

No. _____

In the
Supreme Court of the United States

Manuel Nunez-Gonzalez,

Petitioner,

v.

United States of America,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

- I. Whether all facts—including the fact of a prior conviction—that increase a defendant’s statutory maximum must be pleaded in the indictment and either admitted by the defendant or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt?
- II. Whether substantive reasonableness review necessarily encompasses some degree of reweighing the sentencing factors?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner is Manuel Nunez Gonzalez, who was the Defendant-Appellant in the court below. Respondent, the United States of America, was the Plaintiff-Appellee in the court below.

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Manuel Nunez-Gonzalez seeks a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, *United States v. Manuel Nunez-Gonzalez*, 2021 WL 4096610, CA 20-11150, is reprinted in Appendix A to this Petition. The district court's judgment and sentence is attached as Appendix B.

JURISDICTION

The panel opinion and judgment of the Fifth Circuit were entered on September 8, 2021. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY AND RULES PROVISIONS

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;

This Petition involves 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which states:

(a) In general. Subject to subsection (b), any alien who—

(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding, and thereafter

(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States, unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at a place outside the United States or his application for admission from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien's reapplying for admission; or (B) with respect to an alien previously denied admission and removed, unless such alien shall establish that he was not required to obtain such advance consent under this or any prior Act, shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than 2 years or both.

(b) Criminal penalties for reentry of certain removed aliens.
Notwithstanding subsection (a), in the case of any alien described in such subsection--

(1) whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of three or more misdemeanors involving drugs, crimes against the person, or both, or a felony (other than an aggravated felony), such alien shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both;

(2) whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony, such alien shall be fined under such title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both;

(3) who has been excluded from the United States pursuant to section 235(c) [8 USCS § 1225(c)] because the alien was excludable under section 212(a)(3)(B) [8 USCS § 1182(a)(3)(B)] or who has been removed from the United States pursuant to the provisions of title V [8 USCS §§ 1531 et seq.], and who thereafter, without the permission of the Attorney General, enters the United States, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, and imprisoned for a period of 10 years, which sentence shall not run concurrently with any other sentence.[.] or

(4) who was removed from the United States pursuant to section 241(a)(4)(B) [8 USCS § 1231(a)(4)(B)] who thereafter, without the permission of the Attorney General, enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States (unless the Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien's reentry) shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.

8 U.S.C. § 1326.

LIST OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

1. *United States v. Manuel Nunez-Gonzalez*, 4:20-CR-00055-Y-1, United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The judgment and sentence were entered on November 13, 2020. (Appendix B).
2. *United States v. Manuel Nunez-Gonzalez*, 2021 WL 4096610, CA 20-11150, court of appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Judgment affirmed on September 8, 2021. (Appendix A)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 26, 2020, Manuel Nunez-Gonzalez (Nunez-Gonzalez) was charged by indictment with illegal re-entry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). (ROA.7). The indictment alleged that on or about December 17, 2018, Nunez-Gonzalez was an alien who was found in the United States of America after having been deported and removed therefrom on or about May 17, 2017, and that he had not received the express consent of the Attorney General of the United States and the Secretary of Homeland Security to reapply for admission to the United States. (ROA.7). Other than listing the statutory section that provided for a 0 -- 20 year range of punishment and a three year term of supervised release (8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2)) there were no allegations of any of the enhancement provisions under the statute that would raise the statutory maximum above 2 years as to allow for a term of supervised release in excess of one year. (ROA.7). In the factual resume, Nunez-Gonzalez stipulated to the following facts:

Manuel Nunez-Gonzalez (Nunez) is a citizen and national of Mexico, born in Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico. On May 17, 2017, Nunez was deported and removed to Mexico through Laredo, Texas. On December 17, 2018, Nunez was encountered by immigration authorities at the Tarrant County Jail in Fort Worth, Texas, within the Federal Northern District of Texas. Nunez had re-entered the United States illegally, and he had not applied for nor received permission from the Attorney General of the United States or the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to re-enter the United States at any time after being deported.

(ROA.34).

On July 17, 2020, Nunez-Gonzalez pleaded guilty to this indictment without a plea agreement (ROA.35-36,87). The factual resume and the admonishments at the

re-arraignment noted that the statutory maximum was 20 years imprisonment and the term of supervised release was up to three years. (ROA.35-36,90). The district court did not advise that the felony provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) stated an essential element of the offense to which Nunez-Gonzalez was pleading guilty. (ROA.34,82-83).

The total offense level was 15 with a criminal history category V, resulting in an advisory guideline imprisonment range of 37-46 months. (ROA.141). In the PSR, the probation officer found that there were grounds that warranted an upward variance. (ROA.143). Nunez-Gonzalez filed an objection to the suggestion in the PSR that there were grounds that warranted an upward variance. (ROA.145-146). Nunez-Gonzalez's attorney filed a motion for downward variance. (Defendant's Motion for Downward Variance). The government filed a response to the defendant's motion for downward variance and a sentencing memorandum in which the government asked for an upward variance, based upon the seriousness of Nunez-Gonzalez's criminal history. *See* (Government's Response to Defendant's Motion for Downward Variance, and Government's Sentencing Memorandum). At the sentencing hearing, the district overruled Nunez-Garcia's objection to the PSR, denied his motion for downward variance, granted the government's motion for an upward variance and imposed a 72 month sentence of imprisonment and a three year term of supervised release. (ROA.113-114). The court also ordered the sentence to run consecutively with a 15 year sentence imposed in Tarrant County, Texas in cause numbers 1582122D and 1575176D. (ROA.114).

On appeal, Nunez-Gonzalez argued for the first time that the statutory maximum term of imprisonment was two years and the maximum term of supervised release was one year. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and sentence finding that the issue was foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres v. United States*, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). *See United States v. Nunez-Gonzalez*, 2021 WL 4096610, No. 20-11150, *1 (5th Cir. September 8, 2021). Nunez-Gonzalez also objected to the Fifth Circuit practice of refusing to conduct any degree of reweighing the sentencing factors under reasonableness review. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the sentence holding that the district court considered the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors but did not conduct its own weighing of the factors. *See id.*

REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION

I. This Court should reconsider *Almendarez-Torres v. United States*.

Petitioner was subjected to an enhanced statutory maximum under 8 U.S.C. §1326(b) because the removal or deportation charged in the indictment followed a prior felony conviction. Petitioner's sentence thus depends on the judge's ability to find the existence and date of a prior conviction, and to use that date to increase the statutory maximum. This power was affirmed in *Almendarez-Torres v. United States*, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), which held that the enhanced maximums of 8 U.S.C. §1326 represent sentencing factors rather than elements of an offense, and that they may be constitutionally determined by judges rather than juries. *See Almendarez-Torres*, 523 U.S. at 244.

This Court, however, has repeatedly limited *Almendarez-Torres*. *See Alleyne v. United States*, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2160 n.1 (2013) (characterizing *Almendarez-Torres* as a narrow exception to the general rule that all facts that increase punishment must be alleged in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt); *Descamps v. United States*, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2295 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that *Almendarez-Torres* should be overturned); *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (stressing that *Almendarez-Torres* represented “a narrow exception” to the prohibition on judicial fact-finding to increase a defendant's sentence); *United States v. Shepard*, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (Souter, J., controlling plurality opinion) (“While the disputed fact here can be described as a fact about a prior conviction, it is too far removed from the conclusive significance of a prior judicial record, and too much like the findings subject to *Jones* and *Apprendi*, to say that *Almendarez-Torres* clearly

authorizes a judge to resolve the dispute.”); *Dretke v. Haley*, 541 U.S. 386, 395-396 (2004) (concluding that the application of *Almendarez-Torres* to the *sequence* of a defendant’s prior convictions represented a difficult constitutional question to be avoided if possible); *Nijhawan v. Holder*, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 2302 (2009) (agreeing with the Solicitor General that the loss amount of a prior offense would represent an element of an 8 U.S.C. §1326(b) offense, to the extent that it boosted the defendant’s statutory maximum).

Further, any number of opinions, some authored by Justices among the *Almendarez-Torres* majority, have expressed doubt about whether it was correctly decided. *See Apprendi*, 530 U.S. at 490; *Haley*, 541 U.S. at 395-396; *Shepard*, 544 U.S. at 26 & n.5 (Souter, J., controlling plurality opinion); *Shepard*, 544 U.S. at 26-28 (Thomas, J., concurring); *Rangel-Reyes v. United States*, 547 U.S. 1200, 1201 (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiorari); *Rangel-Reyes*, 547 U.S. at 1202-1203 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); *James v. United States*, 550 U.S. 192, 231-232 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting). And this Court has also repeatedly cited authorities as exemplary of the original meaning of the constitution that do not recognize a distinction between prior convictions and facts about the instant offense. *See Blakely v. Washington*, 542 U.S. 296, 301-302 (2004) (quoting W. Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England* 343 (1769), 1 J. Bishop, *Criminal Procedure* § 87, p 55 (2d ed. 1872)); *Apprendi*, 530 U.S. at 478-479 (quoting J. Archbold, *Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases* 44 (15th ed. 1862), 4 Blackstone 369-370).

In *Alleyne*, this Court applied *Apprendi*'s rule to mandatory minimum sentences, holding that any fact that produces a higher sentencing range—not just a sentence above the mandatory maximum—must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 133 S. Ct. at 2162–63. In its opinion, the Court apparently recognized that *Almendarez-Torres*'s holding remains subject to Fifth and Sixth Amendment attack. *Alleyne* characterized *Almendarez-Torres* as a “narrow exception to the general rule” that all facts that increase punishment must be alleged in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. *Id.* at 2160 n.1. But because the parties in *Alleyne* did not challenge *Almendarez-Torres*, this Court said that it would “not revisit it for purposes of [its] decision today.” *Id.*

The Court's reasoning nevertheless demonstrates that *Almendarez-Torres*'s recidivism exception may be overturned. *Alleyne* traced the treatment of the relationship between crime and punishment, beginning in the Eighteenth Century, repeatedly noting how “[the] linkage of facts with particular sentence ranges . . . reflects the intimate connection between crime and punishment.” *Id.* at 2159 (“[i]f a fact was by law essential to the penalty, it was an element of the offense”); *see id.* (historically, crimes were defined as “the whole of the wrong to which the law affixes [] punishment . . . include[ing] any fact that annexes a higher degree of punishment”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); *id.* at 2160 (“the indictment must contain an allegation of every fact which is legally essential to the punishment to be inflicted”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court concluded that, because “the whole of the” crime and its punishment cannot be separated, the

elements of a crime must include any facts that increase the penalty. The Court recognized no limitations or exceptions to this principle.

Alleyne's emphasis that the elements of a crime include the "whole" of the facts for which a defendant is punished seriously undercuts the view, expressed in *Almendarez-Torres*, that recidivism is different from other sentencing facts. *See Almendarez-Torres*, 523 U.S. at 243–44; *see also Apprendi*, 530 U.S. at 490 ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."). *Apprendi* tried to explain this difference by pointing out that, unlike other facts, recidivism "does not relate to the commission of the offense' itself[.]" 530 U.S. at 496 (quoting *Almendarez-Torres*, 523 U.S. at 230). But this Court did not appear committed to that distinction; it acknowledged that *Almendarez-Torres* might have been "incorrectly decided." *Id.* at 489; *see also Shepard v. United States*, 544 U.S. 13, 26 n.5 (2005) (acknowledging that Court's holding in that case undermined *Almendarez-Torres*); *Cunningham v. California*, 549 U.S. 270, 291 n.14 (2007) (rejecting invitation to distinguish between "facts concerning the offense, where *Apprendi* would apply, and facts [like recidivism] concerning the offender, where it would not," because "*Apprendi* itself ... leaves no room for the bifurcated approach").

Three concurring justices in *Alleyne* provide additional reason to believe that the time is ripe to revisit *Almendarez-Torres*. *See Alleyne*, 133 S. Ct. at 2164 (Sotomayor, Ginsburg, Kagan, J.J., concurring). Those justices noted that the

viability of the Sixth Amendment principle set forth in *Apprendi* was initially subject to some doubt, and some justices believed the Court “might retreat” from it. *Id.* at 2165. Instead, *Apprendi*’s rule “has become even more firmly rooted in the Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.” *Id.* Reversal of precedent is warranted when “the reasoning of [that precedent] has been thoroughly undermined by intervening decisions.” *Id.* at 2166.

The validity of *Almendarez-Torres* is accordingly subject to reasonable doubt. If *Almendarez-Torres* is overruled, the result will obviously undermine the use of Petitioner’s prior conviction to increase his statutory maximum. Petitioner’s 72-month term of imprisonment and three-year term of supervised release would exceed the statutory maximum of two years imprisonment and one year supervised release.

This issue was not raised by Nunez-Gonzalez in the trial court. Because this issue was not raised in the district court, it must be reviewed for plain error. *See United States v. Mondragon-Santiago*, 564 F.3d 357, 368-69 (5th Cir. 2009). The lower court may reverse Petitioner’s sentence if it finds that (1) the district court erred, (2) its error was plain, and (3) the error affected Nunez-Gonzalez’s substantial rights. *See United States v. Mares*, 402 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing *United States v. Cotton*, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002)). If these conditions are met, the court has discretion to reverse Petitioner’s sentence if it also finds that the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” *Id.* (quoting *Cotton*, 535 U.S. at 631). If this Court were to reverse its holding in *Almendares-Torres*, the error would be clear and plain and would affect Nunez-Gonzalez’s substantial rights

because his 72-month imprisonment and a three year term of supervised release would exceed the statutory maximum.

II. The court below and other Federal courts of appeals have reached substantially different conclusions regarding the appropriate level of deference to be accorded the district court in substantive reasonableness review.

A. The circuits are in conflict.

The length of a federal sentence is determined by the district court's application of 18 U.S.C. §3553(a). *United States v. Booker*, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005). A district court must impose a sentence that is adequate, but no greater than necessary, to achieve the goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(2). See 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(2). The district court's compliance with this requirement is reviewed for reasonableness. *See Rita v. United States*, 551 U.S. 338, 359. (2007).

In *Gall v. United States*, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), this Court emphasized that all federal sentences, “whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range” are reviewed on appeal “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” *Gall*, 552 U.S. at 41. It expanded further on this theme in *Kimbrough v. United States*, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), holding that district courts enjoyed the power to disagree with policy decisions of the Guidelines where those decisions were not empirically founded. *See Kimbrough*, 552 U.S. at 109.

Nonetheless, the courts of appeals have taken divergent positions regarding the extent of deference owed district courts when federal sentences are reviewed for reasonableness. The Fifth Circuit flat-out prohibits “substantive second-guessing of

the sentencing court.” *United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez*, 517 F.3d 751, 767 (5th Cir. 2008).

This approach contrasts sharply with the position of several other courts of appeals. The Second Circuit has emphasized that it is not the case that “district courts have a blank check to impose whatever sentences suit their fancy.” *See United States v. Jones*, 531 F.3d 163, 174 (2d Cir. 2008). The Eleventh and Third Circuits have likewise read *Gall* to “leave no doubt that an appellate court may still overturn a substantively unreasonable sentence, albeit only after examining it through the prism of abuse of discretion, and that appellate review has not been extinguished.” *United States v. Pugh*, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008); accord *United States v. Levinson*, 543 F.3d 190, 195-196 (3d Cir. 2008). These cases conform to the consensus among the federal circuits that it remains appropriate to reverse at least some federal sentences after *Gall* as substantively unreasonable. *See United States v. Ofray-Campos*, 534 F.3d 1, 44 (1st Cir. 2008); *United States v. Abu Ali*, 528 F.3d 210, 269 (4th Cir. 2008); *United States v. Funk*, 534 F.3d 522, 530 (6th Cir. 2008); *United States v. Shy*, 538 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2008).

These approaches cannot be squared. The Fifth Circuit understands *Gall* to prohibit substantive second guessing; the majority of other circuits have issued opinions that understand their roles as to do precisely that, albeit deferentially.

B. The present case warrants review.

The present case is an appropriate vehicle to consider this conflict. Mr. Nunez-Gonzalez’s advisory imprisonment range was 37-46 months. The sentencing court imposed a sentence of 72 months.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) requires that, “[t]he court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection.” Section 3553(a) also requires a district court to consider, “[T]he need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(6). This Court has instructed courts of appeals to review a district court’s compliance with Section 3553 by the “reasonableness” standard. See *Rita*, 551 U.S. at 359; and *Gall*, 552 U.S. at 41.

The Fifth Circuit has made it clear that it prohibits “substantive second-guessing of the sentencing court.” *United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez*, 517 F.3d at 767. The Fifth Circuit has simply refused to conduct any reasonableness review by re-visiting the weighing of sentencing factors. See *United States v. Malone*, 828 F.3d 331, 342 (5th Cir. 2016); *United States v. Hernandez*, 876 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 2017); *United States v. Cotten*, 650 Fed. Appx. 175, 178 (5th Cir. 2016) (unpublished); *United States v. Mosqueda*, 437 Fed. Appx. 312, 312 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished); *United States v. Turcios-Rivera*, 583 Fed. Appx. 375, 376-377 (5th Cir. 2014); *United States v. Douglas*, 667 Fed. Appx. 508, 509 (5th Cir. 2016) (unpublished).

The problem in this case is that the Petitioner received no reasonableness review from the court of appeals. Nunez-Gonzalez fully preserved the sentencing issue at the trial court and presented this issue for reasonableness review on appeal. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the sentence without conducting any kind of reasonableness analysis or weighing of the sentencing factors. The court simply found that the district court considered the §3553 factors, which is not the same as conducting its own weighing of the factors. Accordingly, the outcome of the case likely turns on an appellate court's refusal to engage in meaningful review of the reasonableness of a criminal sentence. Review is warranted to address the practice of the Fifth Circuit to refuse to apply the reasonableness review required by this Court, and to resolve the division in the circuit courts in applying reasonableness review.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner respectfully submits that this Court should grant *certiorari* to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted this 7th day of December, 2021.

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