

knowledge that Republicans and Democrats did file and have legal recognition, with only being employed since January 2015 and the plaintiff doesn't believe that Kea Warne is over 130 Years old. This the plaintiff would like to take deposition and get documents. Because the defendants brought up that issue, that becomes a disputable fact with only being an employee since 2015, the plaintiff believes she is not that old, when the parties were started. See exhibits 2,3 of party introductions into the state of South Dakota. The Affidavit of Kea Warne is biased; in number 14 of the Kea Warne Affidavit stated that "the 2018 aberrational election a declaration must contain 3,392." That statement is invalid. One would need 3,410, because in 2018 we had 341,048 voters. Exhibits 1 clearly the plaintiff has the right to seek the depositions and see the documents at the SOS Office, (Exhibit 5) because Kea Warne is not an expert. This is not a fishing expedition, they have the documents blocked (Exhibit 5) The SOS has noted that the American Independent Party is not a political party anymore around 2015/2016. Within the SOS there is some confusion about Political Parties, and because the Defendants brought up the issue, that now becomes a disputable fact. Lieutenant Governor Candidates are selected at party conventions followed by the gubernatorial primary.

The plaintiff states that SDCL § 12-7-1.2 is unconstitutional under the 1st 5th 9th and 14th Amendment. The 1st Amendment was submitted to the states for ratification on September 25 1789 and adopted on December 15 1791. The right of association along with the Bill of rights. Whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertains to political, economic, religious and cultural matters. In NACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson 357, US 449,460-61-(1958) Granting MSJ violates due process of the law. At this time Bates v. City of little Rock 361 US 516, 522-23(1960) Healy v. James 408 US 169. 4th Amendment 5th Amendment 9th Amendment

were all part of the Bill of Rights. The 14th Amendment of 1868 provides “nor shall any state [...] deny to any person within its Jurisdiction to the equal protection of the laws.

The “equal Justice under law” this clause was the base for Brown v. Board of Education (1954) the supreme court decision that helped to dismantle racial segregation, and the bases of discrimination against groups. The Supreme court held in Bolling v. Sharpe that due process clause of the 5th Amendment. To grant MSJ without discovery violates the Administration of Justice. Administration of Justice is to provide justice for all those accessing the legal System.

The Defendants state that Walker has no Fundamental Rights to run for office that statement is wrong “life, liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” Stated in the United States Declaration of Independents, these are unalienable rights in which governments are created for. In fact, in 2009 the US rejoined the United Nations and is now part of the United Nation, so the state of South Dakota could follow the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in 2009 the US rejoined the United Nations. The Fundamental Rights of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human rights contained in that declaration of human rights, is the International covenant on civil and political Rights. (Article 2,3,6,7,19,20,21,22) the right to self-determination, liberty, due process of the law, the freedom of movement, thought religion, expression and to peaceful assembly..... Norman v. Reed 502 US 279, 289 limits of who they can vote for is unconstitutional. Only if it imposes reasonable no discontinuity restrictions. In other words, $\lim_{x \rightarrow c} F(x) = \infty$

SDCL § 12-7-1.2 that requirement in selecting a Lieutenant Governor Candidate prior to the circulation of Walkers certificate of nomination is unconstitutional. The SDCL§ 12-7-1.2 imposes a very high burden upon voters’ rights to associate politically and to have candidates of their choice placed on the ballot. The plaintiff can bring someone from that runoff primary to his

party. Placing strict segregation at primaries violates and infringes upon its citizens rights to vote under the First Amendment and fourteenth Amendments. This provision was found to affect the rights of voters to cast their votes efficiently and could render the restriction unconstitutional. Williams V. Rhodes 393 US 23 30 1968 that ballot access restrictions could infringe on the rights of individuals to associate for political purposes.

The burden is extreme for independents across the United States and SD. And when South Dakota makes the candidate pick a lieutenant governor before they circulate a petition it creates segregation. There is no confusion on last minute changes. Since major parties pick their candidates and submit the second Tuesday in August, three days after the close of the party, and no later than the party convention and no later than the last day in August. Without interference by the government. Life, Liberty, and pursuit of Happiness. The plaintiff has submitted new evidence to disputed facts and seek a motion to be heard. This new law restricts Freedom of Association. When people are leaving the party because they can't vote in the primaries it creates uncertainty. It's unreasonable that defendants get to ask the SOS questions and the plaintiff can't. The plaintiff should get to ask questions to SOS under/by Discovery.

All this SDCL§ 12-7-1.2 does is dictates and discriminates of the "equal protection clause" under the law. The suffrage campaign against Independents by South Dakota needs to end and give equal protection under the law. (14th Amendment) The plaintiff can pick his lieutenant governor at the same time as other parries do in August. The voters are still voting for the people they want and when we give more choices it creates and equal opportunity not a discriminate opportunity. Let's keep the voting the same for all.

Is it unconstitutional to enact laws the same year of an election, that is a great example of a disputed facts. Lieutenant governor must be elected together, the plaintiff isn't questing that part of the constitution but that must be before the candidate's Circulation. The plaintiff could pick up anyone up after the primary just as others do for major elections. The plaintiff is entitled to protection under the 1st 5th 9th 10th and the 14th Amendments. Specifically, in the "Equal Protection Clause" that took in effect in 1868, that provides that : "nor shall any state deny to any person within its Jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws (14th Amendment). Independents, republicans, democrats, and other minor parties should all be in the same boat & not be segregated. In regards that SOS stated that American Independent Party is not a political party anymore is unconstitutional. The people are still voting for the same candidate at the same time as other parties do during the election. When everyone gets to pick their governor and lieutenant governor of choice it represents an equal election. Three days after the close of the party convention and no later than the 2nd Tuesdays in August. Candidates must choose a lieutenant governor. The independent can pick his lieutenant governor at the same time as every other party.

For the genuine issue of Material Facts is the bringing of HB 1037 to State Affairs committee during the election year to stop/slow independents to be placed on the ballot is unconstitutional. The Affidavit of Kea Warne of her stated opinions are not all facts and should be discarded as a biased opinion (Docket 48). Granting in favor of the defendants before discovery has even started would be unconstitutional, premature and a violation of due process. The plaintiff is still entitled to present his case to the court. Creating sanctions and unfair laws, by making laws that only apply to one specific group has to follow is Unconstitutional and violates Walkers' rights protected by the 9th, 10th and 14th amendment. The Defendants failed

twice to answer the complaint on time. Once was on 8/14/19 were the court stated that the brief was due August 14, 2018 (Docket 15), no extension was granted or asked for and in Docket 31 the defendants didn't answer than, the court granted an extension but the way it was entered caused some confusion.

The defendants states that Republican and Democrats have established the party by bringing forward their signature requirements, the plaintiff would like to see those copies of major party establishments. This is another disputed fact under question.

This law restricts Freedom of Association on Independent Candidates.

The defendants talk about establish political party for independents and certainly the plaintiff has the right to subpoenas, get depositions and challenge the issue now. Because the defense has brought up the issues the plaintiff has the right to challenge that statement. The plaintiff is intitled to the Federal Rules of the court including Federal Rule 8, 26, 39,50. The plaintiff did call the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (Pacer), and talked with Angelica she stated that they have no programs for indigent people. The plaintiff would have to call Angelica, in as a witness, if the Defendants challenge that statements as "hearsay." The defendants state that the plaintiff didn't sign under oath. Because Walker served and signed the brief in front of the clerk at the rapid city office, the plaintiff would have to subpoena those severance videos in which is another disputable fact that "the plaintiff's signature is not genuine."

Freedom of Association is of the most importance to Independent Candidate Clayton G. Walker, SDCL 12-7-1.2 is Unconstitutional and violates the first Amendment of the United

States Constitution. (NAACP vs Alabama (1958) Tashjian vs Republican Party convention(1986), California Democratic Party vs Jones (2000).

This court has already stated in the past that it is Constitutional that Independents are not allowed to have primaries, in which a total of 12 or more candidates can be placed on the ballot at the same time in South Dakota elections. Whereas Major Parties like Democrats and Republicans are allowed to have a primary election to lower the amount of candidates voters can choose from. Walker still finds this to be Unconstitutional, unfair and not equal treatment under the 14th Amendment. This court has stated in the past that it is Constitutional that Independents have to collect 3 times as many signatures as other Major Parties have to collect. (over 3,000 for Independent candidates, around 800 for Republicans and less than 1,000 for Democrats) Please do not allow another unconstitutional law to be made Constitutional here in the state of South Dakota. Please review this case 20-2870 and 20-3199 where the Defendants have stated in 20-3199 that the Secretary of State can't bring bills to the legislature but in 20-2870 they did just that, this created a difference of opinion and perjury. The law has some new changes which are still unconstitutional, with changes through 3/31/2021, but Walker has not been made whole and was denied access to Justice at the time of the election. Please not let South Dakota to continue to discriminate against Clayton G. Walker an Independent Candidate.

Reason for Granting the Writ of Certiorari

Freedom of Association is of the most importance to Independent Candidate Clayton G. Walker, SDCL 12-7-1.2 is Unconstitutional and violates the first Amendment of the United States Constitution. Under Rule 10 of the United States Supreme Courts states that the court

must grant a petition for Cert when there are compelling reason. There is an important question of Law that needs to be addressed.

Oppositions

The Plaintiffs' has a Motion to be Heard/Oral argument for Judicial Notice under **FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE** and Fed. R. Civ. P. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts Rule 201 (e). If the Court takes judicial notice before notifying a party, the party, on request, is still entitled to be heard. The plaintiff has made that request. The plaintiff can't view *Harvey v. Piersol* 03-4002.

Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed see *Martin v. Overton*, 391 F. 3d 710,712. The defendants have no basis or authority to influence the Judges decisions without a motion to the court. To have pleadings decided over letters directly to the judge in unconstitutional.

The Defendants has made an error, defendants want to argue that the plaintiff doesn't have the right to reply to a brief. Unquestionably the plaintiff has the right to reply to a brief. The plaintiff re-litigates his motion to be heard. Surely / certainly

The defendants can't be telling the judge what to do with regards to a defense

In the case of *Gibbons v. Orgden* (1824). When a federal and state laws are in conflict the federal law is supreme. Based on rule 56 of the Federal rules of Civil Procedures, to grantin favor the case must have no material facts are in dispute. There are a lot of questions in dispute

here, the moving party does not deserve judgment as a matter of law. There are facts that a jury must weigh in. In the case of United States v. Nixon 1974 everyone can sustain unqualified immunity. There is a clearly established federal law of equal rights. So the defendants do not have immunity. The understanding of how state conventions work in each party that are held privately, the court can't take judicial notice. Discovery must be granted to show in the record of the number of disputed facts that exist. Discovery is incomplete and could raise a disputed material fact when completed. The motion for MSJ by defendants was premature discovery need to take place. The plaintiff deserves his day in court. There was a legal dispute the defendants have no authorities for the legal support for motion on MSJ. The plaintiff objects that the facts is not supported by admissible evidence.

In Muller v. Oregon 1908" the law that limited woman to work only 10 hrs. a day. That ruling was against this law as due to inequality just as segregation to independents. In Reed v. Reed 1971 was an equal protection case. In the case of Marbury v. Madison 1803 the court recognized as having the power to review all acts of congress where constitutionality was an issue and Judge whether they abide by the constitution. By making segregation laws that only apply to one specific group to follow is unconstitutional. It violates Walkers rights that are protected by the 9th 10th and 14th Amendments of the United States constitution. Mr. Walker would like to have the same opportunity's as the other candidates. Under the Equal Protection clause, as part of the 14th Amendment. The clause, which took effect in 1868, provides that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction "the equal protection of the laws. Mr walker ask the Court to grant an extension while the court hearing is pending in this case. So that after the hearing, Mr. Walker can start circulating his petitions. Other candidates have already started circulating, while walker is being held in abeyance. Walker should get to have the same rights as

the party that holds the Secretary of State Seat. It's the 11th Hr. and Walker wants to start going door to door to talk about today's issues and get petitions signed. Time needs to be added to give the Walker the same rights as other candidates. Grant oral Argument so walker can have the same rights that are protected by the constitution. The court has significant discretion to take account of the special circumstances that often arise in Pro Se litigation situation. See Haines vs Krener 404 U.S. 519 (1972) the claims should not be dismissed without affording him the opportunity to present evidence on his claims. Mr. Walker the plaintiff, should get the opportunity to offer proof and facts with discovery.

Conclusion


Why not have everyone be treated the same, have all candidates pick at the same time for certifying their lieutenant governor. This would be fair and generate a more selection when voting. South Dakota has extraordinary limitations, and restrictions placed on Independent candidates. Other parties are not circulating their lieutenant governor to be placed on the ballot. All this law does is discriminate and segregate Independents from fair voting rights. To segregate one specific group of people to follow rules that apply to all is unconstitutional. (1st ,5th , 9th ,10th and 14th Amendment) The bill of rights guarantees civil and political rights to individual citizens, including: freedom of Speech, religion and association. Lieutenant governor for Independent candidates could pick up anyone up after the primary just as others major elections do last Tuesday in August. Enacting laws the same year as the election creates tremendous burden on the plaintiff. Time to prepare for an election takes a long time, at least 2 years. To have all parties pick their lieutenant

governor at the same time, on the last Tuesday would be fair and constitutional. The plaintiff could pick up anyone after the primary just as others do for major elections and presidential Election

Wherefore grant relief of the Writ of Certiorari, and have the 8th Circuit Court of Appeal send the case of 20-2870 up to the United States Supreme Court for review.

Dated this 23rd day of October 2021

Clayton G. Walker



United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit

No. 20-2870

Clayton Walker

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Steve Barnett, Secretary of State, in his official capacity; Shantel Krebs, in her individual capacity; Marty Jackley, in his individual capacity; Jason Ravnborg, in his official capacity; Kea Warne, in her official capacity

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota - Southern

Submitted: March 22, 2021
Filed: April 2, 2021
[Unpublished]

Before SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Clayton Walker appeals following the district court's¹ adverse grant of summary judgment in his civil action challenging the constitutionality of certain South Dakota election laws. Upon careful de novo review, see Odom v. Kaizer, 864 F.3d 920, 921 (8th Cir. 2017) (grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo); Libertarian Party of N.D. v. Jaeger, 659 F.3d 687, 692-93 (8th Cir. 2011) (dismissal for failure to state a claim is reviewed de novo), we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. We also deny Walker's appellate motions.

¹The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota.

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT**

No: 20-2870

Clayton Walker

Appellant

v.

Steve Barnett, Secretary of State, in his official capacity, et al.

Appellees

Appeal from U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota - Southern
(4:18-cv-04015-LLP)

ORDER

The petition for rehearing en banc is denied. The petition for rehearing by the panel is also denied.

June 04, 2021

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

/s/ Michael E. Gans

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

CLAYTON G. WALKER,

* CIV 18-4015

Plaintiff,

vs.

STEVE BARNETT, Secretary of State,
in his official capacity,

* MEMORANDUM OPINION
* AND ORDER

Defendant.

* * * * * Plaintiff Clayton G. Walker brought this pro se lawsuit against South Dakota Secretary of State Steve Barnett, the Director of Election Services for the South Dakota Secretary of State's Office. The lawsuit challenges the constitutionality of SDCL § 12-7-1.2, which provides the requirements to select an independent candidate for lieutenant governor. In particular, Plaintiff contests the requirement in SDCL § 12-7-1.2 that, when running for governor, he select his lieutenant governor candidate prior to the circulation of his certificate of nomination. Plaintiff contends that this provision violates his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pending before the Court is the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 92) and Plaintiff's Motion for an Extension of Time (Doc. 90). For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment and denies the motion to extend time.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Walker filed this lawsuit on December 29, 2017, against then-South Dakota Secretary of State Shantel Krebs, in her personal and official capacities; South Dakota Attorney General Marty Jackley, in his personal and official capacities; and Kea Warne, the Director of Election Services for the South Dakota Secretary of State's Office, in her official capacity (Doc. 1). Walker's complaint alleged that it was unconstitutional to impose different deadlines for the selection of a lieutenant governor for an independent as opposed to a party candidate. *Id.* at 4. The complaint

additionally argued that it was unconstitutional to impose different signature requirements, with independent candidates required to gather more signatures than party candidates. *Id.*

In response, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 18), arguing, *inter alia*, that Walker had not suffered an injury in fact and thus had no standing to sue since he was not a candidate for office at the time he filed the complaint; that his arguments about signature requirements were barred by *res judicata* after Walker's previous lawsuit litigating that same issue; that the requirements were constitutional because they were authorized by the South Dakota Constitution; that the monetary damages Walker sought were barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and that the named defendants were not proper targets for litigation under the doctrine of *Ex Parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

On March 29, 2019, the Court issued a decision on the motion to dismiss (Doc. 31). On the issue of standing, the Court ruled that Walker did have standing to bring the case, since voters have standing to challenge ballot laws under *McLain v. Meier*, 851 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir. 1988). The Court also declined to dismiss the case on substantive grounds, stating that the fact that the challenged rules were enshrined in the South Dakota Constitution did not necessarily make them constitutional. However, the Court did rule that monetary damages were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Additionally, the Court found that the only proper *Ex Parte Young* defendant was the South Dakota Secretary of State; therefore, the claims against Marty Jackley and Kea Warne were dismissed. Finally, the Court ruled that Walker's arguments regarding signature requirements were barred by *res judicata* after the Eighth Circuit's decision in *Walker v. Gant*, 606 F. App'x 856, 856 (8th Cir. 2015). In this decision, the Eighth Circuit found that South Dakota's "nominating-petition deadline and signature requirement did not severely burden Walker's associational rights, and were reasonable restrictions that advanced important state interests." *Id.*

On June 7, 2019, the remaining defendant, South Dakota Secretary of State Steve Barnett, filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 45). The Court then issued an opinion denying summary judgment, since the issues at play could not be ruled on until discovery had completed (Doc. 67).

Immediately after the close of discovery, on July 9, 2020, Walker filed a motion for an extension of time (Doc. 90). While Walker did not specify what he was requesting beyond "an

extension of time,” he seemed to be seeking an extension of the time to conduct discovery. Defendant filed a response on July 10, 2020.

On July 15, 2020, Defendant filed a second motion for summary judgment, along with a statement of material facts and supporting memo (Docs. 92, 93, 94). Defendant argued that there is no factual issue in dispute, and that judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Defendant is appropriate. Plaintiff resisted, but the Court agrees with the Defendant.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Article IV of the South Dakota Constitution requires that the offices of Governor and Lieutenant Governor be jointly elected. S.D. Const. art. IV, § 2. A candidate for lieutenant governor may be chosen either by majority vote at a party convention (for a party candidate) or by certification by an independent gubernatorial candidate (for an independent candidate). SDCL §§ 12-5-21, 12-7-1.2. In order for an independent gubernatorial candidate to circulate a petition for candidacy, that candidate must first certify a candidate for lieutenant governor. SDCL § 12-7-1.2. The gubernatorial candidate must then file a certificate of nomination with the Secretary of State. SDCL § 12-7-1. This certificate must contain a number of valid signatures equal to one percent of the total combined vote in the last gubernatorial election. *Id.* In 2022, this would require 3,392 valid signatures. Affidavit of Kea Warne (Doc. 95) ¶ 12. This certificate of nomination must then be filed no later than the last Tuesday of April before the gubernatorial election. SDCL § 12-7-1.

Conversely, to run for governor as a party candidate, a gubernatorial candidate must be nominated by majority vote at a party convention. SDCL §§ 12-5-21, 12-5-22. The candidate for lieutenant governor is nominated at the same convention. *Id.* In order to hold a party convention, a party must obtain legal recognition by filing with the Secretary of State a declaration containing a number of valid signatures equal to one percent of the total combined vote in the last gubernatorial election. *Id.* This must be filed no later than the last Tuesday of March before the primary election. *Id.* In order to maintain party recognition, the party must then receive at least 2.5 percent of the vote in one of the two prior general election cycles. SDCL § 12-1-3.

Walker has stated that he intended to run for the office of governor in 2018. Complaint at 4. However, he contends that due to the signature requirement and the deadline for certification

of a lieutenant governor, he was unable to run. *Id.* He brought this lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief which would prevent enforcement of these requirements. *Id.* at 3.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant is able to show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact,” and that “the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In order to meet this burden, the movant can present evidence that there is no material factual dispute, or can show that the nonmoving party has not presented evidence sufficient to support an element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). To avoid summary judgment, “[t]he nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but must demonstrate on the record the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial.” *Mosley v. City of Northwoods*, 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted).

Which facts are considered “material” for purposes of a summary judgment motion are determined by the underlying substantive law. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The only factual disputes that may properly preclude entry of summary judgment are those “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” *Id.* (citing 9A Charles Alan Wright, et al., *Federal Practice and Procedure*, § 2725, at 93–95 (3d ed. 1983)).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts. *AgriStor Leasing v. Farrow*, 826 F.2d 732, 734 (8th Cir. 1987). All facts presented to the Court by the nonmoving party must be accepted as true if properly supported by the record. *See Beck v. Skon*, 253 F.3d 330, 332–33 (8th Cir. 2001). Moreover, “at the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 249. The court must determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” *Id.* at 251–52.

The local rules for this district require that the moving party on a motion for summary judgment submit a statement of the material facts as to which it contends there is no genuine issue

to be tried. D.S.D. CIV. LR 56.1(A). The opposing party must then respond to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement of material facts, and to identify any material facts as to which it contends there exists a genuine material issue to be tried. D.S.D. CIV. LR 56.1(B). All material facts set forth in the moving party's statement of material facts are deemed admitted if not controverted by the party opposing summary judgment. D.S.D. CIV. LR 56.1(D); *see also On Target Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Attorney General of the United States*, 472 F.3d 572, 574 (8th Cir. 2007). While pro se pleadings should be construed liberally, pro se litigants are nonetheless "not excused from failing to comply with substantive and procedural law." *Burgs v. Sissel*, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing *Farella v. California*, 422 U.S. 806, 834–35 n. 46 (1975)).

In this case, the Defendant filed a Statement of Undisputed Facts along with a supporting affidavit and exhibit (Docs. 93 and 95). While Walker did file a response to this document, none of his responsive statements directly challenge the factual assertions laid out in the Statement of Undisputed Facts. *See* Doc. 97 at 3. The factual assertions laid out almost all concern the statutory requirements imposed upon a gubernatorial candidate. Walker does not deny that any of these statutory requirements exist, but merely editorializes regarding them, arguing, for instance, that the laws impose an extreme burden upon him or that signatures must be gathered during the coldest part of the year, which burdens independent candidates. *Id.* at 3, ¶¶ 5, 12. There is no reason, therefore, not to accept as fact paragraphs 1–11 of the Statement of Undisputed Facts, which lay out the requirements for a gubernatorial candidate. *See* Doc. 93 at 1–3. The only question remaining is one of law, not of fact: are these requirements constitutional? Because there are no facts in dispute, judgment as a matter of law may be entered on this question.

DISCUSSION

1. Walker's Equal Protection Claim

Plaintiff alleges that requiring an independent candidate for governor to select the lieutenant governor running mate before circulating a nominating petition violates the equal protection clause because the political parties name their candidates later in the election process. In assessing this issue, the Court considers the "character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate" and then identifies and evaluates the "precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule." *Libertarian Party of N.D. v. Jaeger*, 659 F.3d 687, 693–94 (8th

Cir. 2011). “In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” *Id.* at 694.

The Secretary of State has a recognized and important interest in mandating a “preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization’s candidate on the ballot.” *Jenness v. Fortson*, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1970). The question, then, is whether independent candidates and voters are unduly burdened by the requirement to name a lieutenant governor candidate prior to circulating a nominating petition under SDCL § 12-7-1.2. For the following reasons, the Court concludes this requirement is justified by compelling state interests, and it is not unduly burdensome.

The right to vote for a candidate of one’s choosing is a crucial component of the right to vote. Nor can one easily separate laws that affect candidates from those that affect voters; to limit the ability of candidates to run for office is to limit the rights of voters to associate with a candidate of their choosing. *Bullock v. Carter*, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972). Any burden, therefore, that “falls unequally on new or small political parties or on independent candidates impinges, by its very nature, on associational choices protected by the first Amendment.” *Anderson v. Celebrezze*, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).

At the same time, however, “as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.” *Storer v. Brown*, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974). States have a significant interest in “protecting the integrity of their political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies, in ensuring that their election processes are efficient, in avoiding voter confusion caused by an overcrowded ballot, and in avoiding the expense and burden of run-off elections.” *Clements v. Fashing*, 457 U.S. 957, 964–65 (1982). The regulatory schemes necessary to promote these interests will necessarily limit to some degree the right to vote for whomever one wants, but “important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.” *Anderson*, 460 U.S. at 788.

Therefore, in order to determine whether a state’s regulatory system impermissibly limits the rights of independent and third-party candidates, a court must engage in a balancing test, first considering “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First

and Fourteenth Amendments,” and then identifying and evaluating “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.” *Id.* at 789. The court must then weigh “the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests” and the extent to which the state’s interests necessitate the abrogation of the plaintiff’s rights. *Id.*

Here, the State’s claimed interest is in “protecting the integrity of [its] political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies, in insuring that [its] election processes are efficient[.]” Doc. 94 at 8 (quoting *Libertarian Party of North Dakota v. Jaeger*, 659 F.3d at 697). There are many features inherent in our political system, such as “single-member districts, ‘first past the post’ elections, and the high costs of campaigning,” which increase the barriers to entry faced by third party and independent candidates. *Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party*, 520 U.S. 351, 362 (1997). The mere fact that a law makes it *more* difficult for an independent candidate to run does not necessarily mean that the law impermissibly burdens that candidate’s rights. *Id.* Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the limitations actually block independent candidates from running. *See, e.g., Jaeger*, 659 F.3d at 696 (plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a clear connection between the challenged rules and the lack of independent candidates on the ballot). *Compare with Libertarian Party of South Dakota v. Krebs*, 290 F. Supp. 3d 902, 914 (D.S.D. 2018) (plaintiffs were able to show that the Constitution Party would have had candidates on the ballot in 2016 but for the state’s rules). In order to be found unreasonable, a rule must “freeze the status quo by effectively barring all candidates other than those of the major parties.” *Jaeger*, 659 F.3d at 694.

When courts have found early deadlines for independent candidates to be impermissibly restrictive, those courts have reasoned that independent candidates may require additional time to rally support. *See, e.g., Jaeger*, 659 F.3d at 700–01. This same reasoning does not apply to the certification of a lieutenant governor. Walker does not challenge the statutory requirement that requires an independent gubernatorial candidate to seek certification, but instead only the requirement of selecting a running mate prior to certification. Were SDCL § 12-7-1.2 to be found to be unconstitutional, Walker would still need to submit his certification as a candidate by the last Tuesday in April prior to the election. SDCL § 12-7-1. Given, then, that Walker has not demonstrated that SDCL § 12-7-1.2 has kept independent candidates off the ballot, and given that there is no clear logical connection between the provision and lack of ballot access, the limitation of Walker’s rights imposed by the law is minimal. The only specific burden that Walker describes

in his complaint is that an independent gubernatorial candidate must select a lieutenant governor running mate earlier than the political parties select their lieutenant governor candidates.

The state's interest in efficient elections, avoiding frivolous candidacies, and preventing voter confusion is one that has been repeatedly affirmed by the courts. There is no *per se* limitation on setting different ballot access requirements for independent candidates as opposed to party candidates; rather, it has been found to be beyond question that states "may condition access to the general election ballot by a minor-party or independent candidate upon a showing of a modicum of support among the potential voters for the office." *Munro v. Socialist Workers Party*, 479 U.S. 189, 193 (1986). The Supreme Court has never required "a particularized showing" of voter confusion, inefficiency, or frivolous candidates in order to reach a conclusion that a state has a valid interest in imposing limitations in order to protect these interests. *Green Party of Arkansas v. Martin*, 649 F.3d 675, 686 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Munro*, 479 U.S. at 194–95).

Defendant has identified compelling interests justifying the difference between the requirements for independent and party candidates with regard to the lieutenant governor candidate. For political parties in South Dakota, the candidate for lieutenant governor is selected by majority vote at the state convention. *See SDCL § 12-5-22*. Thus, a party candidate for lieutenant governor demonstrates a modicum of support before the general election by being selected by that party at convention. In contrast, independent candidates do not participate in conventions. Instead, an independent candidate for lieutenant governor must be selected by the independent gubernatorial candidate prior to circulating the nominating petition, and both candidates must sign the petition before it is circulated. *See SDCL § 12-7-1.2*. The difference in timing regarding the selection of the lieutenant governor candidates is due to the distinctive methods by which the candidates are nominated. An independent gubernatorial candidate may circulate a nominating petition any time after December 31 before the election and the petition must be filed by the last Tuesday of April. *See SDCL 12-7-1*. For legal recognition a declaration with the same number of qualified signatures must be filed by a political party no later than the last Tuesday of March. This allows the party to then hold a party convention before the primary election. The party convention elected candidates could then face a challenge in the primary election. There can be no such primary challenge to the independent candidates. Due to the

necessarily different procedures, the time differentials established by state law are reasonable to all concerned and do help alleviate voter confusion and do promote more efficient elections.

Having both the governor and lieutenant governor candidates named on the nominating petition allows voters, if they wish, to learn what ideas the candidates support and something about the qualifications of the candidates, before signing the petition, thus alleviating voter confusion, lack of information and misinformation and promoting more efficient elections. In addition, if the independent candidates obtain the requisite number of signatures on a nominating petition, a modicum of support for both the governor and lieutenant governor candidates has been demonstrated, and they go on to the general election ballot. Requiring the independent gubernatorial candidate to select his or her lieutenant governor prior to circulating the nominating petition is justified by compelling state interests. *See SDCL § 12-7-1.2.*

Weighing all available evidence, it is clear that the state has an interest in protecting its elections, which is served by the imposition of rules that may be “necessarily arbitrary,” but do not impose an unduly severe onus upon independent candidates. *Jaeger*, 659 F.3d at 694. The deadline imposed by SDCL § 12-7-1.2 meets this reasonableness standard. There is no evidence that this rule has been a but-for cause of an absence of independent candidates from a gubernatorial ballot, nor is there a particularized showing of how the law has prevented Walker’s candidacy. As a result, the state’s interests outweigh any burden on Walker’s rights imposed by the rule.

2. Motion to Extend Time

Also before the Court is Walker’s Motion for an Extension of Time (Doc. 90). In this motion, Walker seems to seek to extend the discovery stage of the litigation.

Once a scheduling order has been issued, it can be modified only for good cause and with the consent of the judge. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4). The Eighth Circuit’s standard for good cause is whether the party moving for a change to the scheduling order has been diligent “in attempting to meet the order’s requirements.” *Hagen v. Siouxland Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C.*, 286 F.R.D. 423, 424–25 (N.D. Iowa 2012) (quoting *Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc.*, 532 F.3d 709, 716–17 (8th Cir. 2008)).

Walker has not met this standard. He has made no showing of an attempt to meet the requirements of the scheduling order. Furthermore, he filed the motion on July 9, 2020, one day

after the close of discovery and more than two months after the Court's entry of a scheduling order on April 28, 2020. During that time Walker did not conduct any discovery other than attempting to take the deposition of Defendant Steve Barnett. There are no material facts in dispute, so that deposition, even if taken, would not have prevented this case from being solely a question of law. Finally, Walker has filed a previous motion to modify the scheduling order (Doc. 80), which the Court denied on July 1, 2020.

To establish good cause for an extension of discovery, the movant "must—at minimum—itemize the necessary discovery and explain they were not able to complete that discovery" in the time allotted. *Hagen*, F.R.D. at 425. Walker has made no such itemization, nor has he made clear what, if any, changes in his circumstances have occurred since the previous denial of his motion for a change in the scheduling order. He has therefore failed to meet the minimum requirements for such a motion to be granted.

CONCLUSION


For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment for the Defendants should be entered as a matter of law. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED:

1. That the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 92, is granted with prejudice;
2. That Walker's Motion for an Extension of Time, Doc. 90, is denied.

Dated this 3rd day of September, 2020.

BY THE COURT:



Lawrence L. Piersol
United States District Judge

ATTEST:

MATTHEW W. THELEN, CLERK

