

**NOT PRECEDENTIAL**

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 19-1461

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TED A. MCCRACKEN; GORETTI S. MCCRACKEN,  
Appellants

v.

R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO; DEBRA CREW, President/Chief Executive Officer, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Successor; ITG BRANDS, LLC.; DAVID H. TAYLOR, President/Chief Executive Officer, ITG Brands, LLC., Successor; REPUBLIC TOBACCO, INC.; DONALD LEVIN, President/Chief Executive Officer, Republic Tobacco Inc., Successor

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On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(E.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-04495)  
District Judge: Honorable Mark A. Kearney

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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)  
May 11, 2020

Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and PORTER, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed July 30, 2020)

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OPINION\*

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PER CURIAM

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\* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

Pro se appellant Ted A. McCracken appeals the District Court's dismissal of some of his claims and the grant of summary judgment for defendants on his remaining claims.<sup>1</sup> For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court's judgment.

I.

McCracken began smoking cigarettes in 1966, when he was 13 years old. He smoked a pack a day from then on until 2015, when he reduced his smoking to half a pack a day. He mostly smoked Kool cigarettes and preferred tobacco products manufactured by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, ITG Brands, LLC, and Republic Tobacco, L.P. McCracken also smoked cigarettes, cigars, pipe tobacco, and non-menthol cigarettes manufactured by other companies over the years. McCracken was exposed to asbestos at work for several years in the 1970s. In 2015, McCracken was diagnosed with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD"), emphysema, and chronic bronchitis.

Growing up, McCracken's parents and brother advised him to stop smoking because it was not good for him. His wife and his doctors have also advised him to stop smoking for health reasons. McCracken testified at a deposition that he has seen numerous health warnings on cigarette packs since he began smoking but never paid much attention to them. He also stated that he can stop smoking and has stopped

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<sup>1</sup> In federal courts, parties may only proceed pro se or through counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654. Pro se appellants are not permitted to represent any other litigant on appeal. See Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991). Given that appellant Goretti S. McCracken did not sign the brief submitted by Ted A. McCracken and did not submit any other filings on her own behalf, this appeal is dismissed as to appellant Goretti S. McCracken.

smoking for periods of time in the past but that he was not motivated to try to stop until he received his diagnoses in 2015.

In 2017, McCracken initiated an action in the District Court, alleging that he became addicted to tobacco products due to the addition of ammoniated ingredients and excessive nicotine in those products. He named Reynolds, ITG, and Republic as defendants, as well as three officers of those companies, claiming that they designed tobacco products to ensure that he would become addicted to them.

Defendants moved to dismiss the majority of McCracken's claims. The District Court dismissed all individual defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction and dismissed most of McCracken's remaining design defect and failure to warn claims, as well as a variety of fraud, unfair trade practice, and consumer protection claims. McCracken amended his complaint, adding a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and his remaining claims — 1) design defect claims that all remaining defendants added excessive nicotine to their products to increase addiction; 2) design defect claims that Republic failed to include product information data sheets, stop smoking markings, and accurate ingredient lists in its tobacco products; 3) a failure to warn claim against Republic since 1966; and 4) a failure to warn claim for the years 1966-1969 against ITG — proceeded to discovery.

All remaining parties filed motions for summary judgment. In support of their motion, defendants presented evidence from various experts, including a report from a

doctor who opined that McCracken was not addicted to nicotine, after the doctor conducted an examination and reviewed McCracken's medical records and deposition testimony.<sup>2</sup> Another expert provided a report on the widespread availability of information regarding the health risks of using tobacco products since the time McCracken began smoking.

The District Court ultimately granted summary judgment for defendants and denied summary judgment for McCracken. McCracken timely appealed.<sup>3</sup>

## II.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We “review a district court’s decision that it possesses or lacks personal jurisdiction de novo.” Telcordia Tech Inc. v. Telkom SA Ltd., 458 F.3d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 2006). We also exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal and summary judgment decisions. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009); Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). Dismissal is appropriate “only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that [the] plaintiff’s claims lack

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<sup>2</sup> In his brief, McCracken challenges the opinion of this medical expert because he insists that no physical examination was completed. However, the record reflects that this expert completed a physical examination of McCracken after several court orders were required to assure McCracken’s attendance.

<sup>3</sup> The District Court’s rulings on McCracken’s subsequent post-judgment motions are not within the scope of this appeal. McCracken’s appeal from one of those rulings is pending at C.A. No. 20-1735 and will be resolved separately.

facial plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the record evidence is sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

### III.

First, the District Court properly dismissed many of McCracken’s claims early in the litigation.<sup>4</sup> The District Court correctly concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the three individual defendants named by McCracken, where he alleged no personal contacts with Pennsylvania to establish either general or specific jurisdiction over them. See Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255 (3d Cir. 2001). The District Court also correctly concluded that McCracken failed to identify or rely on any legal basis for recovery for allegations he presented that defendants unfairly targeted minors.

Next, McCracken could not bring state law claims against Reynolds or ITG for failing to warn him about the dangers of using their tobacco products after 1969, as

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<sup>4</sup> McCracken does not address the dismissal of several of his claims in his appellate brief. Accordingly, any challenge to the dismissal of those claims is deemed waived. See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A]n appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”).

preempted by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969.<sup>5</sup> See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 520-21 (1992). McCracken's fraudulent misrepresentation claims were properly dismissed because he never identified an allegedly false utterance of a representation made by any defendant. See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 310 (3d Cir. 2006). McCracken also could not state a fraudulent concealment claim because he has never identified a relationship between the parties that gave rise to a duty to speak. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 611 (3d Cir. 1995). McCracken could not allege a civil conspiracy claim between defendants based on his vague allegations where he failed to state an underlying intentional tort claim. See Fife v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 52 A.2d 24, 39 (Pa. 1947). Further, the District Court correctly dismissed the majority of McCracken's design defect claims against Reynolds and ITG because "Pennsylvania courts have refused to recognize causes of action for products which are legal and not defectively manufactured, but inherently dangerous, except in those cases in which there has been a failure to warn of the dangerous qualities thereof." Hite v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 578 A.2d 417, 420 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).

The District Court properly granted summary judgment for defendants, and

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<sup>5</sup> Because McCracken alleged that he began using Reynolds tobacco products after 1969, all of his failure to warn claims against Reynolds are preempted.

properly denied McCracken's summary judgment motion, on his remaining claims.<sup>6</sup> As explained by the District Court, McCracken cannot establish the requisite causation for his design defect claims, under either a strict liability or negligence theory. See Barnish v. KWI Bldg. Co., 980 A.2d 535, 541 (Pa. 2009); Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 841 A.2d 1000, 1008 (Pa. 2003). Although his medical records indicate that his decades of heavy smoking — paired with his years of asbestos exposure — are connected to his emphysema, chronic bronchitis, and COPD diagnoses, McCracken has not presented evidence that the design defects he has identified caused his injuries.<sup>7</sup>

McCracken also cannot establish the requisite causation for his failure to warn claims. See Phillips v. A-Best Prods. Co., 665 A.2d 1167, 1171 (Pa. 1995) ("For the plaintiff in a failure-to-warn claim to establish . . . causation, the plaintiff must

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<sup>6</sup> The District Court appears to have inadvertently mislabeled which of McCracken's claims it was addressing at the beginning of its summary judgment opinion, as a later decision clarifying this issue — which is not on review in this appeal — makes clear that the Court intended to address all of McCracken's remaining failure to warn and design defect claims. Accordingly, we address all of McCracken's claims that proceeded to discovery here.

<sup>7</sup> To the extent that McCracken mentions collateral estoppel in his appellate brief without addressing the Court's reasoning on that issue, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to apply nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel to McCracken's design defect claims against Reynolds and ITG. See Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 249 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[T]rial courts . . . have broad discretion to determine when to apply non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel."). It properly determined that McCracken failed to meet one of the four required factors, see id., and did not err in concluding that it "would be unfair," regardless, to apply nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel under the specific circumstances of this case, see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979).

demonstrate that the user of the product would have avoided the risk had he or she been warned of it by the seller.”). McCracken testified at a deposition that he saw various health warning labels on cigarette containers throughout his decades of smoking, but he did not pay much attention to them. He also testified that his parents and brother told him to stop smoking once he had started, out of concern for his health, but he did not heed their warnings. McCracken’s doctors advised him to quit smoking, but he continued to smoke. Defendants also presented expert testimony about the various ways that the public was aware of the dangers of smoking by 1966. There is no record evidence to support a reasonable inference that the existence of additional warnings would have deterred McCracken from smoking. Pavlik v. Lane Ltd./Tobacco Exps. Int’l, 135 F.3d 876, 881 (3d Cir. 1998) (“To reach a jury on a failure to warn theory of liability, the evidence must be such as to support a reasonable inference, rather than a guess, that the existence of an adequate warning might have prevented the injury.”).

Finally, defendants were entitled to summary judgment on McCracken’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress because the record contained no evidence, let alone “competent medical evidence,” to support McCracken’s unsubstantiated allegations of emotional distress.<sup>8</sup> Kazatsky v. King David Mem’l Park, Inc., 527 A.2d 988, 995 (Pa.

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<sup>8</sup> We also conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in the two discovery-related decisions challenged by McCracken on appeal. See Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1032 (3d Cir. 1997). Similarly, we can discern no error or bias from its decisions denying three requests for extensions of time to file responses, from some of the lengths of time provided when extensions were



1987) (“[E]xistence of the alleged emotional distress must be supported by competent medical evidence.”).

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

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granted, or from the early denial of McCracken’s request to file documents electronically, which was later granted. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982) (“We will not interfere with a trial court’s control of its docket except upon the clearest showing that the procedures have resulted in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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v.

R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO, DEBRA CREW, President/Chief Executive Officer, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Successor; ITG BRANDS LLC, DAVID H. TAYLOR, President/Chief Executive Officer, ITG Brands, LLC, Successor; REPUBLIC TOBACCO, INC., DONALD LEVIN, President/Chief Executive Officer, Republic Tobacco Inc., Successor

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On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 2-17-cv-04495)  
District Judge: Honorable Mark A. Kearney

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SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

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Present: SMITH, *Chief Judge*, McKEE, AMBRO, CHAGARES, JORDAN, HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, RESTREPO, BIBAS, PORTER, MATEY, and PHIPPS, *Circuit Judges*.

The petition for rehearing filed by Appellant Ted Aaron McCracken in the above-entitled case having been submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of this Court and to all the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge who concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a majority of

the judges of the circuit in regular service not having voted for rehearing, the petition for rehearing by the panel and the Court en banc is denied.

BY THE COURT,

s/Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr.  
Circuit Judge

Dated: September 3, 2020

cc:

Ted Aaron McCracken  
Howard M. Klein, Esq.  
Robert S. Pierce, Esq.  
Ryan H. Niland, Esq.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TED A. MCCrackEN, <i>et al.</i>	:	CIVIL ACTION
	:	
v.	:	NO. 17-4495
	:	
R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO	:	
COMPANY, <i>et al.</i>	:	

**MEMORANDUM**

KEARNEY, J.

March 20, 2019

After careful review of extensive discovery with a marked lack of evidence of tobacco use causing Ted A. McCracken's individual injuries necessary to establish negligence and strict liability against tobacco manufacturers, we granted summary judgment to the manufacturers. Mr. McCracken now *pro se* seeks reargument after he appealed our summary judgment Order. After confirming our continuing jurisdiction, we carefully reviewed our factual analysis and agree with Mr. McCracken as to two descriptive errors in our February 14, 2019 Memorandum in support of our February 14, 2019 Order granting the manufacturers' motion for summary judgment. We erred in omitting references to the correct manufacturer and one theory of liability. But after study, those errors do not affect our findings Mr. McCracken and his wife adduced no more than a mere scintilla of evidence his claim design defect or failure to warn caused his alleged injuries. Mr. McCracken cannot simply claim tobacco caused his injury without more than a scintilla of evidence of causation. Speculation based on public reports is not evidence. We grant Mr. McCracken's motion for reargument but affirm our earlier Order granting summary judgment to the manufacturers.

## I. Background

Ted A. McCracken *pro se* sued cigarette manufacturers R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (RJR), ITG Brands, and Republic Tobacco, alleging his smoking their cigarettes for over fifty years caused him COPD and emphysema under both negligence and strict liability theories. The manufacturers filed separate motions to dismiss, on which we issued two rulings on May 21, 2018, and June 26, 2018.<sup>1</sup> We allowed four claims to proceed: (1) a failure-to-warn claim against ITG Brands from Mr. McCracken's first cigarette in 1966 until 1969;<sup>2</sup> (2) a failure-to-warn claim against Republic for failing to warn about the risks of its loose-leaf cigarette tobacco;<sup>3</sup> (3) a design defect claim against ITG and RJR for "altering the amount of nicotine to encourage continued addiction";<sup>4</sup> and, (4) design defect claims against Republic alleging it "[a] altered the amount of nicotine to encourage continued addiction; [b] failed to contain product information data sheets; [c] failed to list accurately and legibly the ingredients contained within loose leaf tobacco and the smoke including known carcinogens; and, [d] a lack of stop smoking markings."<sup>5</sup> We permitted Mr. McCracken to add claims for intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium.<sup>6</sup>

Following vigorous, often perplexing discovery with a *pro se* plaintiff, both parties moved for summary judgment.<sup>7</sup> Mr. McCracken argued we should collaterally estop the manufacturers from defending themselves and the manufacturers' answers to interrogatories established their liability as a matter of law.<sup>8</sup> We carefully studied his claims and looked for evidence of causation of his injuries based on his liability theories. On February 14, 2019, we granted summary judgment to the manufacturers, denying Mr. McCracken's assertion of collateral estoppel and barring his claims due to a lack of competent causation evidence.<sup>9</sup> Mr. and Mrs. McCracken appealed our Order.<sup>10</sup>

## II. Analysis

Mr. McCracken now moves for “reargument” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), arguing we erred in our analysis.<sup>11</sup> After careful review of our February 14, 2019 Memorandum, we agree as to two errors in describing Mr. McCracken’s claims. But these two descriptive errors do not change our February 14, 2019 Order granting summary judgment to the manufacturers.

As we noted, Dr. Brown diagnosed “Emphysema: secondary to smoking” and “Tobacco use disorder.”<sup>12</sup> And Mr. McCracken presents some documentary evidence about the dangers of ammonia.<sup>13</sup> But Mr. McCracken presents no evidence, expert or otherwise, any of the alleged negligence or defects—ammonia addition, failure to contain product information data sheets, failure to list the ingredients contained within loose leaf tobacco, and a lack of stop smoking markings—caused *his* harms. At bottom, Mr. McCracken asks us to allow a jury to find design defect or negligence caused his harms based on the general knowledge smoking can cause harms and the diagnosis of his physician, who is not an expert witness, smoking generally caused his harms.<sup>14</sup> He has not adduced sufficient evidence to proceed to a jury.

### **A. We grant in part Mr. McCracken’s motion for reconsideration but still grant summary judgment to the manufacturers.<sup>15</sup>**

The scope of a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) “is extremely limited.”<sup>16</sup> Motions for reconsideration are not a vehicle for a “second bite at the apple”<sup>17</sup> or to “ask the Court to rethink what [it] had already thought through—rightly or wrongly.”<sup>18</sup> The party seeking reconsideration must show at least one of the following grounds: “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court granted the motion for summary judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.”<sup>19</sup> As Mr. McCracken makes no arguments regarding an intervening

change in controlling law or new evidence previously unavailable is now within his possession, we will evaluate his challenges under the third prong.

When a District Court “addresses the merits—rather than the mere procedural propriety”—of a motion for reconsideration, the motion is considered granted.<sup>20</sup> Still, the “very fact of the court’s review does not prevent the court performing such reconsideration analysis (of the original application, as supplanted by the points raised in the motion for reconsideration) from reaching a disposition identical—either in its rationale or in its outcome, or in both regards—to the court’s decision previously reached upon examination of the original application.”<sup>21</sup> We grant Mr. McCracken’s motion for reconsideration, finding we erred in two ways. First, we incorrectly described Mr. McCracken’s failure-to-warn claim from 1966 to 1969 against Republic when the claim is against ITG Brands. Second, we incorrectly analyzed Mr. McCracken’s design defect claims against Republic as failure-to-warn claims. After reconsideration, the manufacturers are still entitled to summary judgment. Our first error is harmless because we still analyzed whether additional warnings would have stopped Mr. McCracken from smoking. Our second error does not affect the outcome because Mr. McCracken failed to present competent evidence of causation.

#### **1. Mr. McCracken’s failure-to-warn claim against Republic.**

Mr. McCracken correctly identifies we erred in our description of his failure-to-warn claim. We wrote: “Mr. McCracken seeks summary judgment on his failure to warn claim against Republic *for the years 1966 through 1969* based on its responses to interrogatories.”<sup>22</sup> Upon further review, Mr. McCracken’s failure to warn from 1966–69 claim is against ITG Brands, not Republic, as we explained in our May 21, 2018 Memorandum.<sup>23</sup> His failure-to-warn claim against Republic is based on its failure to warn about the dangers of its loose-leaf tobacco.<sup>24</sup>

We addressed Mr. McCracken's awareness of the risks of smoking throughout his life in our February 14, 2019 Memorandum and found additional warnings would not have deterred Mr. McCracken from using tobacco.<sup>25</sup> We described Mr. McCracken's testimony he heard repeated warnings throughout his life about the dangers of cigarettes.<sup>26</sup> We also found Mr. McCracken saw warnings on cigarette packages.<sup>27</sup> We discussed our Court of Appeals' holding in *Jeter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*,<sup>28</sup> both in our February 14, 2019 Memorandum and in our June 26, 2018 Memorandum allowing Mr. McCracken's failure-to-warn claim to proceed.<sup>29</sup> We found additional warnings would not have changed Mr. McCracken's behavior. Our findings apply to cigarettes manufactured by both ITG and Republic.

Mr. McCracken argues we overstated his awareness of the dangers of smoking. He argues "[f]amily member [sic] may have said to stop smoking, but that came after an incident where plaintiff had burned a hole in the wall-to-wall carpet, or in his suit pants, or it was simply a [sic] inconvenience to go out and buy cigarettes after midnight, not because smoking was particularly hazardous to plaintiff's health."<sup>30</sup> He also argues we overstated when he saw Surgeon General's warnings appear on cigarette packs.<sup>31</sup>

But Mr. McCracken's sworn deposition testimony directly refutes his new arguments. He testified his mother, father, and brother told him smoking was not good for him when he began smoking.<sup>32</sup> He also testified he "recall[ed]" cigarettes containing warnings in 1966 and he knew about the warnings when he started smoking but "didn't pay much attention to it."<sup>33</sup> We cannot allow Mr. McCracken to alter his sworn deposition testimony through this motion for reconsideration.<sup>34</sup> Additional evidence described in our February 14, 2019 Memorandum buttresses our holding, such as Mr. McCracken's wife telling him to quit because smoking is bad for your health<sup>35</sup> and the manufacturers' expert testimony disseminating the widespread



knowledge of smoking's harms.<sup>36</sup> Despite all of this, Mr. McCracken smoked throughout his life, even after his COPD diagnosis.<sup>37</sup> He has not presented more than a scintilla of evidence more warnings would have changed his behavior.

## **2. Mr. McCracken's design defect claims against Republic.**

In our June 26, 2018 Memorandum on the motions to dismiss, we permitted Mr. McCracken's design defect claims against Republic to proceed.<sup>38</sup> But in our February 14, 2019 Memorandum, we analyzed those claims as if they were failure-to-warn claims<sup>39</sup> and we did not address Republic's cigarettes in our design defect analysis.<sup>40</sup> Although Mr. McCracken does not raise this error in his motion for reconsideration, we discovered our error while reviewing Mr. McCracken's argument we ignored his failure-to-warn claim against Republic. We now clarify our analysis.

Our design defect analysis regarding RJR's King Kool cigarettes applies all the same to Republic's tobacco products. Just as Mr. McCracken failed to present causation evidence regarding how ammoniated tobacco caused his harms, he has failed to show how any of the alleged defects in Republic's roll-your-own cigarettes caused his harms. Republic's interrogatory responses do not constitute evidence its alleged tobacco manipulation, data sheets, product ingredients, or stop smoking warnings caused his harms. In arguing he did present causation evidence, Mr. McCracken misunderstands our holding: Smoking generally may have caused Mr. McCracken's harms, but as we found in our February 14, 2019 Memorandum, Mr. McCracken has presented no competent evidence any of the alleged defects in the cigarettes caused Mr. McCracken's harms.<sup>41</sup>

**B. We deny the remainder of Mr. McCracken's Motion.**

Mr. McCracken makes several other arguments of error in our February 14, 2019 Memorandum. After study, we deny each argument.

**1. Collateral estoppel does not apply.**

Mr. McCracken renews his argument we should have applied collateral estoppel based on Judge Kessler's opinion in the DOJ Case.<sup>42</sup> Mr. McCracken now attaches specific findings of Judge Kessler and argues we should apply them here. We will not consider these specific findings of fact, as Mr. McCracken cannot receive a "second bite at the apple."<sup>43</sup> But even were we to consider them, Mr. McCracken still fails to address the other reasons why we denied collateral estoppel—its undesirable incentives, the existence of favorable judgments in other cases, and this case's distinguishable posture from the DOJ Case.

**2. Mr. McCracken's asbestos exposure.**

Mr. McCracken argues we incorrectly found Dr. Dovernarsky wrote Mr. McCracken had "heavy, direct exposure to asbestos on a regular basis in the 1970's when he worked with cement."<sup>44</sup> Mr. McCracken is incorrect. We accurately quoted Dr. Dovernarsky's finding.<sup>45</sup>

Mr. McCracken also argues we ignored Dr. Dovernarsky's findings he "reviewed a chest x-ray . . . that shows hyperinflation consistent with emphysema but no other abnormalities,"<sup>46</sup> and he "did not see anything that looks like pleural asbestosis on his chest x-ray."<sup>47</sup> While true we did not mention these findings, we assigned little, if any, weight to Mr. McCracken's exposure to asbestos in our opinion. We mentioned asbestos only in our Introduction and Background sections.<sup>48</sup> We did not opine asbestos caused or even contributed to Mr. McCracken's health problems. Instead, we granted summary judgment to the manufacturers on the design defect claim because Mr. McCracken presented no evidence a design defect caused his harms.<sup>49</sup>

**3. We correctly evaluated expert testimony.**

Mr. McCracken challenges two issues in our review of the expert's opinions. He argues the statement of the manufacturers' expert, Dr. Garner, is unsworn and un-notarized, so it is inadmissible. Mr. McCracken is incorrect. The manufacturers attached a notarized affidavit Dr. Garner signed and swore.<sup>50</sup>

Mr. McCracken argues we should have credited Dr. Brown's medical records over Dr. Agharkar's expert opinion. But as we noted in our February 14, 2019 Memorandum, Dr. Brown did not opine on how any design defect caused Mr. McCracken's harms.<sup>51</sup> Even if we disregarded Dr. Agharkar's opinion, Mr. McCracken's argument fails because he has still failed to present causation evidence.

**4. We do not consider inadmissible documentary evidence.**

Construing Mr. McCracken's motion liberally, he argues we erred in discounting his documentary evidence. But he does not presently rebut our finding the documentary evidence constituted inadmissible hearsay.<sup>52</sup> As in his summary judgment briefing, he makes no argument about the documents' admissibility. We cannot identify a basis of admissibility for the records.

**5. There is no evidence supporting an emotional distress claim.**

Mr. McCracken rehashes his argument regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress. As before, he claims the manufacturers' addition of ammonia is outrageous conduct which caused him emotional distress. We already addressed these arguments.<sup>53</sup> Mr. McCracken has not attached medical evidence proving emotional distress. Nor has he shown outrageous conduct.<sup>54</sup> We properly dismissed this claim.

### III. Conclusion

Mr. McCracken correctly identifies we miscast his failure-to-warn claims in our February 14, 2019 Memorandum. We also find we should have analyzed certain claims against Republic as design defect claims. We grant reargument. But upon reconsideration, we continue to hold the manufacturers are entitled to summary judgment. Using tobacco for over fifty years after several notices of harm, he fails to adduce more than a scintilla of evidence the design defect or a failure to warn caused his present illness.

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<sup>1</sup> ECF Doc. No. 52; ECF Doc. No. 79.

<sup>2</sup> ECF Doc. No. 52 at 1, 8, 13.

<sup>3</sup> ECF Doc. No. 79 at 4–5.

<sup>4</sup> ECF Doc. No. 52 at 10, 13.

<sup>5</sup> ECF Doc. No. 79 at 9.

<sup>6</sup> ECF Doc. Nos. 89–90.

<sup>7</sup> ECF Doc. Nos. 156–59.

<sup>8</sup> ECF Doc. No. 159.

<sup>9</sup> ECF Doc. No. 184.

<sup>10</sup> ECF Doc. No. 188.

<sup>11</sup> ECF Doc. No. 190. Mr. McCracken styles his *pro se* motion as a “Motion For Reargument Of Court’s Order Granting Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment.” We will construe Mr. McCracken’s motion as a Motion for Reconsideration under Rule 59(e). Despite Mr. McCracken’s Notice of Appeal, we have jurisdiction to decide his Rule 59(e) motion. “[A] timely motion filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) precludes a court of appeals from exercising jurisdiction while the motion is pending.” *United States v. Adderly*, No. 06-548, 2012 WL 12906317, at \*1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2012). This is true even when, as here, the Rule 59 motion is filed after the notice of

appeal. *See United States v. Rogers Transp., Inc.*, 751 F.2d 635, 635 (3d Cir. 1985). As a result, the dispositive jurisdictional question is whether Mr. McCracken's motion for reconsideration is timely. It is timely under both the local and federal rules. Our local rules require motions "for reconsideration or reargument . . . be served and filed within fourteen (14) days." Local Rule 7.1(g). We entered Judgment on February 14, 2019. Mr. McCracken filed his motion on February 28, 2019.

<sup>12</sup> ECF Doc. No. 184 at 2.

<sup>13</sup> ECF Doc. No. 180 at MSJ App 1165–69.

<sup>14</sup> *See Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc.*, 167 F.3d 146, 165 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting without excluded expert testimony, plaintiff failed to offer admissible proof defendant's product was defective); *Lamar v. Saks Fifth Ave., Inc.*, No. 2:12-836, 2012 WL 12897909, at \*3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2012) (granting summary judgment where plaintiff failed to "come forward with sufficient expert testimony" proving defendant caused her harm); *Damiani v. Momme*, No. 11-2534, 2012 WL 1657920, at \*4 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2012) (precluding treating physicians who were not designated as experts from testifying with independent opinions as to the cause of Plaintiff's injuries); *Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hosp.*, 610 F. Supp. 2d 401, 407 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (granting summary judgment where medical records contained no evidence a defect caused plaintiff's harms), *aff'd*, 363 F. App'x 925 (3d Cir. 2010). Any finding of liability would result from the jury's mere speculation as to causation.

<sup>15</sup> The standard of review for a Rule 59 motion "relates back to the standard applicable in the underlying decision." *Phelps v. Obama*, No. 1:15-2328, 2016 WL 320648, at \*2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2016) (citing *United States v. Fiorelli*, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003)). We will reapply the standard we use to decide Rule 56 motions in considering Mr. McCracken's motion for reconsideration. Summary judgment is proper when "the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Material facts are those that could affect the outcome of the proceeding, and a dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party." *Pearson v. Prison Health Serv.*, 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted). On a motion for summary judgment, "we view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant." *Id.* at 533–34 (citing *Scott v. Harris*, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)). "The party seeking summary judgment 'has the burden of demonstrating that the evidentiary record presents no genuine issue of material fact.'" *Parkell v. Danberg*, 833 F.3d 313, 323 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting *Willis v. UPMC Children's Hosp. of Pittsburgh*, 808 F.3d 638, 643 (3d Cir. 2015)). If the movant carries its burden, "the nonmoving party must identify facts in the record that would enable them to make a sufficient showing on essential elements of their case for which they have the burden of proof." *Willis*, 808 F.3d at 643 (citing *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). "If, after adequate time for discovery, the nonmoving party has not met its burden, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the court must enter summary judgment against the nonmoving party." *Id.* at 643 (citing *Celotex*, 477 U.S. at 322–23). Because Mr. McCracken is proceeding pro se, we will read his "papers liberally and interpret[] them to

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raise the strongest arguments suggested therein.” *Hodson v. Alpine Manor, Inc.*, 512 F. Supp. 2d 373, 384–85 (W.D. Pa. 2007). “Despite this liberal interpretation, however, a bald assertion, unsupported by evidence, cannot overcome a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” *Id.*

<sup>16</sup> *Blystone v. Horn*, 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011).

<sup>17</sup> *Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas Ltd.*, 52 F.3d 1220, 1231 (3d Cir. 1995).

<sup>18</sup> *Glendon Energy Co. v. Borough of Glendon*, 836 F. Supp. 1109, 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (alteration in original).

<sup>19</sup> *Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros*, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).

<sup>20</sup> *In re Telfair*, 745 F. Supp. 2d 536, 538 n.1 (D.N.J. 2010), *vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Telfair v. Office of U.S. Attorney*, 443 F. App’x 674 (3d Cir. 2011).

<sup>21</sup> *Id.* (citing *Pena–Ruiz v. Solorzano*, 281 Fed. App’x 110, 111 n.1 (3d Cir. 2008)).

<sup>22</sup> ECF Doc. No. 184 at 14 (emphasis added).

<sup>23</sup> ECF Doc. No. 52 at 8–9.

<sup>24</sup> ECF Doc. No. 79 at 4–5.

<sup>25</sup> ECF Doc. No. 184 at 14–15.

<sup>26</sup> ECF Doc. No. 184 at 14–15.

<sup>27</sup> ECF Doc. No. 184 at 14–15.

<sup>28</sup> 113 Fed. App’x 465 (3d Cir. 2004).

<sup>29</sup> ECF Doc. No. 184 at 15; ECF Doc. No. 79 at 5.

<sup>30</sup> ECF Doc. No. 190 at ¶ 12.

<sup>31</sup> ECF Doc. No. 190 at ¶¶ 13, 19.

<sup>32</sup> ECF Doc. No. 158 at MSJ App 128–30.

<sup>33</sup> ECF Doc. No. 158 at 218.

<sup>34</sup> *See Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc.*, 503 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[I]f it is clear that an affidavit is offered solely for the purpose of defeating summary judgment, it is proper for the