing so. . . *Jacobson* hardly supports cutting the Constitution loose during a pandemic.” *Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo*, 141 S. Ct. 63, 70 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). It is not easy to “balance the need for deference in an emergency and the court’s duty to protect constitutional rights . . . neither giving the government a blank check nor hamstringing its emergency response.” Farber, *The Long Shadow*, 57 San Diego L. Rev. at 863. “[T]he Constitution . . . entrusts the protection of the people’s rights to the Judiciary.” *South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom*, 141 S. Ct. 716, 717 (2021) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Courts must be cautious “in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties” and not “rewrite legislation.” *Marshall v. United States*, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974). Courts ordinarily “defer to legislative fact-finding” in keeping with the separation of powers principle that “allocates to legislatures the fact-dependent task of determining social policy.” B. Jessie Hill, *Article: The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines*, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 277, 333 (December 2007). Here, there is only rushed executive action—not legislation. This Court, as an “independent judiciary,” should exercise its “unique role . . . to smoke out pretext for government actions during an emergency.” Wiley, *Coronavirus, Civil Liberties*, 133 Harv. L. Rev. F. at 194-195. “Emergency does not create power” but merely provides an occasion to exercise pre-existing power. *Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell*, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).

B. *Jacobson* involved action by a *state* government, based on a *local* determination of necessity—not the *federal* government.

Two centuries ago, then Chief Justice Marshall observed the power reserved to the states to enact “health laws of every description.” *Gibbons v. Ogden*, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824). That understanding has stood the test of time. *See, e.g., Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R. Co.*, 27 Vt. 140, 149 (1855) (states legislate to protect “the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons”); *Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Lab’ys, Inc.*, 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985) (health is “primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern”); *Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr*, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (“states have exercised their police powers to protect the health and safety of their citizens”). It is “beyond question” that Congress has recognized, “from an early day,” the power of states to enforce regulations for the health and safety of their own residents. *Compagnie Francaise De Navigation A Vapeur v. Louisiana State Board of Health*, 186 U.S. 380, 387 (1902). In keeping with “both federalism concerns and the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety,” even Congress does not normally pre-empt state police power regulations. *Medtronic*, 518 U.S. at 485.

Jacobson echoed the prevailing understanding of the states’ role. 197 U.S. at 25-26 (“to mandate that a person receive a vaccine or undergo testing falls squarely within the States’ police power”). “Our Constitution principally entrusts ‘the safety and the health of the people’ to the politically accountable officials of the States ‘to guard and protect.’” *South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom*, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring), quoting *Jacobson*, 197 U. S. at 38. These matters “do not ordinarily concern the National Government.” *Id.* The “police power of a State”

embraces “reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment” to “protect the public health and the public safety.” *Id.* at 25. Despite the severity of the smallpox outbreak, there was no attempt to undercut federalism.

“Under the Constitution, state *and local* governments, not the federal courts, have the primary responsibility for addressing COVID-19 matters.” *Calvary Chapel*, 140 S. Ct. at 2614 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Not only was *Jacobson’s* mandate a *state* level action—it was explicitly based on a *local* determination of necessity. The Massachusetts legislature required vaccinations “only when, in the opinion of the Board of Health, that was necessary for the public health or the public safety. . . . a Board of Health, composed of persons residing in the locality affected and appointed, presumably, because of their fitness to determine such questions.” *Jacobson*, 197 U.S. at 27. When Spanish influenza hit the world in 1918, “localities were empowered (and expected) to respond to the flu,” although “the states could limit and override that power.” Marisam, *Lessons from the 1918 Flu*, 85 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. at 361. Courts have recognized a limited power for localities and strictly construed the powers delegated to them. *Id.*

Jacobson is one of the only two cases where this Court has upheld a vaccine mandate imposed on individuals.² Both arose from state action—not federal—and acknowledged that this is a *state* matter. *MCP*, *23 (Sutton, J., dissenting from denial of initial hearing en banc). “It’s worth remembering that the power of a federal agency

² See *Zucht v. King*, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922) (upholding school requirement, noting that “it is within the police power to provide for compulsory vaccination”).

to regulate is the power to preempt—to nullify the sovereign power of the States in the area—which explains why 27 States oppose the emergency rule.” *Id.*

It is unlikely, under our constitutional structure, that even Congress would have “authority under the Commerce Clause to impose, much less to delegate the imposition of, a *de facto* national vaccine mandate upon the American public.” *MCP*, *56 (Bush, J., dissenting). “The States . . . have an interest in seeing their constitutionally reserved police power over public health policy defended from federal overreach.” *BST*, *25.

C. *Jacobson* did not rely on an abuse of emergency government powers.

It would be a “considerable stretch” to read *Jacobson*’s upholding of a “local ordinance” as establishing a standard applicable to “statewide measures of indefinite duration.” *Calvary Chapel*, 140 S. Ct. at 2608 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting). However serious COVID-19 may be, “a public health emergency does not give Governors and other public officials *carte blanche* to disregard the Constitution for as long as the medical problem persists.” *Id.* at 2605. Although an “emergency may afford a reason for the exertion of a living power already enjoyed,” it cannot “call into life a power which has never lived.” *MCP*, *71 (Bush, J., dissenting), quoting *Wilson v. New*, 243 U.S. 332, 348 (1917).

America’s Founders understood that emergencies “afford a ready pretext for usurpation” of government powers that in turn “would tend to kindle emergencies.” *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). In that case, “the executive branch claimed it needed to seize control of

the country’s steel mills as a necessary measure to avert a national catastrophe.” *MCP*, *12 (Sutton, J., dissenting from denial of initial hearing en banc), citing *Youngstown*, 343 U.S. at 582 (cleaned up). Judicial review guards against decisions like *Korematsu v. United States*, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), where courts “sustain gross violations of civil rights because they are either unwilling or unable to meaningfully look behind the government’s purported claims of exigency.” Wiley, *Coronavirus, Civil Liberties*, 133 Harv. Rev. F. at 183. If governments are only held to “modest burdens of justification for incursions into our civil liberties during emergencies,” it will be easier for them to “find pretexts for triggering such emergencies” and then “use emergencies as pretexts for scaling back our rights.” *Id.* at 198.

The duration of the emergency is a critical consideration. In early 2020, “two weeks to stop the spread” morphed into months of fluctuating restrictions, with executive officials repeatedly extending emergency declarations. Concerns escalate when a government official can declare open-ended emergencies. *See, e.g., Midwest Inst. of Health, PLLC v. Governor of Mich. (In re Certified Questions from the United States Dist. Court)*, 958 N.W.2d 1 (2020) (recognizing statutory and constitutional limits on the governor’s authority to renew or indefinitely extend a declaration of emergency); *Globe*, 179 P. at 61 (explaining that board of health order closing schools was valid “during the existence of said disease in epidemic form . . . and no longer”).

Jacobson does not demand that “lower courts have no choice but to apply more deferential review to governmental restrictions during public health crises.” Wiley, *Coronavirus, Civil Liberties*, 133 Harv. Rev. F. at 190. Instead, it foreshadows later

cases where fundamental rights are balanced against compelling state interests and solutions are narrowly tailored to minimize the restraint on individual liberty.

II. *JACOBSON* ANTICIPATED LATER LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS PROTECTING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AGAINST GOVERNMENT INTRUSION.

“A national vaccinate-or-test mandate . . . is unprecedented, . . ., *presumably because the intrusion on individual liberty is serious.*” *MCP*, *21 (Sutton, J., dissenting from denial of initial hearing en banc) (emphasis added). Those who advocate lifting the Fifth Circuit stay “must come to grips with each of the statutory imperatives, each of the clear statement requirements, *and all of the constitutional claims.*” *Id.*, *41-42 (emphasis added). Those “constitutional claims” include the long-recognized right to bodily autonomy.

Jacobson was written long before courts began to apply the now familiar tiered scrutiny of fundamental rights—indeed, “*Jacobson* predated the entire modern canonization of constitutional scrutiny.” Wiley, *Coronavirus, Civil Liberties*, 133 Harv. L. Rev. F. at 193. While endorsing government protection for public health, this Court also “offered hints of judicially protected limitations on public health powers” and even “endorsed a relatively modern vision of individual liberty” that gave courts “a basis for limiting laws that infringe upon bodily integrity.” Parmet, *Rediscovering Jacobson*, 100 B.U. L. Rev. Online at 126. The Court “looked back to its nineteenth-century police power jurisprudence” and simultaneously “forward to the fundamental-rights jurisprudence that would develop in the mid-twentieth century.” *Id.* *Jacobson* did not offer simple answers or easy tests but instead foreshadowed the balancing that would characterize future court decisions.

A. Subsequent precedent in this Court confirmed that bodily autonomy is a fundamental right “deeply rooted” in America’s history and traditions.

Even OSHA acknowledges that “[h]ealth in general is an intensely personal matter....” (54 Fed. Reg. 23,042 (May 30, 1989)), and because “vaccine is an invasive procedure . . . OSHA prefers to encourage rather than try to force by governmental coercion, employee cooperation in [a] vaccination program” (54 Fed. Reg. 23,045 (May 30, 1989)). Unlike the small financial penalty assessed in *Jacobson*, “the Mandate threatens to substantially burden the liberty interests of reluctant individual recipients put to a choice between their job(s) and their jab(s).” *BST*, *24.

Jacobson was one of earliest confrontations between “the assertion of an individual right to resist a state-mandated medical intervention” and a state claim that public health warranted the mandate. Hill, *A Tale of Two Doctrines*, 86 Tex. L. Rev. at 296. But even at this early point, “the extent to which *Jacobson* considers and validates personal autonomy interests regarding medical treatment is surprising.” *Id.* This Court should not overlook this aspect of *Jacobson*.

Bodily integrity is “one of the oldest fundamental rights recognized by the law.” Hill, *A Tale of Two Doctrines*, 86 Tex. L. Rev. at 304. Even before *Jacobson*, this Court recognized that no right is “more sacred” or “more carefully guarded” than “the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” *Union P. R. Co. v. Botsford*, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). *Botsford*’s concept of bodily integrity “served as a framework for the informed consent doctrine” articulated a century later in *Cruzan*. William M. Brooks, *Reevaluating Substantive Due Process*

as a Source of Protection for Psychiatric Patients to Refuse Drugs, 31 Ind. L. Rev. 937, 989 (1998).

American law has long recognized the right to informed consent that is “generally required for medical treatment.” *Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health*, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1989). *Cruzan* “effectively enshrined personal autonomy in a medical setting as a constitutionally protected liberty interest,” with the majority assuming it while dissenting Justices “explicitly found that the right existed.” Kathy L. Cerminara, *Cruzan’s Legacy in Autonomy*, 73 SMU L. Rev. 27, 27 (Winter 2020). As then-Judge Cardozo expressed it, every competent adult has “a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.” *Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital*, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). This tracks common law, where “even the touching of one person by another without consent and without legal justification was a battery.” *Id.*, citing W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, *Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts* § 9, pp. 39-42 (5th ed. 1984).

The logical corollary of informed is “the right of a competent individual to refuse medical treatment.” *Cruzan*, 497 U.S. at 277; *see also In re Storar*, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70 (N.Y. 1982), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981) (basing the right to refuse treatment on doctrine of informed consent). “The right to refuse any medical treatment emerged from the doctrines of trespass and battery, . . . applied to unauthorized touchings by a physician.” *Mills v. Rogers*, 457 U.S. 291, 294, n.4 (1982). During the same term as *Cruzan*, this Court concluded in *Washington v. Harper* that

“[t]he forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person’s body represents a substantial interference with that person’s liberty.” 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990). *Washington v. Harper* is perhaps the case “most pertinent to vaccination mandates.” Russoniello, *The End of Jacobson’s Spread*, 43 Am. J. L. and Med. at 87. Coerced vaccination, like the injection of psychotropic drugs, is “an intrusive treatment . . . a significant infringement on bodily autonomy, one of this Nation’s most cherished rights under the Constitution.” Brooks, *Reevaluating Substantive Due Process*, 31 Ind. L. Rev. at 945.

Cruzan’s affirmation of bodily integrity was not confined to the majority. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence noted that “incursions into the body” are “repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process Clause” because “our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-determination.” 497 U.S. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Such coercion “burdens the patient’s liberty, dignity, and freedom to determine the course of her own treatment.” *Id.* at 289. The conclusion is inescapable—“the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects anything, an individual’s deeply personal decision to reject medical treatment.” *Id.* at 289.

The *Cruzan* dissents agreed that “freedom from unwanted medical attention is unquestionably among those principles ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’ *Snyder v. Massachusetts*, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).” *Cruzan*, 497 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was equally adamant: “The right to be free from medical attention without consent, to

determine what shall be done with one's own body, is deeply rooted in this Nation's traditions, as the majority acknowledges." *Cruzan*, 497 U.S. at 342 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The right is "firmly entrenched in American tort law" and "securely grounded in the earliest common law." *Id.*

Building on *Cruzan*, *Washington v. Harper*, and other precedent, this Court confirmed the right to bodily integrity in *Washington v. Glucksberg* although concluding that assisted suicide is not a "fundamental right." 521 U.S. 702 (1997). *Glucksberg* echoed the common-law doctrine of informed consent utilized by the *Cruzan* majority and Justice O'Connor's concurrence. Cerminara, *Cruzan's Legacy*, 73 SMU L. Rev. at 28. *Glucksberg* highlighted the now-familiar terminology that defines "fundamental rights," combining key phrases from *Snyder v. Massachusetts*, 291 U.S. at 105 ("so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental") and *Palko v. Connecticut*, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937) ("implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed"). 521 U.S. at 721.

There is unquestionably a tension between cases emphasizing public health and those considering bodily autonomy. In public health cases, sick persons are viewed "not so much as autonomous decision makers" but "threats to others that can and indeed must be controlled." Hill, *A Tale of Two Doctrines*, 86 Tex. L. Rev. at 295. During the COVID-19 era, even asymptomatic persons are seen as "threats" if they decline mandatory masks and vaccines. Autonomy cases, beginning with *Griswold v. Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "treat[] the right to choose appropriate medical

treatment as an aspect of the rights to bodily integrity and decisional autonomy.” Hill, *A Tale of Two Doctrines*, 86 Tex. L. Rev. at 295. Resolving the tension demands a balancing of the respective interests, and when a fundamental liberty is at stake, “the government’s burden [is] to provide more than minimal justification for its action.” *In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig.*, 874 F. Supp. 796, 813 (S.D. Ohio 1995).

1. *Jacobson* acknowledged the potential for government overreach.

Jacobson narrowly defined its scope according to the “necessities of the case”— “smallpox being prevalent and increasing” in the area subject to the mandate. *Jacobson*, 197 U.S. at 28. This Court explicitly recognized that such a mandate “might be exercised in particular circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of the public” so as to “authorize or compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons.” *Id.*, citing *Wisconsin, M. & P. R.R. Co. v. Jacobson*, 179 U.S. 287, 301 (1900). In *Railroad Company v. Husen*, 95 U.S. 465, 471-473 (1878) this Court affirmed a state’s right to pass “sanitary laws” preventing those suffering from contagious diseases from entering its borders—but the laws at issue “went beyond the necessities of the case” and “violated rights secured by the Constitution,” so they were held invalid. *Jacobson*, 197 U.S. at 28. In sum, *Jacobson* acknowledged that state police powers “may be exerted in such circumstances or by regulations so arbitrary and oppressive in particular cases as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent wrong and oppression.” *Id.* at 38.

Examples of overreach are seen in the years following *Jacobson*. In the wake of the Spanish flu epidemic, Arizona adopted a “public health elitism” model in response to the crisis. Marisam, *Lessons from the 1918 Flu*, 85 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. at 348 (Spring 2008). Under that model, the public defers to experts while the emergency lasts, and law enforcement plays a key role. *Id.* Arizona’s “extreme and committed enforcement” of its public health measures—similar to the COVID-19 response in some areas—“paints a vivid picture of the potential for abuse and the problems of relying on coercion instead of public cooperation.” *Id.* at 362. Deputized citizens demonstrated “patriotic zeal” as they arrested persons who coughed without covering their mouths and stopped traffic to intimidate those who were not traveling for business. *Id.*

Buck v. Bell, twenty years after *Jacobson*, is a glaring example of overreach: “The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes Three generations of imbeciles are enough.” *Buck v. Bell*, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding coerced sterilization). This Court “applied *Jacobson*’s hallmark deference to legislatures” but “ignore[ed] *Jacobson*’s suggestion of an individual right to protect one’s own health.” Hill, *A Tale of Two Doctrines*, 86 Tex. L. Rev. at 300. Only fifteen years later, this Court struck down a sterilization mandate for criminals, highlighting a schism between the Court’s “autonomy” cases and its “public health” cases. *Id.*, citing *Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson*, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). More recent decisions have developed tests to balance public health (compelling state interests) with fundamental rights (autonomy).

2. *Jacobson* acknowledged the need for mandatory medical exemptions in appropriate cases.

In *Jacobson*, the petitioner failed to provide proof of his adverse childhood reaction to a vaccine—his reason for objecting to the mandate. *Jacobson*, 197 U.S. at 36-37. But this Court recognized that a person “embraced by the mere words” of the law might have a medical condition that would render the vaccination “cruel and inhuman.” *Id.* at 38-39. In that case, courts would “be competent to interfere and protect the health and life of the individual concerned.” *Id.* at 39. This Court “presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of that character.” *Id.*

B. *Jacobson* foreshadowed the “compelling interest” standard later developed in cases involving fundamental rights.

Each state “undoubtedly has a compelling interest in combating the spread of COVID-19 and protecting the health of its citizens.” *South Bay*, 140 S. Ct. at 1614 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). “Stemming the spread of COVID-19” qualifies as “a compelling interest.” *Roman Catholic Diocese*, 141 S. Ct. at 67 (*per curiam*). But “this interest cannot qualify as [compelling] forever. . . . [C]ivil liberties face grave risks when governments proclaim indefinite states of emergency.” *Doe v. Mills*, 211 L. Ed. 2d 243, 246 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

Jacobson did not suspend consideration of the claimant’s fundamental rights, but instead “adopted a quintessential balancing test.” Wiley, *Coronavirus, Civil Liberties*, 133 Harv. L. Rev. F. at 190. Despite what “some contemporary courts have concluded,” *Jacobson* cannot fairly be read to establish a weak standard of review. *Id.* at 191. This Court rejected the argument that compulsory vaccination is inevitably

“unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive” (197 U.S. at 26), “however widespread the epidemic” (*id.* at 37)—but also acknowledged its duty to invalidate a statute that had “no real or substantial relation” to public health and safety, or that was “beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by fundamental law.” *Id.* at 31, citing *Mugler v. Kansas*, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).

Subsequent cases developed standards of “proportionality and balancing,” generally “permit[ting] greater incursions into civil liberties in times of greater communal need.” Wiley, *Coronavirus, Civil Liberties*, 133 Harv. L. Rev. F. at 182-183. This Court began to apply a “more searching judicial inquiry” for liberties within the Bill of Rights. Russoniello, *The End of Jacobson’s Spread*, 43 Am. J. L. and Med. at 86; *United States v. Carolene Products Co.*, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting a “narrower scope for . . . the presumption of constitutionality” in such cases). Although the general standard for public health regulations “shifted from reasonableness to the very lenient rational basis,” courts “began to apply a higher level of scrutiny to government actions violating fundamental rights.” Farber, *The Long Shadow*, 57 San Diego L. Rev. at 844. The federal government’s role “as a guarantor of basic federal rights against state power was clearly established” after the Fourteenth Amendment was passed. *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972). This followed the U.S. Constitution’s historical role “as a shield against intrusive governmental behavior and a sword to uphold individual liberty.” Brooks, *Reevaluating Substantive Due Process*, 31 Ind. L. Rev. at 940. A law that infringes on a fundamental liberty must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling state

interest. *See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin*, 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013); *Grutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (racial equality); *Zablocki v. Redhail*, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (“When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.”); *San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973) (under strict scrutiny, the state “is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity”).

Cruzan affirmed that a competent person’s “constitutionally protected liberty interest” in “refusing unwanted medical treatment” could be inferred from *Jacobson* and other prior decisions (497 U.S. at 278), citing *Jacobson*’s balancing “an individual’s liberty interest in declining an unwanted smallpox vaccine against the State’s interest in preventing disease.” 497 U.S. at 279. *See* Farber, *The Long Shadow*, 57 San Diego L. Rev. at 846 (noting *Cruzan*’s reliance on *Jacobson* to infer a “right to refuse medical treatment at the end of life”).

Professors Hodge and Gostin derived a helpful four-factor test from *Jacobson* to evaluate the constitutionality of a vaccine mandate. James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence I. Gostin, *School Vaccination Requirements: Historical, Social and Legal Perspectives*, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 856 (2001). First, the mandate cannot exceed what is reasonably required to respond to a public health necessity. Second, the state must use reasonable means that have a “real or substantial relation” to the danger targeted. Third, the mandate must be a proportionate response that is not arbitrary or unduly onerous. Finally, the vaccine must not cause harm—implying that medical

exemptions must be available. Russoniello, *The End of Jacobson's Spread*, 43 Am. J. L. and Med. at 103; see *In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig.*, 874 F. Supp. 796, 813 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (“bodily invasions often cannot be readily remedied after the fact through damage awards”).

These factors track the general tests for fundamental constitutional rights—compelling state interest, narrow tailoring, least restrictive means. When “the fundamental right to refuse unwanted medical treatment” is at stake, “a court should apply strict scrutiny” Russoniello, *The End of Jacobson's Spread*, 43 Am. J. L. and Med. 57 at 60.

C. Jacobson anticipated the “narrow tailoring” developed in later cases.

The characterization of bodily autonomy as a fundamental right is significant. The “substantive component” to “due process of law” “forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests *at all*, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302 (1993); see also *Zablocki*, 434 U.S. at 388 (restriction must be “closely tailored to effectuate . . . sufficiently important state interests”). *Jacobson* paved the way with a narrowly tailored, “delicately handled scalpel” in contrast to the “one-size-fits-all sledgehammer” OSHA attempts to impose on millions of Americans. *BST*, *10.

In *Jacobson*, “there was no dispute that smallpox was a dire threat to the community” necessitating drastic measures. Farber, *The Long Shadow*, 57 San Diego L. Rev. at 841. This Court “permitted the state to require vaccinations because

smallpox threatened life,” not because the treatment might be beneficial. Brooks, *Reevaluating Substantive Due Process*, 31 Ind. L. Rev. at 1004. *Jacobson* reasoned there was a “paramount necessity” for the community to act in “self-defense” to protect against the epidemic. 197 U.S. at 27. When the Board of Health adopted the mandate, smallpox was “prevalent to some extent in the city of Cambridge and the disease was increasing.” *Id.* The mandate was confined to the well-defined geographic area where the disease was present and spreading. This Court compared the situation to one where a citizen returning from a voyage must be quarantined because of exposure to yellow fever or cholera, but only until “the danger of the spread of the disease among the community at large has disappeared.” *Id.* at 29.

Jacobson’s narrow mandate—unlike OSHA’s one-size-fits-all sledgehammer—foreshadows the “least intrusive means” test in *Shelton v. Tucker*, i.e., “even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.” 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). Even to pursue a legitimate interest, “a State may not choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected liberty.” *Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party*, 440 U.S. 173, 185 (1979), quoting *Kusper v. Pontikes*, 414 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1973). States must “adopt the least drastic means” to achieve their interests. *Illinois State Bd.*, 440 U.S. at 185. *Jacobson* can be understood to require state laws to conform to “public health necessity, reasonable means, proportionality, and harm avoidance.” Parmet,

Rediscovering Jacobson, 100 B.U. L. Rev. Online at 128, quoting Lawrence O. Gostin, *Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint* 68 (1st ed. 2000).

Jacobson took judicial notice of “nearly a century” of medical authority determining that the smallpox vaccine was safe and effective—unlike the rapidly developed COVID-19 vaccine. COVID-19 has generated a multitude of conflicting opinions, even among medical professionals, and vaccines were developed at “warp speed” using new technology. Many Americans are understandably hesitant to assume the potential risks of what seems to be a broad sweeping, coercive medical experiment. This is nothing like *Jacobson*. In the wake of Boston’s smallpox outbreak, both the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and this Court noted that “for nearly a century most of the members of the medical profession have regarded vaccination, repeated after intervals, as a preventive of smallpox.” *Jacobson*, 197 U.S. at 23-24; see *Commonwealth v. Pear*, 66 N.E. 719, 721 (Mass. 1903). Medical experts had generally considered the “risk of injury . . . too small to be seriously weighed as against the benefits.” *Jacobson*, 197 U.S. at 24. “The regulation was not simply reasonable because it aimed to prevent a deadly epidemic but because it was based on public health knowledge” available at the time. Parmet, *Rediscovering Jacobson*, 100 B.U. L. Rev. Online at 125.

CONCLUSION

Obedience to the Constitution does not hinge on “the circumstances of a particular crisis The People have decreed that it shall be the supreme law of the land at all times.” *Downes v. Bidwell*, 182 U. S. 244, 384 (1901) (Harlan, J.,

dissenting). A century later, even with the threat of America’s worst pandemic, “we may not shelter in place when the Constitution is under attack.” *Roman Catholic Diocese*, 141 S. Ct. at 71 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

The Sixth Circuit ruling should be overruled and the stay should be reinstated.

Respectfully submitted,

DEBORAH J. DEWART
Counsel of Record
ATTORNEY AT LAW
111 Magnolia Lane
Hubert, NC 28539
(910) 326-4554
lawyerdeborah@outlook.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae