


21-7007  
No. \_\_\_\_\_



IN THE  
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ORIGINAL

Amador Rodriguez Pro Se — PETITIONER  
(Your Name)

vs.

U.S. District Ct. Northern Dist. of Tx. — RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

U.S. Court of Appeals For the 5th Circuit

(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Amador Rodriguez

(Your Name)

21 F.M. 247 Byrd Unit

(Address)

Huntsville Tx. 77320

(City, State, Zip Code)

N/A


(Phone Number)

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

- 1.) How does the Prosecution bare the burden of Proving a Crime that was Not Alleged in Indictment returned by The Grand Jury?
- 2.) Is this Indictment - The Original Indictment?
- 3.) Does A deadly weapon have to be used or exhibited (in the Crime which I was Convicted) in order To Enter AFFIRMATIVE finding in Judgment?
- 4.) Was This Indictment 2<sup>nd</sup> Count Presented To The Proper Court?
- 5.) Could The State Prove 2<sup>nd</sup> Count of Indictment AS It was Returned by the Grand Jury?
- 6.) Does The 2<sup>nd</sup> Count Track The Language of Any offense under LAW?
- 7.) Did The Language in Courts Charge To The Jury "That The defendant used or Exhibited a deadly weapon, so-wit: a Motor Vehicle, during the Commission of The Offense" Not broaden what was Actually Alleged in Original Indictment.

Question(s) Presented

8.) Does a person not have to be under arrest at some point, in order to be convicted for "Evading arrest" in a Motor Vehicle, and the arrest is made without a warrant and Probable Cause?



## LIST OF PARTIES

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

All parties **do not** appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

Lorie Davis, Director,  
Texas Department of Criminal Justice  
Correctional Institutions Division  
Respondent

Ali M. Nasser\*  
Assistant Attn. Gen.  
P.O. Box 12548,  
Capital Station  
Austin Tx 78711

\* Lead Counsel for Respondent

## RELATED CASES

Rodriaguez v. State, No. 07-14-00407-CP, 7th Court of Appeals

Judgment Entered August 8, 2016

Rodriguez v. State, No PD-1014-16 Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas  
Judgment Entered December 7, 2016

Ex Parte Rodriguez, No. 2014-402,814-A 140th Dist. Court Lubbock Tx.  
Judgment Entered August 18, 2017

Rodriguez v. Davis, No. 5:17-CV-0266-C U.S. District Court for  
The Northern District of Texas Judgment Entered Dec. 14, 2020

Rodriguez v. Lumpkin No. 20-11372 U.S. Court of Appeals  
for The 5th Circuit. Judgment Entered October 27, 2021.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW.....	1
JURISDICTION.....	
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .....	
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .....	
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .....	
CONCLUSION.....	

## INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A - Decision of the 5<sup>th</sup> Circuit

APPENDIX B - Decision of the U.S. District Court

APPENDIX C Decision of Tx. Court of Criminal Appeals

APPENDIX D Decision of Tx Court Criminal Appeals Denying PDR

APPENDIX E Decision of The State Court of Appeals 7<sup>th</sup> Court of Appeals


APPENDIX F

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES	PAGE NUMBER
California v. Hadari D. 499 U.S. 621 (1991) . . . . .	23
Kossie v. Thaler. 423 Fed. Appx. 434, 437-38 (2011) . . . . .	3, 4
Stirone v. U.S. 361 U.S. 212, 217-219 (1960) . . . . .	20
U.S. v. Combs 369 F.3d 925 (2004) . . . . .	12, 13
U.S. v. Pigrum-Allen 922 F.2d 249, 253 (1991) . . . . .	3, 4, 5
U.S. v. Wacker 72 F.3d 1453, 1474 (1995) . . . . .	8
U.S. v. Webb 747 F.2d 278, 282 (1984) . . . . .	5
STATUTES AND RULES	
Hobbs Act 18 U.S.C. 1951. . . . .	20
18 U.S.C. 924 (c)(1) . . . . .	11, 12
T.C.C.P. art 21.02(2) . . . . .	15
T.C.C.P. art 27.09(1) . . . . .	15
T.C.C.P. art 28.10 . . . . .	9
T.C.C.P. art 28.11 . . . . .	9, 10
T.C.C.P. art 42.01 (21) 2013 . . . . .	21, 22
T.C.C.P. art 42.12 3g (a)(2) . . . . .	6, 11, 21, 22
OTHER	
Texas Penal Code 1.07 . . . . .	7
Texas Penal Code 12.35 (c)(1) . . . . .	6, 7, 11, 21
Texas Penal Code 38.04 (b)(2)(A) . . . . .	1, 19

## Table of Authorities Cited

Cases - State	Pg Number
Ex Parte Jones 957 S.W.2d 899 .....	13, 14
Narron v. State 835 S.W.2d 642 .....	14
Kitchen v. State 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 .....	4
Riney v. State 28 S.W.3d 561 (2000) .....	10
Tata v. State 440 S.W.3d 456 (2014) .....	10
Ward v. State 829 S.W.2d 787 (1992) .....	10



IN THE  
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES  
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

**OPINIONS BELOW**

For cases from **federal courts**:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix A to the petition and is

reported at \_\_\_\_\_; or,  
 has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,  
 is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix b to the petition and is

reported at \_\_\_\_\_; or,  
 has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,  
 is unpublished.

For cases from **state courts**:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at Appendix C to the petition and is

reported at \_\_\_\_\_; or,  
 has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,  
 is unpublished.

The opinion of the 11th Court of Appeals Rodriguez, 2016 court appears at Appendix E to the petition and is

reported at RODRIGUEZ, 2016 WL4254388@7; or,  
 has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,  
 is unpublished.

## JURISDICTION

For cases from **federal courts**:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case was October 27, 2021.

No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of Appeals on the following date: \_\_\_\_\_, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix \_\_\_\_\_.

An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and including \_\_\_\_\_ (date) on \_\_\_\_\_ (date) in Application No. \_\_A\_\_\_\_\_.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

For cases from **state courts**:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was Sept. 20, 2017. A copy of that decision appears at Appendix E.

A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date: \_\_\_\_\_, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix \_\_\_\_\_.

An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and including \_\_\_\_\_ (date) on \_\_\_\_\_ (date) in Application No. \_\_A\_\_\_\_\_.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

## CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U. S. Const. Amend. IV

U.S. Const. Amend. VI

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV

### Case Law Federal

Hobbs act 18 U.S.C. § 1951 . . . . Pg 20

18 U.S.C. § 924 (C)(1) . . . . Pg 11, 12

### State Statutory Law

Texas Code of Crim. Procedure art. 21.02(2) . . . Pg 15

Texas Code of Crim. Procedure art. 27.09(1) . . . Pg 15

Texas Code of Crim. Procedure art. 28.10 . . . Pg 9

Texas Code of Crim. Procedure art. 28.11 . . . Pg 9, 10

Texas Code of Crim. Procedure art. 42.01 (21). Pg. 21, 22

Texas Code of Crim. Procedure art. 42.12 & 35(a)(2) . . .  
.... Pg 6, 11, 21, 22

Texas Penal Code 1.07 . . . . . Pg 7

Texas Penal Code 12.35 (C)(1) . . . . . Pg 6, 7, 11, 21

Texas Penal Code 38.04 (b)(2)(a) . . . . . Pg 1, 19

### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 28, 2013, I was charged in a single count Indictment, Cause No. 2013-439260 that was presented on July 23, 2013 for Evading Arrest or Detention (using a vehicle) under Tx. Penal Code § 38.04(b)(2)(a). On July 2, 2014 - while still in custody, the state returned with a superseding Indictment for the same offence of Evading Arrest or Detention in a vehicle that occurred on June 28, 2013. Cause No: 2014-402814. However this time it was a 2 count Indictment and it had a different officers name as to who was attempting to arrest or detain. The 2nd count of this Indictment is mainly what this appeal is about. I was convicted on November 18, 2014, the jury also made an affirmative finding on the 2nd count, and I was sentenced to

## Statement of The Case

45 years T.O.C.J. Institutional Division.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Count of Indictment Alleges the

Following: And the defendant did then

and there use and exhibit a deadly

Weapon, to-wit: Motor Vehicle, that in the

Manner of its use and intended use was

capable of causing death and serious

bodily injury; These allegations were on

Superseding Indictment that came a year later.

What changed 1 year later? I have no victim

in my Conviction For Evading Arrest. In

The Courts Charge to the jury paragraph

4. States the following in Part- The

Prosecution has the burden of proving  
"the defendant used or exhibited a deadly  
Weapon), to-wit: a Motor Vehicle, DURING  
THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE."

The Indictment Alleges no such thing. The  
Courts Charge to the jury joined these  
2 offenses, and Abanded how the Vehicle  
became a deadly weapon in the first  
Place. Both Federal Law and Texas Law  
Permit that a disjunctive statute be plead  
conjunctively (And) and proved disjunctively (or)

U.S. v. Pigrum 922 F. 2d 249, 253 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991)


Kossie v. Thaler, 423 Fed. Appx. 434, 437-438 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007)



Circuit 2011) Kossie's indictment stated that he "used and exhibited" a deadly weapon in the course of the robbery, while evidence from trial only showed Kossie "exhibited" a firearm - and was sufficient evidence of Aggravated Robbery under Texas law. In Kitchen v. State 823 S.W. 2d<sup>250, 258</sup> his indictment stated in part that he committed Murder in the course of kidnapping, robbery and sexual assault. So all the state had to prove was that he kidnapped, robbed, or sexually assaulted his victim in the course of the murder and it became Capital Murder. In US Pilgrum and Allen,

922 F. 2d 249, 253. (1991 5<sup>th</sup> Cir.), sec. B.

Allens indictment alleged that he carried "and" used a Firearm "during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. The original indictment and proper jury instructions, Allen could have been convicted if the jury found "either" that he carried "or" used a Firearm. See U.S. v. Webb (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1984) Under the Amended indictment, the jury could convict Allen only if it found that he carried a Firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, and not that he ~~used~~ ~~and carried~~ a Firearm. carried or used a Firearm. In all these cases that A



deadly weapon was used or exhibited

or that the Murder took place have

Something in Common. They have this

Language that Constitute an act... In the

Course of the Robbery... Murder In the

Course of Kidnapping Robbery and Sexual Assault

... Carried and used a Firearm "During"

relation to a drug trafficking Crime"

Texas Penal Code 12.35(c)(1), art. 42.12(3)(g)(a)(2)

of The Texas Code of Criminal procedures are

both related to deadly weapon, The only

difference is that one 12.35(c)(1) is a state

Jail Punishment enhancement, and 42.12(3)(g)

(a)(2) is a ~~per~~ punishment provision.

However both have this similar language

in there Provisions. "That a deadly weapon

as defined in Section 1.07, Penal Code, was used

or exhibited during the Commission of a

Felony offense, or during Immediate Flight there-

from. In my Case Penal Code 12.35(c)(1) is what

They Used to trigger the entry of The Affirmative


Finding in My judgment. However that Penal

Code does not state that if that finding is made

that the trial Court "Shall" enter that finding in

judgment. The State is Under the impression

that the indictment alleges an offense in the



conjunctive "And" and proved one of their Theories "OR". in the disjunctive. ~~Even~~ Even then, the state did not return a general Verdict. See Courts Charge (Special Issue).

The 5<sup>th</sup> U.S.C.A. forbids Amendment of an indictment by the Court, whether actual or Constructive. U.S. v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1474 (10th Cir. 1995).

2) Is this the Original Indictment? or did The Courts New Charge in Special issue become Official Indictment? If the Original indictment remains official, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Count is not an offense nor a crime by itself, And in 10/28/08

That Case it is impossible for the state or anyone else to prove anything. See Indictments. All These indictments are 2 Count indictments with 2<sup>nd</sup> Count being Some form of deadly weapon. These indictments 2<sup>nd</sup> Count State in Part: That it was further "Presented in and to said Court," and that the deadly weapon was used or exhibited - During the Commission of the offense, My Indictment No 2014-402814 exhibit B has NO Such Language.

Texas Law Permits the Amendment OF an indictment. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 28.10 and 28.11. All amendments must be made.



with the leave of the trial court, and under its discretion Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 28.11. The State must request the trial court's permission before amending a charging instrument.

Ward v. State 829 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Crim. app. 1992) overruled on other grounds, Riney v. State 28 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A motion for leave to amend is an appropriate vehicle to put the amending process in motion. *Id.* In this case, no such motion was filed, therefore a written amendment must be submitted to the trial court and included in the record to be valid. See Tata v. State, 446 S.W.3d 456 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd)

Hobby  
1-3

If the State could of Plead the offense that was supposedly returned by the grand jury, there would of have been no need to change the offense in the courts charge Special Issue. See paragraph 1) of Special issue, and Count 2 of "Official indictment"

3.) Does a deadly weapon, (a Motor Vehicle) have to be used in the transaction from which the Felony conviction was obtained in order to trigger the provisions of Penal Code 12.35(c)(1) or art 42.12 (3)(g)(a)(2) ? 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) is a Federal Firearm (deadly weapon) offense

That is like 12.35(c)(1) and 42.12 3g(2)(a),



18 U.S.C § 924 (c)(1) - As explained in U.S.

v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925 (2004) contains two

Separate offenses: "One for possession of a

firearm "In Furtherance of" a drug traff-

icking crime" and one for using or carrying

a firearm: during and in relation to a drug

trafficking crime. "Use" we explained, is a higher

standard of conduct than "possession" but "in

Furtherance of" is a higher standard of

Participation than "during and in relation to"

In Combs it was held that the district court

"Constructively Amended" Count 4 of his indictment

when the defendant was charged with the

possession crime but the jury instructions

mixed in the lower standard of participation

from the use offense *Id.* @ 396. Thus the

district court "literally altered" the indictment

and Combs was convicted of a crime that was

not the subject of his indictment. We held

this to be plain error because it directly violated

the 5<sup>th</sup> U.S.C.A. guarantee that a defendant be held


to answer only for the charges levied by the grand

jury. Ex Parte Jones, 957 S.W. 2d 849 (Tx. Crim. App. En Banc)

held that: The deadly weapon "must" have been used during

transaction from which felony conviction arose in order to

trigger entry of affirmative finding. See also



Narron v. State, 835 S.W. 2d @ 642, The

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas En Banc held that

1.) That the defendant was provided sufficient notice that

the state intended to seek a deadly weapon finding

and 2.) defendant could not be subject to Affirmative

Finding of a deadly weapon use, "where there was no

associated Felony facilitated" by the defendant's possession

of the firearm, Narron's ground for review was

sustained - Because there was no associated Felony

by appellants short barrel firearm, and the affirmative

Finding from the judgment was deleted. This case

is also controlled by Narron, and Ex Parte Jones

Because according to the charge that was returned

by the grand jury - There is No associated Felony in between those 2 offenses. Therefore the affirmative finding should be deleted from the judgment.

4.) Was this indictment 2<sup>nd</sup> Count Presented To Proper Court? art. 21.02 (2) Must show that the same was presented in the district Court of the county where the grand jury is in session. art. 27.09(1) states that an exception to an indictment or information is authorized on the grounds that it "does not appear to have been "presented" in the proper court as required by law." This indictments 2nd Count, does not have language that all these other indictments



have "That it was further Presented in to said Court". See Exhibits

6. does the AND Count track any offense under Texas

law? ~~been~~ If it is, then it should of remained

The same in Courts jury charge. The 6<sup>th</sup>

Amendment gives every defendant "The right... to

be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation"

7.) Did the language in Court Charge Not broaden

what was actually alleged in original ~~indictment~~

indictment? The indictment alleged 1 thing,

paragraph 1 of the court's charge added "That is

Committing the offense" and changed all the "AND"

to "OR" paragraph 2 stated if you find the

defendant guilty of "evading arrest" you must determine whether or not I used "or" exhibited the deadly weapon "During the Commission of the offense" They were instructed that I had to be found guilty of evading arrest. They were not instructed how the vehicle became a deadly weapon. The 2<sup>nd</sup> part of allegation in indictment was abandoned: "That in the Manner of its Use "And" intended use" was Capable of Causing death "and" serious bodily injury." The State said it does not have to prove intent. Are the States not bound by what was alleged? paragraph 7 of the Special issue which is the Application paragraph.



Allowed the jury to make this affirmative finding on a theory or an offense that was not alleged in the indictment. The theory in the indictment alleged one thing, and the theory for which I was convicted alleged something else. Paragraph 7 alleges in part:

the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, to-wit: a Motor Vehicle, during the commission of the offense for which he has been convicted. The State is under the impression that it alleged the offense in the indictment in the Conjunctive, "and" and proved one of thier theory's in the disjunctive. "OR". That is not



what happen in this case. The deadly weapon is not an element of the evading arrest offense See Penal Code 38.04(B)(2)(a).

however- There has to be a Manner how the Vehicle becomes a deadly weapon, and the State has to prove that beyond a reasonable doubt as well. In this case the 2<sup>nd</sup> Part of The deadly weapon (Vehicle) was abandoned. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Paragraph of Courts Charge State That "Deadly Weapon" and Serious Bodily injury have been defined For You in Numbered paragraph 2 and both have the same meaning here.

"Serious bodily injury, Was incorrectly defined.

how could those 2 definitions have the same meaning and I was incorrectly defined?

This case is just like Stirone v. U.S.

361 U.S. 212, 217-219 (1960). There the defendant

was indicted for obstructing the interstate

movement of sand in violation of the Hobbs

act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The district court had allowed

a conviction based on a factual finding that the


defendant had obstructed a shipment of steel in

interstate commerce. The court reversed and held

that the variation between the jury instructions and

the indictment "DESTROYED" the defendants

substantial rights to be tried only on charges



presented in an indictment returned by the grand jury. In this case the trial court allowed the prosecution to amend what the indictment alleged, it allowed the prosecution to join a misjoined offense, and to enter an affirmative finding to be entered in a judgment, (See Tx. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.01(2)) 2013, state's in part that: affirmative findings entered pursuant to Subdivision (a) of Subsection (a) of Section 3g of art 42.12 of this code.) that Texas Penal Code 12.35(c)(1) provision does not state that if that finding is made that it shall be entered in the judgment. It clearly

States that if the finding is made...

Then the State jail Felony will be punished

as a 3rd degree. art. 42.12 3g (a)(2) has

this language "On an affirmative finding under

this subdivision, the trial court "Shall" enter

the finding in the judgment of the court." art.

42.01 (2) 2013.

8) Was I under arrest the exact minute

That Officer Pulled in behind me? Both officers

stated they did not have a warrant, nor probable

Cause to arrest me. However I was convicted

for evading arrest in a vehicle without a

Conviction of any other crime that caused the arrest



I was not convicted for evading "arrest or detention," nor for evading detention. The Statute has the "or" in between arrest and detain. Two different theories or Manner or Means. In my situation - The States Theory was that I evaded arrest. See Reporter Records pgs 35, and 80 where both officers testified that I was not yet under arrest. Nor was probable cause established. I had not been taken into custody nor had I Submitted to the police officer's Authority. See California v. Hadari D. 499 U.S. 621 (1991)

## REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This petition should be granted for the following reasons: If 2<sup>nd</sup> Count could of been proved as alleged in the Indictment - The State would of Incorporated word for word in the courts charge what <sup>the</sup> official Indictment alleged - It could of tried to prove one of there theories. The trial Court allowed the State to Constructively Amend Count 2 of Indictment in Violation of 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup> United States Constitutional Amendments, and articles 28.10 and 28.11 of The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The State admitted to Amending ~~indictment~~ in there Facts finding and conclusion of Law. However the State believes that the indictment was plead in the conjunctive and proved in the disjunctive - That is Not the case. If this indictment was Not amended Then 2<sup>nd</sup> Count is Not an offense Period - State or Fed. Nor does it qualify to be an indictment.

This Petition Should Also be granted and in the # Alternative delete the deadly weapon finding because as alleged There is No Associated Felony between deadly weapon allegation, and evading arrest. that was made without a warrant and without probable cause. This Petition Should be granted because I was Convicted of a Crime that was Not the Subject of My Indictment.

#### **CONCLUSION**

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Cimadore Rodriguez

Date: \_\_\_\_\_