No
Previously: <u>No. 18-8801</u>
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PATRICK JOSEPH TERRY - Petitioner
-vs-
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA - Respondent
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE OKLAHOMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
APPENDIX OF PETITIONER

Patrick Joseph Terry, *pro se* 1011 S. Muskogee Avenue Tahlequah OK 74464

Index to Appendices

No.	<u>Date</u>	Description	# Pgs
A	7/9/2020	Supreme Court of the United States Judgment; Patrick Joseph Terry v Oklahoma, Case No. 18-8801; Granting motion of petitioner's motion For leave to proceed in forma pauperis And the petition for writ of certiorari.	
В	8/10/29	Supreme Court of the United States Mandate: Patrick Joseph Terry v Oklahoma, Case No. 18-8801, Vacating the judgment of the lower Court, and remanding for further Consideration in light of McGirt v Oklahoma, 591 U.S, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).	1
C	10/14/20	Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma: Patrick Joseph Terry v Oklahoma, Case No. PC-2018-1076; Order Remanding for Evidentiary Hearing.	6
D	1/19/21	District Court of Ottawa County Oklahoma <i>Patrick Joseph Terry v</i> <i>Oklahoma</i> , Case No. CF-2012-242; Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing Denney, District Judge.	86
\mathbf{E}	1/18/20	Letter Attorney General Cherokee Nation.	1

<u>No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	Description	# Pgs
F	1/18/20	Map Bureau of Indian Affairs showing Historical boundary of the Ottawa Indian Nation Reservation established By Congress in the <i>Treaty of February</i> 23, 1827.	1
G	10/6/21	Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma: Patrick Joseph Terry v Oklahoma, Case No. PC-2018-1076; Order Affirming Denial of Post- Conviction Relief	2
Н	10/13/21	Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma: Patrick Joseph Terry v Oklahoma, Case No. PC-2018-1076; Return of the Court Clerk	1
Ι	10/13/21	Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma: State of Oklahoma v Jeremy Lawhorn, Case No. S-2020-189: Opinion (published) Rowland, Presiding Judge; Hudson concurring; Lumpkin concurring	7
J	01/04/22	Letter from Clerk of Court SCOUS per Application No. 21A290 Order of Justice Gorsuch, directing that an extension of time of sixty (60) days Had been granted to file, or, Until March 5, 2022.	2

Supreme Court of the United States

No. 18-8801

PATRICK JOSEPH TERRY,

Petitioner

 \mathbf{v}

OKLAHOMA

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

THIS CAUSE having been submitted on the petition for writ of certiorari and the response thereto.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is ordered and adjudged by this Court that the motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment of the above court in this cause is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma for further consideration in light of *McGirt* v. *United States*, 591 U. S. ___ (2020).

July 9, 2020

A Theopy SCOTTS. HARRIS

Clerical the pipreme Court of the United States

A True copy SCOTT S. HARRIS

lest:

Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States

Deputy

United States of America, ss:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 18-8801

PATRICK JOSEPH TERRY,

Petitioner

 \mathbf{v} .

OKLAHOMA

To the Honorable the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

GREETINGS:

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma case, PATRICK JOSEPH TERRY, Petitioner v.

OKLAHOMA, Respondent, No. PC-2018-1076, was submitted to the SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES on the petition for writ of certiorari and the response thereto; and the Court

Having granted the petition.

It is ordered and adjudged on July 9, 2020, by this Court that the judgment of the above court in this cause is vacated, and the case remanded to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma for further consideration in light of *McGirt* v. *Oklahoma*, 591 U. S. ___ (2020).

THIS CAUSE IS REMANDED to you in order that such proceedings may be had in the said cause, in conformity with the judgment of this Court above stated, as accord with right and justice, and the Constitution and Laws of the United States.

Witness the Honorable JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., Chief Justice of the United States, the 9th day of July, in the year Two Thousand and Twenty.

Clerk with supreme Court of the United States

A True copy SCOTT S. HARRIS
Test:

Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States

Deputy

Petitioner's Appendix





IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA STATE OF OKLAHOMA

OCT 14 2020

PATRICK JOSEPH TERRY,	JOHN D. HADDEN
Petitioner, v.	CLERK No. PC-2018-1076
STATE OF OKLAHOMA,	
Decnandant	} }

ORDER REMANDING FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

The Petitioner has appealed to this Court from an order of the District Court of Ottawa County denying his application for postconviction relief in Case No. CF-2012-242. Petitioner was found guilty following a non-jury trial and convicted of Manufacturing a Controlled Dangerous Substance Within 2,000 Feet of a School, in violation of 63 O.S. § 2-401 (Count 1), Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance, in violation of 63 O.S. § 2-402(A) (Count 2), and Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, in violation of 63 O.S. § 2-405 (Count 3). He was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment on Count 1, six years imprisonment on Count 2, and one year imprisonment on Count 3. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. Petitioner's convictions were affirmed by this Court. See Terry v. State, 2014 OK CR 14, 334 P.3d 953.

REMAND this case to the District Court of Ottawa County, for an evidentiary hearing to be held within sixty (60) days from the date of this Order.

We request the Oklahoma Attorney General and Ottawa County
District Attorney work in coordination to effect uniformity and
completeness in the hearing process. Upon Petitioner's presentation of
prima facie evidence as to the Petitioner's legal status as an Indian and
as to the location of the crime in Indian Country, the burden shifts to
the State to prove it has subject matter jurisdiction.

The hearing shall be transcribed and the court reporter shall file an original and two (2) certified copies of the transcript with the trial court clerk within twenty (20) days after the hearing is completed. The District Court shall make written findings of fact and conclusions of law, to be submitted to this Court within twenty (20) days after the filing of the transcripts in the District Court. The District Court shall address only the following issues:

the Clerk of this Court within twenty (20) days after the District Court's written findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed in this Court.

Provided however, if the parties agree what the evidence will show with regard to the questions presented, they may enter into a written stipulation setting forth those facts upon which they agree and which answer the questions presented and provide the stipulation to the District Court. In this event, no hearing on the questions presented is necessary. Transmission of the record regarding the matter, the District Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law and supplemental briefing shall occur as set forth above.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court shall transmit copies of the following, with this Order, to the District Court of Ottawa County: Petitioner's Appeal of Order Denying Application for Post-Conviction Relief Post-Conviction Petition in Error and Brief in Support filed with the Clerk of this Court on October 22, 2018.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

WITNESS OUR HANDS AND THE SEAL OF THIS COURT this

_day of <u>October</u>, 2020.

DAVID B. LEWIS, Presiding Judge

	The state of the s	
1	APPEARANCES continued	Page 2
2	On behalf of the MIAMI TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA: Robin Lash	
3	JACOBSON, MAGNUSON, ANDERSON & HALLORAN, PC 180 East Fifth Street, #940	
4	St. Paul, Minnesota 55101 651-644-4710	
5	rlash@thejacobsonlawgroup.com	
6	On behalf of the AMICI WYANDOTTE NATION: Michael D. McMahan	
7	William Norman Katie Klass	
8	HOBBS, STRAUS, DEAN & WALKER, LLP 101 Park Avenue, #700	
9	Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 405-602-9425	
10	mmcmahan@hobbsstraus.com	
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16 17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1	Page 3
	EXHIBIT INDEX
2	Exhibit Page
3	1 October 14, 2020 Letter from Cherokee
4	Nation 12
5	2 Bureau of Indian Affairs Map of Historical
6	Ottawa Nation 12
7	3 18 U.S.C. SS 1151, Indian Country
8	Defined 12
9	4 United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634
10	(1978)
11	5 Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ
12	of Certiorari, Patrick Joseph Terry v. State of
13	Oklahoma, Case No. 18-8801 (U.S. Supreme Court,
14	filed Aug. 5, 2018) 12
15	6 Wiggan v. Conolly, 163 U.S. 56 (1896) 12
16	7 Ottawa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Ohio Dept. of
17	Natural Resources, 541 F.Supp.2d 971 (N.D. Ohio
18	2008)
19	8 Ottawa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Logan, 577
20	F3d. 634 (6th Cir. 2009) 12
21	9 Treaty with the Ottawa, 7 Stat. 359, 1831
22	WL 4159 (Aug. 30, 1831)
23	10 Treaty with the Ottawa of Blanchard's Fork
24	and Roche De Boeuf, 12 Stat. 1237, 1862 WL 10265
25	(June 24, 1862) 12

1		
1	Pag EXHIBITS continued	94
2	Exhibit	:
3	11 Treaty with the Seneca, Mixed Seneca and	
4	Shawnee, Quapaw, Etc., 15 Stat. 513, 1867 WL 24064	
5	(Feb. 23, 1867)	
6	12 Public Law 943, 84 Cong. Ch 909, 70 Stat.	
7	963	:
8	13 Public Law 90-63, 81 Stat. 166, 90th	
9	Congress - First Session 12	
10	14 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S.Ct. 2452	
11	(2020)	
12	15 Act of June 17, 1954, c. 303 SS 1, 68	
13	Stat. 250	
14	16 Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United	
15	States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) 12	
16	17 Public Law 95-281, 95th Congress - Second	
17	Session, 92 Stat 246	
18	18 25 U.S.C. SS 1300k Public Law 103-324,	
19	103rd Congress - Second Session, 108 Stat 2156 12	
20	19 Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin; Restoration	
21	of Federal Supervision 28	
22		
23		
24		
25		
		, ,

1	THE COURT: We will go on the record on
2	Ottawa County Case Number CF-12-242. This is also
3	the Court of Criminal Appeals matter PC-18-1076,
4	Patrick Joseph Terry vs. The State of Oklahoma. He
5	had filed a motion for post-conviction relief. The
6	court has received an order from the Oklahoma Court
7	of Criminal Appeals directing me to conduct this
8	evidentiary hearing regarding the aspect of
9	Mr. Terry's motion claiming the State of Oklahoma
10	lacked jurisdiction to try him in that particular
11	case number. We have present here in the courtroom
12	Mr. Kenny Wright here, the district attorney for
13	Ottawa County, and
14	MS. HUNT: Good morning, Your Honor.
15	Caroline Hunt from the Oklahoma Attorney General's
16	Office, also on behalf of the State.
17	THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Hunt.
18	I believe Mr. Terry is with us by video;
19	correct, Mr. Terry?
20	MR. TERRY: Yes.
21	THE COURT: Okay. All right. That's you,
22	sir. All right. Patrick Terry is also present.
23	Then we also have Mr. Joe Halloran here;
24	correct, sir?
25	MR. HALLORAN: Yes, Your Honor, good
	1

1 morning. 2 THE COURT: You are here on behalf of? 3 So, Your Honor, I'm here on MR. HALLORAN: behalf of the Amici Ottawa Tribe, Miami Tribe. 4 5 THE COURT: All right. 6 MR. HALLORAN: Eastern Shawnee Tribe and Shawnee Tribe, and with me here today are Attorney 8 Katie Klass, Michael McMahan and William Norman who 9 represent the Amici Wyandotte Nation, who joined in 10 the joint brief that we filed --11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. HALLORAN: -- with the court. 13 sorry, Your Honor, also with me is the general 14 counsel, Robin Lash, for the Miami Tribe of 15 Oklahoma. 16 I think that you've named THE COURT: 17 everybody that's on the screen then. 18 So I think we're ready to go. Is there

anybody else that anyone is aware of that needs to be attending this hearing, whether in person or by Zoom or Skype that is not -- has not been recognized?

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Your Honor, my name is Peter MR. GRIFFIN: Griffin. I'm an attorney with the Jacobson Law Group, Mr. Halloran's firm. I do not have an

Page 7 1 appearance in, but I am appearing just as a member 2 of the public, if that's all right. 3 THE COURT: That's fine. Sure. It's an 4 open proceeding. 5 My name is MR. BUZZARD: Yes, Your Honor. 6 I represent the Peoria Tribe of Greq Buzzard. Indians of Oklahoma. We did make an appearance, but the Tribe elected not to join the Amici brief, and 8 I'm also here as a member of the public, if that's 10 all right with the court. 11 THE COURT: Certainly. Certainly. 12 right. Anybody else that we don't have down on our 13 record yet? 14 Hearing none, I think we're good to go 15 here. All right. Let me just inquire first of all, 16 is there any stipulations to be made here before we 17 begin, or are we just waiting for Mr. Terry to make 18 his prima facie case here? 19 I think we do have some MR. WRIGHT: 20 stipulations to enter into. 21 THE COURT: Mr. Wright, if you could --22 MR. WRIGHT: Either one.

THE COURT: Your name again, ma'am?

MS. HUNT: Caroline Hunt.

THE COURT:

23

24

25

stipulations to offer here?

MS. HUNT: Yes, Your Honor. I don't have it prepared in the form of stipulations, but there are a number of matters we agree on, and documentation in support of those undisputed facts are included in an exhibit packet I prepared for the court. I mailed a copy to Mr. Terry. Hopefully, he can confirm whether he received that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HUNT: But as far as the stipulated facts, we agree that he does have an Indian blood quantum and we have a letter, a tribal membership verification letter reflecting that, and also that he was a registered citizen of the Cherokee Nation at the time of the crimes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HUNT: So as in other McGirt cases, the State takes no position legally on Indian status, but we do agree that these are all the facts Your Honor needs to decide Indian status, which is a two-part showing of some Indian blood and whether he's recognized as an Indian by a tribe or the federal government.

THE COURT: Okay. Any other stipulations to offer?

MS. HUNT: We do -- we do also agree, Mr.

2 Wright has confirmed, that the crimes occurred

3 within the historical boundaries of the Ottawa

4 Nation.

6

7

8

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

for these events.

5 THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HUNT: So as far as location, that is agreed as well. The dispute here does come down to current status as a reservation.

9 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Terry, you 10 heard Ms. Hunt's offering of those stipulations. 11 Mr. Terry, are you in agreement with those facts

that she's offered to the court?

MR. TERRY: Yes, Your Honor. I am agreeable to the fact that they have determined that I'm a citizen of the Cherokee Nation, that I have a quantum of blood pursuant to the Bureau of --Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs. Ι also agree with the State's Exhibit 2, which shows the outline of the Ottawa Nation, pursuant to the Treaty of 1867, which was the argument that ultimately got us here today. It shows clearly in her exhibit that I am well within the boundaries of the Ottawa Nation where the search incident to arrest occurred, prior to the crime and prosecution

I hope Your Honor has the motions that I filed. One of them is to adopt the joint appendix, the exhibits packet that the State submitted, because use of that exhibit packet will clearly lead you to the conclusion that this was Indian country, based on the Brief of Amici, that was filed on January 6th, and the brief I filed on October 18th, 2018, in the Court of Criminal Appeals.

If your judge -- as Your Honor is aware, the remand from the Court of Criminal Appeals on October 14th, 2020, specifically detailed that the clerk of the appellate courts would forward both my petition in error with Judge Haney's order attached, as well as my appeal of order denying post-conviction relief. These will be the two documents that I would have submitted on my behalf, as well as the motions that I filed subsequent to that order.

Your Honor has a motion showing my degree of Indian blood, which the State's attorney has already stipulated to. As for me, I want to stipulate to the authenticity of the State's exhibits. I would like to use them as joint exhibits when you review the briefs. I would also like to stipulate to the facts presented in the

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11

12

My, Lechos 13

14

15

Zrd (080

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

based on the admitted exhibits.

THE COURT: All right. Would you agree, Ms. Hunt, that at this point Mr. Terry has made a prima facie case for his admission for Indian blood, that he does have Indian blood as well as the membership in the Cherokee Tribe and that the crime, again, prima facially occurred within the boundaries of Ottawa Nation?

> MS. HUNT: Agreed, Your Honor.

All right. So with that being THE COURT: the case, it now goes to the State here has the burden of proving that, in fact, the State does have jurisdiction of this matter. So, Ms. Hunt, go ahead and proceed there at the podium.

MS. HUNT: Thank you, Your Honor. Before I turn to the disestablishment issue, I would like to say, for the record, for preservation purposes, it is the State's position that Petitioner Terry's jurisdictional claim is waived for his failure to raise it until a second post-conviction application and by the doctrine of latches; however, we acknowledge this is beyond the scope of the remand order and the determinations this court has specifically been instructed to make.

So turning to the Indian country issue,

the State's position is simple. The Ottawa reservation was disestablished when in 1956 federal supervision of the Tribe was terminated, thereby removing federal superintendence, which is a necessary element of reservation status. And as I said before -- we've already gone over the things -- we agreed to the location within the historical boundaries.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Then the question I'll spend the most time on is disestablishment. That is covered -- so that brings us to Exhibit 3 in the packet. That is Section 1151 of Title 18. It provides the definition of Indian country that's relevant here. Under Subsection A, Indian country includes, "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation." A portion of that definition, "under the jurisdiction of the United States Government," is very important in this case as I will explain.

Continuing on, as far as the definition of a reservation, Exhibit 4 in the packet, the Supreme Court case, United States vs. John, a Major Crimes

Act case, the court said, The question as to
reservation status is "whether the land in question
'had been validly set apart for the use of the
Indians as such, under the superintendence of the
Government.'" That's on page 649 of John. So as we
see in the Supreme Court's plain language, a

THE COURT: Excuse me, what page did you say that is on?

MS. HUNT: 649, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

necessary element --

MS. HUNT: So as we see in that language from John, a necessary element of reservation status is federal superintendence. So turning to the Ottawa Indians in particular, as I've gone over this morning and in the Attorney General's Office brief in opposition before the Supreme Court, which is Exhibit 5 in the packet, we've previously admitted that there was at one point a reservation. I'm not disputing that this morning, but I have included the historical documents for Your Honor's reference.

As I said, Exhibit 5 is our brief in opposition, filed before the Supreme Court while the Murphy -- McGirt litigation was still pending. It goes over a lot of that history. Exhibits 6 through

1 8 are some cases that provide helpful history on the
2 Ottawas, and then Exhibits 9 through 11 are the
3 operative treaties, as far as originally
4 establishing the reservation.

Continuing on to disestablishment, prior to the 1956 termination of the Tribe, the Ottawa faced a similar fate as the five tribes, being subjected to allotment and various other measures. However, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in McGirt, I'll be clear that the State is not relying on allotment or statehood to argue disestablishment here; rather, the engine of disestablishment in this case is the Act of August 3rd, 1956 titled, "An Act to provide for the termination of federal supervision over the property of the Ottawa Tribe of Indians in the State of Oklahoma and the individual members thereof, and for other purposes." This is Exhibit 12 in the packet.

This court previously found that this Act,
Public Law 943, which I'll refer to as the
Termination Act, disestablished the reservation, and
that's from this Court's September 2018 order, pages
5 through 7. But for purposes of the record and in
light of the intervening law in McGirt, I will
explain the effect of the Termination Act and why

McGirt does not change this Court's earlier conclusion that the reservation was, in fact, disestablished.

As way of background, this Termination Act was not limited to the Ottawa. It was part of the so-called termination era starting in 1953 and lasting through the mid 1960s, in which Congress adopted a policy of terminating the trust relationship between some Indian tribes and the federal government and, in furtherance of that policy, passed a series of acts severing the trust relationship with more than 100 Indian tribes or bands. And the Termination Act here provided a number of provisions typical of such acts and that are relevant to the question before this court with regard to disestablishment.

The opening act -- excuse me, the opening clause of the Act provides that its purpose "is to provide for the termination of Federal supervision over the trust and restricted property of the Ottawa Tribe of Indians," and I'm jumping forward a little, "and for a termination of Federal services furnished to such Indians because of their status as Indians."

Under Section 2 the Secretary of the Interior was directed to transfer to each member of the Ottawa

Tribe unrestricted title to funds or other personal property then being held in trust by the federal government. Also under that section, all restrictions on the land were lifted and the members

received unrestricted title to their land.

1

2

3

5

7

10

11

12

13

14

1.5

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Section 8A is also very important. Federal trust relationship, " and I'm quoting "to the affairs of the Ottawa Tribe and its members shall terminate three years after the date of this Act, and thereafter individual members of the tribe shall not be entitled to any of the services performed by the United States for Indians because of their status as Indians. All statutes of the United States which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall no longer be applicable to the members of the tribe, and the laws of the several States shall apply to the tribe and its members in the same manner as they apply to other citizens or persons within their jurisdiction." After litigation in the Indian Court of Claims, Congress at last provided for the final payments to the tribes -- excuse me, to the Tribe in the Act of 1967, which is Exhibit 13 in the packet.

the Termination Act, the Ottawa Tribe lost its

So when we look at the plain language of

federal supervision, and, as I discussed, that's a necessary element to reservation status. We find that both in Section 1151 and in the Supreme Court's opinion in John. And so when that element, federal superintendence, was terminated here, so was any reservation status. In fact, the Tribe's Amicus brief essentially admits this point.

On page 20 the Tribe's brief admits repeatedly that the termination statute ended the federal government's relationship with the Ottawa Tribe. Another example, on page 22, "The termination statute ended federal supervision of the Ottawa Tribe." And that is exactly why the Termination Act disestablished the reservation, because federal superintendence is a necessary element.

The Court of Criminal Appeals, of course, asks this court, in its remand order, to apply the analysis in McGirt, which I've included for Your Honor's convenience as Exhibit 14 in the packet. While McGirt is relevant, it is like comparing apples and oranges, because the State is taking a very different position as to disestablishment here. As I've already said, we're not pointing to the allotment or statehood era legislation, but

termination of the federal supervision of the Tribe.

That's something that did not happen with the Creeks in McGirt.

In fact, one of the arguments that the State made in McGirt that was rejected is that the first -- allotment was often the first step in a plan ultimately aimed at disestablishment. The Supreme Court agreed, that is often a first step. Congress' policy at the time of the allotment era was to -- for a time to continue the reservation system and trust status of Indian lands, but to allot tracts to individual Indians for agriculture and grazing; thus, once all the lands had been allotted and the trust expired, the reservation could be abolished.

The problem for the State in the case of the Creek Nation, however, is that while this plan was set in motion with the General Allotment Act, Congress never followed through, and that's where the Supreme Court in McGirt said, "Just as wishes are not laws, future plans aren't either. Congress may have passed allotment lands to create the conditions for disestablishment, but to equate allotment with disestablishment would confuse the first step of a march with arrival at its

destination."

That's the difference here. We don't have just a first step towards disestablishment. We have arrival at that destination with the Termination Act. That history, as far as the various treaties and legislation regarding the Ottawa Tribe that were passed in the years prior to termination, are set out in more detail in the brief in opposition, but all of that, ultimately, culminated with disestablishment and termination in the 1954 Termination Act.

There's another point I'd like to make about McGirt. McGirt held that "to disestablish a reservation, Congress must express" -- excuse me, "clearly express its intent to do so, commonly with an explicit reference to session or other language evidencing the present and total surrender of all tribal interests." This is language that the Tribe's brief repeatedly relies on to argue that there are no words similar to this in the Termination Act. But I would have two responses to that.

First, we have to look at the context of McGirt. Again, this is a case that was deciding whether allotment and statehood era legislation

disestablished a reservation, and so the State was arguing, look at all these things that were taken from the Tribe, and all the land was passed into private hands, and so it's in that context that the Supreme Court is saying, yes, but we still need this language with the -- you know, present and total surrender of all tribal interests. Again, here, it's really a different kind of case, because it's this federal superintendence element that Congress is clearly expressing its disestablishment of the reservation through.

The second thing I would add is in the same breath as that quoted language, the McGirt court said that "Disestablishment has never required any particular form of words." So we don't need magic words. We do need words that clearly express Congress' intent, but here Congress did that.

Another source the McGirt court used is looking at language from other statutes to decide what Congress meant as far as the statutes aimed at the Creeks.

So we can do that here as well.

As I said before, there were many other tribes and bands subject to the termination era, and one such example, that I've included as Exhibit 15 in the packet, is the Termination Act for the

1 Menominee Tribe, which was very similar to the 2 Ottawas. Then Exhibit 16 in the packet is a Supreme Court case, Menominee Tribe of Indians vs. United 3 And the Supreme Court in that case was States. examining a claim regarding the Menominee's fishing rights in a prior reservation, and they never 6 questioned whether the reservation was 7 disestablished because of the Termination Act. The dissent expressly says more than once that the 10 reservation was terminated and the majority never 11 disagrees with that. So it is admittedly dicta, but 12 it is telling that there was no question among any 13 of the justices that the Termination Act had 14 disestablished the reservation, and so it provides 15 persuasive authority here where we have a very 16 similar Termination Act with the Ottawa.

And the Menominee Tribe case also forecloses another argument relied on by the Tribe. On page 22 of their brief they argue that because the Termination Act preserved the Tribe's water rights, it must have not terminated the reservation, but this is nearly identical to the issue in Menominee Tribe. The Supreme Court held that the Tribe still had fishing rights in the prior reservation, but it never held that there was a

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

reservation. So, in other words, if the Tribe's
theory there -- here, excuse me, were correct, that
water rights equal continuing reservation, the
Menominee Tribe would have turned out differently.
The Supreme Court would have necessarily found
there's still a reservation when it found there were
water rights.

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The final thing I need to discuss is the 1978 Act that restored federal recognition of the Ottawa Tribe, included as Exhibit 17 in your packet. And among other tribes at issue in that act, this act reinstated the Ottawa Tribe as a federally supervised and recognized Indian Tribe; however, nothing in the Restoration Act mentioned the former lands of the Ottawa Tribe, and it certainly didn't recreate or reestablish a reservation for them. Going back to McGirt, the Supreme Court says that Congress doesn't have to use the word, reservation, or any particular language, but it must evidence some kind of set-aside for a Tribe, as examples where land is either held in trust for the benefit of the Tribe or owned by the Tribe in fee simple, as was the case of the Creeks.

Here, when we look at the Reinstatement Act for the Ottawa, we don't have any kind of

set-aside, and so even if you've got federal supervision, again, you don't have a set-aside of the land for the Tribe. And practically speaking, this outcome makes sense as well, as far as the conclusion, there's no recreation of the reservation, because to do so -- to recreate it would have been very complicated. This underscores the fact that Congress would have done so expressly. The Tribe's original lands had been allotted as the brief in op covers. It had no recognized land base by the time of the Termination Act, all restrictions on the original land had been removed, land has passed into non-Indian hands, and so if Congress were to restore that reservation and backtrack on decades of settled expectations, it would have made it clear that's what it's doing. And again, we can look at contemporaneous acts of Congress to discern its meaning, and, here again, the Tribe's brief --I'll rely on their own example. They point to the Restoration Act of the Menominee Tribe and I believe -- I did not have this. I prepared my exhibit packet before I got their brief, but I believe Mr. Wright has this Act, if we may approach and give that to Your Honor.

1

2

3

4

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

State believes that the Termination Act dissolved

24

25

the treaty.

So the part I'm going to

Okay.

THE COURT:

MS. HUNT:

25

talk about is under Section 903d, Subsection C.

THE COURT: Okay.

1

3

4

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

So again, the Tribe's brief MS. HUNT: points to both this Restoration -- excuse me, Restoration Act and to a Wisconsin case, holding that it recreated the Menominee reservation, but I disagree with the Tribe's assertion that this Restoration Act is nearly identical -- that is the phrase they used on page 26 of the brief -- to the Restoration Act we have here with the Ottawa. This section I've directed Your Honor to is exactly the important distinction. In particular, this subsection deals with property, and the sentence almost all the way down, I would direct the court to, talks about the transfer of land stating, "The land transfer shall be taken in the name of the United States in trust for the Tribe and shall be their reservation." So that is a clear set-aside, you know, Congress is even using the word, restoration, and we have no comparable language in the Ottawa's Restoration Act, so, in fact, this underscores the fact that Congress did not clearly express its intent to recreate any reservation with the Ottawa's Restoration Act.

1 in the brief in opposition, and that's discussed on

2 | pages 11 and 20 of the brief in opposition. Then

3 I've included the Restoration Act as Exhibit 18, and

4 that involves a different band of Ottawas not

5 | included here -- excuse me, not involved here. And,

6 again, Congress used very specific language as far

7 as the set-aside stating, "The land acquired by or

transferred to the Secretary under or pursuant to

9 this section shall be taken in the name of the

10 | United States in trust for the bands and shall be

11 part of the respective band's reservation."

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: Which exhibit were you just reading from?

MS. HUNT: Exhibit 18. So that is a different band of Ottawa, in which their Restoration Act expressed clear intent by Congress to recreate a reservation. So again, using the kind of statutory analysis in McGirt where we compare acts of Congress to determine whether its words intend to reestablish a reservation, we have no similar language of set-aside in the Ottawa's Restoration Act. Congress knows how to disestablish a reservation and used language evidencing that. Likewise, it knows how to recreate a reservation, as shown in these examples, and it did not do that here.

I have nothing further. I know I've covered a lot of information, and so I'm happy to provide briefing or proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to this court, if that would be helpful.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Ms. Hunt.

MS. HUNT: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Be seated for the moment.

Mr. Terry, the State has indicated, other than the exhibits that they have offered here and that have been admitted, that they are offering no further evidence as far as their argument here that they do have jurisdiction, so let me address that issue first. I've heard, of course, also from Ms. Hunt her argument here, but do you have any evidence that you wish to present to the court, whether it's by testimony or exhibits to contradict what the State is asserting here, the evidence that they have put forward regarding their contention to still have jurisdiction of this case or did at the time this was tried?

MR. TERRY: Yes, Your Honor, thank you.

THE COURT: Go ahead. Take it pretty slow. It's a little harder with this Zoom to understand everybody than the people that are right

here in court. So if you will, kind of go slow for
us; okay?

MR. TERRY: That will be fine, sir. Thank you.

Your Honor, I would point out to the State's last statement indicated that Congress knows how to disestablish a reservation. The State's reliance on the 1956 Termination Act is a poor window in which to drive the sovereignty truck through. There is nowhere in the language of the 1956 Termination Statute that expressly repeals or disestablishes any reservation boundary, whether it be for the Ottawas or the Peoria or the Wyandotte who had similar termination statutes entered around approximately the same time by Congress.

One thing, the Termination Statute ended the federal supervision of the tribal property, which is true, it ended certain federal services available to individual Indians, and it made state law applicable to tribal members; however, nothing in the Termination Statute showed an unequivocal intent to disestablish the Ottawa reservation. The applicable laws that the Termination Statute may have been beside -- which that means that's sales tax and property tax, but it certainly did not

discuss tribal boundaries or tribal properties.

1

3

5

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

While the Termination Statute ended the federal government's relationship with the Ottawa Tribe, an examination of the language of that Act reveals nothing in it that evinces explicit Congressional intent to disestablish the Ottawa reservation, and that is required by McGirt.

Now, Justice Gorsuch was very clear in In all this history, there simply was at no moment when any act of Congress dissolved the Creek Tribe or disestablished its reservation, and this is the same year. This is the truth in this case. While there were a number of statutes enacted, the State of Oklahoma asserted sovereignty over the Indians of -- in a tribe, there never was an act by Congress that clearly disestablished the reservation boundaries. We want to ascertain and follow the original meaning in the law. And the law was clear in the 1956 Act that the Tribe's formal relationship with the government would be severed. specifically, in Section 11, I believe, of that Act, the federal government discusses that no language within this Act shall ever break the water rights of the Ottawa Indian Tribe.

1 Honor, because it indicates very clearly that the 2 federal government continues to view the land as being reservation land and that the Ottawas retain 3 their water rights. Why would they say that they have water rights to anything if they were not bound 6 by treaty? And that is correct, Section 11. "Nothing in this act shall ever break any water 7 rights of the Ottawa Tribe or its members." We can 8 see clearly, here, Your Honor, that Congress' 10 subsequent treatment of the Tribe, even as time 11 progressed, clearly recognized that they had water 12 rights within the reservation boundaries established

While the State's argument is very powerful regarding the Menominee Tribe, it falls flat here with regard to the Ottawa, members of the Tribe and their sovereign status. The Termination Statute, of course, as you know, has been argued and was repealed, and when it was repealed, it was clear that Congress at that time did not wish to reinstate their former relations and the -- excuse me.

THE COURT: You might let us know, Mr.

Terry. Mr. Terry, just a moment. Mr. Terry.

MR. TERRY: Pardon me?

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

under the 1867 Act.

THE COURT: Would you let us know what

that 17, a review would indicate that there is

25

language that clearly revokes any implication that the Termination Statute might have imposed. The termination of the federal Ottawa Tribe does not serve as an explicit expression by Congress of its intent to disestablish the Ottawa reservation and that the 1978 Act would clearly indicate, the reservation statute expressly repeals the 1956 Termination Statute and, otherwise, reinstated any treaty rights that may have been diminished by the Termination Statute.

. 23

Any legal relevance of the 1956 statute was divested in 1978. It did not provide a savings clause, similar to what our state constitution has, to address changes in statutory authority. You know our state savings clause provides if you're convicted today of a crime under the law before a bench of competent jurisdiction and you receive a sentence of incarceration or a fine and then 10 days later that law is repealed and is decriminalized, under our state savings clause, the conviction standing on the first day cannot be repealed by intent.

Congress is very clear when it wants to address issues like this, and it also would include language pertinent to that fact. Not only did

Congress not provide language in the 1956

2 Termination Act regarding reservation

disestablishment, the fact is, even if they had,

4 | they repealed it in the 1978 statute. It was

5 divested. Everything in 1956 was divested. It was

6 as if it never happened. There was no indication

7 | that Congress at all wished to do anything but

8 correct an injustice by implicating -- by passing

9 the 1978 statute.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I would point out that Congress knows how to take its land back. They are not unfamiliar with that. There have been historical references throughout the 20th century that Congress has moved to take back land, but not in this instance. The area of land in question was so small and seemingly insignificant to the power of the federal government that they just didn't think to take it back, and there is no Act that can be pointed to by the State or the respondent that clearly shows that the land was dissolved or disestablished.

Furthermore, Your Honor, as you well know, the Ottawa Indian Tribe, as well as the other eight tribes or the nine tribes reaching out there, all have a robust relationship with one another and with other sovereigns and the State of Oklahoma. They

1 have never stopped living. And simply by passing,

2 by saying, oh, we're not going to provide you

3 | federal assistance anymore, that in no way says

4 we're taking your land back, and they didn't. They

5 | haven't, and they won't now.

As far as Tribal sovereignty is there, I believe the State has not made its case that anything has occurred that would indicate that the discretion of the Congress has been reversed. As I'm going to point out in McGirt, "once a lot of land is set aside for an Indian reservation," as is the case here for the Ottawa Indian Tribe in 1867, "no matter what happens to the title of that individual plot within the area, the entire block retains its reservation status until Congress explicitly indicates otherwise."

Now, Your Honor, I know you have a lot of material to go through up there before you enter your order, and I would urge you to review it seriously, but the reservation statute was established in the 1867 Treaty, which is marked as People's Exhibit 11. People's Exhibit 11, Section 16 clearly points to the fact that Congress satisfied this land -- oh, my Lord. She got -- I'm sorry, I'm sorry, Your Honor, I misspoke. That is

Exhibit 11, I'm sorry, Article 16 provides clearly that "The west part of the Shawnee reservation, ceded to the United States by the third article, is hereby sold to the Ottawas at one dollar per acre; and for the purpose of paying for said reservation the United States shall take the necessary amount," then it gives the physical parameters, the geographic location of the reservation, which the State has kindly enough provided in the map, which is Exhibit Number 2.

Exhibit Number 2 clearly shows the boundaries of the Ottawa reservation as established under Article 16 of the 1867 Act, and there has been nothing since regarding this land or the language establishing this reservation that has been enacted by any act of Congress, who has the only authority to take away that reservation boundary.

The court in McGirt said that unlawful acts committed with sufficient vigor over a sufficiently long period of time are not enough to justify the unlawful acts. And simply because the infrastructure in Miami, Oklahoma, has grown up within the historical boundaries of the Ottawa reservation does not in any way displace or disestablish those boundaries.

While the State's vigorous argument regarding the 1956 Act appears to lay itself down in credibility to the conclusion that perhaps the relationship of the members of the Tribe was formally terminated with the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Department of Interior, there is nothing in that act or any other legislation that indicates that the boundaries established under

Article 16 of the 1867 Act have been disestablished.

What they did with the Menominee tribes in Wisconsin or what they did with the Mohawk Tribe in Nebraska or in any of the hundreds of various tribes around the country, that's moot. It's nothing but smoke and mirrors. The fact is, the Treaty of 1867, Article 16 established the reservation, and it said so by name, and nothing since has occurred that would in any way effectively disestablish or terminate those reservation boundaries.

Your Honor, as to this point I am no expert in Tribal law, but I think that the evidence is very, very clear that the Treaty was established in 1867, the reservation boundaries were set, there were many subsequent acts and incidents, not only by the State of Oklahoma but by the federal Congress, regarding the Tribe and tribal members, but once

again, there is nothing that can be pointed to that clearly contains language disestablishing this reservation boundary.

As such, given the fact that the State has stipulated that I'm an American Indian, that I'm a member of a Tribe and that I have a quantum of Indian blood, that has appeared to satisfy the first prong of the two prong McGirt litmus test.

The only other prong left as a question of fact for you to decide, Your Honor, is whether the boundary still exists, it still survives. I would ask you to look to the Brief of Amicus that was filed on January 6th, 2021, on behalf of the -- Joseph Halloran, who is a member attending these proceedings. The brief clearly discusses all of the aspects of the establishment and the history of the Tribe, up to and including the date where the search incident to my arrest occurred, July 12th, 2012.

Having said that, I hope I've made it clear, I hope you could hear me clearly. I'm having a little trouble hearing you, but I think I've made the case, and other courts seem to agree, that as far as under McGirt, this treaty boundary for the reservation of the Ottawa Indian Tribe still exists even today. I would ask you, Your Honor, if counsel

for the Ottawa have a moment or two to argue before you, I think perhaps they can make it more clear about how this boundary remains intact, and I would ask that you would allow them to have five minutes, if possible.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. TERRY: Having said that, that's my statement to the court for now.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. TERRY: The introduction of the other evidence by the State that I haven't seen, but which I stipulate to, may indicate that I should have maybe ten more days to brief, if necessary, but it doesn't seem like they have put much of a defense up, based on the fact that they have relied on the Menominee Tribe relationship with Wisconsin and not on the Ottawa Tribe's relationship with Oklahoma. I just don't think they have met their burden.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. TERRY: Having said that, Your Honor, I hope I was clear enough, and I would refer you to my brief filed October 18th, 2018, before the Court of Criminal Appeals, which was remanded back to this court on October 14th, 2020, as one of the review instruments available to the court in making its

determination as to the veracity of my claim, and I would refer you also to the brief of Amici, that was filed January 6th, 2021, as far as establishing the real time relationship with the Ottawas, the State of Oklahoma, and the federal government. Their evidence, too, concludes clearly, under even a cursory review of the statutes, there has been nothing said by Congress to disestablish the reservation boundaries or to take away the reservation or Indian country status of the land. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Terry. I've heard you very well. You've very eloquently made your position known here. I take it you don't have any other evidence actually to offer, you primarily offered argument referring to the exhibits that were already admitted here; am I correct there? Am I correct that there's no other evidence, Mr. Terry?

MR. TERRY: No -- yeah, there is. That is correct. I've already submitted a couple of motions to you, Your Honor, and you should have one today that states it's a reference to another Indian sovereignty case that was decided on December 9th, and I filed a motion with you today that is asking you to review this in your discussion. This is the

1 case of Keith Davis vs. the State of Oklahoma and

- 2 this is a -- oh, Lord. Here we go. Davis vs.
- 3 | Oklahoma. It was decided on December 9th, and it
- 4 talks about a similar case remanded back, but it is
- 5 | talking about the Choctaw Nation. Do you happen to
- 6 have that motion yet, Judge?
- THE COURT: I don't have the file here in
- 8 | front of me.
- 9 MR. TERRY: Okay. Well, I sent this to
- 10 | the court this morning, the court clerk's office.
- 11 THE COURT: Okay.
- 12 MR. TERRY: I was asking you to take
- 13 | judicial notice of Davis vs. Oklahoma. And in
- 14 Davis, on December the 9th, as filed with the Court
- 15 of Criminal Appeals, they had the same dilemma.
- 16 They had the same fact question before them, if the
- 17 petitioner is recognized as an Indian and whether he
- 18 has Indian blood, and second, whether the crime
- 19 occurred within the boundaries of Indian country.
- Using the analysis set forth in McGirt, a
- 21 | judge down in Latimer County, Oklahoma, entered an
- 22 order determining that the reservation boundary of
- 23 | the Choctaw Nation is alive and well today, as a
- 24 sovereign termination and other statutes, and that
- 25 | it completely encompasses Latimer, Pittsburg and

MR. TERRY:

Latimer County.

25

because I think what we need to do is we need to determine what the law is today, what the law was in 2012, in 2017 when Judge Haney considered this matter, and today.

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The law applicable today, Your Honor, is the law that fully reinstated all rights and privileges and expressly repealed the Termination Act of 1959. What that means, Your Honor, is that the Ottawa Tribe was, following restoration, a tribe that had continued to exist through the time of termination as a sovereign and had been returned to a full relationship with the United States. I think it's also important, Your Honor, to consider that following restoration, whatever the State might suggest the Termination Act did, the effect of the law as an express repeal -- the effect that the restoration order as an express legislative appeal of the Termination Act means that the court must proceed as though that law never existed. It is a legal nullity in any statutory language, legislative history. Any material related to that legislation is an empty set from the perspective of the court's consideration of jurisdiction.

We cite case law to Your Honor, that was not responded to by the State, regarding the effect

of an express repeal, and the effect of the express repeal, as I've indicated, is that the repealed statute is to be treated as though it never existed. That's significant, Your Honor. That's significant with respect to the Ottawa Tribe's treaty established reservation boundaries, among other rights.

It's interesting to consider, Your Honor, what the termination period was intended to affect and what it was not intended to affect. And the termination period represented a very short period of time of roughly 20 years where the United States decided that it was going to get out of the Indian business, and what I mean by that is it was going to get out of the responsibility to engage in a government-to-government relationship to provide services and to provide supervision over Indian lands; okay? Case law has demonstrated what is --what logically follows from that, which is what the termination period did not do. You might be confused by that, given the argument of the State which would imply to the contrary.

Termination period policy did not end the existence of the Tribe and, in fact, could not end the existence of the Tribe as an independent

sovereign exercising its own constitutional rights. In addition, the termination period policy has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in the Menominee decision and its progeny that the termination era policy had no intention to and did

not affect the true rights of tribes terminated.

1

2

3

4

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Contrary to the State's representation, the court in Menominee did reach a decision with respect to whether the Menominee tribal -- Tribe and its members continue to benefit from treaty protected rights following its termination, and it said that it would -- it was its conclusion that it would not interpret the abrogation of treaty rights in a back-handed way, that the abrogation of treaty rights has to be clear and it was clearly not the intention of termination period legislation to do that. In fact, the primary sponsor of the termination legislation was quoted at the time that it was enacted for the Menominee Tribe that the enactment in no way affected any treaty reserved rights of the Tribe and its members.

THE COURT: Now, you were referring to which exhibit, sir? You were referring to which exhibit there you just read from a moment ago?

MR. HALLORAN: The Menominee -- the United

1 States versus -- Menominee vs. The United States. 2 I'm not sure what exhibit. 3 THE COURT: I think that was --It is United States Supreme 4 MR. HALLORAN: 5 Court 1968 decision at 391 U.S. 404. 6 THE COURT: Yes. Okay. That was Exhibit 7 16, I believe. Okay. Go ahead. 8 So the issue, Your Honor, MR. HALLORAN: 9 of the implication of termination era legislation is 10 an empty set. It is a distinction between Tribe --11 the tribes of the 1867 Treaty is different, and that is because in the 1980 (inaudible) --12 13 THE COURT: Mr. Halloran, I've lost --14 MR. HALLORAN: (Audio distortion). 15 THE COURT: Mr. Halloran, could you back 16 up just --17 MR. HALLORAN: (Audio distortion). Mr. Halloran? Can you hear 18 THE COURT: 19 me, Mr. Halloran? Can you hear me? If you would 20 back up just a moment, we've lost our connection 21 there for just a short time. If you could back up 22 just a few sentences to what you were saying because 23 we lost you there a little bit.

MR. HALLORAN: Are you hearing me now,

24

25

Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yeah, we hear you now, but there was a few sentences there that you were trying -- that you were saying but just weren't coming through on this side. You were referring, I believe, to the Menominee vs. U.S., Section -- or the Exhibit 16 had mentioned that in there, that quoted, I believe, that the federal government would not in a back-handed way, that that particular -- you may remember that that you quoted from that.

MR. HALLORAN: Yes.

THE COURT: From there forward, we were losing you.

MR. HALLORAN: So, Your Honor, that decision has been followed by a number of courts in the Ninth Circuit and including in the Tenth Circuit, in United States vs. Felter, where the court, applying Menominee, determined that a Ute tribal member continued to benefit from treaty rights reserved by the Ute Tribe even after the Ute Tribe Termination Act.

I think it's important, Your Honor, for this purpose. The Termination Act, in applicability to treaty rights, is relevant because the Ottawa Tribe's reservation is established by Article 16 of the 1867 Treaty. It is a treaty right that a

reservation exists irrespective of the landholding within its boundaries. So reliance on the Termination Act -- while ignoring the effect of the express repeal, reliance on the Termination Act does not get the court to the answer that it needs because the Termination Act, even if it existed with any legal effect, has been interpreted by the courts not to adversely affect treaty rights, and the Ottawa reservation is a treaty right established under Article 16 of the 1867 Treaty.

I think, Your Honor, that it is also important to note that -- so we're walking back in time, right? Let's deal with what the law is right now, and the law right now is there is no Termination Act to interpret. There is (Zoom froze, inaudible) -- even if it did apply, it did not affect treaty rights reserved under the 1867 Treaty.

Moreover, it's important to take a look at what the Restoration Act did. In addition to its express repeal language, it was very clear that the restoration order reversed any diminishment or loss of treaty or other rights of the inherent rights of the Tribe that were affected by the Termination Act. The statute says that it will -- that any -- "that the statute reinstated all rights and privileges of

each of the tribes restored and their members under federal treaty, statute, or otherwise, which may have been diminished or lost pursuant to the Act to them which is hereby repealed."

I don't know how or why we would need to look at implications of other tribes' termination and restoration legislation when the Ottawa restoration legislation is so crystal clear. It restored all treaty rights and privileges that may have been affected by the termination statute. So not only did the restoration statute expressly vacate, expressly repeal the termination statute, but it went a step further and said all rights that may have been diminished are restored.

Now, the State argues to you, flipping the burden, flipping the legal analysis on its head, suggesting, well, we don't see any language that expressly says that the reservation continues to exist, and without that language, the United States didn't intend to create a reservation, but, Your Honor, that's not the test. That's not the test. We're not establishing a reservation. What the restoration statute does is make clear that all rights that existed in 1959 exist today, period, fully.

1 So the question is, did the Ottawa 2 reservation exist before the Termination Act? 3 There's been no dispute or argument to the court that the Ottawa reservation boundaries did not exist 5 at the time of the Termination Act. The State can't turn legislative analysis on its head and suggest 7 that an express repeal and restoration of rights is 8 somehow inadequate because it doesn't spell out 9 every single right restored and that those rights 10 would be excluded if not expressed. The entire 11 repeal of the statute speaks to the legal undoing of 12 the nefarious effects, all effects of the 13 termination statute. 14 So, Your Honor, I think that it's

So, Your Honor, I think that it's important to read the law and interpret the law and apply the law as it exists today, and understanding what law is effective and valid and what isn't.

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Halloran?

MR. HALLORAN: Yes, Your Honor, I'm just

reviewing my notes.

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: That's fine. Take your time.

MR. HALLORAN: So I think, Your Honor, that it's important that following the 1978
Restoration Act that the Ottawa Tribe which, as I've indicated, continued doing business as a sovereign

tribe exercising authority over its people and any of its lands, was restored to a full intergovernmental relationship. More importantly, any rights that were lost, be they federal supervision of land that the Tribe might acquire on its reservation, health care, other benefits that come from that intergovernmental relationship, those are enormously important to the Tribe, and the Tribe is a thriving, growing, self-determined tribal government today.

But let's not mistake the fact that the United States determining to restore that relationship is -- is in any way limiting to what the restoration statute did against any other argument, and that it was to restore all rights and privileges under any treaty or otherwise, and that includes, in the event there's any question about the status of the Ottawa reservation following the Termination Act, it restored all rights under the treaty, the applicable treaty, the 1867 Treaty, and the applicable article is Article 16, which establishes the boundaries.

So here now in the 21st century, it happens that Mr. Terry was engaged in unlawful conduct on an Indian reservation established nearly

two centuries earlier, and, as a result, his conduct was subject to prosecution by the feds and, yes, even the Tribe, if it were to choose to exercise its jurisdiction, but not the State of Oklahoma, because the land within the boundaries of the Ottawa reservation constitutes Indian country under 1153, and the jurisdiction of the State does not extend to conduct -- criminal conduct within Indian country.

I want to review, Your Honor, a couple of additional matters with respect to the State's argument. In discussing -- in discussing language regarding the Ottawa Termination Act and other tribal termination acts, the State suggests that the court must consider the "context" and that there are no magic words for disestablishing a reservation.

Now, that is language that you may have seen argued to a court before McGirt.

Matter of fact, it was an argument made in McGirt based on the test -- the announced -- the three-part test announced in Solem vs. Bartlett, but McGirt made very clear that its test, the three-part test is not a balancing test, and the court was very clear that any language regarding the disestablishment of a reservation must be a clear expression of Congress on the face of the statute.

Legislative history, contemporaneous facts, facts after the fact, cannot be used to create an ambiguity where Congress has either clearly spoken or Congress has either -- as Congress has clearly not spoken. And in this instance, you are obligated to review not just the allotment history, which you've addressed in the Leopard case and the court addressed in the Leopard case, you look at the Termination Act to determine whether the Act expressly terminated or disestablished the reservation. There is no such language.

I think it's also important to note, with respect to Mr. Terry's argument and our argument about water rights that were left undiminished by the Termination Act, that really, Your Honor, gets to the fact that treaty protected rights weren't intended to be undone by the Termination Act, and among those would be water rights, because the reservation boundary is relevant as to the exercise of those water rights, just as it would have been relevant if, like in the Ute case, an Ottawa tribal member, let's say in the 1960s, was hunting on the Ottawa reserve. There would have been a case that arose about those reserve rights, and the fact that the legislation expressly tipped its hat to reserved

treaty rights of the Ottawa indicates (audio
distortion, inaudible) --

THE COURT: Okay. We lost you there.

MR. HALLORAN: Let's talk about also briefly about the State's position with --

THE COURT: Mr. Halloran, I'm sorry.

There just for about 30 seconds we didn't hear you.

MR. HALLORAN: Okay. Am I back?

THE COURT: Yes, you are back. I think you were just finishing your context argument, I believe, and about the rights, the water rights being restored.

MR. HALLORAN: Yes, the water rights were specifically called out by Congress as not affected by termination, which is an acknowledgment that those treaty rights and the exercise of those treaty rights within the treaty established reservation boundary were unaffected. That is the point of mentioning that language, and that language is supported by the case law that you see developed in the Menominee case in 1968 and its progeny which say, yes, that wasn't the intent of the Termination Act to adversely affect the treaty rights.

I want to also return to the State's comment regarding the Restoration Act. It was, I

1 think, the height of -- height of disestablishment 2 by implication, because it suggests that unlike some other restoration statutes, not the Ottawa 3 restoration statute, the Ottawa restoration statute didn't mention the reestablishment of a reservation 5 land base. I don't know what to make of that, other than what we've already spoken about, Your Honor, 7 which is the restoration statute in the Ottawa case 9 is actually more precise and more wide ranging than 10 any other restoration statute that would have qualifications of that sort. 11 It reverses all 12 effects of the Termination Act and expressly 13 repealed it. The fact that the court didn't -- that 14 the Congress didn't talk about the reacquisition of 15 lost land is really of no moment, because that isn't 16 determinative of the existence of a reservation in 17 any event.

But what we do know, Your Honor, is that following reinstatement, about 27 acres of land was restored to Tribal trust status. Up to that point it had been -- prior to the termination, it had been allotted status, as a result of the General Allotment Act. So there was a restoration of land and within the reservation boundaries, as part of the Tribe's reacquisition of its lost land base,

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

that had really been lost over the course of 230 years. They continue that effort to restore that lost land base. Whether or not there was a restoration of trust land within the boundaries, as a result of the Restoration Act, really is immaterial to the effect of the Restoration Act and the existence of the boundaries.

It would appear that in order to -- in the State's view of what was required, this sort of rights not restored unless they were expressed, it would appear as though that the State wouldn't acknowledge the Ottawa reservation unless they went back and ratified and re-executed the 1867 Treaty, but we know that isn't necessary, Your Honor. Your Honor has already ruled in the Leopard case that these reservations were established, that they existed, and with respect to the Tribes that were not subject to termination, continue to exist today, that there has not been any expression of Congress -- clear expression of Congress in any statute that disestablishes the reservation.

So we come back to the question of the law as applicable to the Ottawa Tribe of Oklahoma. Is there any clear expression that the court can consider that the reservation was disestablished,

and, Your Honor, there just isn't any indication of Congress. And to the contrary, the indication of Congress was that the Ottawa Tribe was to be restored to its full status as it existed before the ill-conceived and misguided policies of the termination period.

Finally, there was a fair bit of conversation about the John case, Your Honor, and, frankly, it is an apposite to this case. The John case was not a disestablishment case. The John case related to and addressed whether the United States could recognize and the Tribe could exercise -- the Choctaw could exercise sovereign authority over a reservation that lacks supervision, and that really doesn't have anything to do with this case, and that's why it wasn't addressed in our brief.

So again in closing, Your Honor, the law right now, the law as it exists today with respect to the status of the Ottawa Tribe of Oklahoma and its reservation, the law that applied at the time of the investigation and arrest and charging of Mr. Terry is clear. The Ottawa Tribe of Oklahoma exists, and its reservation boundaries that were never diminished exist today and that the conduct that formed the basis of the criminal charge

occurred in Indian country and is beyond the jurisdiction of the State of Oklahoma to prosecute.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. 4 Halloran.

MR. HALLORAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is there anybody else that's with this, excluding those that are just here watching, that had any other statements to make to the court?

Mr. Halloran, can I safely assume that you pretty much summarized the Amicus briefs that were submitted?

Anyone else? Hearing none, Ms. Hunt or Mr. Wright, do either of you -- since you carry the burden of proof here, I'm going to give you the last shot, if you wish to make any further argument.

MR. WRIGHT: I would, Judge, just a few things.

THE COURT: You might step -- yeah, if you will. Go ahead.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Judge. We've heard talk about a whole bunch of different things. We've talked about individual rights, individual privileges, group rights, group privileges, the existence of a tribe, but really what we're here to

talk about is a reservation, and that's it. So that's what I would urge the court to focus on is the reservation itself and the status of that reservation as of today. When we look at the 1956 Act, what we see there is a whole handful of things, and I would urge the court to read that Act in its entirety to understand overall what was happening there.

So as part of the loss of federal recognition, it's necessary for all of the tribal assets to be resolved, and the Act of '56 begins that process. So one of the things it does is say that "any land held on behalf of the Tribe by the United States is going to be sold and those assets are going to go back to the tribal members." In addition, "any land that's individually held by a tribal member, that is somehow restricted by virtue of it being Indian land is no longer restricted."

So what Congress is doing is taking care of all the land associated with the Ottawa Tribe at that particular point in time, so that when we get to the effective date of that Act in 1959, there isn't any Indian land left. So specifically when we look at Section 8, which is the big one, and this is of the 1956 Act, "federal trust relationship to the

affairs of the Ottawa Tribe and its members shall terminate three years after the date of this Act and, thereafter, individual members of the Tribe shall not be entitled to any of the services performed by the United States for Indians because of their status as Indians." So that's a loss of rights and privileges that the United States accords to individuals as Indians.

In addition, Congress states that "all statutes of the United States which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall no longer be applicable to the members of the Tribe. The laws of the several states shall apply to the Tribe and its members in the same manner as they apply to other citizens or persons within their jurisdiction."

If Congress intended the reservation to continue in perpetuity at that point, they could not have written Section 8. It is incompatible with the idea that a reservation was going to continue after 1959 for the Ottawa Tribe. When we look at -- I mean, there's no -- I think everybody would agree that from 1959, at least until 1978, nobody is going to claim a reservation existed during that time. I mean, you don't -- you don't have any relationship

with the federal government, and the existence of a 1 2 reservation is 100 percent contingent upon that 3 relationship. It's not a thing that exists 4 naturally. It is a pure creation of the United States Congress, and without that relationship between the federal government, Congress and the 6 Tribe, there can be no reservation. It absolutely 8 can't exist, at least in the sense that we're talking about today in relation to criminal 10 jurisdiction, which is really one of the important 11 points.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

We're talking about reservations -whether reservations exist for the purposes of establishing criminal jurisdiction and allotting that jurisdiction between the State, the federal government and the tribes. We know that Congress' intent was not for that -- was not for that reservation to exist anymore, because they say specifically "that the laws of the State will apply to the former members, just as they apply to anyone else," and that includes criminal. So the Major Crimes Act was already in existence at this point in So for the laws of the State to apply to time. those former Indians, there has to not be a reservation anymore.

Now, what probably makes all this a little bit more difficult, looking back in time, is that I would offer to the court that no one in 1956 or 1978 believed that the Ottawa Tribe or any other Indians in Oklahoma had reservations. So when Congress is crafting these acts, again, I would submit that they weren't thinking in the back of their minds, gee, what do we do with this reservation, because the common -- the common perception in 1956 was that there weren't any reservations in Oklahoma, maybe with the exception of the Osage, but probably not even them. Again, in 1978, the legal understanding was, there aren't any reservations in Oklahoma.

So, you know, that's one thing to consider when we look at the Restoration Act is -- and I know this is probably arguing more on the Tribe's behalf, but it may have been that it didn't occur to Congress to include reservation in that particular restoration piece of legislation, because they didn't really think that the Ottawa Tribe ever had a reservation to begin with, and then in Oklahoma there aren't any reservations. Now, that's probably going to be important in our review of all this because, as Justice Gorsuch instructs us in McGirt is that we really need to put aside common sense and

practical understanding of what's happened.

THE COURT: Mr. Wright, if you need a moment, there's water right there in the jury room.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you.

THE COURT: Let's go off the record just a moment.

(A discussion was had.)

THE COURT: Back on the record on the Terry vs. Oklahoma matter. Mr. Wright, we interrupted you there. We'll let you continue with your final argument.

MS. HUNT: Thank you, Judge. I appreciate that opportunity for me to get a drink of water there. That seems to have helped out.

Basically, what I was trying to talk about was the idea that when we look at the 1956 Act that completely severs the federal government's relationship with the Ottawa Tribe and results in their loss of recognition as a tribe, that doesn't mean the Tribe ceases to exist; okay? What a lot of these tribes did was form nonprofit organizations or collectives of tribes, much like our Intertribal Council here in Miami, which is a product of those times. The tribes transferred a lot of their assets into those nonprofits, but the reservation, which

was established in 1867, had to have been disestablished in 1956, because there's no way -- there's no way to end that relationship and leave a giant piece of property recognized by the federal government as an Indian reservation. It just doesn't make any sense at all.

1

2

3

4

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Now, when we look at the '78 Act, the Restoration Act, the Tribe talks a little bit about the express repeal and that through that express repeal it's like the 1956 Act didn't exist at all. That's probably a little bit of an oversimplification. I would urge the court to read the entire Restoration Act. It's not particularly But just for one example of how the express repeal didn't completely get rid of the 1956 Act altogether, all we have to do is look at Subsection D, which Mr. Terry mentioned is the subsection that talks about water rights, is that -- well, again, we've got to read that in context a little bit with what comes above. So that's that "the following acts are repealed from 1956," and then we get to D, which says, "Except as specifically provided in this Act, nothing contained in this Act shall alter any property rights or obligations, any contractual rights or obligations, including existing fishing or

any obligation for taxes already levied."

So what we see is Congress' explicit intent in the Restoration Act that it not change any property rights or obligations in any way, shape or form from the way they existed prior to 1978, and the State's position is that with the reservation having been disestablished in 1956, when we get to 1978, certainly a reservation -- that's property rights. That's property rights obligations. In the Restoration Act, it appears to specifically except those types of issues from -- from the repealer that's built into the '78 Act.

I think it's also important, when we're talking water rights -- that was something that Mr. Terry focused on a fair bit -- what we're really dealing with is individual property owner's water rights, not the Tribe as a whole, because the Tribe ceased to exist in the eyes of the federal government in 1959. So when they talk about water rights in the Restoration Act, what they're really talking about is individual water rights, whether that be held by an entity or an organization, but that this somehow recreated.

So I think Mr. Perry -- Terry has two potential arguments; one, that it was never

disestablished. We've talked about how the 1956 Act did, in fact, disestablish the reservation. second argument is that if it was disestablished in 1956, it was re-established by the Restoration Act in 1978. Again, that can't be the case either, first of all, because of the wording in D and, second of all, because every other Tribe that Congress restored status to, if it was going to have a reservation, they put specific language in those restoration acts about reservation, whether it's set aside for the use of the Tribe forever and ever, some of the words that we're really familiar with. That's why we encourage the court to look at the Menominee Tribe, as well as the other two that are cited in the State's materials, so we could see that the Ottawa Tribe is different than some of these other tribes, where they did specifically include language about restoring a reservation, and that is completely absent from the '78 Act.

1

2

3

4

6

7

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

So, Judge, for those reasons we would urge the court to make a finding that although the Tribe initially had a reservation pursuant to the 1867 Act, that that reservation was disestablished in the 1956 Act, and that nothing in the Restoration Act of '78 did anything to change that position and that as

of today the Ottawa reservation is still disestablished.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Wright. I think that concludes both the evidence and the argument.

Ms. Beckham, our reporter, is directed here by the Court of Criminal Appeals to prepare a transcript --

MR. TERRY: Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- of this proceeding and get that to the -- have that ready within 20 days. This court, of course, is going to go through all of the evidence and the exhibits, including the exhibits that have been put forth today, and will render some findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Mr. Terry, you were trying to get the attention of the court?

MR. TERRY: Yes. Your Honor, I'd like to say one thing. Although the State's attorney has made an eloquent plea, the fact is, there's no language in that 1956 statute -- or it was 1959 that ever disestablished the reservation formally.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. TERRY: And under McGirt, which relies on a host of Supreme Court case law, there are three

Acts, as well as many of the other cases here, that

25

about there is just the time period that we've been allowed here. Is that something -- if Ms. Beckham is able to get you a transcript sometime in the next couple of weeks or so, is that something you believe you could do relatively quickly?

MS. HUNT: Yes, Your Honor. And we've done them in a number of our other McGirt cases, so that is something I could turn around quickly, if that would be helpful to Your Honor.

THE COURT: I see. All right. I would certainly allow you, Mr. Terry and Mr. Halloran, to also present proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ms. Beckham is to have that transcript done within 20 days, hopefully, maybe a little quicker. And then if counsel then -- and Mr. Terry, believe that you could have those -- once you have received the transcript of this proceeding, if you believe you could have those presented within a couple of weeks, that might get us within our time frame.

MS. HUNT: Yes.

THE COURT: I think --

MR. WRIGHT: I was going to say, when we extended that, when did they get extended to?

MR. TERRY: Yes, Your Honor.

order and the transcript.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Halloran, will that work for you?

MR. HALLORAN: Yes, Your Honor. Your
Honor, I did want to note -- not to drag this out,
but I did want to note that, you know, the State's
last position really was not in the form of a reply
or response to the previous arguments, and it is our
position and argument in very broad statements or
assertions of law that the Amici would like an
opportunity to respond to, but I would request Your
Honor's permission to submit a letter reply -- to
reply within the next five days, certainly within
the time of the drafting and review of the proposed

THE COURT: Is that something you would be able to, if I allowed you today, to make by oral argument, or do you need that time to address that issue? If I allow you to make that by oral argument today, can you do so, or do you need the five days to actually put your brief together?

MR. HALLORAN: I think, Your Honor, we can address it orally. I'm fine proceeding, if you would like to consider it.

THE COURT: You understand, though, that I

will give the State then the opportunity to respond to that?

MR. HALLORAN: That's fine, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I'll allow it then. Go ahead.

MR. HALLORAN: If it would be more efficient, Your Honor, I'd be happy to put together a letter of submission and have it to you in the next three business days.

THE COURT: That would be Friday? Of course, I'm going to give the State -- as I said, I give them -- since they're the ones with the burden of proof here, I give them the last shot. So if there's anything in that that they care to respond to, I would give them an opportunity to do so.

Are you understanding what Mr. Halloran is saying?

MR. WRIGHT: Yes. My only -- if we could proceed orally today, I think that would be a little bit better. I'm afraid if Mr. Halloran files a reply letter for the court to consider, depending on the context or the content of that letter, it might be necessary for the State to then write some form of a reply letter, again, with us carrying the burden, and I don't know that we want to get into

chasing competing letters down the road when we probably could just hash it out today.

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: I get that.

Mr. Halloran, if you can make your argument today orally, I would appreciate doing it that way, and then, like I say, I'll give --

MR. HALLORAN: That's fine, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.

MR. HALLORAN: I'll be happy to. So there were several assertions that I think need to be pinned back to what the law actually provides. Specifically, the existence of treaty rights, and let's be clear, the Ottawa's reservation is a treaty-established right. Whether or not there's any land within the boundary that is owned by the Tribe, the reservation is a treaty right, and the suggestion that the withdrawal of federal supervision over allotted land or tribal trust land, the withdrawal of rights to tribal members is an abrogation of treaty rights is simply unsupported by There is no law in the body of law in the United States that stands for that proposition. So the United States absolutely can get out of the Indian business and withdraw its supervision, and that is not an abrogation of the treaty-established

right of the Ottawa to its 1867 reservation.

The State also suggests that when the Termination Act occurred or was enacted, state criminal law extended to the reservation, and that couldn't occur -- to the divestiture of the United States, that couldn't occur if there was an Indian reservation. That also is not true. There's no law for that proposition, and, in fact, the law is contrary to that proposition.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed that in Kimball vs. Callahan, the 1974 decision, where it discussed the Menominee court, re the termination act and Public Law 280 in pari materia, meaning together with one another, to interpret what rights are affected as a result of the Termination Act.

Now, that is significant, Your Honor, because up here in Minnesota, all of the tribes, except Red Lake, were subjected to Public Law 280. It extended the criminal jurisdiction in the state of Minnesota to the reservation. The statute has never been interpreted by that extension of criminal law to have resulted in a diminishment, disestablishment or abdication of a Tribe's reservation. There simply is no law that

suggests that suggestion, that argument, and, in fact, the law is absolutely to the contrary.

The State would suggest that we would all agree, therefore, that there was no Ottawa reservation between 1959 and 1978. I raise my hand. I absolutely disagree. That's why we're here. We are applying the McGirt decision. We are not arguing in a vacuum as though McGirt didn't exist. We are looking for express language that disestablished the Ottawa reservation, and we can't make the ruling regarding the status of that reservation based on what someone suggests we all knew, because we don't know that. We are learning that right now, through the application of established law to the Tribe's rights.

Finally, Your Honor, the State would suggest that the tribe reservation -- or that the Restoration Act did additional things so that it didn't completely repeal the 1956, effective in 1959, Termination Act. I would direct you to the statutory language (audio distortion) --

THE COURT: We lost you.

MR. HALLORAN: (audio distortion) -Subdivision 3, the Act of August 3rd, 1956, relating
to the Ottawa Tribe --

THE COURT: Hold on. Hold on. If you

would start your argument again on the -- referring

to the 1978 specific language in that Restoration

4 Act, because we lost you there for about 40 seconds.

MR. HALLORAN: Oh, boy. Okay, Your Honor. Thanks. So the State has suggested that because -- because there's some language in the Restoration Act that does other things, that it implies that the effects of the Termination Act were not complete, that it was not a complete repeal. The statute -- the language of the statute, Your Honor, is relevant, Subdivision B of PL 95 281 says, "The following Acts are hereby repealed, Subdivision 3, the Act of August 3, 1956, relating to the Ottawa Tribe." Period. The Termination Act was repealed.

Now, the language in Subsection C then makes even more clear that any rights or privileges affected by that statute that was repealed are reinstated. So if we go to Subdivision D, which is what the State is speaking about, the -- essentially what we call the status quo language has nothing to do with the repealer of the Termination Act, except, as we call it, to maintain the status quo to the extent there were contracts, there was non-Indian land ownership, there were taxes that had accrued

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MS. HUNT: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll try to make this brief. I'll respond to Mr. Halloran's first point, his assertion that there is no law requiring federal superintendence for

reservation status.

First, to the extent he's suggesting that this was a new point on our reply, I strongly disagree with that. In fact, this is the heart of our argument that has gone entirely unaddressed up until now, and his only response is to say, that's not the law, but, in fact, that is the law. As I said, John is entirely relevant. It's a Major Crimes Act case. It tells us that federal superintendence is a necessary element, and then, even setting John aside, we have the definition of a reservation in Section 1151, referring to under the jurisdiction of the United States.

As far as his point regarding express language again, what I'll say here, and it's the crux of our case, is that express language is removing the federal superintendence. Congress knows that's an element required for a reservation, and so that's how it expressly affected disestablishment here.

Finally, as to the Restoration Act, I disagree with Mr. Halloran's point that there were no qualifications on that repeal. There were. All of the subsections thereafter, after it stated -- the Act stated that the Rest- -- excuse me, the

2

3

5

6

7

8

10

12

13

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

you.

(HEARING CONCLUDED AT 11:37 A.M.)



CHEROKEE NATION OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Sara Hill Attorney General

P.O. Box 1533 Tahlequah, OK 74465 918-453-5000

October 14, 2020

To Whom It May Concern:


This letter shall verify that Patrick Joseph Terry, born February 9, 1956, is a registered citizen of the Cherokee Nation as of January 6, 2011. His blood quantum is 1/32, dated August 26, 2011.

The response in this letter is based on information exactly as provided by the requesting party. Any incorrect or incomplete information may invalidate the above determination. Cherokee Nation can only confirm citizenship and blood degree for Cherokees. It is possible for the individual to be a member of another tribe and/or to have some degree of Indian blood from another tribe.

This letter does not reflect a finding of eligibility under the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §1901 et seq., ("ICWA"). Per 25 U.S.C. §1912(a) legal notice regarding an Indian child under ICWA must be sent to Cherokee Nation Indian Child Welfare, PO Box 948, Tahlequah, OK 74465.

If you have questions regarding this determination, please email <u>CNOAG@cherokee.org</u> or call the Cherokee Nation Office of the Attorney General at (918) 453-5262.

Petitioner's Appendix E



Petitioner's Appendix F

ORIGINAL



FILED

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

PATRICK JOSEPH TERRY,	STATE OF OKLAHOMA	
·) OCT - 6 2021	
Petitioner,	JOHN D. HADDEN	
v.) No. PC-2018-1076	
STATE OF OKLAHOMA,))	
Respondent.) }	

ORDER AFFIRMING DENIAL OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner, pro se, appealed to this Court from an order of the District Court of Ottawa County in Case No. CF-2012-242 denying his request for post-conviction relief.¹ Petitioner's post-conviction application asserted the same issues ultimately addressed in *McGirt v. Oklahoma*, 140 S.Ct. 2452 (2020). This Court affirmed the District Court's ruling and denied Petitioner's post-conviction appeal. *Terry v. State*, PC-2018-1076 (Okl.Cr. February 25, 2019) (unpublished). In *State ex rel. Matloff v. Wallace*, 2021 OK CR 21, ____ P.3d ___, his Court determined that the United States Supreme Court decision in *McGirt*, because it is a new procedural rule, is not retroactive and does not void final state convictions. *See Matloff*, 2021

Petitioner sought review of our decision by the United States Supreme Court and that Court vacated our judgment and remanded this case to this Court for further consideration in light of *McGirt. Terry v. Oklahoma*, 141 S.Ct. 191 (2020).

OK CR 21, ¶¶ 27-28, 40.

The conviction in this matter was final before the July 9, 2020 decision in *McGirt*, and the United States Supreme Court's holding in *McGirt* does not apply. Therefore, the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief is **AFFIRMED**. The Respondent's Motion to File a Supplemental Brief filed with this Court's Clerk on September 2, 2021, is **DENIED**. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, *Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals*, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2021), the **MANDATE** is **ORDERED** issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

witness oui	R HANDS AND THE SEAL OF THIS COUR	T this		
6 day of	October, 20	21.		
	Scott Raulone			
SCOTT ROWLAND, Presiding Judge				
	Rom + L. Janohon			
	ROBERT L. HUDSON, Vice Presiding Ju	udge		
	Loy Elali	\triangle		
	GARY L. LUMPKIN, Judge			
	Koules	Toples		
ATTEST:	DAVID B. LEWIS, Judge	1 /		
John D. Hadden				
Clerk				

ORIGINAL

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA Patrick Joseph Terry, Petitioner, STATE OF OKLAHOMA,



OCT 1 2 2021

GLERK

Case Number: PC-2018-1076

JOHN D. HADDEN

Respondent,

TCC Number(s): CF-2012-242

RETURN OF THE COURT CLERK				
To the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma: On the				
On the gath day of Clober, 2021, I issued appropriate process i.e. a certifed copy of the Judgment and Sentence as affirmed by the mandate to the appropriate officer of County of OTTAWA, State of Oklahoma, as required by 22 O.S. 2001 §978 who then made return to my office as follows:				
1. Use this space if the punishment assessed was solely confinement in state penitentiary. See 22 O.S. 2004 \$980. Count 1 30 Hrs. DOC / Count 2 6 Prs. BOC 2. Use this space if the punishment assessed was solely confinement in the County Jail. See 22 O.S. 2005				
 8979. Count 3 — 1 /n. county jail. 3. Use this space if the punishment assessed was confinement, due to failure to pay, in whole, or in part, a fine. See 22 O.S. 2001 §§ 979 and 983. 				
4. Use this space if the case was Reversed and Remanded for a New Trial. See 22 O.S. 2001 §1066. Witness my hand this 8 day of October				
Court Clerk OHawa County (scal) By: Pain Bloloch Deputy				

Petitioner's Appendix H



Previous Case Top Of Index This Point in Index Citationize Next Case

STATE v. LAWHORN

2021 OK CR 37

Case Number: <u>S-2020-858</u> Decided: 10/21/2021

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellant v. JEREMY LAWHORN, Appellee

Dite as: 2021 OK CR 37, _____



OPINION

ROWLAND, PRESIDING JUDGE:

If The State of Oklahoma charged Appellee Jeremy Lawhorn in the District Court of Ottawa County, Case No. CF-2020-189, with one count of Lewd or Indecent Acts with a Child Under 16, in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2018, § 1123 (A)(2). Lawhorn filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the State of Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction over the matter because he is an Indian and the offense occurred in Indian Country, specifically the Quapaw Nation Reservation. The district court held a hearing and concluded, based upon the stipulations and exhibits, that Lawhorn is an Indian for purposes of federal criminal law and that he crime occurred in Indian Country, namely within the historic boundaries of the Quapaw Nation Reservation. The district court granted Lawhorn's Motion to Dismiss, quashed the Information, and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The State announced its intent to appeal the ruling in open court to settle the status of the Quapaw Reservation and ultimately perfected the instant appeal. We exercise jurisdiction under 22 O.S.2011, § 1053. The sole issue for review is whether the Quapaw Nation Reservation is Indian Country. Because the answer is yes, we affirm the district court's order for the reasons discussed below.

DISCUSSION

A. The Major Crimes Act

¶2 The federal Major Crimes Act (MCA) grants exclusive federal jurisdiction to prosecute certain enumerated offenses committed by Indians within Indian Country. Sizemore v. State, 2021 OK CR 6, ¶ 6, 485 P.3d 867, 869; 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2013). There is no dispute that the crime charged against Lawhorn fits squarely within the MCA and its exclusive federal jurisdiction provided he is an Indian and the crime occurred in Indian Country. See State v. Klindt, 1989 OK CR 75, ¶ 3, 782 P.2d 401, 403 ("[T]he State of Oklahoma does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed by or against an Indian in Indian Country.")

B. McGirt v. Oklahoma

¶3 In McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S.Ct. 2452 (2020), the Supreme Court held the reservation Congress established for the Muscogee (Creek) Nation remains in existence today because Congress has never explicitly disestablished it. That ruling meant Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute McGirt, an Indian, because he committed his crimes on the Creek Reservation, i.e., in Indian Country, and the federal government has jurisdiction of such criminal matters under the MCA Although the case now before us involves the lands of the Quapaw Nation, we find McGirt's reasoning controlling.

C. Status of Quapaw Reservation

If the parties stipulated that the charged crime occurred within the historic geographic boundaries of the Quapaw Nation as lesignated by various treaties. The district court admitted, without objection, two treaties purportedly establishing a Quapaw Reservation, namely, the 1833 Treaty with the Quapaw, 7 Stat. 424 (May 13, 1833) and the 1867 Treaty with the Seneca, viixed Seneca and Shawnee, Quapaw, etc., 15 Stat. 513 (Feb. 23, 1867). (Defense Exhibits 2 and 3).

J5 The district court accepted the stipulation and concluded, without any opposition from the State, that the land set aside for he Quapaw Nation in the 1833 Treaty, as reaffirmed and modified by the 1867 Treaty, established a Quapaw Reservation. Γhis finding is consistent with *McGirt*, and we adopt the district court's conclusion that Congress established a Quapaw Nation Reservation in the 1800s.

¶6 "To determine whether a tribe continues to hold a reservation, there is only one place we may look: the Acts of Congress." *McGirt*, 140 S.Ct. at 2462. While no particular words or verbiage are required to disestablish a reservation, evidence of a clear expression of congressional intent to terminate the reservation is required. *Sizemore*, 2021 OK CR 6, ¶ 13, 485 P.3d at 870.

[7 The record before the district court in this case, similar to that in *McGirt*, showed Congress, through a treaty, removed the Quapaws from one area of the United States to another where they were promised certain lands. A subsequent treaty redefined the geographical boundaries of those lands, but nothing in any of the documents showed a congressional intent to erase the boundaries of the Reservation and terminate its existence. Congress, and Congress alone, has the power to abrogate those treaties, and "this Court [will not] lightly infer such a breach once Congress has established a reservation.' *McGirt*, 140 S.Ct. at 2462 (citing *Solem v. Bartlett*, 465 U.S. 463, 470, (1984)).

¶8 The District Attorney informed the district court that he and the Attorney General's Office conducted "extensive research' and found no evidence that Congress disestablished the Quapaw Nation Reservation. Noting that the State of Oklahoma presented no evidence to show Congress erased or disestablished the boundaries of the Quapaw Reservation, and citing McGirt, the district court concluded that the Quapaw Nation Reservation remains in existence and is Indian Country and that the State had no jurisdiction in this matter. This finding is supported by the record and we adopt it.

¶9 For these reasons, we hold, for purposes of federal criminal law, the land upon which the parties agree Lawhorn allegedly committed this crime is within the Quapaw Nation Reservation and is Indian Country. The ruling in *McGirt* governs this case and requires us to find the State of Oklahoma is without jurisdiction to prosecute Lawhorn.

DECISION

¶10 The ruling of the district court dismissing the case against Lawhorn based upon lack of jurisdiction is **AFFIRMED** Pursuant to Rule 3.15, *Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals*, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2021), the **MANDATE** is **ORDERED** issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTTAWA COUNTY THE HONORABLE BECKY BAIRD, ASSOCIATE DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES IN DISTRICT COURT

KENNY WRIGHT
DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF
OTTAWA COUNTY
102 E. CENTRAL AVE.
SUITE 201
MIAMI, OK 74354
ATTORNEY FOR STATE

APPEARANCES ON APPEAL

KENNY WRIGHT
DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF
OTTAWA COUNTY
102 E. CENTRAL AVE.
SUITE 201
MIAMI, OK 74354
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

https://www.newson6.com/story/600114a2dbdb4a0bc5b4ab55/federal-prosecutors-move-to-oklahoma-to-help-with-supreme-court-caseload

LUMPKIN, JUDGE: CONCURRING IN RESULTS:

<u>1</u> Senator Elmer Thomas, D-Oklahoma, was a member of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. After hearing the Commissioner's speech regarding the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) in 1934, Senator Thomas opined as follows:

I can hardly see where it (the IRA) could operate in a State like mine where the Indians are all scattered out among the whites and **they have no reservation**, and they could not get them into a community without you would go and buy land and put them on it. Then they would be surrounded very likely with thickly populated white sections with whom they would trade and associate. I just cannot get through my mind how this bill can possibly be made to operate in a State of thickly-settled population. (emphasis added).

John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, *Memorandum of Explanation* (regarding S. 2755), p. 145, hearing before the United States Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, February 27, 1934. Senator Morris Sheppard, D-Texas, also on the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, stated in response to the Commissioner's speech that in Oklahoma, he did not think "we could look forward to building up huge reservations such as we have granted to the Indians in the past." *Id.* at 157. In 1940, in the Foreword to Felix S. Cohen, *Handbook of Federal Indian Law* (1942), Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes wrote in support of the IRA, "[t]he continued application of the allotment laws, **under which Indian wards have lost more than two-thirds of their reservation lands**, while the costs of Federal administration of these lands have steadily mounted, must be terminated." (emphasis added).

Citationizer[©] Summary of Documents Citing This Document

Level

Cite Name

Okla	Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Cases				
	Cite	Name	Level		
	2021 OK CR 38,	MCCLAIN v. STATE	Cited		
Cita	Citationizer: Table of Authority				
Cite	e Name	Level			
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Cases					
	Cite	Name	Level		
	1989 OK CR 75, 782 P.2d 401,	STATE v. KLINDT	Discussed		
	2021 OK CR 4,	HOGNER v. STATE	Discussed		
	2021 OK CR 6, 485 P.3d 867,	SIZEMORE v. STATE	Discussed at Length		
	2021 OK CR 27,	ROTH v. STATE	Discussed at Length		
	1998 OK CR 74, 973 P.2d 330, 70 OBJ	Hanes v. State	Discussed		
	<u>535</u> ,				
Fitle 21. Crimes and Punishments					
	Cite	Name	Level		
	<u>21 O.S. 1123</u> ,	Lewd or Indecent Proposals or Acts to Child Under 16	Cited		
litie 22. Criminal Procedure					
	Cite .	Name	Level		
	22 O.S. 1053,	State or Municipality May Appeal in What Cases	Cited		

ANDREW MELOY
ATTORNEY AT LAW
103 E. CENTRAL
SUITE 250
MIAMI, OK 74354
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

MARK P. HOOVER
OKLAHOMA INDIGENT
DEFENSE SYSTEM
P. O. BOX 926
NORMAN, OK 730704106
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

WILSON PIPESTEM
MARY KATHRYN NAGLE
ABI FAIN
PIPESTEM & NAGLE, P.C.
401 S. BOSTON AVE.
SUITE 2200
TULSA, OK 74103
AMICUS CURIAE
FOR QUAPAW NATION

OPINION BY: ROWLAND, P.J.

HUDSON, V.P.J.: Specially Concur LUMPKIN, J.: Concur in Results

LEWIS, J.: Concur

HUDSON, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE: SPECIALLY CONCURS

[1 Today's decision dismisses a felony charge of Lewd or Indecent Acts With a Child Under 16 from the District Court of Ottawa County based on the Supreme Court's decision in *McGirt v. Oklahoma*, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020). The Ottawa County District Attorney commendably acknowledges that, after conducting his own extensive research, he has found no evidence showing the Quapaw Reservation was ever disestablished by Congress. Based upon the District Court's findings that Appellee is an Indian for purposes of federal criminal law, and that the crime in this case occurred within the historic boundaries of the Quapaw Reservation, we have no choice but to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction. Under *McGirt*, the State has no jurisdiction to prosecute Appellee for the crime in this case. Instead, Appellee must be prosecuted in federal court where the exclusive jurisdiction for this crime lies. *See Roth v. State*, 2021 OK CR 27, P.3d_. I therefore as a matter of *stare decisis* fully concur in today's decision.

II write separately to re-urge my previous views on the need for a practical solution by Congress concerning criminal urisdiction in eastern Oklahoma. With each passing day, more state criminal cases are dismissed pursuant to *McGirt* while more counties in Oklahoma are transformed into jurisdictional mine fields for the bench, bar and public. Ottawa County, nestled in Oklahoma's far northeastern corner, presents an extreme example. The county is famously known for being the polyhood home of baseball great Mickey Mantle (from Commerce). Many Oklahomans, however, are less familiar with the vast tribal presence in this part of the state. They will soon be hearing much more about it.

If 3 The federal government utilized much of present-day Ottawa County to resettle smaller tribes from around the country starting in the 1830s. See Hanes v. State, 1998 OK CR 74, If 15-16, 973 P.2d 330, 335. Today, Ottawa County is home to ten separate tribes—the Cherokee, Quapaw, Peoria, Ottawa, Miami, Modoc, Seneca-Cayuga, Wyandotte, Shawnee and Eastern Shawnee. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, these Tribes' historic reservation lands cover the entire land mass of Ottawa County, an area consisting of roughly 485 square miles and 30,000 residents. One could easily mistake the map showing these historic tribal territories for a jigsaw puzzle with nine pieces of varying shapes and sizes dividing up the puzzle board.

¶4 Since *McGirt*, we have recognized the existence of Indian country criminal jurisdiction within the historical reservation boundaries of the Cherokee Nation which covers a substantial portion of Ottawa County. *See Hogner v. State*, 2021 OK CR 4 ¶ 9, __P.3d__. Today's decision recognizes the ongoing vitality of a *second* reservation in Ottawa County--this one associated with the Quapaw Tribe--because there is no evidence showing it was ever disestablished by Congress. Other jurisdictional challenges to State authority to prosecute crimes in Ottawa County involving Indian defendants or victims are sure to follow concerning the other tribes. Some have already made their way to this Court and are in the process of being briefed. *See* 9.g., *State v. Dixon*, No. S-2021-205 (Ottawa); *State v. Lee*, No. S-2021-206 (Peoria and Miami).

¶5 Meanwhile, Congress neglects the practical effects of the *McGirt* decision on the local community and the cycle repeats more reservations are recognized, more state criminal cases get dismissed and the public holds its breath wondering what will nappen next. The failure of Congress to provide a practical solution to criminal jurisdiction in eastern Oklahoma in the post *McGirt* universe has a real impact on real people--Indians and non-Indians alike--Iiving on a reservation. Recently, we reversed a conviction for first degree manslaughter from Wagoner County involving an Indian child victim killed on the Creek Reservation by a non-Indian defendant. *See Roth*, 2021 OK CR 27, ¶¶ 2-3. That case is particularly tragic because there is a serious question whether it will be prosecuted in federal court due to issues surrounding the statute of limitations. *Id.*, 2021 OK CR 27, ¶¶ 17. Local authorities too must run the gauntlet of performing routine law enforcement matters that may now nvolve one or more sovereigns depending upon the location of a crime and the status of the parties involved. And this is just the tip of the iceberg. *See Hogner v. State*, 2021 OK CR 4, __P.3d__ (Hudson, J., Specially Concurring) (discussing the practical problems associated with *McGirt*).

[6 Congress has the ultimate authority to provide practical solutions in the post-McGirt world. It takes little imagination to understand how the most basic elements of law enforcement, from toll collection to traffic enforcement, are implicated by McGirt. The wholesale redistribution from state to federal court of a large number of criminal cases involving Indiar defendants or victims highlights the extraordinary strain placed on the criminal justice system and presents its own set or problems. The post-McGirt fallout becomes more apparent with each passing day and deserves the attention of our elected representatives in Congress.

[7] Recently, the Judicial Conference of the United States recommended that Congress add three new federal judgeships for the U.S. District Court sitting in Muskogee along with two new federal judgeships for the U.S. District Court sitting in Tulsa to nandle the skyrocketing caseloads in both federal districts stemming from the filing of Indian country cases. The Conference reported a 400 percent increase in the number of criminal cases filed in the Eastern District of Oklahoma from 2020 to 2021 and a nearly 200 percent increase in the number of criminal cases filed in the Northern District of Oklahoma during the same time period. According to local media reports, federal prosecutors from across America have volunteered to assist locally with these burgeoning caseloads after McGirt.

¶8 None of this is a surprise. Sadly, I am pessimistic the matter will be addressed by our elected representatives in Nashington for the benefit of all. At this point, the clock is ticking. As *Roth* shows, both Indians and non-Indians alike have a rested interest in how the criminal justice system is administered in the post-McGirt world. The consequences of failure, nowever, are shockingly real and these issues should be tackled sooner rather than later.

LUMPKIN, JUDGE: CONCURRING IN RESULTS:

[1 Bound by my oath and the Federal-State relationships dictated by the U.S. Constitution, I must at a minimum concur in the esults of this opinion. While our nation's judicial structure requires me to apply the majority opinion in the 5-4 decision of the J.S. Supreme Court in *McGirt v. Oklahoma*, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), I do so reluctantly. Upon the first reading of the majority opinion in *McGirt*, I initially formed the belief that it was a result in search of an opinion to support it. Then upon eading the dissents by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, I was forced to conclude the Majority had totally failed to

follow the Court's own precedents, but had cherry picked statutes and treaties, without giving historical context to them. The Majority then proceeded to do what an average citizen who had been fully informed of the law and facts as set out in the dissents would view as an exercise of raw judicial power to reach a decision which contravened not only the history leading to the disestablishment of the Indian reservations in Oklahoma, but also willfully disregarded and failed to apply the Court's own precedents to the issue at hand.

[2 My quandary is one of ethics and morality. One of the first things I was taught when I began my service in the Marine Corps was that I had a duty to follow lawful orders, and that same duty required me to resist unlawful orders. Chief Justice Roberts's scholarly and judicially penned dissent, actually following the Court's precedents and required analysis, vividly reveals the failure of the majority opinion to follow the rule of law and apply over a century of precedent and history, and to accept the fact that no Indian reservations remain in the State of Oklahoma. The result seems to be some form of "social justice" created out of whole cloth rather than a continuation of the solid precedents the Court has established over the las 100 years or more.

¶3 The question I see presented is should I blindly follow and apply the majority opinion or do I join with Chief Justice Roberts and the dissenters in *McGirt* and recognize "the emperor has no clothes" as to the adherence to following the rule of law ir the application of the *McGirt* decision?

¶4 My oath and adherence to the Federal-State relationship under the U.S. Constitution mandate that I fulfill my duties and apply the edict of the majority opinion in *McGirt*. However, I am not required to do so blindly and without noting the flaws of the opinion as set out in the dissents. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas eloquently show the Majority's mischaracterization of Congress's actions and history with the Indian reservations. Their dissents further demonstrate that a the time of Oklahoma Statehood in 1907, all parties accepted the fact that Indian reservations in the state had beer disestablished and no longer existed. I take this position to adhere to my oath as a judge and lawyer without any disrespect to our Federal-State structure. I simply believe that when reasonable minds differ they must both be reviewing the totality of the law and facts.

¶5 This particular case is further evidence of the error in analysis in the *McGirt* decision's failure to apply the Supreme Court's past precedents and analysis. Using the prior method of analysis of precedent set out by the dissent it would be readily recognized the Quapaw reservation was disestablished at Oklahoma statehood. Had Congress intended a different result, i surely would have expressly stated such intentions in the Enabling Act. Upon passage of the Enabling Act, Congress joined the former Indian Territory and Oklahoma Territory into one new state of Oklahoma and its sovereignty was established. The *McGirt* decision seeks to overrule an Act of Congress by eroding the State's sovereignty piecemeal, recognizing reservations long extinguished under the criteria set forth in *Solem v. Bartlett*. Tragically, this erosion of state sovereignty is being accomplished through this 5-4 decision in *McGirt*.

FOOTNOTES

HUDSON, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE: SPECIALLY CONCURS

- See http://mickeymantle.com/bio/
- ² See also https://www.okhistory.org/publications/enc/entry.php?entry=OT003
- ³ See https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdok/page/file/1303046/download
- ⁴ See https://www.okhistory.org/publications/enc/entry.php?entry=OT003
- 5 See https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ottawacountyoklahoma/POP060210
- $\frac{6}{2}$ The territory for the Shawnee and Eastern Shawnee tribes are shown as a single unit on the map used by the Department of Justice.
- https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2021/09/28/judiciary-supplements-judgeship-request-prioritizes-courthouse-projects (posted September 28, 2021)

Supreme Court of the United States Office of the Clerk Washington, DC 20543-0001

January 4, 2022

Scott S. Harris Clerk of the Court (202) 479-3011

Mr. Patrick Joseph Terry 1011 S. Muskogee Avenue Tahlequah, OK 74464

Re: Patrick Joseph Terry

v. Oklahoma

Application No. 21A290

Dear Mr. Terry:

The application for an extension of time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the above-entitled case has been presented to Justice Gorsuch, who on January 4, 2022, extended the time to and including March 5, 2021.

This letter has been sent to those designated on the attached notification list.

Sincerely,

Scott S. Harris, Clerk

Claude Alde

Case Analyst

Petitioner's Appendix