

No. _____

In The
Supreme Court of the United States

RYAN KENNETH RICHMOND,
Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

- I. DOES A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL A WITHIN GUIDELINE'S SENTENCE BAR APPELLATE REVIEW WHERE THE DISTRICT COURT USED A CROSS REFERENCE FOR ATTEMPTED MURDER GUIDELINE BY APPLYING THE WRONG DEFINITION OF RELEVANT CONDUCT?
- II. SHOULD STANDARDS IN ADDITION TO THE KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY WAIVER STANDARD OF *BRADY V. UNITED STATES* GOVERN THE ENFORCEMENT OF APPEAL WAIVERS IN PLEA AGREEMENTS?
- III. SHOULD AN APPELLATE COURT ENFORCE A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S APPEAL WAIVER WHERE THE SENTENCING COURT USES AN IMPROPER SENTENCING GUIDELINE THAT GREATLY INCREASES THE GUIDELINE SENTENCE EVEN THROUGH THE DEFENDANT RECEIVED NO SUBSTANTIAL BENEFIT FROM THE PLEA BARGAIN?

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OPINION BELOW

The order of the Fourth Circuit dismissing the appeal, issued on October 19, 2021, is unpublished. The order is reprinted as Appendix A to this Petition. (Appendix A, *infra*).

STATEMENT OF SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) to review the decision rendered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on October 19, 2021

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures provides:

(b) Considering and Accepting a Guilty or Nolo Contendere Plea.

(1) Advising and Questioning the Defendant.

Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the defendant may be placed under oath, and the court must address the defendant personally in open court. During this address, the court must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands the following:

....

(N) the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

"No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) provides that cross references

"shall be determined on the basis of the following:"

(1) (A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and (B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all acts and omissions of others that were —

- (i) within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,
- (ii) in furtherance of that criminal activity, and
- (iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity;

that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense;

- (2) solely with respect to offenses of a character for which § 3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple counts, all acts and omissions described in subdivisions (1)(A) and (1)(B) above that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction;
- (3) all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions specified in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) above, and all harm that was the object of such acts and omissions; and
- (4) any other information specified in the applicable guideline.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendant Ryan Richmond was indicted on May 18, 2020, for two counts of possession of a firearms by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922. J.A. p. 8. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant Richmond entered a plea of guilty to count one of the indictments which charged possession of four firearms on December 3, 2019 in Durham, North Carolina. J.A. p. 22. Hon. Catherine Eagles imposed a sentence of 120 months for the gun possession in count one and dismissed the

second gun possession count pursuant to the plea agreement. J.A. p. 150. This appeal followed.

After the entry of Mr. Richmond's plea of guilty, the probation office prepared a draft presentence report which described the circumstances surrounding the December 3 gun possession as originating in an argument that occurred that day at the Durham County Courthouse between members of rival gangs. The draft Presentence Report proposed various enhancements to the base level offense including enhancements for the number of guns, for possession of a stolen firearm, and an enhancement using a cross reference for attempted murder. Mr. Richmond objected to each of the proposed enhancements and also objected to the conclusion that he was a gang member and that he associated with other gang members named in the report. J.A. p. 160.

The government filed a sentencing memorandum to support these enhancements and, in addition, requested that the defendant be deprived of an offense reduction for acceptance of responsibility for denying relevant conduct. J.A. pp. 163-199.

At the sentencing hearing on January 28, 2021, the government supported the proposed enhancements by calling FBI agent Eric Nye. He testified that he was a part of the Safe Streets Task Force assigned to Durham. J.A. p. 59. Agent Nye first testified about various street gangs operating in Durham and the rivalries between the gangs. J.A. pp. 8. He also described the contents of 23 exhibits offered by the government. Nye described Ex. 1 and 2 as an Instagram post showing Mr.

Richmond's profile photo and messages showing him using gang signs. Nye described Exhibits 3 through 6 as Instagram messages to or from Mr. Richmond relating to payment of gang dues or other gang business. J.A. pp. 64-69.

Agent Nye then testified that Exhibits 7 to 23 were a series of surveillance photographs or maps depicting events on December 3, 2019. Nye testified that Exhibits 7 to 12 were photos from courthouse surveillance cameras that showed Mr. Richmond and others arriving at the courthouse and inside the courthouse. Nye testified that the photographs also showed an argument that erupted the courthouse hallways and showed Mr. Richmond and others being escorted out of the courthouse. J.A. p. 72 - 76. Nye described Exhibits 13 to 15 as surveillance cameras photos from buildings near the courthouse showing Mr. Richmond and his companions leaving the courthouse and walking to a green Hyundai sedan. J.A. pp. 76. Nye described Exhibit 17 as a photo showing a Chrysler 300 that opened fire on the Hyundai sedan and Exhibit 18 as a photo showing the Hyundai giving chase after being fired upon. Nye indicated that Exhibit 18 showed Ravonne Washington as the front passenger in the Hyundai and that Washington later admitted that he fired a gun at the Chrysler. J.A. p. 79. Nye testified that Exhibit 19 was a photograph from a camera on a Durham city bus showing Arlo Smith shooting at the Chrysler with an AR pistol while hanging out a window of the Hyundai at an intersection in downtown Durham. J.A. p. 80.

Nye described Exhibits 16 as a map of the route of the gun battle through downtown Durham, J.A. p. 78, and Exhibit 20 as an overhead view of the

intersection depicted in photo Exhibit 19. J.A. p. 80. Nye testified that Exhibit 21 was a photograph from a surveillance camera at the church where the Hyundai was abandoned showing Ravonne Washington and Mr. Richmond walking away. J.A. p. 81. Nye described Exhibits 22 and 23 as photographs from the courthouse and from Mr. Richmond's Instagram page showing him wearing the same sweatshirt as shown in the photograph from the church. J.A. p. 82.

On cross examination, agent Nye testified that the shootings and car chase most likely occurred in a four-minute period after Mr. Richmond and his companions reached the Hyundai. J. A. P. 85. Nye agreed that Mr. Richmond was a back seat passenger the entire time and that the occupants of the Hyundai could not have left the car during the chase until the car reached the church. J.A. 85.

At the hearing, Defendant offered no witnesses but argued against each of the proposed sentencing enhancements. At the conclusion of the hearing on the sentencing objections, the district court agreed with the defense objection to the PSR statement that he had hung out of the Hyundai shooting a gun and agreed that there was no evidence that defendant had fired a weapon during the car chase. J.A. p. 108. The district court denied each of the other defense objections and held that Defendant Richmond was not entitled to a decrease in offense level for acceptance of responsibility because of his denial of relevant conduct where he was acting in concert with the others in the car. J.A. p. 111. The district court noted that the sentencing range would have been 168 to 210 months but was set at the statutory maximum of 120 months. J.A. p. 111. The court imposed a sentence of

imprisonment of 120 months to be followed by three years supervised release. J.A. p. 150.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE POLICY FOLLOWED IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT AND CERTAIN CIRCUITS TO ENFORCE APPEAL WAIVERS EVEN WHERE THE SENTENCING COURT MISINTERPRETS THE GUIDELINES UNDERMINES THE CONGRESSIONAL POLICY OF SENTENCING UNIFORMITY.

Each circuit upholds appeal waivers in plea agreements.¹ As will be demonstrated below, most circuits, but not all, enforce appeal waivers in a way that prevents appellate review of incorrectly applied sentencing guidelines.

The standards that govern the enforcement of appeal waivers are of enormous consequence since appeal waivers are used in thousands of federal cases each year. A study of appeal waivers published in the Duke Law Journal found that more than 65 percent of the 971 federal cases studied utilized some form of appeal waiver.² The U.S. Sentencing Commission reported that in 2020 that 43,855 federal

¹ See, e.g., *United States v. Khattack*, 273 F.3d 557, 560–561 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing *United States v. Teeter*, 257 F.3d 14, 21 (1st Cir. 2001); See also, *United States v. Fisher*, 232 F.3d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 2000); *United States v. Brown*, 232 F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 2000); *United States v. Branam*, 231 F.3d 931, 932 (5th Cir. 2000); *United States v. Fleming*, 239 F.3d 761, 763–64 (6th Cir. 2001); *United States v. Jemison*, 237 F.3d 911, 916–18 (7th Cir. 2000); *United States v. Estrada – Bahena*, 201 F.3d 1070, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000); *United States v. Nguyen*, 235 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 2000); *United States v. Rubio*, 231 F.3d 709, 711 (10th Cir. 2000); *United States v. Howle*, 166 F.3d 1166, 1168– 69 (11th Cir. 1999).

² Nancy J. King and Michael E. O'Neill, *Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy*, 55 Duke L.J. 209, 231 (2005).

defendants were convicted with plea agreements.³ If 65% of these defendants pleaded guilty with appeal waiver, appeal waivers were used in more than 31,000 federal cases in 2020.

As Defendant Richmond argued at sentencing in the district court in the present case, the cross reference to murder should have been used because the defendant's relevant conduct did not meet the requirements of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a). The district court applied the cross reference on the grounds that Mr. Richmond was acting in concert with others who were firing weapons from the car in which he was a passenger. *See e.g.* JA p. 110. This district court fundamentally misapprehended the limits of relevant conduct under the sentencing guidelines. These guidelines forbid the use of the expanded relevant conduct provisions where criminal conduct would not be grouped under the guidelines.⁴ This court has also examined how this guideline applies in felon in possession of a firearm cases where it is proposed to apply a cross reference to the murder or attempted murder guideline. In *United States v. Horton*, 693 F.3d 463 (4th Cir. 2012), this court held that where the alleged murder was committed with a different weapon than the weapon that was the subject of the felon in possession conviction, and because U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 expressly excludes from grouping crimes against the person,

³ UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, INTERACTIVE SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, available at <https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2020/2020-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf>

⁴ See for example the explanations in the Sentencing Commission's Primer on Relevant Conduct, p. 8. available at https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2021_Primer_Relevant_Conduct.pdf

including attempted murder, the expansive definition of relevant conduct in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) was not applicable and the cross reference could not be applied using this provision. In the later case of *United States v. Ashford*, 718 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2013), this court that where it was alleged that the defendant attempted murder using with the firearm with which he was convicted of possessing, the cross reference could be applied only so long as the more restrictive relevant conduct requirements of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) were met.

As a result, the cross reference would apply in the present case only if the acts constituting attempted murder were (1) committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and (2) occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.

Here there is no doubt that the second requirement was met: defendant's possession of firearms of which he was convicted occurred during the four-minute gun battle in Durham on December 3, 2019. The cross reference failed the first requirement: there was no evidence that Mr. Richmond aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused the other two passengers in the Hyundai to fire their weapons at rival gang's vehicle. The district court, nevertheless, relied on the inapplicable "acting in concert" approach to conduct cannot be grouped.

Because the Fourth Circuit enforced the appeal waiver in Defendant Richmond's case, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit deprived itself and Mr. Richmond of the chance to have the guideline uniformly applied.

II. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVIEW THIS CASE TO RESOLVE THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE CIRCUITS ON WHETHER APPEAL WAIVERS THAT BAR REVIEW OF SENTENCING GUIDELINE APPLICATIONS ARE ENFORCEABLE.

The circuits diverge markedly on the standards used to decide whether appeal waivers are enforceable in cases where the sentencing court has applied the wrong sentencing guideline. This petition presents an opportunity to resolve a split in the circuits over when appeal waivers are enforceable that restrict the review of erroneous application of guideline determinations.

Appellate courts have frequently addressed appeal waivers in plea agreements and generally have held them to be enforceable.⁵ The general policy enunciated in the decisions upholding appeal waivers is that waivers serve the public interest in finality, efficiency, and the preservation of resources in the criminal justice system. When addressing the constitutionality of express waivers of appellate rights in plea bargains, federal and state courts start with the proposition that these agreements are valid so long as they are knowing and voluntary.⁶ As this

⁵ See, e.g., *United States v. Feichtinger*, 105 F.3d 1188, 1190 (7th Cir. 1977); *United States v. Melancon*, 972 F.2d 566, 567-568 (5th Cir. 1992); *United States v. Navarro-Botello*, 912 F.2d 318, 320-21 (9th Cir. 1990); *United States v. Wiggins*, 905 F.2d 51, 52-53 (4th Cir. 1990).

⁶ *Brady v. United States*, 397 U.S. 742, 752-53 (1970); *United States v. Melancon*, 972 F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 1992). See also, *United States v. Fleming*, 239 F.3d 761, 763-764 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing *Town of Newton v. Rumery*, 489 U.S. 386, 393 (1987)), *United States v. Buchanan*, 59 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1995).

Court found in *Brady v. United States*, 397 U.S. 742, 752-53 (1970), waivers of constitutional rights in guilty pleas must be “voluntary[,] . . . knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”

The various federal circuits differ in the extent they test the enforcement of appeal waivers against additional standards and how they apply *Brady*. One of the major differences is whether appeal waivers are enforced to prevent review of sentences even though the district court has applied an incorrect sentencing guideline.

A. The Simplified Application of *Brady*’s Knowing and Voluntary Standard.

The analysis followed in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits focuses almost exclusively on whether the appeal waiver passes a simplified version of *Brady*’s knowing and voluntary standard. For example, the Fourth Circuit routinely enforces appeal waivers, so long as there is any indication that the defendant understood that a waiver was included in his or her plea agreement.⁷ The primary rationale expressed in the Fourth Circuit’s decisions is the idea that any plea bargain struck by a defendant provides him or her with the benefit of having some

⁷ See, e.g., *United States v. General*, 278 F.3d 389, 399–401 (4th Cir. 2002); *United States v. Brown*, 232 F.3d 399, 402–06 (4th Cir. 2000); *United States v. Brock*, 211 F.3d 88, 92 n. 6 (4th Cir. 2000); *United States v. Lambey*, 974 F.2d 1389, 1393 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc); *United States v. Marin*, 961 F.2d 493, 495–96 (4th Cir. 1992); see also *United States v. Davis*, 954 F.2d 182, 185–86 (4th Cir. 1992) (enforcing a waiver that precluded the defendant from appealing certain convictions); cf. *United States v. Williams*, 29 F.3d 172, 174–75 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a defendant who stipulated his drug amounts prior to sentencing waived his right to appeal on the issue of the drug amounts).

control over their sentence. This benefit prevents a bargain from being "inequitable," according to the Fourth Circuit. *Brown*, 232 F.3d at 406. Beyond this requirement, however, there are few limits placed on the enforcement of such waivers in the Fourth Circuit.

Similarly, in allowing the broad enforcement of appeal waivers, the Ninth Circuit has noted that knowingly requirement does not necessarily mean that the defendant "foresees the specific issue that he now seeks to appeal." *United States v. Johnson*, 67 F.3d 200, 203-203 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding " [the defendant] knew he was giving up possible appeals, even if he did not know exactly what the nature of those appeals might be").

Brady's knowing and voluntary test included the requirement that waivers be "intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." 397 U.S. at 752-53. The Fourth and Ninth Circuit read this to mean that the defendant need to understand only that there is an appeal waiver in the plea agreement. This simplified approach to the "voluntary and knowing" test permits appeal waivers to be enforced in a wide set of circumstances. Use of this simplified approach insulates from review many types of mistakes by the sentencing courts including whether a particular guideline is even applicable to a defendant.

B. The Second Circuit's Approach to Enforcing Appeal Waivers Permits Appellate Review of Whether the Sentencing Court Applied the Correct Guideline.

The Second Circuit has the most developed case law addressing when a defendant can challenge a mistaken determination of sentencing guideline ranges

despite an appeal waiver. In its cases, the Second Circuit has fleshed out *Brady's* language that a defendant's waiver be an intelligent act "done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." The end result is that the Second Circuit typically upholds only those waivers that "waive the right to appeal a sentence within (or below) an agreed guideline range." *United States v. Chen*, 127 F.3d 286, 288 (2d Cir. 1997).⁸

The Second Circuit balks at enforcing broader waivers that purport to waive the right to appeal "a sentence within (or below) whatever guideline range the sentencing judge determines is applicable." *United States v. Goodman*, 165 F.3d 169, 174 (2d Cir. 1999). The Second Circuit invalidated such an agreement in *United States v. Martinez-Rios*, 143 F.3d 662, 668-69 (2d Cir. 1998). The Second Circuit's hesitancy in upholding these waivers stems from the view that this "form of waiver leaves a defendant free to appeal an upward departure but denies him the opportunity to challenge the correctness of the sentencing judge's determination as to the applicable guideline range." *Goodman*, 165 F.3d at 174. Furthermore, while the Second Circuit routinely upholds appeal waivers that prevent a defendant from appealing a sentence that falls within a range "explicitly stipulated within the agreement itself,"⁹ the defendant "retains the right of appeal if the ultimate sentence exceeds the prediction."

⁸ See e.g., *United States v. Maher*, 108 F.3d 1513 (2d Cir. 1997); *United States v. Ready*, 82 F.3d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 1996); *United States v. Yemitan*, 70 F.3d 746, 747 (2d Cir. 1995).

⁹ See, e.g., *United States v. Rosa*, 123 F.3d 94, 97-102 (2d Cir. 1997).

The Second Circuit also scrutinizes plea agreements that waive a defendant's rights to appeal in the event that the Court imposes a sentence within or below the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range *as determined by the Court.*" *Id.* at 99 (emphasis added). In the view of the Second Circuit, this type of waiver effectively "provides no protection to the defendant" because the guideline range is up to the discretion of the court and could "bear little to no resemblance to the predicted range." *Id.* Such a waiver, in the view of the Second Circuit, leaves the defendant "to the mercy of the sentencing court" because the defendant "assumes a virtually unbounded risk of error or abuse by the sentencing court." *Id.*

Normally, the standard plea agreement approved in the Second Circuit allows a defendant to weigh the predicted range and determine if he or she is willing to take the risk that they will receive a sentence in the upper part of the range and then be unable to appeal. *Id.* The predicted range provides some form of protection for the defendant because, if that sentence exceeds the range, he or she would still have the right to appeal. These broader waivers take that protection away because the guideline is left to the discretion of the sentencing court. Under such a waiver, a sentencing court could theoretically "sentence to a life term a defendant who had signed a plea which anticipated only a few months of imprisonment, and that defendant, under the terms of [these] agreement[s], would have no right to appeal even if the sentence were made erroneously." *Id.* at 100.

In addition, the Second Circuit has voiced concern that broad waivers are ambiguous and confusing to a defendant, thereby implicating the "knowing and

voluntary” inquiry “to an even greater extent than a standard plea.” *Id.* The Court noted that, to have an understanding of precisely what he is waiving, the defendant must grasp the distinction between 1) the court's upward departure from a sentence range which the court has already determined to be the proper application of the guidelines, a result which *is* appealable; and 2) the court's application of the guidelines to establish a sentence above the predicted range, a result which *is not* appealable. In the Court’s view the distinction between upward departures and relevant conduct enhancements –which remove one from a predicted range – are difficult even for attorneys and judges to grasp. Finally the Court noted a defendant could easily misunderstand the plea to mean that he would retain the right of appeal if the court were to sentence him more harshly than the predicted sentence range. *Id.* at 100-101.¹⁰

Because of these concerns, the Second Circuit has held that appeals under broader appeal waivers should not be summarily dismissed. Instead, the Court will examine “carefully the facts of the case and to look at the manner in which the agreement and the sentence were entered into and applied to determine whether it” should be upheld. *Id.* at 101. The Second Circuit formulated what it has called a “closer look” standard that it now applies to these broad waivers. *Goodman*, 165 F.3d at 174-75. The Court looks for specific factors, such as “the extent to which the

¹⁰ The appeal waiver in this case is even broader than those considered in the Second Circuit cases in that waives the right to appeal all issues except (1) ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) prosecutorial misconduct not known to the defendant at the time of the defendant's guilty plea, (3) a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum, and (4) a sentence based on an unconstitutional factor, such as race, religion, national origin or gender. JA p. 16.

defendant actually understood both the scope of the waiver provision and the factors at work which encompass his risk of a sentence exceeding the predicted range, and the extent of actual discrepancy between the predicted range and the ultimate sentence,” but in practice the Court subjects the appeal waiver and containing plea agreement to a fairness analysis. *Rosa*, 123 F.3d at 101. This fairness analysis has been applied on several occasions.

In *United States v. Rosa, supra*, the appeal waiver provided “[t]he defendant agrees not to file an appeal in the event that the Court imposes a sentence within or below the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range as determined by the Court.” *Id.* at 99. In examining the agreement’s fairness, the Court noted that, in exchange for his waiver of appeal, Rosa was permitted to plead guilty to a lower offense that carried no minimum sentence. This agreement allowed him to escape a ten-year mandatory minimum connected with the other charge in the indictment. The Court viewed this as a substantial benefit and stated that “[w]hile receipt of the expected benefits of a plea is, of course, not in and of itself a reason to hold a defendant to a plea agreement which is otherwise invalid, we mention it as it goes to the overall fairness, and thereby the validity, of that agreement.” *Id.* at 101-02. The Court also noted that the sentence imposed on Rosa, 27 months, was only six months higher than the upper limit set in the plea agreement. While higher discrepancies between predicted sentence and actual sentence may be cause for remand, *Rosa* was not such a case. *Id.* at 102.

The Second Circuit also applied this fairness standard in *United States v. Goodman, supra*, to invalidate a waiver. The appeal waiver in that case provided

that the defendant “knowingly and voluntarily waive[d her] right to appeal any sentence ... imposed by the Court and the manner in which the sentence is determined so long as [the] sentence is within the statutory maximum specified above.” *Goodman*, 165 F.3d at 172. The Court first noted that, because she pleaded guilty to the only charge brought against her, “Goodman received very little benefit in exchange for her plea of guilty.” *Id.* at 174. The Court also concluded that the sentencing court did not adequately insure Goodman understood the appeal waiver because the statements made to the defendant were inconsistent with those in the appeal waiver. *Id.* Finally, the Court noted “the discrepancy between the sentence imposed – thirty months in prison – and the predicted sentencing range—ten to sixteen months—is substantial.” *Id.* As a result of the above issues, the Court determined the appeal waiver to be unfair and refused to enforce the waiver against Goodman. *Id.* at 175.

C. The Miscarriage of Justice Standard.

The First¹¹, Third¹², Eighth¹³, and Tenth¹⁴ Circuits judge the enforcement of appeal waivers using a miscarriage of justice standard.¹⁵ A “miscarriage of justice”

¹¹ The First Circuit holds that the relevant factors of a defendant’s unenforceable waiver claim are “the clarity of the alleged error, its character and gravity, its impact on the defendant, any possible prejudice to the government, and the extent to which the defendant acquiesced in the result.” *United States v. Gonzales-Colon*, 582 F.3d 124, 128 (1st Cir. 2009)(citing *United States v. Gil-Quezada*, 445 F.3d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 2006). In *Ortiz-Garcia*, the First Circuit found that the waiver of appeal was a miscarriage of justice because the sentencing court failed to disclose in taking the waiver that the maximum penalty for the crime was life imprisonment. 665 F.3d 279 (1st Cir. 2011). In this case, the lower court stated only that the minimum penalty was “imprisonment of not less than ten (10) years.” *Id.* Because the defendant was not fully informed of the rights he was waiving, the Court held that enforcing the appeal waiver would be a miscarriage of justice. The rationale behind

this decision was a defendant did not know what right he waived until his sentence was imposed. Therefore, under this logic, a defendant's waiver does not pass the "knowing and voluntary" requirement if the court taking the waiver has stated an incorrect sentence range.

¹² Instead of identifying a list of specific circumstances that fall into the miscarriage of justice exception, the Third Circuit holds that the "underlying facts [of the case] determine whether a miscarriage of justice would be worked by enforcing the waiver." *United States v. Mabry*, 536 F.3d 231, 242 – 243 (3d Cir. 2008). In *United States v. Khattak*, 273 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 2001), the Third Circuit held that the defendant received a sentence "well within the terms of his plea agreement," and, additionally, the defendant's counsel presented no additional argument proving a miscarriage of justice. *Id.* at 563. Therefore, the waiver of his right to appeal was upheld. *Id.*

¹³ The Eighth Circuit also upheld this approach in *United States v. Greatwalker*, 285 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2002). The defendant in this case pled guilty to first-degree murder and later sought to withdraw this plea, claiming his attorney coerced him into taking the deal. *Id.* at 728. The district court denied his motion and imposed the agreed upon sentence of thirty-five years. *Id.* The appellate court reversed and remanded this decision stating, "There can be no plea bargain to an illegal sentence." *Id.* (citing *Baker v. Barbo*, 177 F.3d 149, 155 (3d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 528 U.S. 911, 145 L. Ed. 2d 219, 120 S. Ct. 261 (1999); *Correale v. United States*, 479 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1973)). The Court described an illegal sentence as a decision "not authorized by the judgment or conviction or when it is greater or less than the permissible statutory penalty for the crime." *Id.* The Court further held that "even when a defendant, prosecutor, and court agree on a sentence, the Court cannot give the sentence effect if it is not authorized by law. Thus, when a defendant has entered a plea bargain contemplating an illegal sentence, the defendant is generally entitled to withdraw the guilty plea." *Id.* at 730. To hold otherwise would be considered a miscarriage of justice; therefore, the appeal waiver was considered invalid.

¹⁴ Finally, the Tenth Circuit found persuasive the Eighth Circuit's treatment of these principles and created a three-prong analysis. In reviewing appeals brought after a defendant has entered into an appeal waiver, the Tenth Circuit's analysis calls for the court of appeals to determine: (1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice. *United States v. Hahn*, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing *United States v. Andis*, 333 F.3d 886, 890 – 892 (8th Cir. 2003)).

has been found where the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, where an impermissible factor such as race has been used or where there has been ineffective assistance of counsel. A miscarriage of justice has also been found in these circuits where a sentence was entered that was not authorized by statute, or when the defendant was not informed of the statutory maximum he faced. These courts have not found that erroneous application of a sentencing factor is a miscarriage of justice. This type of mistake is unreviewable in these circuits if there is an appeal waiver.

D. The Ad Hoc Approach Used in Other Circuits.

Without enunciating a broad general standard, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits each use their own *ad hoc* approaches to judge the validity of a defendant's waiver of the right to appeal. These circuits hold there are specific instances in which the defendant's waiver is unenforceable. For example, the Seventh Circuit has enforced appeal waivers to reject challenges made to guideline determinations and to reject claims of ineffective assistance of counsel but has also ruled that an appeal waiver does not preclude review of a sentence that exceeds the statutory

In *Hahn*, the Tenth Circuit defined four situations that would qualify as a miscarriage of justice and would result in the invalidation of the waiver: “[1] where the district court relied on an impermissible factor such as a race, [2] where ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver render the waiver invalid, [3] where the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, or [4] where the waiver is otherwise unlawful.” *Id.* at 1328. The Court held that Hahn's request for an appeal based on the lower court's sentencing error was within scope of the waiver of his right to appeal, and, therefore, the waiver was upheld. *Id.*

¹⁵ *United States v. Ortiz-Garcia*, 665 F.3d 279 (1st Cir. 2011); *See also, United States v. Khattak*, 273 F.3d 557, 563; *United States v. Jennings*, 662 F.3d 988, 990 (8th Cir. 2011); *United States v. Lonjose*, 663 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing *United States v. Hahn*, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004).

maximum. *See United States v. Joiner*, 183 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1999).¹⁶ The Eleventh Circuit instead focuses on procedural protections in connection with appeal waivers. If a defendant has been questioned about the appeal waiver and has understood its full significance, the Eleventh Circuit will uphold appeal waivers even in the face of “blatant errors” committed by the sentencing court.¹⁷

E. The Differing Approaches Used by the Circuits in Enforcing Appeal Waivers Lead to Markedly Different Results When Applied to Sentencing Appeals That Challenge the Use of the Incorrect Guideline; Except in the Second Circuit The Approaches Insulate the Use of Incorrect Guidelines from Appellate Review.

All circuits, except the Second Circuit, enforce waivers in a way that precludes challenges to the correctness of guideline determinations. The Second

¹⁶ In *Joiner*, the Seventh Circuit held that a waiver of the right to appeal “does not completely foreclose review, because the right to appeal survives where the agreement to waive is involuntary or where the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.” *Id.* at 644 – 645 (citing *United States v. Jones*, 167 F.3d 1142 (7th Cir. 1998)). In this case, the defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel did not fall into one of the narrowly defined categories of the exception to make the appeal invalid. *Id.* Therefore, the waiver of appeal was upheld.

The Seventh Circuit also rejected the claim in *Jones*, 167 F.3d 1142, that the court’s sentence exceeded the statutory maximum because the plea agreement proposed a range rather than an exact number. *Id.* at 1145. The Seventh Circuit only recognizes that a “right to appeal survives where the agreement is involuntary, or the trial court relied on a constitutionally impermissible factor (such as race).” *Jones*, 167 F.3d at 1144.

¹⁷ In *United States v. Grinard-Henry*, 399 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005), the court enforced waiver of appeal of the application of the sentencing guidelines that within the scope of the waiver after noting that the trial court had specifically explained the scope of the waiver and determined the defendant understood its full significance. The Court noted an appeal waiver includes the waiver of the right to appeal difficult or debatable legal issues or even blatant error, citing *United States v. Howle*, 166 F.3d 1166, 1169 (11th Cir. 1999).

Circuit does not enforce certain appeal waivers if the plea agreement would not otherwise benefit the defendant.

The circuits that broadly enforce appeal waivers insulate great numbers of sentences from appellate review and thereby allow greater disparity in sentencing results. One of Congress' three primary purposes in enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was to promote reasonable uniformity in sentencing decisions among similarly situated defendants.¹⁸ Thus the policy of broadly enforcing appeal waivers undermines the congressional policy of promoting sentencing uniformity.

Petitioner Richmond's case illustrates how the circuits' different approaches to enforcing appeal waivers brings markedly different results in similar cases. The facts of Petitioner Richmond's case closely parallel those found in the Second Circuit *Goodman* case. Richmond's appeal waiver is the broad type carefully scrutinized in the Second Circuit because it effectively subjects Petitioner to a "virtually unbounded risk of error or abuse by the sentencing court." The sentencing court has unfettered authority to sentence Petitioner however it wishes, because the waiver prevents him from contesting any mistake the court makes in establishing the guideline range.

If Mr. Richmond's case were in the Second Circuit, the appeals court would apply its "closer look" standard to the facts of this case. In doing so, it would observe that Petitioner received little to no benefit for his bargain. Although he pled to specific charges against his, the sentence was based on his entire course of conduct. Also, the Court would observe that due to the broad nature of the plea agreement,

¹⁸ *United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual*, Ch. 1, Pt. A, 1 (3)(2018).

Petitioner possibly did not fully understand the terms of the agreement, and, therefore, did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to appeal. That danger is particularly present in this case where the judge who took the change of plea merely asked Mr. Richmond if he understood that he might be waiving his right to appeal. The district judge did not even read the terms of the agreement to Mr. Richmond and asked no specific questions to probe Petitioner's understanding of what he was waiving. See J.A. 45. This omission by the court paired with the lack of sophistication of Petitioner raises a serious question to his understanding of the appeal waiver, an issue that was also present in *Goodman*.

In this case, the Fourth Circuit summarily upheld the Petitioner Richmond's waiver. The court based its determination solely on whether Petitioner Richmond understood his plea agreement contained an appeal waiver. The Court paid no attention to the relative fairness approach of *Goodman*, and did not examine whether the district court adequately determined whether Mr. Richmond understood what rights he was waiving.

As a consequence, the Fourth Circuit approach prevented review of a mistake of law that caused Mr. Richmond to be sentenced to a longer sentence due to the erroneous determination that the murder cross reference should be used. Similarly the use of the expanded definition of relevant conduct deprived Mr. Ryan of a three level adjust for acceptance of responsibility. If the correct offense level category had been used and Petitioner sentenced using the appropriate guideline range, a

guideline sentence would have been sentenced to 12 to 33 months lower than the sentence he received.¹⁹

In the *Goodman* case, the sentence imposed was 14 months higher than the predicted sentence. The Second Circuit viewed that discrepancy as substantial and refused to enforce the appeal waiver because of it. In this case, the difference is larger or larger. Because of a mistake made by the sentencing court, Mr. Richmond will spend 12 to 33 months in prison than he otherwise would have. This case illustrates the significant effects that flow from the different approaches used by most circuits that prevent appellate review of erroneous determinations of guideline ranges. The insulation of such mistakes from appellate review promotes severe disparities in sentencing contrary to the congressional policy of promoting uniformity in sentencing.

Granting review of this case would provide the Supreme Court with an opportunity to establish greater uniformity in how appeal waivers are applied on sentencing appeals and take a step that would promote a more uniform application of the sentencing guidelines across the country. Given the tens of thousands of federal cases in which appeal waivers are used each year, the Court's review of the use of appeal waivers and the standards for their enforcement has great importance to federal criminal jurisprudence.

¹⁹ The district court found the guideline was 168 to 210 months but was capped at 120 months by the statutory maximum. Without the cross reference and with acceptance of responsibility the guideline would have been 87 to 108 months.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner Richmond respectfully requests that the Supreme Court review this case to resolve this circuit split as well as to provide further guidance to how and whether appeal waivers should be enforced.

This the 13th day of January 2022.

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