ORIGINAL

No. 21-5384

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

WILLIAM A. MASTERS---PETITIONER

VS.

XAVIER BECERRA, in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of California ---RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

A. Must a Citizen exhaust his State's remedies before filing in the Federal Court for a decision upon a Constitutional issue?

B. When a State makes a Pre-hearing seizure of property due to a claimed "emergency situation", must the State give an original hearing as soon as practicable after the taking with full Due Process Rights given to the accused including providing Assistance of Council to economic indigents?

C. Does an appeal of an Executive Branch taking of property, without a pre- or post-taking hearing, satisfy the Original Hearing guarantee under the Fourteenth Amendment?

D. Does the Attorney General of California himself constitute:

"*a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority*"

under 27 Code of Federal Regulations 478.11(a), allowing him to legally declare a citizen a Mental Defective under 18 United States Code 992(g)(4) and strip him of his right to keep and bear firearms and property?

LIST OF PARTIES

[X] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the over page.

[ ] All parties **do not** appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

RELATED CASES

- Masters v. Beccera, No. 2: 19-cv-02030, U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Judgement entered June 18, 2019.

- Masters v. Beccera, No 19-55757, U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Judgement entered March 16, 2021

- Masters v. Beccera, No 19-55757, U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Denial of Petition for Panel rehearing (Docket Entry No. 23) July 1, 2021.

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JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is granted under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871).

Masters v. Beccera, No. 2: 19-cv-02030, U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.

Judgement entered June 18, 2019.

Masters v. Beccera, No 19-55757, U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Judgement entered March 16, 2021.

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Judgement entered July 1, 2021.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S. Constitution, Second Amendment.

> A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

U.S. Constitution, Fourteen Amendment.

> All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

42 United States Code 1983

> Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

18 USC 922(g)(4)

> (g)It shall be unlawful for any person—
>
> (4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution;
>
> to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

27 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 478, Subpart B, Section 478.11

> "Adjudicated as a mental defective.
>
> (a) A determination by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority that a person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, or mental illness, incompetency, condition, or disease:
>
> (1) Is a danger to himself or to others; or
>
> (2) Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own affairs.27 FR

California Welfare and Institutions Code, Section 8100(b)

> (b) (1) A person shall not have in his or her possession or under his or her custody or control, or purchase or receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, any firearms whatsoever or any other deadly weapon for a period of five years if, on or after January 1, 2014, he or she **communicates to a licensed psychotherapist** (emphasis mine), as defined in subdivisions (a) to (e), inclusive, of Section 1010 of the Evidence Code, a serious threat of physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims.

California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 8102 (a).

> (a) Whenever a person, who has been **detained or apprehended for examination** (emphasis mine), of his or her mental condition or who is a person described in Section 8100 or 8103, is found to own, have in his or her possession or under his or her control, any firearm whatsoever, or any other deadly weapon, the firearm or other deadly weapon shall be confiscated by any law enforcement agency or peace officer, who shall retain custody of the firearm or other deadly weapon.

California Welfare and Institutions Code, Section 8103(a)

> (a) (1) No person who after October 1, 1955, has been **adjudicated by a court** (emphasis mine), of any state to be a danger to others as a result of a mental disorder or mental illness, or who has been **adjudicated** (emphasis mine), to be a mentally disordered sex offender, shall purchase or receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, or have in his or her possession, custody, or control a firearm or any other deadly weapon...

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 24, 2018, Attorney General for the State of California Xavier Becerra sent a letter to me informing me that:

> *"The California Department of Justice is in receipt of a Law Enforcement Report of Firearms Prohibition from the LAPD MENTAL EVAL UNIT. Accordingly, you are hereby notified that pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 8100, subdivision (b)(1) you cannot possess, have under your custody or control, purchase or receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, any firearm whatsoever or any other deadly weapon for a period of five years, The five-year firearm prohibition began February 23, 2018 and will expire February 23, 2023."*

My rights to own firearms was taken from me without a pre- or post-hearing under California's Welfare and Institutions Code (WIC) 8100(b). While my firearms were physically taken from me without a pre- or post-hearing under WIC 8102(a).

The language of 8100(b) and 8102(a) are in stark contrast to WIC 8103(a). 8103(a) states"

" *No person who after October 1, 1955,* ***has been adjudicated by a court****..."*

Here the State clearly recognizes the right of the Judiciary to determine if a person is qualified to own firearms. 8103(a) specifically uses language that mirrors the controlling federal legislation 18 USC 922(g)(4) which reads:

> *"(g)It shall be unlawful for any person—*
> *(4) who* ***has been adjudicated*** *as a mental defective..."*

This mirror language was no coincidence. However, in Section 8100 and 8102, there is no adjudication by a court requirement only that:

- In 8100 a "licensed psychiatrist" make and allegation to the state that some kind of "serious threat" was made in their presents.

- While section 8102 merely requires a person to be "detained or apprehended for examination of his or her mental condition"

These two sections of California's Welfare and Institutions Code fall well shy of the legal requirement under 18 USC 922(g)(4) to strip a citizen of their Second Amendment rights and property, and are therefore unconstitutional violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process protection and the Second Amendment. The States may mirror federal law in their state's laws, but they may not be more stringent than the Federal law, as federal law is controlling over federal issues.

I filed suit in Federal District Court for the Central District of California challenging the taking as an unconstitutional violation of my Due Process and the Second Amendment Rights as I was given no pre- nor post-hearing in which to defend myself, and I did not meet the standard of 922(g)(4). Judge Fitzgerald dismissed my suit. Judge Fitzgerald's grounds for dismissal were:

1. I failed to exhaust State's Remedies in that I did not avail myself of the Appeal granted by the State law; and,
2. The Attorney General was immune to prosecution do to State Sovereignty.

I appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court writing that Judge Fitzgerald's first ground for dismissal "exhaustion" of state remedies was in error writing that it:

"...violates 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871). Three days after the District Court handed down its ruling the Supreme Court passed down its ruling in KNICK vs. TOWNSHIP OF SCOTT, No. 17-647, 588 U.S. ___ (2019).

Chief Justice Roberts writing for the majority in KNICK:

"The San Remo preclusion trap should tip us off that the state-litigation requirement rests on a mistaken view of the Fifth Amendment. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, after all, guarantees "a federal forum for claims of unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials," and the settled rule is that "exhaustion of state remedies "is not a prerequisite to an action under [42 U.S.C.] 1983."' Heck v Humphrey 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994) (quoting Patsy v Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982)). But the guarantee of a federal forum rings hollow for takings plaintiffs, who are forced to litigate their claims in state court.'

Just as someone whose property has been taken by the Federal Government has a claim "founded... upon the Constitution" that he may bring under the Tucker Act, someone who's property has been taken by a local government has a claim under 1983 for a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution" that he may bring upon the taking in federal court. The 'general rule" is that plaintiffs may bring constitutional claims under 1983 "without first bringing any sort of state lawsuit even when state court actions addressing the underlaying behavior are available" D. Dana & T. Merril, Property Takings 262 (2002); see McNees v. Board of Ed. For Community Unit School Dist. 187, 373 U.S. 668, 672 (1963)"

I further argued that Judge Fitzgerald's second ground "Sovereign Immunity" failed under EX PARTE YOUNG [290 U.S. 123 (1908)] writing:

"In YOUNG, as herein, an order was sought to stop the Attorney General of Minnesota from enforcing a law claimed to be unconstitutional. The State in YOUNG, claimed Sovereign Immunity under the Eleventh Amendment as the State of California's Attorney General claims here.

Justice Peckham writing for the majority states that it was not hard for the Justices to determine that the law in question was unconstitutional, but the question before the Court was not one of constitutionality, but rather one of "enforcement" could the federal courts stop the enforcement of a law that was unconstitutional?

The majority determined that the Supremacy Clause of the 14th Amendment gave the Court the right to do so, and destroyed any claim of Sovereign Immunity finding that the 14th Amendment had amended the 11th Amendment writing:

"If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States. See In re Ayers, supra, page 507."

In the State's Answer to the appeal, the Attorney General claimed that I had no Second Amendment Rights under 18 USC 922(g)(4) because the Attorney General of the State of California determined on his own initiative, without a determination by a "court, board, commission or other lawful authority" [27 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 478.11(a)], that I was a "mental defective". This Power of Judge and Jury, the Attorney General claimed, was given to him by California's Welfare and Institutions Code 8100 et al.

The State wrote:

~~*"Here, sections 8100(b) and 8102(a) are part of the larger framework of laws that regulates firearms for*~~ *those who are* ***involuntarily committed or receiving treatment for mental health***

> *"Here, sections 8100(b) and 8102(a) are part of the larger framework of laws that regulates firearms for those who are* ***involuntarily committed or receiving treatment for mental health disorders*** (emphasis mine). *In particular, section 8100(b) restricts individuals from possessing firearms who, during the course of mental health treatment, communicate a "serious threat of physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims" to a licensed psychotherapist."* [Answering Brief Pg. 19-20].

In my Reply to the State's Answer, I argued that the Attorney General is not a "court, board, commission, or other lawful authority" as required by 478.11, and so does not have the power to declare me a Mental Defective under 922(g)(4) writing:

> *'The state knows fully well, that I have never been "involuntarily committed" nor*
>
> *have I "received treatment for a mental health disorder", and the state offers no proof otherwise in support of their claim.'*
>
> *Federal laws make clear that those who are "adjudicated" as mental defectives in a hearing appropriate to the charge against them, are not allowed to possess firearms. The State herein admits that no such hearing has ever taken place, and so, federal law makes clear that the Appellant possesses his full Second Amendment Rights.*
>
> *The State's Attorney General holds, without legal support, that Masters is, in its opinion, a mental defective, however that allegation has never been adjudicated, and therefore is merely the State's opinion, and not the law.*
>
> *All persons are innocent of any charge made against them until that charge is proven to be true in a Due Process Hearing appropriate to the charge being made against them."*

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled, de novo, that the dismissal was proper because:

> *"Appellant did not allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim, and did not avail himself of the appeal granted in the California Welfare and Institutions Code 8103."*

The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized there are justifiable emergency situations in which a Pre-hearing taking of property is proper and constitutional, however, in those situations a trial must follow as soon as practicable, see GROSS v LOPEZ, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)

> *"There are recurring situations where prior notice and hearing cannot be insisted upon,'*
>
> *'In such cases, the necessary notice and rudimentary hearing* ***should follow as soon as practicable*** (emphasis mine)." *Id.at 582-83"*

[See also, MACKEY v MONTRYM, 443 U.S. 1 (1979)].

It is held by the California Attorney General, that the State's Welfare and Institutions Code Section 8100(b) allows him to act as prosecutor and judge and, without a hearing of any kind, and strip me of my rights and properties.

This power granted him by California's Welfare and Institutions Code 8100(b) is in full violation of dozens of rulings by this court and the other 11 Circuits, such as in:

> GOLDBERG v. KELLY, 397 U.S. 254 (1970):
>
> "B*efore depriving a citizen of life, liberty, or property, the government must follow fair and just judicial procedures. It must provide a full hearing before an impartial judicial officer. The right to an attorney's help. The right to present evidence and argument orally. The chance to examine all materials that would be relied upon or, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, or a decision limited to the record thus made and explained in an opinion."*
>
> PALKO v. STATE if CONNECTICUT 58 U.S.149 (1937):
>
> *"Due process of law', under this clause, requires that condemnation shall be rendered only after trial, and that the hearing must be* ***a real one, and not a sham or pretense*** (emphasis mine)."

The State of California also holds that the State of California has no duty to bring the Appellant to trial and prove their accusations of mental deficiency or illegal threat. They say this is constitutional because the WIC 8103 grants the accused the right to an appeal of the takings to the Superior Court of California.

Herein, the State of California repeats the argument of the State of Texas in ARMSTRONG v MANZO, 380 U.S. 545 (1965), that whatever deficiency that the accused incurred was remedied by the granting to him of an appeal of the State's Actions afterward. In ARMSTRONG the Court disagreed writing:

> *"Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause, but there can be no doubt that, at a minimum, they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U. S. 306, at 339 U. S. 313.*
>
> *An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385; Priest v. Board of Trustees of Town of Las Vegas, 232 U. S. 604; Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398.'*
>
> *'The hearing subsequently granted to petitioner did not remove the constitutional infirmity, since petitioner was forced to assume burdens of proof which, had he been accorded notice of the adoption proceedings, would have rested upon the moving parties." Pp. 380 U. S. 550-552.*
>
> *'Had the petitioner been given the timely notice which the Constitution requires, the Manzos, as the moving parties, would have had the burden of proving their case as against whatever defenses the petitioner might have interposed. [See Jones v. Willson, Tex.Civ.App., 285 S.W.2d 877; Ex parte Payne, 301 S.W.2d 194].'*
>
> *'The burdens thus placed upon the petitioner were real, not purely theoretical. For "it is plain that where the burden of proof lies may be decisive of the outcome." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 357 U. S. 525. Yet these burdens would not have been imposed upon him had he been given timely notice in accord with the Constitution."* Page 380 U. S. 552

More egregious is the fact that the State of California at this "appeal" is NOT required to prove guilt! The guilt of the accused is assumed to be true, and so, the State need only show, by preponderance of evidence, that the person may not be capable of safely using firearms at that time, not that he is a mental deficient nor that any illegal threat(s) were made. All of the burdens placed upon the State by 18 USC 922(g)(4) and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause are wiped away by the State's Welfare and Institutions Code Section 1800 et al.

With the State of California's refusal to being me to a hearing and bear the burden of the Prosecutor, I am from the start place into the position of the Moving Party, and as such denied the

rights and protections of the Non-moving Party. No service of charges, no Discovery, and no Assistance of Council at the Public's expense.

It has been Repeatedly held by the federal Judiciary as in:

BAER GALLERY, INC v. CITIZEN'S SCHOLARSHIP FUND OF AMERICA 450 F3d 816 (2006):

> *"The Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the* ***nonmoving party*** (emphasis mine), *and afford it all reasonable inferences."*

HARTNAGEL v NORMAN, 953 F2d 394 (1992):

> *"Procedurally the moving party bears the responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which shows a lack of genuine issue."*

Being forced to become the Moving party from the outset, the State has violated my rights as the accused, and stripping me of valuable protections under the law.

The Attorney General further claims that he is a "legal authority" under Title 27 Code of Federal Regulations Part 478, Subpart B "Definitions", Section 478.11. And that his evaluation and final opinion of a report he claims to have received that makes an allegation against me constitutes an "adjudication" of the allegation. Thus, the State argued before the 9th Circuit that I have no Second Amendment rights as I was adjudicated by the Attorney General to be a Mental Deficient under 18 USC 922(g)(4).

The meaning and the essential nature of the "adjudication" requirement of 18 USC 922 (g)(4) have been clearly laid out:

AMERICAN BANK & TRUST CO. v. DALLAS COUNTY, 463 U.S. 855 (1983)

> *"Outpatient treatment may constitute commitment to a mental institution. Specific language requires only commitment to a mental institution not in a mental institution. Thus, a Court ordered outpatient treatment constitutes commitment to a mental institution.*

U.S. v. MIDGETT 198 F3d 143, Certiorari denied 529 U.S. 1028 (1999)

> *"Defendant had been committed to a mental institution within meaning of statute which prohibits possession of firearm by a person previously committed to a mental institution, though confinement was not pursuant to the state's formal civil commitment process.*

Defendant was examined by a competent mental health practitioner who determined he was not competent to stand trial, he was represented by counsel, factual findings were made by a judge who heard evidence, and a conclusion was reached by the judge that defendant suffered from mental illness to such a degree that he was in need of impatient hospital care, and a judicial order was issued committing defendant to a mental institution, where he was actually confined there."

U.S. v GIARDIA, 861 F.2d 1334 (1988)
"The Defendant's involuntary hospitalization, pursuant to physician's and coroner's emergency certificates, did not constitute a "commitment to a mental institution" within the meaning of the statue prohibiting such persons from receiving and possessing firearms; commitment did not occur until the court formally acted."

U.S. v Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120 (1973).
"The finding by the Mental Health Board of the County in Nebraska that the defendant was mentally ill was not an adjudication of mental defectiveness within meaning of subsection (g)(4) of this section prohibiting a person from receiving a firearm after having been adjudicated a mental defective since the term "mental defective" as used in this chapter does not include mental illness.'

'Defendant's hospitalization, pursuant to order of Board of Mental Health of Lancaster County, Nebraska was not a "commitment" within meaning of subsection (g)(4) of this section prohibiting a person from receiving firearm after having been committed to a mental institution, where under Nebraska law an individual may be committed to a hospital if superintendent of state mental hospital determines that the individual is mentally ill and then certifies such determination to the County Board of Mental Health, and there was no evidence that the superintendent had determined that the defendant was mentally ill or had conveyed any certification to the Board."

U.S. v BUFFALOE, 449 F2d 779 (1977)
"Where defendant had been tried in state court for maiming, found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to the state hospital as criminally insane person. The defendant had been adjudicated and committed within the section which prohibits sale of firearms to a person who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to any mental institution."

U.S. v Vertz, 102 F.Supp.2d 787, aff. 40 Fed Appx 69 (2002)
"Finding by a State Judge that defendant was a person requiring treatment because he was mentally ill was not an adjudication of mental defectiveness within meaning of statute absent a finding that the defendant was a danger to himself or to others, or that he lacked mental capacity to contract or manage his own affairs.

It is clear from these and other cases that some form of legal hearing must take place at which:

The accused and his counsel stand before an impartial "judge, board, commission or other lawful authority" and defends the accused from the claims of the State. While the State is made to bear the burden to prove guilt, if the State wishes its actions to possess finality.

In this case, I have never been accorded the right to defend myself in an original proceeding, neither before the taking nor as soon as practicable after the taking.

My only recourse is to file an appeal of the taking by the State wherein I am the Moving Party. Wherein I do not have the right to a Public Defender, and I bear the presumption of guilt!

My guilt of the accusation during the appeal is presumed by the court to be true. No burden to prove the allegations against me is placed upon the State. I am guilty because the Attorney General says I am!

Federal Law clearly mandates that a person is innocent until proven guilty to the legal requirement. That I be "adjudicated" to be a mental defective in a hearing at which the State takes up the Prosecutorial Burden before an impartial Hearing Officer appropriate to the charge. It does NOT allow the Attorney General to act as both Prosecutor and Hearing Officer, and to do so without any hearing and opportunity for the Defendant to be heard, or receive the aid of counsel at the public's expense.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The court should grant Certiorari because this case is about this court's very meaning and survival.

The actions of the State of California and of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals herein constitute treason! Their refusals to obey the rulings of this court constitutes an attempt to create a sub government within the United States wherein our Constitutional protections no longer exist, and this Court has no power to protect us from the State's power to destroy.

They are trying to create States wherein the States may bar citizens from having a federal judge settle an issue of Constitutional importance. States wherein the States are no longer bothered by having to provide defendants with notice of charges, discovery, public jury trials, cross-examination, and Public Defenders. And mostly importantly, a place where the State's Officers are never bothered by our uppity Supreme Court of the United States!

This ruling by the State and the Ninth Circuit is a declaration of war against the Constitution of our Nation. Both the State and the Nineth Circuit know it is nearly impossible for a Pro Se to get a Writ accepted by the court. So, they rule whatever they wish to however egregious.

There is no reasonable debate among legal scholars of the meaning and protections granted by the Civil Rights Act of 1871 [42 USC 1983], or of the Fourteenth's Due Process clause, nor of what constitutes an adjudication under 18 USC 922(g)(4).

This Court, just over a year ago in KNICK v TOWNSHIP OF SCOTT, PENNSYLVANIA held that State mandates that federal questions be settle first in State Courts are unconstitutional. Yet here is the Ninth Circuit refusing to obey a ruling of this court in which the ink has barely dried. If this court allows the Ninth Circuit to get away with this insolence, it will spread to the other

circuits, who are well aware of the limited docket of this court. These legal issues are settled questions of law, settled by this court!

"*Whether a person is a prohibited person under 922(g)(4) is a question of federal law*"

NLRB v NATURAL GAS UTIL. DIST., 402 U.S. 600 (1971)), but not according to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the State of California. That question, they hold, is a question for the Attorney General of California, and to hell with the Supreme Court of the United States.

Also, take note, this is not the first attack upon the Second Amendment's existence by the Ninth Circuit. A year past in YOUNG v HAWIAII, the Ninth ruled that citizens have no right to bear arms openly. Years earlier the Nineth held that citizens have no right to bear arms concealed, thus completely eliminating the right to bear arms from the Constitution and this Court's ruling in MACDONALD. This only leaves citizens with the choice of carrying their arms locked and or disassembled in a locked case, as mandated by California law. This mandate, however, was declared unconstitutional by the court in DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v HELLER in 2008. Such laws reduced the firearm to a state of non-use barring its use for the core purpose of self-defense.

Unconstitutional laws, and unconstitutional rulings by a rouge State, and a Rouge Ninth Circuit Court. Who will stop them?

CONCLUSION

Respectively submitted,

Signed:  August 6, 2021

William A. Masters, II