

## **Attachments**

Attachment A - NH Supreme Court Order, December 16, 2021

Attachment B - NH trial court order, December 21, 2020

Attachment C - Motion for Extension, December 19, 2020

Attachment D - NH trial court order, February 25, 2022

Attachment E - NH Supreme Court Order, June 19, 2020

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Attachment G - Email from Mary Ann Dempsey, March 4, 2022

Attachment H - NH Supreme Court Order, December 9, 2021

Attachment I - Nine NH Family Law Cases, Conflict of Interest

Attachment J - Email from former judge Julie Introcaso, February 15, 2022

Attachment K - Excerpts from deposition of former judge Julie Introcaso

Attachment L - NH Supreme Court Orders disbarring former judge Julie Introcaso

Attachment M - NH Supreme Court Orders disbarring former judge Paul S. Moore

**THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE****SUPREME COURT**

**In Case No. 2021-0192, Katherine Albrecht v. Dana Albrecht, the court on December 16, 2021, issued the following order:**

Having considered the briefs, memorandum of law, and record submitted on appeal, we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). The defendant appeals orders of the Circuit Court (DalPra, M., approved by Leonard and Chabot, JJ.), following a hearing, granting an extension of a domestic violence final order of protection to the plaintiff, see RSA 173-B:5, VI (Supp. 2021), and denying his motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the defendant raises several challenges to the trial court's orders. We vacate and remand.

One of the arguments advanced by the defendant is that he was denied due process of law under both Part I, Article 35 of the New Hampshire Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, when the judicial officer who presided over this matter neither disqualified himself nor disclosed to the parties the basis for his potential disqualification. See In the Matter of Tapply & Zukatis, 162 N.H. 285 (2011); Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 135 N.H. 589 (1992); Sup. Ct. R. 38.

In support of his argument, the defendant provided this court with a copy of a letter from the judicial officer to the New Hampshire Judicial Conduct Committee (JCC), in which the judicial officer reported that he may have violated the New Hampshire Code of Judicial Conduct during a telephonic hearing held in a separate family division proceeding involving the parties. In his letter, the judicial officer states, in part, that “[d]uring [defendant’s] testimony he began speaking of issues that were not relevant to the issues to be decided-something he often did. Under my breath I uttered a comment that contained a vulgar expression: ‘who the f\*\*\* cares.’” Thereafter, apparently without disclosing to the parties his comment, nor his decision to self-report it to the JCC, the judicial officer presided over the hearing in this matter, and subsequently recommended the dispositions set forth in the orders now on appeal.

The defendant states that he did not hear the judicial officer’s comment during the family division hearing, and that he only learned of it after receiving a copy of the judicial officer’s self-report letter pursuant to a request the defendant filed with the JCC. Accordingly, the defendant argues that because he “was ignorant of [the judicial officer’s] self-report at the time [the judicial officer]

conducted the most recent [domestic violence] hearing, Defendant was not given any opportunity to file a motion for recusal.”

In light of the defendant’s arguments, we exercised our supervisory jurisdiction, see RSA 490:4 (2010), and remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to determine whether the judicial officer was disqualified, under the circumstances of this case, from presiding over the plaintiff’s request to extend the protective order. Subsequently, the judicial officer issued an order on remand (DalPra, M., approved by Curran, J.), finding that there was no basis for his disqualification. The judicial officer reasoned, in part, that he is not biased, and explained that the remark was made in response to testimony that “was not relevant to the issues to be decided in the family case,” that it “was not intended to be heard,” and that he only reported it to the JCC “[o]ut of an abundance of caution.” According to the judicial officer, the JCC has since dismissed the matter.

In light of the judicial officer’s decision, we deemed the defendant’s notice of appeal and brief to be challenging the determination that the judicial officer was not disqualified. Because the transcript of the family division hearing at which the judicial officer made his remark was not part of the record on appeal, on November 30, 2021, we ordered the additional transcript. Because the transcript did not contain the relevant remark, on December 10, 2021, we ordered the preparation of an amended transcript, which we received on December 14, 2021. Accordingly, we now review the merits of the disqualification decision with this additional information.

“It is the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as impartial as the lot of humanity will admit.” N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 35. The New Hampshire Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid even the appearance of impropriety, to conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and to disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including, but not limited to instances where the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer. Tapply, 162 N.H. at 296, 302; Blaisdell, 135 N.H. at 593; Sup. Ct. R. 38, Canons 1, 2.

“The party claiming bias must show the existence of bias, the likelihood of bias, or an appearance of such bias that the judge is unable to hold the balance between vindicating the interests of the court and the interests of a party.” Tapply, 162 N.H. at 297 (quotation omitted). “The existence of an appearance of impropriety is determined by an objective standard, *i.e.*, would a reasonable person, not the judge himself, question the impartiality of the court.” Id. at 302 (quotation omitted). “The objective standard is required in the interests of ensuring justice in the individual case and maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process which depends on a belief in the impersonality of judicial decision making.” Id. (quotation omitted). “The test for an appearance of

partiality is whether an objective, disinterested observer, fully informed of the facts, would entertain significant doubt that justice would be done in the case.” Id. (quotation omitted).

“Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Id. at 297 (quotation omitted). “Opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.” Id. (quotation omitted). However, “it is the judge’s responsibility to disclose, sua sponte, all information of any potential conflict between himself and the parties or their attorneys when his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” and his “failure to disclose to the parties the basis for his or her disqualification under [the Code of Judicial Conduct] will result in a disqualification of the judge.” Blaisdell, 135 N.H. at 593-94.

Here, the transcript reflects that the judicial officer was presiding over a hearing on cross-motions to modify the parties’ parenting plan. The judicial officer made his remark in response to testimony of the defendant in which the defendant described his connection with the children, and the things they used to do together before the divorce that he hasn’t been able to do with them since. Specifically, the defendant testified that, before the divorce, he used to make all of the family meals for the holidays, and noted that he heard from one of the children that “last year, they did get to go out and eat at a super nice place, so I think that’s -- I’m glad they got to go out to eat at a super nice place. At the same time, that’s not the traditional homecooked meal that I always make that they were used to. It’s just sad for me. Again, just a basic, they probably miss the traditional one too.” It was during this testimony that the judicial officer whispered: “Who gives a f\*\*\*?”

Although “judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge,” Tapply, 162 N.H. at 297 (quotation omitted), in this case, the judicial officer’s remark is unlike those at issue in Tapply. Here, the remark — which was not intended to be heard — was not made in order to admonish the defendant for unreasonable behavior. See id. at 299-300. Nor can we construe it as the judicial officer “merely fulfilling his duty as the finder of fact,” id. at 300, and expressing skepticism about the defendant’s claims or his credibility. See id. Rather, according to the judicial officer’s self-report letter to the JCC, his remark was “made out of complete frustration,” because the defendant “began speaking of issues that were not relevant to the issues to be decided-something he often did.” Based upon our review of the transcript, we cannot conclude that the defendant’s testimony was irrelevant, nor

so far afield as to justify such a crude remark. Although a judicial officer is not precluded from showing frustration, see id. at 299-300, here, the judicial officer's remark would cause an objective, reasonable person to question whether the judicial officer had reached the point of frustration where he, quite literally, no longer cared about the defendant's testimony, and could no longer keep an open mind and decide the case impartially. See id. at 302 ("The existence of an appearance of impropriety is determined by an objective standard, *i.e.*, would a reasonable person, not the judge himself, question the impartiality of the court." (quotation omitted)).

Our decision is bolstered by another remark the judicial officer made later in the same family division hearing. The transcript reflects that, during the plaintiff's testimony about the maturity level of the children, counsel asked her whether the children "make wise, mature decisions in their daily lives relative to, for example, schoolwork," and whether they "help[] around the house." During this questioning, the judicial officer whispered: "Of course not, they're a bunch of morons." This additional remark further supports our determination that an objective, reasonable person would question whether the judicial officer could keep an open mind and decide the case impartially.

Under these circumstances, we conclude that it was error for the judicial officer to have presided over the hearing in this case. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's orders, and remand for a new hearing on the extension of the protective order before a different judicial officer of the circuit court. We express no opinion as to the merits of the underlying motion to extend the protective order. However, in light of the unique circumstances of this case, the protective order shall remain in place pending the outcome of the new hearing.

Given our decision, we need not address the parties' remaining arguments. To the extent that either party requests an award of attorneys' fees with respect to this appeal, the request is denied. See Sup. Ct. R. 23.

Vacated and remanded.

MacDonald, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, J.J., concurred.

**Timothy A. Gudas,  
Clerk**

Distribution:

9th N.H. Circuit Court - Nashua Family Division, 659-2019-DV-00341  
Honorable Kimberly A. Chabot  
Honorable John A. Curran  
Honorable Elizabeth M. Leonard  
Marital Master Bruce F. DalPra  
Honorable David D. King  
Michael J. Fontaine, Esquire  
Israel F. Piedra, Esquire  
Mr. Dana Albrecht  
Carolyn A. Koegler, Supreme Court  
Lin Willis, Supreme Court  
File

**THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE  
JUDICIAL BRANCH  
NH CIRCUIT COURT**

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<http://www.courts.state.nh.us>

**DV/STALKING NOTICE OF DECISION**

**JOSEPH CAULFIELD, ESQ  
CAULFIELD LAW & MEDIATION OFFICE  
126 PERHAM CORNER RD  
LYNDEBOROUGH NH 03082**

Case Name: **In the Matter of Katherine Albrecht v. Dana Albrecht** PNO: **6591910341**  
Case Number: **659-2019-DV-00341**

Please be advised that on December 21, 2020 Hon John A. Curran made the following order relative to:

Petition     Final Order     Other Order on Initial Extension of Protective Order  
 Notice of Interstate Enforcement  
and Compliance with VAWA for  
Use with Final Order

December 21, 2020

(659316)

C: Dana Albrecht; Katherine Albrecht; Michael J. Fontaine, ESQ

*Sherry L. Bisson*

Sherry L. Bisson, Clerk of Court

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE  
JUDICIAL BRANCH  
NH CIRCUIT COURT

9th Circuit - Family Division - Nashua  
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**ORDER ON INITIAL EXTENSION OF  
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OR STALKING FINAL PROTECTIVE ORDER**  
Pursuant to RSA 633:3-a or 173-B

Case Number: **659-2019-DV-00341**

PNO: **6591910341**

**Katherine Albrecht**  
Plaintiff

**08/17/1966**  
Plf Date of Birth

**V. Dana Albrecht**  
Defendant

**08/01/1971**  
Def Date of Birth

Pursuant to the provision of New Hampshire RSA 173-B:5, VI or RSA 633:3-a, III-c, the Plaintiff requests an initial extension of the Final Protective Order issued on December 30, 2019.

The Court finds, based upon the Plaintiff's representations, that good cause exists to extend the order. Accordingly, the Final Protective Order is hereby extended to 12/29/21. The Defendant shall be given notice of Plaintiff's request and this order. If the Defendant objects to the extension, he/she shall file a written objection within 10 days of the date of the Clerk's Notice of Decision and a hearing shall be conducted within 30 days of this order. At such hearing, the Court may either reaffirm, modify or vacate this extension order. If a hearing is scheduled, both parties shall appear.

The Court finds, based upon the Plaintiff's representations, that good cause does not exist and the request to extend the order is denied.

**Recommended:**

Date

Signature of Marital Master

Printed Name of Marital Master

**So Ordered:**

I hereby certify that I have read the recommendation(s) and agree that, to the extent the marital master/judicial referee/hearing officer has made factual findings, she/he has applied the correct legal standard to the facts determined by the marital master/judicial referee/hearing officer.

Date

12/21/2020

Signature of Judge

John A. Curran

Printed Name of Judge

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE  
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9<sup>th</sup> Circuit – Family Division - Nashua

Katherine Albrecht v. Dana Albrecht  
Docket Number: 659-2019-DV-00341

**PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE  
FINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION**

NOW COMES the Plaintiff, Katherine Albrecht, by and through her attorneys, Welts, White & Fontaine, P.C., and pursuant to NH RSA 173-B:5, VI requests that the Court extend the Protective Orders and, in support thereof, states as follows:

1. On December 30, 2019, this Court entered a Domestic Violence Final Order of Protection which Order will expire on December 29, 2020.
2. Mr. Albrecht has demonstrated a pattern of harassing and stalking behavior and actions that is well-documented with this Court both in pleadings and evidence and testimony presented to this Court in this domestic violence matter and in the divorce matter, *In the Matter of Dana Albrecht and Katherine Albrecht*, Docket No. 659-2016-DM-00288.
3. As such, Ms. Albrecht continues to be in fear for her safety and therefore requests a one-year extension of the Protective Order. If this Domestic Violence Protective Order is not extended as requested herein, Ms. Albrecht is convinced that Mr. Albrecht's violative behavior will not only continue but will escalate given his past well-documented behaviors toward Plaintiff and her children.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, Katherine Albrecht respectfully requests that this Court:

- A. Grant the Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Extension of Domestic Violence Final Order of Protection for one additional year from December 30, 2020 to December 29, 2021; and

B. Grant such other and further relief as is just and equitable.

Respectfully submitted,

Date: December 18, 2020

/s/ Katherine Minges  
Katherine Minges, Respondent  
By Her Attorneys,

WELTS, WHITE & FONTAINE, P.C.



Date: December 18, 2020


By:

Michael J. Fontaine, Esquire  
29 Factory Street; P.O. Box 507  
Nashua, NH 03061  
(603) 883-0797  
NH BAR ID #832

Paragraph 14 of the Twelfth Renewed & Amended Order Suspending In-Person Court Proceedings Related to N.H. Circuit Court & Restricting Public Access to Courthouses states: "All courts will accept electronic signatures on pleadings and will allow litigants' signatures to be electronically signed by attorneys and/or bail commissioners with a statement that they have communicated with the litigant who has authorized them to do so." Katherine Minges has authorized Welts, White & Fontaine, P.C. to affix her electronic signature to this document in accordance with this Supreme Court Order.

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**


I certify that I have this day furnished the within pleading, by delivering a copy of same by email and first-class mail, postage prepaid, to Joseph Caulfield, Esq., attorney for Petitioner.



Date: December 18, 2020

Michael J. Fontaine, Esq.

MOTION GRANTED.  
See accompanying order  
on initial extension of D/V order.  
S> Order.

  
John A. Curran  
12/21/2020

**THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE**  
**JUDICIAL BRANCH**  
**NH CIRCUIT COURT**

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**ORDER ON THE OBJECTION TO THE EXTENSION OF  
 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OR STALKING FINAL PROTECTIVE ORDER**

Pursuant to RSA 633:3-a or 173-B

Case Number: **659-2019-DV-00341**

**PNO: 6591910341**

Katherine Albrecht	08/17/1966	V. Dana Albrecht	08/01/1971
Plaintiff	Plf Date of Birth	Defendant	Def Date of Birth

Pursuant to the provision of New Hampshire RSA 173-B:5, VI or RSA 633:3-a, III-c, the Plaintiff requested, and was granted, a  one year  five year Extension of the Final Protective Order issued on December 21, 2020.

The Defendant objected to the extension and requested a hearing on the extension order, pursuant to RSA 173-B:5, VI or RSA 633:3-a, III-c. A hearing was held on February 18, 2022

- Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the court finds that the Plaintiff showed good cause why the Extension Order is necessary, pursuant to RSA 173-B:5, VI or RSA 633:3-a, III-c. Accordingly, the Extension of the Final Protective Order remains in effect. The Extension Order expires on February 25, 2023
- The Court finds, based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, that good cause does not exist to continue the Extension Order, therefore, the Extension Order is vacated.
- The Court makes the following finding and additional orders:

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See attached narrative order.

**So Ordered:**

February 25, 2022  
 Date

  
 Signature of Judge

Hon. Kevin P. Rauseo  
 Printed Name of Judge

**THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE****SUPREME COURT****In Case No. 2020-0118, Katherine Albrecht v. Dana Albrecht, the court on June 19, 2020, issued the following order:**

Having considered the brief, memorandum of law, reply brief, and record submitted on appeal, we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.

The defendant, Dana Albrecht, appeals an order of the Circuit Court (Derby, J.), following a three-day hearing, granting a domestic violence final order of protection to the plaintiff, Katherine Albrecht. See RSA 173-B:5 (Supp. 2019). The defendant raises numerous challenges to the trial court's order.

We first address the defendant's argument that he received inadequate notice of the allegations being made against him. "[T]he notice provisions within RSA 173-B:3 . . . require that a [defendant] in a civil domestic violence proceeding be supplied with the factual allegations against him in advance of the hearing on the petition." South v. McCabe, 156 N.H. 797, 799 (2008). In this case, the plaintiff attached to her domestic violence petition a typewritten, five-page, single-spaced document clearly stating the allegations supporting her petition, which formed the basis for the court's protective order. The defendant asserts that the petition contained a false allegation regarding the plaintiff's arrival time at the church where the incidents occurred. The trial court noted that there was a discrepancy as to whether the plaintiff arrived at the church before or after the defendant, but did not find this discrepancy to be material. The defendant has not identified any unnoticed allegations upon which the trial court relied. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant received adequate notice of the allegations being made against him. See id.

We next address the defendant's argument that the trial court lacked subject matter and territorial jurisdiction because the incidents alleged in the petition occurred in Massachusetts. We have held that RSA 490-D:2, IV grants subject matter jurisdiction to the circuit court over domestic violence cases, and that RSA chapter 173-B does not incorporate the territorial jurisdiction limitations of the criminal code. Hemenway v. Hemenway, 159 N.H. 680, 684-85 (2010). Accordingly, we reject the defendant's jurisdiction arguments.

We next address the defendant's argument that the trial judge erred in stating that he had "no knowledge of the divorce case," given that the judge previously had approved recommendations from the marital master in the

divorce. See RSA 490-D:9 (Supp. 2019) (noting that the signing judge must certify that he “has read the recommendations and agrees that the marital master has applied the correct legal standard to the facts determined by the marital master.”). The defendant asserts that, in this case, the judge “was influenced by unproven allegations in the divorce case.” The judge explained that he could not recall any facts from the divorce given the passage of time, and that he had not presided over the hearing. Moreover, we have held that “[o]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” In the Matter of Tapply & Zukatis, 162 N.H. 285, 297 (2011) (citation omitted). The defendant has made no such showing in this case.

We next address the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. We review sufficiency of the evidence claims as a matter of law, and uphold the findings and rulings of the trial court unless they are lacking in evidentiary support or erroneous as a matter of law. Achille v. Achille, 167 N.H. 706, 715 (2015). “The trial court, as the trier of fact, is in the best position to assess and weigh the evidence before it.” In re Deven O., 165 N.H. 685, 690 (2013). “It has the benefit of observing the parties and their witnesses, and its discretion necessarily extends to assessing the credibility and demeanor of those witnesses.” Id. Thus, conflicts in testimony, witness credibility, and the weight to be assigned to testimony are matters for the trial court to resolve. Id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Smith v. Pesa, 168 N.H. 541, 544 (2016).<sup>1</sup>

To obtain relief under RSA chapter 173-B, the plaintiff must show “abuse” by a preponderance of the evidence. Achille, 167 N.H. at 716. “Abuse” means the commission or attempted commission of one or more of several criminal acts constituting a credible present threat to the plaintiff’s safety, including stalking as defined in RSA 633:3-a (2016). See RSA 173-B:1 (Supp. 2019). The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding that his conduct constituted stalking.

A person commits the crime of stalking if he “[p]urposely or knowingly engages in a course of conduct targeted at a specific individual, which the actor knows will place that individual in fear for his or her personal safety or the safety of a member of that individual’s immediate family.” RSA 633:3-a, I(b).

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<sup>1</sup> We have considered the arguments in the defendant’s brief and conclude that there is no need to clarify our standard of review. We reject his argument that our standard of review violates his due process rights. See Buchholz v. Waterville Estates Assoc., 156 N.H. 172, 177 (2007) (“[P]assing reference to ‘due process,’ without more, is not a substitute for valid constitutional argument.” (Quotation omitted.)).

“Course of conduct” is defined as two or more acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose. RSA 633:3-a, II(a). A course of conduct may include “[t]hreatening the safety of the targeted person or an immediate family member,” “[f]ollowing, approaching, or confronting that person, or a member of that person’s family,” or “[a]ppearing in close proximity to, or entering the person’s residence, place of employment, school, or other place where the person can be found.” RSA 633:3-a, II(a)(1)–(3).

The record shows that the plaintiff and defendant are divorced parents of four children, including two minors. The court found that the “parties’ divorce and post-divorce co-parenting relationship [has been] contentious and high-conflict.” The plaintiff lives with the three youngest children in California. The defendant accessed records from the youngest child’s school to determine that they would be on vacation in Massachusetts in early November 2019, and he surmised that they would attend services at their former church on November 3. The defendant did not have scheduled parenting time with the children on November 3, and he is no longer a member of the church.

The defendant nevertheless appeared at the church prior to services. The plaintiff and the children were informed of the defendant’s presence and tried to avoid him. When the pastor asked the defendant to leave, he refused. A church leader called the police, and when officers arrived, the defendant refused to leave until they used physical force. The defendant then remained in the church parking lot until approximately 3:30 p.m., long after the church’s activities had ended, and after staff had left for the day. The plaintiff and the children left the church through another door and drove away in a rental car.

The trial court concluded that the defendant, “[b]y using his access to the children’s school records to learn about the vacation, and then tracking the plaintiff and the children to [the church] on November 3, disrupting the Sunday activities by refusing polite lawful requests from [church] leadership to leave, pressing his refusal to leave right up to the point where the police began to physically drag him out of the church, and then standing in the parking lot between the church and the attendees’ cars until 3:30 PM,” committed the crime of stalking. The court found that the defendant appeared at the church for no legitimate or constitutionally protected purpose but rather to intimidate the plaintiff and the children. We conclude that the record supports the court’s findings. See Achille, 167 N.H. at 715.

The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s protective order because there was no evidence of physical violence or contact of any kind. We have held, however, that “the statutory definition of ‘abuse’ does not require the defendant to have committed a violent act.” In the Matter of McArdle & McArdle, 162 N.H. 482, 487 (2011). The court found that the defendant intended to show the plaintiff “that he will track her and the children down and try to confront them wherever they are. Once he has done

that, he will not respect lawful requests from authority figures and he will push his claims up to the point of a physical confrontation with the police.” The court found that the defendant knew that his conduct would cause the plaintiff to fear for her safety and that of the parties’ children. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the court’s order. See Achille, 167 N.H. at 715.

Finally, the defendant argues that the trial court violated RSA 461-A:4-a, which requires any motion for contempt or enforcement of an order regarding an approved parenting plan to be reviewed by the court within 30 days. The defendant filed his motion in the parties’ divorce case, under a different docket number. The motion has no bearing on the court’s issuance of a protective order. We conclude that this issue is beyond the scope of this appeal.

The defendant’s remaining arguments are inadequately developed, see State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49 (2003), not preserved, see Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250-51 (2004), and warrant no further discussion, see Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993). We do not consider new issues raised for the first time on appeal in a reply brief. Harrington v. Metropolis Property Management Group, 162 N.H. 476, 481 (2011).

Affirmed.

Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ., concurred.

**Timothy A. Gudas,  
Clerk**

Distribution:

9th N.H. Circuit Court - Nashua Family Division, 659-2019-DV-00341  
Honorable Mark S. Derby  
Honorable David D. King  
Mr. Dana Albrecht  
Michael J. Fontaine, Esq.  
Israel F. Piedra, Esq.  
Carolyn A. Koegler, Supreme Court  
Lin Willis, Supreme Court  
File

**THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE  
JUDICIAL BRANCH  
NH CIRCUIT COURT**

Hillsborough County

9th Circuit – Family Division – Nashua

**In the Matter of Katherine Albrecht and Dana Albrecht**

659-2019-DV-00341

**ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS (#28, #29)**

Before the court are the defendant's two post-trial motions; (1) ex parte motion to modify (#28); and (2) motion to reconsider (#29). The court has reviewed the plaintiff's objections and all of the defendant's replications to those objections.

The ex parte motion to modify (#28) is denied for the reasons set forth in the plaintiff's objections. The court gave careful consideration to the decision to restrain the defendant from coming within 2,000 feet of the Collinsville Bible Church. The Court believes that the restriction is narrowly tailored to the unique and specific facts of this case, and is necessary to prevent future incidents of stalking by the defendant. This order is rooted in the findings of stalking and the present credible threat that the defendant poses to the plaintiff's safety, and particularly in the defendant's answers, deflections and evasive non-answers to the questioning on Pages 71-79 of the December 20, 2019 transcript. In that line of questioning, the defendant made it clear that without a specific restraining order in place, he would keep inserting himself into the plaintiff's parenting time with the children, regardless of their wishes or anything else. He believes that he did nothing wrong and gave every indication that he would do it again given the chance.

The court agrees with the plaintiff that the defendant's First Amendment argument is a wholly manufactured controversy. For starters, the court's 2,000 foot restriction is remedial in nature, only applies to the defendant and was based on the defendant's specific conduct as part of a finding of domestic violence after a trial. Beyond that, the court has carefully considered this matter and is satisfied that, in light of the defendant's testimony, there is no less restrictive means available by which to protect the plaintiff from the defendant's harassment when she visits the east coast and wants to exercise her constitutional free exercise and associational rights.

Turning to the motion to reconsider (#29), that is also denied for the reasons set forth in the plaintiff's objection. The court acknowledges that the docket in 659-2016-

DM-00288 shows that on or about June 30, 2019 the undersigned judicial officer approved the recommendation of marital Master Bruce Dalpra to deny the defendant's motion for reconsideration of a substantive May 30, 2019 order (co-signed by a different judicial officer).

More than five months later on December 9, 2019, at the beginning of the DV case, the court disclosed to the parties' counsel as they were arguing about which material from the divorce case should be reviewed as part of the DV case, that the court had no knowledge of the divorce case. The phrase "no knowledge" was shorthand for the lack of factual background that a judge would have when the judge had actually heard parts of a related case and drafted substantive orders based on those hearings. The court did not want the parties' counsel to assume that because the undersigned judicial officer's name approved recommendations on prior orders, the court had any working knowledge of the facts of the divorce case. It lacked that knowledge because anything the court would have seen in late June 2019 by reviewing and approving Master Dalpra's recommendation was long forgotten by early December.

During the domestic relations trial, both parties actually re-litigated the events on and after winter vacation 2018. The plaintiff re-litigated those matters as past incidents under RSA 173-B:1, I ("[t]he court may consider evidence of such acts, regardless of their proximity in time to the filing of the petition, which, in combination with recent conduct, reflects an ongoing pattern of behavior which reasonably causes or has caused the petitioner to fear for his or her safety or well-being"), and the defendant re-litigated those events in defense of his actions on November 3, 2019. The defendant argued that the plaintiff's alleged wrongful conduct and parental alienation over at least the last year left him desperate to see his children and with no alternative. Therefore, the court began the DV hearing with no knowledge of the facts of the divorce case, but by the end of the DV hearing, the parties had presented significant evidence of the events on and after winter vacation 2018, which led up to November 3, 2019. The final DV order was based only on the testimony and documents presented at the DV trial.

As to Paragraphs 6-21 and 26-29, the only incident the court considered for the purposes of finding abuse was the November 3, 2019 incident. The components of the stalking are set forth in detail in the narrative portion of the order. The discussion of the other incidents leading up to November 3, 2019 were considered pursuant to RSA 173-B:1, I as evidence in support of the second prong of the DV analysis, i.e., whether, notwithstanding the finding of an event of abuse, the defendant still posed a credible present threat to the plaintiff's safety. The court found that he did.

As to Paragraphs 34-43 of the motion for reconsideration, the facts supporting a criminal trespass finding (in addition to stalking) were set forth in the plaintiff's domestic violence petition, and the defendant unequivocally testified to the elements of the offence. The defendant testified that he refused to leave and remained in the church after multiple orders to leave communicated to him by authorized representatives of the church (Mr. Cooper, a lay leader, and Pastor Smith) and then the Dracut Police. Plaintiffs in their domestic violence petitions are not required to identify by name and citation which crimes in RSA 173-B:1 the defendant has committed. The defendant and the court discern it from the facts that the plaintiff pleads, and that is what happened here. Also, RSA 173-B:5, I states that the evidentiary standard is preponderance of the evidence, even though RSA 173-B:1 cites criminal acts as examples of domestic violence.

As to Paragraph 54 of the motion for reconsideration, the court's choice of the word "approached" referred to the defendant's reactive e-mail communication to the camp asking for a broad range of information that was disproportionate to the amount of time the children actually spent at the camp. If the record shows that the defendant did not physically approach the camp (there was testimony that an order in the divorce case prohibited him from doing so), the court so finds.

Finally, and turning to the broader issue of the plaintiff's fear, RSA 633:3-a, I contains both an objective standard (RSA 633:3-a, I(a)) and a subjective standard (RSA 633:3-a, I(b)). Therefore, even if a reasonable person at the church on November 3, 2019 would not have felt in fear of his or her safety, if the defendant knew that his conduct would cause the plaintiff or the children to be in fear of their safety, that is sufficient to constitute stalking. Regardless of whether or not that fear is the result of a mental health experience, the court finds that the plaintiff clearly knew that tracking of the plaintiff and the children to the church, refusing multiple lawful orders to leave, and then watching the church from the parking lot for the bulk of the day, would cause the petitioner to fear for her safety.

Motions denied.

January 27, 2020

Date



Signature of Judge

Mark S. Derby

Printed Name of Judge

On 3/4/22 12:11 PM, Mary Ann Dempsey wrote:

Mr. Albrecht,

The Domestic Violence Task Force Report was provided to the Supreme Court in accordance with the Order of December 9, 2021. The Report does not constitute a governmental record under Part I, Article 8 of the New Hampshire Constitution; however, the Judicial Branch does intend for it to be made public on March 8, 2022, following the Supreme Court's review. To the extent you believe the Report is relevant in any manner to your case before Judge Rauseo, you would have to address that in a motion within that case. Please let me know if you have any questions.

Mary Ann

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE  
SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE  
O R D E R

The New Hampshire Judicial Branch is committed to ensuring that all victims of domestic violence have full and fair access to the justice system, including proper resources to assist in court cases; knowledgeable advocates, court staff, and judges to explain the court process and legal standards; and a fair and transparent legal forum in accordance with the principle of equal justice for all.

Pursuant to its supervisory obligations, the Supreme Court has established a multidisciplinary Task Force, membership identified at <https://www.courts.nh.gov/news-and-media/new-hampshire-judicial-branch-releases-internal-review-denial-final-domestic>, to conduct a systemic review of domestic violence in the New Hampshire court system.

The Task Force is hereby charged with the following responsibilities:


1. Review existing court practice and procedure in cases involving domestic violence allegations, whether in circuit court, superior court, or both, and identify the resources needed to better support victims of domestic violence throughout the legal process;
2. Analyze the current status of New Hampshire law regarding domestic violence, including the legal definition of “abuse” and its relationship to intimate partner violence, in connection with the domestic violence statute and other statutory protections applicable to abusive behavior;
3. Recommend criteria for the Judicial Branch to make publicly available on its website appellate decisions related to RSA 173-B and RSA 633:3-a, while maintaining individual privacy in accordance with state and federal law;

4. Conduct a review of court forms as they relate to protection from domestic violence and make recommendations to ensure that all factual information necessary to establishing the applicable burden of proof is elicited in a clear and comprehensive format;
5. Explore opportunities available to provide victims of domestic violence increased access to the assistance of legal counsel and victim advocates at protection order hearings and in appellate proceedings;
6. Analyze the current state of relationships between the courts, law enforcement, the criminal defense bar, and domestic violence advocates and steps that can be taken to improve communication with respect to domestic violence and other abusive behaviors that warrant judicial relief; and
7. Examine any other subject matter which the Task Force deems relevant to the objective of providing victims of domestic violence full and fair access to the justice system, while maintaining fundamental fairness for all participants.

The Task Force will engage relevant stakeholders and report its conclusions and recommendations to the Supreme Court no later than March 1, 2022. The Task Force's Report will be posted publicly on the New Hampshire Judicial Branch's website.

Issued: December 9, 2021

ATTEST:

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Timothy A. Gudas, Clerk of Court  
Supreme Court of New Hampshire

## **Domestic Violence Task Force Virtual Meeting Dates**

*All meetings with the exception of the public meeting on Friday, January 21, 2022, will be held virtually using Webex.*

Tuesday, January 11, 2022	4:00 p.m.
Charge 1	Review existing court practice/procedure and identify resources to support domestic violence victims
Wednesday, January 12, 2022	4:00 p.m.
Charge 2	Analyze status of NH law regarding domestic violence
Tuesday, January 18, 2022	4:00 p.m.
Charge 3	Identify criteria for making appellate decisions related to domestic violence and stalking orders of protection publicly available on the judicial branch's website
Wednesday, January 19, 2022	4:00 p.m.
Charge 4	Review and make recommendations concerning court forms related to protection from domestic violence
Friday, January 21, 2022	1:00 – 3:00 p.m.
<b>In-Person Public Meeting</b>	
<b>NH Supreme Court</b>	
Tuesday, January 25, 2022	4:00 p.m.
Charge 5	Identify opportunities to provide domestic violence victims with increased access to legal assistance and victim advocates
Thursday, January 27, 2022	4:00 p.m.
Charge 6	Analyze current state of relationships among courts, law enforcement, criminal defense bar, and advocates and identify steps to improve communication
Monday, January 31, 2022	4:00 p.m.
Charge 7	Identify other relevant subject matters

## Nine Cases – Conflict of Interest

**Ninth Circuit, Family Division, Nashua**

**There is a known conflict of interest between former judge Julie Introcaso,<sup>1</sup> and her close friend Kathleen Sternenberg. Marital Master Bruce F. DalPra has been aware of this conflict since 2014.<sup>2</sup>**

**Former Judge Julie Introcaso appointed Kathleen Sternenberg as *Guardian ad Litem (GAL)***

Date of GAL Appointment	Docket	Case Name
9/5/2013 <sup>3</sup>	657-2011-DM-00565	<i>Merrifield v. Cox</i>
1/30/2014 <sup>4</sup>	659-2013-DM-00348  Appeals: 2015-0199; 2015-0724	<i>Sobell v. Sobell</i>
5/12/2015 (Crusco) <sup>5</sup> 6/22/2015 (Sternenberg) <sup>6</sup>	226-2008-DM-00525	<i>Crawford v. Crawford</i>
8/20/2015 <sup>7</sup>	659-2015-DM-00463	<i>Covart v. Covart</i>
10/13/2016 <sup>8</sup>	659-2016-DM-00288  Appeals: 2018-0379; 2019-0436; 2020-0118; 2021-0192	<i>Albrecht v. Albrecht</i>
2/22/2017 <sup>9</sup>	659-2016-DM-00322	<i>Yiatras v. Yiatras</i>
10/24/2018 <sup>10</sup>	659-2018-DM-00702	<i>Campbell v. Partello</i>
11/29/2018 <sup>11</sup>	659-2015-DM-00185 Related: 659-2019-DM-00383	<i>Loudermilk v. Montgomery</i> <i>Morell v. Montgomery</i>
12/12/2018 <sup>12</sup>	659-2018-DM-00414  Appeals: 2020-0160	<i>Ausiaikova v. Meckel</i>

1 See, e.g., Exhibit 19 from the *Deposition of Julie A. Introcaso*, taken February 8, 2021 (hereinafter “Deposition”), which is an email dated November 18, 2018 from Julie Introcaso to Timothy C. Coughlin, Esq. and Andrew J. Piela, Esq., or the transcript of the May 1, 2014 hearing in *Sobell v. Sobell* at pp. 2-3.

2 Concerning the conflict, Ms. Introcaso stated, “Bruce has known that for seven years.” See *Deposition* at page 61, line 21.

3 See *Deposition*, Exhibit 13.

4 See *Deposition*, Exhibit 14.

5 The NHJB does not possess a copy of this order, because on or about June 22, 2015, Julie Introcaso allegedly “whited out” Ms. Crusco’s name on the original order in violation of RSA: 641:7 (“Tampering with Public Records or Information”). Ms. Crusco has represented, however, that she still has a copy of the original order in her files, as mailed by the court to the parties in May 2015, and before it was “whited out.”

6 See *Deposition*, Exhibit 15.

7 See *Deposition*, Exhibit 16.

8 See *Deposition*, Exhibit 17.

9 See *Deposition*, Exhibit 18.

10 See *Deposition*, Exhibit 2.

11 See *Deposition*, Exhibit 3.

12 See *Deposition*, Exhibit 4.

**Subject:** Subpoena  
**From:** Julie <julie.introcaso@gmail.com>  
**Date:** 2/15/22, 7:28 PM  
**To:** dana.albrecht@hushmail.com

Mr. Albrecht,

Thank you for your response. I will transmit a copy of the Motion to Quash as quickly as I can figure out how to scan, hopefully tomorrow morning. A photocopy of the motion will be mailed to your DW Highway address tomorrow as well. Similarly, I will be forwarding the same to Attorney Fontaine as he was copied on the NOH. I am not submitting my motion to Katherine Albrecht as you were the party compelling my appearance.

I respectfully suggest (a suggestion you are absolutely entitled to ignore) if you are calling me to testify about a matter or statement I made in my deposition, the quickest and easiest way to do that would be to submit my deposition itself with references to particular passages for the judicial officer to digest in deliberation. It is extremely unlikely that I will testify to any matter differently than I did under oath (see below). An in-court solicitation of testimony can be dicey and distract from the substance. You can't anticipate what other parties or the court may ask of me when I appear (I can't either). In all reasonable likelihood, I will continue to refer back to my deposition, frustrating the hearing officer/judge in your case.

An important aside, I have yet to see or read that deposition or any others taken during the same investigation. I did not contest the judicial conduct allegations against me, I did not contest the criminal allegations against me (rather, I asserted my innocence under Alford) and I recently learned of attempts to disbar me which I agreed to resolve without any objection. I have had no reason to review the same. I gave that deposition by agreement in a vain attempt to inform the investigation.

If the Court compels me to attend, I ask that you let me see and review the parts of the deposition you intend to highlight for the Court before Friday morning. I want to be fully responsive to the areas of inquiry you want to highlight in presenting your case.

Also, be aware that I have credible reasons to believe the State would take criminal action against me due to conclusions that have been drawn related to my voluntary resignation and subsequent Alford plea. If asked to expand on or clarify my deposition in any fashion, I will most likely assert my rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution and Part I, Article 15 of the NH Constitution. I would have no other practical alternative and I regret that is the case, but I want you to be on notice of the possibility.

With respect to any Appointment of Guardian ad litem order issued in your case, I suspect I was a "co-signer". I have no recollection of you personally, any facts of your case, or having co-signed many orders, given the nature and volume of my judicial work. I clearly recall being asked about the appointment of Attorney Sterneberg in another case - again, a decision that I did not make substantively, but rather I provided a certification and approval of a master's deliberated recommendation.

Prior to any hearing, I will happily respond to any direct, informal inquiry you have for me, as I will if contacted by the opposing party. I am also amenable to providing a signed affidavit if presented with one that represents my anticipated testimony.

I will cooperate fully with whatever you think is best for your case. I also respectfully ask for your assent to my motion which you can consider after review.

Have a peaceful evening and be well.

Regards,

Julie Introcaso

*In the Matter Of:*

RE HONORABLE JULIE A. INTROCASO

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HONORABLE JULIE A. INTROCASO

February 08, 2021

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THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE  
JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMITTEE

\* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \*  
\*  
IN RE: \* Case Nos.:  
\* JC-19-050-C  
HONORABLE JULIE A. INTROCASO \* JC-20-010-C  
\*  
\*  
\*

DEPOSITION OF HONORABLE JULIE A. INTROCASO  
Deposition taken by agreement of counsel via  
Zoom on Monday, February 8, 2021, commencing at  
1:35 P.M.

Court Reporter:  
Tina L. Hayes, RPR, NH LCR #80  
(RSA 310-A:161-181)

I N D E X		
1	WITNESS:	
2	Honorable Julie A. Introcaso	
3		
4	EXAMINATION:	
5	By Mr. Waystack	Page 6, 210
	By Mr. Delaney	192
6	ERRATA SHEET	217
7	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER	218
8	EXHIBITS FOR IDENTIFICATION:	
9	Number	Page
10	Exhibit 1	03/30/18 - 04/27/18 Email String, Introcaso/King
11		6
12	Exhibit 2	10/25/18 Notice of Decision, Campbell/Partello
13		6
14	Exhibit 3	11/29/18 Order on Appointment of Guardian ad Litem, Loudermilk/Montgomery
15		6
16	Exhibit 4	12/12/18 Order on Appointment of Guardian ad Litem, Ausiaikova/Meckel
17		6
18	Exhibit 5	2/21/19 Notice of Decision, Campbell/Partello
19	Exhibit 6	3/12/19 Notice of Decision, Campbell/Partello
20		6
21	Exhibit 7	3/12/19 Notice of Decision, Campbell/Partello
22	Exhibit 8	3/12/19 Notice of Decision Campbell/Partello
23		6

## APPPEARANCES

Representing the Judicial Conduct Committee:  
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Representing Honorable Julie A. Introcaso:

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[amanda.quinlan@mclane.com](mailto:amanda.quinlan@mclane.com)

## STIPULATIONS

It is agreed that the deposition shall be taken in the first instance in stenotype and when transcribed may be used for all purposes for which depositions are competent under New Hampshire practice.

Notice, filing, caption and all other formalities are waived. All objections except as to form are reserved and may be taken in court at time of trial.

It is further agreed that if the deposition is not signed within 30 days, the signature of the deponent is waived.

EXHIBITS FOR IDENTIFICATION: (Cont.)		4
1	Number	Page
2	Exhibit 9 3/15/19 Notice of Decision and	
3	Sua Sponte Recusal Order, Campbell/Partello	6
4	Exhibit 10 4/29/19 Notice of Decision, Campbell/Partello	6
5	Exhibit 11 1/6/20 Email String, Bisson/Introcaso	6
6	Exhibit 12 3/12/19 Last page of Apple Pay Order with Margin Order	6
7	Exhibit 13 9/5/13 Order on Appointment of Guardian ad Litem, Merrifield/Cox	6
8	Exhibit 14 1/30/14 Order on Appointment of Guardian ad Litem, Sobell	6
9	Exhibit 15 5/12/15 Order on Appointment of Guardian ad Litem, Crawford	6
10	Exhibit 16 8/20/15 Order on Appointment of Guardian ad Litem, Covart	6
11	Exhibit 17 10/13/16 Order on Appointment of Guardian ad Litem, Albrecht	6
12	Exhibit 18 2/22/17 Order on Appointment of Guardian ad Litem, Yiatras	6
13	Exhibit 19 11/29/18 Email, Introcaso/Coughlin/Piela	6
14	Exhibit 20 1/9/20 Email from Judge Introcaso to Judges and Court Staff	6
15	Exhibit 21 1/9/20 Judge Introcaso's Draft Answer to JCC	6
16		
17		
18		
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20		
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22		
23		

1	EXHIBITS FOR IDENTIFICATION: (Cont.)	5	1	did you go right to the 9th Circuit? Was that your
2	Number	Page	2	first posting, so to speak?
3	Exhibit 22 December 2019 Calendar	6	3	A. Yes.
4	Exhibit 23 January 2020 Calendar	6	4	Q. And what was it that you were initially
5	(The original exhibits were retained by		5	assigned to do at the 9th Circuit?
	Mr. Waystack.)		6	A. I was assigned to the family division in
6			7	both Manchester and Nashua, both in the 9th Circuit.
7			8	Q. Okay.
8			9	A. And I was working between the two for a
9			10	period of time.
10			11	Q. Was there -- I know that other judges,
11			12	from time to time -- and this may be more a superior
12			13	court matter. But judges, from time to time, would
13			14	do a process when they began -- of shadowing another
14			15	judge. Did you have such a process?
15			16	A. I did.
16			17	Q. And whom did you shadow?
17			18	A. I know I spent a day with Judge Garner. I
18			19	know I spent a day with -- I apologize -- the judge
19			20	who was in Carroll County. He sat in Carroll County
20			21	up in Laconia and he's since retired.
21			22	Q. Is that Judge Patten maybe?
22			23	A. No. It was not Judge Patten. I know
23				
		6		
1	P R O C E E D I N G S		8	
2	(Judge Introcaso Exhibit Nos. 1 through 23		1	Judge Patten. I apologize.
3	were premarked by Mr. Waystack for		2	Q. That's okay. You don't have to apologize.
4	identification.)		3	A. Shadowed him.
5	HONORABLE JULIE A. INTROCASO,		4	Q. Judge Pam Albee, is that the one? No?
6	having been first duly sworn by the reporter, under		5	A. No, no. Not Pam Albee. It's a gentleman.
7	RSA 310-A:181, Limited Notarial Function, was		6	Q. It's a gentleman?
8	deposed and testified as follows:		7	A. He sat in Laconia. I apologize, mostly to
9	EXAMINATION		8	him. I don't recall his name. But he's retired
10	BY MR. WAYSTACK:		9	within the last year or two.
11	Q. Okay. Good afternoon, Judge Introcaso.		10	Q. Yeah.
12	A. Good afternoon.		11	A. I believe I spent an afternoon or so
13	Q. As you know, my name is Philip Waystack.		12	perhaps with attorney -- sorry -- Judge Spath. And
14	And in this matter, I am representing the Judicial		13	I think that's about it. I really didn't do much
15	Conduct Committee.		14	shadowing.
16	I don't know all of your general details;		15	Q. Okay.
17	so let me get a few of them. Do I understand you		16	A. I had a discussion with Judge Kelly at the
18	began serving on the bench in the year 2012?		17	time, which was within those days that I was, you
19	A. That's correct.		18	know, shadowing, so to speak.
20	Q. And whenabouts was that, Judge Introcaso?		19	Q. Okay. So for a few days with a few
21	A. September. I think my first day actually		20	judges, but not any kind of formal shadowing
22	on the bench was around September 18.		21	program?
23	Q. And when you began your judicial career,		22	A. No.
			23	Q. Okay. So let's talk about you for a bit.

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1 handwriting that is for Kathleen Sternenberg?  
 2 A. This is a combination. Again, I am almost  
 3 certain. This is a combination between Master  
 4 DalPra's writing and -- for example, you will see  
 5 "Dana Albrecht." That to me looks like Master  
 6 DalPra's handwriting of that name. Below it appears  
 7 to be the handwriting of Aline Chasseur, who is his  
 8 courtroom clerk.

9 Q. Paragraph 2 of the appointment, it looks  
 10 like there's a name initially put in there and then  
 11 it's crossed out. Do you see that?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Do you know whose name that was that was  
 14 initially put in there to be the guardian?

15 A. I have no idea. I never conducted a  
 16 hearing or prepared any forms in this case.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Oddly, I am familiar with it. This is  
 19 something of a notorious case. But all I know is  
 20 the name Albrecht and Albrecht.

21 Q. Is this a case where, because you  
 22 respected Master DalPra and he usually made good  
 23 judgments, you just looked at it quick and signed

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1 it?

2 A. Absolutely. Again, I -- yes.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. Appointment of a GAL form, I cosigned it.

5 Q. Let's look at Exhibit 18. This is orders  
 6 on appointment of guardian ad litem for Yiatras, if  
 7 I pronounced that correctly.

8 A. Uh-huh.

9 Q. Do you see that?

10 A. Yeah.

11 Q. And if you look at paragraph 2 on the  
 12 first page of Exhibit 18, it looks like the name  
 13 initially put on was Courtney Curran Ware (ph). Did  
 14 I read that right?

15 A. It's Vore, V-O-R-E.

16 Q. Courtney Curran Vore. Was Courtney Curran  
 17 Vore a GAL in the 9th Circuit?

18 A. She was.

19 Q. And so it looks like whoever initially  
 20 filled this out wanted Courtney Curran Vore. And  
 21 the address is Welts, White & and Fontaine. That's  
 22 a law firm in Nashua; correct?

23 A. Yes.

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1 Q. Okay. But that name is stricken out and  
 2 above it is "Kathleen A. Sternenberg, Esq." Can you  
 3 see that?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Is that your handwriting, Judge?

6 A. That is.

7 Q. So do you remember the circumstances by  
 8 which Courtney Curran Vore was stricken out as  
 9 guardian and you inserted Kathleen Sternenberg?

10 A. I don't. I know she no longer handles  
 11 guardian cases, and that may have been an issue. I  
 12 see this was proposed by the respondent and would  
 13 have been -- would have been put together likely at  
 14 a hearing. So the respondent may have proposed her  
 15 only to find out in our discussion she no longer was  
 16 accepting guardian cases.

17 Q. Did you suggest Kathleen Sternenberg to  
 18 Ms. Yiatras?

19 A. I don't know if that was something tossed  
 20 up by one of the other attorneys or by myself.

21 Q. Do you think this was as a result of a  
 22 hearing?

23 A. I would think it would be a result of a

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1 hearing because I would not have scratched out  
 2 "Courtney Curran Vore" if that's who the parties  
 3 wanted.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. You know, she could have told them  
 6 herself. I just suspect there was a conversation  
 7 that was related to this. I have no independent  
 8 recollection of that. Again, I am just kind of  
 9 looking at it forensically, if you will.

10 Q. Page 3 of Exhibit 18, you signed this on  
 11 February 22, 2017; correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And no recommendation by a marital master?  
 14 You did this on your own?

15 A. Right. Like I said, I likely -- I likely  
 16 conducted the hearing.

17 Q. Okay. Exhibit 21.

18 A. I don't have that one yet.

19 Q. You are going to have it in one second.

20 MR. WAYSTACK: 21, 22, and 23, Mike, and I  
 21 think we're sort of at the end of the exhibits.  
 22 I may have a few more questions.

23 MR. DELANEY: Phil, can I hand her all of

**THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE**  
**SUPREME COURT**

**ORDER**

**JD-2020-0001, In the Matter of Julie A. Introcaso**

On February 23, 2021, the Judicial Conduct Committee (JCC) filed a summary report of its proceedings, findings, and recommendations in JC-19-050-C and JC-20-010-C, In re: Julie Introcaso. On February 26, 2021, the JCC filed a certified copy of the record of its proceedings.

According to the JCC's summary report, former judge Julie A. Introcaso (Introcaso), who resigned from office on February 16, 2021, did not contest that she violated a number of provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as alleged in the JCC's Statement of Formal Charges. The JCC's record includes a copy of the Stipulation and Agreement signed by Introcaso in which she did not contest the alleged violations of the Code provisions; she acknowledged that she understood that the JCC would enter findings that she had violated those provisions; and she waived her right to a de novo hearing on the charges. Introcaso also acknowledged that she is responsible for reimbursing the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) for attorney's fees and expenses that the JCC incurred to investigate and prosecute the matter.

The JCC reviewed the Stipulation and Agreement, and entered findings that Introcaso violated the following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct:

Canon 1, Rule 1.1, which provides: "A judge shall comply with the law, including the Code of Judicial Conduct."

Canon 1, Rule 1.2, which provides: "A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety."

Canon 2, Rule 2.5(A), which provides: "A judge shall perform judicial and administrative duties, competently and diligently."

Canon 2, Rule 2.5(B), which provides: "A judge shall cooperate with other judges and court officials in the administration of court business."

Canon 2, Rule 2.11, which provides in part: "A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned."

Canon 2, Rule 2.16(A), which provides: "A judge shall cooperate and be candid and honest with judicial and lawyer disciplinary agencies."

In the summary report of its findings, the JCC noted that Introcaso had resigned from office before the report was submitted. The summary report stated that because Introcaso had taken this action, the JCC made no additional recommendations for sanctions.

In accordance with Rule 40(12) and (13), when the JCC determines that a judge has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and determines that the violations warrant formal disciplinary action by this court, the judge may request a de novo hearing, after which the court will schedule briefing and oral argument. In this case, Introcaso has waived her right to a de novo hearing, and she notified the court, through her counsel, that she does not seek the opportunity to file a brief or present oral argument.

The court determines that the JCC's findings as to the violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct are supported by the JCC's record. See Rule 40(13). In light of Introcaso's resignation as a judge, the court concludes that no additional disciplinary action is required.

The AOC is directed to pay Philip R. Waystack, counsel appointed by the JCC, the sum of \$74,935.69 for attorney's fees and expenses in the investigation, charging, and prosecutorial stages of the case between February 18, 2020, and February 19, 2021. Pursuant to Rule 40(13-A) and the terms of the Stipulation and Agreement, Introcaso is ordered to reimburse the AOC, in full, for those fees and expenses.

Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ., concurred.

So ordered.

DATE: March 23, 2021

ATTEST:



\_\_\_\_\_  
Timothy A. Gudas, Clerk

**Distribution:**

Judicial Conduct Committee, JC-19-050-C; JC-20-010-C

Philip R. Waystack, Jr., Esq.

Michael A. Delaney, Esq.

Amanda E. Quinlan, Esq.

Ms. Julie A. Introcaso

Christopher Keating, Administrative Office of the Courts

File

# THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

## SUPREME COURT

### O R D E R

#### **LD-2021-0001, In the Matter of Julie A. Introcaso, Esquire**

On March 24, 2021, the court suspended the respondent, Julie A. Introcaso, on an interim basis from the practice of law as a result of criminal charges that were pending against her. On February 3, 2022, the Attorney Discipline Office (ADO) filed certified copies of the respondent's convictions in State of New Hampshire v. Julie A. Introcaso, Hillsborough Superior Court – South docket no. 226-2021-CR-00126, on two misdemeanor counts of RSA 641:7 (Tampering With Public Records or Information) and one misdemeanor count of RSA 641:3 (Unsworn Falsification). With the certified copies, the ADO provided its written recommendation "that the Court enter an order disbarring [the respondent] from the practice of law pursuant to Rule 37(9)(d)." The ADO further stated that it had contacted the respondent, and she "**does not object to the disposition proposed by the Attorney Discipline Office and waives the formal disciplinary process contemplated by Rule 37(9)(d).**"


The court concludes that the respondent has been convicted of a "serious crime," as that term is defined in Supreme Court Rule 37(9)(b). Subparagraph 9(d) of Rule 37 provides that "[u]pon the receipt of a certificate of conviction of an attorney for a 'serious crime,' the court may, and shall if suspension has been ordered pursuant to subsection (a) above, institute a formal disciplinary proceeding by issuing an order to the attorney to show cause why the attorney should not be disbarred as result of the conviction." Because the respondent does not object to the ADO's recommendation for disbarment, and because the respondent has waived the formal disciplinary process contemplated by Rule 37(9)(d), it is unnecessary to serve the respondent with the ADO's recommendation or to provide her an opportunity to be heard on the recommendation prior to court action. In light of the seriousness of the respondent's misconduct, the court concludes that the respondent should be disbarred.

THEREFORE, the court orders that Julie A. Introcaso be disbarred from the practice of law in New Hampshire. She is hereby assessed all costs and expenses incurred by the attorney discipline system in the investigation and prosecution of the disciplinary matter.

Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ., concurred.

DATE: February 25, 2022

ATTEST:



Timothy A. Gudas, Clerk

Distribution:

Mark P. Cornell, Esq.  
Brian R. Moushegian, Esq.  
Michael A. Delaney, Esq.  
Julie A. Introcaso, Esq.  
File

**THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE****SUPREME COURT****ORDER****JD-2018-0001, In the Matter of Paul S. Moore**

On June 26, 2018, the Judicial Conduct Committee (JCC) filed a summary report of its proceedings, findings, and recommendations in JC-17-042-C, In re: Paul S. Moore. It also filed a certified copy of the record of its proceedings.

According to the JCC's summary report, former judge Paul S. Moore (Moore), who resigned from office on April 10, 2018, admitted that he violated a number of provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as alleged in the JCC's Statement of Formal Charges, Amended Statement of Formal Charges, and Second Amended Statement of Formal Charges. The JCC's record includes a copy of the Answer, Stipulation and Agreement signed by Moore in which he admitted violating specific violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, acknowledged that he understood that the JCC would enter findings that he had violated those provisions, and waived his right to a de novo hearing on the charges. Moore also acknowledged that he is responsible for reimbursing the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) for attorney's fees and expenses that the JCC incurred to investigate and prosecute the matter.

The JCC reviewed the Answer, Stipulation and Agreement, and entered findings that Moore violated the following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct:

Canon 1, Rule 1.1, which provides: "A judge shall comply with the law, including the Code of Judicial Conduct."

Canon 1, Rule 1.2, which provides: "A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety."

Canon 1, Rule 1.3, which provides: "A judge shall not abuse the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or others, or allow others to do so."

Canon 2, Rule 2.4, which provides in part: "(A) A judge shall not be swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism. (B) A judge shall not

permit family, social, political, financial, or other interests or relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment."

Canon 2, Rule 2.16, which provides in part: "A judge shall cooperate and be candid and honest with judicial and lawyer disciplinary agencies."

In the summary report of its findings, the JCC noted that Moore had resigned from office before the report was submitted. It stated that because Moore had taken this action, it made no additional recommendations for sanctions.

In accordance with Rule 40(12) and (13), when the JCC determines that a judge has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and determines that the violations warrant formal disciplinary action by this court, the judge may request a de novo hearing, after which the court will schedule briefing and oral argument. In this case, Moore has waived his right to a de novo hearing, and he notified the court, through counsel, that he does not seek the opportunity to file a brief or present oral argument.


The court determines that the JCC's findings as to the violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct are supported by the JCC's record. See Rule 40(13). In light of Moore's resignation as a judge, the court concludes that no additional disciplinary action is required. Moore is ordered to reimburse the AOC for the expenses incurred by the JCC investigating and prosecuting this matter.

Lynn, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz, Marconi, and Donovan, J.J., concurred.

So ordered.

DATE: September 28, 2018

ATTEST:



For Eileen Fox, Clerk

Distribution:

Judicial Conduct Committee, JC-17-042-C  
Philip R. Waystack, Jr., Esquire  
Michael A. Delaney, Esquire  
Mr. Paul S. Moore  
File

**THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE**

**SUPREME COURT**

**O R D E R**

**LD-2018-0005, In the Matter of Paul S. Moore, Esquire**

On May 4, 2018, the Attorney Discipline Office (ADO) filed a certified copy of documents in State of New Hampshire v. Paul S. Moore, showing that the respondent, Attorney Paul S. Moore, had pleaded guilty and was convicted of violating RSA 100-C:16, Protection Against Fraud, a class B felony. On May 9, 2018, the court suspended the respondent from the practice of law on an interim basis.

The respondent's conviction for violating RSA 100-C:16 constitutes a "serious crime," as that term is defined in Supreme Court Rule 37(9)(b). Subparagraph 9(d) of Rule 37 provides that "[u]pon the receipt of a certificate of conviction of an attorney for a 'serious crime,' the court may, and shall if suspension has been ordered pursuant to subsection (a) above, institute a formal disciplinary proceeding by issuing an order to the attorney to show cause why the attorney should not be disbarred as result of the conviction."

In accordance with this rule, the May 9, 2018 suspension order also required the respondent to show cause why he should not be disbarred as a result of the conviction. The respondent, through counsel, advised the court that he did not contest disbarment.

In light of the seriousness of the respondent's misconduct, the court concludes that the respondent should be disbarred. THEREFORE, the court orders that Paul S. Moore be disbarred from the practice of law in New Hampshire. He is hereby assessed all expenses incurred by the Professional Conduct Committee in the investigation and prosecution of this matter.

Lynn, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, J.J., concurred.

DATE: July 5, 2018

ATTEST:

*Eileen Fox*  
**Eileen Fox, Clerk**

Distribution:

Janet F. DeVito, Esquire  
Michael A. Delaney, Esquire  
File