

No. 20-8052

IN THE  
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Vicente Quiroz  
(Your Name)

ORIGINAL

PETITIONER

FILED

APR 23 2021

OFFICE OF THE CLERK  
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

vs.

United State of America — RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Vicente Quiroz #91208308  
(Your Name)

FBI-La Tuna camp P.O. Box 8000  
(Address)

Anthony, New Mexico/TX 88021  
(City, State, Zip Code)

0  
(Phone Number)

## QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

For federal prisoners, the last chance to argue your conviction or sentence was unlawful comes within a year of the conviction becoming final in a habeas corpus petition filed according to the restrictions of 28 USC 2255. Virtually all of those are denied by the district court that convicted and sentenced the petitioners, because, FACE-IT, how many people even judges like to admit they screwed up.

Appeal of a denied 2255 motion is not automatic. Instead, Congress has decreed that would-be appellants get a certificate of appealability ("COA"), granting permission to appeal on a per-issue basis, before briefing can go forward. COAs are the keys to the kingdom: You cannot appeal an order dismissing your 2255 claim without one.

\* Now, Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari before the Supreme Court asks what it means for due process and access to courts if petitioner in one circuit, are 69% more likely to get a COA issued than similar movants in other P. FOR EXAMPLE:

- There's a petition filed by a Columbia Law Professor on behalf of an Alabama State Inmate contends the arbitrariness in COA ruling by Appellate Courts, particularly the 11th circuit, reflects a systemic breakdown in the COA review process. "A lot of petitioners are pro-se, and they're not really getting review any more." Prof. Benard Harcourt told the National Law Journal, "It's almost as if the (statutory) mechanism requiring a COA has closed the gates on federal circuit review of habeas denials."

Harcourt filed the petition on behalf of Phillip Tomlin who has been in state prison for 42 years serving life without parole. The 11th circuit denied Tomlin a COA last year on a legal question that the court had explicitly left open in a 2011 decision, by applying "an improper, too demanding, and unduly burdensome" COA standard, the petition argues.

Tomlin's COA was denied by the 11th Circuit Judge Charles Wilson (who

grants a mere 2.7% of COAs he reviews, according to a Columbia

University Law School study published on 2020). The study showed

significant disparities in grant rates for Capital Prisoners (58%) and noncapital

(8%) in the 11th Circuit. Of more concern the study suggests that it's a

crap sheet for any COA filer. The 11th Circuit using a single judge to

review COA requests, and the grant rates among those judges range

from a low of 2.33% to a high of 25.8% more than an order of

magnitude. The study also compared the 11th Circuit to the 1st circuit,

finding that the 11th circuit's (8.4%) noncapital COA grant rate is far

below the 1st circuit's (14.39%). Petition for writ of Certiorari, Tomlin v.

Patterson. Case No. 19-7127 (Dec 22, 2019). Udall, Certificates of Appealability

in habeas cases in the United States Courts of Appeals for the 11th Circuit:

A study (Columbia Law School, Dec 24, 2019). National Law Journal, Have

Circuits Courts "Close the Gate to Inmate Appeals?" (Feb 5) Thomas L. Root.

Question Presented is: Does a denial of a certificate of Appealability violates

the Petitioner "de novo" review on properly recorded objections, due process

of the Fourteenth Amendment and the access to the courts?

Petitioner requested de novo review per-issue basis: Ineffective assistance of counsel;

Indictive Prosecution; Outrageous government conduct; Perjury in general; Speed trial violation;

Confrontation Clause; False Post arrest statement; Manipulation of recordings to

fit transcripts; Violations to the on or about; Necessity violation; Jury

Instructions; Voir dire and other

## LIST OF PARTIES

[ ] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

☒ All parties **do not** appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

- Steven Shobaf  
Attorney at Law
- Viviana Ramirez  
Attorney at Law
- John Thomas Moran Jr.  
Attorney at Law

## RELATED CASES

13 CR 968

13 CR 21

16-3510

16-3518

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|                                                        |   |
|--------------------------------------------------------|---|
| OPINIONS BELOW .....                                   | 1 |
| JURISDICTION.....                                      |   |
| CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..... |   |
| STATEMENT OF THE CASE .....                            |   |
| REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .....                    |   |
| CONCLUSION.....                                        |   |

## INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A ~ 1 - A

APPENDIX B ~ B

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX F

## APPENDIX A

- I-A - U.S. Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, Order denying a certificate of appealability Case No: 20-1156 filed: 12/08/20.
- U.S. Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, Order denying rehearing "en banc" filed: 12/08/2020, Case No: 20-1156. Both at US DC Case No: 1:18-cv-03121.
- Petitioners Motion at U.S. Court of Appeals submitted for filing on February 09, 2021 - Title: Objection Against Order Denying Rehearing "en banc"
- Petitioner Motion at U.S. District Court and U.S. Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) filed: 01/24/20 - Title: Notice of Appeal And Request for certificate of Appealability under section 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) supportive documents as followed:
  - Defendant's Response to Governments Motion Against Relief under section 28 U.S.C. § 2255: Includes (FOIA) results, partial grand jury transcripts, DEA 6 reports where agents procure the transactions, Government motion authorizing the installation of use of pen register device and a trap and trace device (the results from this motion were not provided by prosecution): "FOIA pending".
  - Motion by Petitioner requesting the discovery of motion just mention e-mails from Petitioner to defense Counsel requesting Speedy trial, pre-trial motions discovery against first "Indictment" 13 CE 21. Petitioner Motion to Dismiss Indictment under Vindictive prosecution and outrageous government conduct.
- Brief and Required Short Appendix of Defendant-Appellant Vicente Quiroz Case No: 16-3510 filed: 04/17/2017.
- Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant Vicente Quiroz Nos. 16-3510, 16-3518 (Cons.) filed: 07/14/2017.
- Petition for Rehearing "En Banc" of Defendant Appellant Vicente Quiroz filed: 11/9/2017 Cases No. 16-3510, 16-3518.
- Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Defendant Vicente Quiroz filed: 02/26/2018.
- Motion to vacate set aside under § 2255.

## APPENDIX A

2-A - Petitioner Motion Requesting Status and objection against the Passage of time: Case No: 1:18-cv-03121 filed: 08/28/19. Supportive documents e-mails to defense counsel "The delay between the Indictments violates my 6th Amendment rights of Speedy trial." Motion for Discovery of Reliable Evidence of law enforcement officer's Misconduct in Unrelated Cases, filed 06/24/15. E-mail to defense Counsel dated back "2013" before 2015 trials - here defendant requested trial for 13ce21, to challenge the third count in 13ce21 indictment as well all this documents are proof of "Ineffective assistance of Counsel". Not hearsay, but hard documents showing the divided loyalty of defense counsel and leverage provided to the prosecutor to a vindictive indictment.

3-A - Government's Santiago Proffer submitted through by standard report to be recorded for appeal Case No: 16-3510 filed 04/17/2017. Proffer filed: 09/08/14 at U.S. District Court Case No. 13ce968. This here proffer fails Fed. R. Evid. (Rule) 801(d)(2)(E). Against this Petitioner filed to the District Court Motion to Dismiss Alleged Conspiracy Aid and Abet. Also letter to defense counsel send through e-mail PDF file. This letter also supports the "Ineffective assistance of Counsel".

4-A ~~Exhibits~~ Exhibits: grand jury transcripts of Agent David Brazao / Benjamin Vance (e1)

5-A ~~Letter~~ Letter to the District Court titled "The Right to Counsel is the Right to effective assistance of Counsel," filed: 2014 when Counsel tried to Quit for the Second time.

- DEA 6 forms where Agents procure the drugs themselves setting aside the defendant.

- Copy of Motion of Pen Register device trap and trace, (no results),

- CI and Cesar phone record all from 10/21/2012 and 10/22/2012. No recordings from defendant with this two for this transactions - But Unrelated calls were use to fit the on or about.

## APPENDIX A

- 5-A ~~BHA~~ - DEA 6 forms addressing money payments by "Government Agents"
- DEA 6 of recorded of drug deals that never happen with so many different people. "Petitioner trial transcripts are full of recorded calls unrelated to the actual transaction, only use to fit, to incriminate fabricating inferences.
  - Letter submitted to the PSI as defendant version, this statement was suppress by the probation office and Judge Thomas M. Durkin who ignore my statement to the PSI at sentencing.
  - Copies of 5.10(A) <sup>Buyer/seller</sup> ~~Buyer~~ Relationship send to defense counsel who ignore my request
  - Letter to Althea K. Welsh, Senior Counsel, Attorney for Registration and Disciplinary Commission, 130 East Randolph Drive suite 1500 Chicago IL 60601. Inquiry against defense counsel and his "unreasonable strategy" for my defense.
- 6-A - Motion to Dismiss Indictment under outrageous government conduct United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S. Ct. 1637, 36 L. Ed 2d 366 (1973).
- 6-A-1 - Motion in objection to grand jury Indictment to be release to prior jury members and other mention here with:
- 6-A-2 - E mail to Defense Counsel PDF filed mail 2014. Letter for defense counsel
- 7-A - E mail to Defense Counsel PDF file mail 2014. Letter and notes
- 8-A - Defendant Motion in Limine.
- 9-A - Motion in Response and objection to oral Ruling and government Response for which posttrial motions were deny.
- 10-A - Defendant consolidated General motions in Limine
- 11-A - Defendant motion supporting Arguments for Appellate Brief.
- 12-A - Motion Responding and objecting to pre sentence Investigation Report.

## APPENDIX-B

I-B Petitioner motion objection against mandate and notice of address change; U.S. Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, motion notice of issuance of mandate against Appellate No. 20-1156 "for Exhibits" to be disposed (Petitioner use the District \* Court docket because my family could not access the Court of Appeals docket entries).

- Notification of docket entry filed: January 21, 2020 - Petitioner motion for Judicial misconduct (motion block from docket).

- Notification of docket entry, June 1, 2020 - Petitioner motion for recusal under section 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and § 144 (this motion was submitted months before June 1, 2020 and was ~~withheld~~ withheld for after the fact ruling.)

- Petitioner "Rough Drafts" of motions that were block for print through Pacer.com. my family was unable to access the appeals records. 1) motion demanding recusal under section 28, U.S.C. § 455(a) and § 144 of District Judge Thomas M. Durkin. 2) Objection against denial of motion for recusal. 3) Fed. R. App. P. Rule 3(c) docketing Statement. 4) Appellant Vicente Quiroz, Request to extend time to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)-(6)(A).

- Statement of ILUNORS Judicial Inquiry board filed: January 11, 2018 (the Judicial Inquiry board acknowledge the complaint against District Judge Thomas M. Durkin.)

- Government Status Report (here the government mentions other motions filed by the Petitioner that weren't available for print. Filed 3/25/20 while the appellate Court requested this status the government filed this at the District Courts docket.

- Petitioner letter for the Honorable Judge Buckle (this letter addresses the (wish) to returned to her Court, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, the (FOIA) filings and other issues that a Senior Judge would not allowed prosecutors to exercise,

## APPENDIX B

2-B Petitioner Request for Service (copy front and back), Seventh Circuit transcript information sheet filed: 10/20/16 (defense counsel refuse to add many of my requested documents) Request to Court Reporter Laura Renke:

- Petitioner Request for waiver of fees (Inmate requesting transcripts) filed:

12/11/17.

- Notification of Docket Entry before the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin:

Defendant's motion for waiver of fees (is denied). Defendant request for transcripts court reporter (is denied). Petitioner tried and tried to get the records, even tried to get the "audio" from my suppression hearing and the judge always obstructed my steps to a fair appeal.

- Petitioner letter to the U.S. Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, dated 2/2/2018 addressing the denial of Judicial Inquiry.

- Petitioner Motion - Request for Judicial Inquiry for "sedition" - seditious conspiracy against former Judge Thomas M. Durkin and others: To guard against repressive measures by several departments of government, by means of which "persons" in power secure themselves and their favorites from "just" scrutiny and condemnation. Also explain in this judicial inquiry request the denial of transcripts, the request to subpoena the witnesses for trial, the way the Judge, defense counsel, prosecutors had a "pre arrangement" AGREEMENT in how my cases should fall out. Also, how prosecutors during voir dire introduce (friends) who yet worked or once work with the prosecution office; also in this inquiry for seditious conspiracy "bench trial," the Santiago Proffer did not mention any "Cesar", but for my Fact Finder and Gate keeper, my 12 Juror Panel accepted HERESAY to himself besides the many objections prior to trial. The Appeals Clerk refuse me the right to filed this complaint, just like Judge Durkin serve as a rubber stamp the Clerk stamp in it too.

## APPENDIX B

3-B Petitioner Motion filed: 09/09/16 (before sentencing) - Motion in support of Document #151 filed: 08/18/16: to the District Court, to consider an order before sentence of all records requested by defendant to the (FOIA), for the prosecutor to release agents disciplinary records. Judge Durkin deny me:

- letter "copy" of Court Reporter Laura Kentle

- Petitioner Motion filed: 10/17/16 (month after sentencing) - Request for Disclosure of (FOIA) information: Plea to avoid injustice to an indigent layman who is equal by the Constitution to any and all persons, to grant fundamental fairness to a claim of innocence by "factual documentation" and more.

- FOIA letter DEA Department of Justice 8701 Morrisette Drive, Springfield, VA 22152 Document #151-08/08/16. Letter was a response that Petitioner request was been consider ONE year before my sentence.

- U.S. Marshals Service (FOIA) requested (a year before my sentence) November 24, 2015: Request for the arrest report at Phoenix, AZ. The Marshals and DEA from Phoenix arrested me (see DEA6 attach, next page) - The Agents from Chicago did not arrested me. (this information was discuss with defense counsel before my hearing to suppress the statement defense counsel did not brought this issue to the attention of the Court nor he cross agent O'Reilly about it.

- Letter from (OGIS) Office of Government Information service dated: December 23, 2015 (Provides mediation services) DEA Records.

- Letter from (OGIS) Office of Government Information service dated: May 18, 2016: mediation for several Government Offices, one asking for \$2000.

- Letter (FOIA) U.S. Department of Justice DEA (SARF) submitted December 07, 2015 - response on October 05, 2016, Partial Release.

## APPENDIX B

- 3-B - Letter in response to (FOIA) request dated September 02, 2015 One Year\* before my sentence DEA (SAEF)
- Letter from Petitioner, Office of General Counsel, Investigation Division 1425 New York Ave. NW Washington, DC 20530: Petitioner requested this office to intervene with the release of documents from DEA granted on 09-11-17 on appeal.
  - Letters from U.S. Department of Justice (EOUSA) Executive Office for the United States Attorneys from February 28, 2020 - through - November 23, 2020 request for access to records in connection with a pen register and trap and trace device order.
  - Letter Office of Professional Responsibility, 950 Pennsylvania Ave NW.
  - DEA money payment from the government to Vicente Quiroz, one of many during my participation with the CI and DEA Agents, merely financial inducement violates due process.
- 4-B - Judgement in a civil case. In this here opinion ignores many of the facts under de novo, Here is just rubber stamp assessment of what the prosecutor wanted my plea agreement to say. I am entitled to Equal Justice, to an Impartial oversight.

## **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED**

**CASES**

**PAGE NUMBER**

**STATUTES AND RULES**

**OTHER**

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

| * Cases at (2255 Response) and § 2255 motion to Vacate                                                           | EXHIBITS |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| - <i>Napue v. Illinois</i> , 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 Ct. 1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959).....                        | 1-A      |
| - <i>United States v. Bagley</i> , 473 U.S. 667, 679, n.8, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1984)...            | 1-A      |
| - <i>Strickland v. Washington</i> , 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064 .....                                     | 5-A      |
| - <i>Powell v. Alabama</i> , 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 27 Ed. 158 (1932).....                                    | 5-A      |
| Id., at 68-69, 53 S.Ct., at 63-64.                                                                               |          |
| - <i>United States v. Cronin</i> , 466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984).....         | 5-A      |
| - <i>People v. Hattery</i> , 109 Ill. 2d 499, 94 Ill. Dec. 514, 488 N.E. 2d 513 (1985).....                      | 1-A      |
| cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1013, 106 S.Ct. 3314, 92 L. Ed. 2d 118, 1989 Ill. Lexis 66, 131 Ill. Dec. 562 (1989)..... | 1-A      |
| - <i>Costello v. United States</i> , 50 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) .....                                               | 1-A      |
| - <i>Blackledge v. Perry</i> , 417 U.S. 21 [40 L. Ed. 628, 94 S.Ct. 2098] (1974).....                            | 1-A      |
| - <i>North California v. Pearce</i> (1969) 395 U.S. 711.....                                                     | 1-A      |
| - <i>Blackledge v. Perry</i>                                                                                     |          |
| - <i>United States v. Goodwin</i> (1982) 457 U.S. 368, 372. Id. at p. 372 fn.....                                | 1-A      |
| - <i>Bodenkircher v. Hayes</i> (1978) 434 U.S. 357, 363 .....                                                    | 1-A      |
| - <i>Chaffin v. Stynchcombe</i> (1973), 412 U.S. 17, 32-33, fn. 20 .....                                         | 1-A      |
| - <i>Re Bower</i> (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 865, 873-879.....                                                            | 1-A      |
| <i>Bower, supra</i> , 38 Cal. 3d                                                                                 |          |
| - <i>Tunggs v. Superior Court, supra</i> 34 Cal. 3d 360, 369 .....                                               | 1-A      |
| - Rule 7(f) Fed. R. Crim. P. ....                                                                                | 1-A      |
| - <i>United States v. Bortnovsky</i> , 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2nd Cir. 1987).....                                    | 1-A      |
| - <i>Roviano v. U.S.</i> , 353 U.S. 53, 60, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639, 77 S.Ct. 653 (1957).....                            | 1-A      |
| - <i>Wkathisford v. Bursey</i> , 429 U.S. 545 (1977).....                                                        | 1-A      |
| - <i>U.S. v. Kilrain</i> , 566 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.); <i>U.S. v. Woods</i> 544 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1976).....       | 1-A      |

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

|                                                                                                |                |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| * Cases supportive of (§2255 Relief) at Brief and require short Appendix Case No. 16-3510      |                |
| 16-3518 filed: 04/17/2017                                                                      | 1-A            |
| - Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980) (per curiam)                                         | 11, 16, 17, 19 |
| - U.S.A., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jimmy Brown, Defendant Appellant, 2011 WL 5834405 (C.A.7), 13 | 22             |
| - U.S. v. Banks, 78 F.3d 1190 (7th Cir. 1996)                                                  | 18, 20         |
| - U.S. v. Brown, 664 F.3d 1115 (7th Cir. 2011)                                                 | passim         |
| - U.S. v. Carrillo, 269 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2001)                                               | 30             |
| - U.S. v. Cerro, 755 F.2d 908 (7th Cir. 1988)                                                  | 29             |
| - U.S. v. Carson, 579 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2009)                                                 | 12, 27         |
| - U.S. v. Cruz-Rea, 626 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2010)                                               | 13             |
| - U.S. v. D-Antony, 856 F.2d 995 (7th Cir. 1988)                                               | 16             |
| - U.S. v. Jackson, 598 F.3d 340 (7th Cir. 2010)                                                | 13             |
| - U.S. v. Lindeman, 85 F.3d 1232 (7th Cir. 1996)                                               | 28             |
| - U.S. v. Mahkimitas, 991 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1993)                                             | 13, 29         |
| - U.S. v. Murdock, 991 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2007)                                                | 16, 17         |
| - U.S. v. Pair, 905 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1990)                                                  | 29             |
| - U.S. v. Pavet Ruiz, 567 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2009)                                               | 27             |
| - Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991)                                                   | 23             |
| - Berghuis v. Thompson, 560 U.S. 370 (2010)                                                    | passim         |
| - Bourjaily v. U.S., 483 U.S. 171 (1987)                                                       | 12, 26, 28     |
| - Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962)                                                      | 22             |
| - Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)                                                    | 22             |
| - Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)                                                   | 30             |
| - Gorham v. Franzen, 760 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1985)                                              | 15             |
| - Jones v. City of Elkhart, Ind., 737 F.3d 1107 (7th Cir. 2013)                                | 13             |
| - Kotteakos v. U.S., 328 U.S. 750 (1946)                                                       | 13             |

- *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ..... *passim*
- *Moran v. Burbine*, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) ..... 17
- *North Carolina v. Butler*, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) ..... 16
- *Sears v. U.S.*, 343 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1965) ..... 27
- *State v. Knight*, 785 S.E. 2d 324 (N.C. App. 2016) ..... 22
- *U.S. v. Santiago*, 582 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1998) ..... *passim*
- *U.S. v. Smith*, 218 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 2000) ..... 17
- *U.S. v. Villaseñor*, 644 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2011) ..... 13
- *U.S. v. Wysinger*, 683 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2012) ..... 12, 23, 24, 25
- *U.S. v. Upton*, 512 F.3d 394 (7th Cir. 2008) ..... 18, 20

## Rules

Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) ..... *passim*

\* Supportive "Table of Contents" for motion § 2255 Relief - Appellant's Circuit

## Rule 30(B) Appendix:

- Government Santiago Proffer, 13 ce 968, Filed 9/8/2014, 968 Dkt. 39 ..... A-1
- Government Santiago Proffer, 13 ce 21, Filed 7/2/2015, 21 Dkt. 11 ..... A-25
- Order re Defendant's Pro Se Appeal, Filed 9/21/2016, Dkt. 3 ..... A-47
- Order re Consolidation of Appeals, Filed 9/21/2016, Dkt. 2 ..... A-48
- Order re Defendant's Oral Argument for Appeal, Filed 10/5/2016, Dkt. 6 ..... A-49
- Transcript of Final Pretrial Conference Proceedings, 13 ce 968, Filed 1/7/2015 ..... A-50
- Testimony of Christopher O'Reilly, Jan. 20, 2015, Bn. Tr. (Vol. 1) 30-32, 34, 37-39, 41-44, 50  
53, 61-62, 64-66, 69, 73-74, 86-87, 94-95, 100-103 ..... A-52
- (c1) Testimony of Benjamin Vance, Jan. 21, 2015, Bn. Tr. (Vol. 2) 270-370 ..... A-81
- Testimony of Christopher O'Reilly, Jan. 23, 2017, Bn. Tr. (Vol. 4) 769, 807 ..... A-182
- Government Closing Arguments, Jan. 26, 2017, Bn. Tr. (Vol. 5) 820, 828 ..... A-184
- Government Rebuttal, Jan. 26, 2017, Bn. Tr. (Vol. 5) 943-945 ..... A-186

- Findings of the Court Jan. 29, 2017, Bn. Tr. (Vol. 6) 961, 988-989, 1002 . . . . . A-189
- Court's Verdict Jan. 29, 2017, Bn. Tr. (Vol. 6) 1005 . . . . . A-193
- Testimony of (c1) Benjamin Vance July 22, 2015, Jry. Tr. (Vol. 2) 160, ~~170~~ 175-176 . . . . . A-194
- Testimony of David Brazao July 22, 2015, Jry. Tr. (Vol. 2) 396 . . . . .
- Government Closing Arguments July 23, 2015, Jry. Tr. (Vol. 3) 499, 505 . . . . . A-198
- Government Rebuttal July 23, 2015, Jry. Tr. (Vol. 3) 554 . . . . . A-200
- Jury Charge July 23, 2015, Jry. Tr. (Vol. 3) 555 . . . . . A-201
- Jury Verdict July 23, 2015, Jry. Tr. (Vol. 3) 567 . . . . . A-202
- Jury Polled July 23, 2015, Jry. Tr. (Vol. 3) 568 . . . . . A-203

- Cases Supportive of (§2255 motion) at Reply Brief Case Nos. 16-3510, 16-3518, filed July 14, 2017: Table of Contents: . . . . . I-A

- The District Court error in admitting Mr. Quiroz's Post-Arrest Statement Warrants & New Trials . . . . . page 2
- The District Court Improperly admitted Hearsay Statements . . . . . page 8
- The District Court's Error in Admitting Mr. Quiroz's Post Arrest Statements was not Harmless . . . . . page 7
- Mr. Quiroz did not waive his objection to the admission of out-of-court statements from confidential Informant Vance . . . . . page 8
- The out of Court Statements made by Vance, Cesar, and Barraza were improperly admitted for the truth of the matter asserted . . . . . page 11
- The out-of-court statements made by Vance, Cesar, and Barraza were improperly admitted for the truth of the matter asserted . . . . . page 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Supporting of (62255 motion) at Reply Brief Case nos. 16-3510, 16-3518,

Filed: July 14, 2017; Table of Authorities:

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) page 8

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) page 1, 4, 5

Ruvalcaba v. Chandler, 416 F.3d 555 (7th Cir. 2005) page 3

United States v. Amaya, 828 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2016) page 11

United States v. Ambrose, 668 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 1996) page 11

United States v. Banks, 78 F.3d 1190 (7th Cir. 1996) page 3

United States v. Brown, 664 F.3d 1115 (7th Cir. 2011) page 3, 4

United States v. Larson, 579 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2009) page 13

United States v. Gajo, 290 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 2002) page 9, 10

United States v. Haynie, 179 F.3d 1048 (7th Cir. 1999) page 10

United States v. Hernandez-Molina, 853 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1988) page 12

United States v. Jackson, 300 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2002) page 3

United States v. Lee, 618 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2010) page 3, 8

United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d 1232 (7th Cir. 1996) page 13

United States v. Mahkimekas, 991 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1993) page 13

United States v. Kadd, 167 Fed. Appx. 565 (7th Cir. 2006) page 9

United States v. Shabazz, 579 F.3d 271 (7th Cir. 2009) page 3

United States v. Walker, 635 F.3d 271 (7th Cir. 2011) page 3

United States v. Whysinger, 683 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2012) page 7, 8

Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 1999) page 9

Rules: Fed. R. Evid. Rule 103 page 9

Fed. R. Evid. Rule 801(a)(2)(E) page 9, 13

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 31(a)(1) page 15

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

### - Cases Supportive of (§2255 motion) at Petition for Rehearing "En Banc"

Case Nos. 16-3510, 16-3518. Filed Nov. 9, 2017. . . . . 1-A

- *Berghuis v. Thompson*, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) page . . . 1

- *Easton v. Leuss*, 532 F.3d 592 (7th Cir. 2008) page . . . . . 1

- *Tague v. Louisiana*, 441 U.S. 469 (1980) page . . . 2

### Rules:

Fed. R. App. P. 35(b)(1)(B)

Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(2)

### - Other Authorities:

Oral Argument Audio, available at

[http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2017/me\\_16-3510\\_16-3510\\_09-08](http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2017/me_16-3510_16-3510_09-08)

2017.mp3, . . . page . . . . 2

### - Cases Supportive of (§2255 motion) at Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed:

February 26, 2018. In the Supreme Court of the United States: Table of Contents: 1-A

- Statement of the Case . . . page . . . . 3

- Trial Court Proceedings . . . page . . . . 3

- Seventh Circuit Proceedings . . . page . . . . 6

- Reasons for Granting the Writ . . . page 7 . . . . 7

I. The Seventh Circuit Decided An Important Question of Federal Law That Has Not Been, But, Should Be, Settle by This Court. . . . . 7

II. This Case Is An Ideal Vehicle For Determining What Evidence Is "Competent" to Show Understanding When An Arrestee Does Not Acknowledge An Officer's Recitation of the Miranda Warnings. . . . . 12

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

|                                                                                   |                   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| - Cases Supportive of (§2255 motion) at Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed:    | 1-A               |
| February 26, 2018. In the United States Supreme Court: Table of Authorities:      |                   |
| - <i>Berghuis v. Thompson</i> , 560 U.S. 370 (2010) ... pages                     | 1, 6, 8, 11       |
| - <i>Brewer v. Williams</i> , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) page                            | 1                 |
| - <i>Carnley v. Cochran</i> , 369 U.S. 506 (1962) - page                          | 8                 |
| - <i>Colorado v. Connelly</i> , 479 U.S. 157 (1986) - page                        | 8                 |
| - <i>Fare v. Michael C.</i> , 442 U.S. 707 (1979) - page                          | 2, 8              |
| - <i>Jackson v. Penno</i> , 378 U.S. 368 (1964) - page                            | 13                |
| - <i>Johnson v. Zerbst</i> , 304 U.S. 458 (1938) - page                           | 11                |
| - <i>Michigan v. Harvey</i> , 494 U.S. 344 (1990) - page                          | 11                |
| - <i>Miranda v. Arizona</i> , 384 U.S. 436 (1966) - page                          | 1, 6, 15          |
| - <i>Moran v. Burbine</i> , 475 U.S. 412 (1986) - pages                           | 2, 7, 8           |
| - <i>Tague v. Louisiana</i> , 444 U.S. 469 (1980) - pages                         | 1, 6, 8, 14       |
| - <i>United States v. Brown</i> , 664 F.3d 1115 (7th Cir. 2011) - page            | 11                |
| - <i>United States v. Hollwood Motor Car Co., Inc.</i> , 458 U.S. 263 (1982) page | 14                |
| - <i>United States v. Jackson</i> , 390 U.S. 570 (1968) - page                    | 13                |
| - <i>United States v. Murphy</i> , 703 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2012) pages              | 9, 10, 11, 14, 15 |
| - <i>United States v. Murphy</i> , 778 F.Supp.2d 237 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) - pages      | 10                |
| - Statutes:                                                                       |                   |
| 18 U.S.C. § 3231 - page                                                           | 4                 |
| 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1) - page                                                       | 3                 |
| 28 U.S.C. § 1291 - page                                                           | 6                 |
| - Constitutional Provisions:                                                      |                   |
| U.S. Const. amend. V -                                                            | 3                 |

1-A

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

|                                                                                                  |     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| - Constitutional Violations to the Sixth Amendment: Ineffective assistance of Counsel            |     |
| - Speedy trial Violation                                                                         | 2-A |
| - U.S. v. Kiszewski, 877 F.2d 210, 216 (2nd Cir. 1989) - Motion for officers Misconduct          | 2-A |
| - U.S. v. Dimas, 3 F.3d 1015 (7th Cir. 1993)                                                     | 2-A |
| - U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 674-76; Giglio, 405 U.S. at 151                                    | 2-A |
| - BarKauskas v. Lane, 878 F.2d 1031, 1034 (7th Cir. 1989)                                        | 2-A |
| - United States v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145, 1162 n.30 (7th Cir. 1989)                             | 2-A |
| - U.S. v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 94 S.Ct 2098 (1974)                                             | 2-A |
| - U.S. v. Recendiz, 557 F.3d 511, 530 (7th Cir. 2009)                                            | 2-A |
| - Letter to Counsel - Specific challenges to grand jury                                          | 2-A |
| - Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(i)(ii)                                                                | 2-A |
| - Dennis v. U.S., 384 U.S. 855, 870-875 (1996)                                                   | 2-A |
| - State of Wisconsin v. Schaffer, 565 F.2d 961, 967 (7th Cir. 1977)                              | 2-A |
| - Costello v. U.S., 50 U.S. 359, 363 (1956)                                                      | 2-A |
| - Costello v. U.S., 50 U.S. 359, 363 (1965)                                                      | 2-A |
| - U.S. v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16 (1972) quoting Strone v. U.S., 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960)       | 2-A |
| - U.S. v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d at 263; Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 546 (1962)                | 2-A |
| - Hoffman v. U.S., 341 U.S. 479, 485 (1958); U.S. v. Walker, 710 F.2d 1062, 1069 (5th Cir. 1983) | 2-A |
| - U.S. v. Basulto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974) id. at 785-86                                    | 2-A |
| - U.S. v. Bracy, 506 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1977)                                                    | 2-A |

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

- Motion to dismiss alleged conspiracy and abet.: 13-CE-968 filed before trial ..... 3-A
- Piling inferences on top of each other cannot make out charges of conspiracy, what the Supreme Court has described as a dragnet: Direct Sales Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 703, 711 (1943) ..... 3-A
- U.S. v. Arbore, 446 F.3d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 2006) ..... 3-A
- Hamling v. U.S., 418 U.S. 87 (1974) ..... 3-A
- Rogers v. U.S., 340 U.S. 367, 375 (1951) ..... 3-A
- U.S. v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566, 580 (7th Cir. 2005) ..... 3-A
- U.S. v. Wright, 506 F.3d 1243, 1248 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007) ..... 3-A
- Lannelli v. U.S., 420 U.S. 770, 781-82 (1975) ..... 3-A
- U.S. v. Bornman, 559 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) ..... 3-A
- U.S. v. Carson, 559 F.3d 804, 811 (7th Cir. 2009) ..... 3-A
- U.S. v. Paret-Ruz, 567 F.3d 116 (1st Cir. 2009) ..... 3-A
- U.S. v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1187, 1195 n.7 (9th Cir. 2008) ..... 3-A
- Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 12(i) - Rule 26.2 ..... 3-A
- Governments Santiago Proffer Motion ..... 3-A

### EXHIBITS 4-A

- Partial grand jury testimony of David Brazao (SA) and (C) Benjamin Vance ..... 4-A

### EXHIBITS 5-A

- Letter to the Court: The Right to Counsel is the Right to effective assistance of Counsel ..... 5-A
- DEA 6's where DEA Agents set aside Mr. Quiroz and procure the drugs themselves.
- Gov. Motion for Pen Register and trap and trace device (results not release in Mr. Quiroz Discovery) ..... 5-A
- (C) Benjamin Vance and Cesar's phone recordings from 10/22/12 drug transaction, no recording from Mr. Quiroz exist - why P. HERESAY came at play ..... 5-A
- DEA 6's where Gov. Agents paid Mr. Quiroz from June 2012 through January 2013 ..... 5-A
- 9 - Letter to the PSI - Mr. Quiroz Statement. (suppress by Judge Dornin and P.O.) ..... 5-A
- Mr. Quiroz Response to Inquiry of Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission ..... 5-A
- Violation to Article VIII Illinois rules of Professional Conduct

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |       |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| - Motion to Dismiss Indictment under outrageous government conduct: filed: 2014                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | 6-A   |
| - U.S. v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L. Ed. 366 (1973)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | 6-A   |
| - Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 12(b)(3)(c)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | 6-A   |
| - Motion Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 12(b)(1)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | 6-A-1 |
| This motion contains more than 11 objections and was properly submitted at pretrial hearing: (1) Jury members should not have a copy of the indictment (2) Objection to Prosecution misconduct during grand jury proceedings (3) Objection to the denial of Bill of Particulars (4) Motion reference to judgment of acquittal (5) Objection to Co-Conspirator Statements F.R.E. 80(d)(2)(E) (6) Objection to Violations under Brady v. Maryland (7) Defendant Objection under due process violation and "oppressive and prejudicial indictment delay that 'Up the Ante' the defendant sentence (8) F.R.E. 609 (9) F.R.E. 106 (10) polygraph results (11) (inquiry under Daubert) Rule 104(a) |       |
| - Letter by email to defense Counsel (supportive document for ineffective assistance of counsel.) Send before both trials, 12/15/14.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | 6-A-2 |
| - People v. Fenninger, 191 Colo. 343, 552 P.2d 1018 (1976)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 6-A-2 |
| - People v. Smith, Colo. 623 P.2d 404 (1981)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | 6-A-2 |
| - State v. Apt, 244 N.W. 2d 801, 802 (Iowa, 1976)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | 6-A-2 |
| - 18 USC § 3500(a)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | 6-A-2 |
| - Fed. R. Evidence (701)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | 6-A-2 |
| - Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 6-A-2 |
| - Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 6-A-2 |
| - § 2518(10)(a), title 18                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 6-A-2 |
| - U.S. v. Santarapio, 560 F.2d 448, 454 n.5 2 679 (1st Cir. L. Ed 652 (1977)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | 6-A-2 |
| - Vasquez v. Hillery, (1986) 474 U.S. 254, 88 L. Ed. 2d 598, 106 S.Ct. 417                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 6-A-2 |
| - Alexander v. Louisiana (1972) 405 U.S. 625, 31 L. Ed. 2d 536, 92 S.Ct. 1221                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | 6-A-2 |
| - Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147, L. Ed 2d 435 (2000)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | 6-A-2 |

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

- U.S. v. Leach, 427 F.2d 1107, 1109-1110 (1st Cir. 1970) 6-A-2
- Request for subpoenas duces tecum Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 17(c) for Phoenix Agents and U.S. Marshals who arrested Mr. Quiroz 6-A-2
- Re Marin Marietta Corp. 856 F.2d 619, 621 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 (1988) citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) 6-A-2
- U.S. v. Valencia, 492 F.2d <sup>1071</sup> 1074 (9th Cir. 1974); Pereira v. U.S., 374 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1954) 6-A-2
- EXHIBIT 7-A SE-mail to defense counsel send "Before Trial" Nov. 22, 2014 - 7-A
- Many request are made in this letter: Audio Recordings challenges, Jury Strategy, bill of particulars, discovery, due process violation, Co-Conspirator statements, challenging the conspiracy, the quantity of the Marijuana did not merit a 5-to-40 indictment (550) Kilos, to move to suppress the false post-arrest statement, Confidential Informant disclosure, Confrontation Clauses, Government provided payments, the filing of motions in limine to avoid the Harmless error review, prosecution misconduct, Hearsay, out-of-court statements, Evidentiary Hearing, "Request for buyer-seller jury instructions, Eye witness id, Griffin errors, Miranda Warnings, all request are properly sighted with Case law 7-A
- EXHIBIT 8-A Defendant Motion in Limine 8-A
- Request for hearing under Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 26.2, Rule 12(i) 8-A
- U.S. v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 1999) citing U.S. v. Guinan, 836 F.2d 350, 35 (7th Cir. 1988) 8-A
- Standard of admission of hearsay Fed. R. E. 807-804(6)(5) 8-A
- Cox v. U.S., 118 S.Ct. 848 (1998) quoting U.S. v. Doer, 866 F.2d 944, 956 (7th Cir. 1989) 8-A
- Hearsay testimony containing a specific charge U.S. v. Williams, 133 F.3d 1048 (7th Cir. 1998) 8-A
- U.S. v. Lovelance, 123 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 1997) 8-A
- U.S. v. Moon, 128 F.3d 515, 525-526 (7th Cir. 1997) 8-A

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

EXHIBIT 9-A Defendant's Consolidated General Motion in Limine 9-A

- Motion in Limine #1 to exclude witnesses during opening statements pursuant to F.R.E. 615 9-A

- Motion in Limine #2 to exclude expert testimony pursuant to F.R.E. 704(b); exclude, "preclude" the government to argue in opening statement that the Defendant had certain status and/or in an alleged conspiracy, reference to an alleged Broker, leader, coordinator to any courier, this will result in prejudice because the Government first need to establish competent evidence of an agreement between a co-conspirator for the Government then move to elements of a conspiracy -- 9-A

- Motion in Limine #4 to dismiss transactions from Indictments that are duplicitous or Mult. Plicious. Fed. R. E. 404(b) 9-A

EXHIBIT 10-A: Defendant's Vicente Quivroz in Response and objections to oral Ruling and Government Response for which post-trial motions were denied: 10-A

- Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(f) allowing objections miss at trial and pretrial by showing good cause 10-A

- Supportive document for Ineffective assistance of Counsel 10-A

- The Court err in allowing recordings in on unsecure digital device, where altering was possible, where the chain of custody was poor to none. F.R.E. 901(a) - 104(a) 10-A

- Defendant objects to recording unsupervised by government agents 10-A

- Prosecutors holding back evidence of law enforcement agents misconduct 10-A

- Reference to Motion for Pre-Indictment delay on 13ee21 page (3) 10-A

- Reference to the false Post Arrest Statement page 4 10-A

- Reference to the Cash to Police it self U.S. v. Gutierrez, 978 F.2d 1413, 1468-69 (11th Cir. 1992) 10-A

- The Use of A. Drunk by DEA Agents page 7 10-A

- U.S. v. Mercer, 165 F.3d 1331, 1999, U.S. App. Lexis 921, 12 Fla. L. No. 97-3224 (Reversed); The Court found that reference to others does not make a conspiracy page 7 10-A

- U.S. v. Kizewski, 877 F.2d 210, 216 (2nd [sic] Cir. 1989); Remanded, concluding that the trial court "erred" in camera review of two FBI agents personal files for misconduct, page 8 10-A

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

|                                                                                                                            |      |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| - The recording device was never presented at Court. page 9.                                                               | 10-A |
| - Reference to other fail transaction page 9                                                                               | 10-A |
| - Reference to Agents payments page 9                                                                                      | 10-A |
| - Reference to allege Co-conspirator Case 13CE 21-Barraza page 10                                                          | 10-A |
| - U.S. v. Conry, 538 F.3d 718, 731 (7th Cir. 2008) page 10                                                                 | 10-A |
| - Reference to an abusive prosecution page 11                                                                              | 10-A |
| - Sherman v. U.S., Supra, at 356 U.S. 382, 383. page 12                                                                    | 10-A |
| - United States v. Willie Earl Johnson, 592 F.3d 749, 2010. NO. 09-1912 Conspiracy and Sentence Vacated <sup>page 13</sup> | 10-A |
| - United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 568; 2008, No. 07-3929 Conspiracy and Aid a Abett Vacated. page 13                      | 10-A |
| - U.S. v. Garza, 08-3005, 340 Fed. Appx. 243, 2009, U.S. App. Lens 17654 (7th Cir. 2009) Vacated page 13                   | 10-A |
| - U.S. v. Baker, 905 F.2d 1100, 1106 (7th Cir. 1990). page 14                                                              | 10-A |
| - U.S. v. Jimmy Jackson, 526 F.2d 1236, 1976 U.S. App. Lexis 12845 No. 75-2026. page 14                                    | 10-A |
| - Johnson v. U.S., 195 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1952) page 15                                                                    | 10-A |
| - U.S. v. Leon, 100 F.2d 401 (2nd Cir. 1938) page 15                                                                       | 10-A |
| - The dealing between (CI) and defendant for common purpose. page 15                                                       | 10-A |
| - Possession of narcotics conviction reverse (Broker) U.S. v. Manzella, 791, F.2d 1263. (7th Cir. 1986)                    |      |
| { 791 F.2d 1266 } the lack of evidence of possession. page 17                                                              | 10-A |
| - U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 288 (1990) the Bill of Rights page 18                                            | 10-A |
| - North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) Unpredictive prosecution page 18                                           | 10-A |
| - Prosecutors lack of ethics. page 19                                                                                      | 10-A |
| - Buyer and seller agreement. page 20                                                                                      | 10-A |
| - U.S. v. Herbert Pulgar (7th Cir. 2015) No. 14-3503. page 20                                                              | 10-A |
| - U.S. v. Bey, 725 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2013) page 20                                                                        | 10-A |
| - U.S. v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 749, 755 (7th Cir. 2010). page 20                                                              | 10-A |
| - The Agreement must exist among co-conspirators. page 20                                                                  | 10-A |

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |      |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| - EXHIBIT 11-A: Defendant's Vicente Quiroz motion supporting Arguments for Appellate Brief: Defendant's Points and Authorities                                                                                                                                       | 11-A |
| - Till v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2013), page 1                                                                                                                                                                                                          | 11-A |
| - Navejar v. Liola, 718 F.3d 692 (2013) page 1                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | 11-A |
| - Page two six different arguments where the District Court fail to provide a fair trial                                                                                                                                                                             | 11-A |
| - Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291, 296 (7th Circuit 1981) (per-curiam) declaratory of constitutional requirements, see, eg. U.S. v. <sup>Sciuto</sup> <del>Scuto</del> 531 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1976); Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458, 465 (6th Cir. 1956), page 3 | 11-A |
| - U.S. v. Carson, 574 F.3d 804, 811 (7th Cir. 2007); U.S. v. Parek-Lutz, 567 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2009);                                                                                                                                                              |      |
| U.S. v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1187, 1195 n.7 (9th Cir. 2008) page 3                                                                                                                                                                                                     | 11-A |
| - U.S. v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2010); U.S. v. Donnell, 596 F.3d 913, 924-25 (8th Cir. 2010);                                                                                                                                                         |      |
| U.S. v. Bacon, 598 F.3d 772, 777 (1st Cir. 2010); U.S. v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672, 680 (6th Cir. 2009);                                                                                                                                                                  |      |
| U.S. v. Borica, 592 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 2010), page 3                                                                                                                                                                                                             | 11-A |
| - Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) cited in U.S. v. Roberts, 163 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1998); U.S. v. Payne, 102 F.3d 289, 283 (7th Cir. 1996); U.S. v. Alcantar, 83 F.3d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1996);                                                                 |      |
| Flores-Figueroa v. U.S., 556 U.S. 646 (2009) page 3                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 11-A |
| - Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435 (7th Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Rodriguez, 67 F.3d 1312 (7th Cir. 1995); see v. denied,                                                                                                                                                |      |
| 116 S.Ct. 1582 (1996); U.S. v. Kalfayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2nd Cir.)                                                                                                                                                   | 11-A |
| - Aleman v. Honorable Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County, 138 F.3d 302, 309 (7th Cir. 1998); U.S. v. Boyd,                                                                                                                                                   |      |
| 55 F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Lover, 148 F.3d 766, 767 (7th Cir. 1998); U.S. v. Brimley, 148 F.3d                                                                                                                                                        |      |
| 819, 822 (7th Cir. 1998), page 3                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | 11-A |
| - 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a); U.S. v. McClellan, 165 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 1999); U.S. v. Ramiski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1009                                                                                                                                                         |      |
| (7th Cir. 1983); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 272, 795 Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed. 127 (1959); U.S. v. Curry, 997                                                                                                                                                          |      |
| F.2d 1042 (7th Cir. 1992), page 3                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 11-A |
| - Page 4: Six more different arguments where the District Court fail to provide a fair trial                                                                                                                                                                         | 11-A |

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |      |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| - Six Amendment Violation, U.S. v. Saunders, No. 98-1986 (7 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 2/2/99); U.S. v. Williams, 133 F.3d 1048 (7 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) citing, Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Wilson v. Williams, 161 F.3d 1078 (7 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998); quoting U.S. v. Toney, 27 F.3d 1245, 1253 (7 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 1994); U.S. v. Meyer, 157 F.3d 1067, 1080 (7 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998); quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79 (1986). Page 5                         | 11-A |
| - Discovery Violation; U.S. v. Salerno, 108 F.3d 730, 743 (7 <sup>th</sup> Cir.) cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 2517 (1997); Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C) and (d)(2), U.S. v. Bagley, 743 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed. 2d 841 (1985); U.S. v. Kiszewski, 877 F.2d 210, 216 (2 <sup>nd</sup> Cir.) en. 1989. Page 5                                                                                                                                                                              | 11-A |
| - U.S. v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 382, 73 L.Ed. 2d 74, 102 S.Ct. 2485 (1982) page 5                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 11-A |
| - Miranda Rights Violation; U.S. v. D.F., 115 F.3d 413, 419 (7 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Brown, 133 F.3d 993 (7 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) quoting Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993). Page 5                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | 11-A |
| - Levine v. Giverson (2003, SD.N.Y.) 334, F. Supp. 2d 376 page 5                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 11-A |
| - U.S. v. Ottavensburg, 76 F.3d 137 (7 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996); U.S. v. Berney, 92 F.3d 597, 600 (7 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996); U.S. v. Guy, 924 F.2d 702, 708 (7 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Lasekiewicz, No. 98-1525 (7 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 2/8/99); U.S. v. DiDomenico, 78 F.3d 294, 299 (7 <sup>th</sup> Cir.) cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 507 (1996); U.S. v. Cotton, 89 F.3d 387, 389 (7 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996); U.S. v. McClinton, 135 F.3d 1178, 1192 (7 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998), page 5 | 11-A |
| - Page 6 - Defendant Statement and Authorities Rebutting the Conspiracy page 6                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | 11-A |
| - Page 7 - Conclusion: Defendant was found guilty in violation of due process, fundamental fairness of the Fifth, Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution. page 7                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | 11-A |
| - EXHIBIT 12-A: Defendant's Vicente Quiróz motion Responding and Objecting to Presentence Investigation Report; Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(2). Page 1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 12-A |
| - Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000). Page 1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | 12-A |
| - U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). Page 1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | 12-A |
| EXHIBIT-12-A 2: 16 additional pages in response to the (PSI) besides the Statement previously mention.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |      |

IN THE  
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES  
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

**OPINIONS BELOW**

☐ For cases from **federal courts**:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix A to the petition and is

- ☐ reported at \_\_\_\_\_; or,  
☐ has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,  
☐ is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix B to the petition and is

- ☐ reported at \_\_\_\_\_; or,  
☐ has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,  
☐ is unpublished.

☐ For cases from **state courts**:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at Appendix \_\_\_\_\_ to the petition and is

- ☐ reported at \_\_\_\_\_; or,  
☐ has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,  
☐ is unpublished.

The opinion of the \_\_\_\_\_ court appears at Appendix \_\_\_\_\_ to the petition and is

- ☐ reported at \_\_\_\_\_; or,  
☐ has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,  
☐ is unpublished.

## JURISDICTION

☒ For cases from **federal courts**:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case was Nov. 2, 2020.

☐ No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

☒ A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of Appeals on the following date: Nov. 30, 2020, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix \_\_\_\_\_.

☒ An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and including February 17, 2021 (date) on March 2, 2021 (date) in Application No. 20 A 1156.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

☐ For cases from **state courts**:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was \_\_\_\_\_.  
A copy of that decision appears at Appendix \_\_\_\_\_.

☐ A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date: \_\_\_\_\_, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix \_\_\_\_\_.

☐ An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and including \_\_\_\_\_ (date) on \_\_\_\_\_ (date) in Application No. \_\_\_\_ A \_\_\_\_.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

**SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES  
OFFICE OF THE CLERK  
WASHINGTON, DC 20543-0001**

March 2, 2021


Vicente Quiroz  
F.C.I. La Tuna Camp  
POB 8000  
Anthony, TX 8802

RE: Vicente Quiroz v. United States, Time Extension  
USCA7 No. 20-1156

Dear Mr. Quiroz:

The application for an extension of time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the above-entitled case was postmarked February 17, 2021 and received March 2, 2021. The application is returned for the following reason(s):

It is returned in light of the order of this Court issued on March 19, 2020. That order extended an additional 60 days--the maximum that may be granted--to all petitions due on or after that date. A copy of that order is enclosed.

Sincerely,  
Scott S. Harris, Clerk  
By: 

Michael Duggan  
(202) 479-3025

Enclosures

## CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

- Under the Sixth Amendment of the constitution all persons have the right to effective assistance of counsel, to confront and cross examine witness, and the right to speedy trial.
- Under the Fifth Amendment of the constitution all person have the right against self incrimination, the right to unbiased grand jury, a grand jury free on its ability to serve as an independent and impartial investigative body. Due process of the Fifth Amendment is violated when a Defendant has to stand on an indictment 13ce968 which the government knows is based on perjured material.
- Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution all persons have the right to due process, to access the courts and the rule of law with out misrepresentation.

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner brought a consolidated Appeal under Section 28 U.S.C to vacate, set aside or correct sentence after being convicted in two separate trials. Case No. 1:18-cv-03121 Document #1 Filed 05/01/18 and Response Document #6 Filed: 08/13/18 both at Appendix A. Also in Appendix B-A Documents in support the above motion.: Brief and Require short Appendix of Defendant Appellant Vicente Quivroz, direct appeal Nos. 16-3510, 16-3518.; Reply Brief of Defendant Appellant Vicente Quivroz.; Petition for Rehearing En Banc.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari; the following abbreviations are in the above documents.

On March 27, 2013 Petitioner was arrested by Phoenix U.S. Marshals and DEA agents from Phoenix. see DEA report in Appendix B. This documents were given to defense counsel to impeach the agent testifying at my suppression hearing (defense counsel ignore my request).

Petitioner was charge with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute Marijuana and distribution of Marijuana. Brief page 3 Bn. Tr. at 30-32; A 52-54. This my first indictment for less than 550 kilos of marijuana under 0-10 guideline range. Though prosecution Manipulated the grand jury to indict with an extra count to boost the Marijuana quantity, at pre trial hearing the government dismiss the extra count. Early in this case 13 ce 21 "defense counsels" move their loyalty to the prosecution goal - the admission of a Global conspiracy - see transcripts from detention hearing in front the Honorable Michael T. Mason, Magistrate Judge, and Judge Becklo Case 13 ce 21 - at Motion § 2255 filed 05/01/18 in Appendix 1-A <sup>Pages</sup> 5-10 ground one "Ineffective assistance of counsel" here the government makes clear his intrusion on Petitioner Six Amendment, prosecutor wanted a "Global Conspiracy". The greed of the prosecution was bold and without scruples. Petitioner asked counsels for trial, discovery, pre-trial motions and they started to quit, the last one He just stall and gave leverage to the prosecution, even then I was indicted in a totally New Indictmen with the same discovery with a Higher mandatory minimum. Defense Counsel wanted an admission to the meth and I said no because I did not procure them and under Booker those transactions could have been challenge at sentencing. See transcripts pages 18-30 from Motion § 2255 filed: 05/01/18 at Appendix 1-A.

### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

- In this transcripts from Pretrial hearing in front Judge Thomas M. Durkin Case No. 13ce 21 proper objections for appeal were recorded, how the (FOIA) findings fall in place, and how perjury in general happened. Motion recorded for appeal DKT. No. 114, Defendant Vicente Quiroz's consolidated motions for speedy trial violation, pre-accusatory delay and pre-Indictment delay and due process violation, objection to vindictive prosecution motion, "the Court statement, I believe by the defense, to try the case with the higher potential penalties first." How can a defense counsel claim such a thing. P

- Other motions are reference to and proper kept for appeal "de novo", also there's the back and forth from Petitioner and Judge Durkin where I'm requesting to bring Barrera to cross examine, but Judge and defense counsel denied me, I knew that Judge was going to pull a fast one like in bench trial where he accepted hearsay to himself to introduce a co-conspirator that wasn't even mention in the Gov. Proffer. see Appendix I-A. Gov motion under Vindictive prosecution at page 37 in Defendant's Response to Gov. motion against relief under section 82255, also in this motion results of (FOIA) that demonstrate perjury of Gov. agents, DEA 6 where agents set aside the petitioner and procure the drugs themselves, E-mails in support of "Ineffective assistance of Counsel."

- In summary of the argument: Brief at Appendix I-A page 11.

In order to admit evidence of Mr. Quiroz's post-arrest statements to the agents, the Gov. bore a "heavy burden" of proving that Mr. Quiroz made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. To meet [its] burden, the government needed to prove not only that Mr. Quiroz was read his rights and that he subsequently made a voluntary statement, but also that he understood his rights. Here, the District Court created a new rule that, "it's an implied waiver when you talk after you've been told you don't have to talk." Bn.Tr. at 101; A 78. Under the District Court Rule, the government meets its "heavy burden" of proving that a knowing and intelligent waiver occurred whenever an arrestee makes a statement after being read the warnings.

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Because the rule relieves the Gov. of making "the additional showing" of understanding required by *Berghuis*, it was a constitutional error. *Berghuis*, *Supra* at 384.

By relieving the government of its burden of making a showing of understanding, the district court effectively created a presumption of understanding whenever a statement is made after the rights have been read. But that is not the law.

Rather, the Supreme Court has held that creating a presumption of understanding that shifts the burden to the defense to prove lack of understanding is unconstitutional.

*Tague v. Louisiana*, 444 U.S. 469, 469 (1980) (*per curiam*). And Mr. Quiroz was prejudiced by the shift in burden because the record shows the Gov. did not

Brief prove Mr. Quiroz so much as heard - much less that he understood his

Page 12 rights. As the District Court constitutional error was not harmless, this court

should vacate Mr. Quiroz's conviction and remand the case for new trial.

In addition, in both trials, the District Court granted admission of multiple statements from alleged co-conspirators on the basis of Gov. pre-trial proffer. In order to admit statements from alleged co-conspirators under the hearsay exception, the offering party needs to establish by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that a conspiracy existed; (2) that the declarant was a member of the same conspiracy as the defendant; and (3) that the statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Here, the Government failed to provide sufficient evidence to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed. The government only offered statements from the alleged co-conspirators, in particular, Vance (C1), a confidential government informant. But communications "solely" with a government informant are not enough to show a conspiracy. *U.S. v. Carson*, 579 F.3d 804, 811 (7th Cir. 2009).

Moreover, the government fail to introduce evidence beyond the co-conspirator statements themselves in support of its position. Therefore, the statements from the alleged co-conspirators were inadmissible hearsay.

# STATEMENT OF THE CASE

They also were undoubtedly not harmless, as the District Court admitted that Vance uses the government's most important witness. Bn. Tr. at 961, A189. By

admitting this evidence on a "erroneous factual findings," the District Court abused

its discretion and should be reversed.

## Argument: Reply Brief at Appendix A page 1 and 2

There is no dispute: Postarrest statements may only be used against a criminal

defendant when the government proves a defendant knowingly and intelligently waive

his Miranda rights before making them. Here the government failed to meet its burden.

But because of an erroneous holding by the District Court ("It's an implied waiver when

you talk after you've been told you don't have to talk"), Mr. Quire's postarrest

statements, which amounted to a full confession, were unconstitutionally used

against him during two different trials. Bn. Tr. at 101, A178. The government's brief

offers no defense of the District Court's erroneous articulation of the law. Instead, the

government relies on a slew of cases that either (1) do not speak to the issue at bar or

(2) do not stand for the proposition the government claims. The government also makes

the same mistake as the District Court - shifting the burden of proving lack of understanding

from the government to the defense - by arguing that Mr. Quire "forfeited" any claim

that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights. Perhaps recognizing the District

Court's errors, the government devotes a significant portion of its brief arguing that any

error was harmless. But it is not harmless error when, as here, the District Court

wrongly admitted what amounted to a full confession. Indeed, the unconstitutional admission

of Mr. Quire's postarrest statements tainted the defense's trial strategy and

foreclosed what may have been his best avenue of defense. Finally, contrary to the

government's brief, the defense did not waive their objection to the admission of out-of-

court-hearsay statements under the conspiracy exception.

Continue next page. page 2. Reply Brief.

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

And the Government's argument that these statements were admitted to provide "context" offers them no help. As this Court has noted, a statement can be admitted both to prove the matter asserted and provide context. Here, regardless of the context these statements may have provided, they were unquestionably admitted to prove the matter asserted, and, thus, hearsay statements improperly admitted by the District Court.

— The District Court's error in admitting Mr. Quiroz's post-arrest statements warrants new trials: Reply Brief Appendix 1-A pages 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

In its response brief, the Government does not even attempt to defend the District Court's statement that "it's an implied waiver when you talk after you've been told you don't have to talk." Br. Tr. at 101, A18. Instead, the Government points to three findings made by the District Court that it believes were sufficient for the Government to carry its burden: (1) that Mr. Quiroz was "read his rights"; (2) that Mr. Quiroz "immediately volunteered a statement without interrogation and continued voluntarily talking with the agents"; and (3) that Mr. Quiroz "is an intelligent individual who understands English and is not reluctant to assert his rights." Gov. Resp. Br. at 25-26.

"Petitioner Note: If a man asked for trial and he know how to read and write then by the prosecutors findings that man needs to be put down by all means necessary. The Supreme Court had said that the Ends do not justify the means."

But these findings are not sufficient to prove an arrestee understood his rights when, as here, the arrestee never acknowledge been read his rights. In nearly every case, the Government's best evidence that an arrestee understood his rights is the arrestee's admission that he understood his rights. See Gov. Resp. Br. at 25-29. But here, Mr. Quiroz never even acknowledge been read his rights. Yet every single one of the cases cited by the Government involved a defendant who explicitly acknowledged that he understood his rights.

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

• U.S. v. Shabazz, 579 F.3d 815, 817 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2009): Defendant "stated that he understood his rights".

• U.S. v. Jackson, 300 F.3d 740, 748 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002): Arresting Officers "asked [defendant] if he understood his rights, and had [defendant] initial each right and sign to acknowledge his willingness to talk".

• U.S. v. Lee, 618 F.3d 667, 671 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2010): Officer "asked if he understood [his] rights". and Defendant "responded that he did.

• U.S. v. Vallar, 635 F.3d 271, 284 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2011): Defendant "signed an advise of rights".

• U.S. v. Banks, 78 F.3d 1190, 1196 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996): Arresting Officer "asked [defendant] if he understood [his] rights, and [defendant] indicated that he did.

• Rujalcaha v. Chandler, 466 F.3d 555, 557 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2005): Defendant "said that he ... understood his rights".

• U.S. v. Brown, 664 F.3d 1115, 1117 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2011): "When asked if he understood [his] rights, [defendant] bobbed his head... [defendant] responded 'Yeah' when asked if he understood his rights".

This distinction is crucial. When an arrestee says he understands, it makes sense for the District Court to look only to whether he was capable of understanding.

But when an arrestee never even acknowledges being read his rights, the question is not only his ability to understand his rights, but also whether or not his conduct implies that he did in fact understand his rights.

In U.S. v. Brown, this Court recognized this distinction. 664 F.3d 1115, 1117-8 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2011). In Brown, this Court assumed, arguendo, that the arrestee's acknowledgment of understanding was ambiguous. *Id.*, at 1118. But instead of relying solely on the fact that the arrestee had the capacity to understand his rights (as the Government does here), the Court undertook an analysis of whether the arrestee's subsequent conduct demonstrated that he actually understood. *Id.* And as Mr. Quiroz's opening brief explains in great detail, none of the circumstances presented in Brown apply in this case. Br. at 17-22

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Yet at the hearing, and again in its brief, the Government relies on Brown to argue that Mr. Quiroz's attempts to "dig himself out of trouble" imply that he understood his rights. Gov. Resp. Br. at 29 (claiming Brown stands for the proposition that "a defendant's voluntary statements aimed at getting himself out of trouble can be considered evidence of a Miranda waiver.") Compare Br. Tr. at 87, A74 (arguing "arrestee trying to dig himself out of trouble" is evidence of understanding).

But that is not the holding in Brown. Indeed, the Government's own parenthetical shows that the holdings rested on the fact that defendant "voluntarily provided information in the hope that he could make a deal." Gov. Resp. Br. at 29 quoting Brown at 1118 (emphasis added). As discussed in Mr. Quiroz's opening brief, there is a fundamental difference between attempting to leverage one's rights for value and merely proclaiming one's innocence. Br. at 21. The Government ~~next~~ argues that there was "no evidence from which the district court could have determined that defendant failed to understand his rights," Gov. Resp. Br. at 25, fn. 9. See also *id.* at 28 ("where there was no evidence (or claim) that defendant received, but did not understand, Miranda warnings, there is no basis to argue that the district court improperly shifted the burden of proof to defendant."). These arguments imply that there needed to be such evidence. But that, as set out in Mr. Quiroz's opening brief, is simply incorrect as a matter of law. See Br. at 14-17. And the Government does not cite a single case to support its conclusory assertions. Nor can it. The case law is clear that the burden is on the Government, not the defendant. See, e.g., *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (holding the Government bears a "heavy burden" of proving a knowing and intelligent waiver occurred). Indeed, based solely on the dearth of evidence presented by the Government, the Court not only could have, but should have, found that the Government failed to meet its burden of proving Mr. Quiroz understood his rights and excluded any post-arrest statement.

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Yet the Government goes still further in attempting to circumvent its burden by arguing that Mr. Quiróz "waive, or at least forfeited" any claim that he did not understand his rights.

In the district court, defendant never claimed that he did not understand warnings provided to him by the agents, and presented no evidence in support of such claim. Thus, not only was there no evidence from which the district court could have determined that defendant failed to understand his rights, the defendant arguably waived, or at least forfeited, any claim regarding the sufficiency of the District Court's findings with respect to the knowing and intelligent nature of his waiver.

Govt. Resp. Br. at 25, fn. 9. This is contrary to the law, as well as the facts. Indeed, the District Court's explicitly acknowledged that, "whether or not [Mr. Quiróz] knows his rights is a question for this hearing." Bn. Tr. at 94, A75. Further, the Government's own arguments at the hearing demonstrate that the hearing concerned, *inter alia*, the questioned of whether Mr. Quiróz understood his rights. Bn. Tr. at 85-86 ("a prosecutor wants to stand before the Court and say, 'yes, he said, 'yes, I fully

understand'"); id. at 86, A73 ("And you can look to the defendant's education to determine whether he fully understood."); id. ("And he, Quiróz, says, 'I did nothing, which goes to show that he did understand'"); id. ("He understood what was going on"); id. at 87, A74 ("without expressly saying that he understood his rights and was waiving them, he did understand"); id. at 87-88 ("It's the Government's position that we've set forth sufficient evidence to show . . .

[the warnings] were understood by the defendant.") (emphasis added). Accordingly, on this record, there is no basis to argue that Mr. Quiróz "waived" or "forfeited" the argument that he did not understand his rights. Put another way, the issue on appeal is not whether this issue was raised before the District Court (it was extensively argued);

the issue is whether the District Court applied the proper standard (next page).

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

in its determination (it did not).

- The District Court's Error in Admitting Mr. Quiroz's Post-Arrest Statement was not Harmless.: Reply Brief Appendix I-A pages 7-8

The District Court's error resulted in the admission of statement in which Mr. Quiroz (1) confessed to arranging the transactions for which was subsequently convicted; and (2) admitted to being the voice on a series of incriminating phone calls.

Jury Tr. at 555, A 201; Bn. Tr. at 820, A 184. As Mr. Quiroz's opening brief explains, U.S. v. Wysinger is on point with respect to whether the Constitutional error in this case was harmless. 683 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2012). The Government attempts to distinguish Wysinger by claiming that, unlike Wysinger, it did not have to rely on Mr. Quiroz's post-arrest statement or on the testimony of cooperating co-conspirators.

Gut. Resp. Br. at 35. But that conclusory assertion cannot be squared with the facts here. First the Government claims it "did not have to rely on the credibility of Vance because the recordings of the defendant spoke for themselves." *id.* But just moments later, the Government maintains it "did not have to rely on defendant's post-arrest statement to connect him to those phone calls because Vance and Agent Brando both testified that it was defendant's voice on those recordings." *id.*<sup>2</sup>

Both cannot be true. In order to prove Mr. Quiroz was on those calls, the Government needed to rely on either (1) Mr. Quiroz's post-arrest statement or (2) the testimony of a cooperating co-conspirator (Vance). Either way, for the same reasons expounded in Wysinger, the error in admitting the statement was not harmless. Moreover, the Government relies on the fact that "defendant did not dispute that it was his voice on [the] recordings at trial." *id.*

But of course Mr. Quiroz could not deny being on the calls at trial knowing he had already admitted to it. Had the post-arrest statements been excluded, the défense could have changed tack and forced the Government to put Vance's credibility front and center.

### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Put simply, Mr. Quiroz's entire defense strategy would have changed if his post-arrest statements had been excluded.<sup>3</sup> As a result, it is not "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict" as it must be in order for Court to conclude the error was harmless. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)

<sup>3</sup> The fact that Mr. Quiroz's theory could have change also distinguishes this case from United States v. Lee, which the government relies on heavily to argue that any error in the bench trial was harmless. 618 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2010). In Lee, the government presented five witnesses that the Court found to be "reliable and credible." Id. at 674. And nothing in the record indicated that the defendant would have been able to present a different theory of the case had his post-arrest statements been excluded. Here, even the District Court conceded that the testimony of the Government's star witness (Vance) needed to be "considered with caution and great care" because of his biases. Br. Tr. at 961, A189. And absent his post-arrest statement, Mr. Quiroz could have defended himself by denying being on the calls - a theory that would put the credibility of Vance front and center. The District Court's statement that it would have reached the same results even without considering Mr. Quiroz's post-arrest statement cannot possibly apply to theories of the case that it never heard.

— The District Court Improperly Admitted Hearsay Statements: Reply Brief  
Appendix - I - A pages 9, 10, 11

The Government argues that Mr. Quiroz waive his objection to the admission of out-of-court statements from Vance when he allegedly "did not object to Vance's cited testimony as hearsay in the District Court." Gut. Resp. Br. at 42. This Argument Incorrectly disregards Mr. Quiroz's formal objection to the admission of Vance's statements in his response to the Government's Santiago Prof' for

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

in each of his two trials. 13 CE 968, Dkt. 59; 13 CE 21, Dkt. 127. Further, the Government's assertion flatly contradicts well-established Seventh Circuit case law on this issue, see e.g., *United States v. Ridd*, 167 Fed. Appx. 565, 570 (7th Cir. 2006); *United States v. Gajo*, 290 F.3d 922, 927 (7th Cir. 2002).

For example, in *Gajo*, the government argued that the defendant had waived his objections to the admission of statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) when he failed to object at trial. As is the case here, both sides briefed the issue in pre-trial motions. During the admission of the statements at trial, the District Court asked the defendant if he had any objections, to which defense counsel responded "no." Id. at 927. On appeal, the Government argue that the District Court's pre-trial ruling was conditional because the out of court statements were only admissible if the Government provided evidence at trial sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). As the Court explained in *Willson v. Williams*, "a definitive ruling in *limine* preserves an issue for appellate review, without the need for later objection." 182 F.3d 562, 563 (7th Cir. 1999). The Court in *Gajo* determined that the District Court's ruling on the admissibility of co-conspirators statements was indeed definitive. Id. at 927. In fact, this court explained that "[u]nder the Government's reasoning, all pre-trial decisions would be considered conditional," a result at odds with Rule 103. id. 9 Fed. R. Evid. 103. The Court expressly held that the defendant's pre-trial objections to the Government's Santiago Proffer were sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. Id. The facts here are virtually identical. As mention above, there is no dispute that the Government and Mr. Quirroz briefed the admissibility of the out of court statements before both trials. 13 CE 21 Dkt. 121, A.25, 127; 13 CE 968, Dkts. 39, A.1, 59; And the District Court made a ruling that the statements were admissible. 13 CE 968, Pre-trial Conf. at 50; 13 CE 21 Pre-trial Conf. at 78-80.

### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

If anything, there is even more of a basis for finding a sufficient objection in this case. Unlike the defendant in *Gajo*, Mr. Quiroz did not affirmatively refuse to make an objection at trial when prompted by the judge - instead he actually renewed his prior objection by stating he had nothing to add to his prior argument. *Bn. Tr.* at 802. It is clear then, that under Seventh Circuit precedent, Mr. Quiroz preserved his objections for review. The government also relies on *United States v. Haynie*, 179 F.3d 1048, 1050-51 (7th Cir. 1999), which is distinguishable. First, during pre-trial proceedings in *Haynie*, the defendant conceded that, should the government prove all of the evidence included in their Santiago proffer at trial, the out of court statements would indeed be admissible. *Id.* at 1050. Here, to the contrary, Mr. Quiroz objected to the sufficiency of the evidence included in the Santiago proffer, 13 CE 968, Dkt. 59 at ¶¶ 3-4; 13 CE 21, Dkt. 127. Second, not only did the defendant in *Haynie* fail to object at trial, he also failed to raise the argument in any post-judgment motion. *Haynie*, 179 F.3d at 1050. In contrast, Mr. Quiroz filed a post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal where he contested the existence of a conspiracy, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence, 13 CE 968, Dkt. 166 at ¶¶ 3, 6-9. Thus, it is clear that Mr. Quiroz's pre-trial objections to the government's Santiago proffers and his post-trial motions were sufficient to preserve his objection to the admission of Vance's out-of-court statements for appellate review.

— The Out-of-Court statements made by Vance, Cesar and Barraza were improperly admitted for the truth of the matter asserted: Reply Brief at Appendix 1-A pages 11, 12, 13, 14.

The Government next argues that the out of court statements admitted from Vance, Cesar, and Barraza were not hearsay because they were offered to provide "context" and show Mr. Quiroz's connection to the alleged conspiracy. *Govt. Resp. Bn.* at 41, 43-45.

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

But, as the court explained in *United States v. Amaya*, "whether a statement is offered for context is beside the point - the relevant question is whether the statement is offered for its truth (and the answer to the question can be yes, even if the statement provides context for some other, admissible statement)." 828 F.3d 518, 528 (7th Cir. 2016). Here, it is obvious that these out-of-court statements were offered for their truth.

First, Vance and Cesar's out-of-court conversations were introduced in the bench trial in order to inculcate Mr. Quiroz in the Methamphetamine transaction.

Indeed, it is only through the recorded statements of Vance and Cesar that evidence is introduced that a methamphetamine transaction took place at all. Br. Tr. 355-58, 4166-69. Put another way, without this testimony, there is no basis for findings against Mr. Quiroz.

Second, in Mr. Quiroz's jury trial, Vance and Barraza's statements were admitted for the same purpose - to connect

Mr. Quiroz to the marijuana transaction at issue. This statements do not merely -

and solely - give context or show that Mr. Quiroz's alleged relationship to the conspiracy was not a "coincidence". Gut. Resp. Br. at 45. Rather, statements from

Barraza and Vance confirm their presence at the scene of the alleged crime. This is

the critical piece of the puzzle that connects Mr. Quiroz to the alleged criminal behavior.

Jury Tr. 195. Unlike the out-of-court statements admitted in *United States v. Herrera - Medina*, the hearsay statement admitted in Mr. Quiroz's trials reference the very

transactions at issue, cf. 853 F.2d 564, 565 (7th Cir. 1988) ("for example, the tapes revealed him and Jesus Herrera talking at length about smuggling marijuana

across the Mexican border by using furniture to conceal the bags of marijuana and spices to conceal its smell, but none of the marijuana seized in connection with the transactions charged in the indictment involved the use of furniture of spices.")

The statements were not admitted to show that Mr. Quiroz has past experience in narcotics trafficking, but, rather, to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Cesar and Barrera met with Vance to complete the transactions for which Mr. Quiroz was indicted. Therefore, the Government's argument that these statements were admissible for a non-hearsay purpose fail.

- Unable to justify the admission of the out-of-court statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the Government spends the majority of their response arguing (1) waiver; and (2) that the out-of-court statements introduced are admissible for "context." But the critical question at issue is whether the out-of-court statements were properly admitted under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). The Government's response is a clear indication that their evidence in support of that conclusion is wholly insufficient.

First, the Government fail to allege a criminal connection between Mr. Quiroz and a non-government individual. United States v. Corson, 579 F.3d 804, 811 (7th Cir. 2009) ("A defendant is not liable for conspiring solely with an undercover government agent or a government informant." (citation omitted)). Second, the government failed to allege that Mr. Quiroz know the scope and objective of the alleged conspiracy. United States v. Mahikimetas, 991 F.2d 379, 382 (7th Cir. 1993).

Finally, the only evidence relied on by the District Court when admitting the statements were (1) the statements themselves; and (2) Mr. Quiroz's alleged confession. As mention above, Mr. Quiroz's confession was unconstitutionally used against him, meaning the statements were improperly admitted. United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d 1232, 1238-39 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[T]o ensure an element of reliability in the statements, courts have required that some evidence, independent of the statements, exist to corroborate the conspiracy's existence") Thus, implicating out-of-court statements were admitted in violation of evidence rules warranting new trials for Mr. Quiroz.

## REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

To Determine whether a certificate of ~~Appeal~~<sup>Appealability</sup> violates Petitioners Due Process (per-issue).

To restore the proper application of the rule of law to the ~~as~~ wrongful interpretation of the government against the admission of a post arrest statement and the proper application of the Hearsay exception under Fed. R. Evid. ~~203~~ 103.

Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E)

The District Court deny a Certificate of appealability ignoring his obligations *de novo* to proper recorded objections. In both of Mr. Quiroz's trials the District court applied the wrong standard in contravention of established case law when they admitted (1) Mr. Quiroz's postarrest statements and (2) out-of-court statements from Vence, Cesar, and Barraza.

These errors were not harmless but rather, denied, Mr. Quiroz his right to a fair trial.

### CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Vicente Quiroz # 91208308

Date: April 26, 2021