

**Additional material  
from this filing is  
available in the  
Clerk's Office.**

# APPENDIX COVER PAGE

A

EXHIBIT

Description of this Exhibit: CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT DENIAL 6-9-21

Number of pages to this Exhibit:   1   pages.

JURISDICTION: (Check only one)

- Municipal Court
- Superior Court
- Appellate Court
- State Supreme Court
- United States District Court
- State Circuit Court
- United States Supreme Court
- Grand Jury

SUPREME COURT  
FILED

JUN 9 2021

Jorge Navarrete Clerk

S267657

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

Deputy

En Banc

---

In re MICHAEL WOOLEN on Habeas Corpus.

---

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

CANTIL-SAKAUYE

---

*Chief Justice*

# APPENDIX COVER PAGE

B

EXHIBIT

Description of this Exhibit: *LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT SUMMARY  
DISMISSAL 3-4-21, 12-24-21*

Number of pages to this Exhibit:   8   pages.

JURISDICTION: (Check only one)

- Municipal Court
- Superior Court
- Appellate Court
- State Supreme Court
- United States District Court
- State Circuit Court
- United States Supreme Court
- Grand Jury

CONFIRMED COPY  
ORIGINAL FILED  
Superior Court of California  
County of Los Angeles

MAR 4 2021

Sherri R. Gater, Executive Officer/Clerk  
DeForest Lockett, Deputy

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) Case No: TA070163-01  
Plaintiff and Respondent, )  
v. MICHAEL WOOLEN ) ORDER SUMMARILY DENYING HABEAS  
Defendant and Petitioner, ) CORPUS PETITION  
(cal. Rules of Court 4.551(g))

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Michael Woolen, *pro se* ("Petitioner").

No appearance by a Respondent. Denied.

The court has read and considered the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner on February 18, 2021. Petitioner contends that the trial court deprived Petitioner of due process and right to an impartial jury combined with patterns of prosecutorial misconduct which infected the integrity of the proceedings as to warrant the grant of habeas corpus. The petition is summarily denied for all of the following reasons:

The writ of habeas corpus is reserved for errors of a fundamental jurisdictional or constitutional type, rather than erroneous evidentiary or procedural ruling. (*In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 813, 828.) No ground alleged here is of a type cognizable on habeas corpus.

Assuming the facts alleged in the petition are true, petitioner fails to allege facts establishing a *prima facie* case for habeas relief. (*People v. Duvall* 1995) 9 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 464, 474-475.)

The petition is untimely, and Petitioner fails to explain and justify the significant delay in seeking habeas corpus relief. (*In re Burdan* (2008) 169 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 18, 30-31; *In re Clark* (1993) 5 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 750, 765; *In re Swain* (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300, 302.) "Substantial delay is measured from the time the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim." (*In re Robbins* (1998) 18 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 770, 780.)

1 The Petition raises issues which could have been raised on appeal, but were not, and  
2 Petitioner has failed to allege facts establishing an exception to the rule barring habeas  
3 consideration of claim that could have been raised on appeal. (*In re Reno* (2012) 55 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 428,  
4 490-493; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 813, 825-826; *In re Dixon* (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759.)

5 The petition raises issues which were raised and rejected on appeal and Petitioner has  
6 failed to allege facts establishing an exception to the rule barring habeas consideration of claims  
7 that had been raised on appeal. (*In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 813, 825; *In re Waltreus* (1965) 62  
8 Cal.2d 218, 225.)

9 The petition presents claims raised and rejected in a prior habeas petition and Petitioner  
10 has not alleged facts establishing an exception to the rule barring reconsideration of claims  
11 previously rejected. Such successive claims constitute an abuse of the writ of habeas corpus. (*In*  
12 *re Reno* (2012) 55 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 428, 455; *In re Clark* (1993) 5 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 750, 767-769.)

13 Petitioner filed a prior habeas corpus petition and failed to raise the claims raised in the  
14 current petition and Petitioner has not alleged facts establishing an exception to the rule  
15 requiring all claims to be raised in one timely-filed petition. (*In re Reno* (2012) 55 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 428,  
16 454-455; *In re Clark* (1993) 5 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 750, 767-768; *In re Horowitz* (1949) 33 Cal.2d 534, 546-  
17 547.)

18 As to the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Petitioner has failed to show that  
19 but for counsel's allegedly deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that a more  
20 favorable outcome would have resulted. It is not enough to speculate about possible prejudice to  
21 be accorded relief. Petitioner has failed to show that the prejudicial effect of counsel's errors was  
22 a "demonstrable reality." (*In re Cox* (2003) 30 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 974, 1016; *In re Clark* (1993) 5 Cal.4<sup>th</sup>  
23 750, 766; *Strickland v. Washington* (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 697.)

24 As to the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, during Petitioner's first  
25 appeal of right, Petitioner has failed to show that appellate counsel's exercise of professional  
26 judgment was deficient or that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the appeal would have  
27 been different. Appellate counsel is not required to raise every non-frivolous issue and Petitioner  
28

1 alleges no more than a failure to raise issues. (*Smith v. Robbins* (2002) 528 U.S. 259, 288; *Jones*  
2 *v. Barnes* (1983) 463 U.S. 745, 750-752.)

3 For all of the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.  
4

5 The clerk is ordered to serve a copy of this memorandum upon Petitioner, and upon the  
6 District Attorney's Habeas Corpus Litigation Team, 320 West Temple Street, Room 540, Los  
7 Angeles, California 90012.  
8

9  
10 Dated: March 4, 2021

11 151  
12 H. CLAY JACKE II  
13 Judge of the Superior Court



1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

**PROOF OF SERVICE**

**Order summarily denying Habeas Corpus Petition**


filed in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, filed in the case of In re **Michael Shaboya Woolen, Trial Court No. TA070163-01**, by placing a copy thereof in a separate envelope for each addressee named hereafter, and sealing each envelope and, with the postage thereon fully prepaid, depositing each in the United States mail at Compton, California, each envelope addressed to each such addressee respectively as follows:

Office of the District Attorney  
Habeas Corpus Litigation Team,  
320 West Temple Street, Suite 540  
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Michael Shaboya Woolen – J92882  
HDSP, C2, 230  
P. O. Box 3030  
Susanville, CA 96127

Executed on March 4, 2021 at Compton, California

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
DeForest Lockett  
Judicial assistant



1 Assuming the facts alleged in the petition are true, petitioner fails to allege facts  
2 establishing a *prima facie* case for habeas relief. (*People v. Duvall* 1995) 9 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 464, 474-475.)

3 The petition is untimely, and Petitioner fails to explain and justify the significant delay in  
4 seeking habeas corpus relief. (*In re Burdan* (2008) 169 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 18, 30-31; *In re Clark* (1993)  
5 5 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 750, 765; *In re Swain* (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300, 302.) "Substantial delay is measured from  
6 the time the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the  
7 information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim." (*In re Robbins*  
8 (1998) 18 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 770, 780.)

9 The Petition raises issues which could have been raised on appeal, but were not, and  
10 Petitioner has failed to allege facts establishing an exception to the rule barring habeas  
11 consideration of claim that could have been raised on appeal. (*In re Reno* (2012) 55 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 428,  
12 490-493; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 813, 825-826; *In re Dixon* (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759.)

13 The petition raises issues which were raised and rejected on appeal and Petitioner has  
14 failed to allege facts establishing an exception to the rule barring habeas consideration of claims  
15 that had been raised on appeal. (*In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 813, 825; *In re Waltreus* (1965) 62  
16 Cal.2d 218, 225.)

17 As to the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Petitioner has failed to show that  
18 but for counsel's allegedly deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that a more  
19 favorable outcome would have resulted. It is not enough to speculate about possible prejudice to  
20 be accorded relief. Petitioner has failed to show that the prejudicial effect of counsel's errors was  
21 a "demonstrable reality." (*In re Cox* (2003) 30 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 974, 1016; *In re Clark* (1993) 5 Cal.4<sup>th</sup>  
22 750, 766; *Strickland v. Washington* (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 697.)

23 As to the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, during Petitioner's first  
24 appeal of right, Petitioner has failed to show that appellate counsel's exercise of professional  
25 judgment was deficient or that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the appeal would have  
26 been different. Appellate counsel is not required to raise every non-frivolous issue and Petitioner  
27 alleges no more than a failure to raise issues. (*Smith v. Robbins* (2002) 528 U.S. 259, 288; *Jones*  
28 *v. Barnes* (1983) 463 U.S. 745, 750-752.)

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.

The clerk is ordered to serve a copy of this memorandum upon Petitioner, and upon the District Attorney's Habeas Corpus Litigation Team, 320 West Temple Street, Room 540, Los Angeles, California 90012.

Dated: December 24, 2019

151

---

H. CLAY JACKE II  
Judge of the Superior Court



1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

**PROOF OF SERVICE**

**Order summarily denying Habeas Corpus Petition**

filed in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, filed in the case of In re **Michael Woolen, Trial Court No. TA070163-01**, by placing a copy thereof in a separate envelope for each addressee named hereafter, and sealing each envelope and, with the postage thereon fully prepaid, depositing each in the United States mail at Compton, California, each envelope addressed to each such addressee respectively as follows:

Office of the District Attorney  
Habeas Corpus Litigation Team,  
320 West Temple Street, Suite 540  
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Michael Woolen J92882  
HDSP C2 216  
P. O. Box 3030  
Susanville, CA 96127

Executed on December 24, 2019 at Compton, California

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
DeForest Lockett  
Judicial assistant

# APPENDIX COVER PAGE

C

EXHIBIT


Description of this Exhibit: *UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT BANT  
OF CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 3-16-10*

Number of pages to this Exhibit:      2   pages.

JURISDICTION: (Check only one)

- Municipal Court
- Superior Court
- Appellate Court
- State Supreme Court
- United States District Court
- State Circuit Court
- United States Supreme Court
- Grand Jury

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL WOOLEN,  
Petitioner,

v.

TOM FELKER,  
Respondent.

CASE NO. CV 07-8161 GW (ANx)


ORDER GRANTING CERTIFICATE OF  
APPEALABILITY

Petitioner Michael Woolen ("Petitioner") constructively filed a "Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus By A Person In State Custody ("Petition"), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, on December 14, 2007. On October 29, 2009, the Magistrate Judge issued and filed a Report and Recommendation, recommending that the Petition be denied and that judgment be entered dismissing the Petition with prejudice. The Magistrate Judge gave Petitioner until November 18, 2009, to file any objections to the Report and Recommendation. Petitioner did not file any objections. The Magistrate Judge then submitted the Report and Recommendation to this Court on December 14, 2009. After considering the Report and Recommendation and the file in this matter, and concurrently with this Order, the Court is adopting the findings and conclusions of the Report and Recommendation and entering Judgment denying and dismissing the Petition with prejudice. However, under Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, the Court now grants a Certificate of Appealability with respect to

1 that adopted Report and Recommendation.

2       The Court believes that the Report and Recommendation's conclusion that equitable  
3 tolling is unavailable to Petitioner is the appropriate conclusion and that no evidentiary hearing is  
4 necessary to develop the record further in this regard. However, the Court also believes that  
5 reasonable jurists could differ on the question of whether this resolution of the Petition, on  
6 procedural grounds, is proper (and on the question of whether the Petition states a valid claim of  
7 the denial of a constitutional right). *See Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Based on  
8 the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that a Certificate of Appealability is granted on the following  
9 related issues: Whether the Court has correctly concluded that equitable tolling is unavailable to  
10 Petitioner and that a conclusion can be reached on that issue without further development of the  
11 record of Petitioner's alleged mental impediment.

12  
13 DATED: March 16, 2010

14  
15 

16 GEORGE H. WU

17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27

# APPENDIX COVER PAGE

D

EXHIBIT


Description of this Exhibit: *UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DENIAC  
OF CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 5-12-11*

Number of pages to this Exhibit:     6     pages.

JURISDICTION: (Check only one)

- Municipal Court
- Superior Court
- Appellate Court
- State Supreme Court
- United States District Court
- State Circuit Court
- United States Supreme Court
- Grand Jury

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL WOOLEN,  
Petitioner,  
v.  
M.D. McDonald, Warden,  
Respondent.

Case No. CV 10-04534 GW (AN)  
ORDER DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF  
APPEALABILITY

Effective December 1, 2009, Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases  
in the United States District Courts was amended to read as follows:

- (a) **Certificate of Appealability.** The district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. Before entering the final order, the court may direct the parties to submit arguments on whether a certificate should issue. If the court issues a certificate, the court must state the specific issue or issues that satisfy the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). If the court denies a certificate, a party may not appeal the denial but may seek a certificate from the court of appeals under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22. A motion to

1 (b) **Time to Appeal.** Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) governs  
2 the time to appeal an order entered under these rules. A timely  
3 notice of appeal must be filed even if the district court issues a  
4 certificate of appealability. These rules do not extend the time to  
5 appeal the original judgment of conviction.

6 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a certificate of appealability may issue “only if the  
7 applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” The  
8 Supreme Court has held that this standard means a showing that “reasonable jurists  
9 could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been  
10 resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve  
11 encouragement to proceed further.” *See Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84, 120  
12 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000)(internal quotation marks omitted).

13 Here, the court finds the Petition a “second or successive” habeas petition relative  
14 to Petitioner’s 2007 Petition, and that it raises three new claims. Therefore, the court  
15 finds the Petitioner has not made the requisite showing for the issuance of a certificate  
16 of appealability.

17 Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is denied in this case.  
18  
19


20 Dated: May 12, 2011

George H. Wu  
GEORGE H. WU  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

22 Presented by:  
23

24 Arthur Nakazato  
25 Arthur Nakazato  
26 United States Magistrate Judge  
27

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
WESTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL WOOLEN,  
Petitioner,  
v.  
M.D. McDONALD, Warden,  
Respondent.

Case No. CV 10-04534 GW (AN)  
ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING  
SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR WRIT  
OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR  
FAILURE TO OBTAIN PRIOR  
AUTHORIZATION FROM THE  
NINTH CIRCUIT

**I. Background**

On June 21, 2010, petitioner Michael Woolen, a state prisoner proceeding *pro se*, filed the pending petition for writ of habeas corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“§ 2254”) in this court. By his Petition, Woolen seeks federal habeas relief from his current state custody arising from his 2004 state conviction for attempted murder while personally using a firearm that he sustained following a jury trial in the California Superior Court for Los Angeles County (case no. TA070163). (“2004 Conviction”). (Pet. at 2 (dkt. 1); Official records of California courts.<sup>1/</sup>)

---

<sup>1/</sup> The court takes judicial notice of the state appellate court records for Petitioner’s case available on the internet at <http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov>. See (continued...)



1 to the judgment of a State court,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), must follow if he  
2 wishes to file a “second or successive” habeas corpus application  
3 challenging that custody, § 2244(b)(1). In pertinent part, before filing the  
4 application in the district court, a prisoner “shall move in the appropriate  
5 court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the  
6 application.” § 2244(b)(3)(A). A three-judge panel of the court of appeals  
7 may authorize the filing of the second or successive application only if it  
8 presents a claim not previously raised that satisfies one of the two grounds  
9 articulated in § 2244(b)(2). § 2244(b)(3)(C); *Gonzalez v. Crosby*, 545 U.S.  
10 524, 529-530, 125 S. Ct. 2641, 162 L. Ed.2d 480 (2005); *see also Felker v.*  
11 *Turpin*, 518 U.S. 651, 656-657, 664, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 135 L. Ed.2d 827  
12 (1996).

13 *Burton v. Stewart*, 549 U.S. 147, 152-53, 127 S. Ct. 793 (2007). District courts lack  
14 jurisdiction to consider unauthorized successive petitions and must dismiss such  
15 petitions. § 2244(b)(2); *Burton, id.*

16 The Ninth Circuit recently held the dismissal of a § 2254 habeas corpus petition  
17 as untimely constitutes a disposition on the merits, and that a further petition challenging  
18 the same conviction constitutes a “second or successive” petition for purposes of  
19 § 2244(b). *McNabb v. Yates*, 576 F.3d 1028, 1029 (9th Cir. 2009). Based upon  
20 *McNabb*, the Court finds Petitioner’s pending Petition clearly constitutes a “second or  
21 successive” habeas petition relative to his 2007 Petition. Further, the Petition and  
22 records of the Ninth Circuit clearly establish that Petitioner has not sought and been  
23 granted authorization by the Ninth Circuit to file a Petition with this Court for the  
24 purpose of raising any new federal habeas claims.

25 ///

26 ///

27 ///

28 ///


1           Therefore, the reference to the Magistrate Judge is vacated and the Petition is  
2 dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. *See Burton, id.* The clerk is directed to enter the  
3 judgment dismissing the Petition. Any and all other pending motions are terminated.

4  
5           IT IS SO ORDERED.

6  
7 Dated: May 12, 2010

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
GEORGE H. WU  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

8  
9  
10 Presented by:

11  
12   
\_\_\_\_\_  
Arthur Nakazato  
United States Magistrate Judge

13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

# APPENDIX COVER PAGE

E

EXHIBIT

Description of this Exhibit: *NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL DENIAL OF APPLICATION TO FILE SECOND AND SUCCESSIVE PETITION.*

Number of pages to this Exhibit:      1   pages.

JURISDICTION: (Check only one)

- Municipal Court
- Superior Court
- Appellate Court
- State Supreme Court
- United States District Court
- State Circuit Court
- United States Supreme Court
- Grand Jury

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FILED

DEC 14 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK  
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

MICHAEL WOOLEN,

Applicant,

v.

JASON PICKETT, Warden,

Respondent.

No. 20-73446

ORDER

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, HURWITZ and BADE, Circuit Judges.

The application for authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 habeas corpus petition in the district court is denied. The applicant has not made a prima facie showing under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) that:

(A) the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

Any pending motions are denied as moot.

No further filings will be entertained in this case.

**DENIED.**

# APPENDIX COVER PAGE

F

EXHIBIT

Description of this Exhibit: *UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SUMMARY  
DISMISSAL 1-9-8*

Number of pages to this Exhibit:   10   pages.

JURISDICTION: (Check only one)

- Municipal Court
- Superior Court
- Appellate Court
- State Supreme Court
- United States District Court
- State Circuit Court
- United States Supreme Court
- Grand Jury

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
WESTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL WOOLEN,  
Petitioner,  
v.  
TOM FELKER,  
Respondent.

Case No. CV 07-08161 GW (AN)

**ORDER DENYING MOTION  
REQUESTING EQUITABLE  
TOLLING AND ORDER TO SHOW  
CAUSE RE DISMISSAL OF  
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS  
CORPUS BY A PERSON IN STATE  
CUSTODY AS TIME-BARRED**

**I. BACKGROUND**

On December 14, 2007, Michael Woolen ("Petitioner"), a state prisoner proceeding *pro se*, commenced the pending action for federal habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition") by constructively<sup>1/</sup> filing his pending Petition. (Pet.

---

<sup>1/</sup> Pursuant to the "mailbox rule," a *pro se* prisoner's habeas petition is deemed to be filed on the date the prisoner delivers the petition to prison authorities for mailing to the clerk. *Houston v. Lack*, 487 U.S. 266, 270-71, 108 S. Ct. 2379 (1988); *Huizar v. Carey*, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 2001). The mailbox rule also applies to *pro* (continued...)

1 8.) The Petition raises three claims challenging attempted murder-related convictions  
2 and life to twenty-five years to life prison sentence that Petitioner sustained on January  
3 24, 2004, following a jury trial in the California Superior Court for the County of Los  
4 Angeles (case no. TA070163). (Pet. 2; Official records of California courts.<sup>2/</sup>)

5 The Petition and state court records establish that, on February 24, 2004,  
6 Petitioner appealed his judgment of conviction to the California Court of Appeal (case  
7 no. B173587) and that court affirmed the judgment on January 31, 2005. (Pet. 2-3;  
8 Official records of California courts.) On March 14, 2005, the California Supreme  
9 Court received a petition for review (case no. S132152) that was denied without  
10 comment on April 20, 2005. (Pet. 3; Official records of California courts.) Petitioner  
11 did not seek collateral review in the state courts. (Pet. 3; Official records of California  
12 courts.) On December 14, 2007, Petitioner constructively filed his pending Petition  
13 along with a Motion Requesting Equitable Tolling ("Motion"). (Pet. 8; Mot.  
14 Requesting Equitable Tolling.)

15 For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is DENIED and Petitioner is  
16 ordered to show cause why the pending Petition should not be dismissed with prejudice  
17 because it is time-barred.

18 ///

19 ///

20 ///

21

22 <sup>1/</sup> (...continued)

23 *se* state habeas petitions. *Stillman v. Lamarque*, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003).  
24 The pending Petition was signed by Petitioner and filed by the Clerk on December 14,  
2007. (Pet. 8.)

25 <sup>2/</sup> The Court takes judicial notice of Petitioner's records in the state trial and  
26 appellate courts, which are available on the Internet at <http://lasuperiorcourt.org> and  
27 <http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov>. *See Smith v. Duncan*, 297 F.3d 809, 815 (9th  
28 Cir. 2002) (federal courts may take judicial notice of relevant state court records in  
federal habeas proceedings).

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

## II. DISCUSSION

### A. Standard of Review

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (“Rule 4”), states that “the judge to whom [the petition] is assigned” is required to examine the petition promptly and “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge shall make an order for its summary dismissal and cause the petitioner to be notified.” Further, an untimely habeas petition may be dismissed *sua sponte*, however, the district court must give the prisoner adequate notice and an opportunity to respond before doing so. *Day v. McDonough*, 547 U.S. 198, 209-10, 126 S. Ct. 1675 (2006); *Herbst v. Cook*, 260 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2001).

### B. Statute of Limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) establishes a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners to file a habeas petition in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). In most cases, the limitation period begins to run from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

As discussed above, Petitioner’s direct appeal in the state courts ended on April 20, 2005, the date the California Supreme Court denied his petition for review. Petitioner did not seek review with the United States Supreme Court. For purposes of AEDPA’s limitation period, his judgment of conviction became final ninety days later, on July 19, 2005. *Barefoot v. Estelle*, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983); *Bowen v. Roe*, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999) (the period of “direct review” in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court). AEDPA’s one-year limitation period then started to run the next day, on July 20, 2005, and ended on

1 July 19, 2006. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); *see also Patterson v. Stewart*, 251 F.3d  
2 1243, 1245-47 (9th Cir. 2001) (the statute of limitations begins to run on the day  
3 following the day of the triggering event pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  
4 6(a)).

5 Petitioner missed this deadline by failing to constructively file the pending  
6 Petition until December 14, 2007-- 513 days (over sixteen months) after the statute  
7 expired. Therefore, the pending Petition is time-barred unless Petitioner is entitled to  
8 statutory or equitable tolling, or an alternate start date to AEDPA's limitation period  
9 under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

#### 10 **C. Statutory Tolling**

11 AEDPA's one-year limitation period may be tolled for "[t]he time during which  
12 a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with  
13 respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).  
14 Petitioner did not seek collateral review in the state courts so he is not eligible to  
15 receive statutory tolling. Therefore, this Court concludes this Petition, constructively  
16 filed on December 14, 2007, is untimely by 513 days.<sup>37</sup>

#### 17 **D. Alternative Start of the Statute of Limitations**

##### 18 **1. State-Created Impediment**

19 In rare instances, AEDPA provides that its one-year limitation period shall run  
20 from "the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action  
21 in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant  
22 was prevented from filing by such State action." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). Asserting  
23 that the statute of limitations was delayed by a state-created impediment requires a  
24 showing of a due process violation. *Lott v. Mueller*, 304 F.3d 918, 925 (9th Cir. 2002).

---

26  
27 <sup>37</sup> Specifically, the 513 days represents the untolled time beyond the limitation  
28 deadline (July 19, 2006), and the Petition's constructive filing date (December 14,  
2007).

1 The face of the Petition and attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities  
2 (“Memorandum”) do not set forth any facts showing that Petitioner is entitled to relief  
3 under this provision.

4 **2. Newly Recognized Constitutional Right**

5 AEDPA provides that, if a claim is based upon a constitutional right that is  
6 newly recognized and applied retroactively to habeas cases by the United States  
7 Supreme Court, the one-year limitation period begins to run on the date which the new  
8 right was initially recognized by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. §  
9 2244(d)(1)(c). The face of the Petition and Memorandum do not set forth any facts  
10 showing that Petitioner is entitled to relief under this provision.

11 **3. Discovery of Factual Predicate**

12 AEDPA also provides that, in certain cases, its one-year limitation period shall  
13 run from “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented  
14 could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. §  
15 2244(d)(1)(D). The face of the Petition and Memorandum do not set forth any facts  
16 showing that Petitioner is entitled to relief based upon a late discovery of the factual  
17 predicate.

18 **E. Equitable Tolling**

19 “[E]quitable tolling is justified in few cases,” and “the threshold necessary to  
20 trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the  
21 rule.” *Spitsyn v. Moore*, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). “Generally, a litigant  
22 seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has  
23 been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood  
24 in his way.” *Pace v. DiGuglielmo*, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807 (2005).

25 By way of his Motion, Petitioner principally proffers three grounds for equitable  
26 tolling. As the ensuing analysis demonstrates, none of Petitioner’s asserted grounds  
27 satisfy the *Pace* elements for equitable tolling.

28 ///

1           **1. Mental Disability Claim**

2           Petitioner alleges he should be entitled to equitable tolling because of his mental  
3 illness. (Mot. 1, 3-5.) In support of his contention, Petitioner has attached numerous  
4 medical records (likely every medical exam he has had since he was incarcerated)  
5 indicating he suffers from depression and bipolar disorder. (Mot. Ex. A at 1, 4, 5, 17.<sup>4/</sup>)  
6 However, none of the mental disorders he claims to have suffered from establish that  
7 they prevented him from filing a timely Petition. Moreover, mental disabilities alone  
8 do not warrant equitable tolling where other evidence shows the petitioner could still  
9 have filed a timely petition. *See Gaston v. Palmer*, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (9th Cir.  
10 2005) (petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling based upon physical and mental  
11 disabilities since he prepared and filed a state habeas petition while suffering from the  
12 alleged disabilities). Since his conviction in January 2004, Petitioner's own exhibits  
13 and actions establish he not only filed two state habeas petitions during the course of  
14 his purported mental disorders but he also maintained constant communication with  
15 his mother regarding his appeals, wrote letters to his attorney and prison authorities,  
16 tracked down his legal file and sleuthed out any alleged missing documents. (Mot. Ex.  
17 A at 21-22, 36-38; Official records of California courts.) Petitioner has quite simply  
18 failed to show the slightest causal link between the alleged mental disabilities and his  
19 failure to file a federal habeas petition at any time during the nearly five years since his  
20 conviction. *See Allen v. Lewis*, 255 F.3d 798, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2001), *amended on*  
21 *other grounds by Allen v. Lewis*, 295 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc) ("the prisoner  
22 must show that the 'extraordinary circumstances' were the but-for and proximate cause  
23 of his untimeliness.").

24           In an apparent effort to circumvent this obvious problem, Petitioner asserts his

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26           <sup>4/</sup> Petitioner failed to designate and consecutively number each page of the  
27 exhibit in the manner required by Local Rules 11-3.3 and 11.5.2. Consequently, for  
28 ease of reference, the Court has designated Petitioner's attachment to the Motion  
entitled "Exhibits" as "Exhibit A" and consecutively numbered each page.

1 mother, fellow inmate (former step-father), and the Library Technical Assistant helped  
2 him file the pending Petition. (Mot. Ex. A at 36-38.) This argument is unpersuasive.  
3 Regardless of *how* Petitioner managed to file two state habeas petitions, write letters,  
4 and investigate his case, the fact is he accomplished these things. He has failed to  
5 explain why his mother, fellow inmate, and the prison librarian assistant who  
6 ostensibly provided valuable aid to him could not have done so while the statute of  
7 limitations was running instead of sixteen months after it expired. *Tacho v. Martinez*,  
8 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (mental condition of *pro se* prisoner and reliance  
9 upon allegedly incompetent jailhouse lawyers did not constitute “cause”). Petitioner  
10 has failed to show that his alleged mental disabilities amounted to extraordinary  
11 circumstances beyond his control, making it *impossible* to file a petition on time.  
12 *Brambles v. Duncan*, 412 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2005).

13 **2. Inadequate Law Library Claim**

14 Petitioner also claims equitable tolling is warranted because of restrictions on  
15 meaningful law library access in violation of his due process rights. (Mot. 2, 5-6.) The  
16 Court notes that such restrictions do not generally qualify as an “extraordinary  
17 circumstance” sufficient to equitably toll the statute of limitations for federal habeas  
18 petitions. *See Miller v. Marr*, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (petitioner’s alleged  
19 lack of access to law library materials and resulting unawareness of the limitation  
20 period until it was too late did not warrant equitable tolling); *Wilders v. Runnels*, No.  
21 C031478 CRB (PR), 2003 WL 22434102, \*3 (N.D. Cal. 2003); *Atkins v. Harris*, No.  
22 C 98-3188 MJJ (PR), 1999 WL 13719, \*2 (N.D. Cal. 1999).

23 \* Prison officials typically provide prison law libraries or legal assistants to ensure  
24 that prisoners “have a reasonably adequate opportunity to file nonfrivolous legal claims  
25 challenging their convictions or conditions of confinement.” *Lewis v. Casey*, 518 U.S.  
26 343, 356, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (1996). However, prison officials of necessity must regulate  
27 the time, manner and place in which library facilities and legal assistant programs are  
28 used. *See Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr.*, 776 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1985).

1 Not surprisingly, lockdowns, placement in administrative segregation/solitary  
2 confinement, and other common restrictions on access to the law library and legal  
3 assistant programs, generally do not qualify as “extraordinary circumstances.” *Lindo*  
4 *v. Lefever*, 193 F. Supp. 2d 659, 663 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). There is no due process  
5 violation so long as an inmate has the basic capability of presenting his claims to the  
6 courts, irrespective of the “capability of turning pages in a law library.” *Lewis*, 518  
7 U.S. at 356-57.

8 Petitioner’s inadequate law library claim is facially without merit. Aside from  
9 his perfunctory, unsupported allegations, he has not shown that he was actually denied  
10 access to the law library or why he needed library access to file a timely federal habeas  
11 petition. Petitioner’s inadequate law library claim fundamentally ignores the clearly  
12 established premise that “prison law libraries and legal assistance programs are not  
13 ends in themselves, but only the means for ensuring a reasonably adequate opportunity  
14 to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.” *Lewis*,  
15 518 U.S. at 351. “[M]eaningful access to the courts is the touchstone . . . and the  
16 inmate therefore must go one step further and demonstrate that the alleged  
17 shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered [his] efforts to pursue  
18 a legal claim.” *Id.*

19 Further, even if Petitioner had shown he was denied access to the law library at  
20 various times and for various reasons during the relevant period, as noted above, he has  
21 failed to meet his burden of establishing the alleged limited access made timely  
22 *impossible*. *Brambles*, 412 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2005).

### 23 **3. Lack of Legal Training, Representation, and/or Education Claims**

24 Petitioner’s grounds for equitable tolling is also based on his lack of legal  
25 training, lack of legal representation, and/or general lack of education. The Court  
26 rejects such contention. (Mot. 1.) Neither the lack of assistance nor ignorance of the  
27 law qualify as extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling. *See Rasberry*  
28 *v. Garcia*, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“a pro se petitioner’s lack of legal

1 sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable  
2 tolling” of AEDPA’s limitation period); *Ekenberg v. Lewis*, No. C 98-1450 FMS (PR),  
3 1999 WL 13720, \*2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 1999) (“Ignorance of the law and lack of legal  
4 assistance do not constitute such extraordinary circumstances.”); *Bolds v. Newland*,  
5 No. C 97-2103 VRW (PR), 1997 WL 732529, \*2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 1997) (same);  
6 *see also Hinton v. Pac. Enter.*, 5 F.3d 391, 396-97 (9th Cir. 1993) (mere ignorance of  
7 the law generally is an insufficient basis to equitably toll the running of an applicable  
8 statute of limitations); *Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass’n*, 932 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir.  
9 1991) (neither “lack of knowledge of applicable filing deadlines,” nor “unfamiliarity  
10 with the legal process,” nor “lack of representation during the applicable filing period,”  
11 nor “illiteracy,” provides a basis for equitable tolling); *cf. Hughes v. Idaho State Bd.*  
12 *of Corr.*, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding pre-AEDPA that illiteracy of pro  
13 se prisoner is insufficient to meet standard of an objective, external factor amounting  
14 to “cause” for purposes of avoiding procedural bar on habeas claims).

15 Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable  
16 tolling because he has failed to satisfy either of the *Pace* elements. Petitioner has not  
17 met his burden to show he was reasonably diligent in pursuing federal habeas relief  
18 throughout the time that AEDPA’s limitation period was running, nor has he shown  
19 he was prevented from filing a timely petition because of extraordinary circumstances.

#### 20 ORDER

21 Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds the Petition, Memorandum, and  
22 Motion indicate it is untimely. Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED and Petitioner  
23 shall have until **January 31, 2008**, to file a written response and show cause why his  
24 Petition should not be dismissed with prejudice because it is time-barred. In  
25 responding to this Order, Petitioner must show by declaration and any exhibits what,  
26 if any, factual or legal basis he has for claiming that the Court’s foregoing analysis is  
27 factually or legally incorrect, or that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations should  
28 be tolled, or the start date extended. If Petitioner still maintains he is entitled to tolling

1 because of a lack of access to the prison law library due to a purported lockdown or  
2 some other state-created impediment, his written response must be supported by a  
3 declaration from the warden or prison librarian verifying that the law library and  
4 library materials were unavailable throughout the relevant time period because of the  
5 lockdown or other stated reason. Further, Petitioner must demonstrate that, during the  
6 time that access to the prison law library was allegedly unavailable, he made requests  
7 for legal materials to be brought to his cell and those requests were denied.

8 **Petitioner is warned that, if a timely response to this Order is not made,**  
9 **Petitioner will waive his right to do so and the Court will, without further notice,**  
10 **issue an order dismissing the Petition, with prejudice, as time-barred. Further,**  
11 **if Petitioner determines the Court's above analysis is correct and the Petition is**  
12 **clearly time-barred, he should file a Request For Voluntary Dismissal of this**  
13 **action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) in lieu of a response to this Order.**

14  
15 IT IS SO ORDERED.

16  
17 DATED: January 9, 2008

18           /s/          ARTHUR NAKAZATO  
19           ARTHUR NAKAZATO  
20 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

# APPENDIX COVER PAGE

G

EXHIBIT

Description of this Exhibit: *EXHIBITS A - D; SEE INDEX TO EXHIBITS*

Number of pages to this Exhibit:           pages.

JURISDICTION: (Check only one)

- Municipal Court
- Superior Court
- Appellate Court
- State Supreme Court
- United States District Court
- State Circuit Court
- United States Supreme Court
- Grand Jury

## INDEX TO EXHIBITS

### EXHIBIT A: ADA EXHIBITS

- FIRST SIX PAGES - MOTION FOR EQUITABLE TOLLING ..... 8, 10
- NEXT NINE PAGES - FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN THE FIRST AND SECOND INSTANCES ..... 8, 10
- NEXT TWENTY TWO PAGES - MENTAL HEALTH EXHIBITS THAT WERE PRESENTED WITH THE MOTION FOR EQUITABLE TOLLING AND FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN THE FIRST INSTANCE CASE NO. CV-07-8161-GW(CAN) (12-14-07) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ..... 11, 18
- NEXT FOURTEEN PAGES - MEDICATION PRESCRIBED RECORD ..... 13
- NEXT FIVE PAGES - DECLARATIONS FROM LAW LIBRARY TECHNICIAN, PETITIONER'S MOTHER, AND PETITIONER'S STEP FATHER REQUESTING LEGAL REPRESENTATION, EDUCATION AND LAW LIBRARY DOCUMENT ..... 9, 12, 13
- NEXT FORTY SEVEN PAGES - MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES FOR CASE NO. CV-07-8161 - GW(CAN) (12-14-07) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ..... 13

### EXHIBIT B: JUDICIAL ABUSE OF DISCRETION EXHIBITS

- FIRST FOUR PAGES - DOCKET SHEETS ..... 13, 14, 24, 29
- NEXT FOUR PAGES - JURY'S INQUIRY, TRIAL COURT'S RESPONSE, COMPLAINT WITNESS INTERROGATORY, TRIAL REPORTER TRANSCRIPT PAGE 459 ..... 12, 14, 16, 19
- NEXT NINE PAGES - PEOPLE'S 12; DEFENSE INVESTIGATOR REPORT, MENTAL HEALTH EXPERT REPORTS, COURT REPORTER TRANSCRIPT PAGE 236 ..... 14, 17, 19, 22

NEXT SEVENTY SEVEN PAGES - PRELIMINARY HEARING, AND TRIAL REPORTER TRANSCRIPTS  
FROM PEOPLE V. WOOLEN CASE NO. TA070163 (SEE INDEX TO NEXT SEVENTY SEVEN)

EXHIBIT C: NAPUE EXHIBITS

FIRST FOUR PAGES - POLICE REPORTS .....29

NEXT FOUR PAGES - PHOTO DOCUMENTS .....29, 30

NEXT NINE PAGES - PRELIMINARY HEARING, AND TRIAL REPORTER TRANSCRIPTS  
FROM PEOPLE V. WOOLEN CASE NO. TA070163 (SEE INDEX TO NEXT NINE)

EXHIBIT D: EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCE EXHIBITS .....13

FIRST TWENTY ONE PAGES - REQUEST FOR TRIAL FILE AND RECORDS .....12  
FROM 2007 - 2012

NEXT TWO PAGES - CDCR 602 INQUIRY OF TRIAL FILE (2007),  
AND CDCR 119 INCOMING MAIL DOCUMENT (2005) .....13

NEXT EIGHTEEN PAGES - CDCR AND POST OFFICE INQUIRY OF  
2019 .....12

NEXT NINE PAGES - DUE DILIGENCE FILES SINCE 2019 .....13