In The Supreme Court of the United States

303 CREATIVE LLC, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

AUBREY ELENIS, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Tenth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE NATIONAL
RELIGIOUS BROADCASTERS, AMERICAN FAMILY
ASSOCIATION, THE BRINER INSTITUTE,
CHRISTIAN PROFESSIONAL PHOTOGRAPHERS,
THE WALK TV, AND TURNING POINT USA
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE¹

Amici are a group of organizations dedicated to the creation, curation, and promotion of speech that encourages traditional, conservative values—and these groups depend on editorial discretion in offering consistent messages about those topics. In the market-place of ideas, such a voice is invaluable. And this speech—made across a wide range of media, from television to radio to Internet to newspapers—relies on the First Amendment and its robust protections for differing viewpoints.

Amici currently have the editorial freedom to engage in speech that helps ensure that debate on public issues retains a diversity of opinions. But Colorado's interpretation of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), C.R.S. § 24-34-601(2)(a), has created a censorship tool that goes far beyond just the local baker, artist, or service provider. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit's logic in upholding Colorado's speech restrictions cuts across mediums and thus threatens the variety of viewpoints offered by amici. At the heart of the freedom of speech, safeguarded jealously under this Court's precedent, is the commitment to protect different and diverse ideas. Amici's interest lies in the continued ability to offer a different perspective on a wide

¹ Rule 37 statement: All parties were timely notified and consented to the filing of this brief. No part of this brief was authored by any party's counsel, and no person or entity other than *amici* funded its preparation or submission.

range of issues that the Tenth Circuit's undermining of the First Amendment threatens.

Amicus National Religious Broadcasters (NRB) is a non-profit, membership association that represents the interests of Christian broadcasters throughout the Most of its approximately eleven-hundred member organizations are made up of radio stations, radio networks, television stations, television networks, and the executives, principals, and production and creative staff of those broadcast entities. NRB member broadcasters are both commercial and noncommercial entities. Since 1944, the mission of NRB has been to help protect and defend the rights of Christian media, and to ensure that the channels of electronic communication stay open and accessible for Christian broadcasters to proclaim the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Additionally, NRB seeks to effectively minister to the spiritual welfare of the United States of America through the speech it advances to the public.

Amicus American Family Association, Inc. (AFA) is a non-profit, faith-based organization devoted to developing and fostering a biblical worldview through radio programming. Its mission since 1977 has been to inform, equip, and activate people to transform American culture and to give aid to the church in its call to execute the Great Commission. Through its broadcast division, AFA airs its programming to roughly 180 radio stations in over 30 states across the country each week.

Amicus The Briner Institute, Inc. (TBI) is a network of like-minded individuals dedicated to improving culture through media and entertainment. TBI is named in honor of author Bob Briner, whose vision was for people to live their lives attempting to do good and provide a positive influence on society. TBI provides financial support for gatherings and talent development efforts through grants and donations, spotlighting people, projects, initiatives, and ventures of "salt-and-light-inspired" people. TBI hosts events that are focused on bringing together the best and the brightest minds in entertainment, media, and technology to develop new strategies for achieving its mission of cultural engagement and influence.

Amicus Christian Professional Photographers (CPP) is an organization devoted to encouraging and training professional photographers who are committed to the Christian faith. CPP connects photographers across the country through conferences and assists those professionals in obtaining excellence in their field.

Amicus The Walk TV is a Christian specialty television network. The network consists primarily of 263 individual low-powered television stations across the United States, and is available on satellite and Roku media receivers as well. The network's purpose is to provide programming that helps people appreciate the Judeo-Christian legacy in America. The Walk's programming includes religious shows, family movies, offnetwork syndicated public domain shows, and some Christian music programs.

Amicus Turning Point USA (TPUSA) is a nonprofit organization that seeks to identify, educate, train, and organize students to promote the principles of freedom, free markets, and limited government. Since its founding, TPUSA has built the most organized, active, and powerful conservative grassroots activist network on high school and college campuses across the country. With a presence on over 2500 campuses in all 50 states, and a network of approximately 400,000 student activists, TPUSA is the largest and fastest-growing youth organization in America. Given its mission to promote America's founding principles on high school and college campuses, TPUSA understands how vital it is that the Constitutional right to free speech is protected nationwide, on every school campus, and for every student.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Constitution guards individual rights in furtherance of "a tolerant citizenry." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992). But such tolerance in "a pluralistic society *** presupposes some mutuality of obligation." Id. at 590–91. That mutuality of obligation was recently emphasized in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). While Obergefell held that the Constitution does not allow government to prohibit same-sex marriage, it also explained that the First Amendment rights of individuals who disagree must be "given proper protection" by government. Id. at 679.

Lorie Smith and her company, 303 Creative LLC, must now choose between her art and her conscience because she has a view on marriage that Colorado will not abide being promoted. This is not the "proper protection" Obergefell promised. And whether one agrees with 303 Creative's position or not is irrelevant—the First Amendment protects diverse and conflicting voices in the marketplace of ideas, especially on a public matter. Essential to American self-government is preventing the coercive power of the state from foreclosing debate; the solution to speech with which one disagrees is not to silence the speaker but to offer alternative views. It is only the organic result of competing ideas that may form the basis for legitimate government. Colorado's agreement with Petitioners' speech is thus irrelevant—it is protected by the First Amendment and must be allowed.

But Colorado doesn't just stop there. Under the panel opinion below, the Tenth Circuit allows for government censure of disfavored speech and the compulsion of other speech (if the speaker is going to participate in the marketplace at all). Consequently, the panel dissent noted that the scope of the majority's ruling is staggering and, "[t]aken to its logical end, the government could regulate the messages communicated by all artists, forcing them to promote messages approved by the government in the name of 'ensuring access to the commercial marketplace.'" Dissent at 30 (quoting majority opn. at 27). And what is true of artists is also true of speech "editors" such as television studios, newspaper printers, or event organizers that

work to ensure consistent messages from their organizations. Taken to its logical conclusion, the Tenth Circuit's opinion allows for government control in those areas as well. Such state-sponsored censorship has already been rejected on multiple occasions by this Court, however, and should be rejected here as well.

The petition should be granted.

ARGUMENT

The First Amendment protects a diversity of viewpoints across all manner of media—everything from art to broadcast productions to website design. This diversity of speech is a necessary element of the marketplace of ideas that shapes society; and that speech, in turn, is "the essence of self-government." Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985). At present, though, the overreach of Colorado's anti-discrimination statute (at least as interpreted by the Tenth Circuit) threatens "the free and robust debate of public issues." Ibid. By chilling both artists and groups that promote speech through various media outlets, the state law destabilizes the marketplace of ideas, cheapens the remaining speech, and undermines self-government. As applied, CADA thus ensures that "debate on public issues [will not] be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," and it is unconstitutional. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).

I. The First Amendment Protects Various Types Of Speech—Including Editorial Discretion—Across A Wide Range Of Media.

This Court has traditionally recognized free speech protections for the messages of speakers across a range of platforms and media. And the First Amendment's protections even apply to expression that may not be literal speech. See *Ward* v. *Rock Against Racism*, 491 U.S. 781, 790–91 (1989) (recognizing that the First Amendment's protections apply to regulations of music). Art in its various forms is "unquestionably shielded"—whether it is nonsensical poetry (Lewis Carroll's Jaberwocky), uncomfortable instrumentals (Arnold Schönberg's atonal musical compositions), or incomprehensible paintings (Jackson Pollack's modern art). *Hurley* v. *Irish-American Gay*, *Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston*, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).

The First Amendment applies equally to speech editors who serve as gatekeepers for groups or publications that want to ensure fidelity to certain messages. *Hurley*, 515 U.S. at 570–74 (noting that the First Amendment does not "require a speaker to generate, as an original matter, each item featured in the communication" and that editorial discretion is "enjoyed by business corporations generally and by ordinary people engaged in unsophisticated expressions as well as by professional publishers"). After all, editing or producing is a "speech activity" entitled to First Amendment protections. *Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n* v. *Forbes*, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998). In fact, it is "no less communication than is creating the speech in the

first place." *Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.* v. *FCC*, 512 U.S. 622, 675 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In exercising editorial discretion, the party engages in expressive conduct by determining which message is "worthy of presentation." *Hurley*, 515 U.S. at 575.

A group sponsoring a publication thus has a vested interest in the message set forth by their particular publication. That interest includes not having the general public confuse the publisher's message with any other messages an outsider may seek to disseminate through the publication. See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (2019) ("[W]hen a private entity provides a forum for speech * * * [t]he private entity may * * * exercise editorial discretion over the speech and speakers in the forum."). That is why this Court has explained that newspapers are "more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising," but have First Amendment rights related to their editorial decisions. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). That is also why parade organizers cannot be forced—under the guise of a public accommodation law—"to modify the content of their expression to whatever extent beneficiaries of the law choose to alter it with messages of their own." Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572. Free speech protection is not forfeited through profit motives, either, as editors do not lose their First Amendment rights even when they are paid to convey information for third parties. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266.

Therefore, if the government seeks to compel a newspaper to publish material to which the newspaper objects, this interferes with the newspaper's editorial function and is a free speech violation. *Tornillo*, 418 U.S. at 258. Because editing involves "interpretation and * * * selection," there is a risk of "editorial suppression" by the government; the state cannot "force abstention from discrimination in the news without dictating selection." *Id.* at 258 n.24 (quoting 2 Z. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 633 (1947)). And so the state cannot compel a newspaper "to publish that which reason tells them should not be published." *Id.* at 256.²

² Newspapers retain editorial discretion even when accused of violating anti-discrimination laws. See Groswirt v. Columbus Dispatch, 238 F.3d 421, 2000 WL 1871696, at *2 (6th Cir. 2000) (invoking "free press right" in context of discrimination claim); Johari v. Ohio State Lantern, 76 F.3d 379, 1996 WL 33230, at *1 (6th Cir. 1996) (invoking First Amendment in context of equal protection claims); Melvin v. U.S.A. Today, No. 3:14-cv-00439, 2015 WL 251590, at *9 (E.D. Va. Jan. 20, 2015) (explaining that selective news coverage, which was allegedly discriminatory, "lies at the heart of editorial discretion protected by the First Amendment"); Rose v. Morning Call, Inc., No. 96-2973, 1997 WL 158397, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 1997) (invoking Tornillo in context of discrimination claims and declining to issue injunction forcing newspaper to run advertisement); Treanor v. Wash. Post Co., 826 F. Supp. 568, 569 (D.D.C. 1993) (explaining that applying public accommodations requirements to newspapers "would likely be inconsistent with the First Amendment"); cf. Sinn v. Daily Nebraskan, 638 F. Supp. 143, 146, 152 (D. Neb. 1986) (finding no constitutional right to have housing ad printed that included plaintiffs' sexual orientation because it would usurp newspaper's editorial discretion).

These same editorial freedoms are available in other forms of media as well—television stations, radio show producers, photography editing companies, and Internet designers all engage in protected speech in determining what their company produces. After all, "whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, 'the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary' when a new and different medium for communication appears." Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011). To be sure, there are some restrictions on editorial content—for instance, there is no First Amendment protection "when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity." Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Hum. Rels., 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973). Publishers may also be subject to liability for distributing unprotected speech such as libel. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80. Neither case is applicable here. When dealing with protected speech regarding a topic of public debate, media producers "exercise substantial editorial discretion in the selection and presentation of their programming." Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673. This allows broadcasters to be afforded the "widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public obligations." Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 119 (1973).

Editorial discretion thus serves as both a form of speech and a protection against the message of the speaker—the group or publication—being misconstrued by outsiders. This is why the state cannot force citizens to "host or accommodate another speaker's message." Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 63 (2006). Otherwise, "[p]rivate property owners and private lessees would face the unappetizing choice of allowing all comers or closing the platform altogether." Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1931. And so a Catholic television station, for example, cannot be forced to host a commercial promoting abortion. Like the organizer of a parade or a newspaper publisher, the owner of that station is ultimately responsible for (and inevitably tied to) the speech produced in her studio. Consequently, the owner must be allowed to have a say in the content of what appears on the station because the freedom of speech "necessarily compris[es] the decision of both what to say and what not to say." Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988).

II. The Failure To Protect Diverse Speech Short-Circuits The Exchange Of Ideas Essential To A Free Society.

The First Amendment reflects a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen." *Sullivan*, 376 U.S. at 270. Government that is representative of a free people demands no less. *Janus* v. *AFSCME*, *Council 31*, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 (2018) ("Free speech * * * is essential to our democratic form of government * * * Whenever the Federal

Government or a State prevents individuals from saying what they think on important matters or compels them to voice ideas with which they disagree, it undermines those ends."). Thus an individual's right to speak on public matters "is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." *Dun & Bradstreet*, 472 U.S. at 759.

Free speech—necessary to a free people—protects society through diverse speech creating competition amongst ideas and preventing blind spots that develop when operating in an echo chamber. In fact, the Constitution provides freedom of expression "in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and * * * in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests." *Cohen v. California*, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). That is why the very purpose of the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause—and among its highest uses—is allowing opposing sides of a debate to express themselves without censorship. See *Roth v. United States*, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).

As this Court has held, "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." *Texas* v. *Johnson*, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). That is especially critical in the debate in question in this case—a topic over which this Court has recognized that people of "good faith" are divided. *Obergefell*, 576 U.S. at 657. Indeed, *Obergefell*

explicitly mentioned that the First Amendment rights of individuals who disagree with same-sex marriage must be "given proper protection" by government. *Id.* at 679. Government intrusion only short-circuits that process and undermines the legitimacy of the viewpoint that gains predominance.

Recent protests in Hong Kong highlight what happens when government silences unpopular viewpoints. America is different, though. We err on the side of allowing more speech, not less, in order to ensure the exchange of ideas crucial to our society. This includes actions such as protesting against war by wearing black armbands to school, *Tinker* v. *Des Moines Indep*. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969), or the draft by wearing clothing with vulgar words, Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26. We even allow the burning of our nation's flag as a form of symbolic speech against some aspect of the government with which one does not agree. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414. A diversity of viewpoints is encouraged as we believe that "each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence." Agency for Int'l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 213 (2013) (quoting *Turner*, 512 U.S. at 641). Our commitment to the free exchange of ideas must continue to be upheld here.

III. Censorship Of The Protected Speech At Issue In This Case Undermines Editorial Freedom For *Amici* And Other Speech Outlets That Contribute To Public Debate.

The Tenth Circuit's damage to First Amendment principles not only strips 303 Creative of its rights, it also attacks *amici*'s speech and opens the door for wideranging censorship in other areas. Indeed, because all speakers are unique, the Tenth Circuit's logic ensures that any speaker may be banned in Colorado for failing to promote the state-sponsored view. Dissent at 30 (quoting majority opn. at 27). For example, following the panel's conclusion to its logical end, a Christian television station that appeals to a certain demographic in Colorado Springs could be forced—under the CADA—to run an advertising campaign out of Denver promoting any number of things with which it disagrees: all because it has a unique voice in the marketplace. The editorial freedom of speakers (such as amici) that currently adds to the public debate will be peeled away as heterodoxy is enforced. Consequently, the national debate on controversial topics will be impoverished as dissent on matters of public life becomes forbidden.

Such a result is wrong, though, because it allows the state to "alter the expressive content" of the message at stake. *Hurley*, 515 U.S. at 572–73; see also *Halleck*, 139 S. Ct. at 1931 (rejecting the claim that government may force business owners to face the "unappetizing choice of allowing all comers or closing the [business] altogether"). 303 Creative is entitled to full

First Amendment protections when offering its view on traditional marriage, even—or especially—if that view is unpopular in Colorado. After all, "[i]t is firmly settled that * * * the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers." Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969). And "[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." W. Va. State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).

But under Colorado law, the company must affirm same-sex marriage if it is to say anything in support of traditional marriage. CADA thus puts artists and editors to an unconstitutional choice: publish content that goes against the speaker's beliefs or remove content in that area all together. See Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1931. The effect, of course, is a ban on the company's speech since it does not wish to give equal time to both of those viewpoints. Yet Colorado need not "burn[] the house to roast a pig." *Reno* v. *ACLU*, 521 U.S. 844, 882 (1997). And the First Amendment will not allow it anyway. As a private entity, 303 Creative has the right to choose between messages, and this Court has upheld that a government actor may not censor that choice through speech compulsion. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258. Therefore, it is unconstitutional for Colorado to violate the company's conscience by making it promote same-sex marriage in violation of its conscience or leave the field altogether.

This is confirmed by the fact that 303 Creative's Internet-based platform ensures that it enjoys the same freedoms that a newspaper, magazine, or book publisher would have. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870; see also U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 855 F.3d 381, 427 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("[F]oundational First Amendment principles apply to editors and speakers in the modern communications marketplace in much the same way that the principles apply to the newspapers, magazines, pamphleteers, publishers, bookstores, and newsstands traditionally protected by the First Amendment."). Because it is undisputed that a newspaper could not be forced to surrender its editorial discretion to the state's prerogative, *Tornillo*, 418 U.S. at 258, Petitioners may not be made to do so either.

When speech that is so obviously protected is allowed to be censored, it threatens other speakers (such as *amici*) that participate in the public debate on controversial issues; it also chills any speech that challenges common viewpoints in the public square. These concerns are particularly relevant to publishers and speakers who purposefully encourage "counter-cultural" speech in an effort to restore traditional, conservative principles to public life. This means *amici*'s speech will necessarily be a dissenting voice in some segments of the populace. Absent this Court's intervention, however, Colorado will continue to threaten First Amendment rights across a wide range of mediums. There is no warrant for such undermining of the

public debate and the Tenth Circuit's opinion should be reversed.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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