APPENDIX

"A"

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CHADD A. MORRIS, Plaintiff,	)	
JERRY WORLEY, et. al., Defendants	)	Case No. 16-4127

ORDER

COLIN S. BRUCE, U.S. District Judge:

This cause is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff's "Motion *in Limine* and Clarify and Strike," [144]; Motion to Reset Trial Date, [145]; Motions to Compel [146, 147]; and "Motion for Clarification/Strike/Vacate" [152]. Plaintiff's motions are DENIED as moot [144, 145, 146, 147, 152] and this case is DISMISSED with prejudice for the reasons stated below.

Summary of Warnings By The Court

Plaintiff's motions are continued examples of his contentious filings repetitively rejecting or refusing to accept previous rulings of the Court, some containing disrespectful commentary to the Court, and some plainly intended to further delay and disrupt the proceedings in this case. Two different judges over a period of almost four years have admonished Plaintiff on *seven separate occasions* that this continued conduct could result in sanctions, specifically including the dismissal of his lawsuit:

- January 29, 2018 Case Management Order (JES), p. 5 ("If Plaintiff continues to ignore the orders of the Court, he may face sanctions including fines, or ultimately the dismissal of his lawsuit.").

• June 28, 2018 Text Order (JES)("Plaintiff is admonished if he does provide intentionally misleading or untruthful information to the Court in the future, he may face sanctions including fines, or ultimately, the dismissal of his lawsuit.").

• September 17, 2018 Text Order (JES)("Plaintiff is admonished he could face sanctions including financial sanctions or ultimately, the dismissal of his case if he continues to file repetitive motions asking for clarification when he simply disagrees with a ruling.").

• September 16, 2019 Text Order (CSB)("If Plaintiff continues to file repetitive motions and ignore the Court's rulings, he could face sanctions including fines or ultimately, the dismissal of this lawsuit.").

• September 14, 2020 Text Order (CBS)("Plaintiff is reminded even though he is proceeding *pro se*, his filings should not contain disrespectful or inappropriate commentary, or he could face sanctions, including dismissal of his case.").

• November 2, 2020 Minute Entry (CSB)("Plaintiff's motions are abusive to the judicial process. As Plaintiff has been admonished … he must abide by Court orders and continuing to file repetitive motions will result in sanctions up to and including the dismissal of this lawsuit.").

• November 2, 2020 Pretrial Conference (CSB)(Plaintiff admonished in person, "I will caution you much in the same way Judge Shadid has already cautioned you: There will be consequences up to and including dismissal of your case if you can't understand that when the Court enters an order that's the order. It's not subject to your approval.")(Transcript, [150], p. 12-13).

Applicable Caselaw

While district courts have wide latitude in ordering sanctions, the Seventh Circuit considers dismissal to be an extreme and "draconian" measure which should rarely be imposed. *Maynard v. Nygren*, 332 F.3d 462, 467 (7th Cir. 2003), *overruled on other grounds*; *see also Dotson v. Bravo*, 321 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2003); *Marrocco v. General Motors Corp.*, 966 F.2d 220, 223-24 (7th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a court to dismiss a lawsuit for failing to follow court orders. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). "Dismissal under Rule 41(b) is appropriate only when there is a clear

record of delay or contumacious conduct or when less severe sanctions will not suffice." *Gay v. Chandra*, 682 F.3d 590, 595 n.2 (7th Cir. 2012)(internal quotation omitted).

In addition to the Federal Rules, courts also have an inherent authority to manage their dockets and sanction a party who "has willfully abused the judicial process or otherwise conducted litigation in bad faith." *Emerson v. Dart*, 900 F.3d 469, 473 (7th Cir. 2018), *citing Secrease v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co.*, 800 F.3d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 2015). "The court must first make a finding of 'bad faith, designed to obstruct the judicial process, or a violation of a court order.'" *Fuery v. City of Chicago*, 900 F.3d 450, 463-64 (7th Cir. 2018), *quoting Tucker v. Williams*, 682 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2012).

> Although part of a court's consideration should be on the impact or effect that the conduct had on the course of the litigation, there is no requirement that the district court find prejudice. Nor is there a requirement that a district court impose graduated sanctions. The appropriateness of lesser sanctions need not be explored if the circumstances justify imposition of the ultimate penalty—dismissal with prejudice.

Fuery, 900 F.3d at 464.

The Court's inherent authority to sanction "is at its pinnacle...when contumacious conduct threatens a court's ability to control its own proceedings." *Id.; see also Royce v. Michael R. Needle P.C.*, 950 F.3d 939, 958 (7th Cir. 2020).

Furthermore, a plaintiff's *pro se* status does not excuse continued failure to abide by court orders, nor a clear record of contumacious or stubbornly disobedient conduct. *See Jones v. Phipps*, 39 F.3d 158, 162 (7th Cir. 1994)("Although civil litigants who represent themselves ... benefit from various procedural protections not otherwise afforded to the ordinary attorney-represented litigant, *pro se* litigants are not entitled to

a general dispensation from the rules of procedure or court imposed deadlines.") (internal citations omitted); *Stewart v. Credit Control, LLC*, 845 Fed.Appx. 465, 467 (7th Cir. 2021)("dismissing the case was reasonable" given *pro se* plaintiff's "inexcusable, willful, and steadfast disobedience" to court orders); *White v. Williams*, 423 Fed.Appx. 645, 646 (7th Cir. 2011) (dismissal of Rushville plaintiff's lawsuit "appropriate when a party has shown a lack of respect for the court or proceedings."); *Jacobs v. Frank*, 349 Fed.Appx. 106, 107 (7th Cir. 2009)(*pro se* Plaintiff's repeated refusal to comply with court's explicit direction warrants dismissal); *Martin v. Heisner*, 2021 WL 2021141, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2021) ("Plaintiff's continued misconduct and false personal attacks are unacceptable and, by themselves, support dismissal, especially since he has been placed on notice that he must—like all litigants—conduct himself appropriately under the law.").

Plaintiff's Conduct

The record in this case demonstrates Plaintiff's repeated refusal to both follow Court orders and accept the rulings of this Court. Plaintiff has now filed roughly *forty* motions, often labeled "Motions to Clarify," in which Plaintiff refuses to accept a ruling from the Court and wishes to reargue a decided issue. *See i.e.* [16, 28, 29, 34, 36, 40, 42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 58, 59, 61, 63, 64, 68, 70, 77, 79, 80, 83, 112, 117, 120, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 135, 136, 137, 144, 146, 147, 152].[1] Most of these motions are repetitive filings addressing the same issue on multiple occasions:

[1] Plaintiff filed motions to reconsider the rulings of both judges who have presided over this litigation. *See* May 14, 2019 Text Order (case reassignment).

• November 29, 2017 Case Management Order, p. 3 ("Plaintiff again repeats claims previously dismissed without curing any of the deficiencies noted by the Court.").

• December 13, 2017 Text Order (for the "fourth time," Plaintiff "continues to ignore the Courts admonitions and simply restates previously dismissed claims.").

• January 29, 2017 Case Management Order, p. 3 ("Not to be deterred, Plaintiff has now filed yet another motion for clarification.").

• March 8, 2018 Text Order (noting Plaintiff had filed "six motions" with same argument).

• July 18, 2018 Text Order (advising Plaintiff he has again failed to provide a proper basis for sanctions and the Court will not consider additional motions making the same arguments).

• September 17, 2018 Text Order (Plaintiff files his fourth motion for sanctions and the "Court has already addressed each of these issues.").

• November 26, 2018 Text Order ("The Court has previously addressed this issue on multiple occasions.").

• September 18, 2019 (noting Court has repeatedly acknowledged Plaintiff's status as detainee).

• September 14, 2020 Text Order ("Most of Plaintiff's motion simply repeats claims previously made and considered by the Court.").

• October 14, 2020 Text Order ("Plaintiff has filed a second 'motion for clarification' which is his third motion to reconsider…").

• November 2, 2020 Minute Entry ("Plaintiff has filed three, four, or more motions asking the Court to reconsider the same ruling.").

The Court has also found Plaintiff repeatedly refuses to follow the Court's explicit orders and directions on multiple occasions:

• March 23, 2017 Case Management Order, p. 3 (finding Plaintiff "ignores the specific instructions previously provided by the Court.").

• November 29, 2017 Case Management Order, p. 2 ("Plaintiff has wholly ignored the Court's previous orders.").

• December 13, 2017 Text Order ("Plaintiff has clearly ignored those directions.").

• January 29, 2017 Case Management Order, p. 5 ("Plaintiff is admonished he MUST NOT ignore Court orders.").

Further, Plaintiff's filings, including his most recent motions, often include derogatory and inappropriate comments based on his disagreement with Court orders:

• (Plain. Mot. Clarify, [124], p. 1, 5)(questioning veracity of Court's representations and accusing the Court of providing "false information.").

• (Plain. Mot. Clarify, [128], p. 1)(claiming court "has lied on the record.").

• (Plain. Mot. Recuse, [139], p. 7)("court lied and falsified the record.").

• (Plain. Mot. Recuse, [140], p. 1)(court provided "false information, misrepresentation, lying and making false statement on the record...").

• (Plain. Mot. Compel, [146], p. 3)(alleging "judicial misconduct, and prejudice, by intentionally choosing irrelevant cases to make it appear as if the court's rulings are correct.").

• (Plain. Mot. Clarify, [152], p. 5)(accuses Court of "misapplication of law, judicial misconduct, and bias" as well as ignoring and violating laws).

The Court notes Plaintiff's refusal to follow its orders is not based on illiteracy or an inability to understand the contents. Indeed, the Court specifically found Plaintiff is competent to litigate this case on his own.[2] *See* August 18, 2020 Case Management

[2] Plaintiff's sole surviving excessive force claim is not complex. His pleadings demonstrate an understanding of his claim. Plaintiff is clearly capable of explaining what happened. He has ably represented himself during four hearings before two different judges in this case. *See* April 26, 2018 Minute Entry; December 7, 2018 Minute Entry; October 28, 2019 Minute Entry; November 2, 2020 Minute Entry. Plaintiff has aggressively participated in discovery and he has previous experience conducting discovery. *See Morris v Kulhan*, CDIL Case No. 15-3063; *Morris v. Jumper*, CDIL Case No. 18-4121.

Order, p. 5. Plaintiff's blatant refusal to follow Court orders, despite multiple warnings, demonstrates his continued, bad faith efforts to delay and disrupt this litigation.[3]

Plaintiff's Pending Motions

Plaintiff's Motion To Continue [145]

Nearly five years after Plaintiff filed his initial complaint, this case has still not proceeded to jury trial on the sole claim of excessive force.[4] The delays clearly prejudice Defendants' ability to mount a defense to an incident which occurred on February 21, 2016.

Nonetheless, one of Plaintiff's pending motions again asks to continue the trial in this matter due to Plaintiff's concerns over COVID-19. (Plain. Mot., [145]). Plaintiff states he should not be required to wear a mask due to his asthma, he "is adamant" he will not be vaccinated, and Plaintiff "is not willing to subject himself ...to being quarantined" upon his return to Rushville since he disagrees with the adequacy of the facility's safety protocols. (Plain. Mot., [145], p. 2). In essence, Plaintiff would like a substantial, perhaps indefinite, continuation of his jury trial. Defendants object to

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[3] The Court attempted to find *pro bono* counsel to represent Plaintiff at trial "to streamline and simplify trial proceedings for all parties and the Court." August 18, 2020 Case Management Order, p. 5. The search was unsuccessful after two separate attempts involving more than 1,570 attorneys. *See* August 18, 2020 Case Management Order; August 31, 2020 Text Order. Since those attempts, Plaintiff's conduct indicates this is not an appropriate case for any continued efforts to recruit counsel. *See Martin*, 2021 WL 2021141, at *3 ("Plaintiff has willfully refused to abide by Court orders because he disagrees with them and has instead litigated this matter as he sees fit; such conduct also weighs against the decision to recruit counsel.").

[4] In addition to Plaintiff's repeated motions to reconsider, he also filed an interlocutory appeal which the Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (Plain. Appeal, [102], [119]). Plaintiff's interlocutory appeal further delayed the jury trial. (Mandate, [119]).

further continuances. (Def. Mot., [151]); *see also* (Def. Mot., [138])(objecting to previous motion to continue). The Court finds Plaintiff's motion is a further attempt in bad faith to delay his trial.

Plaintiff's Motion In Limine [144]

Plaintiff's other remaining motions further demonstrate Plaintiff's intention to delay the trial and his refusal to accept and follow Court orders. For example, Plaintiff's Motion *in Limine* disputes the Court's statements describing his surviving claim, the same statements of the Court repeated in earlier orders from March 23, 2017 through May 10, 2021. *See* March 23, 2017 Case Management Order, p. 5; August 18, 2020 Case Management Order, p. 1; May 10, 2021 Case Management Order, p. 1.

Plaintiff's Motions to Compel [146 & 147]

One of Plaintiff's pending motions to compel notes the Court recently denied his two motions to recuse. Undeterred and typically unwilling to accept the order of the Court, Plaintiff again demands the Court recuse itself from consideration of this lawsuit "and any future litigation Plaintiff files." (Plain. Mot., [147], p. 7). Plaintiff maintains his arguments throughout this litigation are based on "precedential/standard legal procedures," not his opinions. (Plain. Mot., [146], p. 1). Furthermore, Plaintiff argues the Court relies on irrelevant prisoner case law, "cherry picks" and incorrectly applies case law, and lies on the record. (Plain. Mot., [146], p. 3, 4). Sadly, such derogatory and inappropriate comments and assertions against the Court are common for Plaintiff.

In several of Plaintiff's motions, Plaintiff claims his arguments are supported by long standing precedent, despite the legal basis provided in Court Orders. *See* March 23,

2017 Case Management Order; November 29, 2017 Case Management Order; January 29, 2018 Case Management Order; November 6, 2019 Case Management Order; August 18, 2020 Case Management Order; May 21, 2021 Case Management Order.

Plaintiff claims he "has explained may times, he is not the one 'disagreeing' with the court, the court by/through their rulings by comparative analysis to such conflicting laws, legal standards, is the noncompliant one." (Plain. Mot., [146], p. 1).

And for the fifth time, Plaintiff notes his disagreement with the Court's refusal to provide additional information concerning every attorney contacted in the search for *pro bono* representation and again claims the Court has incorrectly applied case law. [5] (Plain. Mot., [147], p. 2); *see also* May 10, 2021 Case Management Order, p. 5-6.

Finally, Plaintiff argues the Court has applied the incorrect legal standard in considering his previous motions to recuse. In short, Plaintiff maintains the Court's refusal to adopt his arguments demonstrates bias in favor of Defendants.

Plaintiff's most recent "Motion for Clarification/Strike/Vacate" describes Plaintiff's astonishment that this Court is still presiding over his claims. (Plain. Mot., [152]). Plaintiff states "JUDGE BRUCE IS LEGALLY OBLIGATED TO REMOVE HIMSELF FROM THIS CASE, BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FILED A RECUSAL AGAINST HIM, AND SINCE JUDGE BRUCE RULED ON THAT RECUSAL MOTION..." (Plain. Mot., [152], p. 5)(emphasis in original). In simplest terms, Plaintiff continues to argue

[5] As another example, in one of his many motions refusing to accept an earlier order of the Court, Plaintiff made the bold assertion that the holding in *Pruitt v Mote*, 503 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2007) was "irrelevant" to the issue of the recruitment of *pro bono* counsel in *pro se* cases. [42].

this Court must automatically recuse from these proceedings because Plaintiff filed a motion to recuse under 28 U.S.C. §144.[6] Plaintiff is mistaken. "A trial judge has as much obligation ***not*** to recuse himself when there is no occasion for him to do so [under § 144] as there is for him to do so when the converse prevails." *Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc.*, 368 F.3d 709, 717 (7th Cir. 2004)(emphasis added), *quoting United States v. Ming*, 466 F.2d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 1972). As previously noted, Plaintiff's disagreement with the Court's rulings does not provide a proper basis for recusal. *See* May 10, 2021 Case Management Order, p. 3-8.

Plaintiff's "Motion to Clarify"[152]

Plaintiff's final motion further demonstrates his adamant refusal to accept and follow the rulings of this Court. In this motion, Plaintiff wishes to relitigate, for at least the third time, his unfounded motion to recuse. In the Order on these motions to recuse, the Court cited the appropriate cases and explained its basis for the denial of Plaintiff's motions. [141]. In short,[7] as explained by the supporting cases, "[a]dverse rulings do not constitute evidence of judicial bias" necessitating recusal. *Thomas v. Reese*, 787 F.3d 845, 849 (7th Cir. 2015).

Undeterred by the Court's Order, Plaintiff disagrees with the cases and conclusions in the denial of his motions to recuse, claiming:

JUDGE BRUCE'S USAGE OF THESE CASES ARE NULL AND VOID,

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[6] Plaintiff's motions did not indicate the statutory basis for recusal. [139, 140]; *see also* May 10, 2021 Case Management Order, p. 3.

[7] The Order itself, approximately eight pages, addresses and analyzes Plaintiff's basis for his motion to recuse in some detail. [141].

BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS A HIGHER STANDARD OF LAW, CONTROLLINGLAW, THAT OVERRIDES THE JUDGE BRUCE'S USEAGES OF CASE LAW TO BACK HIS RULING TO DENY A RECUSAL MOTION.

(Plain. Mot., [152], p. 5)(emphasis in original).

Plaintiff then proceeds in this same motion to acknowledge the Court's direct warning to him during the November 2, 2020, pretrial conference to cease filing repetitive motions asking the Court to reconsider the same issue on multiple occasions. (Plain. Mot., [152], p. 3). Plaintiff was advised he could file an appeal, if he chose, at the conclusion of his litigation. (Hearing 11/02/2020 Trans. pp. 12-13).[8] After this warning from the Court, Plaintiff filed six more motions which, in whole or in part, attempt to reargue multiple issues already decided by the Court. *See* Plaintiff's motions 139, 140, 144, 146, 147, 152. Evidently, this direct warning - the seventh from the Court - had no effect upon Plaintiff.

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[8] The Court:

Mr. Morris, I will caution you, though, as I understand you've been cautioned in front of Judge Shadid since I read his docket entry: Be very careful. Be very careful in how you file what you're calling motions to clarify or compel. You're pushing the bounds of what's appropriate.

When the Court enters an order, it's not subject to you approving it. It's not subject to you saying *That's wrong* and rearguing. An order is an order. When the case is done, if you think the Court has entered improper orders, you can appeal.

You are spending an inordinate amount of the Court's time dealing with motions which are simply rearguing things where I've entered a ruling. If you continue to do so, I will caution you much in the same way Judge Shadid has already cautioned you: There will be consequences up to and including dismissal of your case if you can't understand that when the Court enters an order, that's the order. It's not subject to your approval.

All right, that's all I'm going to say about that.

Hearing 11/02/2020 Trans. pp. 12-13

Further, based upon this last warning, Plaintiff now claims the Court has "preemptively" certified that any appeal he files is in "good faith." (Plain. Mot., [152], p. 3). Plaintiff is mistaken. A good faith determination would be based on the specific contents of the appeal. *See i.e. Walker v. O'Brien*, 216 F.3d 626, 630-31 (7th Cir. 2009).

Nonetheless, Plaintiff says he is extending an "olive branch" to the Court. (Plain. Mot., [152], p. 3). The Court should accept Plaintiff's appeals are in good faith, and he therefore moves to "vacate, strike, and withdraw this litigation" because the Court has no authority to continue to preside over his case. (Plain. Mot., [152], p. 3, 5).

Conclusion

After multiple warnings to Plaintiff to alter his conduct, the Court's patience is at an end. Plaintiff, with increasing vitriol, continues to ignore and refuses to follow orders of the Court, has repeatedly challenged this Court's authority, and seeks to further delay this case with frivolous motions. The Court finds that Plaintiff is conducting this litigation in bad faith, that he is attempting to obstruct the judicial process, and that he has violated numerous orders of the Court.

Plaintiff has demonstrated he has no intention of abiding by Court orders despite six explicit written warnings and one direct, oral warning that his continued misconduct could result in the dismissal of his case. The Court is aware that such warnings were not necessary, however because of Plaintiff's *pro* se status the Court believed such warnings to be appropriate and hoped Plaintiff would stop his abuse of the judicial process. "[T]he warning requirement is not 'a rigid rule.... It was intended rather as a useful guideline to district judges— safe harbor to minimize the

likelihood of appeal and reversal.'" *Kasalo v. Harris & Harris, Ltd.*, 656 F.3d 557, 562 (7th Cir. 2011), *quoting Fischer v. Cingular Wireless, LLC*, 446 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2006).

Despite all of these warnings, the record demonstrates Plaintiff's willful disobedience, bad faith, and obstreperous conduct. To allow a litigant, even a *pro se* litigant, to continue to blatantly ignore orders, continually question the Court's authority, and overwhelm and consume scarce judicial resources with repetitive motions "sends the wrong message and is unfair to other litigants seeking relief in the federal courts system." *Fiorito v. Samuels*, 2018 WL 11307319, at *9 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2018); *see also Tucker v. Williams*, 682 F.3d 654, 661–62 (7th Cir. 2012)("Sanctions imposed pursuant to the district court's inherent power are appropriate where a party has willfully abused the judicial process or otherwise conducted litigation in bad faith); *Scott v. Wood*, 2015 WL 3457962, at *1–2 (S.D. Ill. May 29, 2015)(dismissing lawsuit, *pro se* prisoner given multiple opportunities, but his "obstinate refusal to comply with the Rules and Orders of this Court, would waste not only Defendants' time and resources, but also the resources of this Court."); *Murray v. Baker*, 2017 WL 1382871, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2017)(*pro se* prisoner's record of disregard for court orders, failure to respond to discovery, failure to pay initial filing fee, and conduct causing delay warrant dismissal); *Smock v. Roeckeman*, 2016 WL 7013867, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2016) (difficulties facing *pro se* prisoner do not excuse plaintiff from complying with deadlines and following orders of the court).

The Court has considered a monetary sanction rather than dismissal. After due consideration, the Court does not believe financial sanctions will realistically have any

impact on Plaintiff's conduct. Plaintiff is proceeding *in forma pauperis* (IFP) and he has little ability to pay a fine commensurate with his repeated, willfully disobedient conduct. In addition, after considering the record, there is no indication that a financial sanction would have any impact on Plaintiff or in any way influence his behavior more than repeated warnings from the Court. *See Donelson v. Hardy*, 931 F.3d 565, 569-70 (7th Cir. 2019)(lesser sanctions not appropriate for extensive misconduct when warnings were ineffective, plaintiff could not pay fines due to IFP status, harm was substantial, and claims weak); *Watkins v. Nielsen*, 405 Fed.Appx. 42, 44 (7th Cir. 2010) (court finds lesser sanctions not appropriate for plaintiff who could not afford a fine); *Fiorito*, 2018 WL 11307319, at *8 (court finds financial sanctions inappropriate for *pro se* litigant proceeding IFP based on repeated failure to follow court orders and abuse of judicial process). The Court, therefore, finds that a monetary sanction would be ineffective and inappropriate to address Plaintiff's misconduct.

Thus, based upon all of the above, the Court chooses to exercise it's inherent power to sanction Plaintiff's conduct which abuses the judicial process and dismisses this case with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) This case is DISMISSED in its entirety with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) and the Court's inherent authority to sanction a party who has abused the judicial process and conducted litigation in bad faith.

2) Plaintiff's "Motion *in Limine* and Clarify and Strike," [144]; Motion to Reset Trial Date, [145]; Motions to Compel [146, 147]; and "Motion for Clarification/ Strike/Vacate" [152] are DENIED as moot.

3) The pretrial and trial setting are vacated and the writs are recalled.

4) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for leave to appeal *in forma pauperis* MUST identify the issues Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the court in determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); *See also Celske v. Edwards*, 164 F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an appellant should be given an opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for appealing so that the district judge "can make a reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith."); *Walker v. O'Brien*, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing that a good faith appeal is an appeal that "a reasonable person could suppose...has some merit" from a legal perspective). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal.

Entered this 14th day of June, 2021.

s/Colin S. Bruce

COLIN S. BRUCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPENDIX "B"

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Everett McKinley Dirksen
United States Courthouse
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Chicago, Illinois 60604

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September 13, 2021

By the Court:

No. 21-2109	CHADD A. MORRIS, Plaintiff - Appellant v. JERRY WORLEY, et al., Defendants - Appellees
Originating Case Information:	
District Court No: 4:16-cv-04127-CSB Central District of Illinois District Judge Colin S. Bruce	

This cause, docketed on June 15, 2021, is **DISMISSED** for failure to timely pay the required docketing fee, pursuant to Circuit Rule 3(b).

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Everett McKinley Dirksen
United States Courthouse
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ORDER

September 3, 2021

Before
MICHAEL S. KANNE, *Circuit Judge*
DIANE P. WOOD, *Circuit Judge*

No. 21-2109	CHADD A. MORRIS, Plaintiff - Appellant v. JERRY WORLEY, et al., Defendants - Appellees
Originating Case Information:	
District Court No: 4:16-cv-04127-CSB Central District of Illinois District Judge Colin S. Bruce	

Upon consideration of the **MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION AND TO COMPEL AND TO RECUSE, AND DISQUALIFY JUDGES**, filed on August 26, 2021, by the pro se appellant,

IT IS ORDERED that the motion is **DENIED**. Appellant has not identified a potentially meritorious argument that the district judge erred when denying his motions to recuse or when dismissing his case. Further requests to reconsider will be rejected pursuant to Seventh Circuit Operating Procedure 1(c)(8).

APPENDIX "C"