

APPENDIX

A

FILED: July 1, 2021

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-2368
(1:20-cv-00592-GLR)

CHARLES A. DREAD

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

MARYLAND STATE POLICE

Defendant - Appellee

J U D G M E N T

In accordance with the decision of this court, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of this court's mandate in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 41.

/s/ PATRICIA S. CONNOR, CLERK

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-2368

CHARLES A. DREAD,

Plaintiff - Appellant.

v.

MARYLAND STATE POLICE,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
George L. Russell, III, District Judge. (1:20-cv-00592-GLR)

Submitted: June 29, 2021

Decided: July 1, 2021

Before HARRIS, RICHARDSON, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charles A. Dread, Appellant Pro Se. Mark Holdsworth Bowen, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Pikesville, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Charles A. Dread appeals the district court's order granting Defendant's motion to dismiss Dread's complaint alleging multiple claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Dread v. Md. State Police*, No. 1:20-cv-00592-GLR (D. Md. Nov. 24, 2020). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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No. 20-2368
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CHARLES A. DREAD

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TEMPORARY STAY OF MANDATE

Under Fed. R. App. P. 41(b), the filing of a timely petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc stays the mandate until the court has ruled on the petition. In accordance with Rule 41(b), the mandate is stayed pending further order of this court.

/s/Patricia S. Connor, Clerk

APPENDIX

D

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

CHARLES ANTHONY DREAD,

Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No.: GLR-20-592

MARYLAND STATE POLICE,

Defendant.

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Maryland State Police's ("MSP") Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 3). The Motion is ripe for disposition, and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2018). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the Motion.¹

Plaintiff Charles Anthony Dread advances this lawsuit against MSP, alleging that it violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). (Compl. at 4, ECF No. 1).² The Complaint is unclear regarding the specific substantive bases for Dread's allegations against MSP, but it appears to allege that MSP terminated him, retaliated against him, falsified reports about him, and subjected him to unequal terms and conditions of employment based on his race, color, national origin, and disability. (Id. at 5). According to Dread, these unlawful acts occurred in 1991 and 1997. (Id.).

¹ Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff Charles Anthony Dread's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (ECF No. 7). For the same reasons the Court will grant MSP's Motion, it will deny Dread's Motion.

² Citations to page numbers of documents in the record refer to the pagination assigned by the Court's Case Management/Electronic Case Files ("CM/ECF") system.

practice occurred within which to file his claim with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Even assuming arguendo that Dread articulated an adverse action that took place in 1997 and filed the relevant EEOC charge in 2018, more than twenty years elapsed between the unlawful employment practice and his filing. The Supreme Court has held that Title VII “precludes recovery for discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation that occur outside the statutory time period.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105 (2002).⁴ Dread’s claims are untimely. The Court will grant MSP’s Motion.

For the foregoing reasons, it is this 24th day of November, 2020, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, hereby:

ORDERED that MSP’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 3) is GRANTED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dread’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 7) is DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk MAIL a copy of this Order to Dread at his address of record; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall CLOSE this case.

/s/
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

⁴ In his Opposition to MSP’s Motion to Dismiss, Dread cites three cases without explanation: Francois v. Alberti Van & Storage Co., 404 A.2d 1058 (Md. 1979); Flying “A” Serv. Station v. Jordan, 302 A.2d 650 (Md. 1973); and Border v. Grooms, 297 A.2d 81 (Md. 1972). These state court decisions, none of which involve claims of employment discrimination, are inapposite.

**Additional material
from this filing is
available in the
Clerk's Office.**

