

NO. 20-8437

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

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OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

GAWLIK, JAN.M.
PETITIONER

V.

SEMPLE, SCOTT. ET. AL., COM'R OF CONNECTICUT CORRECTIONS
RESPONDENTS

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OF
THE CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JUNE 7th, 2021

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I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED

WHERE THE CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION VIOLATES THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS, DENYING THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS INFIRM MOTHER DENIED VISITS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS, AND VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION. WHERE THE CONNECTICUT STATE COURTS VIOLATED THE UNITED STATES SUPREMACY CLAUSE DISMISSING THIS PLAINTIFFS FEDERAL 42 U.S.C. §1983 CIVIL ACTION FILED IN STATE OF CONNECTICUT COURTS. WHERE THE STATE COURTS VIOLATED THE U.S. CONSTITUTION PRE-EMPTS THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT LAWS, CONSTITUTION, JUDICIAL JUDGEMENTS AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IS THE LAW OF THE LAND. WHERE THE STATE COURTS DENIED 1st AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION OF PLAINTIFFS MOTHER IS DIRECT (BLOOD) WITHOUT DUE PROCESS INWHERE THE COURTS ARE DENYING THIS PLAINTIFF AND HIS INFIRM MOTHER FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, FREEDOM OF RELIGION TO COMMUNICATE CATHOLIC BELIEFS, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, FREEDOM OF INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP, ALIENATION OF AFFECTION, ECT. WHERE THE PLAINTIFFS INFIRM MOTHER IS A (83) YEAR OLD CATHOLIC MOTHER THAT WANTS TO SPEAK, SEE, EMBRACE HER SON PRIOR BEFORE HER LIFE WITH GOD IN HEAVEN. WHERE THE DEFENDENTS VIOLATE THIS PLAINTIFF AND HIS (83) YEAR OLD INFIRM MOTHERS 1st AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, AND 14th AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION DUE PROCESS.

II. PARTIES

DOCKETING STATEMENT OF DEFENDENTS AND COUNSEL OF RECORD;

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V. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

GAWLIK, JAN.M., AN INMATE CURRENTLY INCARCERATED AT CHESHIRE.CORR. INST., IN CHESHIRE, CT. AS A PRO-SE LITIGANT RESPECTFULLY PETITIONS THIS COURT FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO REVIEW THE JUDGEMENT OF THE CONNECTICUT SUPERIOR COURT, CONNECTICUT APPELLATE COURT, SUPREME COURT.

VI. OPINIONS BELOW

THE DECISION BY THE CONNECTICUT APPELLATE COURT DENYING TO PROPERLY REVIEW THE APPEAL AND EVIDENCE IS REPORTED AS (GAWLIK, JAN.M.- V.SEMPLE, SCOTT.ET.AL., APPELLATE COURT, 202 CONN.APP, 202(JANUARY 12th, 2021).) THE CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT DENIED CERTIFICATION PETITION FOR HEARING ON APRIL 21st, 2021. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION "EN BANC", WAS DENIED BY SUPREME COURT ON MAY 25th, 2021. THE ORDERS OF THE CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT ARE ATTACHED AT ("APPENDIX") AT: (APPN.#(A))!

VII. JURISDICTION

GAWLIK, JAN.M., PETITION FOR HEARING TO THE CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT WAS DENIED ON APRIL 21st, 2021. EN-BANC DENIED MAY 25th, 2010, INVOKES COURTS JURISDICTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1257, HAVING TIMELY FILED THIS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI WITHIN NINETY DAYS OF THE CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURTS JUDGEMENT.

VIII. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT I:

CONGRESS SHALL MAKE NO LAWS RESPECTING AN ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION, OR PROHIBITING THE FREE EXERCISE THEREOF; OR ABRIDGING THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH, OR OF THE PRESS; OR THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE, AND TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT XIV:

ALL PERSONS BORN OR NATURALIZED IN THE UNITED STATES, AND SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION THEREOF, ARE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE STATE WHEREIN THEY RESIDE. NO STATE SHALL MAKE OR ENFORCE ANY LAW WHICH SHALL ABRIDGE THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES; NOR SHALL ANY STATE DEPRIVE ANY PERSON OF LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY, WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW; NOR DENY TO ANY PERSON WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

IX. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

THE PETITIONER FILED A 42 U.S.C. §1983 WITHIN THE STATE COURT USING FEDERAL CAUSES OF ACTION PROTECTED BY THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, DUE TO THAT THE CONNECTICUT COURTS ARE DENYING 1st AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, WITH THIS PLAINTIFFS (83) YEAR OLD INFIRM MOTHER AND IMPLEMENTING AN ALIENATION OF AFFECTION DENYING CONTACT VISITS WITHOUT ANY DUE PROCESS. THE STATE COURTS DENIED 1st AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION OF PLAINTIFFS MOTHER IS DIRECT (BLOOD) WITHOUT DUE PROCESS INWHERE THE CONNECTICUT COURTS ARE DENYING THIS PLAINTIFF AND HIS INFIRM MOTHER U.S. CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, FREEDOM OF RELIGION BETWEEN THIS PLAINTIFF AND INFIRM (83) YEAR OLD MOTHER TO COMMUNICATE CATHOLIC BELIEFS, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, FREEDOM OF INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP, ALIENATION OF AFFECTION, ECT. THE PLAINTIFFS INFIRM (83) YEAR OLD MOTHER WANTS TO SPEAK & SEE, EMBRACE HER SON PRIOR BEFORE HER LIFE WITH GOD IN HEAVEN. PLAINTIFFS (83) YEAR OLD MOTHER FORGAVE HER SON (PLAINTIFF) WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN OUR FAMILY AS JESUS CHRIST FORGAVE, AND HAS REQUESTED (3) TIMES IN THREE VISITING APPLICATIONS TO VISIT HER SON ON CONTACT VISITS SO SHE CAN EMBRACE THIS PLAINTIFF WITH FORGIVENESS. THE CONNECTICUT STATE COURTS VIOLATED THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE U.S. - CONSTITUTION DISMISSING THIS FEDERAL §1983 FILED IN STATE COURT USING STATE HERITAGE LAWS, STATUTES, CONSTITUTIONS WHICH DO NOT APPLY AND ARE PRE-EMPTED BY FEDERAL LAWS. THE COURTS OF CONNECTICUT USED IN ALL THE RULINGS STATE LAWS VIOLATING THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE. THE PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER IS NOW RESPECTFULLY APPEALING THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE VIOLATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT TO ALLOW THIS PLAINTIFFS (83) INFIRM MOTHER CONTACT VISITS BEFORE THE PLAINTIFFS MOTHER GOES TO GOD IN HEAVEN.

THIS PLAINTIFFS 42 U.S.C. §1983 FILED IN STATE COURTS IS PROTECTED UNDER THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION PRE-EMPTS THIS CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION UNDER THE 1st AMENDMENT. THE CONNECTICUT COURTS HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THIS PLAINTIFFS ACTION, BUT, USED COMMON STATE LAWS TO DISMISS THIS §1983 CASE AND VIOLATED THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION WHICH GOVERNS THIS FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION. NOTICE OF CLAIMS COMMISSIONER APPROVAL DOES NOT APPLY WITHIN A FEDERAL §1983, AND NOTICE OF CLAIMS COMMISSIONER CONFLICTS WITH §1983 AND IS BARRED AND NOT APPLICABLE IN FEDERAL ACTIONS. STATUTORY AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOES NOT APPLY IN A §1983 FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION FILED IN STATE COURT. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE PRE-EMPTS STATE STATUTES AND STATE COMMON LAW OF CONNECTICUT, BUT, THE CONNECTICUT COURTS BELIEVE THAT STATE LAWS SUPERCEDE FEDERAL LAWS IN A §1983 FILED IN THE STATE COURTS. CONNECTICUT CALLED THE CONSTITUTION STATE REQUIRES THE COURTS IN CONNECTICUT TO BE REEDUCATED ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND THEY MUST REALIZE THAT THE U.S. CONSTITUTION IS THE LAW OF THE LAND. THIS PLAINTIFFS VISITATION RIGHTS UNDER THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND 1st AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION WITH DUE PROCESS OF LAW IS PROTECTED UNDER U.S. CONSTITUTION. THE DUE PROCESS IS GUARANTEED BY THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE DEFENDENTS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS DENIED THIS PLAINTIFFS MOTHERS REQUESTS TO VISIT HER SON, AND, DUE TO HIS (83) YEAR OLD MOTHERS ELDERLY INFIRM CONDITION THIS PLAINTIFFS MOTHER REQUESTED (3) TIMES TO VISIT HER SON, AND REQUESTING THE COURTS FOR VISITATION. THE PLAINTIFF AND INFIRM MOTHER WERE DENIED VISITATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS, AND BOTH SUFFERED INJURY DUE TO DENIAL OF THEIR FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND RELIGION AND SPEECH, TO A CLOSE AND INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP AS MOTHER AND SON, RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCES OF THIS PETITIONER AND INFIRM MOTHER, AND RELIGIOUS RELATIONSHIP UNDER GOD.

THE MOTHER AND THIS PETITIONER SUFFERED INJURY BEING DENIED (BLOOD) VISITS, AND THE SON (PETITIONER) BEING AN EFFECTIVE (3rd) PARTY ADVOCATE FOR HIS INFIRM MOTHER DUE TO HER INFIRMITY AND BLOOD RELATIONSHIP. THE HINDERANCE AND DENIAL OF PETITIONERS (83) YEAR OLD INFIRM MOTHER WHO CANNOT ADVOCATE FOR HERSELF LEAVES THE ONLY AVENUE OF THE SON (PLAINTIFF) TO ADVOCATE FOR MOTHER AND HIMSELF WHICH HAS CAUSED INJURY TO BOTH THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS INFIRM MOTHER, VIOLATES 1st AMENDMENT OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, SPEECH, RELIGION, ALIENATION OF AFFECTION, AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW. INFIRM MOTHER AND PETITIONER HAVE RIGHT TO INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP.

1.) THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT COURTS HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER (ALL) FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS 42 U.S.C. §1983 FILED IN STATE COURTS, STATUTORY AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS BARRED AND DOES NOT APPLY IN STATE COURTS, VIOLATES SUPREMACY CLAUSE.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT STATE COURTS REFUSAL TO ENTERTAIN §1983 CLAIMS, WHEN STATE COURTS ENTERTAIN SIMILAR STATE LAW ACTIONS AGAINST STATE DEFENDENTS, VIOLATES THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE. FEDERAL LAW IS ENFORCABLE IN STATE COURTS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND LAWS PASSED PURSUANT, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE FORBIDS STATE COURTS TO DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM FEDERAL LAWS BECAUSE OF A DISAGREEMENT WITH ITS CONTENT OR REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE SUPERIOR AUTHORITY OF ITS SOURCE. THE DEFENDENTS STATUTORY AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY GROUNDS OF CONNECTICUT VIOLATES THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE. CONNECTICUT STATE LAWS OF STATUTORY AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DEFENSE IS NOT APPLICABLE IN A §1983 ACTION BROUGHT IN STATE COURTS. THE JURISDICTION SUBJECT MATTER IS PRE-EMPTED BY THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE WHEN A FEDERAL ACTION IS BROUGHT IN STATE COURT. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE CANNOT BE EVADED BY THE MERE MENTION OF THE WORD "JURISDICTION" AS PERSONS SUBJECT TO LIABILITY, INDIVIDUAL STATES MAY NOT EXEMPT SUCH PERSONS FROM FEDERAL LIABILITY IN STATE COURTS BY RELYING ON THEIR OWN LAW HERITAGE; TO HOLD OTHERWISE WOULD ENABLE STATES TO NULLIFY FOR THEIR

OWN PEOPLE THE LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS THAT CONGRESS HAS MADE ON BEHALF OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. THE ENTIRE CONNECTICUT COURTS DISMISSING THIS PLAINTIFFS FEDERAL §1983 FILED IN STATE COURTS AND APPLYING STATUTORY AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DEFEATS THE PURPOSE OF §1983 FROM LIABILITY AND INJURIES UNDER THE COLOR OF STATE LAWS OF THE STATES. THE §1983 IS A REMEDY AGAINST THE STATES THAT INJURE THEIR CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS AND USE STATUTORY AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS PROTECTION AS THE DEFENDENTS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, AND THE CONNECTICUT COURTS CONDONING THEIR FEDERAL UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS, TO HIDE FROM THEIR ACTIONS. STATE AS WELL AS IN FEDERAL COURTS HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER SUITS BROUGHT PURSUANT TO §1983 WHICH CREATES A REMEDY FOR VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL RIGHTS COMMITTED BY PERSONS ACTING UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW, AS THE DEFENDENTS IN THIS FEDERAL CIVIL §1983 ACTION. UNDER THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, STATE COURTS HAVE A CONCURRENT DUTY TO ENFORCE FEDERAL LAW: (MONDOU V. NEW YORK, N.H. & H.R. - CO., 223 U.S. 1, 57, 32 S. CT. 169, 178, 56 L. ED. 327). THE CONNECTICUT COURTS CANNOT VIOLATE THE FEDERAL SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF §1983 AND ALLOW STATUTORY AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS A DEFENSE AND ARE NOT SUBJECT TO LIABILITY UNDER §1983, IT DIRECTLY VIOLATES FEDERAL LAW, WHICH MAKES GOVERNMENTAL DEFENDENTS THAT ARE NOT ARMS OF THE STATE LIABLE FOR THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS UNDER §1983. (ST. LOUIS V. PRAPROTNIK, 485 U.S. 112, 121-122, 108-S S. CT. 915, 922-23, 99 L. ED. 2d. 107). THE CONNECTICUT DEFENDENTS CONDUCT DENYING VISITATION PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, VIOLATING PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS OF ANY HEARINGS OF BOTH THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS (83) YEAR OLD INFIRM MOTHER, UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW WHICH IS WRONGFUL UNDER §1983, CANNOT BE IMMUNIZED BY STATE LAW EVEN THOUGH THAT THE FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION IS BEING ASSERTED IN STATE COURT. (MARTINEZ-V. CALIFORNIA, 444 U.S. 227, 100 S. CT. 553, 62 L. ED. 2d. 841 (1980)).

THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEFENDENTS AND COUNSEL STATES ALWAYS THAT THEY ARE PROTECTED BY STATUTORY AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY WHICH HAS NO MERIT TO THIS PLAINTIFFS ARGUMENT OF THIS (FEDERAL §1983 FILED IN STATE COURT) AND STATE THAT STATE COURTS HAVE NO SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THIS PLAINTIFFS §1983 FILED IN STATE COURT. THE STATE COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE FEDERAL LAWS. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE RULES ARE DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE INDIVIDUALS INJURED UNDER §1983 BY THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEFENDENTS UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW WHICH DOES NOT APPLY. CONGRESS STATES; COMMON LAW PRACTICE AND INDIVIDUAL STATES MAY NOT RELY ON THEIR OWN COMMON LAW HERITAGE TO EXEMPT FROM FEDERAL LIABILITY PERSONS THAT CONGRESS SUBJECTED TO LIABILITY UNDER §1983.

SECTION#1, OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871, REV. STAT §1979, NOW CODIFIED AS 42 U.S.C. §1983, CREATES A REMEDY FOR VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL RIGHTS COMMITTED BY PERSONS ACTING UNDER COLOR OF STATE IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES. THE COURTS AS WELL AS FEDERAL COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER §1983 CASES, AND CONNECTICUT COURTS HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THIS PLAINTIFFS §1983 FILED WITHIN STATE OF CONNECTICUT COURTS. THE CONNECTICUT DEFENDENTS ARE LIABLE FOR INJURIES AGAINST THIS PLAINTIFF AND HIS INFIRM MOTHERS FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND DUE PROCESS. IN CASE: (MARTINEZ V. CALIFORNIA, 444 U.S. 277, 100 S. CT. 553, 62 L. ED. 2d. - 481 (1980): HELD); THAT A STATE CANNOT IMMUNIZE AN OFFICIAL FROM LIABILITY FOR INJURIES COMPENSABLE UNDER FEDERAL LAW. THIS CONNECTICUT COURTS HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THIS PLAINTIFFS §1983 AND FEDERAL LAW IS ENFORCEABLE IN STATE COURT. THE PLAINTIFFS ACTION OF §1983 AGAINST THE DEFENDENTS ARE VALID BECAUSE THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS PASSED PURSUANT PRIOR TO IT ARE AS MUCH LAWS IN THE STATES AS LAWS PASSED BY THE STATE LEGISLATION OF CONNECTICUT. THE "SUPREMACY CLAUSE" MAKES THOSE LAWS "THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND", AND CHARGES STATE COURTS SUBJECT

MATTER JURISDICTION AND TO ENFORCE THIS PLAINTIFFS §1983 FILED IN STATE COURT. THE TWO TOGETHER FORM ONE SYSTEM OF JURISPRUDENCE, WHICH CONSTITUTE THE LAW OF THE LAND FOR THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT. A STATE COURT MAY NOT DENY A FEDERAL RIGHT, WHEN THE PARTIES AND CONTROVERSY ARE PROPERLY BEFORE IT. THE EXISTANCE OF "JURISDICTION" CREATES AN IMPLICATION OF THE STATES DUTY TO EXERCISE IT. (MONDOU V. NEW YORK, N.H. & H.R. CO. 223, U.S. 1, - 58, 32, S. CT. 169, 178, 56, 1. ed. 327, (1912): (TESTA V. KATT, 330 U.S. 386, 67, S. CT. - 810, 91, L. ED. 967 (1947): (ROBB V. CONNOLLY, 111, U.S. 624, 637, 4 S. CT. 544, 551, - 28 1. ed. 542 (1884)).

A COURT'S EXCUSE THAT IS INCONSISTANT WITH OR VIOLATES FEDERAL LAW STATING IT HAS NO JURISDICTION SUBJECT MATTER, IS NOT A VALID EXCUSE. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE FORBIDS STATE COURTS TO DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES ENTIRELY FROM FEDERAL LAW. (JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNER, IN (HOWLETT V. ROSE): HELD: THAT STATES MAY NOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST FEDERAL CAUSES OF ACTION, FEDERAL §1983 IN THE STATE COURTS ARE PRE-EMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW. (QUOTE).

(FELDER V. CASEY, 487, U.S. 131, 108 S. CT. 2302, 101 L. ED. 2d. 123 (1988): (JAMES-V. KENTUCKY, 466 U.S. at 348, 104 S. CT. 1835). THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS STATE COURTS OF (GENERAL JURISDICTION) FROM REFUSING TO DO SO SOLELY BECAUSE THE SUIT IS BROUGHT UNDER FEDERAL LAW. THE CONNECTICUT COURT HAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT GOVERNMENT AND STATE ENTITIES SUBJECT TO §1983 DO NOT HAVE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, OR STATUTORY IMMUNITY THAT THIS WOULD DIRECTLY VIOLATE FEDERAL LAW. CONNECTICUT STATE COURTS ENTERTAINING §1983 ACTION MUST ADHERE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND CANNOT APPLY COMMON STATE LAW ASSERTING OF A SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TO A FEDERAL RIGHT ACTION, OF COURSE, CONTROLLED BY FEDERAL LAW. (OWEN V. CITY OF INDEPENDENCE, 445 U.S. 647 n. 30, 100 S. CT. 1413). THE SUPREME SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY THE MUNICIPALITY POSSESSED. THE DECISION TO SUBJECT STATE SUBDIVISIONS TO LIABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL

RIGHTS, WAS A CHOICE THAT THE U.S. CONGRESS MADE, AND IT IS A DECISION THAT THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO OVERRIDE. FEDERAL LAW MAKES DEFENDENTS THAT ARE ARMS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT LIABLE FOR THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS. (MONELL V. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. CT. 2018, 56 L. ED. 2D. 611 (1978)). CONGRESS SURELY DID NOT INTEND TO ASSIGN TO THE COURTS AND LEGISLATORS A CONCLUSIVE ROLE IN THE FORMATION OF DEFINING AND CHARACTERIZING THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION. (WILSON V. GARCIA, 471 U.S. 261, 269, 105 S. CT. - 1938, 1943, 85 L. ED. 2D. 254 (1985)). A FEDERAL LAW IN STATE COURT IS JUST AS MUCH LAWS PASSED BY STATE LEGISLATORS, REFUSING TO APPLY FEDERAL LAW IN STATE COURTS VIOLATES FEDERAL LAWS. (MINNEAPOLIS & ST. LOUIS R. CO. V. BOMBOLIS, 241 U.S. 222, 36 S. CT. 558). STATES ARE OBLIGATED TO ENFORCE FEDERAL LAW OF §1983 AND MAY NOT IGNORE THE TERM OF "JURISDICTION," AND DENY SUBJECT MATTER OF CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS. PERSONS THAT CONGRESS SUBJECTED TO LIABILITY, INDIVIDUAL STATES MAY NOT EXEMPT SUCH PERSONS FROM FEDERAL LIABILITY BY RELYING ON THEIR OWN COMMON LAW HERITAGE. IN THE CASE OF (HOWLETT V. ROSE, 496 U.S. 356 (1990)); STATES: COURTS REFUSAL TO ENTERTAIN §1983, VIOLATED THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF U.S. CONSTITUTION. STATUTORY AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY NOT ALLOWED IN FEDERAL §1983 CAUSES OF ACTION, EVERY STATE WOULD HAVE THE SAME OPPORTUNITY TO EXTEND THE MANTLE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TO "PERSONS" WHO WOULD OTHERWISE BE SUBJECTED TO §1983 LIABILITY. STATES WOULD BE FREE TO "NULLIFY" FOR THEIR OWN PEOPLE THE LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS THAT CONGRESS HAS MADE ON BEHALF OF ALL THE PEOPLE. * (APPENDIX (E) - HOWLETT V. ROSE, 496 U.S. 356 (1990)).

2.) NOTICE OF CLAIMS COMMISSIONER OR STATUTE AUTHORIZATION IS PRE-EMPTED BY THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE WITH RESPECT TO FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS BROUGHT IN ANY STATE COURTS, AND (NO) CLAIMS COMMISSIONER AUTHORIZATION IS REQUIRED OF ANY §1983 BROUGHT IN STATE COURTS.

THIS PLAINTIFF DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY (NOTICE OF CLAIM OR CLAIMS COMMISSIONER

ONER AUTHORIZATION) TO OBTAIN MONETARY DAMAGES FROM THE DEFENDENTS VIOLATIONS. NOTICE OF CLAIM STATUTE IN CONNECTICUT CONFLICTS IN BOTH ITS PURPOSE AND EFFECTS WITH §1983 REMEDIAL OBJECTIVES, AND BECAUSE ITS ENFORCEMENT IN STATE COURT ACTIONS WILL PRODUCE DIFFERENT OUTCOMES IN §1983 LITIGATION BASED SOLELY ON WHETHER THE CLAIM IS ASSERTED IN STATE COURT, IT IS PRE-EMPTED PURSUANT TO THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE WHEN §1983 ACTION IS BROUGHT IN STATE COURT. WITH REGARD TO FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION OF STATE LAW, APPLICATION OF NOTICE OF CLAIMS COMMISSIONER OF CONNECTICUT, BURDENS THE EXERCISE OF THE FEDERAL RIGHT BY FORCING CIVIL RIGHTS VICTIMS WHO SEEK REDRESS IN STATE COURTS TO COMPLY WITH A REQUIREMENT THAT IS ABSENT IN CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS. CONNECTICUT CLAIMS COMMISSIONER APPROVAL IS NOT APPLICABLE IN §1983 UNIQUE REMEDY AGAINST STATE GOVERNMENTAL BODIES AND THEIR OFFICIALS BY CONDITIONING THE RIGHT OF RECOVERY SO AS TO MINIMIZE GOVERNMENTAL AND STATE AGENCY LIABILITY. CONNECTICUT NOTICE OF CLAIMS COMMISSIONER APPROVAL STATUTE DISCRIMINATES AGAINST THE FEDERAL RIGHT. U.S. CONGRESS NEVER INTENDED THAT THOSE INJURED BY STATE OFFICIAL WRONGDOERS TO SUBMIT PERMISSION AS A CONDITION OF RECOVERY TO SUBMIT THEIR CLAIMS TO THE STATE OFFICIALS FOR THEIR INJURIES. THE CONNECTICUT OFFICIALS INJURED THIS PLAINTIFF AND HIS INFIRM ELDERLY (83) YEAR OLD MOTHERS 1st AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, SPEECH, RELIGION, AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THE DEFENDENTS AND ALL THE STATE COURTS THAT RULED ON THIS CASE STATE I MUST ASK FOR PERMISSION FOR DAMAGES AS ALSO THE HIGH COURT STATED THAT CONNECTICUT CASES ARTICULATE FOR PERMISSION FOR DAMAGES, USING STATE LAWS AND IGNORING FEDERAL LAWS TO PREJUDICIALLY DISMISSING MY FEDERAL ACTION FOR DAMAGES FOR THE INJURIES CONNECTICUT OFFICIALS IMPLEMENTED. THE DECISION TO SUBJECT STATE OF CONNECTICUT SUBDIVISIONS TO LIABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL RIGHTS, WAS A CHOICE CONGRESS MADE, AND IT IS A DECISION THAT THE STATE HAS NO AUTHORITY TO OVERRIDE.

CONNECTICUT CLAIMS COMMISSIONER APPROVAL FOR FEDERAL VIOLATIONS AND INJURIES IN §1983 ACTIONS FILED IN STATE COURT CANNOT BE APPROVED AS A MATTER OF EQUITABLE FEDERALISM, JUST AS FEDERAL COURTS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY OBLIGATED TO APPLY STATE LAW TO CLAIMS, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE IMPOSES ON STATE COURTS A CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO PROCEED IN SUCH MANNER THAT ALL THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES UNDER CONTROLLING FEDERAL LAW ARE PROTECTED. A STATE LAW THAT PREDICTABLY ALTERS THE OUTCOME OF §1983 CLAIMS DEPENDING SOLELY ON WHETHER THEY ARE BROUGHT IN STATE OR FEDERAL COURT WITHIN THE STATE IS OBVIOUSLY INCONSISTANT WITH THE FEDERAL LAW INTERSTATE UNIFORMITY, WHEN THERE IS A FEDERALLY CREATED CAUSE OF ACTION. THE FEDERAL RIGHT CANNOT BE DEFEATED BY THE FORMS OF LOCAL PRACTICE.

(BROWN V. WESTERN R. CO. OF ALABAMA, 338 U.S. 294, 296, 70 S. CT. 105, 106, 94-1. ED. 100 (1949)). CONNECTICUT DEFENDENTS COUNSEL OF RECORD AND THE TRIAL COURT HON. ABRAMS, STATE THAT THE PLAINTIFF REQUIRES CLAIMS COMMISSIONER APPROVAL FOR DAMAGES, THIS VIOLATES THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE. THIS IS BARRED UNDER THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE TO THE STATE OF ITS OWN LAW REQUIRING CLAIMS COMMISSIONER APPROVAL IS NOT MATERIAL WHEN THERE IS A CONFLICT WITH VALID FEDERAL LAW, FOR "ANY STATE LAW", HOWEVER CLEARLY WITHIN A STATES ACKNOWLEDGEMENT POWER, WHICH INTERFERES WITH OR IS CONTRARY TO FEDERAL LAW MUST YIELD.

(FREE V. BLAND, 369 U.S. 663, 666, 82 S. CT. 1089, 1092, 8, 1. ED. 2D. 180 (1962)). THE §1983 IS TO ENSURE THAT INJURED INDIVIDUALS WHOSE FEDERALLY OR STATUTORY RIGHTS ARE ABRIDGED MAY RECOVER DAMAGES OR SECURE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. (BURNETT V. GRATTON, 468 U.S. 42, 55, 104 S. CT. 2924, 2932, 82 1. ED. 2D. 36- (1984)). THUS: §1983 PROVIDES "A UNIQUE FEDERAL REMEDY AGAINST INCURSIONS...UPON RIGHTS SECURED BY THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS OF THIS NATION." (MITCHUM V. FOSTER, 407 U.S. 225, 239, 92 S. CT. 2151, 2160, 32 1. ED. 2D. 705 (1972)). AND IT IS TO BE ACCORDED "A SWEEP AS BROAD AS ITS LANGUAGE".

(UNITED STATES V. PRICE, 383 U.S. 787, 801, 86 S. CT. 1152, 1160, 16 L. ED. 2D. - 267 (1966)). CONNECTICUT CLAIMS COMMISSIONER APPROVAL IS NOT REQUIRED IN A §1983 AND INAPPLICABLE TO §1983 ACTIONS BROUGHT INTO STATE COURT.

(BROWN V. UNITED STATES, 239 U.S. APP. D.C. 345, n. 6, 742 F.2d. 1498, 1509 n. 6. - (1984)). CONNECTICUT CLAIMS COMMISSIONER APPROVAL IS/ARE INAPPLICABLE TO FEDERAL §1983 IN STATE COURT IN AN ANALYSIS OF TWO CRUCIAL RESPECTS; FIRST: IT DEMONSTRATES THAT THE NOTICE OF CLAIMS COMMISSIONER REQUIREMENT BURDENS THE EXERCISE OF THE FEDERAL RIGHT FORCING A CIVIL RIGHTS VICTIMS WHO SEEK REDRESS IN STATE COURTS TO COMPLY WITH A REQUIREMENT THAT IS ENTIRELY ANSENT FROM CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS. ITS INCONSISTANT TO BOTH DESIGN AND EFFECT WITH THE COMPENSATORY AIMS OF THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS.

SECOND: IT REVEALS THAT THE ENFORCEMENT OF SUCH STATUTES IN §1983 ACTIONS BROUGHT IN STATE COURT WILL FREQUENTLY PRODUCE DIFFERENT OUTCOMES IN FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION BASED SOLELY ON WHETHER THAT LITIGATION TAKES PLACE IN STATE OR FEDERAL COURT. STATES MAY NOT APPLY SUCH AN OUTCOME DETERMINATIVE LAW WHEN ENTERTAINING SUBSTANTIVE FEDERAL RIGHTS IN STATE COURT. CONNECTICUT CLAIMS APPROVAL CONFLICTS WITH THE VERY PURPOSE OF §1983 LIABILITY TO COMPENSATE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND INJURY. CONNECTICUT CLAIMS COMMISSIONER APPROVAL IS ENACTED PRIMARILY FOR BENEFIT OF GOVERNMENTAL AND STATE AGENCIES, WHICH IS INTENDED TO AFFORD SUCH DEFENDENTS AN OPPORTUNITY TO PREPARE A STRONGER CASE. ONE DOES NOT REQUIRE A EXHAUSTED STATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY OF ANY CLAIMS COMMISSIONER APPROVAL BEFORE FILING §1983 IN STATE COURT. (PATSY V. BOARD OF REGENTS, - 457 U.S. 496, 102 S. CT. 2557, 73 L. ED. 2D. 172 (1982)). THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE IMPOSES ON STATE COURTS A CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO "PROCEED IN SUCH A MANNER THAT ALL THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES ARE PROTECTED. (GARRETT V. MOORE-McCORMACK, CO., 317 U.S. 239, 245, 63 S. CT. 246, 251, 87 L. ED. 239- (1942)).

STATE COURTS ARE NOT FREE TO SIMPLY VINDICATE THE SUBSTANTIVE INTERESTS UNDERLYING A STATE RULE OF CONNECTICUT CLAIMS COMMISSIONER APPROVAL AT THE EXPENSE OF THE FEDERAL RIGHT. PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM, AS WELL AS THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, DICTATE THAT SUCH A STATE LAW MUST GIVE WAY TO VINDICATION OF THE FEDERAL RIGHT WHEN THAT RIGHT IS ASSERTED IN STATE COURT. (WILSON V. GARCIA, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S. CT. 1938, 85 L. ED. 2d. 254 (1985)). THE STATES CANNOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST A CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDY. A STATE OF CONNECTICUT CLAIMS APPROVAL TO BAR A CIVIL RIGHTS PETITIONER §1983 SUIT, WHICH IS IN REALITY "AN ACTION FOR INJURY TO PERSONAL RIGHTS". STATE COURTS MUST ENTERTAIN A §1983 ACTION IF PLAINTIFF CHOOSES A STATE COURT OVER A FEDERAL FORUM THAT IS ALWAYS AVAILABLE AS A MATTER OF RIGHT. (MARTINEZ V. CALIFORNIA, 444 U.S. 277, 283, n. 7. 100, S. CT. 553, 558 (1980)): THE PLAINTIFF (GAWLIK, JAN. M.), DOES NOT REQUIRE A CONNECTICUT CLAIMS COMMISSIONER APPROVAL FOR A "DETAILED CLAIM FOR DAMAGES." THIS PLAINTIFF AND INFIRM MOTHER, BOTH INJURED PARTIES, NEED ONLY TO RECITE THE FACTS GIVING RISE TO THE INJURIES OF BOTH AND INDICATE AN INTENT TO HOLD THE DEFENDENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM INJURY. THIS PLAINTIFFS DAMAGES AND RELIEF ARE INDICATED IN THE COMPLAINT. THE CONNECTICUT COURTS ARE VIOLATING SUPREMACY CLAUSE STATING THAT CLAIMS APPROVAL REQUIRED AND DISMISSED THIS FEDERAL §1983 ON THESE GROUNDS. THE ORIGINAL TRIAL COURT (HON. JAMES ABRAMS), AN EXPERIENCED JUDGE KNOWS THAT A §1983 FILED IN THE STATE COURT CANNOT BE DISMISSED AND IN HIS (MEMORANDUM OF DECISION/DOCKET#106.00), BUT, DUE TO HIS PREJUDICE AGAINST THIS PLAINTIFF STATED: (QUOTE); AS RELATES TO THE CLAIMS FOR MONETARY DAMAGES MADE AGAINST THE DEFENDENTS IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES ON STATE CLAIMS, SUCH CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY UNLESS IT HAS BEEN WAIVED OR AUTHORIZED BY THE CLAIMS COMMISSIONER, (QUOTE). THE ORIGINAL TRIAL COURT (HON. ABRAMS) AS A EXPERIENCED JUDGE KNOWS THIS IS A FEDERAL §1983 FILED IN STATE

COURT, AND THERE IS NO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN A FEDERAL ACTION IN STATE COURT, AND DEFENDENTS CAN BE SUED IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY FOR U.S.-CONSTITUTION VIOLATIONS. (MONELL V. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n.54, 98 S. CT. (1978)): HOLDS; THAT THE 11th AMENDMENT DOES NOT FORBID SUING STATE OFFICIALS FOR DAMAGES IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, AND FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN BOTH CAPACITIES. THE COURT (HON. ABRAMS), DISMISSED THIS FEDERAL §1983 FILED IN STATE COURT REQUIRING CLAIMS COMMISSIONER APPROVAL WHICH IS NOT REQUIRED IN A FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE PROTECTS THE IS PLAINTIFFS ACTION FROM DISMISSAL AND THE CONNECTICUT COURTS DISMISSED THIS FEDERAL §1983 ACTION VIOLATING THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE. PURSUANT TO U.S. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT CASE OF, (FELDER V. CASEY, 487 U.S. 131 (1988)). NOTICE OF CLAIM STATUE/CLAIMS COMMISSIONER APPROVAL NOT REQUIRED TO A FEDERAL §1983 CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS BROUGHT IN STATE COURTS.*
(APPENDIX(F)-FELDER V. CASEY, 487 U.S. 131 (1988)).

3.) DEFENDENTS VIOLATE DUE PROCESS OF 14th AMENDMENT DENYING PLAINTIFF AND PLAINTIFFS MOTHER VISITATION RIGHTS OF ASSOCIATION GUARANTEED BY THE 1st AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS.
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FORBIDS GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING PRISON OFFICIALS DEPRIVING YOU OF LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY, WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. DUE PROCESS ALSO PROTECTS THE FIRST, SIXTH, AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT. (DUNCAN V. LOUISIANA, 391 U.S. 145, 147-148, 88 S. CT. 1444 (1968)): (DUNCAN V. POYTHRESS, 657, f. 2d. 691, 704 (5th. cir. 1981)). THE TRIAL COURT OF THIS PLAINTIFF DISMISSED A PROTECTIVE ORDER IN WHICH THIS PLAINTIFFS MOTHER DID NOT REQUEST. THE PROTECTIVE ORDER WAS TERMINATED, AND PLAINTIFFS MOTHER REQUESTED THE TRIAL (JUDGE) FOR VISITATION OF HER SON (GAWLIK, JAN. M.). THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS (83) YEAR OLD INFIRM MOTHER WERE DENIED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS OF VISITATION AND ALSO DENIED VISITATION DUE TO THE PREJUDICE OF PRISON OFFICIALS AGAINST THIS PLAINTIFF AND HIS INFIRM MOTHER.

DENYING VISITS WITHOUT ANY HEARINGS, WITNESSES, PRESENTING EVIDENCE, COURT TRANSCRIPTS, WITHOUT PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIAL DUE PROCESS VIOLATES THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE. THE DEFENDENTS ARE PREJUDICIAL TO THIS PLAINTIFF AFTER HIS SICK MOTHER (3) TIMES THIS PLAINTIFFS MOTHER REQUESTED THE DEFENDENTS FOR VISITATION OF HIS SON. A STATE AGENCY THAT DENIES A SICK (83) YEAR OLD MOTHER THAT IS PLEADING TO SEE HER SON AT CONTACT VISITS BEFORE SHE DIES AND GOES TO (GOD), IS EVIL, CALLOUS, AND "SHOCKS THE CONSCIENCE", AFTER A SICK MOTHERS REPEATED REQUESTS. (COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO V. LEWIS, - 523 U.S. 883, 849-49, 118 S. CT. 1708 (1998)). THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS INFIRM MOTHER HAVE A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO 1st AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION. THE COURTS DID NOT IMPOSE DUE PROCESS OF LAW SANCTIONS THAT ARE PRESENTLY IMPLEMENTED, THE DEFENDENTS ARE DOING THIS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS. THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT HAS NO AUTHORITY WITHOUT PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS OVER AN INDIVIDUALS FREEDOM TO ENTER IN A FAMILY ASSOCIATION AND RELATIONSHIP OF THE MOST INTIMATE TO THE MOST ATTENUATED OF PERSONAL ATTACHMENTS WITH HIS MOTHER. (RUNYON V. MCCRARY, 427 U.S. 160, 187-89, 96 S. CT. - 2586, 2602-2603, 49 L. ED. 2d. 415 (1976)). THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS INFIRM MOTHER HAVE A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO FAMILY VISITATION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THERE WAS NO DUE PROCESS OR PROCEDURAL HEARING IMPLEMENTED TO ASK THE MOTHER ABOUT HER FEELINGS TOWARD HER SON (GAWLIK, JAN. M.). BOTH HAVE A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CORRESPOND INTIMATELY, EXPRESSION, RELIGION, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, AND VISITATION OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION. (NAACP V. - CLAIBORNE HARDWARE CO., 458 U.S. 886, 907-909, 932-933, 102 S. CT. 3409, 3422-3423, 3436, 73 L. ED. 2d. 1215 (1982)): (ABOOD V. DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION, - 431 U.S. 209, 231, 97 S. CT. 1782, 1797, 52 L. ED. 2d. 261 (1997)): (LARSON V. VALENTE, 456 U.S. 228, 224-246, 102 S. CT. 1673, 1683, 1684, 72 L. ED. 2d. 33 (1982)). DEFENDENTS VIOLATE THIS PLAINTIFF AND HIS (83) INFIRM MOTHERS FIRST

AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION PROTECTED UNDER THE BILL OF RIGHTS, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, RELIGION OF FAMILY, OF THE INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE 14th AMENDMENT OF THE U.S.- CONSTITUTION DUE PROCESS CLAUSE. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE PRE-EMPTS THIS COURTS PROCEDURE OF STATE COMMON LAW AND REQUESTED TO BE HEARD AND PRESENTED TO A IMPARTIAL JURY AS THIS PLAINTIFF REQUESTED AND DENIED A (JURY-TRIAL), OF THE FACTS, ALLEGATIONS, ECT. THE CONNECTICUT DEFENDENTS IN THIS §1983 CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION, HAVE NOT IMPLEMENTED ANY HEARINGS OR REVIEWS, OR ANYTYPE OF INQUIRY FROM MOTHER. THE DEFENDENTS DENIAL OF HIS MOTHERS IS TO THE ANIMUS OF THIS PLAINTIFF. THE COURT (HON.ABRAMS) IS AWARE THAT A §1983 FILED IN STATE COURT CANNOT BE DISMISSED, AND YET, DISMISSED THIS FEDERAL ACTION VIOLATING THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE. THIS DUE PROCESS VIOLATION OF ASSOCIATION, SPEECH, RELIGION, AND THE JURY MUST DECIDE THE FACTS AND ALLEGATIONS UNDER THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THIS ACTION IS PRE-EMPTED AND THIS HONORABLE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT MUST REMEDY THE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONNECTICUT COURTS THAT DISMISSED THIS §1983 FILED IN STATE COURT. THE DEFENDENTS ARE LIABLE FOR INJURY UNDER §1983, UNDER 14th AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS. THE CONNECTICUT COURTS VIOLATED THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE DISMISSING A FEDERAL §1983 FILED IN STATE COURT.

4.) THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS (83-YO) MOTHER INFIRM, WHERE PLAINTIFF IS THIRD (3rd) PARTY ADVOCATE, DUE TO INFIRMITY IS PROTECTED PURSUANT TO 1st AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, BILL OF RIGHTS, RELIGION, SPEECH, DUE-PROCESS OF THE 14th AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS INFIRM MOTHER PURSUANT TO (CAMACHO V. BRANDON), IN WHERE PLAINTIFF IS THIRD PARTY ADVOCATE UNDER U.S. CONSTITUTION.

PURSUANT TO (CAMACHO V. BRANDON, 317 f.3d.153(2003.2nd.cir)), ALLOWS THIS PLAINTIFF TO BE THIRD (3rd) PARTY ADVOCATE FOR HIS INFIRM ELDERLY MOTHER. A PLAINTIFF IN A §1983 FILED IN STATE COURT GENERALLY HAS STANDING TO SUE FOR THE RIGHTS OF ANOTHER WHEN PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATES THAT, 1.) INJURY- TO THE PLAINTIFF, 2.) A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND THE

THIRD PARTY AND, 3.)SOME HINDERANCE TO THE THIRD PARTYS ABILITY TO PRO-
TECT HIS OR HER OWN INTERESTS. THE PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED TO THE COURT
THAT THIS INJURES THE PLAINTIFF,THE RELATIONSHIP IS THE MOTHER (BLOOD)
OF THE PLAINTIFF,AND THE MOTHER BEING INFIRM AND SPEAKING LITTLE ENGLISH
TO PROTECT HER OWN INTERESTS AND RIGHTS THAT ARE BEING VIOLATED BY THE
DEFENDENTS,PLAINTIFF HAS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THIS PLAINTIFF IS
AN ADVOCATE FOR HIS ELDERLY AND INFIRM MOTHER. THIS IS A FEDERAL §1983
FILED IN STATE COURT,NOT STATE HERITAGE LAWS AS CAUSES OF ACTION IN STATE
COURT,WHICH VIOLATES THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE. THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS ELDERLY
MOTHER HAVE HAD BOTH THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS VIOLATED UNDER FEDERAL
CIVIL RIGHTS. THE COURTS IN CONNECTICUT JUDGEMENT STATED THAT THE COURT
IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS,ANY,THE PLAINTIFF IS MAKING ON BEHALF
OF HIS MOTHER. IN THIS FEDERAL §1983,ON THE CONTRARY,UNDER FEDERAL LAW,
AND THIS IS A FEDERAL ACTION,THAT IS PURSUANT TO, (CAMACHO V.BRANDON,317-
F.3d.153(2nd.cir.2003)),THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OF THIS PLAINTIFFS
CLAIMS FOR HIS INFIRM ELDERLY MOTHER AS THIRD PARTY ADVOCATE,BUT,INSTEAD
OF USING FEDERAL LAW THAT IS WARRENTED UNDER THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE,THE CO-
URTS USED STATE COMMON LAWS THAT ARE CONTRARY TO THE FAVORABLE OUTCOME
OF THIS PLAINTIFFS FEDERAL ACTION FILED IN STATE COURT. THE DEFENDENTS
COUNSEL STATED IN THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS THAT:THAT AN INMATE DOES NOT
HAVE LIBERTY INTERESTS IN VISITATION.THIS IS INCORRECT.THIS IS A FEDERAL
ACTION §1983 FILED IN STATE COURT,AND CONNECTICUT LAWS,CASE LAWS,CONSTI-
TUTIONS,COURT JUDGEMENTS OF STATE DO NOT APPLY. THE CONNECTICUT COURTS
HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE PLAINTIFF MAKING CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF HIS INFIR-
M MOTHER. THE CONNECTICUT COURTS ARE VIOLATING THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF
THE U.S.CONSTITUTION IF THE COURTS DO NOT ALLOW THIS FEDERAL (3rd) PAR-
TY ADVOCATE FOR HIS MOTHER,AND HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT FEDERAL LAW PRO-
TECTS THIS PLAINTIFF AND HIS SICK MOTHER IN THIS FEDERAL CIVIL ACTION,

AND PLAINTIFF AS THIRD PARTY ADVOCATE FOR HIS INFIRM MOTHER. THIS PLAINTIFF HAS STANDING TO BRING THIRD PARTY ADVOCATE UNDER A FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION, AND THIS ACTION IS A FEDERAL §1983. THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS MOTHER HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF EXPRESSION, RELIGION TO TALK TO EACH OTHER FACE TO FACE ABOUT GOD AS THIS PLAINTIFF AND INFIRM MOTHER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION, AND BOTH CANNOT BE DISCRIMINATED AS U.S. CITIZENS FREE AND BOUND OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO FREE SPEECH WITH HIS MOTHER. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAVE REFERED TO CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED "FREEDOM-OF SPEECH", AS PROTECTED LIBERTIES. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS CONCLUDED THAT CHOICE TO ENTER INTO MAINSTREAM CERTAIN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS MUST BE SECURED AGAINST UNDUE INTRUSION BY THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT BECAUSE OF THE ROLE OF SUCH RELATIONSHIPS IN SAFEGUARDING THE INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM THAT IS CENTRAL TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION SCHEME. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION RECEIVES PROTECTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY. THIS PLAINTIFF AND HIS INFIRM MOTHER IS PROTECTED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IS PROTECTED ACTIVITIES UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSE. THE CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION OF THIS KIND AS AN INDISPENSABLE MEANS OF PRESERVING OTHER INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES. THE BILL OF RIGHTS IS DESIGNED TO SECURE INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY, IT IS FORMULATED OF THE PRESERVATION OF CERTAIN KIND OF HIGHLY PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS AS THIS (PLAINTIFF & MOTHER) A SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE OF SANCTUARY FROM UNJUSTIFIED INTERFERENCE BY THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT. DEFENDENTS. (PIERCE V. SOCIETY OF SISTERS, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535, 45 S. CT. 571, 573-69, 1. ED. 1070 (1925): (MEYER V. NEBRASKA, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S. CT. 625, 626, 67 L. ED. 1042 (1923)), FREEDOM OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION IS PROTECTED UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION. THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS MOTHER ARE PROTECTED OF PERSONAL BONDS, IDEAS, BELIEFS,

RELIGION, AND INDIVIDUAL INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP AS MOTHER AND SON, AND THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEFENDENTS CANNOT INTERFERE. (ZABLOCKI V. REDHAIL, -434 U.S. 374, 383-386, 98 S. CT. 673, 679-681, 54 1. ed. 2d. 618 (1978)); (MOORE V. EAST-CLEVELAND, 431 U.S. 494, 503-504, 97 S. CT. 1932, 1937-38, 52, 1. ed. 2d. 531- (1977)); (WISCONSIN V. YODER, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92 S. CT. 1826, 1541, 32, 1. ed. 2d. - (1971)); (GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479, 482-485, 85 S. CT. 1678, 1680-1682, 14 L. ED. 2D. 510 (1965)). THE U.S. CONSTITUTION FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, EXPRESSION, RELIGION, SPEECH, INTIMATE EXPRESSION SHELTERS SUCH RELATIONSHIPS, AS IN THIS PLAINTIFFS MOTHER AND SON RELATIONSHIP, REFLECTS THE REALIZATION THAT INDIVIDUALS DRAW MUCH OF THEIR EMOTIONAL ENRICHMENT FROM CLOSE TIES WITH OTHERS. PROTECTING THESE RELATIONSHIPS FROM UNWARRENTED STATE OF CONNECTICUT INTERFERENCE THEREFORE SAFEGUARDING THE ABILITY INDEPENDENTLY TO DEFINE ONES IDENTITY THAT IS CENTRAL TO ANY LIBERTY AND RIGHT THAT THIS PLAINTIFF AND HIS MOTHER HAVE AS MOTHER AND SON INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP. (QUILLION V. ORGANIZATION OF FOSTER FAMILIES, 431 U.S. 816-844, 97 S. CT. 2094, 2109, 53, 1. ed. 2d. 14 (1977)); (STANLEY V. GEORGIA, 394, U.S. -557, 564, 89 S. CT. 1243, 1247, 22 1. ed. 2d. 542 (1969)). THE PERSONAL AFFILIATIONS THAT EXEMPLIFY PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS ARE ENTITLED TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION, ARE THOSE THAT THE CREATION AND SUSTENANCE OF A FAMILY, AS IN THIS PLAINTIFF AND HIS INFIRM MOTHER OF (83) YEARS OLD. FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS BY THEIR NATURE INVOLVE DEEP ATTACHMENTS AND COMMITMENTS WITH WHOM ONE SHARES NOT ONLY A SPECIAL BOND, BUT, ALSO THOUGHTS, EXPERIANCES, AND BELIEFS DISTINCTLY PERSONAL ASPECTS OF LIFE, AMOUNG THE THINGS, THEREFORE. THEY ARE DISTINGUISHED BY SUCH ATTRIBUTES AS RELATIVE SMALLNESS, A HIGH DEGREE OF SELECTIVITY IN DECISIONS TO BEGIN AND MAINTAIN THE AFFILIATION AND SECLUSION FROM OTHERS IN CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP. AS A GENERAL MATTER, ONLY RELATIONSHIPS WITH THOSE SORT OF QUALITIES ARE LIKE-
LY TO REFLECT UNDERSTANDING OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AS AN INTRISTIC

AND NOT THE CONNECTICUT COURTS WITH PREJUDICE THAT DENIED THIS PLAINTIFFS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL. THIS PLAINTIFF HAS PLACED THE DEFENDENTS IMMUNITIES WITHIN THE TRIAL JURY, AND THAT THIS CASE IS FACTUAL, THE FACTS MUST BE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL JURY FOR IF ANY IMMUNITIES. THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE DEFENDENTS AND THE FACTS ARE TO BE DECIDED BEFORE A JURY TRIAL. (McCOY V. HERNANDEZ, 203 f.3d.371,375, (5th.cir.200)):HOLDS; THAT COURTS HAVE SAID THAT IN A FACTUALLY CONTESTED CASE GOING TO A JURY, THE QUESTIONS OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THE JURY. (KEYLON V. CITY-OF ALBUQUERQUE, 535 f.3d., 1210, 1217-18 (10th.cir.2008)):HOLDS; QUALIFIED IMMUNITY MAY BE FOR THE JURY TO DECIDE. GENERALLY MEANS THAT THE PLAINTIFF ALLEGATIONS ABOUT THE DEFENDENTS ACTIONS ARE TRUE, THEY VIOLATED CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW, IF NOT TRUE, THEY DID NOT VIOLATE ESTABLISHED LAW. THE FACTS MUST BE RESOLVED IN ORDER TO DECIDE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY BEFORE A JURY ONLY. THIS PLAINTIFF PRESENTED FEDERAL CASE LAWS, AND THIS IS A §1983 FILED IN STATE COURT AND JUDGEMENTS THAT WHEN A PLAINTIFF DEMANDS A TRIAL JURY, THE FACTS MUST BE ESTABLISHED TO THE TRIAL JURY FOR ANY IMMUNITY OR NO IMMUNITY, AND THE LAWS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES ARE LAWS THAT GOVERN IMMUNITY UNDER THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND PRE-EMPTS ALL STATE JUDGEMENTS AND STATE COMMON LAW. (NOVITSKY V. CITY OF AURORA, 491, f.3d.1244-1255-56 (10th.cir.2007)):HOLDS; THAT VIOLATIONS OF §1983 LAW IS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED, IF PLAINTIFF PRESENTS LAWS FROM OTHER CIRCUITS THAT IS ON "POINT" THE PLAINTIFF PRESENTS U.S. SUPREME COURT CASES AND OTHER CIRCUITS THAT ARE ON POINT THAT CLARIFY THAT ONLY A TRIAL JURY CAN DECIDE THE FACTS, ALLEGATIONS, AND EVIDENCE ON THE IMMUNITIES OF THE DEFENDENTS. CIRCUITS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ALL HAVE RULED THAT ANY IMMUNITY MUST BE PRESENTED BEFORE A TRIAL JURY, IF PLAINTIFF REQUESTS/DEMANDS A TRIAL JURY IN FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS CASE.

THIS PLAINTIFF AND HIS (83) YEAR OLD INFIRM MOTHER HAS SUFFERED INJURY COMPENSATABLE IN §1983 CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OF DEPRIVATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION OF A INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP OF MOTHER AND SON. THE DEFENDENTS ARE LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES THIS PLAINTIFF HAS PRESENTED IN THE COMPLAINT AND AS THE MOTHERS (3rd) PARTY ADVOCATE UNDER (CAMACHO V. BRANDON) DUE TO THE MOTHERS INFIRMITY THIS FEDERAL CIVIL COMPLAINT MUST BE PRESENTED TO THE JURY AND CANNOT BE DISMISSED BY THE STATE COURTS IN THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT. THIS PLAINTIFF HAS PRESENTED TO THE COURT THAT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS NOTED THE FOLLOWING CONCERNING INMATES CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. "CONVICTED" PRISONERS DO NOT FORFEIT ALL CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION BY REASON OF THEIR CONVICTION AND CONFINEMENT IN PRISON. (BELL V. WOLFISH, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)):- (JONES V. N.C. PRISONERS LABOR UNION, 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977)): (MEACHUM V. FANO, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)): HOLDS; (QUOTE/CHIEF JUSTICE REINQUIST), THERE IS NO IRON CURTAIN DRAWN BETWEEN THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE PRISONS OF THIS COUNTRY. (WOLF, 418 U.S. at 555-56). IN FACT THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT: SENTENCED PRISONERS ENJOY FREEDOM OF SPEECH, RELIGION, AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION UNDER THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. THEY ARE PROTECTED AGAINST INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RACE UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT... AND THAT THEY MAY CLAIM THE PROTECTION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE TO PREVENT ADDITIONAL DEPRIVATION OF LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS. THIS PLAINTIFF AND HIS INFIRM MOTHER HAVE BEEN INJURED BY THE DEFENDENTS FOR NEARLY A DECADE TEN YEARS, DENYING VISITS WITH EACH OTHER CAUSING INJURY BEYOND EVIL, CALLOUS, THAT SHOCKS THE CONSCIENCE. THIS IS AN ANIMUS CASE THAT THE COURT OF CONNECTICUT MUST ALLOW A JURY TRIAL, AND NOT DISMISS AS THE COURT HAS IN THIS CASE VIOLATING THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND DISMISSING THIS FEDERAL CASE. THIS IS A DISMISSED FEDERAL §1983 CASE DISMISSED BY ALL THE COURTS

IN CONNECTICUT VIOLATING THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE. PLAINTIFF DEMANDED JURY TRIAL TO BE DECIDED FOR DAMAGES, INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY JUDGEMENTS AND THE COURT VIOLATED SUPREMACY CLAUSE DISMISSING §1983 IN STATE COURT WITH PREJUDICE AGAINST INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS IN CONNECTICUT AS THIS IS WHAT CONNECTICUT COURTS DO, THEY ARE IN AS THEY SAY: KUM-BA-YA, WE ARE ALL ONE AND STICK TOGETHER, THIS IS CONNECTICUT. PLAINTIFF APPEALS TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT TO RESPECTFULLY REVERSE THE CONNECTICUT JUDGEMENT DUE TO THE VIOLATION OF SUPREMACY CLAUSE IN WHERE THE LAW OF THE LAND PRE-EMPTS UNDER U.S. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

5.) THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND PRE-EMPTION OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION APPLIED TO THIS PLAINTIFFS §1983 CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION IN STATE COURT/ANALYSIS.
(THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND PRE-EMPTION)

PRE-EMPTION INVOLVES THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE WHICH PROVIDES THAT THE LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATE, "SHALL BE THE LAW OF THE LAND"...ANYTHING IN THE U.S. CONSTITUTION OR LAWS OF ANY STATE TO THE CONTRARY NOTWITHSTANDING. "U.S. CONST., ART. VI. CL. 2." UNDER THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, "STATE LAWS THAT CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL LAW WITHOUT EFFECT".

(ALTRIA V. GROUP INC. V. GOOD, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008)): (GIBBONS V. OGDEN, 22 U.S. - 1211 (1824)). THE APPROPRIATE APPLICATION OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE IS TO SUCH ACTS OF THE STATE LEGISLATORS...ENACTED IN THE EXECUTION OF ACKNOWLEDGED STATE POWERS, THAT INTERFERE WITH, OR ARE CONTRARY TO THE LAWS OF CONGRESS, MADE IN PURSUANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION...MUST YIELD TO IT.

THE "STATE LAWS" IN QUESTION INCLUDE MORE THAN JUST STATUTES. ALSO PRE-EMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW ARE ACTIONS OF STATE LEGISLATORS, EXECUTIVES, JUDICIAL BRANCH OFFICIALS AND STATE COURTS THAT CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL LAW.

(COUMO V. CLEARING HOUSE ASS'N, L.L.C., 557 U.S. 519, 536 (2009)). PRE-EMPTION PRINCIPLES DENY STATE AUTHORITY TO ACT IN A WAY THAT WOULD UNDERMINE THE PURPOSE OF FEDERAL LAW. (RIEGEL V. MEDTRONIC, INC., 552 U.S. 312, 323.30 (2008)).

A FEDERAL LAW PRE-EMPTS STATE LAW. CONGRESS MAY "OCCUPY THE FIELD OF SUPREMACY CLAUSE THEREBY PRE-EMPTING ALL CONTRARY STATE LAW". CONGRESS INTENT TO OCCUPY THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE CAN BE INFERRED FROM THE FRAMEWORK OF AUTHORITY SO PERVASIVE...THAT CONGRESS LEFT NO ROOM FOR STATES TO DOMINATE THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, WILL BE PRECLUDED ENFORCEMENT OF STATE LAWS. (ARIZONA V. UNITED STATES, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012)). A FEDERAL LAW MAY CONFLICT WITH STATE LAW, THEREBY PRE-EMPTING IT. (CROSBY V. NAT. L. FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, 530 U.S. 363, 387 (2000)). CONFLICT PRE-EMPTION INVOLVES SITUATIONS IN WHICH "COMPLIANCE WITH BOTH FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATIONS IS A PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY, AND THOSE INSTANCES WHERE THE CHALLENGED STATE LAW STANDS AS AN OBSTACLE TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT AND EXECUTION OF THE FULL PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES OF CONGRESS. THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF §1983 WAS TO INTERPOSE THE FEDERAL COURTS BETWEEN THE STATES AND THE PEOPLE, AS GUARDIANS OF THE PEOPLES RIGHTS...TO PROTECT THE PEOPLE FROM UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTION UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW. "WHETHER THAT ACTION BE EXECUTIVE, - LEGISLATIVE, OR JUDICIAL". (MITCHUM V. FOSTER, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972)). SECTION §1983 WAS ORIGINALLY ENACTED AS PART OF THE KU KLUX KLAN ACT OF (APRIL-20th, 1871), §1, 17 stat. 13. CONGRESS GOAL IS OF CREATING FEDERAL JUDICIAL REMEDY AGAINST VIOLATIONS OF CITIZENS FEDERAL RIGHTS BY STATE OFFICIALS. CONGRESS'S PROPONENTS OF THE LEGISLATION NOTED THAT STATE COURTS WERE BEING USED TO HARASS AND INJURE INDIVIDUALS, EITHER BECAUSE THE STATE COURTS WERE POWERLESS TO STOP DEPRIVATIONS OR WERE IN LEAGUE WITH THOSE WERE BENT UPON ABROGATION OF FEDERALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS. "THE ULTIMATE RESULT-OF THE PASSAGE OF THE KLU KLUX KLAN ACT WAS THAT"-THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS A GUARANTOR OF BASIC FEDERAL RIGHTS AGAINST STATE POWER WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED. THE §1983 IS TO DETER STATE ACTORS FROM RISING THE BADGE OF AUTHORITY TO DEPRIVE INDIVIDUALS OF THEIR FEDERALLY PROTECTED AND GUARANTEED RIGHTS AND TO PROVIDE RELIEF TO VICTIMS IF SUCH DETERRENCE FAILS.

(CITY OF NEWPORT V. FACTS CONCEPTS, INC., 453 U.S. 247, 268 (1981)). THUS,
THE FEDERAL INTEREST IMPLICATED IN SECTION §1983 IS TO COMPENSATE THE
VICTIMS CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND TO DETER STATE OFFICIALS FROM COMM-
ITTING SUCH VIOLATIONS IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, AND THE FUTURE. THE HONO-
RABLE COURTS OF CONNECTICUT IS BOUND BY THE U.S. CONSTITUTION SUPREMACY
CLAUSE AND IS PRE-EMPTED USING STATE COMMON LAW, OF THE PLAINTIFFS §1983
FILED IN STATE COURT OF CONNECTICUT. THE U.S. CONSTITUTION IS "THE LAW OF-
THE LAND", AND THE CONNECTICUT COURTS MUST ABIDE BY §1983 FEDERAL LAWS.
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT MUST NOT EVER ALLOW THE STATE OF CONN-
ECTICUT OR ANY OTHER STATE TO VIOLATE THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND IGNORE
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION. IT BEGINS WITH ONE CASE, THEN ANOTHER, AND THEN IT
IS SO OUT OF CONTROL ALLOWING STATES TO DO WHAT THEY PLEASE AGAINST THE
CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION JUST BECOMES ONLY
A PIECE OF PAPER WITHOUT MEANING. THIS PETITIONER RESPECTFULLY REQUESTS
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT REVERSE THIS PLAINTIFF SUPREMACY CLAUSE VIOLA-
TIONS AND PROPERLY RULE ON THIS §1983 FILED IN STATE COURTS.

(APPENDIX(H)-U.S. CONSTITUTION/ARTICLE VI, (SUPREMACY CLAUSE)).

7.) THIS IS A FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS 42 U.S.C. §1983 ACTION FILED IN STATE
COURT OF THE VIOLATIONS WITHIN THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, THE DEFENDENTS
ARE RELYING ON STATE JUDGEMENTS AND STATE COMMON LAW WHICH IS NOT
APPLICABLE WITHIN A §1983 CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION, DEFENDENTS ENTIRE IS
BASED ON STATE COMMON LAW AND VIOLATES THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF U.S.

THE DEFENDENTS, DEFENDENTS COUNSEL AND THE COURTS OF CONNECTICUT, DISMISS-
ING THIS §1983, IS BASED ON STATE JUDGEMENTS OF STATE COMMON LAWS, CON-
STITUTIONS, STATE CAUSES OF ACTIONS WITHIN THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT. DUE
TO THAT THIS IS A FEDERAL ACTION IN STATE COURTS, STATE OF CONNECTICUT
RULINGS, JUDGEMENTS WITHIN COURTS, STATE OF CONNECTICUT CASE LAWS, DECISIONS
LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS, EVEN THE STATE OF
CONNECTICUT CONSTITUTION, IS PRE-EMPTED BY THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. THIS §1983 IS FEDERAL WITHIN THE STATE COURT
AND ONLY THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND FEDERAL LAWS MUST BE APPLIED AS
AUTHORITY IN THIS FEDERAL ACTION.

THE DEFENDENTS FOR THE RECORD STATED THAT THERE IS NO SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, AND THEY HAVE SOVEREIGN AND STATUTORY IMMUNITY. THIS IS A FEDERAL ACTION AND IN STATE COURT ONLY FEDERAL CITATIONS, FEDERAL LAWS, AND FEDERAL JUDGEMENTS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND U.S. COURTS, AND OTHER CIRCUIT COURTS JUDGEMENTS ARE ONLY BINDING AND APPLICABLE IN THIS PLAINTIFFS §1983 ACTION FILED IN STATE COURT. THE DEFENDENTS STATE THAT ALL OFFICIAL CAPACITIES MUST BE DISMISSED DUE TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. THIS IS A FEDERAL §1983 AND THE PROTECTION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN ALL FEDERAL ACTION IS BARRED. THE DEFENDENTS "MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD IS VOID" AND BARRED. THE JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER USING STATE CASE LAWS IS PRE-EMPTED BY THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF FEDERAL DOCTRINES, IN WHICH IS THE AUTHORITY OF THIS ACTION. THE DEFENDENTS USING STATE JUDGEMENTS RENDER THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS AS NULL, AS WITH ALL THE CONNECTICUT COURTS RULINGS KNOWINGLY DISMISSING A §1983 FEDERAL ACTION IN STATE COURT. AN EXPERIENCED JUDGE AND JUDGES DISMISSING A FEDERAL CIVIL ACTION IN STATE COURT REFLECTS PREJUDICE. THE PLAINTIFF ADVOCATING FOR INFIRM MOTHER AS THIRD PARTY AS A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP IS PROTECTED UNDER FEDERAL LAW. (CAMACHO V. BRANDON, 317, f. 3d. 153, 159 (2nd. cir. 2003)), THUS, THE CONNECTICUT COURTS DISMISSING THIS §1983 VIOLATES THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE DUE TO ALL THE COURTS USING STATE STATUTES, JUDGEMENTS, STATE COMMON LAW DOES NOT APPLY AND IS INAPPLICABLE AND NOT RELEVANT TO THIS PLAINTIFFS §1983 FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION FILED IN STATE COURT, AND IS PRE-EMPTED BY THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. "THE LAW OF THE LAND".

8.) THE CONNECTICUT STATE COURTS RULINGS USING STATE STATUTES, JUDGEMENTS, CASE LAWS, CONSTITUTIONS, VIOLATES THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE U.S. CONSTITUTION ALL, THE STATE COURTS USING CONNECTICUT GENERAL STATUTES AND IN ITS RULINGS VIOLATES THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE. THE ORIGINAL TRIAL COURT (HON. ABRAMS), IN ITS MEMORANDUM OF DECISION STATED IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES ARE

BARRED BY, (CONNECTICUT.GENERAL.STATUTE.§4-185), WHICH PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS IN WHOLE: "NO STATE OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE SHALL BE PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES OR INJURY, NOT WANTON, RECKLESS OR MALICIOUS, CAUSED IN THE DISCHARGE OF HIS OR HER DUTIES WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS OR HER EMPLOYMENT". THIS STATUTE WOULD EVEN ALLOW THE DEATH OF A INCARCERATED INDIVIDUAL IN THE COURSE OF STATE OF CONNECTICUT EMPLOYMENT WITHOUT ANY TYPE OF ACCOUNTABILITY. THIS IS HOW BARBERIC THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT IS. ALL THE COURTS USING THIS STATUTE ON THE RULING AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF VIOLATES THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, AND STATE LAWS DO NOT APPLY AND IS PRE-EMPTED BY FEDERAL LAWS, CONSTITUTIONS, ECT. THE STATE RULINGS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF CANNOT STAND, AS STATE STATUTES ARE INAPPLICABLE IN §1983. THE ORIGINAL TRIAL COURT MADE AND RULED WITH A IRRATIONAL RULING STATED: "THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS TAKEN THE VIEW THAT CONGRESS DID NOT INTEND TO DEFEAT TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN ENACTING §1983"; THIS RULING AND STATEMENT IS A LANGUAGE THAT IS NO WHERE IN THE U.S. COURT CASES, ECT, AND THE ORIGINAL TRIAL COURTS AND STATE COURTS DO AS THEY WANT. THE STATE COURTS AND DEFENDENTS ANIMUS TOWARDS THIS PLAINTIFF AND HIS INFIRM ELDERLY MOTHER BY THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT COURTS, DEPT. OF CORRECTION, DEFENDENTS, IS AN ACTION THAT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THE PETITIONER RESPECTFULLY REQUESTS THAT THE U.S. SUPREME COURT REVERSE JUDGEMENT DUE TO THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE VIOLATIONS AND THAT THE STATE COURTS ADHERE TO FEDERAL LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN A §1983 IS FILED WITHIN THE STATE COURTS.

9.) PLAINTIFF AND INFIRM MOTHER ARE PROTECTED UNDER 1st AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF RELIGION, THE PLAINTIFF AND MOTHER HAVE RELIGIOUS BOND MOTHER/SON.

THE PLAINTIFF AND MOTHER HAVE A RELIGIOUS RELATIONSHIP IN ADDITION TO BEING MOTHER AND SON. THE PLAINTIFF RAISED AS A CATHOLIC BY HIS BELOVED MOTHER AND BY HIS MOTHER WAS INSTILLED WITH STRONG CATHOLIC ROOTS, IN WHERE

PLAINTIFF WAS SENT TO A CATHOLIC SCHOOL AND PLAINTIFF WAS AN ALTER BOY SERVING THE CATHOLIC PRIESTS AT CATHOLIC MASSES IN SERVICES. THE MOTHER A DEVOUT CATHOLIC HAS STRONG CATHOLIC ROOTS BACK IN POLAND INWHERE THIS PLAINTIFF AND MOTHER BOTH AND FAMILY RITUALLY ATTENDED MASS ON SUNDAYS AND CATHOLIC OBSERVENCES OF HOLY DAYS OF THE YEAR. THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS INFIRM (83) YEAR OLD MOTHER SPOKE REGULARLY THROUGH THE PLAINTIFFS LIFE-TIME ABOUT GOD, JESUS CHRIST, AND MOTHER MARY, THE MOTHER OF GOD OUR SAVIOR. THIS IS A 1st AMENDMENT PROTECTION UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION FREEDOM OF RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION WITH HIS MOTHER PROTECTED UNDER DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THE PLAINTIFF AND MOTHER BOTH HAVE A RELIGIOUS BOND OF ASSOCIATION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT.

10.) STANDARDS APPLIED TO THIS 42 U.S.C. §1983 FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION FILED IN STATE COURT.

THIS IS A FEDERAL 42 U.S.C. §1983 FILED IN STATE COURT. THE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, THE 14th AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAUSE IS APPLICABLE WITHIN THIS FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION FILED IN STATE COURT. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS THIS PLAINTIFF AND HIS INFIRM MOTHER FROM VIOLATIONS BY THE DEFENDENTS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEPT. OF CORRECTION. THE DEFENDENTS VIOLATING THE PLAINTIFFS AND HIS MOTHERS FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS, WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THE CONNECTICUT COURTS MUST USE FEDERAL LAWS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND RULINGS IN THIS PLAINTIFFS §1983 FILED IN STATE COURT. THE STANDARDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION MUST BE USED WITHIN THIS FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS UNDER SUPREMACY CLAUSE AS THE ENTIRE STATE COURTS VIOLATE LAW.

11.) STATEMENT OF RELIEFS AND DEMANDS REQUESTED.

A.) ISSUE A DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT STATING THAT:

1.) THE DEFENDENTS SCOTT SEMPLE, SCOTT ERFE, AND ANGEL QUIROS, VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE 14th AMENDMENT OF U.S. CONSTITUTION.

- 2.) THAT THE DEFENDENTS VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS OF BOTH PLAINTIFF AND MOTHER (MRS.ANNA GAWLIK), DENYING CONTACT VISITS AFTER THE SUPERIOR COURT TERMINATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF.
- 3.) THAT THERE WAS NO HEARING IN WHICH THE PLAINTIFFS RIGHTS AND PLAINTIFFS MOTHERS RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S.CONSTITUTION, WERE VIOLATED.
- 4.) THAT THE DEFENDENTS AND THE DEPT.OF CORRECTION, AND ITS AGENTS, VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF U.S.CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
- 5.) THAT THE DUE PROCESS VIOLATION OUTSIDE OF A COURT OF LAW IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VIOLATES THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
- 6.) DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATION IS WARRENTED.
- B.) ISSUE AN (INJUNCTION) ORDERING DEFENDENTS, SEMPLE, ERFE, QUIROS, AND ITS AGENTS TO;
 - 1.) CEASE DENYING CONTACT VISITS REQUESTED BY PLAINTIFFS MOTHER (MRS.-ANNA GAWLIK), IN WHICH SHE IS NO SAFETY AND SECURITY ISSUE.
 - 2.) TO APPROVE THE VISITING APPLICATION SUBMITTED BY THE PLAINTIFFS MOTHER (MRS.ANNA GAWLIK).
 - 3.) TO ALLOW CONTACT VISITS TO HER SON (JAN.M.GAWLIK), EVEN IF THE PLAINTIFF RECIEVES ANY DISCIPLINARY REPORTS OF CLASS, (A)(B)(C)/D.R.
 - 4.) TO ALLOW CONTACT VISITS WITH HER SON DURING VISITING TIMES WITHOUT ANY HINDERANCE OR DIFFICULTY.
 - 5.) TO UPDATE AND ERASE THE/WITHIN THE VISITING COMMENT AREA OF DEPT.OF CORRECTIONS ANY DENIALS LANGUAGE OF APPEALS COMPLETELY WITHIN SECTION OF VISIT LIST OF THE PLAINTIFF (JAN.M.GAWLIK) MOTHERS INFORMATION DENYING CONTACT VISITS
 - 6.) PLACE IN THE PLAINTIFFS COMMENT AREA OF (JAN.M.GAWLIK) VISITING LIST THAT INMATE (JAN.M.GAWLIK#138888), IS ALLOWED CONTACT VISITS WITH HIS MOTHER (MRS.ANNA GAWLIK), EVEN IF THE INMATE/PLAINTIFF RECIEVES ANY

DISCIPLINARY TICKET WHILE INCARCERATED INSIDE THE DEPT.OF CORRECTIONS.

7.) ORDERING THE DEFENDENTS AND ITS AGENTS,OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEPT.OF CORRECTION TO CEASE DENYING CONTACT VISITS OF THE PLAINTIFFS ELDERLY INFIRM MOTHER.

C.) AWARD COMPENSATORY DAMAGES;

1.) \$500,000.00/FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS,IN DAMAGES SEVERALLY AGAINST DEFENDENTS,SEMPLE,ERFE,QUIROS,INTHEIE INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES DUE TO DEPRIVATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

D.) AWARD PUNITIVE DAMAGES;

1.) \$500,000.00/FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS,IN DAMAGES SEVERALLY AGAINST DEFENDENTS,SEMPLE,ERFE,QUIROS,INTHEIR INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES DUE TO DEPRIVATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

E.) AWARD DAMAGES FOR DEPRIVATION OF PLAINTIFFS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS;

1.) \$100,000.00/ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS,IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES,FOR DEPRIVATION OF PLAINTIFFS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF, EACH/DEFENDENT.

F.) GRANT SUCH OTHER RELIEF AS IT MAY APPEAR THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED.

G.) IN ACCORDANCE UNDER CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES ARTICLE SEVENTH (7th):RIGHT BY TRIAL BY JURY SHALL BE PRESERVED. THIS PLAINTIFF DEMANDS- TRIAL BY JURY.

H.) STATE IMMUNITY DOES NOT APPLY IN STATE COURT UNDER A CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION IN ACCORDANCE UNDER 42 U.S.C.§1983. (HOWLETT V.ROSE,496 U.S.356,- 378.n.20,110 S.CT.2430(1990)).

I.) STATE NOTICE OF CLAIMS COMMISSIONER REQUIREMENT DOES NOT APPLY IN STATE COURT UNDER 42 U.S.C.§1983. (FELDER V.CASEY,487 U.S.131,151,108.- S.CT.2302(1988)).

J.) PURSUANT 42 U.S.C.§1988,ATTORNEY FEES,FILING FEES,COSTS,COPIES,ECT.

X. REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI

A.) TO AVOID CONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATIONS OF INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS ACROSS THE ENTIRE UNITED STATES OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED 1st AMENDMENT AND 14th AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION WITH FAMILY, PROTECTING FAMILY.


THE GRANTING OF CERTIORARI AND RELIEF WILL SERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST BECAUSE IT IS ALWAYS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST FOR PRISON OFFICIALS AND STATE COURTS TO OBEY THE LAW, ESPECIALLY THE CONSTITUTION. (PHELPS-ROPER-V. NIXON, 545 f.ed.685,690(8th.cir.2008)):(DURAN V. ANAYA, 642 F.SUPP, 510,527, (D.N.M.1986)): "RESPECT FOR LAW, PARTICULARLY BY OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF STATES CORRECTIONAL SYSTEMS, IS IN ITSELF A MATTER OF THE HIGHEST PUBLIC INTEREST." (LLEWELYN V. OAKLAND COUNTY PROSECUTORS-OFFICE, 402, f.supp.1379,2393(E.D.MICH.1975)):HOLDS; THE CONSTITUTION IS THE ULTIMATE EXPRESSION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST. INCARCERATED HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS UNLESS IT IS TAKEN AWAY UNDER DUE PROCESS OF LAW. INCARCERATED HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

XI. CONCLUSION

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED IN THIS CASE

DATED THIS 7th DAY OF JUNE, 2021.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,



GAWLIK, JAN.M./PRO-SE

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