No. __-____

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

MATTHEW NIX,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a new trial is warranted pursuant to this Court's decision in *McDonough Power Equipment, Inc.* v. *Greenwood*, 464 U.S. 548 (1984), only upon circumstances evidencing intentional juror dishonesty for the purpose of securing a seat on the jury, or, alternatively, whether a new trial is warranted even upon a showing of intentional dishonesty for an alternative purpose or inadvertent juror dishonesty.
2. Whether *McDonough* requires a showing of actual juror bias before a new trial may be granted, or, alternatively, whether a showing of implied or inferred juror bias is sufficient to demonstrate a valid basis for a challenge for cause to warrant a new trial.
3. Whether attempted robbery under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, qualifies as a "crime of violence," meaning that it "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another" when analyzed under the "categorical" or "elements" analytic.

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Defendant/Petitioner Matthew Nix, AKA Meech, AKA Mack AKA Mackey respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Second Circuit's opinion (*United States* v. *McCoy*, No. 17-3515 (2d Cir. 2021) (Docket Nos. 17-3515(L), 17-3516, 18-619, 18-625)) is unpublished and reproduced in the appendix (App. 78a-149a). The district court's judgment is published at *United States* v. *Nix*, 275 F. Supp. 3d 420, 438 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) and is reproduced in the appendix (App. 1a-77a).

JURISDICTION

The Second Circuit entered its decision on April 22, 2021 and is timely pursuant to this Court's Thursday, March 19, 2020 Miscellaneous Order (Order List U.S. 589) which is reproduced in the appendix (App. 150a-151a). This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Relevant provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 1951 are reproduced in the appendix (App. 152a-170a).

INTRODUCTION

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant's right to "an impartial jury." The requirement that a jury's verdict "must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial," rather than bias, goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional impetus of trial by jury. *United States* v. *Titsworth*, 422 F. Supp. 587 (D. Neb. 1976). Where a potential juror intentionally fails to disclose implicit biases, or in fact conceals such inequity, a manifest interference with the fundamental animus of the impartial predicate of our jury and judicial system is extant.

In *McDonough Power Equipment, Inc.* v. *Greenwood,* 464 U.S. 548 (1984), this Court espoused a two (2) part test to determine whether a juror's false statements during *voir dire* implicates his impartiality and necessitates a mistrial. The Court held that "to obtain a new trial in such a situation, a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on *voir dire,* and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause." *Id.* at 556.

However, the application of the *McDonough* test has been the subject of much confusion amongst the courts, resulting in a Circuit split encompassing several divergent standards. The lack of clear guidance as to the *McDonough* standard has resulted in its misapplication by numerous courts,

including the Second Circuit in the instant matter. The Court should Grant Certiorari in this matter to: (1) resolve the extant Circuit split and provide clear guidance on *McDonough's* application; and (2) reverse the Second Circuit's ruling in this matter, which incorrectly denied Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial trial.

As to the Hobbs Act, there remains a plurality in the Circuits as to whether attempted Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a "crime of violence" with the majority of the Circuits holding in the affirmative, however using an incomplete and flawed analysis of the "categorical" or "elements" approach, while the minority Fourth Circuit, has offered a well-reasoned discord as to the inherent contradictions of the majority analysis.

There is no disagreement among the Circuits as to whether a *completed* Hobbs Act Robbery constitutes a "crime of violence." There exists, however, a paradigmatic conflict among the Circuits as to the archetype of the "categorical" or "elements" analysis necessary to qualify *attempted* Hobbs Act Robbery as a predicate "crime of violence."

This extant discordant dynamic has led to, and will continue to lead to, uncertainty among the District Courts and the Circuits, and additionally leads to disunity in sentencing. Perspicacious analysis has augmented the jurisprudence of both the majority and minority approaches, however the results are both diametrically opposed and irreconcilable.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was charged with Hobbs Act conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); use of a firearm in furtherance and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); narcotics conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i); Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a); use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).

Petitioner was tried by a jury in the Western District of New York ("District Court") and convicted of: Hobbs Act conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); Hobbs Act robbery and attempted robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2; brandishing firearms during and in relation to crimes of violence, to wit, the Hobbs Act conspiracy, Hobbs Act robbery, and Hobbs Act attempted robbery counts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(C)(i) and 2; conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute marijuana and heroin, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(D); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(C)(i). *United States* v. *McCoy*, Docket No. 17-3515(L)

(2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2021) *2. App. 78a-79a. Petitioner was sentenced to 1,860 months, or 155 years, incarceration. App. 79a.

Following the trial, it was discovered that Juror No. 3 provided false statements during *voir dire* in several respects. *United States* v. *Nix*, 275 F. Supp. 3d 420, 424-428 (W.D.N.Y. 2017). App. 4a-12a. A hearing was conducted, after which the District Court ruled that Juror No. 3 lied to the court with respect to his status as a felon, his contacts with the police, his prior jury service, his status as a defendant, his participation in a burglary and his being the victim of a burglary. App. 12a-27a. Indeed, Juror No. 3 bordered upon the opaque, if not the perjurious. The District Court held that Juror No. 3's conduct was intentional and that, despite being offered immunity from non-perjurious testimony, App. 12-a, 61a, at a subsequent evidentiary hearing, Juror No. 3 continued to lie until exposed by his own prior confessions. *Nix*, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 429. App. 16a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

A. Courts are Divided over *McDonough's* Application.

The Circuit courts are split in their application of *McDonough*. As to *McDonough*'s first prong, the First, Fourth and Sixth Circuits hold that a new trial may be granted even where a juror's dishonesty was inadvertent. *See United States* v. *Solorio*,

337 F.3d 580, 596 n.12 (6th Cir. 2003), *cert. denied*, 540 U.S. 1063 (2003); *Jones* v. *Cooper*, 311 F.3d 306, 310 (4th Cir. 2002), *cert. denied*, 539 U.S. 980 (2003); *Amirault* v. *Fair*, 968 F.2d 1404, 1405-1406 (1st Cir. 1992), *cert. denied*, 506 U.S. 1000 (1992).

Conversely, the Eighth, Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits hold that a new trial is only warranted where a juror's false statements were made intentionally. *See United States* v. *Hawkins*, 796 F.3d 843, 863-64 (8th Cir. 2015), *cert. denied*, 136 S. Ct. 2030 (2016); *United States* v. *Carpa*, 271 F.3d 962, 967 (11th Cir. 2001), *cert. denied*, 537 U.S. 889 (2002); *United States* v. *White*, 116 F.3d 903, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1997), *cert. denied*, 522 U.S. 960 (1997).

Further, as was the case in the instant matter, the Second Circuit adds a more stringent requirement that the juror's dishonesty must have been motivated by a desire to sit on the jury. *See McCoy*, Docket No. 17-3515(L) *42. App. 115a-116a.

As to *McDonough*'s second prong, the First and Second Circuits hold that a valid basis for a challenge for cause exists where a reasonable judge would have dismissed the juror once made aware of the information the juror failed to disclose and the reason for the underhanded behavior, even where disqualification would not have been mandatory but bias can be inferred. *United States* v. *Parse,* 789 F.3d 83, 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2015) (challenges for cause are valid even if juror disqualifications are not mandatory); *Sampson* v. *United States,* 724 F.3d 150, 165-166 (1st Cir. 2013). Specifically, the

important factors are whether counsel has a valid basis for cause, not whether the court would have acted.

The Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that a valid basis for a challenge for cause exists where disqualification would have been mandatory because of actual or implied bias. *See United States* v. *Claxton*, 766 F.3d 280, 301 (3d Cir. 2014) (affirming a denial for a motion for a new trial when actual or implied bias was established); *Johnson* v. *Luoma*, 425 F.3d 318, 326 (6th Cir. 2005) (a juror is subject to a valid challenge for cause based on actual bias in limited circumstances); *Carpa*, 271 F.3d at 967 (*McDonough* requires "a showing of bias that would disqualify the juror," namely, an "express admission" of bias or circumstances under which "bias must be presumed").

The Fourth and Eighth Circuits hold that a valid basis for challenge for cause exists where disqualification would have been mandatory because of bias, and add an additional requirement that the juror's motivation for concealing the material information must have affected the trial's fairness. *See Hawkins*, 796 F.3d at 863-64; *Conaway* v. *Polk*, 453 F.3d 567, 588 (4th Cir. 2006).

The District of Columbia Circuit holds that a valid basis for a challenge for cause exists only where disqualification would have been mandatory because of actual bias. *See United States* v. *North*, 910 F.2d 843, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

As if evident by the disparity amongst the Circuits, the term "a valid basis for challenge for cause" is not clearly defined and has a number of different connotations. The absence of a definite understanding of "a valid basis for challenge for cause" provides an unjustifiable risk of improper sentences.

B. The Second Circuit Misapplied *McDonough* in the Instant Matter.

Petitioner is entitled to a new trial. Juror No. 3's false *voir dire* deprived Petitioner of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury.

i. The Second Circuit Misapplied *McDonough's* First Prong

There is no dispute as to Juror No. 3's dishonesty. Both the district court and the Second Circuit held that Juror No. 3 made numerous false statements during *voir dire*. *See McCoy*, Docket No. 17-3515(L) *32-33. App. 105a-107a. Nor is there any dispute that Juror No. 3 made these false statements intentionally for the purpose of concealing his criminal background from the court. *See id.* Nevertheless, the Second Circuit held that Petitioner failed to satisfy *McDonough*'s first prong because Juror No. 3's "false statements as to his criminal history were not motivated by any desire to serve as a juror in the present case." *Id*. at *32. App. 106a. But no such requirement was espoused in *McDonough*. *McDonough*'s first prong only requires a showing "that a juror failed to answer

honestly a material question on voir dire," which by all accounts Petitioner has demonstrated.

The Second Circuit's heightened standard appears to flow from *McDonough*'s holding that "[t]he motives for concealing information may vary, but only those reasons that affect a juror's impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness of a trial." *McDonough*, 464 U.S. at 556. However, to hold that juror impartiality is only implicated where a juror deliberately attempts to secure a seat on a jury is to ignore the well-established principles of implied and inferred bias. A juror may not believe a perceived bias to be significant or may not even be consciously aware of his bias towards a litigant, yet the bias remains and can subconsciously affect the juror's impartiality. Even actual bias can be present where a juror does not wish to serve on a jury and provides a dishonest answer in *voir dire* either inadvertently or due to an innocuous motive such as embarrassment. Indeed, it is likely the exception rather than the rule to find a biased juror eager to serve on a jury.

Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in *McDonough*, joined by justices Stevens and O'Connor, makes clear that the only relevant inquiry is juror bias, regardless of intentional juror dishonesty or related motive, and that such bias may be actual, implied or inferred. *See McDonough*, 464 U.S. at 556-67 ("I understand the Court's holding not to foreclose the normal avenue of relief available to a party who is asserting that he did not have the benefit of an impartial jury. Thus, regard-

less of whether a juror's answer is honest or dishonest, it remains within a trial court's option, in determining whether a jury was biased, to order a post-trial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to demonstrate actual bias or, in exceptional circumstances, that the facts are such that bias is to be inferred.") (Blackmun, J., concurring, joined by Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.) (citations omitted). Notably, the Blackmun concurrence provided the swing fifth, sixth, and seventh votes to form the *McDonough* majority. *See, e.g.*, *Dyer v. Calderon*, 151 F.3d 970, 985 (9th Cir. 1998).

Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in *McDonough*, joined by justice Marshall, similarly holds that "the proper focus when ruling on a motion for new trial in this situation should be on the bias of the juror and the resulting prejudice to the litigant. . . . Because the bias of a juror will rarely be admitted by the juror himself, 'partly because the juror may have an interest in concealing his own bias and partly because the juror may be unaware of it,' it necessarily must be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances. . . . Whether the juror answered a particular question on voir dire honestly or dishonestly, or whether an inaccurate answer was inadvertent or intentional, are simply factors to be considered in this latter determination of actual bias." (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.) (*quoting*, *Smith* v. *Phillips*, 455 U.S. 209, 221-22 (1982)).

As discussed, *supra*, several other circuits disagree with the Second Circuit's interpretation of

McDonough as providing a motive requirement, holding that a new trial may be granted even upon a finding of inadvertent juror dishonesty. *See, e.g.*, *Solorio*, 337 F.3d at 596 n.12; *Cooper*, 311 F.3d at 310; *Fair*, 968 F.2d at 1405-1406.

Regardless, even assuming, *arguendo*, that *McDonough*'s first prong does require intentional juror dishonesty motivated by a desire to sit on the jury, *McDonough*'s first prong was satisfied here. "When asked whether he had wanted to serve as a juror in this case, Juror No. 3 three times responded 'Yes' (H.Tr. 93, 96)." *McCoy*, Docket No. 17-3515(L) *29. App. 102a. It was an abuse of discretion for the district court and Second Circuit to instead rely upon Juror No. 3's contradictory fourth response, "no," "when later again asked whether he had wanted to serve as a juror in this case . . . ([H. Tr.] 97, 235, 242, 243)." *Id*. App. 102a. This is especially true as Juror No. 3 witnessed how numerous prospective jurors were excused during jury selection for cause, and knew that a truthful response during *voir dire* as to his criminal background could have similarly excused him from serving on the jury.

ii. The Second Circuit Misapplied *McDonough's* Second Prong

The above misapplication is tempered by the disjointed application among the circuits as to the relevant inquiry as to the nature of the bias, and its concomitant impact upon a determination as to juror impartiality. While *McDonough* provides that

(1) the defendant must first demonstrate that the juror failed to answer honestly a material question on *voir dire*; and (2) the defendant then must also demonstrate that "a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause[,]" as aptly observed by the District Court below, "a bright line does not divide the two prongs of the test, and there is some blurring of the factors to be considered under each prong." *Nix*, 275 F. Supp. at 438. App. 38a.

McDonough is cited perennially, however a three-way split amongst the Circuits remains extant in interpreting the blurred line expressed above. The First and Second Circuits hold that the standard is satisfied so long as a reasonable judge, made aware of the withheld information, would have excused the juror for cause, even if disqualification was not mandatory. *Parse*, 789 F.3d at 83; *Sampson*, 724 F.3d at 165-166. The Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have imposed a more stringent standard, opining "a valid basis for a challenge for cause" exists only where disqualification would be mandatory, either because of actual or implied bias. *See Claxton*, 766 F.3d at 301; *Luoma*, 425 F.3d at 326 (6th Cir. 2005); *Carpa*, 271 F.3d at 967. The D.C. Circuit vexatiously holds that only *actual* bias—and not implied bias—can constitute a "valid basis." *See North*, 910 F.2d at 904.

There is a lack of uniformity as to the malleability or inflexibility of the element of bias, indeed, even as to the underlying nature of the bias itself. While it is respectfully submitted that the Second

Circuit below evoked the proper standard, articulating the inquiry as to actual, implied or inferred bias, it ultimately misapplied the self-same standard it evoked. The *cor quaestio* stems from the fractured treatment of bias, weighed upon different scales, throughout the Circuits. Whether the question of bias is likewise perennial to any analysis of juror non-disclosure, as espoused in the First and Second Circuits, or weighed with a butcher's thumb, as in the D.C. Circuit, will necessarily taint the interpretation of bias in each standard and lead to dystopic conclusions and uncertainty.

Herein, the Second Circuit first looked to the elements of actual bias, "the existence of a state of mind that leads to an inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality" *United States* v. *Torres*, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997) ("*Torres*"), *cert. denied,* 523 U.S. 1065 (1998), and found it to be wanting. Continuing its analysis, the Court looked to implied bias, and interpreted the same to "circumstances deal[ing] mainly with jurors who are related to the parties or who were victims of the alleged crime itself." *United States* v. *Greer*, 285 F.3d 158, 172 (2d Cir. 2002). The Courts again found the circumstances below to be likewise wanting, despite the forced admission that Juror No. 3 was, in fact, the victim of a similar burglary. While both Courts below fenced with Juror No. 3's perceived confusion with "robbery" as opposed to "burglary", inscrutably, neither Court was sufficiently confident to apply a bias standard in the face of any scintilla of doubt.

In turning finally to its analysis of inferred bias, the Courts below noted, "[b]ias may be inferred when a juror discloses a fact that *bespeaks a risk* of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to excuse the juror for cause, *but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of bias*." *McCoy*, Docket No. 17-3515(L) *36 (*quoting Nix*, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 453) (emphasis in original). App 109a. However, in applying these risk factors, at least in part due to the disharmony in bias analysis, the Courts below found a risk of partiality, but declined to apply it for reasons discussed, *infra*. In further commenting on how a finding of bias below was "a close one[,]" the District Court went so far as to note, "in the Second Circuit, it is unsettled whether either implied or inferred bias may serve as the basis for a post-trial allegation of jury partiality." *Nix*, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 438. App. 39a.

In its analysis of *McDonough*, the District Court below misinterpreted this Court's sentiment that, "Defendants were 'entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one, for there are no perfect trials[,]'" by reasoning:

> "Juror No. 3 did not destroy the impartiality of the jury in this case. Juror No. 3, a convicted felon who was not qualified to serve, admittedly blundered his way onto the jury —but he did not smuggle his way onto the jury through intentional deceit."

Nix, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 424. App. 4a.

Both the District Court and the Second Circuit implicated *Parse*, 789 F.3d at 83, as the standard bearer with regard to overturning a verdict on the basis of juror nondisclosure. The Court took pains to illustrate that the juror therein "was 'a pathological liar and utterly untrustworthy,' " and described the lies as "breathtaking" and "calculated to prevent the Court and the parties from learning her true identity, which would have prevented her from serving on the jury." *Nix*, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 439. App. 40a-41a. The Second Circuit then abstractly summarized that the District Court found that the "very fact that Juror No. 3 [herein] continued to lie about his criminal history at the evidentiary Hearing, after having been granted immunity for non-perjurious Hearing testimony, indicated he had a persisting motive for refusing to be honest about his criminal past at the Hearing until confronted with documentary evidence. **The court was persuaded that "his motives had nothing to do with securing a seat on this jury**." *McCoy*, Docket No. 17-3515(L) *33 (emphasis added). App. 105a.

The Second Circuit further noted, the court found that "[t]his was plainly not a case of Juror No. 3 wanting to hide information about his past *to make himself more marketable as a juror*" and that, "*[t]here is just no proof that Juror No. 3 intentionally lied to smuggle his way onto the jury*." *Id*. at 34 (emphasis added). App. 107a-108a.

In this regard, the District Court and Second Circuit below have disregarded the flavor, context,

character, and nature of a potential juror's non-disclosure in favor of a myopic and trammeled inquiry of whether the motivation for the lie was solely to serve on a jury. Such inquiry is hyper-specific to the point of nonutilitarian rather than deontological and is in fact contraindicated within the District Court's own decision. *See Nix*, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 438 (*quoting United States* v. *Stewart*, 433 F.3d 273, 303 (2d Cir. 2006)) ("The critical determination is not simply whether the lies in question are deliberate, but rather whether '*the deliberateness of the particular lies evidenced partiality*.'") (emphasis in original). App. 39a.

The Second Circuit concomitantly apprehended the District Court's conclusion, noting, "[b]ias may be inferred when a juror discloses a fact that *bespeaks a risk* of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to excuse the juror for cause, *but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of bias*[,]" *McCoy*, Docket No. 17-3515(L) *36 (emphasis in original), App. 109a, however ultimately misapplied the enunciated standard. It is the risk, and not the purpose, that speaks to the relevant inquiry.

The Courts below have conflated whether *McDonough* requires proof that the withheld information would have provided "a *valid basis* for *a challenge* for cause[,]" *McDonough*, 464 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added), with an inquiry as to whether such inquiry requires proof that a correct response would have resulted in a for-cause dismissal. The analysis is contradictory to both lower Courts'

analysis implicating the character and substance of the deceit *as juxtaposed to its risk of partiality*, not its ultimate impact. The relevant inquiry is whether partiality existed *in potential* rather than in fact.

Were the standard that the Juror dishonesty was motivated solely by a desire to be seated on the jury, the need for inferred bias would be obviated. The Second Circuit, in practical effect, in all but the most pervasively mendacious and hyper-specific circumstances, has fallen back upon the D.C. Circuit standard of actual bias. It is respectfully submitted the Second Circuit's, and many Circuits' to inevitably follow, inherent contradiction and muddled application stems from the dearth of guidance as to the appropriate treatment of bias.

The dichotomy is pervasive. Herein, for example, the court found that Juror No. 3 continued to lie about his criminal history at the evidentiary Hearing after having been granted immunity for non-perjurious Hearing testimony, until such time as he was presented with documentary evidence exposing his lies. Juror No. 3's concealment was, in fact, perjurious testimony. In applying *Parce*, *supra*, the District Court looked to the nature of the dishonesty as "a mission apparently 'so powerful as to cause the juror to commit a serious crime' –it 'reflect[s] an impermissible partiality on the juror's part.'" *Nix*, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 440. App. 42a. Juror No. 3 below committed the exact same crime reflective of impermissible partiality. There is no utility in parsing the definition as to whether

the juror was motivated to commit a crime to obtain a seat on the jury or otherwise. The correct analysis is whether the commission of the crime, "*bespeaks a risk* of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to excuse the juror for cause." App. 109a.

Sworn Juror No. 3's implied bias prevented the Petitioner from being tried by an unbiased jury. Petitioner's appeal was denied despite it being clear that the Petitioner's rights were usurped. Juror No. 3's dishonesty and flavor of deceitfulness enhances the bias finding. The Judge in the matter in fact made a finding of fact as to Juror No. 3's dishonesty.

There were a number of instances where Juror No. 3 was intentionally misleading. Prior to *voir dire*, the court mailed a questionnaire to all prospective jurors. Question 6 specifically asked "Have you ever been convicted, either by your guilty or nolo contendere plea or by a court or jury trial, of a state or federal crime for which punishment could have been more than one year in prison?" Juror No. 3 answered this question by checking "No." *Nix*, 275 F. Supp.3d at 425 n.4., 445. App. 4a-5a, 55a-56a.

Additionally, during the oral *voir dire*, while under oath, Juror No. 3 failed to provide accurate responses to the following material questions:

> (1) "Has anyone ever been the victim of a home robbery?";
>
> (2) "Has anyone ever served on a jury before?";

> (3) "Has anyone ever been a defendant in a criminal case?";
>
> (4) "Has anyone ever visited a jail or correctional facility other than in connection with . . . your educational curriculum";
>
> (5) "Has anyone had anyone close to them, other than what we already discussed, . . . anyone close to them convicted of a crime?"

Nix, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 426. App. 7a-8a.

Juror No. 3 failed to respond truthfully to any of the above questions, *id*. at 425-26, App. 8a, or respond to the Court's question when asked whether there was "anything in fairness to both sides that you think we should know that we haven't covered already" or "[i]s there anything that you think we should know that we haven't covered up to this point?" *Id*.

The Court went on to note that where such concealment is in furtherance of a scheme to smuggle oneself onto a jury, that, "[c]ertainly when possible non-objectivity is secreted and compounded by the deliberate untruthfulness of a potential juror's answer on *voir dire*, the result is deprivation of the defendant's rights to a fair trial." *Nix*, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 440. App. 42a. Where the juror has deliberately concealed information, "bias" is to be "presume[d]." *Id*. Whether the prospective juror lies to obtain a seat on the jury, as an anarchist, or simply a pathological liar speaks to risk. The question of whether a potential juror would lie while under oath and subject to penalties of perjury sufficiently

establishes the risk of impartiality as to nullify any inquiry as to that juror's intentions. Some jurors may lie to obtain a seat on a jury because they have previously been otherwise disqualified. Some may do so because they wish to sway the jury determination. Some may do so because they cannot help it. The critical inquiry speaks to the *actus reus* rather than the *mens rea*.

In approaching this analysis, there is no utility is seeking guidance from the other Circuits as uniform guidance is not to be had. Whether the above is obviated by a requisite showing of actual bias, or alternatively punctuated by a determination of inferred bias, is an open question that is likely to continue to occupy the dockets of Courts throughout the country. While, as would be otherwise required, such Courts will look to their own Circuits, they may nonetheless be vexed as to whether the standard applied is the standard that will ultimately remain. The gravity of the risk of taint as applied to an impartial jury potentially leading to a death sentence, lifetime incarceration, or otherwise begs the Court's attention and clarification.

C. Attempted robbery under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, does not qualify as a "crime of violence," meaning that it does not "ha[ve] as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another" when analyzed under the "categorical" or "elements" analytic.

There remains a plurality in the Circuits as to whether attempted Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a "crime of violence" with the majority of the Circuits holding in the affirmative using the "categorical" or "elements" approach, while the minority Fourth Circuit, has offered a well-reasoned discord as to the inherent contradictions of the majority analysis.

The dichotomy of focus among the Circuits as to the compelling elements of attempted Hobbs Act robbery and its subcomponents has led to diluted results and hybrid analysis, which, as discussed *infra*, colored the opinion of the Second Circuit Court below. The Second Circuit went so far as to acknowledge and reject the minority analysis, yet did not discount adopting its rationale should further examples of the practical impact of the majority flaw come to bear. Rejecting the minority argument and citing a proclivity of imagination on behalf of Defendants below, rather than practical reality, the Second Circuit opined:

> "*McCoy* and *Nix* next argue that Hobbs Act attempted robbery does not categorically

constitute a crime of violence because substantive Hobbs Act robbery need not always involve the actual use of force; rather, the statute defines 'robbery' as 'the unlawful taking . . . of personal property . . . by means of actual *or threatened* force.' 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1) (emphasis added). Based on this definition of 'robbery,' as the Fourth Circuit recently observed, Hobbs Act attempted robbery could also theoretically include 'attempt[s] to *threaten* force,' which would appear not to constitute an 'attempt to *use* force' as required by § 924(c)(3)(A). *Taylor*, 979 F.3d 7 at 209 (emphases in original).

However, even though it is theoretically possible that a defendant could be charged with Hobbs Act attempted robbery under such an attempt-to-threaten theory, we have made clear that "to show a predicate conviction is not a crime of violence 'requires more than the application of legal imagination to [the] . . . statute's language' "; rather "there must be 'a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,' that the statute at issue could be applied to conduct that does not constitute a crime of violence." *Hill*, 890 F.3d at 56 (quoting *Gonzales* v. *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). To show such a 'realistic probability,' a defendant " 'must at least point to his own case or other cases in which the . . . courts did in fact apply the statute in the . . . manner for which he argues.' " *Hill*,

> 890 F.3d at 56 (quoting *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. 18 at 193)
>
> [. . .]
>
> [W]e hold that Hobbs Act attempted robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c) because an attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery using force necessarily involves the 'attempted use . . . of force' under § 924(c)(3)(A), and because, even though a conviction for an inchoate attempt to threaten is theoretically possible, *McCoy* and *Nix* have not shown that there is a 'realistic probability' that the statute will be applied in such a manner, *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 193."

McCoy, No. 17-3515 at *56-58. App. 127a-130a.

The Second Circuit's analysis does not resolve the dilemma within its own jurisdiction, nor does it adequately address the minority opinion in a manner reflective of a preclusive resolution of the dichotomy of analysis. The Second Circuit's analysis ultimately conflates intent with attempt by holding that an attempt to commit a crime is treated as an attempt to commit every element of that crime. It is respectfully submitted that for purposes of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, one can *intend* to use force without ever actually *attempting* to use force, yet only the latter comes within the definition of "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A). In that regard, attempted Hobbs Act Robbery is not a crime of violence and therefore not a valid predi-

cate offense because a Hobbs Act Robbery does not categorically require the use or threat of violence.

The above is in accord with the treatment of *United States* v. *Davis*, — U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (ruling that § 924(c)(3)(B) was unconstitutionally vague in defining crime of violence in terms of a "risk" that physical force would be used, *see* 139 S. Ct. at 2323-24), and by extension the treatment of Hobbs Act conspiracy. Hobbs Act conspiracy is now conclusively an inapposite predicate offense because it is an offense that can be complete without performance of any overt act, despite it posing a potential risk of violence. *See United States* v. *Barrett*, 937 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2019). As such, it is an inapposite predicate because it is not a crime of violence within the meaning of § 924(c), because the concept of "risk" is unconstitutionally vague. *Davis*, — U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. at 2319. The "risk" of violence inherent in conspiracy and its inchoate nature does not categorically require violence, just as attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not *categorically* require a violent act. Only the potential, or the *intent* to commit a statutorily violent act. Both the conspiracy to commit a crime of violence and the attempt to threaten violence in furtherance of a crime of violence connote only *violence in potential*, yet neither *require* the commission of a violent act.

i. Attempted Hobb's Act Robbery

The Hobbs Act creates criminal liability for any person "who [ ] in any way . . . obstructs, delays, or

affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery . . . or attempts or conspires to do so." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). As used in the Act, "robbery" means "the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property." *Id*. at § 1951(b)(1). Federal attempt liability attaches where there is intent to commit the completed offense together with "an overt act qualifying as a substantial step toward completion of [that] goal." *United States* v. *Resendiz-Ponce*, 549 U.S. 102, 106-107 (2007).

Under federal law, a person who uses or carries a firearm "during and in relation to any crime of violence" or who "possesses a firearm" "in furtherance of any such crime" may be convicted of both the underlying "crime of violence" and the additional crime of utilizing a firearm in connection with a "crime of violence." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) directs enhanced sentencing for any person who uses, carries, or possesses a firearm in furtherance of a "crime of violence." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Repeat violations of § 924(c) carry a minimum term of 25 years in prison. *Id*. at § 924(c)(1)(C)(i).

A "crime of violence" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) as "an offense that is a felony and A) has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property

of another, or B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense." As discussed, *supra*, *United States v. Davis* has since struck 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(B) as unconstitutionally vague.

ii. Application

Both the Second Circuit below and the minority Fourth Circuit are in conformity that Hobbs Act robbery is a "crime of violence" as defined by application of the "categorical" approach. *See Barrett*, 937 F.3d at 128; *United States* v. *Hill*, 890 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2018), *cert. denied*, 139 S. Ct. 844 (2019); *United States* v. *Taylor*, 979 F.3d 203, 207 (4th Cir. 2020). Pursuant to the categorical approach, "where Congress has defined a violent felony as a crime that has the use or threat of force 'as an element,' the courts must determine whether a given offense is a crime of violence by focusing categorically on the offense's statutory definition, *i.e.*, the intrinsic elements of the offense, rather than on the defendant's particular underlying conduct." *McCoy*, No. 17-3515 *48-49 (citation omitted), App. 121a; *See also Taylor*, 979 F.3d at 207 ("[p]ursuant to the categorical approach, a court 'focuses on the *elements* of the prior offense rather than the *conduct* underlying the conviction' ").

As such, looking strictly to the elements of Hobbs Act robbery, the Second and Fourth Circuits both concluded that Hobbs Act robbery has as an element, "the use, attempted use, or threatened use

of physical force against the person or property of another," 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), in that it requires "taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property." 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and (b)(1).

The confluence between the Circuits ends there and demarks the divergence of analytics in application of the categorical approach as it pertains to attempted Hobbs Act robbery. In an attempt to remain steadfast to the categorical approach, and thereby offer consistency in its application, the Fourth Circuit noted the majority's misapplication as an improper misdirection of focus. Distinct from the majority analysis, the Fourth Circuit justified that while a *completed* Hobbs Act robbery necessarily entails the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, it does not mean that every *attempt* at Hobbs Act robbery involves an attempt to use force. Highlighting the distinction, the *Taylor* Court correctly noted that because the commission of Hobbs Act robbery requires, at a minimum, the "threatened use of physical force," it categorically qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)'s force clause but distinguished the assumed parity by noting "an attempt to threaten force does not constitute an attempt to use force." *Taylor*, 979 F.3d at 208-09.

The *Taylor* Court criticized the majority analysis as a dereliction of the categorical approach directed

by the Supreme Court in *Davis* in that rather than focusing on the elements of the offense, the majority "rest[s] their conclusion on a rule of their own creation," imparting significance not upon the elements of the offense but upon the *acts required to complete the offense*. *Id*. at 208. This distinction, while subtle, underlines the conflation between attempt and intent, or, as the *Taylor* Court distinguished the apparent dichotomy, the categorical approach should not countenance an "*attempt [] to threaten* to use physical force" under the plain text of § 924(c)(3)(A). *Id*.

The Fourth Circuit correctly looked to the practical application of its analysis while contemporaneously dissecting the critical failure of the majority application in its misapprehension of the inherent salient distinction:

> [A] straightforward application of the categorical approach to attempted Hobbs Act robbery yields a different result. This is so because, unlike substantive Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not invariably require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. The Government may obtain a conviction for attempted Hobbs Act robbery by proving that: (1) the defendant specifically intended to commit robbery by means of a threat to use physical force; and (2) the defendant took a substantial step corroborating that intent. The substantial step need not be violent. *See*, *e.g.*, *United States* v. *McFadden*, 739 F.2d 149,

152 (4th Cir. 1984) (concluding that defendants took a substantial step toward bank robbery where they "discussed their plans," "reconnoitered the banks in question," "assembled [] weapons and disguises," and "proceeded to the area of the bank"). Where a defendant takes a nonviolent substantial step toward threatening to use physical force—conduct that undoubtedly satisfies the elements of attempted Hobbs Act robbery—the defendant has not used, attempted to use, or threatened to use physical force. Rather, the defendant has merely *attempted to threaten* to use physical force. The plain text of § 924(c)(3)(A) does not cover such conduct.

[. . .]

[A]s we have repeatedly held, certain crimes of violence—like Hobbs Act robbery, federal bank robbery, and carjacking—may be committed *without* the use or attempted use of physical force because they may be committed merely by means of threats. *See Mathis,* 932 F.3d at 266 (holding that "Hobbs Act robbery, when committed by means of causing *fear of injury,* qualifies as a crime of violence") (emphasis added); *McNeal,* 818 F.3d at 153 (holding that "[b]ank robbery under [18 U.S.C.] § 2113(a), 'by intimidation,' requires the *threatened use* of physical force" and thus "constitutes a crime of violence")

> (emphasis added); *United States* v. *Evans,* 848 F.3d 242, 247 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding "that the term 'intimidation,' as used in the phrase 'by force and violence or by intimidation' in the carjacking statute, necessarily includes a *threat* of violent force within the meaning of the 'force clause'") (emphasis added).

Taylor, 979 F.3d at 208-09.

In this regard, the Second Circuit below, while citing and rejecting *Taylor*, opined categorically that, "it follows as a matter of logic that an 'attempt [ ]' to commit Hobbs Act robbery—which the statute also expressly prohibits, *see* 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)—categorically qualifies as a crime of violence." *McCoy*, No. 17-3515 *53-54. App. 125a-126a. The Second Circuit below, and indeed the majority, have failed to justify the *Taylor* distinction, and in so doing have extrapolated a confluence between the actual acts required to commit an offense with the manifestation of intent to commit those inchoate acts.

The logic of the above is flawed and parallels *post hoc ergo propter hoc* reasoning, mistakenly leading to what is characterized as an inevitable conclusion, yet overlooking a critical distinction–an attempt to *threaten* force does not *categorically* constitute an attempt to *use* force. The Second Circuit below did not dismiss this apparent flaw in its application, but rather reflected an uncertainty as

to its mechanics. Its confinity was thereby trammeled leading the Court to opine:

> "[E]ven though it is theoretically possible that a defendant could be charged with Hobbs Act attempted robbery under such an attempt-to-threaten theory, we have made clear that "to show a predicate conviction is not a crime of violence 'requires more than the application of legal imagination to [the] . . . statute's language'"; rather "there must be 'a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,' that the statute at issue could be applied to conduct that does not constitute a crime of violence." *Hill*, 890 F.3d at 56 (quoting *Gonzales* v. *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). To show such a "realistic probability," a defendant "'must at least point to his own case or other cases in which the . . . courts did in fact apply the statute in the . . . manner for which he argues.'" *Hill*, 890 F.3d at 56 (quoting *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 193)."

McCoy, No. 17-3515 at *56. App. 128a.

The Second Circuit below faulted *Nix* and *McCoy* for failing to include examples of individuals convicted of attempted Hobbs Act robbery predicated upon an attempt to threaten to use force. *Id*. at *57. App. 128a-129a. Yet, this censure is misplaced and obfuscates theory with preparedness, a black eye to a raised fist. The discord among reasonable minds as to the correct application of an attempt to

threaten is prevalent within the District Courts of the Second Circuit's jurisdiction. As posited by *Taylor*:

> [A]n attempt to commit a crime of violence need not involve the attempted use of physical force. Some crimes of violence can be accomplished merely through the threatened use of force. The crime at issue here—attempted Hobbs Act robbery—is just such a crime. But an attempt to *threaten* force does not constitute an attempt to *use* force. A person who attempts to commit Hobbs Act robbery by passing a threatening note to a store cashier has attempted the planned robbery without using or attempting to use physical force. He may case the store that he intends to rob, discuss plans with a coconspirator, and buy weapons to complete the job. But none of this conduct involves an attempt to use physical force, nor does it involve the use of physical force or the threatened use of physical force. In these circumstances, the defendant has merely taken nonviolent substantial steps toward threatening to use physical force.

Taylor, 979 F.3d at 209.

None of the above lies exclusively in the realm of theory, and to categorize such eventualities otherwise is to fail to accept the inevitable. Disagreement in the District Courts has been and will

continue to be realized in Courts of Second Circuit jurisdiction.

In *United States* v. *Culbert*, 453 F. Supp. 3d 595 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), the Eastern District of New York (Cogan, J.) grappled with attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and embraced the minority approach as the more salient analysis. Tracking the first prong of the minority and majority analysis, the *Culbert* Court noted, "Hobbs Act robbery, of course, is a crime of violence under the 'elements' clause of § 924(c) because it 'has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another[,]'" *Culbert*, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 596, but went on to posit and conclude, "[t]he narrow question put to the Court is whether *attempted* Hobbs Act robbery is likewise a crime of violence. It is not." *Id*.

Seeking jurisprudential guidance from *Hill*, 890 F.3d at 51, the *Culbert* Court recognized the categorical approach to an elements analysis. Reinvigorating the *Davis* conspiracy distinction when looking to the elements analysis, focusing on the acts necessary to take substantial steps towards each element, the Court noted, "the 'essence of a conspiracy' is merely an agreement to commit an unlawful act [. . .] there is nothing inherently violent about the crime of conspiracy, no matter how gruesome the culmination of such an agreement might be." *Culbert*, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 596.

The Court went on to distinguish the acts necessary to take "substantial steps" towards Hobbs Act

robbery, and noted time and time again, the element of violence was absent. In a precognitive response to the Second Circuit's soon to be issued challenge, the *Culbert* Court recognized non-violent acts constituting substantial steps to violent offenses:

> In *United States* v. *Stallworth*, 543 F.2d 1038, 1041 (2d Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit upheld an attempted robbery conviction where the defendants "reconnoitered the bank, discussed (on tape) their plan of attack, armed themselves and stole ski masks and surgical gloves," had a getaway car ready, and "moved ominously toward the bank." None of these actions was violent.
>
> Even less was sufficient to convict the defendants of attempted bank robbery in *United States* v. *Jackson*, 560 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1977). In that case, the Court upheld the conviction where the defendants "reconnoitered the place contemplated for the commission of the crime and possessed the paraphernalia to be employed in the commission of the crime." *Id*. at 120. There, too, violence—threatened, attempted, or otherwise—was absent.
>
> In *United States* v. *Muratovic*, 719 F.3d 809, 816 (7th Cir. 2013), the Seventh Circuit affirmed an attempted robbery conviction where "the co-conspirators had assembled a team, finalized the robbery plan, conducted surveillance on the truck, procured two

> handguns and all other supplies called for in the plan," filled up gas cans for the drive, and arrived on location of the would-be crime. No violence.
>
> And in *United States* v. *Shakur*, Nos. 82-cr-312 and 84-cr-220, 1988 WL 36170, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 1988), the court denied the defendants' Rule 29 motion for acquittal of attempted bank robbery where "the individuals concerned reconnoitered the territory, made elaborate plans, obtained arms and instruments of disguise, arranged getaway cars, and were at the site of the target bank in their vehicle, armed, booted and spurred, ready to go." No violence.

Culbert, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 598-99.

Qualifying the Model Penal Code as persuasive authority, the Court nonetheless commented upon Section 5.01 acts of a non-violent nature that when taken alone or together *could* constitute Hobbs Act robbery, yet lack the requisite threat of force. *Id*. at 599. The Court rejected the majority view that *attempted* force is equated to *completed* force, and that conviction of attempt requires proof of intent to commit all elements of the completed crime, as an incomplete and hurried analysis:

> Although a satisfying syllogism on some level, this argument "collapses the distinction between acts constituting an underlying offense and acts constituting an attempt of the underlying offense, which does not

> square with the Supreme Court's decision in *Davis*." *Cheese*, 2020 WL 705217, at *3. Thus, at most, someone who takes a non-violent, substantial step toward committing a Hobbs Act robbery has *intended* to attempt violence. Moreover, as Judge Johnson pointed out in *Tucker*, 2020 WL 93951, at *6, "[s]uch an absolute rule (i.e., that an attempt to commit any violent crime will necessarily be itself a violent crime) seems at odds with the requirements of the categorical analysis."

Culbert, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 600.

Culbert, while poignant and succinct, was not alone in its presumptive departure from the Second Circuit's recent adoption of the majority analysis. *See United States* v. *Pica*, No. 8-cr-559 (CBA), ECF No. 378 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2020); *United States* v. *Cheese*, No. 18-cr-33, 2020 WL 705217 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2020); *Lofton* v. *United States*, No. 16-cv-6324, 2020 WL 362348 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2020); *United States* v. *Tucker*, No. 18-cr-119, 2020 WL 93951 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2020). Thus, while the Second Circuit may have characterized *Nix* and *McCoy's* argument in favor of the minority view as an exercise in imagination, it is an imagination of imminence, comporting with the reality of a critically flawed analysis of the statutory framework.

Joining the minority view espoused herein and cited above, *Tucker*, No. 18 CR 0119 (SJ), 2020 WL 93951, at *6, and *Lofton*, 2020 WL 362348, found that the elements of attempt to commit robbery

could be met without any use, attempted use, or threatened use of violence. Therein, the *Tucker* Court held, "it is incorrect to say that a person necessarily attempts to use physical force within the meaning of 924(c)'s elements clause just because he attempts a crime that, if completed would be violent." *Tucker*, No. 18 CR 0119 (SJ), 2020 WL 93951, at *6 (*quoting United States* v. *St. Hubert*, 918 F.3d 1174, 1212 (11th Cir. 2019) (Jill Pryor, J., joined by Wilson and Martin, JJ., dissenting from the denial of rehearing *en banc*)). *Lofton* went further in describing the majority analysis as only partially complete, having first made two right turns before taking a wrong turn. *Lofton*, 2020 WL 362348 at *17, 24 (*quoting St. Hubert*, 918 F.3d at 1211-12) (not recognizing the critical distinction that *intending* to commit each element of an offense involving the use of force is "simply not the same as *attempting* to commit each element of that crime.") (emphasis in original).

Lofton categorically and unconditionally addressed the Second Circuit's prohibition against imaginative statutory interpretation by emphasizing that a charge of attempted Hobbs Act robbery is "much more than a realistic probability that attempted Hobbs Act robbery could be applied to conduct that does not constitute a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A)." *Lofton,* 2020 WL 362348 at *25. In that regard, the Second Circuit's presumed admission is extant, and its challenge countered.

iii. Conclusion

A plurality is extant among reasonable minds as to the application of the categorical approach as it pertains to attempted Hobbs Act robbery. On the one hand, its application has been disjointed and perfunctory equating intent with attempt, yet ignoring substantial analysis of the categorical approach it espouses. On the other hand, what is respectfully submitted to be the correct, albeit minority, interpretation looks to the categorical application with greater depth and focus on its literal meaning and priority, rather than its current, perfunctory mechanical application.

This case presents an opportunity to reconcile the inconsistent treatment of attempted Hobbs Act robbery under § 924(c)(3)(A) and to guide courts in applying the categorical approach to attempt offenses.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the within petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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September 15, 2021

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
W.D. NEW YORK.

6:14-CR-06181 EAW.

Signed August 24, 2017.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

MATTHEW NIX AND EARL MCCOY,

Defendants.

Robert Marangola, U.S. Attorney's Office, Rochester, NY for United States of America.

Mark D. Hosken, Federal Public Defender, Rochester, NY, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants Matthew Nix ("Nix") and Earl McCoy ("McCoy") (collectively, "Defendants") were charged in a Third Superseding Indictment returned on January 5, 2017, with 12 counts alleging violations of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and related firearms and narcotics charges, all in connection

with a spree of violent home invasions during 2014. (Dkt. 165). Trial commenced on February 13, 2017, and concluded on March 17, 2017, with the jury convicting Defendants on all 12 counts. (Dkt. 229; Dkt. 266; Dkt. 267). Sentencing is presently scheduled for September 8, 2017. (Dkt. 350).

Nix and McCoy aggressively defended the case before and during trial, and the intensity of that defense only continued after the jury returned its verdict.[1] Defendants' post-verdict activities spawned further hearings, appearances, and motion practice, with Defendants attacking various aspects of the trial, from the jury selection to the jury instructions. Among the issues raised by Defendants was that one of the jurors in this case—"Juror No. 3"[2]—

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[1] To illustrate, even though this case has been pending since October 2014, approximately 30% of the docket entries have been generated in the few months following the verdict.

[2] This District's Jury Plan as amended on October 31, 2016 ("the Jury Plan"), adopted pursuant to the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861 *et seq.,* and approved by the Judges of the Western District of New York and the Reviewing Panel of the Judicial Council for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, provides for a general rule that the names and personal information concerning jurors and prospective jurors should not be publicly disclosed. *See* United States District Court, Western District of New York, *Jury Plan,* at 9-10 (Oct. 2016), www.nywd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016%20Jury%20Plan%20-%20FINAL-WebVersion.pdf. Consistent with the Jury Plan, and based on the nature of the allegations directed at Juror No. 3, this Court determined that publicly revealing Juror No. 3's name would not be in the interests of justice (Dkt. 332), and, accordingly, the juror in question will be referred to herein as "Juror No. 3" or "J.B."

was a convicted felon who failed to disclose his criminal history during jury selection. Juror No. 3's felon status was not discovered until, post-verdict, counsel for Nix uncovered this information based on a "hunch." (Dkt. 327 at 6-9). Arguing that Juror No. 3's felon status tainted the impartiality of the jury, Defendants have filed motions pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 seeking a new trial. (Dkt. 286; Dkt. 289).

Defendants had a fundamental constitutional right to a fair trial, and this Court is responsible for ensuring that they were afforded that right. Central to that right is the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to a trial by an impartial jury. *See also United States v. Nelson,* 277 F.3d 164, 206 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[Q]uite apart from offending the Sixth Amendment, trying an accused before a jury that is actually biased violates even the most minimal standards of due process."). "An impartial jury is one in which all of its members, not just most of them, are free of interest and bias." *United States v. Parse,* 789 F.3d 83, 111 (2d Cir. 2015).

However, in the words of the Supreme Court, Defendants were "entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one, for there are no perfect trials." *McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood,* 464 U.S. 548, 553, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, although Defendants were unquestionably entitled to an impartial jury, they may not, post-verdict, challenge the selection of jurors who, in hindsight and with additional information, Defendants wished had not been selected. After a thorough consideration of the evidence and

the parties' arguments, the Court concludes that the presence of Juror No. 3 did not destroy the impartiality of the jury in this case. Juror No. 3, a convicted felon who was not qualified to serve, admittedly blundered his way onto the jury—but he did not smuggle his way onto the jury through intentional deceit. As a result, Defendants are not entitled to a new trial, and, for the reasons discussed below, the motions pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 (Dkt. 286; Dkt. 289) based upon Juror No. 3's alleged bias are denied.[3]

II. BACKGROUND

A. Jury Selection—February 13, 2017

Jury selection occurred on February 13, 2017. (*See* Dkt. 328). From a venire of 83, the Court sat a panel of 36 prospective jurors for the proposed 16-member jury (12 jurors and 4 alternates). Prospective jurors were excused for cause and replaced from the venire as the Court questioned the panel of prospective jurors. Each prospective juror had completed a questionnaire mailed to him or her in advance by the Clerk's Office. The questionnaire asked, among other things, for information about prior felony convictions.[4]

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[3] Defendants' post-verdict motions also raise a number of other issues in an effort to obtain an acquittal or new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c) or 33. (*See* Dkt. 286; Dkt. 289). The Court will address those issues in a separate Decision and Order.

[4] The questionnaire asked each prospective juror: "Have you ever been convicted, either by your guilty or nolo con-

Juror No. 3, an African American male, was the sixth prospective juror called by the Court's deputy clerk, and he was seated in the sixth seat of the panel of 36. (*Id.* at 29). After all prospective jurors were placed under oath (*id.* at 30), the Court proceeded to ask questions of the panel.

Juror No. 3 responded to the Court's questions shortly after the questioning began, when the Court questioned the prospective jurors about their availability to sit for the trial that was estimated to last five weeks:

> JUROR NO. 3: Hello, my name is [J.B.]. I'm self employed.
>
> . . .
>
> THE COURT: What do you do [J.B.]?
>
> JUROR NO. 3: I have my own cleaning business. Right now it's covered because I'm working at night. I don't know if I can do that for five weeks.
>
> THE COURT: You tell me what you would be able to do.
>
> JUROR NO. 3: I don't know. I have contracted and these people rely on me to clean the businesses.

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tendere plea or by a court or jury trial, of a state or federal crime for which punishment could have been more than one year in prison?" (*See* Court Ex. 15 at 7). If that question was answered in the affirmative, the individual was prompted to answer additional questions.

THE COURT: Do you typically clean during the day[?]

JUROR NO. 3: No, at nighttime. And I have a couple of contracts during the daytime, too.

THE COURT: Only you know whether or not you can manage it. We're going to be in session typically from 9 to 1. You would have the afternoons, typically, would be free and there would be some days where we'll be going full days. Obviously we're not meeting on the weekends. You tell me whether or not you think you could do it.

JUROR NO. 3: I have a contract that gets Tuesday and Friday morning. I don't know if she will allow me not to do it for five weeks.

THE COURT: During the break, would you be able to contact the person.

JUROR NO. 3: Not really, I don't have my phone. It's in the car.

THE COURT: If during the lunch break—

JUROR NO. 3: Yes.

THE COURT: We'll have about an hour lunch break, would you be able to make a call to see if it would work.

JUROR NO. 3: Yes.

(*Id.* at 40-42).[5]

[5] The transcript filed at Docket 328, as well as other transcripts referenced in this Decision and Order, were filed under

After the first break, Juror No. 3 revealed that he had been able to "switch everything around" and, therefore, he would be able to serve if selected. (*Id.* at 86-87). Juror No. 3 did not speak for the rest of the day in response to the Court's *voir dire* questions, until the Court asked for biographical information from each juror at the end of the *voir dire*. (*See id.* at 245). As a result, Juror No. 3 did not respond to any of the following questions that were asked of the entire panel:[6]

(1) "Has anyone ever been the victim of a home robbery?" (*id.* at 97);

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seal in order to protect the identity and personal information of jurors and prospective jurors, including Juror No. 3, from public disclosure consistent with the Court's Jury Plan. *See* note 2, *supra.* The portions that are quoted in this Decision and Order have been redacted, where necessary, to avoid public disclosure of the identity of jurors and prospective jurors.

[6] To be clear, the questions asked by the Court that are relevant to these post-verdict motions are the ones set forth above. In various parts of their submissions, as well as during the evidentiary hearing, Defendants argue that Juror No. 3 failed to provide accurate answers to certain questions that, in fact, were never asked by the Court during *voir dire.* (*See, e.g.,* Dkt. 363 at 11 ("Have you ever been convicted of a felony? If so, have your civil rights been restored?" and "Have you ever been the victim of a home robbery or burglary?"); Dkt. 340 at 2 (criticizing Juror No. 3 for falsely responding to the questions "[H]ave you ever been convicted of a felony?" and "[H]ave you ever been to a correctional facility. . . ?"); Dkt. 359 at 156 (defense counsel stating, at the evidentiary hearing, "I know the jurors were asked about prostitution"), 160-61 (the Court clarifying that the only reference to prostitution occurred during a sidebar, and the panel of prospective jurors was not asked about prostitution)).

(2) "Has anyone ever served on a jury before?" (*id.* at 205);

(3) "Has anyone ever been a defendant in a criminal case?" (*id.* at 214);

(4) "Has anyone ever visited a jail or correctional facility other than in connection with . . . your educational curriculum" (*id.* at 229);

(5) "Has anyone had anyone close to them, other than what we already discussed, I know we covered this, anyone close to them convicted of a crime?" (*id.* at 239).

Similarly, Juror No. 3 did not offer any information in response to the Court's "catch-all" questions asked toward the end of *voir dire*: whether there was "anything in fairness to both sides that you think we should know that we haven't covered already" (*id.* at 221), and "[i]s there anything that you think we should know that we haven't covered up to this point?" (*id.* at 257).

Juror No. 3 was one of two African American males seated in the panel of 36 prospective jurors.[7] Like Juror No. 3, prospective juror "T.P." was also called by the Court's deputy clerk during the initial seating. (*Id.* at 30). T.P was seated in seat 26 of the panel of 36. (*Id.*). And like Juror No. 3, T.P. remained quiet throughout much of the *voir dire* until the Court asked each prospective juror at the end of jury selection to provide biographical infor-

[7] Both Defendants are African American males.

mation.[8] (*See id.* at 252). Also like Juror No. 3, T.P. was a convicted felon and failed to disclose that information either when completing the questionnaire mailed by the Clerk's Office or in response to the Court's *voir dire* questions. (*See* Court Ex. 3A). However, unlike Juror No. 3, T.P.'s felon status was discovered during jury selection when, prior to exercising peremptory challenges, the Government disclosed that it had run a background check on T.P. and discovered his undisclosed criminal history. (Dkt. 328 at 269-75; *see also* Court Ex. 3B; Court Ex. 3C).

When the Government brought to the attention of the Court and defense counsel its discovery of T.P.'s criminal history, counsel for McCoy accused the Government of targeting the racial minorities on the jury. (Dkt. 328 at 270 ("I'm concerned if an African American comes in and the FBI is running record checks on him, they probably did that with the other one, too.")). The Government denied defense counsel's accusations, and ultimately the issue was resolved with the Government agreeing to use one of its peremptory challenges to strike T.P. (*Id.* at 270-75).

As it turns out, the Government had not run a background check on any other prospective juror, including Juror No. 3 (Dkt. 308 at ¶3(A)), and

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[8] The only time that T.P. spoke before providing biographical information was when another prospective juror, A.B., an African American female who was ultimately seated on the jury as Juror No. 6, indicated in response to the Court's questions that she knew T.P. as the son of her former pastor. T.P. denied knowing Juror No. 6. (*See id.* at 218-19).

Juror No. 3's criminal history was not discovered until after the return of the verdict. One of the issues Nix raises in his post-verdict motion is the Government's background check on T.P. (Dkt. 289 at ¶¶ 83-84).[9] Thus, Defendants seek a new trial both because an African American prospective juror who failed to disclose his criminal history was excused from the jury, and because an African American prospective juror who failed to disclose his criminal history was *not* excused from the jury.

B. Discovery of Juror No. 3's Felon Status

Post-verdict, Defendants filed motions pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c) and 33 raising a number of issues, including the discovery that Juror No. 3 may be a convicted felon. (Dkt. 286-1 at ¶¶ 8-22; Dkt. 289 at ¶¶ 36-50).[10] The Government filed papers in opposition to the motions, and, among other things, indicated that it was unaware of Juror No. 3's felon status until the issue was raised in Defendants' post-trial filings. (Dkt. 296 at 5-11). Defendants filed reply papers (Dkt. 299; Dkt. 300), and, due to the competing allegations about the background checks on the jurors in the case, the

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[9] Again, the Court will address the issue involving T.P., along with the other issues Defendants raise in their motions filed pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c) and 33, in a separate Decision and Order.

[10] Juror No. 3 was mistakenly referenced as Juror No. 4 in some of the earlier post-verdict filings and transcripts, including by the Court. At the appearance on May 15, 2017, it was clarified that the juror in question is Juror No. 3. (*See* Dkt. 327 at 23; *see also* Dkt. 344 at 2 n.1).

Court directed each counsel to disclose, by affidavit, information about any background checks conducted on jurors or prospective jurors. (Dkt. 302). Counsel for each party filed affidavits (Dkt. 306; Dkt. 308; Dkt. 309), and a hearing was conducted on May 15, 2017 (*see* Dkt. 327).

At the appearance on May 15, 2017, counsel for Nix indicated that he performed the criminal background check post-verdict on Juror No. 3 based on "a hunch." (*Id.* at 6-9). The Court determined that it would hold an evidentiary hearing concerning Juror No. 3 (*id.* at 25-27), and the Court scheduled a further appearance for May 25, 2017 (*id.* at 28-29). At the Court's direction, the United States Marshals Service served Juror No. 3 with an Order directing his appearance on May 25, 2017. (Dkt. 315; Dkt. 317).

On May 25, 2017, Juror No. 3 appeared in Court, was advised of his rights, and, at his request, counsel was appointed to represent him. (Dkt. 329 at 5-7). The Court set a date to conduct an evidentiary hearing: June 12, 2017. (*Id.* at 11). The Court also heard argument from counsel on the scope of the hearing, and it reserved decision on whether it would allow counsel to question Juror No. 3, indicating that the Court was going to initiate the questions and any questions that the parties wanted asked needed to be submitted to the Court in advance. (*Id.* at 37-41; *see, e.g.,* Dkt. 312).[11] On

[11] The legal support for the Court having broad discretion to control the means and manner of any inquiry of Juror No. 3 in these post-verdict proceedings is discussed in detail in the Decision and Order filed on June 9, 2017, and will not be repeated here. (*See* Dkt. 344 at 16-22).

June 9, 2017, the U.S. Attorney's Office provided an immunity letter to Juror No. 3. (*See* Dkt. 358 at 70[12]).

C. The Evidentiary Hearing

The evidentiary hearing commenced on June 12, 2017, and continued on June 14, 2017 (Dkt. 358; Dkt. 359). Only the Court asked questions on the first day of the hearing, but counsel were permitted to ask questions during the second day of the hearing. (*See* Dkt. 358; Dkt. 359).

Juror No. 3, a 47-year-old African American male (*see* Dkt. 358 at 76; *see, e.g.,* Court Ex. 14), testified that he did not have a high school diploma or G.E.D., but had been educated up until the 11th grade (Dkt. 358 at 71). He has five children (*id.* at 71-72) and is self-employed as a cleaner (*id.* at 71; *see, e.g.,* Court Ex. 14). He described his marital status as single (Dkt. 358 at 72), although when questioned further about his marital status, it was revealed that he is separated but not legally divorced (*id.* at 94-95).

Juror No. 3 acknowledged that he completed the Court's juror questionnaire online (*id.* at 73), and he inaccurately answered "No" in response to Question No. 6, which asked: "Have you ever been convicted either by your guilty or nolo contendere plea or by a court or jury trial, of a state or federal crime

[12] References to the page numbers for the transcripts filed at Dockets 358 and 359 are to the actual page numbers of the transcript, not to the electronically-designated pages from CM/ECF.

for which punishment could have been more than one year in prison?" (*id.* at 74; *see* Court Ex. 14; Court Ex. 15).

Juror No. 3 explained his reasoning for answering inaccurately as follows: "At the time, I thought that it meant 21 and over." (Dkt. 358 at 74). Juror No. 3 offered a similar explanation as to why he had not offered this information during the Court's questions during *voir dire* (*id.* at 86-88), but he acknowledged that his answers were not accurate:

> Q But I never said 21 and up, did I?
>
> A No, you did not.
>
> Q And the questionnaire didn't say 21 and up, did it?
>
> A No, it did not.
>
> Q And as you sit here now, would you agree with me that you did not answer those questions truthfully?
>
> A Yes.

(*Id.* at 89).

While admitting that he had been convicted of at least one felony, Juror No. 3 displayed a hazy memory concerning the number of prior felony convictions and arrests.

> Q Can you tell me how many crimes punishable by more than one year in prison or felonies have you been convicted of?
>
> A Truthfully, I don't remember, your Honor.

(*Id.* at 75). Juror No. 3 did offer that he could recall being convicted of a felony where he "was accused of breaking into a clothing store" when he was 17 or 18 years old. (*Id.* at 76). He testified that he was sentenced to two to four years in prison, but that sentence was satisfied by serving six months in "shock camp." (*Id.* at 78). However, Juror No. 3 did not recall several facts surrounding this conviction, such as: if the charge was resolved through a plea or trial (*id.* at 76); where the shock camp was located (*id.* at 78); the name of one of his co-defendants (*id.* at 77); if he was prosecuted in federal or state court (*id.* at 79); and the name of the judge who sentenced him (*id.*).

Initially, Juror No. 3 testified that he did not know if he had been convicted of any other felonies other than the one involving the clothing store:

> Q Other than that felony conviction [involving the burglary of the clothing store], do you know if you were convicted of any other prior felonies?
>
> A No, I don't.

(*Id.* at 80). He testified that he had been arrested, although the only arrest that he was initially able to recall involved a stolen car when he was 17 or 18 years old, and he testified that he could not recall how it was resolved. (*Id.*). However, later during the first day of the hearing, Juror No. 3 testified that he was convicted of the incident involving the stolen car:

Q How did the—I may have asked you this, I'm not sure—how did the stolen motor vehicle charge get resolved?

A I'm not sure.

Q In other words, do you know if you were convicted or not?

A Yes.

Q You were convicted?

A Yes.

Q But you don't know if you were convicted by a plea or by a trial?

A No, I don't.

Q And as you sit here now, you don't know if you served—you don't recall serving any time for that conviction —

A No, I —

Q—is that fair to state?

A Yes, your Honor.

(*Id.* at 87-88).

Juror No. 3 testified that he was falsely accused of both the clothing store burglary and the stolen car crime:

Q So, you were falsely accused of this crime [involving the clothing store burglary]?

A Yes.

(*Id.* at 79).

> Q And if I understand correctly, you did not actually engage in the burglary of the clothing store, correct?
>
> A Yes.
>
> Q What about the stolen vehicle, did you actually steal a vehicle?
>
> A No.

(*Id.* at 84-85). However, during the second day of the hearing, when confronted with his signed confession about the burglary of the clothing store, Juror No. 3 ultimately admitted his involvement and that he provided the Court false testimony on the subject. (Dkt. 359 at 181-84). When the Court confronted him about why he failed to testify accurately, Juror No. 3 had no explanation:

> Q So, why did you not answer my question accurately when I first asked it of you?
>
> A Don't know.
>
> Q You don't know?
>
> A No.
>
> Q Isn't it fair to state that you'd prefer not to be honest about your prior criminal history?
>
> A Truthfully, I don't think about my prior history, to tell you the truth. I don't think about it.
>
> Q Well, we're here on it right now.
>
> A Yes, we are.

> Q So we're talking about it right now. Isn't it fair to state that you'd prefer not to be honest about your prior criminal history?
>
> A No.

(*Id.* at 183; *see id.* at 231 (admitting that Juror No. 3 provided false testimony during first day of the hearing about his involvement in the clothing store burglary)). In response to Nix's counsel's questions, Juror No. 3 also admitted that he remembered stealing a car and switching the license plates. (*Id.* at 225).

A number of additional arrests were reflected in the records obtained by the parties in preparation for the evidentiary hearing. Juror No. 3 appeared to have no memory of those arrests:

> Q Do you recall being arrested in 1986 for assault in the second degree?
>
> A No, I don't.
>
> Q Do you recall being arrested in March of 1987 for petit larceny?
>
> A No.
>
> Q And in connection with that arrest, do you recall you were convicted and were sentenced to two work Saturdays; do you have any recollection of that?
>
> A No.
>
> Q What about a conviction in November 1987 for petit larceny where you served 14 days in

> the Monroe County Jail; does that sound familiar to you?
>
> A Truthfully, your Honor, I don't remember none of this stuff. That was 28 years ago.

(Dkt. 358 at 81-82).

> Q Do you recall being arrested in July of 1989 for burglary in the second degree for illegal entry of a dwelling?
>
> A No, I do not.
>
> . . .
>
> Q Do you recall burglarizing a home in May of 1989?
>
> A No, I do not.

(*Id.* at 84). In addition, during the second day of the hearing, Juror No. 3 was questioned by the Court about reports concerning two separate alleged domestic violence incidents (one in 1993 and the other in 1999)—one of which he recalled but for which he denied being arrested, and the other of which he had no recollection. (Dkt. 359 at 176-77). During questioning by Nix's counsel, Juror No. 3 appeared to have some recollection of a petit larceny conviction on March 10, 1987 (*id.* at 215-16), and possibly an assault charge when he was 16 (*id.* at 214-15), although it was impossible to distinguish at that point whether Juror No. 3 was testifying based on his memory or his review of records.

In addition, other than his six-month stint at shock camp for the clothing store burglary, Juror

No. 3 indicated he had no memory of being incarcerated for any other period of time, other than possibly overnight for the stolen vehicle charge:

> Q Do you recall ever serving any time in the Monroe County Jail?
>
> A Not at all, no, I don't.
>
> Q I mean, as you sit here right now, can you tell me whether or not you've been to the Monroe County Jail?
>
> A Yes, I've been there.
>
> Q And tell me in connection with why you've been there.
>
> A For the stolen car.
>
> Q Okay. And, so, tell me about the time—I mean, were you kept overnight for the stolen car?
>
> A Yes.
>
> Q So, how long were you kept overnight for the stolen car, do you recall?
>
> A I don't remember how long. I think I got out the next day on my own recognizance, I think. I'm not sure.
>
> . . . .
>
> Q Do you recall being sentenced for that case [the stolen car case] in April of 1988, does that sound as though it may be correct?
>
> A It sounds like it's correct, the year, yes.

> Q If records indicated that you served six months in the Monroe County Jail for that, would those be accurate?
>
> A All I remember is shock camp, six months in shock camp. I don't remember doing six months in jail.
>
> Q So if I understand correctly, you recall possibly spending a night in jail in connection the stolen car arrest, correct?
>
> A Yes.
>
> Q And you recall six months in shock camp correct?
>
> A Yes.
>
> Q But is there any other time that you recall of serving time either in prison or jail in any capacity?
>
> A Don't remember.
>
> Q Is there anything that would refresh your recollection?
>
> A Not really.

(Dkt. 358 at 82-83). When confronted during the second day of the hearing with the certified copy of his conviction involving the stolen vehicle, which indicated that he served six months in the Monroe County Jail in 1988, Juror No. 3 continued to insist that he had no recollection of serving that time. (Dkt. 359 at 185-86). In response to questioning by McCoy's counsel, Juror No. 3 indicated that he did not share information about his prior sentences

because "[s]he [referencing the Court] said visited a jail. I assume she meant visiting somebody else, not me actually going to jail. That's why I didn't tell her." (*Id.* at 197). Juror No. 3 also responded to the Court's questions during the first day of the hearing that with respect to his actual time in jail, as with the convictions, he assumed the questions applied to incidents only when he was 21 or older. (Dkt. 358 at 88-89).

In response to the Court's questions, Juror No. 3 expressed his belief that his civil rights had been restored because of the age of his criminal convictions, and he also denied knowing that his criminal history would have disqualified him from jury service:

> Q As far as you know, were your civil rights ever restored?
>
> A I thought they were.
>
> Q And why did you think they were?
>
> A Because it happened 20 years ago. I assumed that they were.
>
> Q Are you able to vote?
>
> A Yes.
>
> Q Did you know that a prior felony conviction, without having your civil rights restored, would have disqualified you from jury service in this case?
>
> A No, I did not.
>
> . . .

> Q Would you agree with me, as you sit here now, that you did not answer this questionnaire correctly, this question number six?
>
> A Yes.
>
> Q And can you tell me, at the time that you answered it, did you know that you were answering that question inaccurately?
>
> A No, I did not.
>
> Q And what was your understanding of what the question was seeking, what information?
>
> A Like I said, I thought it meant from 21 and up. I assumed that. That's what I assumed.
>
> Q Why did you assume that?
>
> A Because I thought everything that I did back then was expunged or whatever. I didn't know that it was a felony still on there.
>
> Q And you thought it was expunged because of your age?
>
> A Yes.

(*Id.* at 85-86).

Juror No. 3 denied that his prior criminal history impacted his ability to be fair and impartial, and he denied being biased in favor of either Defendants or the Government. (*Id.* at 90; *see also id.* at 93; Dkt. 359 at 170). He also denied sympathizing or identifying with the cooperating witnesses in this case because of his criminal history. (Dkt. 358 at 91-92; Dkt. 359 at 170-71). Similarly, he denied working with law enforcement or prosecuting agen-

cies as a cooperating witness and he had no recollection of cooperating against his co-defendants in the clothing store burglary case. (Dkt. 358 at 95).[13]

Juror No. 3 testified that he was aware at the time of the hearing of the fact that his son had been convicted of a crime (*id.* at 93), but *at the time of jury selection* he had not spoken to his son in three or four years, and, as a result, he was not aware of his son's conviction during jury selection. (*Id.* at 93-94; Dkt. 359 at 167). Juror No. 3 denied know-

[13] When questioned by Nix's counsel during the second day of the hearing, Juror No. 3 was asked whether he cooperated with law enforcement when he confessed to crimes and named his co-defendants, to which Juror No. 3 responded "I guess so." (Dkt. 359 at 222). The Court did not find this line of questioning particularly illuminating given counsel's tone and the leading nature of the questions. Indeed, at the conclusion of the first day of the hearing, the Court indicated to counsel that it would allow them to ask questions and not prohibit them from asking leading questions. However, the Court also gave fair warning that due to perceived comprehension issues on the part of Juror No. 3, eliciting admissions from Juror No. 3 with leading questions was not going to be particularly helpful in aiding the Court's credibility assessment. (Dkt. 358 at 138). Thus, although the Court overruled various objections by the Government during this line of questioning by Nix's counsel because the Court believed that counsel generally should have been permitted to pursue their questioning in the manner that they deemed appropriate, the Court did not find that means of questioning—leading questions in a confrontational tone—helpful in reaching a credibility assessment of Juror No. 3. Moreover, and in any event, there is no evidence that Juror No. 3 received a benefit in exchange for his confession or naming of co-defendants, nor is there any evidence that he testified at a trial against any co-defendant, like the cooperating witnesses in this case.

ing of anyone else who was close to him who had been convicted of a crime (Dkt. 358 at 94-95; Dkt. 359 at 212-13), and he similarly denied visiting any family member or close friend in jail (Dkt. 358 at 95).

Juror No. 3 testified that he had been previously called for two other juries, and in one of those cases he was selected, but the jury never reached a verdict because the defendant pleaded guilty.[14] (Dkt. 358 at 100-01; Dkt. 359 at 169). Juror No. 3 testified that he answered other juror questionnaires the same way he did in this case because he assumed the convictions were not part of his record if they occurred before the age of 21. (Dkt. 358 at 101). In response to questioning by McCoy's counsel, Juror No. 3 denied any recollection of being asked during *voir dire* about his prior jury service, but then appeared to recall the question but could not recall if he had answered it:

> Q And do you recall being asked if you'd ever sat on a jury before?
>
> A No, I don't. It was a long day.
>
> . . .

[14] Counsel for Nix makes reference in his post-hearing submission to Juror No. 3's prior jury service occurring on July 6, 2015 (Dkt. 369 at 14), although nothing in the record supports that information. It appears as though counsel for Nix may have spoken to "counsel for OCA" about Juror No. 3's state court jury service (*id.*), although, again, nothing in the record supports this conclusion other than this passing reference in Nix's post-hearing memorandum.

> Q And do you recall her [referencing the Court] asking if anybody had ever sat on a jury before?
>
> A Yes.
>
> Q And do you recall whether or not you answered that question?
>
> A No, I don't.
>
> Q Did you tell her that you had sat on a jury before?
>
> A I don't know if I told her yes or no.

(Dkt. 359 at 193-94).

During the second day of the hearing, Juror No. 3 was questioned about an incident in October 1999, in which his home was broken into and various items were stolen, including jewelry and his wife's checkbook. (*Id.* at 172). The records regarding this incident were produced on June 13, 2017, in response to a subpoena served by counsel for Nix (and, thus, were not available on the first day of the hearing). Juror No. 3 testified that he did not share this information in response to the Court's questions during *voir dire* because "truthfully, it slipped my mind, forgot all about it." (*Id.* at 173). Juror No. 3 testified that he had remembered the burglary only when the documents were produced in response to the subpoena. (*Id.*). Juror No. 3 denied having any recollection of the event at *voir dire* or during the trial, and testified that he recalled the incident only after being presented with the subpoenaed documents:

Q When did you remember it?

A When I saw the documents.

Q So within the last 24 hours?

A Yes.

Q On Monday, before you had seen those documents, did you have any memory of this incident?

A No, I did not.

Q . . . Were there any other occasions where you were living in a home and it was burglarized or robbed?

A Nope.

Q Is this the only time?

A It's the only time.

Q Well, wasn't it a pretty significant event in your life?

A Not really because we weren't there. Just came home and the house was broken into.

Q . . . [D]id your memory at all get refreshed about that sitting through a five-week trial dealing with home invasion?

A No, it did not.

Q I mean, that never once occurred to you?

A No, it did not.

> Q And it wasn't until you saw the actual police report in this case that I provided to counsel yesterday that this—hat you remember this?
>
> A Yes.

(*Id.* at 173-74). The records from this incident indicate that Juror No. 3's wife was the primary point of contact with law enforcement after the incident (Court Ex. 17), which was consistent with Juror No. 3's testimony that his wife handled the matter. (Dkt. 359 at 201).

D. Certified Certificates of Conviction

Based on the certified certificates of conviction procured by McCoy's counsel and introduced at the evidentiary hearing as Court Exhibits 21 and 22, the fact of the prior felony convictions is plainly established.

On March 9, 1988, Juror No. 3 pleaded guilty to criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree (a class E felony). (Court Ex. 21). The certificate of conviction reflected the imposition of a sentence on April 6, 1988, of six months in the Monroe County Jail. (*Id.*). This conviction involved the stolen car. Juror No. 3 was 18 years old at the time of this conviction and sentence.

On September 26, 1989, Juror No. 3 pleaded guilty to burglary in the third degree (a class D felony), and he was sentenced to two to four years in the New York State Department of Corrections on January 11, 1990. (Court Ex. 22). Juror No. 3 testified that in lieu of serving two to four years in

prison, he spent six months in shock camp. (Dkt. 358 at 78). This conviction involved the clothing store burglary. Juror No. 3 was 19 years old at the time of this conviction and sentence.

E. Post-Hearins Submissions

In accordance with the schedule set by the Court, McCoy filed his post-hearing memorandum on July 7, 2017. (Dkt. 363). In that submission, McCoy argues that Juror No. 3's felony conviction alone warrants the granting of a new trial, without any showing of bias. (*Id.* at 8-10). Alternatively, McCoy argues that both prongs of the *McDonough* test[15] have been satisfied (*id.* at 10-17), contending that Juror No. 3 was involved in conduct similar to the conduct at issue in this case so as "raise the possibility that an inferred bias exists" and the "potential for substantial emotional involvement" (*id.* at 15), and as a result, Juror No. 3 would have been excused for cause if he gave honest answers during *voir dire*. McCoy concedes in his submission that it "is unknown . . . why [Juror No. 3] lied during *voir dire*" (*id.* at 17; *see also id.* at 19), but contends that the material and repeated lies by Juror No. 3 make his presence on the jury "incompatible with our truth-seeking process. . . ." (*Id.* at 18). McCoy

[15] As discussed further below, the "*McDonough* test" is a two-prong test to evaluate a motion for a new trial based on incorrect responses by a juror during *voir dire,* based on the Supreme Court's decision in *McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood,* 464 U.S. 548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984).

does not specify any actual bias that has been demonstrated on the part of Juror No. 3, but rather contends that the Court should infer bias and order a new trial as a result. (*See id.* at 17-23).

On July 8, 2017, counsel for Nix emailed his post-hearing submission to the Court and counsel, and then filed that submission on July 19, 2017. (Dkt. 369). In that submission, among other things, Nix refers to alleged prior drug convictions related to alleged siblings of Juror No. 3. (*Id.* at 11).[16] Nix also argues that one of the Government's potential law enforcement witnesses in this case was involved in the investigation of Juror No. 3's clothing store burglary, and since Juror No. 3 was convicted based on that law enforcement witness' efforts, "[h]e would remember him." (*Id.* at 13). He also argues that another Government witness was involved in the investigation related to Juror No. 3's son. (*Id.*). Indeed, Nix contends that Juror No. 3 has "had bad experiences with law enforcement." (*Id.* at 12). However, the thrust of Nix's post-hearing submission is that Juror No. 3 necessarily identified with the cooperating witnesses in this case, and, therefore, he must have been biased against Defendants. (*See id.* at 22).

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[16] Nix's post-hearing submission refers to various exhibits, such as Exhibits 5 and 6 allegedly pertaining to Juror No. 3's siblings' criminal history—but there are no exhibits attached to the post-hearing submission. (*See* Dkt. 369). Nix may be referencing the documents filed at Docket 366, which was mistakenly filed as a "motion" but consisted of only exhibits and, thus, was terminated as a motion by the Court. (*See* Dkt. 367).

In accordance with the schedule set by the Court, the Government filed its post-hearing memorandum of law on July 21, 2017. (Dkt. 370). The Government argued that Juror No. 3's non-responsive answers and demeanor during the hearing demonstrated that he had difficulty understanding questions put to him by the Court and counsel. (*Id.* at 2 ("He appeared nervous and uncomfortable and, at times, defensive, which is understandable (in additional to his lack of comprehension) considering he was ordered to appear in court, read his rights in open court as if he were under arrest, assigned an attorney, and publicly questioned under oath by a federal judge, two criminal defense lawyers, and a federal prosecutor.")). The Government argues that the evidentiary hearing did not reflect a "'searching inquiry' by the defense to vindicate a constitutional right" but rather it reflected "an all-out attack with the singular focus of trying to make the juror look like a liar at every turn, for the sole purpose of getting out from under the consequences of the constitutionally valid guilty verdicts after a full, fair and impartial trial by a jury they chose." (*Id.* at 2-3). The Government challenges the nature of the questioning by defense counsel, contending that it was "done in a sarcastic, condescending and goading manner" and that before the hearing, those same counsel "had already publicly vilified [Juror No. 3] as a liar and unfairly blamed him for the plight of their clients." (*Id.* at 4). The Government contends that Defendants have failed to establish that Juror No. 3 intentionally lied during jury selection, nor have they demonstrated that

honest answers would have required the Court to excuse Juror No. 3 because of actual or implied bias, or justified his excusal due to inferred bias against Defendants or in favor of the Government. (*Id.* at 4-5). In short, the Government submits that Defendants have failed to meet their burden under the *McDonough* test.

Defendants filed their post-hearing reply memoranda on July 28, 2017. (Dkt. 371; Dkt. 372). Nix argues that the "prosecution is very tolerable of perjury in a federal courtroom when it suits them" and that, contrary to the Government's arguments, every response from Juror No. 3 at the hearing "was more deceitful and mendacious than the next." (Dkt. 371 at 2). McCoy challenges the Government's description of the hearing as "pure invention" and "especially outlandish" given the plans that the Court put in place with respect to the conduct of the hearing. (Dkt. 372 at 2). McCoy continues that "lying at voir dire because of embarrassment or some other benign reason might be understandable, [but] multiple lying at the hearing and indeed committing perjury is another thing altogether." (*Id.* at 4). McCoy submits that "perhaps Juror # 3's inability to accept his past led to the same pattern of false answers." (*Id.* at 8). McCoy argues that a challenge for cause by the Government would have been granted if Juror No. 3 had disclosed his criminal history. (*Id.* at 9). McCoy also argues that Defendants would have raised a successful cause challenge if they had known about the burglary involving Juror No. 3's home. (*Id.*).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861 *et seq*. ("JSSA"), Juror No. 3's prior felony convictions made him statutorily ineligible to serve on the jury in this case. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (disqualifying from jury service any person who "has a charge pending against him for the commission of, or has been convicted in a State or Federal court of record of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year and his civil rights have not been restored"). However, this information was never disclosed during *voir dire,* and it is too late for any statute-based challenge to Juror No. 3's service. *See id*. § 1867(a), (e) (providing that the procedures under the JSSA are exclusive means to challenge jury not selected in conformity with the provisions of the JSSA, and setting final deadline to challenge as before the *voir dire* examination begins); Dkt. 381 at 3-6 (discussing the untimeliness of any challenge by Defendants to jury under JSSA); *see also United States v. Silverman,* 449 F.2d 1341, 1344 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding where there was a substantial failure to comply with § 1865(b)(2), but the challenge was not raised until after the return of the verdict, the defendant's "attack on that conviction cannot be founded on [the juror's] disqualification under the statute"); *United States v. Harmon,* 21 F.Supp.3d 1042, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (finding § 1865(b)(5) "is a statutory bar as applied to prospective jurors, not a constitutional requirement required under due process principles"); *cf.*

United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding that the provisions set forth in § 1865(b)(5) apply to the procedures utilized by a district court to administer the jury selection process—not to a situation where a juror fails to disclose his felon status on the jury qualification form).

As a result, Defendants base their challenge to Juror No. 3's selection for this jury on the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to an impartial jury. However, the "Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury . . . does not require an *absolute bar* on felon-jurors." *Boney,* 977 F.2d at 633. As explained by the D.C. Circuit in *Boney*:

> A *per se* rule would be appropriate . . . only if one could reasonably conclude that felons are always biased against one party or another. But felon status, alone, does not necessarily imply bias. In fact, as the dissent suggests, Congress' purpose in restricting felons' jury service may stem from considerations other than a concern for biased jurors. More important, a *per se* rule requiring a new trial whenever it turns out that a felon served on a jury seems inconsistent with *McDonough's* hostility to unnecessary new trials, and the oft-repeated axiom that "a defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one." We think, therefore, that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial trial does not mandate a *per se* invalidation of every conviction reached by a jury that included a felon.

Id. at 633 (citations omitted); *see also United States v. Langford,* 990 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting the argument that a juror's intentionally false response during *voir dire* is automatic grounds for a new trial).[17]

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[17] McCoy argues that because a convicted felon such as Juror No. 3 is *per se* disqualified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5), the verdict must be set aside without any inquiry into Juror No. 3's reasons for not disclosing his criminal record and without any finding of bias. (Dkt. 363 at 8-10). This argument has been rejected by every circuit court to have considered the issue. *See Hanna v. Ishee,* 694 F.3d 596, 616 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[I]t is inappropriate to invalidate, as a matter of law, any conviction simply because it was reached by a jury that mistakenly included a convicted felon."); *United States v. Bishop,* 264 F.3d 535, 554 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[O]nce the trial is complete, a felon's serving as a juror is not an automatic basis for a new trial."); *Coughlin v. Tailhook Ass'n,* 112 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the participation of a felon-juror who is statutorily disqualified from serving "is not an automatic basis for a new trial" and the defendant must still show that the juror's participation resulted in "actual bias" to one of the parties); *United States v. Humphreys,* 982 F.2d 254, 261 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that the participation of felon juror, who mistakenly believed that civil rights had been restored, did not justify new trial, and finding that "[i]n an effort to obtain a new trial, it is incumbent upon the defendant to clearly demonstrate that the juror's lack of qualifications presented actual bias or prejudice, affecting the juror's impartiality and impacting the fairness of the trial. A challenge after the verdict without such a showing comes too late."); *United States v. Boney,* 977 F.2d 624, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that felon status alone does not imply bias); *United States v. Uribe,* 890 F.2d 554, 562 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that the fact that a felon juror technically should have been disqualified under statute does not automatically require a new trial).

McCoy contends that he is relying on the dissenting opinion in *Boney* (Dkt. 363 at 9), but a *per se* rule was rejected

Thus, the question as to whether Defendants' Sixth Amendment rights were violated by virtue of Juror No. 3's selection to the jury necessarily centers on whether his presence destroyed the impartiality of the jury; in other words, was Juror No. 3 biased? Based upon the Supreme Court's decision in *McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood,* 464 U.S. 548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984), the Second Circuit has adopted a two-part test that a defendant must establish in order to justify granting a new trial based upon incorrect responses by a juror during *voir dire*: (1) the defendant must first demonstrate that the juror "failed

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by the *Boney* dissent. *See Boney,* 977 F.2d at 639 (Randolph, J., dissenting) ("I would therefore reject the defendants' argument that the Sixth Amendment itself bars felons from serving on juries and requires reversal *per se* where one slips through."). McCoy also contends that he is relying on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in *Jackson v. Alabama State Tenure Commission,* 405 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2005), (Dkt. 363 at 9), but *Jackson* did not adopt a *per se* rule as advocated by McCoy. Rather, *Jackson* determined that the first prong of the *McDonough* test must be satisfied—in other words, there must be a finding that the juror intentionally failed to disclose the prior felony conviction. 405 F.3d at 1288-89 (finding no reasonable possibility that juror could have forgotten three years spent in prison for murder). Moreover, to the extent *Jackson* dispensed with the second prong of the *McDonough* test, this Court finds that reasoning unpersuasive, especially in view of the other circuit courts that have rejected the *per se* rule, *and* because satisfaction of the second prong of the *McDonough* test was apparently undisputed in *Jackson*. *See id.* at 1288 ("It is undisputed that a question about prior felony convictions is material to jury service and that an honest answer from this juror would have provided a basis to challenge her for cause.").

to answer honestly a material question on *voir dire*"; and (2) the defendant then must also demonstrate that "a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause"—in other words, the juror would have been excused for bias based on the correct *voir dire* response. *Langford,* 990 F.2d at 68-69 (quoting *McDonough,* 464 U.S. at 556-58, 104 S.Ct. 845); *see also United States v. Stewart,* 433 F.3d 273, 303 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[A] party alleging unfairness based on undisclosed juror bias must demonstrate first, that the juror's *voir dire* response was false and second, that the correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause."); *United States v. Shaoul,* 41 F.3d 811, 816 (2d Cir. 1994) ("We reiterate that, in order to obtain a new trial, a defendant must show *both* that a juror gave a dishonest answer, *and* that the correct answer would have provided a basis for the defendant to challenge the juror for cause.").

The first part of the test entails a threshold requirement to show juror dishonesty. *Shaoul,* 41 F.3d at 815. In other words, the Court must assess whether Juror No. 3 deliberately lied or consciously deceived the Court, as opposed to providing inaccurate responses as a result of a mistake, misunderstanding or embarrassment. *See McDonough,* 464 U.S. at 555, 104 S.Ct. 845; *Langford,* 990 F.2d at 69-70 (finding where a juror's intentionally false statements at *voir dire* were caused by embarrassment, and there was no evidence "that she gave false answers because of any desire to sit on the jury," it was proper for the district court to deny

the defendant's motion for a new trial (emphasis added)); *see, e.g., United States v. Escalera,* 536 Fed.Appx. 27, 35 (2d Cir. 2013) ("[The defendant] points to no record evidence that the juror intentionally failed to disclose [material information during voir dire], much less that the reason for the non-disclosure was to avoid excusal (as opposed to embarrassment) or to conceal some bias that could have prejudiced the trial."); *Dyer v. Calderon,* 151 F.3d 970, 984 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Not all jurors may walk a perfectly straight line. A distracted juror might fail to mention a magazine he subscribes to. An embarrassed juror might exaggerate the importance of his job. Few voir dires are impeccable, and most irregularities can be shrugged off as immaterial to the fairness of the trial.").

With respect to the second part of the test, the Court must determine if it would have granted a hypothetical cause challenge if Juror No. 3 had responded accurately to the Court's questions. *Stewart,* 433 F.3d at 304 (citing *United States v. Greer,* 285 F.3d 158, 171 (2d Cir. 2002)); *see United States v. Blackwell,* 436 Fed. Appx. 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2011) ("[A] '*McDonough* claim necessarily fails unless the court would have committed reversible error—that is, abused its discretion—in failing to dismiss a juror.' " (citation omitted)).

This second part of the test is really the most crucial. *Stewart,* 433 F.3d at 305 ("The significant factor, however, is that the District Court found that even if it were established that [the juror's] responses were false as alleged, none of the correct answers would have supported an inference that he

was biased or prejudiced against [the defendants] or had prejudged the evidence."). The critical determination is not simply whether the lies in question are deliberate, but rather whether *"the deliberateness of the particular lies evidenced partiality." Id.* (quoting *Greer,* 285 F.3d at 172-73); *see also Greer,* 285 F.3d at 170-71 (finding it unnecessary to determine whether juror dishonestly answered questions at *voir dire* because "the District Court did not exceed its allowable discretion in finding that those omissions and misstatements did not satisfy *McDonough*'s prong two").

A juror's dishonesty under the first part of the test "is among the 'factors to be considered' in the ultimate determination of bias . . . [but] an analysis of bias is required even if the juror's erroneous response was deliberate." *Greer,* 285 F.3d at 173. It is important to consider the dishonesty in the second part of the test because it can show "a personal interest in this particular case that was so powerful as to cause the juror to commit a serious crime [by lying during *voir dire*]." *United States v. Colombo,* 869 F.2d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 1989). In other words, a bright line does not divide the two prongs of the test, and there is some blurring of the factors to be considered under each prong. "Challenges for cause are generally based on actual bias, implied bias, or inferable bias." *Greer,* 285 F.3d at 171 (citing *United States v. Torres,* 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997)). As explained by the Second Circuit:

> Actual bias is bias in fact. Implied bias, by contrast, is bias presumed as a matter of law.

> Finally, inferred bias is available when actual or implied bias does not apply. "Bias may be inferred when a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to excuse the juror for cause, but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of bias."

Id. (citations omitted). At least in the Second Circuit, it is unsettled whether either implied or inferred bias may serve as the basis for a post-trial allegation of jury partiality. *See id.* at 172.

There is only one instance where the Second Circuit[18] has found a reason to overturn a verdict on the basis of juror nondisclosure under *McDonough* —in the case of *United States v. Parse,* 789 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2015). *Cf. Stewart,* 433 F.3d at 303 (observing, pre-*Parse,* that this "Court has never found reason to overturn a verdict on the basis of juror nondisclosure under *McDonough* and only once, . . . has remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the matter"); *United States v. Colombo,* 909 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1990) (having previously remanded to the district court to conduct post-trial hearing

[18] Defendants have relied heavily on the case of *United States v. Eubanks,* 591 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1979). (*See* Dkt. 363 at 15-16). Not only is *Eubanks* from outside the Second Circuit, but it was decided prior to *McDonough* and does not employ the two-part test. While the Court has reviewed *Eubanks,* as well as other cases outside the Circuit dealing with this issue, the Court has relied, as it must, on the decisions from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressing the issue post-*McDonough.*

regarding allegations that juror deliberately lied during *voir dire,* finding upon appeal after remand that district court's finding that juror had not intentionally withheld information was not clearly erroneous).

Parse involved a situation where, after a verdict was returned in favor of the Government, a juror sent a letter to the Government praising its performance but lamenting the acquittals on some of the counts as to one of the defendants (Parse). 789 F.3d at 90. That letter prompted further investigation by defense counsel and a revelation that the juror had lied extensively during *voir dire* about her criminal history, her background, and a host of other information, including the fact that she was an attorney facing disciplinary action. *Id.* at 91. The district court ordered an evidentiary hearing to go forward, and the juror initially refused to appear, prompting an arrest warrant to be issued. *Id.* The hearing ultimately went forward, and the juror admitted lying during *voir dire* "to make herself more 'marketable' as a juror. . . ." *Id.* In other words, the juror admitted that she created a fictional profile to make herself more attractive as a juror. *Id.* at 91-92. The district court concluded that the juror's false answers "were attributable neither to a desire to avoid embarrassment nor to honest mistakes," *id.* at 92, but rather were "premeditated and deliberate," *id.* at 93 (quoting *United States v. Daugerdas,* 867 F.Supp.2d 445, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)). The district court further concluded that the juror "was 'a pathological liar and utterly untrustworthy,'" describing the lies as

"breathtaking" and "calculated to prevent the Court and the parties from learning her true identity, which would have prevented her from serving on the jury." *Id.* at 92 (quoting *Daugerdas,* 867 F.Supp.2d at 468-70). The juror lied in response to clear and unambiguous *voir dire* questions, and the district court rejected any contention that the juror was somehow confused by the questions, particularly given her status as an attorney. *Id.* Moreover, the events about which the juror lied were "recent, personally significant, and directly affected her qualifications to serve as a juror." *Id.* (quoting *Daugerdas,* 867 F.Supp.2d at 469).

> Her arrests and suspensions from the practice of law were not the result of youthful indiscretions or errors on the part of police or courts. . . . There is no dispute that [the juror] was aware of her prior convictions, her attorney disciplinary problems, and her personal injury suit at the time she answered the Court's questions under oath. There is also no question that she made a conscious decision to hide them from the Court.

Id. at 92 (quoting *Daugerdas,* 867 F.Supp.2d at 469). As a result, the district court concluded that the juror was actually biased against the defendants, but with respect to the defendant Parse, the district court concluded that his counsel was aware of these issues during the trial and failed to raise the issue until after the verdict, thus waiving any claim. *Id.* at 93, 101-02.

On appeal, the Second Circuit explained that a new trial was required where "the juror's false responses 'obstructed the *voir dire* and indicated an impermissible partiality on the juror's part.'" *Id.* at 110 (quoting *Colombo,* 869 F.2d at 151).

> Where the juror has lied for the purpose of securing a seat on the jury—a mission apparently "so powerful as to cause the juror to commit a serious crime"—it "reflect[s] an impermissible partiality on the juror's part." Such conduct not only suggests a view on the merits and/or knowledge of evidentiary facts but is also quite inconsistent with an expectation that a prospective juror will give truthful answers concerning her or his ability to weigh the evidence fairly and obey the instructions of the court. . . . [C]ertainly when possible non-objectivity is secreted and compounded by the deliberate untruthfulness of a potential juror's answer on *voir dire,* the result is deprivation of the defendant's rights to a fair trial. Where the juror has deliberately concealed information, "bias" is to be "presume[d]."

Id. at 111 (citations omitted). The Second Circuit concluded that the district court appropriately determined that the juror's presence caused the jury not to be impartial, and furthermore, that the record did not support the conclusion that Parse had waived his challenge.

> In these circumstances—in which a juror aligned herself with the government, lied pervasively in voir dire for the purpose of avoiding

> dismissal for cause, believed prior to the presentation of any evidence that the defendants were "'crooks'" and expressly mentioned [the defendant] as a target of her efforts to persuade the other jurors to convict—a refusal to order a new trial for Parse would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Id. at 120. Thus, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the motion for a new trial as to Parse. *Id.*

IV. FIRST PRONG OF *McDONOUGH*-FAILURE TO ANSWER HONESTLY MATERIAL QUESTION ON VOIR DIRE

A. General Assessment of Juror No. 3

Defendants contend that, like the juror in *Parse,* Juror No. 3 deliberately lied during *voir dire* and continued his lies during the evidentiary hearing before this Court. (*See, e.g.,* Dkt. 363 at 17; Dkt. 369 at 53). The Government contends that Juror No. 3 was tricked and attacked by defense counsel, and, at most, displayed a lack of recall and comprehension that resulted in the inaccurate answers during *voir dire* and confusion during the evidentiary hearing. (Dkt. 370 at 1-2).

An analysis of Juror No. 3's credibility under the first prong of the *McDonough* test is a more nuanced inquiry than posited by either the Government or Defendants. Having observed Juror No. 3's facial expressions, demeanor, and intonation while

he testified during the two-day evidentiary hearing, including when he responded to the Court's questions, it was apparent that Juror No. 3 had problems understanding the questions and expressing himself clearly. In part, this appeared attributable to nervousness. Juror No. 3 was questioned in open court before Defendants and their counsel, Government counsel, and a large number of spectators. The courtroom was significantly more crowded during the evidentiary hearing involving Juror No. 3 than it had been at any point during the five-week trial.[19]

The testimony must also be viewed through the lens of one with Juror No. 3's educational background. Juror No. 3 appeared neither sophisticated nor bright. He exhibited poor comprehension during the evidentiary hearing and difficulties providing understandable and clear answers. As an example, the following answers were elicited during the Court's questions:

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[19] Of course, a way to avoid this would have been for the Court to examine Juror No. 3 in chambers outside the presence of the public and without the parties being present. The Second Circuit appears to have approved this process in *United States v. Shakur,* 888 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1989), *aff'g* 723 F.Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Here, the Court ultimately adopted a process that attempted to balance the various competing interests at play, including Defendants' very real and legitimate interests in being present during any questioning of Juror No. 3 and the public's critically important right to access court proceedings. However, a downside to the process employed in this case is that, in the Court's view, it ultimately impacted Juror No. 3's testimony because of his nervousness and discomfort.

Q Do you recall being asked by me during jury selection whether you had ever been a defendant in a criminal case?

A Yes.

Q And you didn't *respond* to that question, correct?

A No.

Q And can you tell me why you didn't *respond* to that question?

A Because I didn't think it *responded* to me at the time.

Q What?

A I didn't think it *responded* to me at the time.

. . .

Q But my question was had you ever been a defendant in a criminal case. You had been a *defendant* in a criminal case, correct?

A I don't understand what you mean, your Honor.

Q So you don't know what I mean when I'm saying *defendant*—

A Yes.

(Dkt. 358 at 86-87 (emphasis added)).

The above exchange plainly depicts Juror No. 3's vocabulary challenges. He repeatedly utilizes the Court's reference to "respond" in its questions to provide his answers, even though answering the question with reference to that word is plainly an

incorrect use of the word "respond." Similarly, he exhibits difficulty understanding the meaning of the word "defendant." The Court did not view this testimony as intentionally deceptive. Juror No. 3 did not display attributes of cleverness. Rather, Juror No. 3 displayed vocabulary and comprehension issues that the Court interpreted as impacting the substance of his testimony. In the Court's view, Juror No. 3 was what he seemed: a relatively simple individual with a lack of education and sophistication who had difficulty comprehending certain areas of inquiry.[20]

Thus, in assessing Juror No. 3's credibility, the Court must exercise caution against viewing Juror No. 3's testimony from the Court's own educational or socio-economic background. As recognized by the Supreme Court, "jurors are not necessarily experts in English usage. Called as they are from all walks of life, many may be uncertain as to the meaning of terms which are relatively easily understood by lawyers and judges." *McDonough,* 464 U.S. at 555, 104 S.Ct. 845.

In addition, as discussed below, the Court finds that Juror No. 3 provided false testimony at the evidentiary hearing concerning his criminal record. However, based upon the Court's observations of Juror No. 3 during the evidentiary hearing, includ-

[20] The Court's impression of Juror No. 3 in this regard is supported by numerous exchanges that occurred throughout the two-day hearing, including, for example, the exchange concerning Juror No. 3's name and the naming of Juror No. 3's son that occurred during a sidebar discussion during the second day of the hearing. (*See* Dkt. 359 at 202-05)

ing his demeanor, tone, and facial expressions, along with the substance of his testimony, the Court does not discredit the entirety of his testimony even though some parts of it were plainly false. *See Van Buren v. Cargill, Inc.,* 10-CV-701S, 2016 WL 231399, at *7 & n.5 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2016) ("[*F*]*alsus in uno* merely permits, but does not require, a finder of fact to disregard the entirety of the testimony." (citing *United States v. Weinstein,* 452 F.2d 704, 713 (2d Cir. 1971) ("The maxim *'Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus'* has been well said to be itself 'absolutely false as a maxim of life.'" (citation omitted)).

B. Deliberate Lies

Against this backdrop, the Court must assess whether Juror No. 3 intentionally gave false answers during *voir dire.* The Court will first address the information supplied that was unrelated to the criminal background of Juror No. 3.[21]

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[21] Defendant Nix contends that Juror No. 3 intentionally misstated his marital status as "single" during *voir dire,* when in fact he is still legally married. (Dkt. 369 at 15). The Court disagrees. At the evidentiary hearing, Juror No. 3 also testified that he was "single," but then when asked follow-up questions, he revealed that he is separated but not legally divorced. (Dkt. 358 at 72, 94-95). It was also revealed at the evidentiary hearing that although Juror No. 3 saw his wife at his daughter's graduation in the prior month, before that time, he had not seen her for about three or four years. (Dkt. 359 at 213). At the *voir dire,* follow-up questions about the marital status of Juror No. 3 were not asked.

Defendant Nix also contends that Juror No. 3 failed to reveal that his brother "Derrick" was murdered in a stabbing

1. Answers Unrelated to Juror No. 3's Criminal Background

a. Burglary of Juror No. 3's Home

It was revealed at the evidentiary hearing that Juror No. 3 had his home burglarized in October 1999, but he never shared that information in response to the Court's question: "Has anyone ever been the victim of a home robbery?" (Dkt. 328 at 97). The Government argues that Juror No. 3 was the victim of a home "burglary," not a "robbery," and he was never asked during *voir dire* about being the victim of a burglary. (Dkt. 370 at 16). Although technically correct, the Court does not find the Government's argument persuasive, particularly in view of the burglaries described by other prospective jurors in response to the Court's question about a "home robbery." (*See* Dkt. 328 at 97-101).

However, based on Juror No. 3's demeanor, tone, and appearance when questioned at the evidentiary hearing about the home burglary—which occurred almost 20 years ago—the Court is convinced that the incident had completely slipped his mind. Moreover, the Court agrees with the Government's argument that no correlation exists between the violent home invasions described during the

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and the accused was acquitted at trial (Dkt. 369 at 15), but no questions during *voir dire* would have elicited this information, and furthermore, Juror No. 3 was not asked questions about this at the evidentiary hearing. (*See* Dkt. 359 at 157-58).

trial and the burglary of Juror No. 3's home, such that the trial testimony should have been expected to trigger Juror No. 3's recollection about the burglary. When he was questioned about the home burglary and his failure to disclose the information, Juror No. 3 appeared genuinely surprised that he had not earlier recalled the burglary. Moreover, the documentary evidence involving the burglary suggests that Juror No. 3's wife was the primary point of contact with law enforcement following the incident. Thus, the Court easily concludes that Juror No. 3 did not intentionally fail to disclose information about this burglary from 1999. *See, e.g., Harmon,* 21 F.Supp.3d at 1052 ("[C]ourts 'must be tolerant, as jurors may forget incidents long buried in their minds, misunderstand a question or bend the truth a bit to avoid embarrassment. The Supreme Court has held that an honest yet mistaken answer to a voir dire question rarely amounts to a constitutional violation.'" (quoting *Dyer,* 151 F.3d at 973)).

b. Criminal Convictions of Individuals "Close" to Juror No. 3

Defendants also contend that Juror No. 3 failed to disclose the criminal convictions related to his brother "Gary," his sister "Cynthia," his son, and his wife "Tracey." (Dkt. 369 at 15). The Court asked during *voir dire* whether "anyone close to" the prospective jurors had been convicted of a crime. (Dkt. 328 at 239). Juror No. 3 did not reveal any information in response to this question.

At the evidentiary hearing, in response to Nix's counsel's questions, Juror No. 3 testified that he had not seen his brother "Gary" in three or four years, and he was unaware of his brother's criminal convictions for multiple drug offenses. (Dkt. 359 at 212). Similarly, Juror No. 3 testified that he was unaware of his son's criminal convictions at the time of jury selection, and he had not seen him in about three or four years. (Dkt. 358 at 93-94; Dkt. 359 at 167, 212). Juror No. 3 also was unaware of any arrests of his wife from whom he is separated (but not legally divorced). (Dkt. 359 at 213). Juror No. 3 was not asked any questions about his knowledge of the criminal record of his sister "Cynthia," or when he last saw her.

Thus, there is no basis for the Court to conclude that Juror No. 3 failed to provide material information on this subject during *voir dire* because the record indicates that Juror No. 3 was not aware of the convictions and Juror No. 3 did not view himself as close to the individuals in question. *See, e.g., United States v. Stewart,* 317 F.Supp.2d 432, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (recognizing ambiguity in questions as to whether somebody "close" to juror had been victim of crime, and finding that defendants could not "demand a new trial because a juror failed to place the broadest possible construction on those questions"), *aff'd,* 433 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 2006).

c. Prior Jury Service

During *voir dire,* the Court questioned the prospective jurors about their prior jury service by

asking: "Has anyone ever *served* on a jury before?" (Dkt. 328 at 205 (emphasis added)). In the Court's view, the question was straightforward, and in response a number of prospective jurors provided information regarding their prior jury experience. (*Id.* at 205-13). In addition to providing the parties with information that may be utilized during peremptory challenges, the primary purpose of the Court's questions on this topic was to ensure that nothing about that prior jury service would impact a prospective juror's ability to be fair and impartial. In other words, prior jury service does not, in and of itself, normally constitute a basis for a cause challenge.

Juror No. 3 did not respond to the question during *voir dire*. This topic was addressed during both days of the evidentiary hearing. During the first day of the hearing, the Court elicited the following testimony:

> Q Have you ever *served* on any other juries?
>
> A I was called for two but they took the plea, so I didn't have to.

(Dkt. 358 at 100-01 (emphasis added)). In other words, Juror No. 3 suggested that he "didn't have to" serve on any prior juries because the cases were resolved through pleas. No follow-up questions were asked during the first day of the hearing.

During the second day of the hearing, the Court again addressed the topic during its questioning:

> Q Now, you had mentioned, I believe, that there were other occasions where you were summoned for jury duty?

A Yes.

Q And this was in state court, not federal court—

A Yes.

Q—correct? Did you ever, like, actually *get selected* or did you get put in the box?

A I was selected.

. . .

Q On how many occasions were you selected?

A Once.

Q And do you remember the type of case?

A No, I don't.

Q Was it civil or criminal?

A I believe it was criminal.

Q But the case, the jury did not ultimately deliberate in that case?

A No, the person took the plea.

. . .

Q How long ago was this where you were *selected to serve* on a jury?

A A few years ago.

. . .

Q And is that the only other time that you've been called for jury service, other than this incident?

A There was one other time before that, too.

Q And were you *selected* in that case?

A Nope.

Q Did you ever get put into the box and asked questions?

A No.

Q And this was before the other time that you just mentioned?

A Yes.

Q Do you know how long ago that was?

A Probably about a year before that.

(Dkt. 359 at 168-70 (emphasis added)).

When questioned by counsel for McCoy, Juror No. 3 initially denied any recollection of being asked about prior jury service during *voir dire,* responding "[i]t was a long day." (*Id.* at 193). Counsel for McCoy then asked the questions again:

Q And do you recall her [the Court] asking if anybody had ever *sat on a jury* before?

A Yes.

Q And do you recall whether or not you answered that question?

A No, I don't.

Q Did you tell her that you sat on a jury before?

A I don't know if I told her yes or no.

(*Id.* at 193-94 (emphasis added)).

The Court believes the questions about prior jury service were straightforward, particularly in light of the responses of the other prospective jurors, including one prospective juror who indicated that, like Juror No. 3, he had been selected for a jury but "about halfway through the case the defendant copped a plea." (*See* Dkt. 328 at 211). As a result, Juror No. 3 should have disclosed his prior selection to serve on a jury in response to the Court's *voir dire* questions, even though that jury ultimately did not deliberate.

However, the Court is hard-pressed to conclude that Juror No. 3 intentionally withheld this information in response to the Court's questions, or somehow tried to deliberately mislead the Court and the parties by not revealing this information. There is no conceivable reason for Juror No. 3 not wanting to disclose this information. The explanation for Juror No. 3's non-disclosure could be his misunderstanding of the scope of the question—equating prior "service" as requiring actual deliberation—and again, the Court must assess Juror No. 3's responses in view of his educational background and perceived comprehension issues as noted above. Alternatively, the explanation could simply be attributed to Juror No. 3 being distracted and not paying close enough attention to the questions that were being asked at that point during *voir dire* (which was later in the day). Under any scenario, the Court does not believe that Juror No. 3 intentionally withheld this information or intentionally lied about this topic during *voir dire*. Moreover, even if Juror No. 3 intentionally lied about his

prior jury service, the Court has difficulty concluding that that the subject dealt with a "material" issue as required under the *McDonough* test.

d. Summary of Findings

For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Juror No. 3 did not deliberately fail to honestly answer the *voir dire* questions related to the home burglary in 1999 and the criminal history of anyone "close" to him. The Court's assessment of Juror No. 3's answers (or lack thereof) concerning prior jury service is a closer call, but on balance, the Court concludes that Juror No. 3 did not intentionally fail to reveal information during *voir dire* about that prior jury service, and even if he had, the information about Juror No. 3's prior jury service would not, in and of itself, rise to the level of materiality required under the first prong of the *McDonough* test.

2. Answers Related to Juror No. 3's Criminal Background

Whether Juror No. 3 deliberately lied about his criminal background during *voir dire* is a more difficult question. The questions related to Juror No. 3's criminal background were included in the questionnaire mailed in advance to prospective jurors, which asked:

> "Have you ever been convicted, either by your guilty or nolo contendere plea or by a court or jury trial, of a state or federal crime for which

> punishment could have been more than one year in prison?"

(Court Ex. 15). Juror No. 3 incorrectly answered this question by checking "No." (*Id.*). In addition, Juror No. 3 did not respond to the following *voir dire* questions asked of the panel as whole: "Has anyone ever been a defendant in a criminal case?" (Dkt. 328 at 214) and, "Has anyone ever visited a jail of correctional facility other than in connection with . . . your educational curriculum?" (*id.* at 229).

In assessing whether Juror No. 3 deliberately lied in responding to these questions (or in not responding), the Court must recognize that two jurors (Juror No. 3 and T.P.) failed to accurately respond to the Court's questions on these topics. Certainly, the Court could justifiably conclude that these two individuals intentionally attempted to mislead the Court and the parties about their criminal background. However, it is at least arguable that more direct questioning during *voir dire* on this topic may have elicited the information. In other words, the information may have been disclosed if the Court had directly asked each juror whether he or she had been "arrested" (a question that was not asked), "convicted" of "any crime" (again, a question that was not asked), or ever "been to a jail" (as opposed to a "visit" to a jail, as was asked).

Although the Court accepts full responsibility for the framing of the questions, Defendants never requested any follow-up on these issues during *voir*

dire. *See* Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a)(2)(B) ("If the court examines the jurors, it must permit the attorneys for the parties to submit further questions that the court may ask if it considers them proper."). In fact, it was the Government that wanted these issues explored further during the *voir dire*. (*See* Dkt. 328 at 227 (asking that the Court ask whether "anyone close to you" had been a defendant in a criminal case, and whether any prospective juror had "visited a jail")). Moreover, neither Defendant proposed questions regarding the prospective jurors' criminal background as part of their requested *voir dire* questions. (*See* Dkt. 173 (McCoy proposed *voir dire*); Dkt. 178 (Nix proposed *voir dire*)). Again, it was the Government that requested questions on this topic as part of its proposed *voir dire* questions. (*See* Dkt. 170 at 6).

Juror No. 3 unquestionably failed to reveal his criminal record in response to the juror questionnaire and the Court's *voir dire* questions. By all accounts, the convictions at issue occurred before Juror No. 3 reached the age of 21, and that was the explanation offered by Juror No. 3 as to why he did not reveal the convictions: he did not believe that they counted because of their age (approximately 30 years old). (*See* Dkt. 358 at 74, 85-87).[22] Juror

[22] Although there was evidence of two domestic violence incidents after Juror No. 3 reached the age of 21 (*see* Court Ex. 16 (incident from 1999) and Court Ex. 18 (incident from 1993)), Juror No. 3 could not recall one of the incidents, and he denied being arrested in connection with the incident that he did recall. (Dkt. 359 at 176-177). The documents reflecting these incidents do not plainly indicate that an arrest was

No. 3 also told the Court that that was the reason he did not respond affirmatively to the question about visiting a jail (*id.* at 88-89), and he also told McCoy's counsel that he assumed the question was directed at "visiting" another individual as opposed to serving time in jail himself (Dkt. 359 at 197).

The problem with accepting Juror No. 3's explanation is that he plainly provided false testimony at the evidentiary hearing regarding his criminal record. In other words, although it is at least debatable whether Juror No. 3 lied about his criminal history during *voir dire,* there is no question that he lied about his criminal history during the evidentiary hearing. Juror No. 3 initially denied any recollection of a felony conviction other than the one related to the clothing store burglary, but then, upon further questioning, he did admit to the felony conviction involving the stolen vehicle. (Dkt. 358 at 75-76, 80, 87-88).

Juror No. 3 exhibited a hazy recollection of his criminal record, including the two felony convictions. Although Juror No. 3's poor recollection is understandable in view of the convictions' temporal remoteness, the age of the convictions cannot

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made (*see* Court Ex. 18 (indicating that a "warrant" is "advised"), nor is there any information in the record about the disposition with respect to these incidents (*see* Gov't Ex. 900 (criminal history printout run on the NYSID database for Juror No. 3, which does not contain any reference to arrests for these domestic violence incidents)). Thus, based on the record before the Court, it does not appear that Juror No. 3 would have needed to disclose this information in response to either the questionnaire or the *voir dire* questions.

explain Juror No. 3's false testimony that he was wrongly accused of both the clothing store burglary and stolen vehicle incident. (*Id.* at 79, 84-85). Juror No. 3 first claimed that he did not actually burglarize the clothing store or know the criminal purpose of the visit to the clothing store. (*Id.* at 84-85; Dkt. 359 at 180). Similarly, Juror No. 3 denied stealing a vehicle. (Dkt. 358 at 85).

However, during the second day of the hearing, when confronted with his signed confessions regarding these two incidents, Juror No. 3 admitted that he was involved in the clothing store burglary and that he had earlier testified falsely regarding the event. (Dkt. 359 at 179-84, 231). Juror No. 3 also admitted, in response to Nix's counsel's questions, to stealing a vehicle and switching the license plates. (*Id.* at 225).

Additionally, although Juror No. 3 denied any recollection of spending time in jail other than the six months spent in shock camp, the documentary evidence in this case suggests that Juror No. 3 spent six months in the Monroe County Jail for the stolen vehicle conviction in 1988. (Court Ex. 21). In addition, although the Court agrees with the Government that, to some extent, the so-called admissions that defense counsel—particularly Nix's counsel—procured during the evidentiary hearing are not particularly helpful to any credibility assessment given the tone and nature of the questioning,[24] the fact is that Juror No. 3 lied during

[24] For example, at the end of the second day of the hearing, when being questioned by Nix's counsel, the following exchange occurred:

the evidentiary hearing in response to *the Court's questions*. Juror No. 3 was not tricked—he deliberately offered false testimony at the evidentiary hearing regarding his criminal history.

The Court does not doubt that Juror No. 3's inaccurate testimony regarding his criminal record was due, in part, to the age of the convictions. However,

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> Q How many times have you been to jail?
>
> A I don't know. I don't think about how many time I been to jail. I don't know. I don't look at my record. I don't think about it so I don't know.
>
> Q Does seven sound right?
>
> A I don't know. . . . I don't know. You tell me. I don't know.
>
> Q So you would need someone to tell you how many times you've been to jail?
>
> A Like I said, I don't think about it. It's not something I get up in the morning and think about. I don't think about that stuff.
>
> . . .
>
> Q Do you think you've been to jail more than five times?
>
> A Probably.

(Dkt. 359 at 217-18). Although the Court allowed this line of questioning and overruled the Government's objections, it was apparent to the Court that Juror No. 3 was extremely frustrated at this point, and the exchange quoted above is not helpful to the Court in assessing Juror No. 3's credibility or discovering the truth about his times in jail. In other words, although Juror No. 3 likely was incarcerated for more than just the six months in shock camp, and although the documentary evidence in the form of the certified certificate of conviction marked as Court Exhibit 21 at least suggests that he also spent six months in the Monroe County Jail, the reality is that the record is unclear as to the exact amount of incarceration served by Juror No. 3.

given Juror No. 3's false testimony during the evidentiary hearing about his culpability for the two felony convictions, the Court does not credit Juror No. 3's explanation that he was confused by the *voir dire* questions or thought that the questions applied to criminal convictions only after the age of 21. Based on Juror No. 3's continued refusal to disclose the full extent of his criminal history during the evidentiary hearing—until faced with documentary evidence of the same—the Court concludes that Juror No. 3 failed to respond truthfully to the juror questionnaire and the Court's *voir dire* questions as they pertained to both his criminal convictions and his exposure to a jail.

However, this finding does not mean that the Court concludes that Juror No. 3 provided false information about his criminal record in an effort to intentionally deceive the Court so as to be selected to serve on the jury. Here, Juror No. 3 did not lie "for the purpose of securing a seat on the jury," *Parse,* 789 F.3d at 111, nor can his lies be characterized as "premeditated and deliberate" so as to hide his true identity and ensure his selection on the jury, *id.* at 92-93. Rather, as revealed by Juror No. 3's continued lies at the evidentiary hearing, his motives had nothing to do with securing a seat on this jury. The Government granted Juror No. 3 immunity for his testimony at the evidentiary hearing *except for any perjured testimony,* and yet Juror No. 3 refused to be honest about his criminal past at the hearing until confronted with documentary evidence. Juror No. 3 repeatedly testified at the evidentiary hearing that he does think about or

focus on his criminal record. A more sophisticated witness may have been able to articulate a reason for his refusal to be honest about his criminal past—whether it be embarrassment, concern that the criminal record could impact his job as a cleaner, or a desire to simply block that part of his distant past. Instead, Juror No. 3 testified that he did not believe the convictions counted because they occurred before he was 21 years old. Juror No. 3 has applied a similar interpretation when answering juror questionnaires in the past.

The Court is not persuaded that Juror No. 3 misunderstood the scope of the questions as only applying to convictions at the age of 21 and older, when responding to either this Court or other courts in the past. However, the Court is convinced that the reason for Juror No. 3's inaccurate responses is not some nefarious motive; rather, the reason more likely originates from the simple fact that, at 47 years old, Juror No. 3 would prefer to shut out any recollection of his criminal history—the most recent of which (if the domestic violence incident from 1999 is included) was about 20 years ago, and most of which occurred when he was a teenager. *Cf. Parse,* 789 F.3d at 111 ("Where the juror has lied for the purpose of securing a seat on the jury—a mission apparently 'so powerful as to cause the juror to commit a serious crime'—it 'reflect[s] an impermissible partiality on the juror's part. . . .' In the present case, the record amply supports the findings of the district court that [the juror] repeatedly lied during voir dire. . . and that she did so in order to be chosen as a juror." (quoting

Colombo, 869 F.2d at 151) (emphasis added)); *Langford,* 990 F.2d at 69 ("[A] juror who . . . has deliberately responded falsely to a material question on voir dire precisely because she wanted to sit on the case, should be presumed not to be impartial." (emphasis added)).

Thus, although the Court finds that Juror No. 3 testified falsely about certain information during the hearing that was conducted on June 12 and 14, 2017, it rejects the notion that Juror No. 3 testified falsely about *all* matters that were covered during that hearing, and it further rejects the notion that Juror No. 3 intentionally deceived the Court during *voir dire* as to his criminal history so as to gain a seat on the jury. Although Juror No. 3's *voir dire* answers regarding his criminal history were inaccurate, the Court cannot conclude that they rise to the level of intentional falsehood necessary to satisfy the first prong of the *McDonough* test.

V. SECOND PRONG OF *McDONOUGH*—BIAS

The Court concedes that the issues at play concerning the inaccuracy of Juror No. 3's disclosed criminal history with respect to the first prong of the *McDonough* test present a close question. Moreover, as noted above, the second prong of the *McDonough* test is the most critical. Thus, the Court will proceed to consider whether a correct response to the Court's *voir dire* questions would have required excusing Juror No. 3 for cause—in other words, whether the Court would have granted a hypothetical challenge if Juror No. 3 had

responded accurately to the Court's questions. Unlike the first prong, resolution of the second prong is not a close question. The Court concludes that Juror No. 3's lies, even if deliberate, did not evidence partiality so as to violate the Sixth Amendment.

As an initial matter, with the exception of Juror No. 3's prior criminal record, none of the other alleged inaccurate *voir dire* responses from Juror No. 3 would have even triggered a challenge for cause. Other jurors responded by disclosing prior jury service, being close to those who had been convicted of a crime, and being the victims of home burglaries (including suffering the theft of jewelry and other items of value (*see* Dkt. 328 at 97-101)). Yet none of those prospective jurors were challenged for cause, nor could they have been appropriately challenged for cause.

In addition, in many respects, the Court does not need to analyze how it would have handled a hypothetical challenge for cause due to Juror No. 3's criminal record, because, in the Court's view, based on Defendants' reaction to the disclosure of T.P.'s criminal history, Defendants would *not* have made a cause challenge. The Court is hard-pressed to credit Defendants' new-found aversion to jury service by a convicted felon given their reaction to the disclosure that T.P. was a convicted felon, and particularly when (at least Nix) continues to press the issue related to T.P. in post-verdict motion practice. *Defendants* would not have challenged Juror No. 3 for cause if he had revealed the full extent of his criminal history during *voir dire*—rather, the

Government would have likely claimed bias and sought to excuse Juror No. 3.[26]

Notwithstanding the above, the Court will examine whether actual bias, implied bias or inferred bias is properly attributable to Juror No. 3.

A. Actual Bias

The Second Circuit has described actual bias as follows:

> Actual bias is "bias in fact"—the existence of a state of mind that leads to an inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality. A juror is found by the judge to be partial either because the juror admits partiality, or the judge finds actual partiality based upon the juror's voir dire answers.

Torres, 128 F.3d at 43 (citations omitted). "[A] finding of actual bias 'is based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge's province.'" *Id.* at 44 (quoting *Wainwright v. Witt,* 469 U.S. 412, 428, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)).

The record in this case is barren of any evidence of actual bias on the part of Juror No. 3 against Defendants. Indeed, although Defendants argue in a conclusory manner that the convictions should be

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[26] Of course, if Juror No. 3's criminal history was revealed during *voir dire,* he would have been statutorily disqualified pursuant to the JSSA, as opposed to any common-law based cause challenge. However, as discussed above, given the procedural posture of this case, it is too late to launch a challenge pursuant to the JSSA.

set aside because of actual bias, they make no real attempt to demonstrate actual bias. (*See, e.g.,* Dkt. 363 at 17 (merely listing that "[t]he testimony of Juror # 3 demonstrated actual, implied or inferred bias")).

This was plainly not a case of Juror No. 3 wanting to hide information about his past to make himself more marketable as a juror, like the juror in *Parse*. Early in the *voir dire,* Juror No. 3 expressed reservations about serving because of his job responsibilities. (Dkt. 328 at 41). During the jury selection, Juror No. 3 was frustrated with the Court about the length of the proceedings (*see* Dkt. 359 at 238-39), and in fact, once selected to serve, he left the courtroom as the Court was still informing the jurors about some housekeeping matters (*see* Dkt. 327 at 32).

Moreover, the Court's observations of Juror No. 3—both during *voir dire* and throughout the trial—led to the inescapable conclusion that Juror No. 3 was by no means an overzealous or enthusiastic juror. Juror No. 3 had expressive features that the Court interpreted as reflecting his displeasure with being selected to sit on a 5-week trial. Juror No. 3 did his duty, but his body language did not depict somebody who was relishing the experience.

McCoy contends that Juror No. 3's expressed displeasure with the lateness of the proceedings on the day of jury selection should not be taken to infer that he was not enthusiastic about serving on the jury. (Dkt. 363 at 19). However, that is not the only basis for the Court's conclusion that Juror No. 3 was not pleased about being selected to serve on

the jury. His facial expressions and body language throughout the trial caused the Court to conclude that, if he had a choice, Juror No. 3 would have elected not to sit on the jury. This included rolling his eyes at the Court when the jury had to be repeatedly excused from the courtroom during the defense presentation of the case, and appearing displeased when the court was in session for full days.

Given the fact that Juror No. 3 was working at nights to keep up with his cleaning business (Dkt. 358 at 98 (Juror No. 3 testifying that he worked until 1:00 AM after serving on the jury)), it is certainly understandable that he was not savoring the experience of sitting on this case. Indeed, it was a long trial, and perhaps each of the jurors would have elected to be someplace else if given the choice. Regardless, this Court had the definite and firm impression that Juror No. 3 was less than pleased when selected to serve on the jury.

As a result, the Court was quite surprised when, during the hearing, Juror No. 3 initially testified that, in fact, he wanted to serve "[b]ecause I was picked. It's my right, I'm assuming." (Dkt. 358 at 44). Ultimately, Juror No. 3 gave varying responses about his interest in serving, and the Court believes that Juror No. 3 was initially confused by the Court's questioning. (*See id.* at 96-100). Yet, given Juror No. 3's varying statements about his interest in serving on the jury, the Court cannot rely on the substance of Juror No. 3's testimony in assessing this issue—what Juror No. 3 said on this topic is of little or no value. However, the Court has

considered its observations of Juror No. 3 throughout the trial. It also believes Juror No. 3's reaction in the form of tone, facial expression, and demeanor, to a particular line of questioning by the Government at the hearing, was revealing:

> Q . . . did you have in your mind, I'm not going to say anything about my 27-year-old felony conviction because that way I can wind up on this jury?
>
> A (Laughing.)
>
> Q Is that what happened?
>
> A No, it's not.
>
> Q You laughed when I said that. Does that seem ridiculous in your mind?
>
> A Yes, it does.
>
> Q Why is that ridiculous to you?
>
> A Because I have better things to do than to sit here for five weeks. If I knew that, I would have told her then and I wouldn't have been on the jury at all.

(Dkt. 359 at 236-37).

There is no evidence that Juror No. 3 knew that disclosure of his criminal record would have disqualified him from jury service. The Court believes that if Juror No. 3 had known this information, his reluctance to be honest about his criminal history would have likely been overcome by a desire to avoid jury service. In sum, the Court finds that there is no evidence of actual bias on the part of

Juror No. 3, in favor of or against either the Government or Defendants. Even evaluating the facts in the light most favorable to Defendants (which is not the standard), no actual bias has been shown in this case. There is just no proof that Juror No. 3 intentionally lied to smuggle his way onto the jury.

B. Implied Bias

Implied bias is reserved for "extreme situations," *Greer,* 285 F.3d at 172 (quoting *Smith v. Phillips,* 455 U.S. 209, 222, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982)), and "'deals mainly with jurors who are related to the parties or who were victims of the alleged crime itself,'" *id.* (quoting *Torres,* 128 F.3d at 45). As explained by the Second Circuit:

> Implied or presumed bias is "bias conclusively presumed as a matter of law." It is attributed to a prospective juror regardless of actual partiality. In contrast to the inquiry for actual bias, which focuses on whether the record at voir dire supports a finding that the juror was in fact partial, the issue for implied basis is whether an average person in the position of the juror in controversy would be prejudiced. And in determining whether a prospective juror is impliedly biased, "his statements upon voir dire [about his ability to be impartial] are totally irrelevant."

Torres, 128 F.3d at 45 (citations omitted). It is unsettled in the Second Circuit whether implied bias may serve as the basis for a post-trial allegation of jury partiality. *See Greer,* 285 F.3d at 172.

This is not a case of implied bias. There is no fact in the record which, had it been elicited during jury selection, would have required the Court to automatically assume bias on the part of Juror No. 3 or that Juror No. 3 was prejudiced against Defendants or in favor of the Government. Juror No. 3 is not related to any of the parties, victims, witnesses, attorneys, and he was not a victim of the charged crimes. Moreover, as discussed above, Juror No. 3's felon status does not justify a *per se* finding of bias as a matter of law. At best, Defendants cite to Juror No. 3's potential knowledge of one of the identified law enforcement witnesses in the case (who never ultimately testified) because he is the same individual who investigated Juror No. 3's clothing store burglary. Yet, even if Juror No. 3 recalled the name of the investigator (and there is no evidence that he did), this would not support a finding of implied bias against Defendants.

C. Inferred Bias

From a review of Defendants' submissions, it is apparent that the central focus of their argument is that it should be inferred, from Juror No. 3's inaccurate answers and undisclosed information, that he was biased against Defendants. "[A] finding of inferred bias is, by definition, within the discretion of the trial court." *Id.* As explained by the Second Circuit in *Torres*:

> Bias may be inferred when a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial

judge discretion to excuse the juror for cause, but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of bias. There is no *actual* bias because there is no finding of partiality based upon either the juror's own admission or the judge's evaluation of the juror's demeanor and credibility following voir dire questioning as to bias. And there is no *implied* bias because the disclosed fact does not establish the kind of relationship between the juror and the parties or issues in the case that mandates the juror's excusal for cause.

Nonetheless, inferable bias is closely linked to both of these traditional categories. Just as the trial court's finding of actual bias must derive from voir dire questioning, so the court is allowed to dismiss a juror on the ground of inferable bias only after having received responses from the juror that permit an inference that the juror in question would not be able to decide the matter objectively. . . . [O]nce facts are elicited that permit a finding of inferable bias, then, just as in the situation of implied bias, the juror's statements as to his or her ability to be impartial become irrelevant. . . .

[C]ases in which a juror has engaged in activities that closely approximate those of the defendant on trial are particularly apt [for an inference of bias].

128 F.3d at 47.[27] Like implied bias, it is unsettled in the Second Circuit whether inferred bias may serve as the basis for a post-trial challenge based on jury partiality. *See Greer,* 285 F.3d at 172.

As an initial matter, the Court must assess any claim of inferred bias in light of Defendants' attitude about Juror No. 3 before they were convicted. Defendants wanted Juror No. 3—the only African American male remaining after the removal of T.P.—on the jury. During the first day of the trial, the Court raised an issue after opening statements as to whether Juror No. 3 had dozed off during the Government's opening statement.[29] The Court observed that Juror No. 3 had made a noise that could have been a snore, and the Government observed that his eyes were closed and then opened after making the noise. In response, defense counsel denied that Juror No. 3 had his eyes closed or

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[27] It should be noted that *Torres* is factually distinguishable from the instant case, in that it dealt with a trial court's exercise of discretion during *voir dire* to excuse a prospective juror who had engaged in criminal conduct similar to the crimes on trial—as opposed to a challenge to a juror post-verdict. In any event, *Torres* simply stands for the proposition that the trial judge "acted within her discretion in finding that the 'inquiries made of [Juror No. 7] revealed a sufficient factual basis' to allow the court to draw the inference—especially given the hypertechnical nature of the offense of structuring—that that the juror would be unable to divorce her consideration of this case from her own structuring experience." 128 F.3d at 48.

[29] The Court's recitation of this part of the trial is based upon its notes, since a transcript has not yet been prepared for this part of the trial.

was sleeping, and objected to the Court making any further inquiry. The Court indicated that it would continue to observe Juror No. 3 (as well as the rest of the jurors), and, ultimately, no further inquiry was required. However, defense counsels' objections demonstrate that they perceived Juror No. 3 as an individual who was potentially in their corner, not the opposite. Indeed, Defendants' attitude in this regard is only further reinforced by their reaction to the removal of the other African American male (T.P.) because of his undisclosed felony convictions. *See Stewart,* 317 F.Supp.2d at 439 (rejecting defendants' argument that nondisclosures by juror would have provided sufficient basis for a challenge for cause, citing to defendants' "vigorous[]" argument against the Government's challenge to another prospective juror who failed to disclose similar information).

Additionally, the information disclosed about Juror No. 3's criminal history does not support an inference of bias against Defendants. The fact that Juror No. 3 has been previously arrested and convicted of two prior felonies—including convicted for burglarizing a clothing store and possibly arrested for burglarizing a home[30]—does not justify a finding of bias against Defendants, and Defendants cannot articulate any reasonable basis for conclud-

[30] There is some evidence in the record that Juror No. 3 may have been arrested for burglarizing a home in May of 1989 (when he was 19 years old). However, Juror No. 3 had no recollection of this alleged incident, and there is no evidence that he was convicted of this crime. (*See* Dkt. 358 at 84).

ing otherwise. The fact that neither Defendant requested that any issue about prospective jurors' criminal histories be explored during *voir dire,* necessarily reflects Defendants' lack of concern with having criminals serve on the jury. Rather, this was the Government's concern, and in fact, McCoy even admits that it would have been the Government who challenged Juror No. 3 for cause if his criminal history had been revealed. (Dkt. 372 at 9). *See Stewart,* 317 F.Supp.2d at 442 ("[D]efendants have still failed to demonstrate how that information would have supported a for-cause challenge of [the juror]. It is difficult to see how information concerning [the juror's] son's conviction for an attempted robbery—a crime unrelated to the crimes charged in this case—could justify an inference that [the juror] would be biased against these defendants. If anything, a prospective juror with a family member who had been convicted of a crime would more likely be considered biased in *favor* of criminal defendants.").

Similarly, Nix contends that Juror No. 3 is biased because he "had bad experiences with law enforcement." (Dkt. 369 at 12). Not only is there no evidence of this in the record, but even if that was correct, any potential bias would be more likely directed at the Government, not Defendants. Again, to support this point, one need only review the focus of Defendants' and the Government's requested *voir dire.* (*See* Dkt. 170 at 5; Dkt. 173 at 2-3; Dkt. 178 at 2-5).

The primary thrust of Defendants' claimed inferred bias is the contention that Juror No. 3

must have been biased against Defendants because he would have necessarily identified with the cooperators in this case. However, just because Juror No. 3 was a defendant in the criminal justice system with co-defendants does not mean that he actively cooperated with law enforcement. There is no evidence that Juror No. 3 was offered some benefit in exchange for cooperation against any co-defendant or that he testified against co-defendants. At best, there is evidence that Juror No. 3 confessed to his crimes and implicated his co-defendants. There is just no evidence in the record to support the inference that, because of his criminal past, Juror No. 3 sympathized with the cooperating witnesses in this case, and thus was biased against Defendants.

More to the point, Juror No. 3's criminal history is from some 30 years ago. That criminal history is just too remote to support a finding of inferred bias. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Juror No. 3's criminal past reflected bias against Defendants, let alone that it even came into his thought processes when sitting on this jury. In fact, by all accounts, Juror No. 3 went to great lengths to avoid any thoughts about his criminal past.

Moreover, this Court genuinely believes that Juror No. 3 had no recollection of being the victim of a home burglary, but, even if he did recall that incident, the remoteness and lack of similarity to the crimes at issue in this case again negates any finding of inferred bias. In other words, the Court has necessarily taken into account not just its findings about Juror No. 3's failure to respond accu-

rately during *voir dire* concerning his criminal history, but also the other claims made by Defendants as to Juror No. 3's alleged false answers, including the fact that Juror No. 3 was a victim of a home burglary about 20 years ago and his various family members' alleged criminal records. Even crediting Defendants' allegations about Juror No. 3's false answers, the Court cannot conclude that this supports an inference of bias against Defendants on the part of Juror No. 3. The incidents are just too remote and, on balance, do not support a finding of bias against Defendants.

In sum, the record does not provide a basis to infer bias. Even if the first prong of the *McDonough* test was satisfied, there is no evidence of extreme deceit (such as in *Parse*) that would support the showing required under *McDonough*'s second prong. Put simply, the Court does not believe that the "deliberateness of [Juror No. 3's] particular lies evidenced partiality," *Stewart,* 433 F.3d at 305 (citation omitted); and even if Juror No. 3 did intentionally attempt to deceive the Court, the deliberateness of his lies is not sufficiently intentional or premeditated so as to, in and of themselves, establish bias under the second prong. *Cf. Colombo,* 869 F.2d at 151 (if juror deliberately provided false information by not disclosing that brother-in-law was a lawyer for the government so that she could sit on the case, then both prongs of *McDonough* would be satisfied).

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Defendants' motions pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 (Dkt. 286; Dkt. 289) to the extent the motions are based upon Juror No. 3's alleged bias.

SO ORDERED.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term, 2019

(Argued: October 23, 2019
Final Briefs Submitted: January 3, 2020

Decided: April 22, 2021)

Docket Nos. 17-3515(L), 17-3516, 18-619, 18-625

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

—v.—

EARL MCCOY, aka P, MATTHEW NIX, aka Meech, aka Mack, aka Mackey,

*Defendants-Appellants**.

Before: KEARSE, PARKER, and SULLIVAN, *Circuit Judges*.

Appeals in Nos. 17-3515 and 17-3516 from judgments of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, Elizabeth A. Wolford, *Judge,* convicting each defendant of Hobbs Act conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 951(a); Hobbs Act robbery and attempted robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2; brandish-

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* The Clerk of Court is instructed to amend the official caption to conform with the above.

ing firearms during and in relation to crimes of violence, to wit, the Hobbs Act conspiracy, Hobbs Act robbery, and Hobbs Act attempted robbery counts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(C)(i) and 2; conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute marijuana and heroin, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(D); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2); convicting defendant McCoy of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 2; convicting defendant Nix of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(C)(i) and 2; and sentencing defendants McCoy and Nix principally to imprisonment for 135 years and 155 years, respectively.

In Nos. 18-619 and 18-625, defendants appeal from an order of the district court denying their postjudgment motions for reconsideration of the denial of their postverdict motions seeking a new trial on the ground that one of the jurors had given false responses to voir dire questions with regard to whether he had previously been convicted of a felony. *See United States v. Nix,* No. 6:14-CR-06181, 2018 WL 1009282 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2018); *United States v. Nix,* 275 F.Supp.3d 420 (W.D.N.Y. 2017).

On appeal, defendants contend principally (a) that they were entitled to a new trial on the ground that the juror's false voir dire responses violated their rights to be tried before a fair and impartial jury; (b) that their firearm-brandishing convictions

should be reversed on the ground that none of their Hobbs Act offenses are predicate crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); (c) that in light of *Rehaif v. United States,* 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on an essential element of the § 922(g)(1) charges of being felons in possession of firearms; and (d) that they are entitled to reduction of their sentences under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194.

Finding merit in the contention that Hobbs Act conspiracy is not a § 924(c) crime of violence, *see United States v. Barrett,* 937 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2019), we reverse defendants' § 924(c) convictions on Count 2 for brandishing firearms predicated on Hobbs Act conspiracy. Defendants' convictions on all other counts, as well as the denial of their motions for a new trial, are affirmed. The matter is remanded for resentencing, and for consideration by the district court of what relief, if any, may be appropriate under the First Step Act.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings with regard to sentencing.

ROBERT MARANGOLA, Assistant United States Attorney, Rochester, New York (James P, Kennedy, Jr., United States Attorney for the Western District of New York, Tiffany H. Lee, Assistant United States Attorney, Rochester, New York, on the brief), *for Appellee.*

ROBERT W. WOOD, Rochester, New York, *for Defendant-Appellant Earl McCoy.*

MICHAEL JOS. WITMER, Rochester, New York, *for Defendant-Appellant Matthew Nix.*

KEARSE, *Circuit Judge:*

Defendants Earl McCoy and Matthew Nix appeal in Nos. 17-3515 and 17-3516, respectively, from judgments entered in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York following a jury trial before Elizabeth A. Wolford, *Judge,* convicting each defendant on one count of Hobbs Act conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); one count of Hobbs Act robbery and two counts of Hobbs Act attempted robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2; four counts of brandishing firearms during and in relation to crimes of violence, to wit, the Hobbs Act conspiracy, Hobbs Act robbery, and Hobbs Act attempted robbery counts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(C)(i) and 2; one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute marijuana and heroin, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(D); and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2); convicting McCoy on one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 2; and convicting Nix on one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(C)(i) and 2. McCoy and Nix were sentenced principally to imprisonment for 135 years and 155 years, respectively.

In Nos. 18-619 and 18-625, respectively, McCoy and Nix appeal from an order of the district court denying their postjudgment motions for reconsideration of the denial of their postverdict motions seeking a new trial on the ground that one of the jurors had given false responses to voir dire questions with regard to whether he had previously been convicted of a felony.

On appeal, defendants contend principally (a) that they are entitled to a new trial on the ground that the juror's false voir dire responses violated their rights to be tried before a fair and impartial jury *(see* Part II.A. below); (b) that their firearm brandishing convictions should be reversed, and those counts dismissed, on the ground that none of their Hobbs Act offenses are predicate crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) *(see* Part II.B. below); (c) that in light of *Rehaif v. United States,* 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on an essential element of the § 922(g)(1) charges of being felons in possession of firearms *(see* Part II.C.1. below); and (d) that they are entitled to reduction of their sentences under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 ("First Step Act") *(see* Part II.D. below). Nix also makes brief sufficiency and instructional challenges.

Finding merit in the contention that Hobbs Act conspiracy is not a § 924(c) crime of violence, *see, e.g., United States v. Barrett,* 937 F.3d 126 (2d Cir.

2019), we reverse defendants' § 924(c) convictions on Count 2 for brandishing firearms predicated on Hobbs Act conspiracy. Defendants' convictions on all other counts, as well as the denial of their motions for a new trial, are affirmed. The matter is remanded for defendants' resentencing, and for consideration by the district court of what relief, if any, may be appropriate under the First Step Act.

I. BACKGROUND

The present prosecution focused on a series of home invasions in the Rochester, New York area in September and October 2014. The operative superseding indictment ("Indictment") alleged that McCoy and Nix, along with others including Clarence Lambert, Jecovious Barnes, Jessica Moscicki, and Gary Lambert, unlawfully conspired and attempted to rob other persons of commodities that had been shipped and transported in interstate and foreign commerce, such as diamonds, watches, United States currency, and narcotics, and conspired to traffic in the stolen narcotics. Clarence Lambert (or "Clarence") and Gary Lambert (or "Gary") are McCoy's younger brothers.

The government's evidence at the five-week trial of McCoy and Nix principally included testimony by Barnes, Moscicki, and Gary Lambert, who had entered into plea agreements with the government; testimony by victims of four home invasions; and cellular telephone records indicating that McCoy and Nix were in the immediate vicinity of the invasions, corroborating victim testimony about phone

calls made during the robberies. Taken in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence included the following.

A. *Coconspirator Testimony as to Planning and Implementation*

Gary Lambert testified that in early 2014 he relocated from Brooklyn to Rochester to be with his brothers. He had known that McCoy and Clarence were engaged in the business of prostitution; when he arrived in Rochester, McCoy and Clarence also told him that "they was doing home invasion robberies, robbing people and selling drugs," and they recruited him to join their operation. (Trial Transcript ("Tr.") 2797.)

Gary testified that the robbery operation was led by McCoy and Nix and principally targeted persons who were believed to be drug dealers. McCoy, who was generally called "P," and Nix, who was generally called "Meech," had members of their crew, including Clarence, place tracking devices on vehicles driven by the persons targeted. McCoy and Nix were then able to use their phones to track the prospective victims' whereabouts *(see id.* at 2867) and tell Gary, Clarence, and the others whether the homes they were about to invade were unoccupied. Nix "was the one to tell us who had what, where to get it and how to get it." *(Id.* at 2853.)

Barnes, who was also known as "Bubbs" *(see* Tr. 1256-58), testified that he had committed some 10-20 "home invasion missions" with Nix (Tr. 1240) and that their targets generally were suspected

drug dealers, victims unlikely to report the robberies to the police. Nix would drive Barnes to the locations for the invasions; and although Nix never went inside the homes, he provided weapons and would communicate with Barnes by phone during the robberies. *(See, e.g., id.* at 1227 (Nix and McCoy supplied their crew with guns).) Nix would determine how the proceeds were distributed. *(See id.* at 1225-39.)

Moscicki testified that in the summer of 2014 she worked as a prostitute for McCoy, with whom she had a close, but non-romantic relationship; she was the girlfriend of McCoy's brother Clarence. Moscicki testified that, except for a 60-day period when she was in jail for shoplifting, she saw Clarence every day; she also saw McCoy about every two days. Much of the time she was living either with McCoy and his girlfriend "Anness" or with Clarence.

She assisted in the robbery operation by receiving on her cellphone messages from Nix to be relayed to Clarence, who did not have a working phone. On at least two occasions, she assisted more directly in invasions, either by knocking at the door of the targeted home to determine whether anyone was there or by driving a getaway car. She testified that she had been aware of the robbery operations conducted by McCoy and Nix, in which Clarence participated, because "Clarence would come back" to where they were staying "with a whole bunch of stuff, money, drugs, electronics" (Tr. 514). Clarence told her he was participating in home invasions with McCoy, Nix, Barnes, and Gary *(see id.* at 515)

and described the tracking devices they used on the cars of their prospective victims. Clarence said Nix told the crew which places to rob. Moscicki also heard Clarence discussing such invasions with Gary, Barnes, McCoy, and Nix.

Gary described the first home invasion in which he participated, a burglary where no one was at home; Nix told McCoy, Clarence, and Gary that the occupants had a lot of money and marijuana in the house; Nix and McCoy provided information from a tracking device. Gary and Clarence broke in; Gary then let McCoy in; and the three of them searched the house. *(See* Tr. 2868-71.) They found— as Nix had predicted—substantial amounts of cash (totaling some $64,000) and marijuana (some 24 pounds). All of the proceeds of the robbery were handed over to McCoy and Nix, who divided most of it between themselves and gave the remainder—a total of $6,000 and one-and-a-half pounds of marijuana—to Gary and Clarence. *(See id.* at 2871-76.) Gary assisted in the sales of McCoy's share of the marijuana. *(See id.* at 2873-79.)

B. *Victims' Testimony and Results of the Invasions*

Victims of four home invasions described their losses and/or their treatment by the intruders. In an attempted robbery on September 15, two men with guns broke into a home on Hayward Avenue, demanding drugs and assaulting the adult occupants. No drugs were found. One of the would-be robbers was identified at trial as McCoy. Upon

realizing that the residents were not drug dealers as defendants had believed, McCoy had made a phone call stating that "there was nothing in the house, that . . . there was just a woman and a man and a little kid." (Tr. 1082.)

In another attempted robbery, men broke into a home on Garson Avenue on September 18. They knocked one of the residents down and tied her up, brandished a gun at her mother, and asked "'Where the money, where the money, and the pills at'" (Tr. 1710). One of the victims identified Barnes as one of the intruders. Barnes testified that he had been driven to the Garson Avenue location by Nix and had participated in that attempted robbery with Clarence and McCoy. When no money or pills were found there, Barnes called Nix to report that they had found nothing of value.

On September 23, there was a burglary of a house on Maple Street where no one was at home. The victim testified that in 2014 he was a seller of marijuana and cocaine and kept a number of guns in the house. He described returning home at the end of his work day and finding that his drugs, money, and guns were gone. *(See* Tr. 1803, 1816.)

Moscicki testified that that Maple Street burglary was the first of defendants' invasions in which she had a direct role, ordered by McCoy to accompany him and Clarence. McCoy drove them to a spot near Maple Street, where they met up with Nix, who had brought Barnes. McCoy conferred with Nix, who said he had been monitoring the house to determine the owner's pattern of comings and goings. *(See* Tr. 519-26, 686.) McCoy instructed

Moscicki to knock on the door of the targeted house to learn whether anyone was there. After Moscicki found the right house and no one answered her knock, she returned to McCoy's car; Nix then drove Barnes and Clarence into the driveway of the house. Later, Clarence told Moscicki they had found large quantities of marijuana and guns. *(See id.* at 597-98.) Barnes testified that on that day, Nix had brought him to Maple Street; that McCoy and Clarence had arrived separately; and that McCoy and Nix told Barnes that the targeted home had heroin and cocaine hidden in the walls. Barnes and Clarence, armed, broke into the house and found 10-12 large ziplock bags of marijuana, $7-10,000 in cash, and a half dozen guns. Barnes telephoned Nix and said, "We hit the jackpot" (Tr. 1321). Barnes and Clarence delivered everything they found to Nix. McCoy and Barnes subsequently "bought capsules to package the" marijuana for sale. (Tr. 1332.)

On October 7, there was an invasion of a house on Polo Place in the Rochester suburb of Greece, New York, occupied by a jewelry wholesaler and his wife, who were at home. The jeweler testified that he ran his business from his home. He testified that after the men broke into his house, he and his wife were threatened and repeatedly pistol-whipped. He estimated that the men stole $20,000 in cash, along with jewelry whose wholesale value was approximately $200,000. *(See* Tr. 1926-27.)

Barnes and Gary testified that they and Clarence were the ones who had conducted that robbery. Moscicki testified that several days earlier, she had

gone to Polo Place with McCoy, Nix, Barnes, and Clarence, and had knocked at the jeweler's door to see whether anyone was at home. After the jeweler answered the knock (and tried his best to help Moscicki find the person or place she claimed to be seeking), the crew regrouped and considered whether to do the robbery that day. Nix said no, which ended the discussion.

Barnes testified that they returned on October 7 to rob the house on Polo Place. Moscicki, driving a car belonging to McCoy's girlfriend, waited in the driveway; McCoy and Nix were parked nearby. Barnes and Clarence, along with Gary who had not been on the previous trip, broke into the house. Barnes and Gary testified that they threatened the couple with guns (and BB guns), and pistol-whipped the jeweler to get him to reveal the location of his money and open his safe. When they had collected all the cash, gold coins, watches, and jewelry they could find, they left and sped off in the car driven by Moscicki. They soon met up with McCoy and Nix, and Nix demanded that all of the loot be transferred to his vehicle.

As usual, McCoy and Nix were "the ones that did the splitting and division of" the loot (Tr. 2912). They divided most of it between themselves; they gave Barnes, Clarence, and Gary $3,300 each and allowed each to take a watch. *(See id.* at 2911-15.)

Defendants' operation began to unravel shortly thereafter when Clarence—despite admonitions by McCoy and Nix not to try to sell the watches in or near Rochester—tried a week later to pawn his chosen watch in Rochester.

C. *The Defense Case*

Neither McCoy nor Nix testified at trial. They called two witnesses from law enforcement who described possible inconsistencies between various witnesses' trial testimony and their respective prior statements. A Special Agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives testified that Gary Lambert, in response to postarrest questioning about the Polo Place robbery, did not mention McCoy except to say that McCoy did not enter the building; and that Gary did not mention Nix at all. *(See* Tr. 3300-02.) And a Rochester police investigator testified that the Hayward Avenue victim who identified McCoy at trial as one of the intruders had given the Rochester police descriptions of the two intruders that did not match either Barnes or McCoy, and he had not picked McCoy's picture out of a photo array. *(See id.* at 3349-68.) However, on cross-examination, the investigator testified that, from a different photo array, the victim picked out McCoy as the intruder who had hit him in the face with a gun. *(See id.* at 3373-74).

D. *Jury Instructions and the Verdicts*

In charging the jury, the district judge segmented its deliberations, giving instructions first on Counts 1-8 and 11-12, leaving Counts 9 and 10, which charged Nix and McCoy, respectively, with firearm possession as a convicted felon, for later consideration.

As to the first group of counts to be considered, the court described the subject of each count of the

Indictment, to wit: Count 1, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery; Count 2, brandishing firearms during and in relation to that conspiracy; Counts 3 and 5, the Hobbs Act attempted robberies at Hayward Avenue and Garson Avenue, respectively; Counts 4 and 6, brandishing firearms during and in relation to the Hobbs Act robbery attempts charged in Counts 3 and 5, respectively; Count 7, the narcotics possession-and-distribution conspiracy; Count 8, possession of firearms in furtherance of the Count 7 narcotics conspiracy; Count 11, the Hobbs Act robbery at Polo Place; and Count 12, brandishing firearms during and in relation to the Polo Place robbery.

With respect to Count 1, the court explained that conspiracy to commit a crime is itself a crime separate from and independent of the crime that is the objective of the conspiracy; that the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "the minds of at least two alleged conspirators met in an understanding way to meet the objectives of the conspiracy" (Tr. 3767); and that the objectives alleged in this case were

> the robbery of diamonds, watches and United States currency from a person engaged in the business of buying and selling diamonds, watches and other items shipped and transported in interstate and foreign commerce; and the robbery of controlled substances and United States currency from persons engaged in or believed to be engaged in the unlawful possession and distribution of controlled substances,

(id. at 3768-69). The court reiterated that in order to find a defendant guilty on Count 1, the jury must find that "the defendant under consideration knowingly and willfully became a participant in or member of the conspiracy." (Tr. 3769.)

With respect to Counts 2, 4, 6, and 12, charging defendants with brandishing firearms during a crime of violence (the "brandishing counts"), the court instructed that the government was required to prove that each defendant committed the predicate crime of violence, *i.e.,* the Hobbs Act offenses alleged in Counts 1, 3, 5, and 11, respectively; and it instructed that "Hobbs Act conspiracy, attempted Hobbs Act robbery and Hobbs Act robbery all constitute crimes of violence." (Tr. 3787.) However, the court instructed that if the jury found a given defendant not guilty on a particular Hobbs Act count, the jury was not to consider against that defendant the brandishing count for which that Hobbs Act count was a predicate.

The court also instructed that, except with respect to the counts charging defendants with conspiracy or with firearm possession as a convicted felon, the Indictment charged each defendant both as a principal and as an aider and abettor, and that it was not necessary for the government to show that a defendant himself personally committed the crime with which he is charged in order for him to be found guilty. The court explained that a person who willfully causes another person to perform an act that is a crime against the United States is punishable as a principal; and that an aider and abetter, *i.e.,* "a person who did not commit the

crime, but in some . . . way counseled, advised or in some way assisted the commission of the crime," "is just as guilty of that offense as if they had committed it themselves." (Tr. 3815.)

In addition, with respect to the substantive crimes alleged in Counts 2-6, 8, and 11-12, the court —over defendants' objections—gave a *Pinkerton* charge, *see Pinkerton v. United States*, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), instructing the jury that, as to "reasonabl[y] foreseeable acts" of any member of the conspiracy (Tr. 3804),

> [i]f you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant whose guilt you are considering was a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment, then any acts done or statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy by persons also found by you to have been members of the conspiracy may be considered against that defendant. This is so even if such acts were done and statements were made in a defendant's absence and without his knowledge

(id. at 3804-05).

The jury after deliberating for less than three hours, found McCoy and Nix guilty on Counts 1-8 and 11-12.

The court then turned to Counts 9 and 10, which charged Nix and McCoy, respectively, with being a felon in possession of firearms on September 23, 2014. It informed the jury that defendants and the government had "stipulated that prior to September 23, 2014," Nix and McCoy had each "been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year." (Tr. 3873.) The court instructed that "[i]t is not necessary that the government prove that a defendant knew that the crime was punishable by imprisonment for more than one year." *(Id.* at 3874.) After brief deliberations, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on both counts.

Defendants thereafter moved for, *inter alia,* a new trial on the ground that they had recently discovered that one of the jurors was a previously convicted felon and had failed to disclose his criminal history during jury selection. As discussed in Part II.A. below, the district court, following an evidentiary hearing at which the juror testified, denied the motion, *see United States v. Nix,* 275 F.Supp.3d 420 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (*"Nix I"*).

E. *Sentencing*

Defendants were sentenced in October 2017 under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"), pursuant to calculations they do not challenge on appeal. Each was sentenced principally to imprisonment totaling 30 years for Counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 11, and the felon-in-possession counts (Count 9 for Nix, Count 10 for McCoy), to be followed by 25-year terms for each of Counts 2, 4, 6, and 12. Nix, whose prior record included a § 924(c) conviction, also received a mandatory minimum consecutive sentence of 25 years on Count 8; McCoy, whose record did not include a prior § 924(c) conviction, received a mandatory minimum consecutive sentence of 5 years on Count 8. Thus, Nix's total term

of imprisonment was 155 years; McCoy's was 135 years.

F. *The Present Appeals*

Defendants promptly appealed the judgments of conviction. Thereafter they moved in the district court for reconsideration of the denial of their motions for a new trial on the ground of juror misconduct. Following the denial of reconsideration, *see United States v. Nix,* No. 6:14-CR-06181, 2018 WL 1009282 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2018) (*"Nix II"*), each defendant appealed that denial, and their four appeals were consolidated. Defendants filed their opening briefs, principally pursuing the contention that they are entitled to a new trial because of juror misconduct, and contending that their convictions on the brandishing counts should be reversed on the ground that the Hobbs Act conspiracy and robbery offenses of which they were convicted are not crimes of violence.

Thereafter, prior to the oral argument of their appeals, defendants sought and received permission to file supplemental briefs to contend that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in *United States v. Davis,* 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), Hobbs Act conspiracy is not a crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and to contend that they are entitled to reduction of their sentences under the First Step Act. Following oral argument of the appeals, defendants sought and received permission to file additional supplemental briefs in light of the Supreme Court's decision in *Rehaif v.*

United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), contending that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that, in order to establish their guilt under § 922(g)(1) as felons in possession of firearms, the government was required to prove that, when they possessed the firearms, they knew they were convicted felons.

II. DISCUSSION

On these appeals, defendants contend principally (1) that the juror's misconduct violated their Sixth Amendment rights to an impartial jury and entitled them to a new trial on all viable counts; (2) that none of the Hobbs Act offenses of which they are convicted qualifies as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and thus the § 924(c) firearm-brandishing counts (Counts 2, 4, 6, and 12) predicated on Hobbs Act offenses are not viable and should be dismissed; and (3) that their respective Counts 9 and 10 felon-in-possession-of-firearm convictions should be vacated in light of *Rehaif* because the government did not prove that, when they possessed the firearms, they knew they were convicted felons. They also argue, alternatively, that they are entitled to a reduction of their sentences under the First Step Act; and they make cursory challenges to various aspects of the trial proceedings.

Several of defendants' contentions are raised for the first time on these appeals. An error that has not been preserved by timely objection in the district court may be reviewed on appeal if it is "[a]

plain error that affects substantial rights." Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Under plain-error review,

> "before an appellate court can correct an error not raised [in the district court], there must be (1) 'error,' (2) that is 'plain,' and (3) that 'affect[s] substantial rights.' If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'"

United States v. Groysman, 766 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2014) *("Groysman")* (quoting *Johnson v. United States,* 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) (which was quoting *United States v. Olano,* 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993))).

The burden is on the appellant to meet all four criteria. *See, e.g., United States v. Dominguez Benitez,* 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004); *Groysman,* 766 F.3d at 155; *United States v. Dussard,* 967 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 2020). If all four are met, we have discretion to grant relief despite the defendants' failure to preserve the issue in the district court for normal appellate review. *See, e.g., Johnson,* 520 U.S. at 467; *Olano,* 507 U.S. at 732.

For the reasons that follow, we find merit only in defendants' contention that Hobbs Act conspiracy is not a crime of violence within the meaning of § 924(c) and that their convictions on Count 2 must therefore be reversed and the case remanded for resentencing.

A. *The Motion for a New Trial Based on Juror Misconduct*

About a month after the jury's final verdicts were returned, and prior to the imposition of sentences, McCoy and Nix moved pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 for a new trial, stating that defense counsel had learned that one of the jurors had been convicted of two felonies and had failed to disclose his criminal history during jury selection. The juror was eventually correctly identified as Juror Number 3, and was referred to by the district court—as he will be here—as either "J.B." or "Juror No. 3" in light of general court "rule[s] that the names and personal information concerning jurors and prospective jurors should not be publicly disclosed," *Nix I,* 275 F.Supp.3d at 424 n.2.

1. *The Juror Questionnaire and Voir Dire Proceedings*

Prior to any oral voir dire at defendants' trial, a questionnaire had been mailed by the court to prospective jurors. Question 6 asked: "Have you ever been convicted, either by your guilty or nolo contendere plea or by a court or jury trial, of a state or federal crime for which punishment could have been more than one year in prison?" J.B. answered this question by checking "No." *Nix I,* 275 F.Supp.3d at 445 & n.4.

In addition, during the oral voir dire—to the extent "relevant to these post-verdict motions," *id.* at 426 n.6—the court addressed the following ques-

tions to a panel of 36 prospective jurors who had been placed under oath, including J.B.:

> (1) "Has anyone ever been the victim of a home robbery?" ([Tr.] 97);
>
> (2) "Has anyone ever served on a jury before?" *(id.* at 205);
>
> (3) "Has anyone ever been a defendant in a criminal case?" *(id.* at 214);
>
> (4) "Has anyone ever visited a jail or correctional facility other than in connection with . . . your educational curriculum" *(id.* at 229);
>
> (5) "Has anyone had anyone close to them, other than what we already discussed, . . . anyone close to them convicted of a crime?" *(id.* at 239).

Nix I, 275 F.Supp.3d at 426. Juror No. 3 "did not respond" to any of these questions. *Id.* at 425-26.

> Similarly, Juror No. 3 did not offer any information in response to the Court's "catch-all" questions asked toward the end of *voir dire:* whether there was "anything in fairness to both sides that you think we should know that we haven't covered already" ([Tr.] 221), and "[i]s there anything that you think we should know that we haven't covered up to this point?" *(id.* at 257).

Nix I, 275 F.Supp.3d at 426.

In support of their new-trial motion, defendants produced public records showing, *inter alia,* that

Juror No. 3 had previously pleaded guilty and been convicted of two felonies, *i.e.,* possession of stolen property in 1988 and burglary in 1989; that his son had been convicted of a crime; and that Juror No. 3 had been the victim of a home burglary. Defendants contended that they were entitled to a new trial even absent a showing of bias, because convicted felons are statutorily ineligible to serve as jurors in federal court, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5), and, in any event, that Juror No. 3's nondisclosures demonstrated bias.

The district court ordered an evidentiary hearing ("Hearing") at which Juror No. 3 testified, represented by appointed counsel. *(See* New Trial Hearing Transcript, June 12 and 14, 2017 ("H.Tr.").) The government granted Juror No. 3 immunity with regard to any nonperjurious testimony he would give at the Hearing.

2. *The Hearing*

In response to questioning by the court at the Hearing, Juror No. 3 acknowledged that he had answered Question 6 on the preliminary questionnaire incorrectly. He testified that he had not been aware that his answer was incorrect. Age 46 when defendants' trial proceedings began, Juror No. 3 testified that he had responded that he had no prior felony convictions because he assumed that the question referred only to crimes committed after the age of 21; that he was 17 or 18 at the time he was convicted; and that he believed convictions entered when he was younger than 21 had been

expunged from his record. He also testified that he had not believed that his 1989 conviction for burglary required an affirmative answer because, although the sentence was two-to-four years, he "was offered six months in shock camp" and that is how he satisfied the sentence (H.Tr. 72-75); he testified that he did not "know that [he] actually had a felony" *(id.* at 83).

In addition, while conceding that the district court had not stated that its voir dire questions applied only to one's experiences over the age of 21, Juror No. 3 testified that he had also believed the five questions quoted above did not apply to crimes, convictions, or experiences prior to the age of 21. Juror No. 3 also testified that at the time of trial, he did not know his son had been convicted of a crime; he had not spoken to his son for several years prior to that time and learned of the conviction only a month before the Hearing. Juror No. 3 conceded that his failure to respond to the above five questions posed to the panel as whole was incorrect. *(See id.* at 83-85, 89-92, 168-69, 172-75; *see also id.* at 97-98 (stating that he had answered questions on previous calls for jury duty in the same way, on the assumption that they concerned events and experiences after the age of 21).)

When questioned further about his own prior record, Juror No. 3 also initially claimed that he had been falsely accused of both of the felonies of which he was convicted, and he claimed to have at best a hazy memory of events that had occurred 28 years earlier, when he was 17 or 18. He said he did not remember how many times he had been con-

victed of crimes punishable by more than one year in prison. And while he recalled being convicted of breaking into a clothing store when he was 17 or 18, and serving six months in "shock camp" for that crime, he did not remember such aspects as the location of the shock camp, the names of all of his codefendants, whether the prosecution was state or federal, or whether he had pleaded guilty or gone through a trial. *(See id.* at 72-76.) However, on the second day of the Hearing, Juror No. 3 was confronted with his signed confessions in both the burglary case and the stolen property case, and he admitted that he had been involved in both. *(See id.* at 179-84, 222-25, 231.)

When asked whether he had wanted to serve as a juror in this case, Juror No. 3 three times responded "Yes" (H.Tr. 93, 96); when asked why, he stated it was because he was picked, and he believed it was his right and his duty *(see id.* at 93). He stated that he is able to vote, and he did not know that having a prior felony conviction disqualified him from serving as a juror. *(See id.* at 82.) However, when later again asked whether he had wanted to serve as a juror in this case, Juror No. 3 answered "No" *(id.* at 97, 235, 242, 243). He testified he had answered yes to that question previously because he was "confused about the question" *(id.* at 242). He said that he had not been happy to receive a summons for jury duty; that his false or inaccurate answers to the voir dire questions were not given out of any desire to serve on the jury *(see id.* at 94, 233-34); and that if he had known that by telling the court about his past experiences with the law

he would have been excused, he would have done so *(see id.* at 97, 240, 243).

Juror No. 3 answered "No" to all questions as to whether his prior experiences with the law had caused him to be biased for or against the defendants or for or against the government, or had given him reason to credit the testimony of cooperating witnesses against the defendants.

3. *The District Court's Ruling*

In a thorough opinion, *Nix I,* 275 F.Supp.3d 420, the district court denied defendants' motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct. It rejected their contention that Juror No. 3's felony conviction, absent any showing of bias, automatically warranted the granting of a new trial based on the statutory disqualification of convicted felons from serving on federal juries, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5). The court noted that "[t]his argument has been rejected by every circuit court to have considered the issue." *Nix I,* 275 F.Supp.3d at 436 n.17; *see, e.g., United States v. Boney,* 977 F.2d 624, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (the "Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury . . . does not require an absolute bar on felon-jurors"); *see also United States v. Langford,* 990 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1993) *("Langford")* (rejecting the argument that a juror's intentionally false response during voir dire is an automatic ground for a new trial).

Rather, pointing to "the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to a trial by an impartial jury," and noting that "'[a]n impartial jury is one in which all of

its members, not just most of them, are free of interest and bias,'" *Nix I,* 275 F.Supp.3d at 424 (quoting *United States v. Parse,* 789 F.3d 83, 111 (2d Cir. 2015) (*"Parse"*))—but that a defendant is "'entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one, for there are no perfect trials,'" *Nix I,* 275 F.Supp.3d at 424 (quoting *McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood,* 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984) (*"McDonough"*))—the district court noted that

> the Second Circuit has adopted a two-part test that a defendant must establish in order to justify granting a new trial based upon incorrect responses by a juror during voir dire: (1) the defendant must first demonstrate that the juror "failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire"; and (2) the defendant then must also demonstrate that "a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause"—in other words, the juror would have been excused for bias based on the correct voir dire response. *Langford*, 990 F.2d at 68-69 (quoting *McDonough*, 464 U.S. at 556-58 . . .).

Nix I, 275 F.Supp.3d at 437 (emphases ours). The district court stated that under the first part of this test

> the Court must assess whether Juror No. 3 deliberately lied or consciously deceived the Court, as opposed to providing inaccurate responses as a result of a mistake, misunderstanding or embarrassment. *See McDonough,*

> 464 U.S. at 555, 104 S.Ct. 845; *Langford,* 990 F.2d at 69-70 (finding *where a juror's intentionally false statements at voir dire were caused by embarrassment, and there was no evidence "that she gave false answers because of any desire to sit on the jury,"* it was proper for the district court to deny the defendant's motion for a new trial. . . .

Nix I, 275 F.Supp.3d at 437-38 (emphasis ours).

The court here found that Juror No. 3 had made some intentionally false statements at voir dire; but it found that they were in no way motivated by a desire to sit on the jury:

> The Court does not doubt that Juror No. 3's inaccurate testimony regarding his criminal record was due, in part, to the age of the convictions. However, *given Juror No. 3's false testimony during the evidentiary hearing about his culpability for the two felony convictions, the Court does not credit Juror No. 3's explanation that he was confused by the voir dire questions or thought that the questions applied to criminal convictions only after the age of 21.* Based on Juror No. 3's continued refusal to disclose the full extent of his criminal history during the evidentiary hearing—until faced with documentary evidence of the same—the Court concludes that Juror No. 3 failed to respond truthfully to the juror questionnaire and the Court's voir dire questions as they pertained to both his criminal convictions and his exposure to a jail.

> *However, this finding does not mean that the Court concludes that Juror No. 3 provided false information about his criminal record in an effort to intentionally deceive the Court so as to be selected to serve on the jury.* Here, *Juror No. 3 did not lie "for the purpose of securing a seat on the jury," Parse,* 789 F.3d at 111, nor can his lies be characterized as "premeditated and deliberate" so as to hide his true identity and ensure his selection on the jury, id. at 92-93.

Nix I, 275 F.Supp.3d at 447-48 (emphases ours).

The court found that the very fact that Juror No. 3 continued to lie about his criminal history at the evidentiary Hearing, after having been granted immunity for nonperjurious Hearing testimony, indicated he had a persisting motive for refusing to be honest about his criminal past at the Hearing until confronted with documentary evidence. The court was persuaded that "his motives had nothing to do with securing a seat on this jury." *Id.* at 448. While the court was "not persuaded that Juror No. 3 misunderstood the scope of the questions as only applying to convictions at the age of 21 and older, when responding to either this Court or other courts in the past," *id.,* it found that Juror No. 3's motivation for the inaccurate responses was not nefarious, but

> rather, . . . more likely originates from the simple fact that, at 47 years old, Juror No. 3 would prefer to shut out any recollection of his criminal history—the most recent of which (if [a] domestic violence incident from 1999 is

> included) was about 20 years ago, and most of which occurred when he was a teenager.

Id. Thus, although the court found "that Juror No. 3 testified falsely about certain information during the Hearing that was conducted on June 12 and 14, 2017," it

> *reject[ed] the notion that Juror No. 3 intentionally deceived the Court during voir dire as to his criminal history so as to gain a seat on the jury.* Although Juror No. 3's voir dire answers regarding his criminal history were inaccurate, *the Court cannot conclude that they rise to the level of intentional falsehood necessary to satisfy the first prong of the* McDonough *test.*

Id. (emphases added).

The court further saw no evidence from which to find or infer that Juror No. 3 had had any bias, whether actual, implied, or inferred. As to actual bias, *i.e.,* "'the existence of a state of mind that leads to an inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality,'" *Nix I,* 275 F.Supp.3d at 449 (quoting *United States v. Torres,* 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997) *("Torres"), cert. denied,* 523 U.S. 1065 (1998)), the court found that

> [t]his was plainly not a case of Juror No. 3 wanting to hide information about his past *to make himself more marketable as a juror,* like the juror in *Parse.* Early in the *voir dire,* Juror No. 3 expressed reservations about serving because of his job responsibilities. (Dkt. 328 at 41). During the jury selection, Juror No. 3 was

> frustrated with the Court about the length of the proceedings *(see* Dkt. 359 at 238-39), and in fact, once selected to serve, he left the courtroom as the Court was still informing the jurors about some housekeeping matters *(see* Dkt. 327 at 32).

Nix I, 275 F.Supp.3d at 450 (emphasis added). Further, there was

> *no evidence that Juror No. 3 knew that disclosure of his criminal record would have disqualified him from jury service.* The Court believes that if Juror No. 3 had known this information, his reluctance to be honest about his criminal history would have likely been overcome by a desire to avoid jury service. *In sum, the Court finds that there is no evidence of actual bias on the part of Juror No. 3, in favor of or against either the Government or Defendants.* Even evaluating the facts in the light most favorable to Defendants (which is not the standard), no actual bias has been shown in this case. *There is just no proof that Juror No. 3 intentionally lied to smuggle his way onto the jury.*

Id. at 451 (emphases added).

Nor did the court find any basis to find "implied bias"—a concept that is "reserved for 'extreme situations'" warranting a conclusive presumption of bias as a matter of law. *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Greer,* 285 F.3d 158, 172 (2d Cir. 2002) (*"Greer"*)); *see, e.g., Torres,* 128 F.3d at 45. Implied bias generally "'deals mainly with jurors who are related to

the parties or who were victims of the alleged crime itself.'" *Nix I,* 275 F.Supp.3d at 451 (quoting *Greer,* 285 F.3d at 172 (other internal quotation marks omitted)). The court found that Juror No. 3 had no relationships with any of the parties, victims, witnesses, or attorneys; and it saw "no [other] fact in the record which, had it been elicited during jury selection, would have required the Court to automatically assume bias on the part of Juror No. 3 or that Juror No. 3 was prejudiced against Defendants or in favor of the Government." *Nix I,* 275 F.Supp.3d at 451.

Finally, the district court found no evidence from which it should "infer" bias. It noted that

> *"[b]ias may be inferred when a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to excuse the juror for cause, but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of bias."*

Id. at 453 (quoting *Torres,* 128 F.3d at 47 (emphases ours)); *see, e.g., Greer,* 285 F.3d at 172 (findings as to inferred bias lie "within the discretion of the trial court"). After reviewing all of the evidence and defense contentions before it, the court concluded that there was no evidence to support defendants' contention that Juror No. 3 had "had bad experiences with law enforcement" or that his experiences would cause him to be biased against defendants; and it found no evidence to support their contention that because Juror No. 3 had pleaded guilty in a case in which he had code-

fendants, he would be predisposed to credit the views of cooperating witnesses and thus be biased against defendants. *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also deemed the mere existence of Juror No. 3's criminal history—nearly three decades old—too remote to warrant inferring bias.

The district court further found that defendants' own jury selection strategy strongly suggested the absence of reason to infer that Juror No. 3 was biased against defendants based on his criminal record: When the government moved, during jury selection, to dismiss a prospective juror ("T.P.") for cause upon learning that T.P. had prior felony convictions that he had not disclosed, defendants vigorously objected to T.P.'s dismissal. *Nix I,* 275 F.Supp.3d at 426-27, 429; *see also id.* at 453 ("McCoy even admits that it would have been the Government who challenged Juror No. 3 for cause if his criminal history had been revealed.").

In sum, the court concluded that defendants also failed to meet the second prong of the *McDonough* test because it concluded that

> [t]here is no actual bias because there is no finding of partiality based upon either the juror's own admission or the judge's evaluation of the juror's demeanor and credibility following voir dire questioning as to bias,

id. at 453 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted); that

> there is no implied bias because the disclosed fact does not establish the kind of relationship

> between the juror and the parties or issues in the case that mandates the juror's excusal for cause,

id. (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted); and that

> the record does not provide a basis to infer bias. Even if the first prong of the *McDonough* test was satisfied, *there is no evidence of extreme deceit* (such as in *Parse)* that would support the showing required under *McDonough*'s second prong. Put simply, the Court does not believe that the deliberateness of [Juror No. 3's] particular lies evidenced partiality . . . ; and *even if Juror No. 3 did intentionally attempt to deceive the Court,* the deliberateness of his lies is not sufficiently intentional or premeditated so as to, in and of themselves, establish bias under the second prong,

Nix I, 275 F.Supp.3d at 454 (internal quotation marks omitted (emphases added)).

4. *Abuse-of-Discretion Review*

A district court's denial of a Rule 33 motion for a new trial is reviewable for abuse of discretion. *See, e.g., Parse,* 789 F.3d at 110. A court abuses its discretion if (1) it takes an erroneous view of the law, (2) its decision rests on a clearly erroneous finding of fact, or (3) its decision "cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions." *Id.* We see no such flaws in the denial at issue here.

First, we see no error in the district court's ruling that the statutory disqualification of felons from serving on the jury, raised for the first time after trial, did not provide an automatic basis for a new trial. Under the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 ("Jury Selection Act"), 28 U.S.C. § 1861 *et seq.,* the court, in determining "whether a person is unqualified for . . . jury service" in federal court, *id.* § 1865(a), shall deem ineligible a person who "has been convicted in a State or Federal court of record of[ ] a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year and his civil rights have not been restored," *id.* § 1865(b)(5). In a criminal case, a defendant who contends that there has been a substantial failure to comply with the Jury Selection Act's provisions may move to stay or dismiss the proceedings *"before the voir dire examination begins,* or within seven days after the defendant discovered or could have discovered, by the exercise of diligence, the grounds therefor, *whichever is earlier." Id.* § 1867(a) (emphases added). Without precluding such other remedies as may be available for challenges based on prohibited discrimination, the statute provides that "[t]he *procedures described by this section shall be the exclusive means* by which a person accused of a Federal crime . . . may challenge any jury on the ground that such jury was not selected in conformity with the provisions of this title." *Id.* § 1867(e) (emphasis added).

In light of the procedural limitations imposed by §§ 1867(a) and (e), this Circuit and most others have concluded that the mere fact that the jury

included a person whom § 1865 made ineligible to serve as a juror is not a ground for a new trial when the objection is not raised until after voir dire has begun. *See, e.g., United States v. Silverman,* 449 F.2d 1341, 1343-44 (2d Cir. 1971) (*"Silverman"*) ("the statute clearly requires that a challenge on this ground be made at or before the v[oi]r dire"), *cert. denied*, 405 U.S. 918 (1972); *United States v. Paradies*, 98 F.3d 1266, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 1996), *as amended* (Nov. 6, 1996) ("once voir dire begins, Jury Selection Act challenges are barred, even where the grounds for the challenge are discovered only later"), *cert. denied,* 522 U.S. 1014 (1997); *United States v. Candelaria-Silva,* 166 F.3d 19, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1999) (same), *cert. denied,* 529 U.S. 1055 (2000); *United States v. Jasper,* 523 F.2d 395, 398 (10th Cir. 1975) ("a motion" under § 1865 must "be filed prior to the beginning of the voir dire examination"); *Dawson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,* 978 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 1992) ("section 1867 precludes any statutory challenges to irregularities in jury selection that are not made before voir dire"); *but see United States v. Webster,* 639 F.2d 174, 180 (4th Cir. 1981), *modified,* 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1982) ("Any objection to the composition of the jury was waived, however, because defendants first sought to raise it at a time subsequent *both* to the beginning of the voir dire examination and to a point seven days after they could have discovered the grounds for the challenge by the exercise of due diligence." (emphasis added)), *cert. denied,* 456 U.S. 935 (1982).

In *Silverman,* which concerned a juror who was disqualified under § 1865(b)(2) because she was unable to read or write the English language, we concluded that "[s]ince defendant failed to raise any objection to [the disqualified juror's] serving on the jury until after his conviction, his attack on that conviction cannot be founded on [her] disqualification under the statute." 449 F.2d at 1344. We ruled that after trial, "[t]he inclusion in the panel of a disqualified juror does not require reversal of a conviction unless there is a showing of actual prejudice." *Id.*

Defendants have proffered no basis for deviating from this principle orfrom our view of the timing restrictions imposed by the statute. Accordingly, their contention that, because Juror No. 3 would have been excluded from the jury if his statutorily disqualifying prior conviction had been known, they are entitled to a new trial without consideration of whether Juror No. 3 was biased or whether his being on the jury caused them actual prejudice, was correctly rejected by the district court. The district court instead properly turned to the question of whether the presence of Juror No. 3 on the jury violated defendants' rights under the Sixth Amendment to trial before a jury that was unbiased. The court correctly laid out the relevant Sixth Amendment principles, describing standards indicated by the Supreme Court in *McDonough* and applied in past cases in this Court, *see, e.g., Parse,* 789 F.3d 83; *Greer,* 285 F.3d 158; *Torres,* 128 F.3d 38; *Langford,* 990 F.2d 65. As reflected in the above description of the district court's decision, the court

properly recognized that the initial question to be explored is whether the juror's nondisclosure was deliberate or inadvertent; and it recognized that the ensuing determination as to the existence of bias—whether actual, or implied as a matter of law, or permissibly inferred—may well be affected both by whether the nondisclosure was deliberate and, if it was, by the juror's motivation to conceal the truth. Such determinations required assessments of the juror's credibility.

As was well within its prerogative as finder of fact, the court found Juror No. 3 to have been truthful in some parts of his testimony while not in others. The court here relied on, *inter alia,* its observation of Juror No. 3's "facial expressions, demeanor, and intonation"; it noted that Juror No. 3 appeared to be unsophisticated and had demonstrable "problems understanding the questions and expressing himself clearly," *Nix I,* 275 F.Supp.3d at 440; and it drew permissible inferences both with respect to the likely truthfulness of Juror No. 3's explanations for his inaccuracy about, for example, the life experiences of his relatives, and with respect to the likely motivation for Juror No. 3's false statements at the Hearing and on voir dire about his own criminal history. Although defendants view Juror No. 3's statements as "dubious" or "not ring[ing] true" (McCoy brief on appeal at 69, 70), the court explored the possible sources of bias on the part of Juror No. 3 and found none. The record does not support a conclusion that the court erred in its assessments of Juror No. 3's credibility or in its ultimate conclusion that his false state-

ments as to his criminal history were not motivated by any desire to serve as a juror in the present case.

Accordingly, we see no error of law or clearly erroneous finding of fact, and no other basis for overturning the district court's ruling that the record does not suggest that Juror No. 3 had any bias against defendants or in favor of the government, and its consequent denial of defendants' juror-misconduct-based motion for a new trial.

5. *Defendants' Postjudgment Motion for Reconsideration*

Nor is there merit in defendants' appeals from the denial of their postjudgment motion for reconsideration of the denial of their Rule 33 new-trial motion. A motion for reargument, while proper for calling to the court's attention controlling decisions or data the court has overlooked, is inappropriate for the presentation of new facts or contentions, or for an attempt to reargue old ones. *See, e.g., Shrader v. CSX Transportation, Inc.,* 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). The denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. *See, e.g., United States v. Bayless,* 201 F.3d 116, 131 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied,* 120 S. Ct. 1571 (2000).

The district court denied defendants' motion for reargument in part because it was based on supposedly new evidence that was not new; and it was unaccompanied by a showing of diligence as to why the evidence had not been sought or discovered earlier. *See Nix II,* 2018 WL 1009282, at *3-*4. The

court also found that what defendants proffered was not sufficiently significant to influence the decision of the Rule 33 motion.

What defendants sought to introduce as new evidence was "actual evidence" that Juror No. 3 had been "arrested" for burglary in 1989. *Nix II,* 2018 WL 1009282, at *5. The record is clear, however, that "[i]n rendering its decision [*in Nix I*], the Court was already aware that there was some evidence that Juror No. 3 was arrested for a home burglary in May of 1989," *Nix II*, 2018 WL 1009282, at *5; *see, e.g., Nix I*, 275 F.Supp.3d at 453 n.30 (*"There is some evidence in the record that Juror No. 3* may have been arrested for burglarizing a home in May of 1989 (when he was 19 years old). . . . Juror No. 3 had no recollection of this alleged incident, and there is no evidence that he was convicted of this crime." (emphasis added)).

Thus, defendants' "new" evidence concerned an arrest that had in fact been discussed at the Hearing. And defendants' desire to renew a challenge to Juror No. 3's claimed lack of memory—of an arrest not shown to have led to a conviction—hardly seems likely to shed light on the material issue of whether Juror No. 3's failure to disclose any part of his criminal history was motivated by a desire to be seated as a juror for the trial in this case.

As to that material issue, the court reaffirmed its *Nix I* assessment of Juror No. 3's credibility and motivation:

> Having observed Juror No. 3 firsthand during the course of the trial and the two-day eviden-

> tiary hearing, this Court rejects the notion that Juror No. 3 lied during *voir dire* so as to secure a spot on the jury.

Nix II, 2018 WL 1009282, at *5. The district court correctly stated that "Defendants are not entitled to reconsideration merely because they disagree with the outcome of the Rule 33 Denial Order and the Court's determination as to Juror No. 3's alleged bias . . . ." *Id.*

We see nothing in the record to suggest that the denial of defendants' request for reconsideration of their juror-misconduct-based motion for a new trial constituted an abuse of the district court's discretion.

B. *Which Hobbs Act Offenses Are Crimes of Violence Within the Meaning of § 924(c)*

Section 924(c), as pertinent to defendants' convictions on the brandishing counts (Counts 2, 4, 6, and 12), prescribes enhanced punishment for any person who brandished a firearm "during and in relation to any crime of violence." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Although prior to the Supreme Court's decision in *Davis,* 139 S. Ct. 2319, § 924(c) also contained an alternative definition of crime of violence in subpart (c)(3)(B) *(see* Part II.B.1. below), for purposes of § 924(c) a "crime of violence" is now defined only as a felony that "has as an element the *use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force* against the person or property of another," *id.* § 924(c)(3)(A) (emphases added).

The crimes on which defendants' brandishing-count convictions are predicated are offenses proscribed by the Hobbs Act (or "Act"), 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The Act in pertinent part, prohibits a person from

> affect[ing] commerce . . . *by robbery . . . or attempt[ing] or conspir[ing] to do so,* or commit[ting] *or threaten[ing] physical violence* to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section.

18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (emphases added). Hobbs Act "robbery" is defined to

> mean[] the unlawful *taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another*, against his will, *by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future,* to his person or property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the taking or obtaining.

Id. § 1951(b)(1) (emphases added).

McCoy and Nix, convicted of three types of Hobbs Act offenses—robbery (Count 11), conspiracy to commit robbery (Count 1), and attempted robbery (Counts 3 and 5)—contend that none of the Hobbs Act crimes are crime of violence. We agree only with respect to Hobbs Act conspiracy.

1. *Hobbs Act Conspiracy*

Defendants' convictions on the brandishing charge in Count 2 of the Indictment were predicated on their convictions of the Hobbs Act conspiracy alleged in Count 1. It is now established that Hobbs Act conspiracy is not a crime of violence within the meaning of § 924(c). *See United States v. Barrett,* 937 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2019) *("Barrett II").*

In *United States v. Barrett*, 903 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2018) (*"Barrett I"*), *vacated and remanded for further consideration,* 139 S. Ct. 2274 (2019), we had affirmed the defendant's convictions on several § 924(c) counts that were predicated on Hobbs Act robbery (see Part II.B.3 below), and had affirmed one § 924(c) conviction that was predicated on Hobbs Act conspiracy. We had affirmed the latter § 924(c) conviction based in part on § 924(c)(3)(B) because Hobbs Act conspiracy (an offense that is complete without performance of any overt act *see, e.g., United States v. Maldonado-Rivera,* 922 F.2d 934, 983 (2d Cir. 1990), *cert. denied*, 501 U.S. 1211 (1991); *United States v. Persico,* 832 F.2d 705, 713 (2d Cir. 1987), *cert. denied,* 486 U.S. 1022 (1988)), poses a risk of the use of force, *see Barrett I,* 903 F.3d at 175-77.

While the present appeals were pending, the Supreme Court decided *United States v. Davis,* —U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), ruling that § 924(c)(3)(B), in defining crime of violence in terms of a "risk" that physical force would be used, was unconstitutionally vague, *see* 139 S. Ct. at 2323-24. As "a vague law is no law at all," *id.* at 2323, we

concluded in *Barrett II* that *Davis* "precludes" a conclusion "that [a] Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy crime qualifies as a § 924(c) crime of violence," 937 F.3d at 127.

Accordingly, we conclude, and the government agrees, that defendants' convictions on Count 2 must be reversed, and the case remanded for resentencing.

2. *Hobbs Act Robbery*

Defendants' contention that Hobbs Act robbery is also not a crime of violence within the meaning of § 924(c), however, is contrary to the law of this Circuit. *See Barrett II,* 937 F.3d at 128; *United States v. Hill,* 890 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2018) *("Hill"), cert. denied,* 139 S. Ct. 844 (2019). In *Hill,* we employed the "categorical approach" prescribed by *Taylor v. United States,* 495 U.S. 575 (1990), which requires that where Congress has defined a violent felony as a crime that has the use or threat of force "as an element," the courts must determine whether a given offense is a crime of violence by focusing categorically on the offense's statutory definition, *i.e.,* the intrinsic elements of the offense, rather than on the defendant's particular underlying conduct, *id.* at 600-01. We stated that

> [a]s relevant here, the categorical approach requires us to consider the minimum conduct necessary for a conviction of the predicate offense (in this case, a Hobbs Act robbery), and then to consider whether such conduct

> amounts to a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A).

Hill, 890 F.3d at 56.

We noted that subpart (3)(A) of § 924(c) defines crime of violence as a felony that "'has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.'" *Hill,* 890 F.3d at 54 (quoting § 924(c)(3)(A)). And we noted that the Hobbs Act penalizes a person who affects commerce *"'by robbery* . . . or attempts or conspires so to do, *or commits or threatens physical violence* to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section,'" and that the Act defines robbery in part as "'the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, *by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property,'" id.* 890 F.3d at 54-55 (quoting 19 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and (b)(1) (emphases ours)). Comparing these statutes, we concluded that "Hobbs Act robbery 'has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,' 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)," and thus is a crime of violence within the meaning of that provision. *Hill,* 890 F.3d at 60; *see also id.* at 60 & n.7 (noting that "all of the circuits to have addressed the issue" have "h[e]ld that Hobbs Act robbery 'has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another'" (citing cases)).

Hill's conclusion that Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence within the meaning of § 924(c)(3)(A) was not eroded by the Supreme Court's subsequent ruling in *Davis* that the alternative crime-of-violence definition in § 924(c)(3)(B) was unconstitutionally vague. Rather, after *Davis,* a § 924(c) conviction based on a crime of violence is valid only under § 924(c)(3)(A). *See, e.g., Barrett II,* 937 F.3d at 128 (noting that Hobbs Act robbery is "a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A) applying the traditional, elements only, categorical approach not at issue in *Davis").* Accordingly, we "affirm[ed] Barrett's convictions on" the § 924(c) counts for which the predicate crime of violence was *"substantive* Hobbs Act robbery." *Id.* (emphasis in original).

Although McCoy and Nix contend that Hobbs Act robbery is not categorically a crime of violence even under § 924(c)(3)(A), arguing that property could be obtained by threatening to withhold care from a person in need or to "poison" a person, and that such means do not constitute physical force *(e.g.,* McCoy brief on appeal at 82), we expressly rejected just such an argument in *Hill.* We noted that such hypothetical possibilities as the withholding of vital care, which have never been the basis of a Hobbs Act charge, are ineffective to deflect the stated thrust of the statute; and that "physical force 'encompasses even its indirect application,' as when a battery is committed by administering a poison." *Hill,* 890 F.3d at 59 (quoting *United States v. Castleman,* 572 U.S. 157, 170 (2014)).

In sum, defendants' contention that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence within the mean-

ing of § 924(c)(3)(A) is foreclosed by *Hill* and *Barrett II*.

3. *Hobbs Act Attempted Robbery*

Defendants' contention that their firearm-brandishing convictions on Counts 4 and 6 should be reversed on the ground that the offense of Hobbs Act attempted robbery (Counts 3 and 5) does not constitute a crime of violence—a contention not raised in the district court, and thus reviewable only under plain-error analysis—is also unpersuasive. We address this issue as to the nature of the Act's prohibition of attempted robbery, which is one of first impression in this Circuit, again using the categorical approach.

As set out above, the surviving § 924(c) definition of "crime of violence" expressly includes a felony that "has as an element the . . . *attempted* use . . . of physical force against the person or property of another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added). It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that, "absent other indication, Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses." *Sekhar v. United States,* 570 U.S. 729, 732 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). The definition of "attempt" both in federal law and in the Model Penal Code had long been settled by 1986, when the operative language of § 924(c)(3)(A) was adopted. *See* Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(a)(2), 100 Stat. 449, 456-57 (1986) (first defining "crime of violence" to include "attempted

use . . . of physical force"); *United States v. Farhane,* 634 F.3d 127, 146 (2d Cir.) *("Farhane")* ("This court effectively adopted the Model Code's formulation of attempt in *United States v. Stallworth,* 543 F.2d 1038, 1040-41 (2d Cir. 1976)."), *cert. denied,* 565 U.S. 1088 (2011). Accordingly, when Congress used "attempted use" in § 924(c) without providing a different definition for the phrase, it adopted the concept of "attempt" existing under federal law.

"Under federal law, '[a] person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if he or she (1) had the intent to commit the crime, and (2) engaged in conduct amounting to a "substantial step" towards the commission of the crime.'" *United States v. Thrower,* 914 F.3d 770, 776 (2d Cir.) (*"Thrower"*) (quoting *United States v. Martinez,* 775 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1985)), *cert. denied*, 140 S. Ct. 305 (2019). This means that, for substantive crimes of violence that include the use of physical force as an element, defendants also commit crimes of violence when commission of those crimes is attempted—because such attempts necessarily require (a) an intent to complete the substantive crime (including an intent to use physical force) and (b) a substantial step towards completing the crime (which logically means a substantial step towards completion of all of that crime's elements, including the use of physical force). *See United States v. Taylor*, 979 F.3d 203, 209 (4th Cir. 2020) (*"Taylor"*). Because we held in *Hill* that Hobbs Act robbery categorically constitutes a crime of violence, *see* 890 F.3d at 53, it follows as a matter of logic that an "attempt[]" to commit Hobbs Act robbery—which the statute also

expressly prohibits, *see* 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)—categorically qualifies as a crime of violence.

McCoy and Nix raise two principal arguments for why this should not be so. First, they contend that Hobbs Act attempted robbery is not a crime of violence because it is possible for a defendant to "take a substantial step towards commission of an offense without engaging in a violent act." (McCoy first supplemental brief on appeal at 16). But while it is true that a substantial step towards a completed Hobbs Act robbery need not itself involve the "use . . . of physical force" within the meaning of § 924(c)(3)(A), *see, e.g., United States v. Jackson,* 560 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir.) *("Jackson")* ("reconnoiter[ing] the place contemplated for the commission of the crime and possess[ing] the paraphernalia to be employed in the commission of the crime" constituted substantial steps towards a bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)), *cert. denied,* 434 U.S. 914 (1977); *United States v. Gonzalez,* 441 F. App'x 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying *Jackson* to Hobbs Act attempted robbery), *cert. denied,* 565 U.S. 1218 (2012), that is of no moment, since the substantive Hobbs Act robbery towards which that substantial step leads necessarily would involve the "use of physical force," if completed. To be guilty of Hobbs Act attempted robbery, a defendant must necessarily (1) intend to commit all of the elements of a substantive robbery, including the use of physical force, and (2) take a substantial step towards committing the substantive robbery, which logically includes taking a substantial step towards completing all of its elements, including the use of

force. Accordingly, even if a defendant's substantial step does not itself involve the use of physical force, a defendant must necessarily intend to use physical force and take a substantial step towards using physical force, which constitutes "attempted . . . use of physical force" within the meaning of § 924(c)(3)(A). *Accord United States v. Walker,* 990 F.3d 316, 325 (3d Cir. 2021); *United States v. Dominguez,* 954 F.3d 1251, 1262 (9th Cir. 2020), *petition for cert. filed,* No. 20-1000 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2021); *United States v. Ingram,* 947 F.3d 1021, 1026 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied,* 141 S. Ct. 323 (2020); *United States v. St. Hubert,* 909 F.3d 335, 351-52 (11th Cir. 2018), *cert. denied,* 139 S. Ct. 1394 (2019). *Cf. United States v. Hendricks,* 921 F.3d 320, 328-29 & n.40 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that attempted bank robbery by intimidation in violation of § 2113(a) is a crime of violence because intimidation "means that the defendant did or said something that would make an ordinary reasonable person fear bodily harm" (internal quotation marks omitted)), *cert. denied,* 140 S. Ct. 870 (2020).

McCoy and Nix next argue that Hobbs Act attempted robbery does not categorically constitute a crime of violence because substantive Hobbs Act robbery need not always involve the actual use of force; rather, the statute defines "robbery" as "the unlawful taking . . . of personal property . . . by means of actual *or threatened* force." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1) (emphasis added). Based on this definition of "robbery," as the Fourth Circuit recently observed, Hobbs Act attempted robbery could also theoretically include "attempt[s] to *threaten* force,"

which would appear not to constitute an "attempt to *use* force" as required by § 924(c)(3)(A). *Taylor,* 979 F.3d at 209 (emphases in original).

However, even though it is theoretically possible that a defendant could be charged with Hobbs Act attempted robbery under such an attempt-to-threaten theory, we have made clear that "to show a predicate conviction is not a crime of violence 'requires more than the application of legal imagination to [the] . . . statute's language'"; rather "there must be 'a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,' that the statute at issue could be applied to conduct that does not constitute a crime of violence." *Hill,* 890 F.3d at 56 (quoting *Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez,* 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). To show such a "realistic probability," a defendant "'must at least point to his own case or other cases in which the . . . courts did in fact apply the statute in the . . . manner for which he argues.'" *Hill,* 890 F.3d at 56 (quoting *Duenas-Alvarez,* 549 U.S. at 193).

McCoy and Nix have failed to make such a showing here. They point to no case in which a defendant has been convicted of Hobbs Act attempted robbery premised on an *attempted* "threat[]" to use force, and we are aware of none. And for good reason: For purposes of the federal crime of attempt, a "substantial step" means conduct (a) that is "planned to culminate in the commission of the *substantive* crime being attempted," *Farhane,* 634 F.3d at 147 (internal quotation marks omitted (emphasis ours)), and (b) that "is strongly corroborative of the criminal intent of the accused," *United*

States v. Davis, 8 F.3d 923, 927 (2d Cir. 1993). It is difficult even to imagine a scenario in which a defendant could be engaged in conduct that would "culminate" in a robbery and that would be "strongly corroborative of" his intent to commit that robbery, but where it would also be clear that he only "attempt[ed]" to "threaten[ ]," and neither used nor even actually "threatened" the use of force.

Indeed, in *Thrower* we made a similar observation when considering whether the New York crime of attempted third-degree robbery involves the "attempted use . . . of physical force" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), since New York law defines robbery similarly to Hobbs Act robbery, *see* N.Y.Penal Law § 160.0 (defining "[r]obbery" as "us[ing] or threaten[ing] the immediate use of physical force" "in the course of committing a larceny"). We observed that "[t]hough Thrower posits that a defendant might be convicted of attempted robbery in New York *for an attempt to threaten* to use physical force—*as distinct from an attempt to use* physical force *or a threat to use* physical force—he fails to 'at least point to his own case or other cases in which the state courts did in fact apply the statute in the . . . manner for which he argues.'" *Thrower*, 914 F.3d at 777 (quoting *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 193 (emphases ours)).

In sum, we hold that Hobbs Act attempted robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c) because an attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery using force necessarily involves the "attempted use . . . of force" under § 924(c)(3)(A), and because, even though a conviction for an inchoate attempt to

threaten is theoretically possible, McCoy and Nix have not shown that there is a "realistic probability" that the statute will be applied in such a manner, *Duenas-Alvarez,* 549 U.S. at 193.

4. *Liability for Aiding-and-Abetting*

Finally, McCoy and Nix contend—for the first time on these appeals—that their § 924(c) firearm-brandishing convictions on Counts 4, 6, and 12 should be reversed for lack of a proper predicate because their convictions of the corresponding substantive Hobbs Act offenses (Counts 3 and 5 (attempted robbery) and Count 11 (robbery)) were based on an aiding-and-abetting theory of liability. Given evidence that they normally sat in nearby cars while their brothers and/or friends entered the targeted homes, threatened the victims, and stole or attempted to steal the victims' property, McCoy and Nix contend that aiding-and-abetting a substantive Hobbs Act offense is not a crime of violence. This contention need not detain us long.

Section 2 of Title 18 provides in part that "[w]hoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal." 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). For the aiding-and-abetting theory of liability to apply, the underlying federal crime must have been committed by someone other than the defendant; and the defendant himself must either have acted, or have failed to act, with the specific intent of aiding the commission of that underlying crime. *See, e.g., Rosemond v. United*

States, 572 U.S. 65, 77 (2014); *United States v. Smith,* 198 F.3d 377, 382-83 (2d Cir. 1999) *("Smith"), cert. denied,* 531 U.S. 864 (2000). Section 2(a) makes an aider and abetter as guilty of the underlying crime as the person who committed it.

There is no culpable aiding and abetting without an underlying crime committed by some other person; and aiding and abetting itself is not the predicate crime for firearm brandishing under § 924(c). The aiding-and-abetting concept describes the role of the defendant that makes him liable for the underlying offense. "[W]hen a person is charged with aiding and abetting the commission of a substantive offense, the 'crime charged' is . . . the substantive offense itself." *Smith*, 198 F.3d at 383 (other internal quotation marks omitted); *see, e.g., United States v. Richardson*, 906 F.3d 417, 426 (6th Cir. 2018) (*"Richardson I"*) ("There is no distinction between aiding and abetting the commission of a crime and committing the principal offense. *Aiding and abetting is simply an alternative theory of liability; it is not a distinct substantive crime."* (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis ours)), *vacated and remanded on other grounds, Richardson v. United States*, 139 S. Ct. 2713 (2019) (*"Richardson II"*).

The crime charged in a prosecution for aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery is thus Hobbs Act robbery. *Accord In re Colon,* 826 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2016) ("Because an aider and abettor is responsible for the acts of the principal as a matter of law, an aider and abettor of a Hobbs Act robbery necessarily commits all the elements of a principal

Hobbs Act robbery."); *United States v. Deiter,* 890 F.3d 1203, 1215-16 (10th Cir.) (courts should look to "the underlying statute of conviction, rather than § 2, to decide whether [§ 924(c)(3)(A)] is satisfied"), *cert. denied,* 139 S. Ct. 647 (2018).

If the underlying offense is a crime of violence, it is a predicate for § 924(c) liability; if the defendant aided and abetted that underlying offense, he is guilty of the underlying offense. As we have concluded above, Hobbs Act robbery and Hobbs Act attempted robbery are crimes of violence within the meaning of § 924(c). As McCoy and Nix—either directly or as aiders and abetters—were found guilty of those crimes of violence, they were convicted of crimes that are proper predicates for § 924(c) liability. Their § 924(c) convictions, based on their guilt as aiders and abetters of the violent crimes of Hobbs Act robbery and attempted robbery, are not error, much less plain error.

C. *Instructional and Sufficiency Challenges*

Defendants also make several other challenges to their convictions, principally contending that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in *Rehaif,* their § 922(g)(1) convictions as felons in possession of firearms should be vacated because the district court failed to instruct the jury that the government was required to prove that when they possessed the firearms, they knew their status as felons. Nix also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions on Counts 3, 4, and 7, and that the court erred in giving the jury

a *Pinkerton* instruction. We reject all of these challenges.

1. *The* Rehaif *Challenges*

On Counts 9 and 10, respectively, Nix and McCoy were convicted of having been in possession of firearms on September 23, 2014, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which makes firearm possession unlawful by "any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of[ ] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (the "felon-in-possession" subparagraph). Anyone who "knowingly violates" any of the nine subparagraphs of § 922(g), including subparagraph (g)(1), is subject to imprisonment for up to 10 years. *Id.* § 924(a)(2).

While the present appeals were pending, the Supreme Court in *Rehaif,* which involved a defendant convicted under a different § 922(g) subparagraph, ruled that "in prosecutions under § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove that a defendant knows of his status as a person barred from possessing a firearm," 139 S. Ct. at 2195; *see id.* at 2194 (the government must show not only that "the defendant knew he possessed a firearm" but "also that he knew he had the relevant status when he possessed it").

In charging the jury in the present case, the district court instructed that each defendant had "stipulated" with the government "that prior to September 23, 2014," he had in fact "been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year" (Tr. 3873); but it did not instruct that the jury must find that, when they possessed firearms on that date defendants knew they had been convicted of a crime that was punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. Defendants contend that they are thus entitled to have their convictions on Counts 9 and 10 vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. We disagree. As defendants neither requested an instruction as to their knowledge of their felony status nor objected to the instructions that were given, we review these challenges only for plain error, and we conclude that defendants do not meet that standard.

In light of *Rehaif,* it was error not to instruct that the government was required to prove defendants' knowledge of their status as convicted felons at the time of their firearm possession; and that error is plain, *see, e.g., Henderson v. United States,* 568 U.S. 266, 279 (2013) ("it is enough that an error be 'plain' at the time of appellate consideration for [t]he second part of the [four-part] *Olano* test [to be] satisfied" (other internal quotation marks omitted)); *United States v. Balde,* 943 F.3d 73, 97 (2d Cir. 2019). Thus, the first two prongs of plain-error analysis have been met.

It is also arguable that the third prong of the plain-error test—an error affecting substantial rights—may have been met. The Supreme Court in *Rehaif,* while noting that, as to the relevant status element of § 922(g), the requisite "knowledge can be inferred from circumstantial evidence," 139 S. Ct. at 2198 (internal quotation marks omitted),

also suggested that an inference of knowledge as to felony status with respect to the felon-in-possession subparagraph of § 922(g) might not be available if the "person . . . was convicted of a prior crime but sentenced only to probation," and "d[id] not know that the crime [wa]s *punishable* by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," *id.* (emphasis in original).

In the present case, while McCoy and Nix stipulated that they had previously been convicted of crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, their stipulations neither included acknowledgement that they knew those crimes were punishable to that extent nor specified the length of the sentences actually imposed on them. And the government has not called to our attention any trial evidence from which the jury, if properly instructed, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that they had such knowledge.

In a case raising post-*Rehaif* issues similar to those here, we "decline[d] to decide whether a properly-instructed jury would have found that [the defendant] was aware of his membership in § 922(g)(1)'s class," *United States v. Miller,* 954 F.3d 551, 559 (2d Cir. 2020) *("Miller"),* and we instead proceeded directly to "the fourth prong of plain-error review, which examines whether not reversing would seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings and which does not necessarily confine us to the *trial* record," *id.* (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted) (emphasis ours). In *Miller* we found reliable information in the presentence

report ("PSR") prepared on the defendant, which, *inter alia,* described his criminal record. As a defendant's criminal history is an essential factor in the district court's required calculation of the sentence recommended for him by the Guidelines, the contents of the PSR will have been subjected to close scrutiny by both sides. The PSR for the defendant at issue in *Miller* showed that he had prior felony convictions for which he received "a total effective sentence of ten years' imprisonment, with execution suspended after three years, which remove[d] any doubt that [he] was aware of his membership in § 922(g)(1)'s class." *Id.* at 560.

Accordingly, we concluded that the *Miller* trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the element of whether the defendant knew he was a convicted felon "did not rise to the level of reversible plain error" because it does no disservice to the judicial system to hold that a person who was sentenced to and served a prison term of more than one year must have been aware of both the extent of his sentence and the length of time he spent in prison. *Id.* We have reached the same result in other post-*Rehaif* cases in which the district court records revealed that the defendant had received, and had served, a prison sentence exceeding one year. *See, e.g., United States v. Sandford*, 814 F. App'x 649, 652-53 (2d Cir. 2020); *United States v. Smith*, 814 F. App'x 634, 635-36 (2d Cir. 2020); *United States v. Goolsby*, 820 F. App'x 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2020); *United States v. Johnson*, 816 F. App'x 604, 607-08 (2d Cir. 2020); *United States v. Frye*, 826 F. App'x 19, 23-24

(2d Cir. 2020); *United States v. Feaster,* 833 F. App'x 494, 497 (2d Cir. 2020).

The district court record in the present case includes PSRs with similar details—unobjected to by McCoy or Nix—as to the sentences actually imposed on them for their prior felony convictions and the amounts of prison time they served for those convictions. McCoy, in 2001, was convicted in New York State court, following his plea of guilty, on two felony counts of criminal possession of controlled substances and was sentenced to a prison term of 54 months to nine years; as a result he was imprisoned for nearly six years. Nix, in 2008, was convicted in federal court, following his plea of guilty, of possession of narcotics with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm in furtherance of the drug offense; he was sentenced to 24 months' imprisonment for each offense, to be served consecutively. As a result, Nix spent some four years in prison.

On this record, we conclude that there can be no reasonable doubt that each of these defendants knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. McCoy and Nix thus have not shown that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that it must find that a defendant had such knowledge seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. The unobjected-to error provides no basis for vacating the convictions on Counts 9 and 10.

2. *Nix's Sufficiency Challenges*

Nix contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him on Count 7 of the Indictment, which charged the narcotics distribution conspiracy, and on Counts 3 and 4, which concerned the attempted robbery and use of firearms at Hayward Avenue. In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could have been drawn in the government's favor, and deferring to the jury's assessments of witness credibility and the weight of the evidence. *See, e.g., United States v. Lyle*, 919 F.3d 716, 737 (2d Cir. 2019), *cert. denied*, 140 S. Ct. 846 (2020); *United States v. O'Brien*, 926 F.3d 57, 79 (2d Cir. 2019); *United States v. Praddy*, 725 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2013). With the evidence at trial viewed in that light, and considered as a whole rather than piecemeal, *see, e.g., United States v. Podlog*, 35 F.3d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 1994), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 1135 (1995); *United States v. Brown*, 776 F.2d 397, 403 (2d Cir. 1985), *cert. denied*, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986), a conviction will be upheld so long as, "*any* rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." *Jackson v. Virginia,* 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original).

In a prosecution for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a prohibited substance, the element of intent to distribute—as contrasted with an intent to possess only for personal use—"may be

inferred from the volume of drugs with which defendant was associated or that was in his actual or constructive possession." *United States v. Anderson,* 747 F.3d 51, 62 n.8 (2d Cir. 2014), *cert. denied,* 574 U.S. 850 (2014); *see, e.g., United States v. Brockman,* 924 F.3d 988, 993 (8th Cir. 2019) (finding that the district court did not clearly err in determining that "eight ounces [of marijuana] exceeded a user quantity"); *United States v. Martinez,* 964 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2020) ("A pound, whether it's cocaine, heroin, marijuana, or methamphetamine, is more than personal users typically buy."). And we have noted quantity is not always dispositive: "[A]ny amount of drugs, however small, will support a conviction when there is additional evidence of intent to distribute." *United States v. Martinez,* 54 F.3d 1040, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995).

Nix, in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his Count 7 conviction of conspiracy to distribute narcotics, argues that there was no direct testimony that he engaged in narcotics distribution, and that Barnes testified that he never observed Nix engaging in such distribution. *(See* Nix brief on appeal at 55-56.) Given the record before us, and the fact that Count 7 charged conspiracy, rather than actual distribution, this challenge is meritless.

First, there was abundant proof of the existence of a robbery conspiracy whose principal members were McCoy, Barnes, Clarence and Gary Lambert, and Nix—who was called "Meech" (Tr. 1223). The evidence included, as described in Part I.A. above, the testimony of Barnes who admitted having

engaged in 10-20 home invasions with Nix; and through Nix, Barnes met, and participated in home invasions with, Clarence, Gary, and McCoy. *(See* Tr. 1240, 1230-31.) Although Nix himself did not enter the invaded homes, he selected the persons to be robbed, conducted preliminary surveillance of targeted premises, planned the invasions, provided guns, and gave the men who would enter information as to what to expect and where to search *(see, e.g., id.* at 1239 (Barnes: "Meech would tell me the location and take me there and I would go in the house with somebody else")). And while his associates were inside, Nix would wait for them in the car "either down the street or around the corner" *(id.* at 1236); the men who had entered would phone Nix to report whether they were finding the expected trove of money and/or drugs *(see id.* at 1236-37). When the men who had entered emerged with stolen property, they turned it over to Nix who, with McCoy, decided how it would be divided. *(See, e.g., id.* at 1237-40, 2912.)

Second, there was ample evidence that a principal goal of the conspiracy was to rob drug dealers. Barnes testified that in all but one instance, the residents of the invaded homes were persons Nix believed to be drug dealers. *(See* Tr. 1228.) And it was understood among the coconspirators that Nix and McCoy intended to sell the narcotics obtained in those robberies. *(See, e.g., id.* at 1238 (as to drugs obtained in such a robbery, "Meech would take it and sell it and give me what he felt like I should get off those"); *id.* ("[Meech] would sell the drugs and give me money, bring me money back off

the drugs").) Barnes testified that drug dealers were targeted precisely because they would have "[m]oney, drugs, drugs that we could sell." *(Id.* at 1228.)

For example, Barnes testified that for the September 23 burglary, Nix drove him to Maple Street and identified the intended house; Nix then phoned McCoy and Clarence. After McCoy and Clarence arrived and got into Nix's car, Nix and McCoy told Barnes and Clarence what kind of drugs they would find in the house and said that drugs could be found hidden in the walls. *(See* Tr. 1312-15.) Barnes testified that the "plan . . . if [they] got drugs from inside that house," was that "Meech and P was going to sell" the drugs and give Barnes and Clarence some of the proceeds. *(Id.* at 1316.)

According to plan, Barnes and Clarence, armed with guns, entered the Maple Street house and, as predicted by Nix, found cash and drugs. Barnes phoned Nix from the house and said, "We hit the jackpot"; Nix told him to "Get everything and I'll be there . . . I'm coming." (Tr. 1321.) What they found in the Maple Street house included 10-12 "large" ziplock bags—an estimated eight inches by six or eight inches—"full of weed." *(Id.* 1322-33.) Nix, McCoy, Barnes, and Clarence then went to Barnes's then-house, and Nix—who had taken possession of the $7-10,000 in cash that Barnes and Clarence had found—gave Barnes and Clarence each $1,000. "[Nix] took all of the drugs" (Tr. 1332); and McCoy and Barnes subsequently "bought capsules to package the" marijuana "[s]o we could sell it" *(id.).*

The jury could also infer that the amounts of narcotics stolen by the conspirators and appropriated by Nix as his share—especially given the large number of home invasions done by defendants and their crew seeking to obtain drugs, *see, e.g., id.* at 2871-76 (Gary describing an earlier burglary that yielded 24 pounds of marijuana, of which Nix's share was more than 11 pounds)—were inconsistent with possession merely for Nix's personal use.

In sum, the evidence was ample to allow the jury to find that Nix was part of a conspiracy whose express goal was to rob drug dealers of narcotics in quantities sufficient to allow members of the conspiracy to be drug dealers themselves.

In challenging his conviction on Counts 3 and 4 with respect to the Hayward Avenue attempted robbery, Nix argues that the cellphone evidence that he was near that location at the time of that event was "dispute[d]," and that "mere presence at the scene of a crime, even when coupled with knowledge that at that moment a crime is being committed is insufficient to establish the defendant's participation in criminal activity." (Nix brief on appeal at 56, 55 (internal quotation marks omitted).) This argument is meritless as well.

As discussed above, coconspirators at trial described the usual operations of the conspiracy, in which Nix organized and planned the home invasions and remained nearby while they took place, and the men who actually entered the homes would telephone Nix after entering and inform him of what they found. One of the armed men who broke into the Hayward Avenue home, expecting to find

drugs, was identified at trial as McCoy. After he and the other invader failed to find any drugs, McCoy made a telephone call in which one of the victims heard him report that "there was nothing in the house" (Tr. 1082). Evidence of telephone and cellphone tower records identified calls between phones of McCoy and Nix, both of which were in the immediate vicinity of the Hayward Avenue residence during the time of this robbery attempt; and both defendants' phones were tracked to the house of Nix's mother immediately thereafter. *(See, e.g.,* Tr. 3133-39.)

Thus, although Nix did not himself enter the home, the evidence was plainly sufficient to permit the jury to find him guilty of the Counts 3 and 4 substantive offenses of attempted robbery and firearm use on Hayward Avenue, either by aiding and abetting the attempted robbery *(see generally* Part II.B.4. above) or on the *Pinkerton* theory of conspiratorial vicarious liability, to which we now turn.

3. *Nix's* Pinkerton *Challenge*

Nix contends that it was error for the district court to give the jury a *Pinkerton* charge, which informs the jury that it may find a defendant guilty of a substantive offense that he did not personally commit if it was committed by a coconspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy, and if commission of that offense was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiratorial agreement, *see Pinkerton,* 328 U.S. at 646-48. Nix argues that such an instruction

was improper here, claiming that the evidence of conspiracy was "sufficiently thin that the charge invite[d] the jury" to "infer[] the conspiracy from the substantive offense." (Nix brief on appeal at 60.) This argument lacks any foundation in the evidentiary record or in the instructions as given.

To begin with, the court expressly instructed the jury that, in order to find a defendant guilty of a substantive offense committed by another person on this theory of conspiratorial vicarious liability, it must first find beyond a reasonable doubt that both the defendant and the person who actually committed the substantive offense were members of the charged conspiracy at the time the substantive offense was committed, that the substantive offense was committed pursuant to the common plan of the coconspirators, and that the commission of the substantive offense was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. *(See* Tr. 3819-21.) The court then reiterated that the jury could not find a defendant guilty on this theory of liability if it had not made all of the described preliminary findings. *(See id.* at 3821-22.) The court in no way invited the jury to infer the existence of a conspiracy from the performance of the substantive acts.

Further, the evidence supporting the charges of conspiracy was anything but "thin." As discussed above, the testimony of Gary, Moscicki, and Barnes, who were coconspirators of McCoy and Nix—which plainly was credited by the jury—abundantly established the existence of a conspiracy, *i.e.,* an agreement among Nix, McCoy, Gary and Clarence Lambert, Barnes, and others to act together to

commit home invasions, principally against persons thought to be drug dealers, and indeed established that Nix was the conspiracy's principal leader. We see no *Pinkerton* error.

D. *Resentencing*

When the district court sentenced McCoy and Nix in 2017, § 924(c)(1)(C) had been interpreted to require that a defendant convicted of multiple § 924(c) violations in a single prosecution be sentenced to consecutive 25-year minimum prison terms for the second violation and each subsequent violation. *See Deal v. United States,* 508 U.S. 129, 132-37 (1993). In 2018, however, Congress adopted the First Step Act (or "FSA"), amending § 924(c)(1)(C) "to provide that only a second section 924(c) conviction 'that occurs after a prior conviction under [section 924(c)] has become final' requires the consecutive minimum 25-year sentence provided by subsection 924(c)(1)(C)(i)." *United States v. Brown,* 935 F.3d 43, 45 n.1 (2d Cir. 2019) *("Brown")* (quoting First Step Act, Pub L. No. 115-391, § 403(a), 132 Stat. 5194, 5221-22).

In supplemental briefing, defendants argue—in the event that their requests for a new trial and their challenges to the viability of any of their § 924(c) convictions are unsuccessful—that we should remand to the district court for reduction of their sentences on the surviving § 924(c) counts in light of § 403 of the First Step Act. McCoy and Nix argue that they are eligible for such relief because

their convictions will not become final until appellate review rights have been exhausted.

While defendants' concept of finality is generally correct, its applicability here is unclear. With respect to the temporal applicability of its provisions, the First Step Act provides that its amendments to § 924(c) "shall *apply to any offense* that was committed before the date of enactment of this Act, *if a sentence for the offense* ***has not been imposed*** *as of such date of enactment,"* FSA § 403(b) (emphases added). When an FSA reduction in sentence has been sought by a defendant who was sentenced before the FSA's date of enactment and who was not otherwise entitled to appellate relief on his § 924(c) convictions, courts have concluded that FSA relief was not available. *See, e.g., United States v. Cruz-Rivera,* 954 F.3d 410, 413 (1st Cir.), *cert. denied,* 2020 141 S. Ct. 601 (2020) (interpreting Congress's focus on the time at which a sentence was "imposed" as intending to deny eligibility for FSA relief to any defendant originally sentenced prior to the FSA's enactment, reflecting the customary understanding that a sentence is "imposed either when it is pronounced or entered in the trial court, regardless of subsequent appeals" (internal quotation marks omitted)); *United States v. Jordan,* 952 F.3d 160, 174 (4th Cir. 2020) ("Congress decided to extend the more lenient terms of § 403(a) of the First Step Act to some but not all pre-Act offenders, with the date of sentencing in the district court drawing the line between those who are covered and those who are not." (internal quotation marks omitted)), *cert.*

denied, 141 S. Ct. 1051 (2021); *United States v. Gomez,* 960 F.3d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 2020) ("A sentence is 'imposed' when the district court pronounces it, not when the defendant exhausts his appeals."). However, at least one court has held that as to a defendant who was originally sentenced prior to the FSA's date of enactment and whose "sentences were remanded prior to the First Step Act's enactment but who were not . . . resentenced" until after enactment, "both the text of the statute and Congress's purpose in enacting the legislation make clear that § 403 applies." *United States v. Henry,* 983 F.3d 214, 219 (6th Cir. 2020).

In *Davis,* the Supreme Court itself described Congress in the First Step Act as having "changed the law . . . *going forward."* 139 S. Ct. at 2324 n.1 (emphasis added). However, a week before *Davis* was filed, the Supreme Court in *Richardson II* had granted certiorari and remanded, stating, without other substantive comment, "[j]udgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for the court to consider the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391 (2018)," 139 S. Ct. at 2713-14—in a case that had been the subject of appellate review in the court of appeals and the Supreme Court for several years with respect to a sentence originally imposed on the defendant in 2013 and reimposed in 2017, *see Richardson I,* 906 F.3d at 421-22. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court denied further review after the Sixth Circuit, following the *Richardson II* remand, concluded that retroactive FSA relief was unavailable to Richardson because "[i]n the general con-

text of criminal sentencing, a sentence is 'imposed' when the trial court announces it, not when the defendant has exhausted his appeals from the trial court's judgment," *United States v. Richardson,* 948 F.3d 733, 748 (6th Cir.) (*"Richardson III"*), *cert. denied,* 141 S. Ct. 344 (2020) *("Richardson IV").*

In *Brown,* we quoted the *Davis* Court's "'changed the law . . . going forward'" language, but we also stated that "at the resentencing, which will occur as a result of our remand, Brown will have the opportunity to argue that he is nevertheless entitled to benefit from section 403(b) of the [FSA]." 935 F.3d at 45 n.1. Here too, as we have reversed defendants' convictions on Count 2 and are remanding for resentencing, we leave it to the district court in the first instance to consider the applicability of the First Step Act to McCoy and Nix in light of the possible temporal limitation on retroactivity dictated by Congress's reference to the time when a sentence was "imposed." We also note that although Nix adopts without elaboration the arguments made by McCoy for First Step Act relief, the results might not be the same for both defendants because, leaving aside common questions as to the FSA's temporal applicability, differences in the criminal records of McCoy and Nix *(see* Part I.E. above) may dictate different outcomes.

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of defendants' arguments on these appeals and, except as indicated above, have found them to be without merit. Defendants'

convictions on Count 2 are reversed; their convictions on all other counts are affirmed. The matter is remanded for dismissal of Count 2 and for resentencing, including consideration by the district court of the First Step Act.

Should any appeal ensue after resentencing, either party may restore our jurisdiction pursuant to the procedure outlined in *United States v. Jacobson,* 15 F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1994), in which event the appeal will be referred to this panel.

THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 2020

ORDER

In light of the ongoing public health concerns relating to COVID-19, the following shall apply to cases prior to a ruling on a petition for a writ of certiorari:

IT IS ORDERED that the deadline to file any petition for a writ of certiorari due on or after the date of this order is extended to 150 days from the date of the lower court judgment, order denying discretionary review, or order denying a timely petition for rehearing. See Rules 13.1 and 13.3.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that motions for extensions of time pursuant to Rule 30.4 will ordinarily be granted by the Clerk as a matter of course if the grounds for the application are difficulties relating to COVID-19 and if the length of the extension requested is reasonable under the circumstances. Such motions should indicate whether the opposing party has an objection.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, notwithstanding Rules 15.5 and 15.6, the Clerk will entertain motions to delay distribution of a petition for writ of certiorari where the grounds for the motion are that the petitioner needs additional time to file a reply due to difficulties relating to COVID-19. Such motions will ordinarily be granted by the Clerk as a matter of course if the length of the extension requested is reasonable under the circumstances

and if the motion is actually received by the Clerk at least two days prior to the relevant distribution date. Such motions should indicate whether the opposing party has an objection.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that these modifications to the Court's Rules and practices do not apply to cases in which certiorari has been granted or a direct appeal or original action has been set for argument.

These modifications will remain in effect until further order of the Court.

18 U.S. Code § 924 – Penalties

(a)

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, subsection (b), (c), (f), or (p) of this section, or in section 929, whoever—

(A)

knowingly makes any false statement or representation with respect to the information required by this chapter to be kept in the records of a person licensed under this chapter or in applying for any license or exemption or relief from disability under the provisions of this chapter;

(B)

knowingly violates subsection (a)(4), (f), (k), or (q) of section 922;

(C)

knowingly imports or brings into the United States or any possession thereof any firearm or ammunition in violation of section 922(l); or

(D)

willfully violates any other provision of this chapter, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

(2)

Whoever knowingly violates subsection (a)(6), (d), (g), (h), (i), (j), or (o) of section 922 shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

(3) Any licensed dealer, licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed collector who knowingly —

(A)

makes any false statement or representation with respect to the information required by the provisions of this chapter to be kept in the records of a person licensed under this chapter, or

(B)

violates subsection (m) of section 922, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

(4)

Whoever violates section 922(q) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the term of imprisonment imposed under this paragraph shall not run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed under any other provision of law. Except for the authorization of a term of imprisonment of not more than 5 years made in this paragraph, for the purpose of any other law a violation of section 922(q) shall be deemed to be a misdemeanor.

(5)

Whoever knowingly violates subsection (s) or (t) of section 922 shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 1 year, or both.

(6)

(A)

(i)

A juvenile who violates section 922(x) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, except that a juvenile described in clause (ii) shall be sentenced to probation on appropriate conditions and shall not be incarcerated unless the juvenile fails to comply with a condition of probation.

(ii) A juvenile is described in this clause if—

(I)

the offense of which the juvenile is charged is possession of a handgun or ammunition in violation of section 922(x)(2); and

(II)

the juvenile has not been convicted in any court of an offense (including an offense under section 922(x) or a similar State law, but not including any other offense consisting of conduct that if engaged in by an adult would not constitute an offense) or adjudicated as a juvenile delinquent for conduct that if engaged in by an adult would constitute an offense.

(B) A person other than a juvenile who knowingly violates section 922(x)—

(i)

shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both; and

(ii)

if the person sold, delivered, or otherwise transferred a handgun or ammunition to a juvenile knowing or having reasonable cause to know that the juvenile intended to carry or otherwise possess or discharge or otherwise use the handgun or ammunition in the commission of a crime of violence, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

(7)

Whoever knowingly violates section 931 shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both.

(b)

Whoever, with intent to commit therewith an offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that an offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year is to be committed therewith, ships, transports, or receives a firearm or any ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

(c)

(1)

(A) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or

drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime—

(i)

be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;

(ii)

if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and

(iii)

if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.

(B) If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation of this subsection—

(i)

is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years; or

(ii)

is a machinegun or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muf-

fler, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 years.

(C) In the case of a violation of this subsection that occurs after a prior conviction under this subsection has become final, the person shall—

(i)

be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years; and

(ii)

if the firearm involved is a machinegun or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, be sentenced to imprisonment for life.

(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law—

(i)

a court shall not place on probation any person convicted of a violation of this subsection; and

(ii)

no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any term of imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed.

(2)

For purposes of this subsection, the term "drug trafficking crime" means any felony punishable

under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46.

(3) For purposes of this subsection the term "crime of violence" means an offense that is a felony and—

(A)

has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or

(B)

that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.

(4)

For purposes of this subsection, the term "brandish" means, with respect to a firearm, to display all or part of the firearm, or otherwise make the presence of the firearm known to another person, in order to intimidate that person, regardless of whether the firearm is directly visible to that person.

(5) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided under this subsection, or by any other provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an

enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries armor piercing ammunition, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses armor piercing ammunition, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime or conviction under this section—

(A)

be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 15 years; and

(B) if death results from the use of such ammunition—

(i)

if the killing is murder (as defined in section 1111), be punished by death or sentenced to a term of imprisonment for any term of years or for life; and

(ii)

if the killing is manslaughter (as defined in section 1112), be punished as provided in section 1112.

(d)

(1)

Any firearm or ammunition involved in or used in any knowing violation of subsection (a)(4), (a)(6), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), or (k) of section 922, or knowing importation or bringing into the United States or any possession thereof any firearm or ammunition in violation of section 922(l), or knowing violation

of section 924, or willful violation of any other provision of this chapter or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder, or any violation of any other criminal law of the United States, or any firearm or ammunition intended to be used in any offense referred to in paragraph (3) of this subsection, where such intent is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture, and all provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 relating to the seizure, forfeiture, and disposition of firearms, as defined in section 5845(a) of that Code, shall, so far as applicable, extend to seizures and forfeitures under the provisions of this chapter: Provided, That upon acquittal of the owner or possessor, or dismissal of the charges against him other than upon motion of the Government prior to trial, or lapse of or court termination of the restraining order to which he is subject, the seized or relinquished firearms or ammunition shall be returned forthwith to the owner or possessor or to a person delegated by the owner or possessor unless the return of the firearms or ammunition would place the owner or possessor or his delegate in violation of law. Any action or proceeding for the forfeiture of firearms or ammunition shall be commenced within one hundred and twenty days of such seizure.

(2)

(A)

In any action or proceeding for the return of firearms or ammunition seized under the provi-

sions of this chapter, the court shall allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee, and the United States shall be liable therefor.

(B)

In any other action or proceeding under the provisions of this chapter, the court, when it finds that such action was without foundation, or was initiated vexatiously, frivolously, or in bad faith, shall allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee, and the United States shall be liable therefor.

(C)

Only those firearms or quantities of ammunition particularly named and individually identified as involved in or used in any violation of the provisions of this chapter or any rule or regulation issued thereunder, or any other criminal law of the United States or as intended to be used in any offense referred to in paragraph (3) of this subsection, where such intent is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, shall be subject to seizure, forfeiture, and disposition.

(D)

The United States shall be liable for attorneys' fees under this paragraph only to the extent provided in advance by appropriation Acts.

(3) The offenses referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2)(C) of this subsection are—

(A)

any crime of violence, as that term is defined in section 924(c)(3) of this title;

(B)

any offense punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.) or the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.);

(C)

any offense described in section 922(a)(1), 922(a)(3), 922(a)(5), or 922(b)(3) of this title, where the firearm or ammunition intended to be used in any such offense is involved in a pattern of activities which includes a violation of any offense described in section 922(a)(1), 922(a)(3), 922(a)(5), or 922(b)(3) of this title;

(D)

any offense described in section 922(d) of this title where the firearm or ammunition is intended to be used in such offense by the transferor of such firearm or ammunition;

(E)

any offense described in section 922(i), 922(j), 922(l), 922(n), or 924(b) of this title; and

(F)

any offense which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States which involves the exportation of firearms or ammunition.

(e)

(1)

In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another, such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such person with respect to the conviction under section 922(g).

(2) As used in this subsection—

(A) the term "serious drug offense" means—

(i)

an offense under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46 for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law; or

(ii)

an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term of

imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law;

(B) the term "violent felony" means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult, that—

(i)

has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or

(ii)

is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another; and

(C)

the term "conviction" includes a finding that a person has committed an act of juvenile delinquency involving a violent felony.

(f)

In the case of a person who knowingly violates section 922(p), such person shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

(g) Whoever, with the intent to engage in conduct which—

(1)

constitutes an offense listed in section 1961(1),

(2)

is punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46,

(3)

violates any State law relating to any controlled substance (as defined in section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6))), or

(4)

constitutes a crime of violence (as defined in subsection (c)(3)), travels from any State or foreign country into any other State and acquires, transfers, or attempts to acquire or transfer, a firearm in such other State in furtherance of such purpose, shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined in accordance with this title, or both.

(h)

Whoever knowingly transfers a firearm, knowing that such firearm will be used to commit a crime of violence (as defined in subsection (c)(3)) or drug trafficking crime (as defined in subsection (c)(2)) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined in accordance with this title, or both.

(i)

(1)

A person who knowingly violates section 922(u) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

(2)

Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which provisions of this subsection operate to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this subsection be construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this subsection.

(j) A person who, in the course of a violation of subsection (c), causes the death of a person through the use of a firearm, shall—

(1)

if the killing is a murder (as defined in section 1111), be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life; and

(2)

if the killing is manslaughter (as defined in section 1112), be punished as provided in that section.

(k) A person who, with intent to engage in or to promote conduct that—

(1)

is punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46;

(2)

violates any law of a State relating to any controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 802); or

(3)

constitutes a crime of violence (as defined in subsection (c)(3)), smuggles or knowingly brings into the United States a firearm, or attempts to do so, shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined under this title, or both.

(l)

A person who steals any firearm which is moving as, or is a part of, or which has moved in, interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned for not more than 10 years, fined under this title, or both.

(m)

A person who steals any firearm from a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

(n)

A person who, with the intent to engage in conduct that constitutes a violation of section 922(a)(1)(A),

travels from any State or foreign country into any other State and acquires, or attempts to acquire, a firearm in such other State in furtherance of such purpose shall be imprisoned for not more than 10 years.

(o)

A person who conspires to commit an offense under subsection (c) shall be imprisoned for not more than 20 years, fined under this title, or both; and if the firearm is a machinegun or destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or muffler, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or life.

(p) PENALTIES RELATING TO SECURE GUN STORAGE OR SAFETY DEVICE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—

(A) Suspension or revocation of license; civil penalties.—With respect to each violation of section 922(z)(1) by a licensed manufacturer, licensed importer, or licensed dealer, the Secretary may, after notice and opportunity for hearing—

(i)

suspend for not more than 6 months, or revoke, the license issued to the licensee under this chapter that was used to conduct the firearms transfer; or

(ii)

subject the licensee to a civil penalty in an amount equal to not more than $2,500.

(B) Review.—

An action of the Secretary under this paragraph may be reviewed only as provided under section 923(f).

(2) ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.—

The suspension or revocation of a license or the imposition of a civil penalty under paragraph (1) shall not preclude any administrative remedy that is otherwise available to the Secretary.

18 U.S. Code § 1951 – Interference with commerce by threats or violence

(a)

Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

(b) As used in this section—

(1)

The term "robbery" means the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the taking or obtaining.

(2)

The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.

(3)

The term "commerce" means commerce within the District of Columbia, or any Territory or Possession of the United States; all commerce between any point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any point outside thereof; all commerce between points within the same State through any place outside such State; and all other commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.

(c)

This section shall not be construed to repeal, modify or affect section 17 of Title 15, sections 52, 101–115, 151–166 of Title 29 or sections 151–188 of Title 45.