

APPENDIX  
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

George Berka,  
*Petitioner*,  
v.  
City of Middletown, Et. Al.,  
*Respondents*.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Connecticut Supreme Court's Denial of Petition for Certification.....	A1
Opinion of the Connecticut Appellate Court.....	A2
Superior Court Docket Entries.....	A8
Judgment of the Superior Court .....	A10
Blight Citation.....	A12

1. Connecticut Supreme Court's Denial of Petition for Certification:

SUPREME COURT

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

PSC-200484

GEORGE BERKA

v.

CITY OF MIDDLETOWN

ORDER ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION TO APPEAL

The plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court, 205 Conn. App. 760 (AC-43853), is denied.

*George Berka*, self-represented party, in support of the petition.

Decided June 29, 2021

By the Court.

/s/

Rene L. Robertson  
Deputy Chief Clerk

Notice Sent: June 29, 2021  
Petition Filed: June 10, 2021  
Clerk, Superior Court, MMX-CV18-5010856-S  
Hon. Edward Domnarski  
Clerk, Appellate Court  
Reporter of Judicial Decisions  
Staff Attorneys' Office  
Counsel of Record

## **2. Opinion of the Connecticut Appellate Court:**

\*\*\*\*\*

The "officially released" date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing post-opinion motions and petitions for certification is the "officially released" date appearing in the opinion.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

\*\*\*\*\*

GEORGE BERKA v. CITY OF MIDDLETOWN ET AL. (AC 43853)

Alvord, Elgo and Albis, Js.

*Syllabus*

The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from the decision of the defendant citation hearing officer for the defendant city of Middletown upholding a citation assessed against him for violating the city's anti-blight ordinance. The court upheld six of the seven blight violations alleged against the plaintiff and calculated a resulting fine, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. *Held*:

1. The trial court properly granted the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiff's request for a jury trial; the plaintiff cited no authority that would support his challenge to the plain language of the rule of practice (§ 23-51) that governs petitions to reopen citation assessments and provides that there is no right to a hearing before a jury in such circumstances.
2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the citation hearing officer had a conflict of interest; the plaintiff never raised this issue before the citation hearing officer, which precluded him from raising the issue on appeal; moreover, even if the citation hearing officer had a conflict of interest, the hearing on appeal before the trial court was a *de novo* proceeding, and any possible prejudice would have been cured because the decision of the trial court, not that of the citation hearing officer, was on appeal.
3. This court declined to address the merits of the plaintiff's constitutional claims as they were not properly before the trial court, which never ruled on them, and could not be reviewed for the first time on appeal; the plaintiff filed a request to amend his complaint that included constitutional claims three days prior to the *de novo* hearing, and his attempted amendment failed to comport with the requirements of the rules of practice (§§ 10-1 and 10-60) regarding the amendment of pleadings, such that the court sustained the defendants' objection to the plaintiff's request to amend; accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit the plaintiff to amend his petition or to argue those constitutional issues at the *de novo* hearing.
4. The trial court's factual findings challenged by the plaintiff on appeal were not clearly erroneous; the findings were supported by evidence in the record, and this court was not left with a definite and firm conviction that any mistake had been committed.

Argued February 3—officially released June 8, 2021

*Procedural History*

Petition to reopen a citation assessment issued by the named defendant, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, where the court, *Domnarski, J.*, granted the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiff's claim for a jury trial; thereafter, the court, *Hon. Edward S. Domnarski*, judge trial referee, rendered judgment denying the petition, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. *Affirmed*.

George Berka, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).

Brig Smith, general counsel, for the appellees (defendants).

*Opinion*

ALBIS, J. The plaintiff, George Berka, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his petition to reopen a municipal blight citation assessment and upholding a failure to pay fines notice issued by the defendant city of Middletown (city), with respect to six blight violations that existed on the plaintiff's rental property located at 5 Maple Place in Middletown (property). Specifically, the plaintiff claims that (1) he should have been granted a jury trial, (2) he should have been allowed to raise constitutional issues related to the blight ordinance at his appeal hearing, (3) the blight citation violated his constitutional rights, (4) boarded windows should not constitute

blight, (5) it was neither fair nor reasonable to expect him to pour concrete and to paint in the winter, (6) the blight enforcement officer was not qualified to make structural assessments about the property, (7) the siding on his home was not "seriously damaged," (8) the outside structural walls of his home were watertight, (9) there was no garbage, rubbish, or refuse being stored or accumulated in public view, and (10) the hearing officer, defendant Sylvia K. Rutkowska,<sup>1</sup> had a conflict of interest. We disagree, and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following chronology is drawn from the trial court's memorandum of decision. "By letter dated January 10, 2018, the [city] gave the plaintiff a notice of blight for [the property] . . . . The notice referred to seven blight conditions.<sup>2</sup> . . . . The [city] issued the plaintiff a blight citation on February 14, 2018, for the seven separate violations of the blight ordinance and imposed a \$100 per day civil fine for each violation.

. . . . On March 28, 2018, the [city] issued a failure to pay fines notice for blight violations. . . . The failure to pay fines notice stated that accumulated fines totaled \$29,400 (42 days x \$700). The notice also advised the plaintiff of his right to appeal. An appeal hearing was conducted by a citation hearing officer on May 2, 2018. The hearing officer issued a revised notice of decision/ assessment on May 7, 2018, assessing fines through the date of the appeal, which resulted in a total of \$53,900 (77 days x \$700)." (Citations omitted; footnote added.)

The plaintiff appealed that decision to the Superior Court by filing a petition to reopen a municipal blight citation assessment pursuant to General Statutes § 7-152c (g) and Practice Book § 23-51,<sup>3</sup> and the court held a de novo hearing on the petition on November 7, 2019.<sup>4</sup>

At that hearing, the court heard testimony from Michelle Ford, the blight enforcement officer for the city at the time of the May 2, 2018 hearing. Ford testified that she had inspected the subject property on February 13,

2018, and March 27, 2018, that she took photographs of the alleged blight conditions on both occasions, and that she issued the blight citation and failure to pay fines notices. In its January 16, 2020 memorandum of decision, the court upheld six of the seven blight violations.<sup>5</sup> The court explained that it had "carefully considered Ford's testimony and thoroughly reviewed the [inspection] photographs," and that it found that six violations existed on, and the fines accrued from, February 14, 2018, through March 27, 2018. The court calculated the resulting fine as \$25,200 (42 days x \$600). This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The plaintiff claims that he was entitled to a jury trial in his appeal of the blight citation. We disagree. The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of this claim. On November 13, 2018, the plaintiff requested a jury trial of his appeal. On October 30, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's request for a jury trial on the ground that there is no right to a jury trial in citation assessment appeals pursuant to Practice Book § 23-51 (c). On November 6, 2019, the court granted the defendants' motion.

The plaintiff's claim is governed by Practice Book

§ 23-51, which is titled "Petition To Open Parking or Citation Assessment," and provides in subsection (c) that "[t]he hearing on the petition shall be de novo. There shall be no right to a hearing before a jury." Nevertheless, the plaintiff argues that "blight citations are grouped together with parking tickets, which are generally around \$20 . . . . Perhaps the authors here had these types of 'small' citations in mind when writing this section, and it is understandable that they likely saw these small citations as 'too trivial' to warrant a jury trial. However, a \$53,900 blight fine is a 'far cry' from a \$20 parking ticket! Doesn't a case in which a person's home is on the line deserve a hearing before a jury?" The plaintiff cites no authority that would support his challenge to the plain

language of § 23-51. We are not persuaded, and, accordingly, the trial court properly granted the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiff's request for a jury trial.

## II

The plaintiff next claims that Rutkowska "may have had a conflict of interest." He claims that "[p]rior to being permitted to appeal his blight citation to the Superior Court, [he was required to] attend a hearing on the matter before the city officials and a 'citation hearing officer,' whom the city designates. Th[e] hearing officer who presided over this hearing . . . Rutkowska, is actually a local attorney, who has business dealings and an attorney-client relationship with the city." (Emphasis omitted.) The plaintiff, therefore, claims that Rutkowska was unlikely to be objective and that her potential conflict of interest "may have caused the plaintiff to be prejudiced . . . ."

At oral argument before this court, the plaintiff conceded that he never raised this issue at the hearing before Rutkowska. The failure to raise the claim of bias of the administrative hearing officer at the time of the hearing precludes the plaintiff from raising the issue on appeal. See *Moraski v. Connecticut Board of Examiners of Embalmers & Funeral Directors*, 291 Conn. 242, 261-62, 967 A.2d 1199 (2009). Moreover, even if Rutkowska did have a conflict of interest, as the plaintiff claimed, the hearing on appeal before the trial court was a *de novo* proceeding, and, therefore, any possible prejudice would be cured. Because the decision of the trial court, and not that of Rutkowska, is currently on appeal, we agree with the court that the *de novo* hearing on appeal before the trial court cured any possible prejudice to the plaintiff.

## III

We next turn to the plaintiff's two constitutional arguments. The plaintiff claims that (1) he should have been permitted to raise constitutional issues with respect to his blight citation during the appeal hearing, and (2) the blight citation violated the first, fourth, fifth, and eighth amendments to the United States constitution. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's requests to raise those constitutional claims, and, consequently, we decline to address them on their merits.

The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of these claims. On November 4, 2019, the plaintiff filed a request to amend the complaint and an amended complaint<sup>6</sup> that included his constitutional claims. The defendants objected to that request on November 5, 2019, and the court sustained their objection on December 5, 2019. Nevertheless, the plaintiff notes in his appellate brief that, "during the hearing, the plaintiff had again asked the judge if he could present testimony as to why he believed this entire blight citation to be unconstitutional in the first place, and, again, the judge denied the plaintiff's request."

Practice Book § 10-60 provides in relevant part: "(a)

. . . [A] party may amend his or her pleadings . . . at any time . . . in the following manner: (1) By order of judicial authority; or (2) By written consent of the adverse party; or (3) By filing a request for leave to file an amendment together with . . . (B) an additional document showing the portion or portions of the original pleading or other parts of the record or proceedings with the added language underlined and the deleted language stricken through or bracketed. . . .

"(b) The judicial authority may restrain such amendments so far as may be necessary to compel the parties to join issue in a reasonable time for trial. . . ."

"Whether to allow an amendment is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. [An appellate] court will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a proposed amendment unless there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. . . . It is the [amending party's] burden

... to demonstrate that the trial court clearly abused its discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Ford*, 144 Conn. App. 165, 184, 73 A.3d 742 (2013).

Practice Book § 23-51 provides in relevant part: "(a) Any aggrieved person who wishes to appeal a parking or citation assessment issued by a town, city, borough or other municipality shall file with the clerk of the court within the time limited by statute a petition to open assessment with a copy of the notice of assessment annexed thereto. . . .

"(b) Upon receipt of the petition, the clerk of the court . . . shall set a hearing date on the petition and shall notify the parties thereof. There shall be no pleadings subsequent to the petition."

The record reveals that the plaintiff filed his request to amend on November 4, 2019, merely three days prior to the de novo hearing that was held on November 7, 2019, and that his attempted amendment failed to comport with the requirements of Practice Book §§ 10-

1 and 10-60 (a) (3). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit the plaintiff to amend his petition or to argue those constitutional issues at the de novo hearing.

Consequently, because the plaintiff's constitutional arguments were not properly before the trial court, which, therefore, never ruled on them, we cannot review them for the first time on appeal. "Our appellate courts, as a general practice, will not review claims made for the first time on appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Guzman v. Yeroz*, 167 Conn. App. 420, 426, 143 A.3d 661, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 923, 150 A.3d

1152 (2016). "It is well established that [a] party cannot present a case to the trial court on one theory and then seek appellate relief on a different one . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Council v. Commissioner of Correction*, 286 Conn. 477, 498, 944 A.2d 340 (2008).

"[A]n appellate court is under no obligation to consider a claim that is not distinctly raised at the trial level.

... [B]ecause our review is limited to matters in the record, we [also] will not address issues not decided by the trial court." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) *Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P.C.*, 252

Conn. 153, 170-71, 745 A.2d 178 (2000); see also Practice Book § 60-5. Accordingly, we decline to address the merits of the plaintiff's constitutional claims.

#### IV

Finally, the plaintiff challenges six of the trial court's findings of fact. Specifically, he claims that boarded windows should not constitute blight, that it was neither fair nor reasonable to expect him to pour concrete and to paint in the winter, that the blight enforcement officer was not qualified to make structural assessments about the property, that the siding on his home was not "seriously damaged," that the outside structural walls of his home were watertight, and that there was no garbage, rubbish, or refuse being stored or accumulated in public view. We conclude that the court's factual findings are not clearly erroneous.

"The trier of facts is the judge of the credibility of the testimony and of the weight to be accorded it. . . . [A finding of fact] will not be reversed or modified unless it is clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.

... The weight to be given to the evidence and to the credibility of witnesses is solely within the determination of the trier of fact. . . . In reviewing factual findings, [we] do not examine the record to determine whether the [court] could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . . Instead, we make every reasonable presumption . . . in favor of the trial court's ruling." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) *Cohen v. Roll-A-Cover, LLC*, 131 Conn. App. 443, 450-51, 27 A.3d 1, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 915, 33 A.3d 739 (2011).

The factual findings challenged by the plaintiff on appeal were supported by evidence in the record, and we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that any mistake has been committed. With respect to the plaintiff's claim that he should not have been required to paint and pour concrete in the winter, we further note that the plaintiff conceded at oral argument before this court that he did not request additional time from the city to comply with those requirements in warmer weather. Additionally, we need not reach the issue of the blight enforcement officer's qualifications, because the trial court determined independently, after reviewing the photographs of the property, that the structural blight conditions existed. The trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

<sup>1</sup> In this opinion we refer to the city and Rutkowska individually by name where necessary and collectively as the defendants.

<sup>2</sup> In its decision, the court noted the blight conditions referenced in the notice of blight as follows: "(1) missing, broken or boarded windows or doors, if the building is not vacant or abandoned . . . (2) broken glass, crumbling stone or other conditions reflective of deterioration or inadequate maintenance . . . (3) a collapsing or missing exterior wall, roof, floor, stairs, porch, railings, basement, hatchways, chimneys, gutters, awnings or other features . . . (4) siding or roofing that is seriously damaged, missing, faded or peeling; (5) the outside structure walls are not weather-tight [or] water-tight, that is evidenced by having any holes, loose boards, or any broken, cracked or damaged siding that admits rain, cold air, dampness, rodents, insects or vermin . . . (6) garbage, rubbish, refuse, accumulating refuse, putrescible items, trash or other accumulated debris that is being stored or accumulated in public view . . . [and] (7) abandoned or inoperable vehicles are improperly stored on the premises . . ." (Citations omitted.)

<sup>3</sup> General Statutes § 7-152c (g) provides: "A person against whom an assessment has been entered pursuant to this section is entitled to judicial review by way of appeal. An appeal shall be instituted within thirty days of the mailing of notice of such assessment by filing a petition to reopen assessment, together with an entry fee in an amount equal to the entry fee for a small claims case pursuant to section 52-259, at a superior court facility designated by the Chief Court Administrator, which shall entitle such person to a hearing in accordance with the rules of the judges of the Superior Court." Practice Book § 23-51 provides: "(a) Any aggrieved person who wishes to appeal a parking or citation assessment issued by a town, city, borough or other municipality shall file with the clerk of the court within the time limited by statute a petition to open assessment with a copy of the notice of assessment annexed thereto. A copy of the petition with the notice of assessment annexed shall be sent by the petitioner by certified mail to the town, city, borough or municipality involved. (b) Upon receipt of the petition, the clerk of the court, after consultation with the presiding judge, shall set a hearing date on the petition and shall notify the parties thereof. There shall be no pleadings subsequent to the petition. (c) The hearing on the petition shall be de novo. There shall be no right to a hearing before a jury."

<sup>4</sup> The parties refer to the petition as a "complaint."

<sup>5</sup> With respect to the seventh alleged violation, the court found that there was no evidence to establish that the trailer stored on the plaintiff's property was mechanically inoperable.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 4 of this opinion.

### 3. Superior Court Docket Entries :

Motions / Pleadings / Documents / Case Status				
Entry No	File Date	Filed By	Description	Arguable
	06/07/2018	D	APPEARANCE	
			Appearance	
	07/05/2018	D	APPEARANCE	
			Appearance	
	03/11/2020	D	APPEARANCE	
			Appearance	
	10/01/2020		ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENT	
			Appeal Transmittal of Exhibits	
100.30	05/08/2018	P	PROCEEDINGS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF MUNICIPAL REGULATIONS AND ORDINANCES CGS 7-152b/7-152c (JD-CV-20)	No
100.31	05/08/2018	P	MUNICIPAL NOTICE OF ASSESSMENT CGS 7-152b and 7-152c	No
101.00	05/08/2018	P	RETURN OF SERVICE	No
102.00	07/05/2018	D	REQUEST TO REVISE	No
103.00	07/13/2018	P	ANSWER	No
			Reply to City's Request to Revise	
104.00	11/13/2018	D	SCHEDULING ORDER	No
			RESULT: Denied 11/13/2018 HON JOSE SUAREZ	
104.10	11/13/2018	C	ORDER	No
			order entered in error; VACATED	
			RFS/II T: Denied 11/13/2018 HON JOSE SUAREZ	
			Watermark	
			Last Updated: Additional Description - 11/13/2018	
104.20	11/13/2018	C	ORDER	No
			alternate trial dates to be proposed ...	
			RESULT: Denied 11/13/2018 HON JOSE SUAREZ	
105.00	11/13/2018	P	CLAIM FOR JURY OF 6	No
			Last Updated: Result Information - 11/13/2018	
106.00	11/20/2018	D	SCHEDULING ORDER	No
			RESULT: Accepted 11/21/2018 HON JOSE SUAREZ	
106.10	11/21/2018	C	ORDER	No
			RESULT: Accepted 11/21/2018 HON JOSE SUAREZ	
107.00	11/21/2018	P	CERTIFICATE OF CLOSED PLEADINGS AND CLAIM FOR TRIAL LIST	No
108.00	06/10/2019	P	MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE	No
			RESULT: Order 6/19/2019 HON MATTHEW FRECHETTE	
108.01	06/19/2019	C	ORDER	No
			RESULT: Order 6/19/2019 HON MATTHEW FRECHETTE	
109.00	10/24/2019	P	NOTICE	No
			Revised Notice of Decision from Citation Hearing Officer; (Now Includes Total Fines)	
110.00	10/25/2019	P	AMENDMENT	No
			Addendum to Initial Complaint	
111.00	10/30/2019	D	OBJECTION	No
			Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint	
			RESULT: Sustained 12/5/2019 HON EDWARD DOMNARSK	
111.10	12/05/2019	C	ORDER	No
			RESULT: Sustained 12/5/2019 HON EDWARD DOMNARSK	
112.00	10/30/2019	D	MOTION TO STRIKE	Yes
			Motion to Strike the Plaintiff's Claim for Jury Trial	
			RESULT: Granted 11/6/2019 HON EDWARD DOMNARSKI	
112.10	11/06/2019	C	ORDER	No
			RESULT: Granted 11/6/2019 HON EDWARD DOMNARSKI	
113.00	10/30/2019	D	MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION	No
			Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Claim for Jury Trial	

114.00	10/31/2019	P	<u>MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE</u> <sup>5</sup> To revise complaint.	No
114.10	10/31/2019	C	<u>ORDER</u> <sup>5</sup> RESULT: Denied 10/31/2019 HON MATTHEW FRECHETTE	No
115.00	10/31/2019	D	<u>OBJECTION</u> <sup>5</sup> RESULT: Sustained 12/5/2019 HON EDWARD DOMNARSKI	No
115.10	12/05/2019	C	<u>ORDER</u> <sup>5</sup> RESULT: Sustained 12/5/2019 HON EDWARD DOMNARSKI	No
116.00	10/31/2019	P	<u>REQUEST TO REVISE</u> <sup>5</sup> RESULT: Withdrawn 10/31/2019 BY THE PLAINTIFF	No
117.00	10/31/2019	P	<u>REQUEST TO REVISE</u> <sup>5</sup> Clarification RESULT: Withdrawn 10/31/2019 BY THE PLAINTIFF	No
118.00	11/01/2019	P	<u>WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION</u> <sup>5</sup> Withdrawal of REQUEST TO REVISE, 116.00	No
119.00	11/01/2019	P	<u>WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION</u> <sup>5</sup> Withdrawal of REQUEST TO REVISE, Clarification, 117.00	No
120.00	11/01/2019	P	<u>REVISED COMPLAINT</u> <sup>5</sup> Per Defendant's REQUEST TO REVISE, Dated 07-05-2018	No
121.00	11/04/2019	P	<u>REQUEST TO AMEND COMPLAINT/AMENDMENT</u> <sup>5</sup> Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint	No
122.00	11/04/2019	P	<u>AMENDED COMPLAINT</u> <sup>5</sup> Amended Blight Citation Appeal	No
123.00	11/05/2019	D	<u>OBJECTION</u> <sup>5</sup> Objection to and Request to Revise for Amended Petitions RESULT: Sustained 12/5/2019 HON EDWARD DOMNARSKI	No
123.10	12/05/2019	C	<u>ORDER</u> <sup>5</sup> RESULT: Sustained 12/5/2019 HON EDWARD DOMNARSKI	No
124.00	01/16/2020	C	<u>JUDGMENT AFTER COMPLETED TRIAL TO THE COURT WITH NO JURY</u> RESULT: HON EDWARD DOMNARSKI	No
125.00	01/16/2020	C	<u>ORDER</u> <sup>5</sup> RESULT: Order 1/16/2020 HON EDWARD DOMNARSKI	No
126.00	01/27/2020	P	<u>APPEAL TO APPELLATE COURT ALL FEES PAID</u> <sup>5</sup>	No
127.00	06/03/2020	P	<u>PROPOSED JUDGMENT FILE</u> <sup>5</sup>	No
128.00	06/10/2020	C	<u>JUDGMENT FILE</u> <sup>5</sup>	No
129.00	03/11/2020	D	<u>APPELLATE COURT MATERIAL</u> <sup>5</sup> Motion to Terminate Stay	No
129.10	05/27/2021	C	<u>ORDER</u> <sup>5</sup> RESULT: Order 5/27/2021 HON EDWARD DOMNARSKI	No
130.00	03/13/2020	P	<u>APPELLATE COURT MATERIAL</u> <sup>5</sup> Objection to Motion to Terminate Stay	No
131.00	05/20/2021	P	<u>CASEFLOW REQUEST (JD-CV-116)</u> <sup>5</sup> Request to Appear Telephonically	No
131.10	05/21/2021	C	<u>ORDER</u> <sup>5</sup> RESULT: Granted 5/21/2021 HON EDWARD DOMNARSKI	No
132.00	05/21/2021	D	<u>LIST OF EXHIBITS (JD-CL-29/JD-CL-28a)</u> <sup>5</sup>	No
133.00	06/08/2021	C	<u>APPELLATE COURT DECISION/JUDGMENT/ORDER OF TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED</u> <sup>5</sup> RESULT: BY THE COURT	No
134.00	06/10/2021	P	<u>APPELLATE COURT MATERIAL</u> <sup>5</sup> Pet Cert to Supreme Court	No
135.00	06/29/2021	C	<u>APPELLATE COURT MATERIAL</u> <sup>5</sup> Denial of Pet Cert	No

4. Judgment of the Superior Court :

DOCKET NO.: MMX-CV18-5010856-S

SUPERIOR COURT

GEORGE BERKA  
57 Concord St.  
Waterbury, CT 06710

JUDICIAL DISTRICT  
OF MIDDLESEX

V.

AT MIDDLETOWN

CITY OF MIDDLETOWN  
245 DeKoven Dr.  
Middletown, CT 06457

SYLVIA K RUTKOWSKA  
148 Broad Street  
Middletown, CT 06457

JANUARY 16, 2020

Present: Hon. Edward Domnarski, Judge

JUDGMENT

This action, by writ and complaint, in the nature of a petition to open a municipal blight citation assessment, came to this Court on May 8, 2018, with a Return Date of June 5, 2018, and thence on June 7, 2018, when the defendant appeared, and thence on July 5, 2018 when the defendants filed a Request to Revise, and thence on July 13, 2018 when the plaintiff filed an Answer to the Request to Revise, and thence on November 13, 2018, when the plaintiff filed a Claim for Jury, and thence on October 30, 2019, when the defendants filed a Motion to Strike the plaintiff's Claim for Jury, and thence on November 1, 2019, when the plaintiff filed a Revised Complaint, and thence on November 4, 2019 when the plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, and thence on November 5, 2019, when the defendant filed an Objection to the plaintiff's Amended Complaint, and thence on November 6, 2019, when the Court granted defendant's Motion to Strike the Claim for Jury, and thence on December 5, 2019, when the Court sustained defendant's Objection to the plaintiff's Amended Complaint.

The Court, having heard the parties on November 7, 2019, upholds the failure to pay fines notice as to six blight violations with each violation incurring a fine of \$100 per day, for a total of \$600 per day. The violations existed on, and the fines accrued from, February 14, 2018 to March 27, 2018, which covers forty two days. Consequently, the plaintiff is assessed fines of \$25,200 (42 days x \$600). The plaintiff's petition is denied.

WHEREUPON, it is adjudged that on January 16, 2020 judgment enters in favor of the defendants.

By the Court,

Debora Kaszuba-Neary  
Debora Kaszuba-Neary,  
Chief Clerk  
6/10/20

5. Blight Citation



**City of Middletown**  
Department of Planning, Conservation & Development  
245 deKoven Drive  
Middletown, CT 06457  
860-638-4840  
[www.middletownplanning.com](http://www.middletownplanning.com)

## BLIGHT CITATION

**CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED: 7017 1070 0000 7743 2754**

George Berka, Jr.  
305 W. 6<sup>th</sup> Street  
Wilmington, DE 19801

**CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED: 7017 1070 0000 7743 2761**

New Alliance Bank  
195 Church St.  
New Haven, CT 06510

**CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED: 7017 1070 0000 7743 2723**

George Berka, Jr.  
57 Concord St.  
Waterbury, CT  
06710

**VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL:** [gberka57@comcast.net](mailto:gberka57@comcast.net)

February 14, 2018

**PROPERTY LOCATION:** 5 Maple Place, Middletown, CT  
Map/Lot: 34/0133  
Zone: RPZ

**PROPERTY OWNER:** George Berka, Jr.  
**OWNER MAILING ADDRESS:** 305 W. 6<sup>th</sup> Street, Wilmington, DE 19801 &  
57 Concord St., Waterbury, CT 06710

The City of Middletown's Zoning Enforcement Officer issued a Notice of Blight dated January 10, 2018, for violations of Chapter 120, Article II, § 120-20 and §120-25 of the City of Middletown's Code of Ordinances (referred to herein as the "Code") which existed on the above noted property located at 5 Maple Place, Middletown, Connecticut. The Notice of Blight provided that such violations were required to be remediated by Friday, February 9, 2018.

On Tuesday, February 13, 2018 the Zoning Enforcement Officer conducted another inspection of your Property, which revealed that the violations were not remediated by the deadline set forth in the Notice of Blight. Due to your failure to remediate the violations on the Property, by the authority granted pursuant to C.G.S. § 7-148(c)(7)(H)(xv), as amended, and Chapter 120, Article II, Section 120-25 of the Middletown Code of Ordinances, as amended:

February 14, 2018

Page 2

**YOU ARE HEREBY SERVED WITH A CITATION OF \$700 FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE CITY OF MIDDLETON'S CODE OF ORDINANCES ON THE PROPERTY. THE CITED FINES MUST BE PAID AND THE VIOLATIONS ON THE PROPERTY MUST BE REMEDIATED NO LATER THAN March 1, 2018.**

You have fifteen (15) days from the date of this notice, until Thursday, March 1, 2018 to pay the fines in full on an uncontested basis and to remediate the violations on the Property. If any violations on the Property are ongoing, maintained or are re-established, the failure to remediate such violations by such date may result in the imposition of additional fines.

**THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF THE VIOLATION(S) CITED IS/ARE DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:**

It is determined by the City that existing conditions pose a serious or immediate danger to the health, safety or welfare of any person or the community. (§120-20A (1))

Missing, broken or boarded windows or doors, if the building is not vacant or abandoned (§120-20A (2)(a))

**REMEDY:** Remove the boards used to cover the basement windows and replace/install/repair the windows.

Broken glass, crumbling stone or brick or other conditions reflective of deterioration or inadequate maintenance (§120-20A (2)(b))

**REMEDY:** Repair all crumbling brick and stone and other conditions reflective of deterioration or inadequate maintenance.

A fence that is in a state of dilapidation or decay; (§120-20A (2)(c))

A collapsing or missing exterior wall, roof, floor, stairs, porch, railings, basement hatchways, chimneys, gutters, awnings or other exterior features (§120-20A (2)(d))

**REMEDY:** Repair the unstable front porch and rear exterior stairs and associated railings, repair any/all missing/damaged gutters, repair chimney and other exterior features in need of repair.

- Siding or roofing that is seriously damaged, missing, faded or peeling (§120-20A (2)(e))**

**REMEDIY: Repair damaged siding and roofing.**

- Unrepaired fire or water damage that has existed for longer than two months (§120-20A (2)(f))

- A foundation that is structurally faulty (§120-20A (2)(g))

- The outside structure walls are not weather- and watertight, that is evidenced by such structure having any holes, loose boards, or any broken, cracked or damaged siding that admits rain, cold air, dampness, rodents, insects or vermin (§120-20A (2)(h))**

**REMEDIY: Seal, patch or otherwise secure all holes, loose boards, or any broken, cracked or damaged siding that admits rain, cold air, dampness, rodents, insects or vermin.**

February 14, 2018

Page 3

- Garbage, rubbish, refuse, accumulating refuse, putrescible items, trash or other accumulated debris that is being stored or accumulated in the public view (§120-20A (2)(i))**

**REMEDIY: Remove all accumulated debris including but not limited to the pallets, and discarded household items.**

- Parking lots in a state of disrepair or abandonment evidenced, for example, by cracks, potholes, overgrowth of vegetation within the surface pavement or macadam, or within medians and buffers (§120-20A (2)(j))

- Shrubs, hedges, grass, plants, weeds or any other vegetation that have been left to grow in an unkempt manner that are covering or blocking means of egress or access to any building or that are blocking, interfering with, or otherwise obstructing any sight line, road sign, or emergency access to or at the property, when viewed from any property line (§120-20A (2)(k))

- Abandoned or inoperable vehicles or abandoned or inoperable property are improperly stored on the premises; (§120-20A (2)(l))**

**REMEDIY: Removal or repair of the inoperable trailer lying beneath a fallen tree from the property.**

- Abandoned or vacant buildings or structures that are devoid of water, sewer or other utility function or service that has become an illegal residence (§120-20A (2)(m))

- Grass or weeds that have reached a height greater than eight inches (§120-20A (2)(n))

- Graffiti on buildings or structures. (§120-20A (2)(o))

- Vacant or abandoned buildings must be boarded up as required by the Building Code. In addition, for any building that is vacant for more than two months, the plywood used to board up the openings must be painted in a color to match the building. (§120-20A (3))

- The property is a fire hazard as documented by the Fire Department. (§120-20A (4))

- The property provides rodent harborage or infestations, as documented by the Health Department. (§120-20A (5))
- All equipment or other materials stored on the property must be free from rust and in good working order. Abandoned appliances, automobile parts, discarded household items and piles of rotten lumber are prohibited from being stored on the property. Equipment and material stored outside shall be stacked or arranged in an orderly fashion in a location providing reasonable screening from neighbors and adjoining streets. (§120-20A (6))

#### **BLIGHT LIEN**

Pursuant to Chapter 120, Article II, Section 120-25(C)(2) of the Middletown Code of Ordinances, if you fail to pay the fine within fifteen (15) days of the date of this Citation, the Zoning/Wetlands Enforcement Officer, pursuant to C.G.S. §§ 7-148(c)(7)(H)(xv), 7-148aa and 7-152c, as amended, is authorized to obtain a judgment against you in the Superior Court and to place a lien against your property in the amount of such judgment.

#### **CRIMINAL VIOLATION**

February 14, 2018

Page 4

Pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 7-148(c)(7)(H)(xv) and § 7-148o, as amended, any person or entity who, after written notice and a reasonable opportunity to fully remediate the blighted premises within the time period prescribed in the Notice of Blight willfully continues to violate the provisions of Chapter 120, Article II of the Middletown Code of Ordinances, may, pursuant to Section § 120-25(C)(1) of the City of Middletown's Blight Ordinance, be fined by the State of Connecticut not more than TWO HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS (\$250.00) FOR EACH DAY for which it can be shown, based on an actual inspection of the blighted premises on each such day, the blighted conditions continued to exist after written notice to the owner or occupant. This section is designated as a violation pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-27.

#### **ABATEMENT OF VIOLATION(S)**

Pursuant to C.G.S. § 7-148(c)(7)(H)(xv), as amended, and Chapter 120, Article II, §§ 120-25(D) and 120-26 of the Middletown Code of Ordinances, the City may enter the blighted premises to remediate the blighted conditions, and that in such cases, the City shall assess the costs incurred by the City of Middletown for such remediation upon the owner or occupant of the blighted premises as a lien, or as taxes pursuant to C.G.S. § 49-73b and C.G.S. § 12-169b, as amended.

If you have any questions please feel free to contact me by email at [michelle.ford@middletownct.gov](mailto:michelle.ford@middletownct.gov) or by phone at 860-638-4837.

Sincerely,



Michelle T. Ford, CWB®, PWS, CESSWI

*Acting Zoning & Wetlands Enforcement Officer*  
*City of Middletown*