

No. 20-7717

ORIGINAL

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Chadd A. Morris

Plaintiff/Petitioner (Pro-Se)

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

FEB 05 2021

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

VS.

Gregg Scott, Shan Jumper, Diana Dobier, Rebecca Housenga, Ashley Smith, Mara Sheldon
Britney Petiford, Todd Moody, Sandra Simpson, Paul Vincent
Respondents

On Petition For A Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
And the United States District of Illinois

Petition For Writ of Certiorari

Chadd A. Morris

Illinois Department of Human Services

Treatment and Detention Facility

17019 County Farm Road

Rushville, Illinois 62681

217-322-3204

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The lower courts having prejudicated this plaintiff, with judicial misconduct, error beyond harmless, amounting to structural, and manifest in the following issues:

- 1) When making rulings thought the plaintiffs litigation, courts failing to comply with controlling, precedential case laws/legal standards, cited in plaintiffs writ herein.
- 2) Courts when granting defendants summary judgment, having construed facts in their favor, against controlling legal standards, precedential case law, cited herein, requiring, and obligating courts to construe and favor the "non moving party" which is this plaintiff. Courts failed to apply the conflicting documentations plaintiff provided to show how defendant's professional judgments were falsified by having solely relied on defendants "conclusionary" labels and failing to credit plaintiffs proof he provided that defendants labels give a false and misrepresented assessment of plaintiffs treatment. In courts summary judgment order falsifies the record intentionally by putting false words in plaintiff's mouth claiming defendants can't provide treatment because facility rules prohibit residents from having sex with each other.
- 3) Courts failed to apply and credit, that of plaintiffs evidence he submitted (defendants treatment progress notes) largely has required "behavioral management" and defendants claims as documented that is why plaintiff cant progress courts failed to apply that "behavioral management" as majority methods of treatment issuing are in fact identified as not sufficient to produce long term changes in clients which amounts to inadequate treatment. Defendants treatment issuing and program in general entertains, threatens and intimidates clients to "give up his constitutional rights". i.e. requiring self incrimination.
- 4) Courts, while granting defendants summary judgment, allows defendants to avoid liability and continue such violations because of being absent of court orders requiring systemic changes, which is require by controlling/precedential case law/legal standards plaintiff cited herein this writ.
- 5) Courts, while granting defendants summary judgment "cherry picked" defendants documentations, and plaintiffs evidence filed with the courts and during discovery to intentionally and deliberately leave out anything that showed legal liability against defendants to essentially block plaintiff from prevailing.
- 6) Courts failed to comply with controlling/precedential case law/legal standards that obligate courts to "put defendants professional judgments and documentations" through "litmus test" of compliance to standards sex offender treatment regulations as cited in cases plaintiff cited herein this writ.
- 7) Courts throughout this litigation failed to locate a willing attorney/counsel/expert witness for the plaintiff. Since this case requires plaintiffs challenging of defendants professional judgments, precedential/controlling legal standards/case law, plaintiff cited herein this writ.
- 8) Courts failed to comply with legal standards that permit plaintiff to prevail on criminal violations made by defendant.
- 9) Courts in summary judgment fails to comply with controlling/precedential cases law/legal standards that obligate courts to rule based on law, and not based on their personal judgment, and preference of the litigant, which is by cases plaintiff cited herein this write. The courts did this by seemingly failing to allow plaintiff to prevail, in spite of multitude of fruitful evidence by preponderance of evidence, courts rather seemed to deliberately and intentionally block plaintiff form prevailing because of his confinement at the facility, relying solely on defendants professional judgment.
- 10) Courts, while granting defendant's summary judgment, then permits them to continue such inadequate and constitutional offensive treatment methods by only allowing some treatment and not meeting the 14th amendments standards of "adequate" treatment sufficient for one to be released.

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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner/Plaintiff respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari is issued to review the Judgments Below:

OPINIONS BELOW

FOR CASES FROM FEDERAL COURTS:

The Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals appears at Appendix "B" to the petition, and is to the best of the Plaintiffs knowledge "Unpublished".

The Opinion of the United States District Court appears at Appendix "A" to the Petition, and is to the best of the Plaintiffs knowledge "Unpublished".

JURISDICTION

For Cases from Federal Courts:

The Date on which the United States Court of Appeals Decided my case was on December 7th 2020.

To The best of the Plaintiff/Petitioners knowledge there was no re-hearing granted. However Plaintiff did file a "Response" to the Appellate Courts order, which they altered his filings, calling it a "Motion For Reconsideration", which such Appellate Courts Decision, appears at appendix "C". This Was decided on December 18th 2020 by the Appellate court.

Subsequently The Plaintiff filed a "Motion For Clarification", inquiring about that altered title of Plaintiffs Motion, and inquired into why the Appellate Court Refused to respond or indicate as to why they and the District Court Falsified their Rulings. Specifically inquiring why the Appellate court claimed Plaintiff didnt present a Meritorious claim, i.e. dismissing his IFP status, to show the Courts errored when granting Defendants summary judgment, when Plaintiff provided evidence, proof, by preponderance of evidence, of controlling/precedential case law/legal standards that conflicts with Courts orders, Rulings, Decisions having relied on Defendants Professional Judgments, as well as falsifying the record by misquoting plaintiffs filings, i.e. his summary judgment responses to Defendants, construing, and favoring them, as the moving party in summary judgment, which is against even their cited standards, in summary judgment, to rather favor the non-moving party, which is the Plaintiff. Appellate Court simply Denied this Motion for Clarification, without a response/reasoning, on June 7th 2021. Such decision appears in appendix "D".

The Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, and 1257.

LIST OF PARTIES

All parties do NOT appear in the caption of this case on the Cover page. Additional parties to this case, involves the ENTIRE Rushville Facility Clinical Team, otherwise known as "Liberty Healthcare". This is due to the fact that such persons treatment issuings, and treatment program methods continue to, and have before this Plaintiffs initial litigation date, (authorized under the 'continuous violations doctrines' in the cases/legal standards Plaintiff cited herein this writ) violate, and fail to comply with the standards of sex offender treatment methods. Also because during this litigation, some other parties, have been involved in the initial deprivations of the constitutional, legal, statutory rights, in violation against the Plaintiff, that wasn't initially part of the litigation, thus Plaintiff didn't initially know/was aware of such parties, because such parties, had yet to be involved. Such additional parties are required to be enjoined, under the enjoining, and continuous violations doctrines, due to continuous, ongoing deprivations in same/similar nature, by additional parties, after the litigation's initial filing, as well as before its initial filing date.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1.) United States Constitution, Amendment 1, prohibition from harassment and retaliation for/from filing grievances. 'Section 1, Freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly' "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of Grievances".

2.) United States Constitution, Amendment 5, section 1, restrictions on prosecutions', "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger, nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life, limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation".

3.) United States Constitution, Amendment 14, section 1, 'due process and equal protections', "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws". Section 5 'enforcement' "congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation the provisions of this article".

4.) Constitution from the State of Illinois, Section 12, right to remedy and justice, "every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property, or reputation, he shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely and promptly".

5.) Constitution from the State of Illinois, Section 23, fundamental principals, "A frequent recurrence to the fundamental principals of civil Government necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty, these blessings cannot endure unless the people recognize their corresponding individual obligations and responsibilities".

6.) Constitution from the State of Illinois, section 24, rights retained, "The enumeration of this Constitution of certain limits shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the individual citizens of the state".

7.) Title 42, U.S.C.A., Section 1963, "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States, or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution, and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this action, any act of congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia".

8.) Title 28, U.S.C., section 1257, state courts; certiorari', (a) "Final Judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by Writ of Certiorari where the validity of a treaty or Statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or Statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under the United States".

9.) Title 28, U.S.C., Section 1331, federal Question, "the district Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States".

10.) Title 28, U.S.C., Section 1343, civil rights and elective franchise', "(a) The District courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: (1) To recover damages for injury to his person, or property, or because of the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, by any act done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of title 42; (2) To recover damages from any person who fails to prevent or aid in preventing wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of title 42, which he had knowledge were about to occur and power to prevent; (3) to redress the deprivation under color of any state law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any act of congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States; (4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any act of congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote".

11.) Title 28, U.S.C., Section 1357, injuries under Federal Laws, "The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action commenced by any person to recover damages for any injury to his person, or property, on account of any act done by him, under any act of congress, for the protection or collection of any of the revenues or to enforce the right of citizens of the United States to vote in any State".

12.) Title 28, U.S.C., Section 1367, Supplemental Jurisdiction, "(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) and (c) or as expressively provided otherwise by Federal Statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under article III of the United States Constitution. such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties".

13.) Title 18 U.S.C.A., Crimes and criminal procedure, part 1 crimes, chapter 13, section 241 conspiracy against rights', "If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any state, territory, commonwealth, possession, or district, in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same or if two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with the intent to hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured, they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years or both, and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section, or if such acts include kidnapping, or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any terms of years, or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death".

14.) 720 I.L.C.S. 5/33-3 'official misconduct' "(a) A public officer (which is applicable to any persons in this Rushville Facility, under 720 I.L.C.S. 5/12-3.05 (d) (4) (i) (4) "a peace officer, community policing volunteer, fireman, private security officer, correctional institution employee, or DHS employee supervising or controlling Sexually dangerous persons, or sexually violent persons") or employee or special government agent commits misconduct, when, in his official capacity, as a special government agent he or she commits any of the following acts (1) intentionally or recklessly fails to perform any mandatory duty as required by law to perform, or (2) knowingly performs an act which he knows is forbidden by law to perform, or (3) with intent to obtain a personal advantage for himself or another, he performs an act in excess of his lawful authority or (4) solicits or knowingly accepts for the performance of any act, a fee or reward which he knows is not authorized by law (b) an employee of a law enforcement agency commits misconduct when he or she knowingly communicates, directly or indirectly information acquired in the course of employment with intent to obstruct, impede, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, or prosecution of any criminal offense or person, nothing in this subsection (b) shall be construed to impose liability for communicating to a confidential resource who is participating or aiding law enforcement in a ongoing investigation (c) a public officer or employee or special government agent convicted of violating any provision of this section forfeits his or her office or employment or position as a special government agent, in addition commits a class 3 felony".

15.) 720 I.L.C.S. 5/12-21, criminal abuse or neglect of an elderly person, or person with a disability, section: criminal abuse or neglect of an elderly person or person with a disability, Section: 12-21 "a person commits the offense of criminal abuse or neglect of an elderly person or person with a disability, when he or she is a caregiver and he or she knowingly: (1) preforms acts that cause the elderly person or person with a disability's life to be endangered, health to be injured, or preexisting physical or mental condition to deteriorate, or (2) fails to preform acts that he or she knows, or reasonably should know, are necessary to maintain or preserve the life or health of the elderly person or person with a disability, and such failure causes the enderly person or person with a disability's life to be endangered, health to be injured, or pre-existing physical or mental condition to deteriorate, or (4) physically abuses, harasses, intimidates, or interfereas with the personal liberty of the elderly parson or person with a disability or exposes the elderly parson or person with a disability to willful deprivation".

16.) "Speical Duty doctrine - "the rule that a Governmental entity (such as a State or Municipality) can be held lieable for an indivudal Plaintiffs injury, when the entity owed a duty to the Plaintiff, but not to the general public, this is an exception to the public duty doctrine, the special duty doctrine applies only when the plaintiff has reasonably relied on the Governmental entity's assumption of the duty".

17.) "Special Relationship Doctrine - "the therory that if a State has assumed control over an indiviual sufficient to trigger an affirmative duty to protect that indivudal (as in involuntary hospilitization or custody) then the state may be lieable for the harm inflicted on the indivudal by a third party, this is an exception to the general principle prohibiting members of the public from suing state employees for failing to protect them from third parties".

18.) "Governemnt Laws Doctrine - "the doctrine that the Government must operate according to established consistant legal principals and not according to the interists of those who happen to be in power at any given time, esp, the doctrine that judicial decisions must be based on the law, regardless of the charactor of the litigants or the personal predilections of the judge".

19.) "Stare Decisis - "The doctrine of precedent under which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same point arises again in litigation, the rule adherence to judicial precidents finds its expression in the doctrine of stare decisis, this doctrine is simply that when a point or principle of law has once been offically decided or settled by the ruling of a competant court in a case in which it is directly and necessary invovled, it will no longer be considered as open to examination or a new ruling by the same tribunal or by those which bound to follow its adjudications, unless it be for urgent reasonings, and in exceptional cases".

20.) Body of Principals for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or imprisonment, Principle 7.2 "States should prohibit, by law, any act contrary to the rights and duties contained in these principals, make any act subject to appropriate sanctions, and conduct, impartial investigations, upon complaints. The Term cruel and inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment should be interpreted so as to extend the widest possible protection against abuses or imprisoned persons in conditions which deprive him, temporarily or permanently of the use of his natural senses, such as sight, hearing, of his awareness of place and the passing of time".

21.) Local Rule of Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure, 7.1 (d) (pt. 6) (Exception) "local rule 7.1 (d) [requiring plaintiff to respond to each material fact, in summary judgment, otherwise will be deemed an omission of the fact] does not apply to pro-se litigants, social security appeals, or any other case upon the showing of good cause".

22.) Dewalt V. Carter 224 F 3d 607 612 (7th cir 2000) (headnote #15) "An Act taken in retaliation for exercise of a constitutionally protected right, violates the Constitution".

23.) Griffin V. County School Bd Of Prince Edward County 377 U.S. 218 84 s ct 1226 (headnote #12) "constitutional principals cannot yield simply because of disagreement with them".

24.) Holtzman V. Schlissinger 414 U.S. 1304 94 s ct 1 (1973) (Headnote #11) "United States Constitution ensures that the law will ultimately prevail, but it also requires that the law be applied in accordance with lawful procedures".

25.) Koontz V. St. Johns River Water Management District 570 U.S. 595 133 s ct 2568 (2013) (headnote #2) "The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine vindicates the Constitutions enumerated rights, by preventing the Government from coercing people into giving them up"; (Headnote #3) "regardless of whether the Government ultimately succeeds in pressuring someone into forfeiting a Constitutional right, the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine forbids burdening the Constitution enumerated rights by coercively withholding such benefits"; (headnote #1) "the Government may not benefit to a person because he exercises a Constitutional Right".

26.) Martin V. Hunters Lessee 14 U.S. 304 1816 WL 1721 1 ed 97 (headnote #10) "The Government of the United States can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the Constitution".

27.) Governer V. Lt. Governer 193 Ill 2d 467 Ill Dec 131 444 N.E. 2d 170 (1983) (also cited in Blacks Law Dictionary) "The Government Laws Doctrine - the doctrine that the Government Must operate according to established consistent legal principals and not according to the interests of those who

happen to be in power at any given time, esp, the doctrine that judicial decisions must be based on the law, regardless of the character of the litigants, or the personal predilections of the judge".

28.) Hufford V. McEnaney 2000 WL 536847 *n7 (9th Cir 2001) (Quoting Brewster V. Board of Education 149 f 3d 971 982 9th cir 1998)) "Held that the procedural component of the due process clause requires the government to act in a manner which is fair and just, if it does anything that directly affects a person or his/her property, a procedural due process claim has two distinct elements (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural protections".

29.) Kikumura V. Turner 28 f 3d 592 (7th cir 1994) (headnote #2) "officials voluntary cessation from engaging in conduct as unconstitutional, does not render a case moot".

30.) People Ex Rel Miller V. Holtz 327 Ill 433 (1927) (headnote #2) "every citizen is bound to obey the Constitution, and every Court is bound to enforce its provisions".

31.) Sorrell V. IMS Health Inc 564 U.S. 552 131 s ct 2653 (2011) (headnote #22) "the First Amendment directs courts to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the Government Precieves to be their own good".

32.) Stanley V. Illinois 405 U.S. 547 92 s ct 1208 (1972) "the court has however not embraced the general proposition that if a wrong can be done, it can be undone".

33.) San Diego Citizens For Quality Education V. Barrera 2018 WL 4599700 (headnote #31) "voluntary cessation of purportedly unlawful conduct does not ordinarily render a case moot".

34.) U.S. V. Phosphate Export 393 U.S. 199 89 s ct 361 (1968) (headnote #3) "a case may become moot if subsequent events make it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior would not be reasonably expected to recur".

35.) Friends of the Earth Inc V. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs, Inc 528 U.S. 167 189 120 s ct 693 145 L ed 2d 610 (2000) "make it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrong behavior could not reasonable be expected to recur"; "There is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated".

36.) Weeks V. Hodges 871 f supp 2d 811 (N.D. Ind 2012) (headnote #18) "express policy theory of municipal liability under section 1983 applies with a plaintiff can point to an explicit policy or omission in policy that violates the Constitutional Right".

37.) Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission 558 U.S. 310 130 s ct 872 (2010) (headnote #16) "Supreme Court precedent is to be respected by the court, unless the most convincing of reasonings demonstrate that adherence to it puts the court on a course that is sure error"; (headnote #17) "beyond workability the relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis includes the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake and whether the decision was well reasoned".

38.) Ogden V. Atterholt 606 f 3d 355 356 (7th cir 2018) "in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the deciding court must construe all facts in light most favorable to the non moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that parties favor".

39.) Brown V. Burlington 765 f 3d 765 (7th cir 2014) [5-8] "Daubert laid out four factors by which courts can evaluate the reliability of expert testimony (1) whether the experts conclusions are falsified (2) whether the experts method has been subject to peer review (3) whether there is an error rate with the technique and (4) whether the method is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community (Citing Daubert V. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 U.S. 579 (1993))

40.) Carter V. Carter 298 U.S. 56 s ct 855 (1936) (headnote #7) "powers which generally Government may exercise are only those specifically enumerated in Constitution and such implied powers are necessary and proper to carry into effect enumerated powers and whether end sought to be attained by act of congress is legitimate is wholly a matter of Constitutional Power and Not Legislative Discretion which begins with choice of means and ends with adoption of methods and details to carry delegated powers into effect".

41.) Erisby V. Schultz 487 U.S. 475 98 s ct 2495 (1988) "there may be an appropriate proxy but the State has to provide some evidence beyond conclusory assertions to justify its regulations".

42.) In Re M.H. 196 Ill 2d 356 362 256 Ill Dec 297 751 N.E. 2d 1134 (2001) "the due process clause Guarantees more than fairness, it also provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests (See also: Washington V. Glucksburg 521 U.S. 702 719-20 117 s ct 2258 2267 (1997)).

43.) People V. Thorpe 52 Ill App 3d 576 367 N.E. 2d 960 (1977) (headnote #6) "decisions of an appellate court are binding on all circuit courts, regardless of locale".

44.) People V. Leavitt 2014 Ill App 1st 22 N.E. 3d 430 (headnote #13) "although the appellate court is not bound to follow decisions by the federal courts, other than United States Supreme Court, such

decisions may be considered persuasive authority".

45.) Louisiana V. Maaco 366 U.S. 293 297 81 s ct 1333 (1961) (headnote #6) "eventhough Governmental Purpose may be legimate and substantial, the purpose cannot be presued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly drawn".

46.) Schultz V. Illinois 237 Ill 2d 391 930 N.E. 2d 943 341 Ill Dec 429 (2010) "court must interpret and apply statutes in the manner in which they are written and cannot re-write them to make them consistant with their own idea of orderliness and public policy".

48.) Waldridge V. American Hoechst 24 f 3d 918 (7th cir 1992) "summary judgment is not a vehicle for resolving factual disputes".

49.) Collignon V. Milwaukee City 163 f 3d 982 989 (7th cir 1998) "that the professional knew of the searous medical need, and (2) disregarded that need, knowledge can be proven if the trier of fact can conclue the plaintiffs medical need was obvious"; "then Plaintiff must prove that the treatment decision, by the treatment professionals was a substantial departure from the accepted professional standard".

50.) Michael Hughes V. James Dimas et al U.S.C.D. No: 4:15-cv-04163-JES; Appeal No: 16-1818 (pg. 3) "the Supreme Court Understands that the Fourteenth Amendment to require that Civil Detainees recieve treatment for the disorders that led to their confinement and be released when they've improved enough to no longer be dangerous (225 ILCS 109/40; 725 ILCS 207/55 (a)-(b)) "that the decision can be understood as a response to doubts increassingly raised about the constutional adequacy of the treatment provided to civilly detained sex offenders; "the Constutionality of Civil Commitment and the Requirment of adequate treatment see: (49 Boston College Law Review 1383 (2008); Karsjens V. Jesson 109 f supp 3d 1139 1172 (d. Minn 2015))".

51.) Karsjens V. Piper (Appeal No: 15-3485) (Amicus Curie) (Page 18, last paragraph) "Following the Supreme Courts Decision in County Of Sacramento V. Lewis 523 U.S. 833 (1998) this court held to prevail on an as-applied due process claim, that the States defendants' actions violated the plaintiffs' substantiative due process rights, the plaintiff "must demonstrate both that the [state defendants] conduct was conscienca-shocking, and that the [state defendants] violated one or more fundamental rights that are 'deeply rooted in this Nations' history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that the neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed" (page 19) "as indicated above however, the court should determine both whether the state defendants actions were

conscience-shocking and if those actions violated a fundamental Liberty interest. To determine if the actions were Conscience-Shocking the district court should consider whether the state defendants actions were "egregious or outrageous" See Montin V. Gibson 718 f 3d 752 755 (8th cir 2013) (quoting Burton V. Richmond 370 f 3d 723 729 (8th cir 2004)). To meet this high standard we have explained that the alleged substantive due process violations must involve conduct "so severe ... so disproportionate to the need present, and ... so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience" Moran 926 f 3d at 647 (quoting In Re Scott Cnty Master Docket 672 f supp 1152 1166 (D. Minn 1987)). Accordingly the district court applied an incorrect standard in considering the class plaintiffs as applied substantive due process claims".

52.) Cameron V. Tones 783 f supp 1511 1524-25 (D. Mass 1992) (headnote #3) "challenges to conditions of confinement by convicted sex offender who was confined indefinitely in State Treatment Center for the Sexually Dangerous, were most appropriately analyzed under the due process clause requiring conditions that did not fall below minimal standards of civilized decency, although offenders prison sentences would expire in approximately nine years, his confinement in treatment center was indefinite and needlessly worsening his mental conditions that he might well be confined long after his sentence expired".

53.) Brown V. Plata 563 U.S. 493 (headnote #34) "a court invokes equitys power to remedy a Constitutional violation by an injunction mandating systemic changes to an institution, has the duty and responsibility to assess the efficacy and consequences of its order".

54.) Babcock V. White 102 f 3d 267 (7th cir 1996) (headnote #3) "prisoner may maintain suit against prison officials alleging that officials took action against prisoner in retaliation for prisoners exercise of first amendment rights to petition redress of grievances, even though actions complained of by prisoner did not independently violate the constitution".

55.) Bracy V. Grondin 712 f 3d 1012 (7th cir 2013) (headnote #4) "even if district court abused its discretion in denying motion for appointment of counsel under the in forma Pauperis (IFP) statute, an appellate court can reverse when the absence of counsel prejudicated the litigant which requires a reasonable likelihood that the presence of counsel would have made a difference in the outcome of the litigation".

56.) Willis V. Palmer 175 f supp 3d 1081 1106 N.D. Iowa (Mar 20 2016) (Headnote #12) "conscience shocking standard rather than professional judgment standard applied in determining whether treatment received by civilly committed sex offenders violated substantive due process"; (headnote #13) "genuine

issue of material fact regards whether quality of sex offender treatment received by long term sex offender patients committed to civil commitment at a state hospital under state statute shocked the conscience precluded summary judgment in favor of head of Iowa Department of Human Services, former administrator of treatment program and various individual treatment providers in patients section 1933 action alleging violation of Fourteenth Amendment".

57.) Miranda V. City Of Lake 900 f 3d 355 (that objective unreasonableness standard applies, opposed to courts relying of professional judgment of the treatment professionals).

58.) Turay V. Seeling 108 f 2d 1148 (9th cir 2004) (headnote) "due process clause of United States Constitution Required State officials to provide civilly committed sexually violent persons with access to mental health treatment that gave them realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve condition which they are confined".

59.) Chlinger V. Watson 652 f 2d 775 (8th cir 1980) (Headnote #1) "those persons convicted of a criminal sex offense and given intermediate life sentences, on basis of mental illness are entitled to Constitutionally adequate treatment for those sex offenders committed in civil proceedings"; "Adequate and effective treatment is Constitutionally required because absent treatment appellants could be held indefinitely as a result of their mental illness".

60.) Johnson V. Rimmer 936 f 3d at 707 (citing Youngberg V., Romeo 457 U.S. 307 321 s ct 2542 731 1 ed 28 (1982) "this review is differential, professionals decision is presumptively valid and liability may be imposed, only when decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment or practice or standards to determine that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment".

61.) Jackson V. County of McLean 953 f 2d 1070 1073 (7th cir 1992) (it will probably be necessary to present a medical expert witness or to cross examine medical witnesses called by the defendants, or both, the presence of medical or other issues requiring expert testimony supports the appointment of counsel"); ("it should have been apparent from the onset that Jackson needed the expert testimony of a physician or health professional to prove two essential elements of his claim, the accepted professional practice regarding the use of restraints and that the restraints used at the McLean jail constituted a substantial departure from the accepted professional practice.... in short the lack of legal representation placed Jackson at a serious disadvantage compared with an adversary who took advantage over the situation... we therefore hold that the District Court abused its Discretion in failing to grant Jacksons request for Counsel under section 1915 (d)".

62.) Sain V. Wood 512 f 3d 886 895 (7th cir 2009) (also cited in Youngberg V. Romeo 457 U.S. 307 323 (1982)) "such substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment".

63.) Johnson V. U.S. 565 77 s ct 550 (1957) (headnote #1) "certification by judge presiding at trial that appeal of one seeking to appeal In Forma Pauperis is not taken in Good Faith carries great weight, but is not final or conclusive, and does not preclude convicted defendant from showing that certification was not unwarranted and that appeal should be allowed, and upon proper showing court of appeals must displace district courts certification (28 U.S.C. section 1915); (Headnote #2) "Where defendant seeking to appeal In Forma Pauperis challenges certification by trial judge that appeal from conviction is not taken in good faith, court of appeals must afford defendant the aid of counsel, unless he insists on acting as his own counsel and either defendant or his assigned counsel must be enabled to show that grounds seeking appeal are not frivolous, and do not justify finding that appeal is not sought in good faith".

64.) Pate V. Stevens 163 f 3d 437 (7th cir 1998) (headnote #3) "district court should not apply an inappropriately high standard when determining whether a prisoners appeal was taken in good faith, for purposes of prisoners application to proceede In Forma pauperis".

65.) Johnson V. Johnson 385 f 3d 503 524 "officials knowledge of risk can be proven through circumstantial evidence demonstrating that risk was so obvious that the official must have known about it".

66.) Smith V. Rowel f 2d 360 360 (7th cir 1985) "correctional supervisors may be liable for failing to correct unconstitutional conditions or practices within their area of authority if they know, or should have known about them, officials may also be held liable if they are informed of due process violations in other ways and fail to act on them, supervisory accountability and responsibility can be shown in the following factors (1) the defendant participated directly in violation of rights or (2) the defendant, after being informed via report, appeal, grievance, letter, etc, failed to remedy the wrong or (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred or were allowed to continue to occur via that policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervision of his or her subordinates, who committed the acts, supported, or covered up, the acts (5) the defendant demonstrated deliberate indifference to the rights of plaintiffs by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring, or potentially occurring".

67.) Hildebrandt V. Illinois Dept. of Natural Resources 347 f 3d 1014 1039 (7th cir 2003) (an official satisfies the personal responsibility requirement of section 1983 if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at his direction or with his knowledge and consent, that is he must know

about the conduct, facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye to it".

68.) Plaintiffs entitlement to invoke joinders, and continuous violations of defendants, and enjoin non defendants, because of having participated, in continuing the initial violations: U.S. LLC V. Kim 385 f supp 3d 600 N.E. 111 (2019) (headnote #6) "in determining whether the doctrine of ex-parte young applies, a court need only to conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint alleges a ongoing violation of federal law, and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective".

69.) Also by: Heard V. Shaahan 253 f 3d 316 320 (7th cir 2001) (adopting defendants that continue to violate rights under section 1983); (Continued violations exist if the defendants at any time ceased their wrongful conduct, further injury [not avoiding initial injury, initial injury still exists] would have been avoided); ("a violation is called continuing signifying that a plaintiff can reach back to its beginnings, even if that beginning lies outside the statutory limitations period when it would be unreasonable to require or even permit him to sue separately over every incident of defendants wrongful actions").

70.) Murphy V. Smith 344 f 3d 663 (7th cir 2016) (headnote #9) "federal rule under ex-parte young allows suits for injunctive relief or declaratory relief to require state officials to comply with federal law".

71.) U.S. V. Von Behren 822 f 3d 898 (2008) (headnote #11) "Governments threat to seek revocation of defendants supervised release if he failed to complete sex offender treatment program which required him to answer incriminating questions in sexual history polygraph, constituted unconstitutional compulsion under the fifth amendment defendant had affirmatively asserted his privilege against self incrimination, fact that court would be revoking defendants supervised release for failure to complete treatment, not refusal to incriminate himself was a distinction without difference, because he was unable to complete treatment as a direct result of the invocation of his rights and it was irrelevant that the court never actually revoked his release as defendant was compelled in the moment, the government threatened him with a substantial penalty (28 U.S.C.A. Const Amend 5) (U.S. V. Calvert-Cata 2017 WL 478597; Bennett V. Bigelow 387 f 3d 1016 1027 Utah (2016))"

72.) Illinois Administrative Code, Title 20, Section 1905.80 (b) (1) "risk: Sexual abusers presenting a higher risk of reoffending receive a greater intensity and dosage of treatment services, while lower risk sexual abusers receive less. Providing an inappropriate intensity of services may negatively affect treatment effectiveness and recidivism risk".

73.) Illinois Administrative Code, Title 20, Section 1905.100 (a) (7) "Treatment providers assist

clients with identifying and enhancing prosocial interests, skills, and behaviors, that the clients themselves seek to enhance or attain (i.e. approach goals that are oriented toward a nonoffending lifestyle), As opposed to strictly focusing on managing inappropriate thoughts, interests behaviors and risky situations".

74.) Illinois Administrative Code, Title 20, Section 1905.100 (b) (3) (C) "Treatment providers are aware that although clients may hold attitudes, beliefs, and values that are unconventional, but unrelated to their risk for sexually abusive or criminal behaviors, these attitudes, beliefs, and values are not deemed appropriate primary treatment targets".

75.) Illinois Administrative Code, Title 20, Section 1905.100 (c) (2) "treatment providers recognize that, although clients present for sexual abuser specific treatment as a direct result of legal or other mandates, external motivations alone are generally insufficient for producing long-term change among clients".

76.) Illinois Administrative Code, Title 20, Section 1905.100 (c) (6) "Treatment providers are aware that clients present with differing levels of internal motivation to change (and varied types and levels of denial and minimization related to sexually abusive behavior, interests, arousal and attitudes, and beliefs), but that such characteristics do not preclude access to treatment".

77.) Illinois Administrative Code, Title 20, section 1905.100 (c) (7) "treatment providers recognize that denial and minimization may impact the clients engagement in treatment, but that influence of denial and minimization on sexual recidivism has not yet been clearly established and may vary among client groups".

78.) Illinois Administrative Code, Title 20, Section 1905.100 (c) (8) "treatment providers support the client in being honest in discussing the client history and functioning, but acknowledge that it is not the role of treatment providers to attempt to determine or verify a clients legal guilt or innocence, or to coerce confessions of unreported or undetected sexually abusive behaviors".

79.) Illinois Administrative Code, Title 20, Section 1905.100 (c) (9) "treatment providers are aware that attempting to provide treatment for problems that a client persistently denies, results in having limitations in making reliable clinical recommendations about the individuals treatment progress and re-offense risk, and that this has ethical implications".

80.) Illinois Administrative Code, Title 20, Section 1905.110 (d) "treatment providers recognize that a client who has successfully completed treatment has generally: (3) Demonstrated changes in managing

these thoughts, attitudes, emotions, behaviors, and sexual interests that are sufficiently sustained to create a reasonable assumption that the client reduced the risk to reoffend".

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case was filed due to the Defendants, and many other 'treatment team professionals' having failed to issue adequate sex offender treatment to this Plaintiff/Petitioner. While doing so, committing many other Constitutional and legal, and statutory violations. After this complaint was filed, during its litigation the District court as well as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals engaged in many errors, beyond harmless, but amounting to prejudicial, bias, judicial misconduct and error in manifest while making their rulings, having favored the Defendants in spite of clear, plain, and obvious conflicts as to Constitutional, Statutory, and documentations/filings that was already on the record. Such courts also dismissed, and failed to apply clear constitutional violations committed by defendants, contemporaneously as to the initial deprivation of 14th Amendment due process.

The Plaintiff/Petitioner had (and still to this filing date) participated in the Rushville Facility's/ Defendants sex offender treatment program, since 2009. During such years, Plaintiff/Petitioner has been the victim of many, continued, and ongoing constitutional, statutory, criminal, felonious acts committed by Defendants and Rushville Facility Clinical Team professionals throughout his years of treatment. This includes, but is in absolutely no way limited to: having been subjected to deliberate and intentional delaying, and precluding of this Plaintiff from his access, and progression in the sex offender treatment program, which includes such deliberate, intentional, calculated, and malicious actions by Defendants and Rushville Facility Clinical Treatment Team Professionals of having predominately issued, and expected to the Plaintiff of numerous conflicting goals, expectations. This dynamic has created to where it makes it impossible for the Plaintiff to ever progress in treatment. For example, claiming the Plaintiff needs to meet behavioral expectations in order to progress in the next phases of treatment. Then when plaintiff 'meets those' sabotaging him, by imposing that those are no longer necessary, and cannot progress due to not taking responsibility for his behaviors/sexual offenses (which as this plaintiff will explain, is completely false, and fabricated, because plaintiff has simply been accused of this, in spite of factual documentation that by his written treatment work, took responsibility for numerous undisclosed offenses, and behaviors etc). Then when Plaintiff has been deemed and evaluated as completing required tasks, and expectations, i.e. taking responsibility, then it gets flipped back around as to accuse the Plaintiff of not meeting behavioral expectations, in spite of still maintaining those positive behaviors, (i.e. cessation of sexually acting out, cessation in rule violations etc).

This, in short, has been the ongoing dynamic of the Plaintiff's treatment since 2009, having approximately 4 times over, completed all his Sex offender treatment work, (since 2011) up to par, of what documentations reflect by defendants and other professionals progress notes. However in spite of that, somehow plaintiff has still been continuously required to essentially re-do all his work, claiming that in

the past, had not in fact completed all such work, nor took responsibility for his behaviors, sexual offending behaviors/offenses etc, in spite of prior documentation indicating otherwise, which was why and was indicated of the Plaintiff being permitted to progress onto other assignments, etc, because of having essentially completed, took responsibility up to satisfaction of treatment team, and group members.

At which point then turned focus back onto plaintiff's behaviors, years past, claiming he is not meeting behavioral expectations. Essentially by re-hashing up prior discussed and 'moved on' issues, to essentially continually berate plaintiff with requirements of re-discussing those behaviors, when he had already effectively and to the expectations of treatment team, and group members, as documentations reflected, in years past, discussed, took responsibility for such. However having re-brought up those issues, essentially mudding the waters with discussions of issues already discussed.

This dynamic has repetitively occurred, in this fashion, simply because of the plaintiff being removed from sex offender treatment groups, and or removed from all mental health groups together, then re-placed back in after years of absence, being re-placed back in with completely different set of treatment team professionals, and group members, that essentially has no prior knowledge of prior progressions of and responsibility takings of and by this plaintiff. Also due to the continuous 'change over' of treatment team therapists at this Rushville facility, which has essentially been done, because of what Defendant Jumper calls the program, as labeled on his 'training manuals' for interns, and post-doctoral fellowships as a 'investigative, forensic training program'. This continuous change over, coupled with such so called treatment team professionals has ultimately created such dynamics, because of newly assigned treatment professionals not having been knowledgeable to, and or because of failing to investigate and read all of plaintiff's prior treatment work, filings, progress notes etc. Making any progress he made, years prior, essentially, null and void, and having to start from scratch. Thus making it impossible, as required by 14th Amendment procedural due process, and cases like Michael Hughes V. James Dimas; Karsjens V. Jesson; Youngberg V. Romeo; and The Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act 725 ILCS 207; 225 ILCS 109/40; to in fact provide, and require more than just some treatment, which the defendants and Courts continually bragged about, that is all that's required having cited Allison V. Snyder, however such cases and laws, set precedence over that standard in Allison V. Snyder simply requiring 'some' treatment, and as well as requiring treatment to be issued by the professionals in manners in which allows Plaintiff to progress to improve enough to where he can be released. This standard is also set in the regulations, and laws, of standard sex offender treatment regulations, in Title 20 Section 1905.60 (b) (1); Title 20 Section 1905.100 (c) (6); Title 20 Section 1905.100 (c) (9).

While Treatment Professionals/Defendants have in fact, provided 'some' treatment, however the courts are in error beyond harmless, amounting to prejudicial, bias, judicial misconduct, and error in manifest, by not applying conflicting standards that render these antiquated standards moot, by new standards, requiring sex offender specific treatment, to be given, in an adequate way, that affords one to be released. The courts failing to apply such precedential standards, rather their own interpretation and decisions, relying on such antiquated legal standards, and professionals judgments, essentially violates

the precedential laws and standards cited above, but in addition, controlling legal standards like GOVERNMENT LAWS DOCTRINE, STARE DECISIS, SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP, SPECIAL DUTY DOCTRINES.

The reasoning why such new precedential standards have been set, essentially is because courts and treatment professionals, and evaluations, simply do not conclude that 'some treatment' i.e. mental health treatment, is not sufficient for considerations of a offenders release, that only sex offender specific treatment is the premiss of denoting a client to have made substantial, and sufficient progress to be released. For example, plaintiffs participation in what is called ancillary groups, i.e. anger management, etc, is not sufficient for courts and sex offender treatment professionals/evaluations to conclude one has made sufficient progress to be released. I.e. requiring progression in sex offender treatment specific programs, which at this Rushville Facility is only available through groups called 'core' or 'disclosure/post disclosure groups'. No other 'ancillary' groups/i.e. mental health treatment group participation affords clients, this plaintiff abilities to receive any form of sex offender treatment. Such other mental health groups are only identified in assisting the client in that process, but is not sufficient to call or label as having received sex offender specific treatment, nor to have reduced the clients/plaintiffs risk to reoffend through these mental health groups. Thats why antiquated legal standards the court, and defendants brag about, to only afford plaintiff/clients at Rushville Facility 'some' treatment, is essentially inadequate.

Plaintiff, when having filed his initial complaint, in the district court, had essentially 'had enough' of defendants, and treatment teams 'screwing him around' in this above concluded methods since 2009.

Plaintiffs suit was initially filed because of the Defendants having becoming more brazen in such conduct, having escalated such initial constitutional, statutory deprivations, this was because of such concluded situations as explained as follows:

Plaintiff was re-placed back in disclosure group, under the expectation, as documented by his treatment plans, by Defendant Dobier, as well as many other treatment professionals on his treatment team, to re-present his timeline, to essentially catch the new group up to speed of his offending. This method, although feasible, does in fact create such problems of plaintiff having to re-hash his already presented and approved work, essentially delaying his progressions, but defendants excuse was, and still is because, they cannot simply allow plaintiff to 'pick up where he left off' because 'the new therapists and group members then wouldnt be able to give plaintiff appropriate and meaningful feedback, to his offenses and behaviors, because of not being knowledgeable of his prior presentations' (again is a double edged sword for the reasonings already mentioned). However in spite of plaintiff many suspicions of this process having gone awry over the years past, Defendants continued to assure plaintiff that all he would need to do is go over his timeline briefly. Plaintiff exclaimed, that is not really possible, because unlike most residents at this Facility, he cannot simply go over it briefly, his offending is very lengthy, widespread, complex, and conflicting, which provokes many discussions of resident group members being confused. For example, Plaintiff has in fact gone from rags to riches, and back and fourth, from being a spoiled brat, to living homeless on the streets in Chicago, which to most resident group members are

confused on how someone can live that lifestyle because most have come from one fixed upbringing.

Additionally, most of Plaintiff's offending has been predominantly exposing, in public areas, or voyeering in public restrooms, which has in fact caused much contention amongst group members, because of most being at this facility for having brutally raped, or taking advantage of others sexually. Plaintiff's offense style in this fashion essentially provokes many group members to become befuddled in this, poking, prodding the plaintiff for more information, deliberately frustrating him, after many denials, and proofs of police reports that inquire into methods in which plaintiff did not use in his offending, that most others have, i.e. force, rape, etc. This dynamic has essentially caused conflicts in plaintiff's sex offender treatment groups because of resident group members being in the selfish unempathetic nature, lashing out, and refusing to allow progressions of plaintiff's presentations, because of him stating things like, under sections of 'manipulation tactics used was waiting in bathrooms for someone attractive'. Others feel that since they had to place writings related to and because of feedback plaintiff gave them, of 'having brutally raped another person' becoming essentially spiteful, trying to twist plaintiff's offending into where he would need to place such similar writings, in spite of police reports, and victim statements indicating just as plaintiff took responsibility for. For example, plaintiff had lived with an older person, because of plaintiff being homeless, and in that, such person being in his 50's sought out minors to offend also. In one conversation one person overheard plaintiff's voice on the phone, and asked to talk to this plaintiff, in which plaintiff was asked to pick up this person, and drive him to this house, nearly 70 miles away with intent of sexual interactions. Due to the reports in fact reflected the victim seeking out plaintiff in this regard, group members can't conceive this, and indicated, and badgered plaintiff to state, and write, he kidnapped and raped this person. Essentially the group members' 'theory' was that someone can't simply get at this facility for essentially what's 'statutory rape' by consensual sexual interaction, sought out to the Plaintiff, by a minor, and 'had to be something else there'. However in fact this is most of plaintiff's offending, as undisputed reports reflect.

Plaintiff adamantly informed defendants of this 'concern' upon entering the new disclosure group, in spite of such repetitive historical events, and even in spite of defendants' treatment informing plaintiff that 'if he continuously does the same thing over and over, and getting the same result, do something different' that if the 'doing the same thing over and over' is their expectations to re-do his work, which is creating such problems of 'stalling plaintiff out' is the problem, then why can't he 'do something different' as they instruct. Again defendants referred to that group members need to be informed of offending patterns to give appropriate feedback, which then the plaintiff countered, if that's the case, why does 'he' have to do that, under this reasoning, but essentially no other resident has to upon re-entering disclosure, after being removed, or why doesn't one have to do this, when phased up to the post disclosure group, which is with other members, that then were residents do their offending cycle, i.e. learning interventions, i.e. not having to 're-present all prior offending' 'in order for the group to understand it'.

However Defendant Dobier reassured plaintiff that they would make this process go smoother, than

in years past, however plaintiff again reiterated, if the process is the problem, and stays the same, then what will be different. Defendant Dobier simply reassured plaintiff to 'trust them'.

Thus in spite of plaintiff many hesitations, he agreed.

However, upon a few months of entering this disclosure group, this same dynamic once again seemed to present and manifest itself in the exact same ways. Treatment Professionals, I.e. Defendants Howell, Smith, Sheldon then tried to blame plaintiff as to 'if the process is going the same, he must be doing something to make it that way' essentially redirecting and blaming plaintiff to 'focus on his behaviors and 'not others'. However, in re-explaining this above dynamic, plaintiff's progress notes was falsified by defendants by simply concluding writings of 'plaintiff diverts blame onto others instead of taking responsibility for his behaviors, and his part in actions, and situations', without documenting subsequent circumstances to support, again, if that was done, then would identify blame on defendants faulty and non compliant treatment processes, which is concluded by this plaintiff, why defendants intentionally make such conclusionary labels, without subsequent supporting details, facts, description of circumstances.

As this progressed, there was 2 main situations that led to Defendants conclusions, to then remove plaintiff of his sex offender treatment group participation, essentially not permitting him to be afforded 'adequate' treatment, in which to where he could be released, only then referring him to mental health groups, as explained before. One being that because of these dynamic issues, treatment team professionals/Defendants began to conclude, plaintiff was not making sufficient progress in the assignment to do a brief review/overview of his timeline. This was calculated on Defendants unrealistic expectations, as compared to as explained plaintiff's lengthy offending history, and patterns, etc. Defendants believed that it should only take a few months to do that, however again, as plaintiff preemptively 'warned' them, that it would take 5 years or more, that was, unless they were going to prevent resident group members from giving or offering feedback, thus its their questions and unabilities to conceptualize plaintiff's contradicting offending, and lifestyles that creates this process to re-take years, which again as explained earlier of why, which is why defendants conduct of removing, and replacing plaintiff in disclosure groups, essentially is the problem, that creates the lack of progress, as blamed to the plaintiff, as explained earlier.

The other matter that came about, is that much of plaintiff's work/presentations became and was allowed to be derailed by the treatment team professionals by group members/residents sabotaging his assignments that he was told to do with intentional, deliberate, malicious accusations that was knowingly false. Such accusations included nothing related to plaintiff's presentations, per-se like blaming plaintiff of sexually acting out on the unit, damaging state property, etc. Plaintiff had calmly discussed for months, how these accusations were false, and hearsay, and was prefaced on group members malicious intent, as facts and evidence points to. For example, Plaintiff was accused of sexually acting out, in spite of the fact that plaintiff asked 'when' when group members said 'last night on the unit' when plaintiff asked for video footage to be reviewed to show that he was not on the yard, as claimed he was,

supposeably sexually acting out under the camra, which was irrelvnat, becuae the camra, regardless, would have shown him entering, exiting yard. then accusations turned into sexually acting out with a specic individual, resident West. This was soly based on 'rumors'. Simply because resident West took a liking to the Plaintiff, and continuously tried to talk to him, and other residents, including group members, were esetaily running a 'sex ring' which either recutes new, younger residents, or solicits 'foot solidgers' to be 'look outs' and or to 'start drama' agianst any non participants. As a result of Plaintiff being simualr in age, as to Resident West, as opposed to others whom are 20-30 years older from this plaintiff, and resident West, Plaintiff exclaimed of why they associate. And further, Plaintiff mentioned, that if there was factual proof to those allegations, woudient it be that group members could even somewhat point to a general timeframe in which for admistritation to review video, to try to show supposed actions of this alledged sexually acting out occuring. However once that was proposed by this plaintiff, many group members deleirhatly lied, and then became 'vague' in their refered to times/days etc, which plaintiff then identified, thats why, becuae any time plaintiff, and resident west was associating, was intentionally in view of video, which then cant be idantified as unapropoiate interactions. These residents had verbalized (outside of group) (but moreso their offending patters and histories aludes to this) that of wanting to recruit resident West into their sex ring, and becuae he rather chooses to associate with this Plaintiff, and not those persons, precieved this plaintiff as a 'threat' to their antics, and offending behaviors. Ironcially, a specic indiuvdal resident Rice had infact offended, and victimized resident West, by grabbing him in the genatiles, with a held hand, as resident west reported to staff. However when 'this' came up in disclosure group, considering these dynamics, this resident Rice, was permitted, and allowed by other group members, and therapists accepted such, as 'his mistake' becuae he 'was reaching for a card he put in his pocket'. Which plaintiff exclaimed that is B***S**t, becuae theres a differnace from a 'brush' versus, a 'held grabbed hand'. However Plaintiff esetially was documented and removed, for and accused of 'causing disruptions, and problems and refusing to take and accept feedback, and rather blaming and diverting attention onto others. Again by defendants documtnations, but maliciously becuae of failign to document these surrounding reasonings, only conclusionary labels.

After that occured, ironcially Resident Rice was progressed in treatment, labled as 'taking responsibility' and is and has been released on conditional release, simply becuae all prior written documtnations of 'this incident' was destroyed agiasnt resident Rice, of resident West's reports, and video footage, resident Rice being permitted to continue sexual victimization, treatment professionals claiming and allowing it 'was a mistake'. Regardless of circumstances, fact is plaintiff has no idea and is befuddled at why a victim can claim such, but the abuser is 'let off' with 'claiming it was a mistake' becuae 'of soical acceptance of such'. Which is exactly why plaintiffs anger is so intense in this litigation, of the Rushville Treatment team esetially sabatoging those who want to progress in treatment, and allowing those to progress that esetially 'cose them' or 'pull the wool over their eyes' with 'social colclusions'.

Then focuses of these malicious residents, turned to plaintiff 'causing disruptions on the unit

he lived on. Again this same dynamic was at play, and again ironically involves another resident Hollingsworth, who is again released from the program deemed as doing treatment. This was because (again, don't take plaintiff's word for it, rather such documentations of their treatment records, and offense patterns reflects to such) that resident Vernon was seeking out resident Hollingsworth as a young vulnerable, poor resident, whom, resident Vernon has much financial resources, and uses that to sexually exploit persons. In this case, resident Hollingsworth. Now this involved this plaintiff, was simply because resident Hollingsworth and Vernon were on the Plaintiffs living unit. Resident Hollingsworth was in plaintiff's disclosure group, along with resident Vernon's roommate, (again, ironically released) Resident Perroquet. Resident Vernon had made many attempts to talk to this plaintiff, but being 'an older creep' in that regard, plaintiff rejected. This in fact is what caused such disruptions, of plaintiff being adamant about not talking to this person, but Resident Vernon taking offense to that. This manifested itself as to then resident Vernon 'whining' to resident Hollingsworth, and Perroquet, as to why this plaintiff wouldn't subject himself to sexual interactions with Resident Vernon, because resident Vernon even would 'pay' this plaintiff to do so. Again, which is what caused such 'disruptions' of much yelling, cussing, of plaintiff exclaiming he needed to be left alone, and essentially these residents pressuring plaintiff into trying to 'talk and resolve the situation' when he 'wasn't interested' because 'he knew the motive'. This resulted in resident Hollingsworth bringing up, against the Plaintiff, in his group, sexually acting out. Which as well as Resident Perroquet. This of course, as explained, didn't occur, and as can be seen on video didn't occur, as plaintiff pleaded to be reviewed, but staff, and defendants refused. And when plaintiff was blamed as for then trying to rather discuss his involvement, and when he explained that was because he refused to sexually act out, for these reasonings that such accusations was simply because of the group members trying to cover up their conduct, to blame plaintiff, and thus resulting in either 1 of 2 possibilities. 1 being to instill doubt in the treatment team defendants, resulting in plaintiff's removal anyhow, for accusations then of 'him refusing to take responsibility'. or 2, antagonizing plaintiff with countless relentless accusations, inciting anger in him, lashing out, leading to him being removed anyhow. However defendants, refused to document facts, rather continued to document conclusionary labels, and also refused to investigate the matter, i.e. video to prove that it in fact was others, as plaintiff blamed, and not him.

Then as Defendants after months, of yelling, cussing, screaming, in such groups, which ironically, plaintiff was advised to 'be and remain calm. Again, plaintiff pleaded, how is that going to fix the problem, his calmness, will not remove this. Plus coupled with, when plaintiff was then accused of 'monopolizing groups time' with 'such discussions' in spite of then being forced to talk about it, because as documented, but then conflicts with 'shutting down, and not speaking' which clearly alludes to this problem, and cover ups. How can plaintiff 'monopolize groups time, and then 'shut down'?? This was prefaced on the fact that it was agreed (or so plaintiff thought) that the previous day, that since the whole group time was spent discussing the matters, that the following day, it wouldn't be discussed, and plaintiff needs to stop discussing such. However, the problem why plaintiff cannot do that, is simply

because group members intentionally arrived at group, the very next morning, 10 minutes early, to preemptively bring up and discuss new false accusations. Which upon plaintiffs entering, was then bombarded with questions to answer of such false accusations. When he refused, claiming 'he thought we were not going to discuss me today'. That then plaintiff got blamed by treatment professionals, in written documentations as 'diverting onto others, and refusing to take responsibility'. Then when, in the same day, and same group session, plaintiff was urged by treatment team to follow their direction to discuss the matters, then conflicted documentations stated that 'continued to monopolize groups time, with focusing on situations and blaming others when he was redirected to not do this'.

After plaintiff finally stormed out, in frustration, by being intentionally and deliberately entrapped by this regard, and the so called treatment professionals being manipulated by other non professional group members, to entertain such discussions, without facts, evidence. Then Plaintiff was called in a few days later, again to discuss missing metal pieces out of the units microwave. In spite of a shakedown of plaintiff, and in spite of numerous irate behaviors by Resident Perroquet, and Vernon alleging, the plaintiff still has this metal piece and will use it to shank someone and in spite of then video footage proving resident perroquet having been seen taking 'something shiny out of the microwave' and 'throwing it in the units trash' and then incident reports and records of this situation being destroyed (yet plaintiff still has affidavits of impartial resident witnesses to these events in spite of such documents seemingly being destroyed, because of defendants, and courts being or claiming ignorance now to these issues). Plaintiff was still blamed as behaviorally outbursting onto others, blaming others, refusing to take/accept responsibility for his actions and behaviors. Again as by conclusionary documentations by defendants, absent of 'what those exact behaviors, and situations of dates events, times, residents involved, and any correlating evidence, like incident reports, or video footage. (which ironically in e-mails plaintiff retained in discovery, defendant Dobier mentioned of receiving reports, that plaintiff was hiding under camera sexually acting out, but ironically, no 'reports' i.e. staff incident reports, are found, again, only 'resident hearsay, which then, why were such residents not written up for lying to staff, why, plaintiff answers, so defendants, and state attorney could progress them in treatment and hide these behaviors, and release them, endangering community/society, under the guise, that to justify programs existence, claiming when they reoffend, or violate c.r. rules was 'the residents choice' not because, as facts prove, because of inadequate, and falsified treatment progressions, rather treatment professionals, and facility staff concealing such, allowing such progressions, because otherwise would identify such staffs lack of professionalism, to avoid that, blame residents, or ignore events in this regard, of how such was mishandled, and rather encouraging residents, as treatment motto's are as reflected in e-mails in discovery prove 'for the resident to get out, and be free, and not be right' I.e. disturbingly that no emphasis on 'not reoffending, rather only 'to get out' by 'any means necessary, even as given rise to, by manipulating the system, and casing the treatment in such regards).

Ultimately, plaintiff was then removed from disclosure group, placed in mentoring groups under the premise that by Defendant Dobier, to complete assignments, to the treatment teams satisfaction. Most

of these wasn't a problem for the plaintiff. That is, until, he noted that by defendant Dobiers instructions this would take more than 2 months (approx) after about 4 months, plaintiff filed a grievance, indicating their lack of compliance.

Then Plaintiff was given an assignment to 'essentially omit to 2 sexually acting out incidents, one most recent, in the last year, and one most serious'. Plaintiff then wrote on it, stating he couldn't complete it, because it requires him to lie, omitting to behaviors he didn't do, i.e. sexually acting out within the last year. Defendant Dobier falsified this, by blaming plaintiff, stating, he refused to complete the assignment, and refused to take responsibility. Plaintiff grieved this, indicating this issue. Grievance response simply was denying this specific assignment was given. Then Plaintiff submitted the handwritten assignment that stated exactly as plaintiff claimed, that defendants just lied about, blaming plaintiff as to not accepting responsibility, and not doing assignments, again, being conclusive, without stating specifics, again, without stating that plaintiff refused because they required omission of lies, i.e. omitting to more sexually acting out, and in recent timeframes, opposed to what plaintiff actually did (this was based on these prior discussed/explained accusations, that defendants had to make their 'informants' information correct, and subjected plaintiff to these pressurings to do so', which also violates plaintiff's 5th amendment constitutional rights, and as well as Title 20 Section 1905.100 (c) (8). After plaintiff submitted such proof that treatment team was lying, and requiring plaintiff to admit to lies. Then Defendants desperately tried to claim, and deny they ever required such omissions by plaintiff, but again, documented proof, as submitted and plaintiff still has as produced in discovery, and more that wasn't shown otherwise. Then Defendants claimed as a 'collective treatment team decision plaintiff was going to be removed from all groups till he decided that he wants to take responsibility, quit filing grievances etc'. This now adds another constitutional violation, of harassment and retaliation (i.e. removing plaintiff from groups not allowing his treatment preparation, because of his grievance activity). Plus, in conflict to courts, all defendants claim (in summary judgment) that (paraphrased) Plaintiff has always been given 'some (mental health) treatment'. Plaintiff pointed to specific documentation in summary judgment, to where (via e-mails by Defendant Dobier) plaintiff was 'removed from all group participation. This clearly means that Plaintiff at such points, was not even given 'some treatment' as courts and Defendants Attorney brags about, is required by antiquated legal standards that they use to justify defendants actions having used, predominately Alison V. Snyder to establish such. But again defendants own omissions, in documentations in this litigation, proves that the Plaintiff has not been given the entitlement to 'some treatment' as even they brag about, is minimally required. Based on such, how can courts claim that defendants committed no violations, when clearly proof/evidence says and points to such. Hence courts findings, in that regard, is falsified, and with deliberate and intentional error, beyond harmless, but amounting to prejudicial, bias, judicial misconduct, and error in manifest.

Since then, Plaintiff has remained in 'mental health' groups, i.e. specifically only 1, that being power to change group. Which by these facts, and circumstances, even as omitted by defendants, supposedly puts plaintiff at a higher risk to reoffend. Yet, if that's the factual case, as they claim, then by standard sex offender treatment regulations i.e. TITLE 20 Section 1905.80 (b) (1) plaintiff shall

be receiving 'more' treatment, not less, by removing him from disclosure, sex offender specific treatment, and only permitting him attendance, and participation in one mental health group, power to change, which meets half the hours per week that disclosure group meets.

Further, defendants, and any other treatment team professionals, have, in this timeframe, predominately relied, on and focused on 'plaintiffs behavioral management' as reasonings to justify and blame onto plaintiff, as to why he is not progressing in treatment. However defendants treatment issuings that are solely based on 'behavioral management' is infact identified as not sufficient to produce long term changes among clients. Title 20 section 1905.100 (c) (2) as well in Title 20 Section 1905.100 (c) (6); Title 20 Section 1905.100 (b) (C); Title 20 Section 1905.100 (a) (7); Title 20 Section 1905.110 (d) (3). Having said that, Defendants, and other non parties, which courts dismissed, but is entitled to be included, under continuous violations doctrines, as cited in Heard V. Sheahan, infact contrary to courts rulings, does in fact meet the 'Gaubert' test under Daubert V. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals; Brown V. Burlington which infact that defendants professional judgments were infact falsified, and not based on standard practices, rather a substantial departure from them. Courts, however, as well as defendants acted with judicial misconduct, bias, prejudice, error in manifest, in their 'summary judgment order' claiming of a not quoted part of title 20 section 1905 by the Plaintiff, to circumvent their liabability and falsify the record, by claiming that their part of title 20 section 1905, doesnt specify the methods of treatment defendants are required to issue. However courts, in their Summary Judgment order, falsifies this because of misquoting the part of title 20 section 1905 plaintiff did. Courts quoted a part plaintiff did not. Infact plaintiff then gave specific document and page number, and paragraph number, in which was already filed to the court, in his summary judgment response, that of the sections of title 20 1905 that he referred to, which was not what the court said. Plus, the court also falsified, errored in manifest, prejudicating this plaintiff, delibeirately, by claiming he never claimed defendants documentations and records were false, however, once again, plaintiff pointed appellate courts to where there was the specific parts, in his summary judgment responses where he specifically said that, by stating defendants lied. As well in the multiple instances of defendants falsified documentations, and records, by such conflicting decisions, and records, based on same circumstances, and situations as plaintiff predominately explained in so far. In spite of that factual evidence, on record, of courts rulings are intentional and delibeirate falsified, and prejudicating this plaintiff, to intentionally, delibeirately rule in favor of defendants, to avoid their liabability, then esserially 'adds' to the problem, of then creating judicial misconduct, bias, prejudice, error in manifest, by failing to comply with legal standards, and controlling laws, that obligate courts to rule by law, not based on what they believe, not based on defendants professional judgments, not based on public policy/orderliness. This is required: Spical relationship, special duty, Government Laws Doctrines, Stare Decisis, Griffin V. County School Bd Of Prince Edward County; Holtzman V. Schlissinger, Koontz V. St. Johns River Water Management District, Martin V. Hunters Lessee, Weeks V. Hodges, Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission, Orlen V. Atterholt, Brown V. Burlington, Daubert

V. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Carter V. Carter, Frisby V. Schultz, In Re M.H., Washington V. Glucksburg, People V. Thorpe, People V. Leavitt, Louisanna V. Naacp, Schultz V. Illinois, Waldrige V. American Boschst, Collignon V. Milwaukee cty, Michael Hughes V. James Dimas, 225 ILCS 109/40, 725 ILCS 207/55, Karsjens V. Jesson, Cameron V. Tomas, Brown V. Plata, Babcock V. White, Willis V. Palmer, Miranda V. City of Lake, Turay V. Seeling, Ohlinger V. Watson, Johnson V. Rimmer, Sain V. Wood, U.S. LLC V. Kim, Heard V. Sheahan, Murphy V. Smith, U.S. V. Von Behren, U.S. V. Calvert-Cata.

Courts also seemed to allow defendants to prevail, on the simple pretenses that they corrected the conduct, however, the irony is that, (1) courts cannot simply render case moot, i.e. allowing defendants to prevail, simply because they ceased the conduct, and (2) it must be absolutely clear, that the conduct could not possibly recur. Considering many of these factors, of defendants boasting about usages of 'professional judgments' which then is allowance for the possibility for such to recur, under the guise of 'changes in their judgments/discretion, and simply because of the unreliability of the resident group members, bringing in and their treatment program being allowed and to entertain dynamics of 'behaviors' even false/hearsay ones, in clear conflict to standard sex offender treatment regulations, of title 20 section 1905, in the sections mentioned in so far, clearly the 'same issue could and is in fact likely to occur. Hence, courts allowing defendants to prevail, essentially rendering the case moot, then violates and fails to comply with legal standards established in Kikumura V. Turner, People Ex Rel Miller V. Holtz, Sorrell V. IMS Health Inc, Stanley V. Illinois, San Diego Citizens For Quality Education V. Barrera, U.S. V. Phosphate Export, Friends of the Earth Inc V. Laidlaw Envi Servs Inc, Schultz V. Illinois.

Throughout the litigation, plaintiff filed proof that additional, non defendant treatment providers, continued to engage in conduct, while hiding behind the 'professional judgment' that continued to violate such rights, and substantially departed from standard sex offender treatment regulations standards in title 20 section 1905, while issuing treatment to the plaintiff in which plaintiff is entitled to enjoiners, which court denied, essentially continuing their judicial misconduct, prejudice, bias, and error in manifest, by then not complying with the legal standards requiring enjoiners of persons whom continue to violate rights of plaintiff, not needing for him to sue separately over every separate incident: Heard V. Sheahan.

Courts also failed to comply with their own Local Rules Of Federal Rules Of Civil Procedures, Rule 7.1 (d) (pt 6) (exceptions), Ogden V. Atterholt, by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, having relied on their professional judgments, while not, and intentionally ignoring, and not applying the conflicting evidence provided to prove how defendants professional judgments was not only falsified, but based on substantial departures from standard sex offender treatment regulations. This was because courts failed to infer, construe, all facts in light of and in favor of plaintiff, as being the non moving party, in summary judgment. Rather courts construed and applied facts in favor of the defendants, by relying on their professional judgment, ignoring the departures, and falsified documentations, as plaintiff provided to the court, by never speaking to those parts, and rather only indicating and relying on the assertions

and professional judgments, and insufficient conclusionary labels, of them, essentially construing, and applying facts in favor of the moving parties, in summary judgment, the defendants and not, as legal standards require, to rather favor the plaintiff, whom was the non moving party.

In addition, courts ignored the fact that plaintiff is a pro-se litigant, and whom does not have to respond to defendants summary judgment at all, and any/all inadequacies, or non responding to material facts, shall not be used against the plaintiff, as being to grant defendants summary judgment in favor of defendants.

Courts also failed to take it upon themselves to ensure plaintiff had a expert witness, and or counsel to assist him in this litigation. While courts have boasted about the lack of availability of willingness of counsel. That's irrelevant, to the matters the Plaintiff presented, that such matters involve challenging defendants professional judgments, as plaintiff being a lay person. Subsequently, courts are under obligation to locate counsel, expert witnesses for favoring the plaintiff, at least come time in summary judgment stage. Leaving plaintiff to his own devices, to challenge defendants professional judgments, and courts relying on them, when plaintiff clearly pointed to their falsified documentations, and substantial departures, then put the plaintiff at a substantial disadvantage, allowing defendants to prevail, in violation of: Bracy V. Grondin, Jackson V. County of McLean.

Courts also adamantly denied plaintiffs ability to contemporaneously invoke criminal charges, against defendants, claiming a falsified ruling, that they don't have jurisdiction, such belongs with criminal enforcement agencies. However the reasoning why that ruling by courts is false, because plaintiff is entitled to recover on criminal conduct by defendants, under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1343, 1357, 1367. By Defendants committing conduct, while exercising professional conduct, that was in fact 2 or more persons engaging in conduct, (use of professional judgment) in which did in fact correlate to deprivations of such constitutional, and statutory rights of plaintiff, in spite of courts findings they did not. Courts seemed to intentionally and deliberately rule in favor of defendants, so they wouldn't be found in violation of such criminal violations in that regard under Title 18 U.S.C.A. Section 241. 720 HCS 5/33-3, 720 HCS 5/12-21. Such rulings by courts, to deliberately and intentionally avoid findings of liability against defendants, in fact is what creates bias, prejudice, judicial misconduct, error in manifest, hence requiring reversing, and remanding by this Supreme Court.

REASONINGS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This case involves long standing presidential decisions cited herein, that involves, and requires more than just some treatment to be issued to a sex offender (Plaintiff) receiving treatment in a civil commitment setting. Such issues, include, but are no way limited to, the constitutional rights under 14th amendment due process that in fact requires 'adequate' treatment to be issued, in manners that afford persons under civil commitment or confinement standards adequate treatment in which affords that person meaningful opportunities to then subsequently be released.

The importance of this case, is because Defendants, and clinical treatment providers, at this Rushville Facility, for countless years, (to plaintiff belief, ever since its existance) has successfully circumvented such laws, and legal standards, and most importantly obligations to comply with limitations of standardized sex offenders treatment guidelines, regulations, hiding behind usages, and labels of 'professional judgment and discretion'. As explained herein, courts and such professionals are under legal obligation mostly by Precedential decisions/controlling case law, like: Daubert V. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Brown V. Burlington; Youngberg V. Romeo that obligate, and require such clinical professionals issuing such treatment, to be done in manners that are in compliance with standard sex offender treatment regulations, and guidelines (i.e. not to issue it, by substantial departures of such regulations) that the Defendants, and Rushville Clinical Treatment team are repetitively adamant about not complying with, but moreso, substantially departing from such standards, calling it their right to do so, because of professional judgments, and individualized treatment issuings to the plaintiff/and persons confined at such facility.

The other very serious and important issue, is that Defendants, and Clinical Treatment team at this Rushville Facility have hidden behind, and largely been able to avoid legal liability by claiming their professional judgments, and by treatment issuings, of courts allowance for such 'excuses' to recur, by not allowing plaintiffs to prevail that SUCH TREATMENT ISSUINGS THAT SUBSTANTIALLY DEPARTS FROM SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT STANDARDS LARGELY ENDANGER THE COMMUNITY, WHICH THEY RATHER BRAG ABOUT THEY ARE TRYING TO PROTECT. Specifically, in examples already explained, that, most residents have been released on the programs conditional release program, but have ultimately violated rules, or offended again, winding back up in prison, or back at this program. Defendants, and state call this 'residents choice' rather is because of Defendants, and largely The Rushville Facility's inadequate treatment methods, in which largely substantially depart from standards required of providing treatment to such sex offenders. This is by some examples (*but is no way limited to) that treatment issuings are solely unregulated, and documentation left to the interpretations and judgments of such so called professionals, without litmus tests of compliance of standard regulations, or factual evidence. For example, as plaintiff explained herein, there is no audio/visual recordings of such treatment groups, leaving such documentations of residents involvement, subject to discretion, and judgment of the so called professionals. As explained, this then allows such so called professionals to only place conclusionary labels against or in favor of the resident, in which then conceal or cover up any truthfulness of opposing facts and circumstances. For example making conclusionary labels like 'refuses to take responsibility for his behaviors, or sex offenses'. such label then is allowed to be placed, avoiding the truthfulness of 'what' specific behaviors are in question. As the Plaintiff has explained, and personally been subject to, only untruthful hearsay by malicious group members that intentionally 'have it in for the plaintiff' as explained earlier, which, by such so called treatment professionals/defendants largely 'entertaining' such accusations, by their treatment regulations and requirements of 'behavioral management' requiring before one progresses in the phases of the program (which as explained is a substantial departure itself, because of as explained, by

standard methods, identify that behavioral management is not appropriate, and not a criteria to determine ones progress, or lack thereof in treatment, and in fact is identified as 'not sufficient to make long term changes amongst clients') which by such professionals/defendants being given permission (essentially by plaintiffs never being permitted to prevail against them) to use/exercise broad judgment, in light of much evidence proving how their judgments substantially depart from standard treatment) they have been continuously allowed, and permitted to then entertain such 'high school like antics' amongst groups members, which in fact only perpetuate ones risk to reoffend, which ironically is why residents get out on c.r. and violate rules, because of such so called treatment professionals having entertained and allowed such residents to gain power and control issues of such vulnerable persons in group. For example as plaintiff explained, such group members, like Perroquet, Hollingsworth, and Vernon being permitted to sabotage plaintiffs progression in treatment, and group work presentations, with false accusations of sexually acting out, and damaging state property, simply because of a 'hidden ulterior, malicious agenda' to cover up their 'sex ring' antics, and methods to 'remove plaintiff from the living unit, so such others could, without plaintiff giving rise to such persons exploiting each other. Also to remove plaintiff from such groups, so they wouldnt be challenged, or brought up of their offending behaviors by this plaintiff. As explained, such relentless accusations, being permitted, because defendants/treatment professionals at Rushville Facility are so focused on obtaining anything to use against persons, they in fact perpetuate offense behaviors, in this regard of Resident Rice being permitted to 'sate by' with his offending victimizing behaviors to another resident was 'just a mistake' as because of blaming plaintiff so much of such false behaviors, that defendants continuously entertain without investigation, when they are not even to be allowing 'behavior management' to be part of ones treatment progress, nor to make treatment recommendations based on such behaviors. However plaintiffs treatment for years, has only been prefaced on this, because of allowing resident group members to bring in, and relentlessly torment him with accusations, of behaviors, whether true or false, which in fact derails plaintiffs abilities to focus on his offending behaviors, which then does not afford plaintiff abilities to focus on 'the things that brought him to this facility' rather focusing on such behaviors that usually are in this explained

Such so called treatment professionals, for years, have successfully circumvented liability in such regards, and continuously being allowed to use discretion, and professional judgment, being 'unchecked' for credibility, making conclusionary labels, like 'fails to take responsibility for his actions, offending behaviors', simply by such professionals conclusionary writings in such group sessions. Such is why, in some other legal proceedings, have required audio/visual recordings, so such 'false interpretations cannot be allowed. Such allowances of unregulated standards, courts allowing the Rushville Facility clinical team/defendants to run amok with their judgments, has caused problems in this regard, by then the state, and evaluations relying on such so called professionals documents and conclusions to say one progressed, or completed treatment to their standards. But no one has ever questioned 'if their standards were correct' in such findings, because largely they instill to residents that 'just do whatever he needs to do, to get out and be free' without emphasizing non offending lifestyles. For example, requiring residents/plaintiffs to disclose things (i.e. unreported offenses, or sexual behaviors) that occurred after

ones predicate offense (offense leading to ones confinement) under the 'intimidation' (because of usages of their authority/judgments, if residents dont comply, will not progress in treatment as not allowed by the professionals at such facility, unless a resident agrees to 'do it their way') which regulations indicate that to withhold such disclosures, (as explained and quoted herein) and as well as by constitutional rights, to be free from and protected against self incrimination. which such so called professionals require such rights to be given up, if not, with intimidations and threats of withholding ones progressions in treatment. Ironically, then 'sign off' on residents completions in treatment, denoting that they 'have followed/complied with all rules of the facility, meeting behavioral expectations. which is a lie, and falsified records, because in fact the resident didnt comply with 'all rules' because he had to violate the ones requiring withholding of such disclosures, in order to 'do whatever he needs to get out'.

defendants/rushville treatment professionals 'signing off on' as one meeting behavioral management, is then clearly a lie, and falsified but no one challenges this, because the residents are aware that if they do, they will be withheld in treatments progressions, unless they agree to 'do it their way' which is in violation. Ironically, this is a 'barrier' to treatment, as labeled 'casing' or 'telling one what they want to hear just to please them'. But ironically the treatment providers 'ignore' these barriers that identify ones high risk to offending, to essentially be able to impose treatment as 'they deem necessary' which 'largely departs from such standards, and regulations, intimidating the resident, with 'if he doesnt want to do it their way, he can just stay here for the rest of their life'. Ultimately most residents 'give in' because 'they want to get out' and are careless of receiving treatment in which makes them better, to not reoffend, realizing if they dont 'give in' they will ultimately stay here for the rest of their life. The only other alternative, is to allow the such so called treatment providers to have it their way, sign off on their treatment with the resident ignoring it was done in a multitude of violations of rights, and standards for sex offender treatment, and in fact identified as by methods that are not sufficient to invoke long term changes among clients. Instead of 'staying here for the rest of ones life' usually a resident then decides to 'ignore these methods that only makes a resident worse, and allow them to do it their way, in violation, because of 'wanting to do anything to get out' and 'screw reducing his risk to reoffend' but wants 'to make it appear that the professionals claimed he is a lower risk, when as explained, he really isnt. again, because his treatment progressions was largely falsified, signed off on, by such professionals ignoring the methods in which the resident complied with, was only making them worse, identified as by standards of treatment to not produce long term changes among clients. Another one, being that the treatment objectives checklist, indicates that assignments are required to be signed off on as the client completes them, rather clients allow this to be violated, to just do anything to get out, even if thats complying with their instructions that largely make him worse, because as one can find, such assignments are rather signed off on all at once, by the treatment team, in violation of even their own regulations.

Point being, most residents, at such facility allow staff, and treatment professionals 'to have it their way' because of being intimidated into keeping them there for their life, if they give rise to such faulty and non complaint treatment issuings. This process, then largely identifies a resident

having completed treatment to the satisfaction of the treatment professionals, as relied on by the state attorney as such, releasing a resident on conditional release. Then a resident whom was so used to ignoring rules, and simply doing as he is told, gets on c.r. and winds up violating it, because of complete disregard to rules, under the impression for years, that has been instilled in him, he doesn't have to comply, as long as authority figures allow that to be violated. Under this guise, then the resident is befuddled on why c.r. agents violate him, and bring him right back to the facility, again, its often blamed as the 'residents choice' but in fact was because of the dynamic, at large at this rushville facility, by not just the treatment team, entertains, and nurtures, compliance only with what staff want, and mostly is in violation of rules, which is never documented because staff are satisfied with and settle for 'ones compliance' and can care less about rules. Subsequently instilling in residents, 'rules are pointless if authority permits them to be violated'. Such is not only the plaintiffs beliefs, but as proof shows, in systemic evidence.

Such methods, largely, is with deliberate and malicious intent to justify the facility's existence, blaming the resident, of his behaviors, boasting such to society, of the residents choices, when such has nothing to with that, rather because of such operational, systemic non compliance on staff, and treatment professionals part in such explained methods.

Most of the time, when residents litigate such issues, they are inticed into settling such suits, with then the professionals 'fast tracking' them through treatment, and being released. Which again, creates such exact same endangerment dynamics to the society/community, that the professionals and staff at the rushville facility once again skated by with legal liability, signing off a false documentation of one supposedly doing what he needed to do to complete treatment, because of one being inticed for 20 years, of incarceration, to just let them have it, so he can get out, and be free. Again, ultimately the resident gets out, and is a high risk to reoffend, but such is documented, for reasons explained, otherwise. Such isn't 'treatment' if the resident was documented as a low risk to reoffend, by such professionals, and state evaluations and attorney general, but no investigation went into any conflicting facts of such professionals judgments, as explained herein,

Because of the state attorney general inticing residents to accept settlements of such litigations, by such methods, essentially the problems spoken of herein, only continues, and gets worse, and perpetuates itself which is why such litigations from this Rushville Facility continue, because they avoided liability for one individual, but still invoke the systemic problems, to the rest of the facility's operations, and against residents, ultimately provoking more and more litigations, of the same matters, and or then subjecting all other individual residents at the facility to such problems, just because that one person/resident was able to prove the such issues and settle the litigation, but ultimately, settling it, still allows such professionals/defendants/rushville facility to invoke the same systemic problems to all other residents, thus the problems continue to manifest itself, in either more litigations, or that resident being given treatment issuings, that fail to make them 'better' 'reducing risk to reoffend',

documentations reflect as they have improved, but only because of such 'concealed' unprofessional and

illegal methods employed, i.e. such refelctions in documentations are only being taken 'on its face' without ever challanging if such decision, and recommendation by such professionals was done by compliance to such standards, or by, as done, methods that largely depart from accepted standards, and infact are idnetified as 'not sufficient for producing long term changes among clients'.

In this litigation, as plaintiff explained herein, the lower courts have continued this illegal and constutitionally offensive process, by falsfying records of proceedings, by misquoting the plaintiffs filings, having favored the defendants, in summary judgment, failing to apply, refelct, and credit plaintiffs evidnace that he filed to the court, as well as provided in discovery, that shows defendants and rushville clincial teams treament infact is falsfied, lied on the plaintiff, and largely substantially departs from standard sex offender treatment reguatlions, hiding behind their usages of professional judgments, in which courts are under legal obligations to compare, and contrast their usages of professional judgements to standard sex offender treatment reguatlions. Lower courts failed to comply with these legal standards, and rather relied on the Rushville facility/Defendants usages of professional judgments, without ever identifying the facts of how its illegal, constutitionally offensive, and substantial departures from standard sex offender treatment reguatlions. Lower courts, while ruling in favor of defendants, in summary judgment, infact failed to comply with even their own legal standards cited, as claimed they applied, but obviously didnt, in areas like, they are required to favor and consture facts in light most favorable to the non moving party, which in this litigation would infact be the plaintiff. The lower courts rather constured facts in favor of the moving party in summary judgment, the Defendnats, by consruing facts, evidnace, and their professional judgments, and documentations in their favor. Court only, in their summary judgment order, relied on 'chery picked' portions of defendants documentations to identify blame and no merit on plaintiffs claims, instead of applying mounds of conflicting documentations and evidnace, plaintiff provided, that shows how that intial documentnation, by defendants, was false, and a lie, and not based on standard sex offender treatment reguatlions, rather their professional judgments in which largely departed from standards of sex offender treatment guidelines, and reguatlions.

Lower courts also erroneously dismissed, and failed to allow plaintiff to entertain and recover on proof of many constutitional violctions, by Defendants treatment issuings, as opposed to the one claim courts allowed under 14th amendment procedural due process. Speffically, as plaintiff explaiend herein, plaintiff provided to court, docuemnts provided to him, in discovery (e-mails) that proved the plaintiff has, and shall recover also on first amendment harassment and retaliation claims for his greivance activity, by defendant omiting that plaintiff will continued to be held up in treatment, untill he ceases his grievance activity. Plaintiff also showed through documents provided to the court, that defendants treatment program largely is in conflict with standard sex offender treament regulations, and constutitional rights, speffically requiring self incrimination, in order to progress in the treament program. In spite of written treatment work claiming they dont and advise of such things to be withheld, agian, their treatment as omited in e-mails, conflicts, requiring disclosures of self incrimination, violctions of 5th amendment, and if a client refuses to give up those rights, (i.e. intimidating him to give them up) (i.e.

criminal violations, on top of such constitutional violations under Title 18 U.S.C.A. Section 241) he is essentially threatened under professionals authority and judgments usages, to not progress him in treatment, till he gives up these rights, and 'can stay at this facility for life'.

Lower courts lied and falsified the record, and their rulings, by claiming, in their summary judgment order, of things plaintiff never said, nor quoted, for example, claiming plaintiff supposedly cited title 20 section 1905.90 which courts claimed doesn't specify anything of how professionals are required to issue treatment. Plaintiff in fact pointed out to appellate court, which they deliberately ignored, continuing illegal conduct prejudice, bias, judicial misconduct, error in manifest, by not identifying the fact that plaintiff pointed out, in specific summary judgment responses, where he rather cited other parts of title 20 section 1905, where such does in fact specify, and require how the defendants, and treatment professionals are required to issue treatment, in which they are substantially departing from. Courts simply ignored this, to favor the Defendants.

Courts also claimed plaintiff stated, in their summary judgment order that plaintiff cannot progress in treatment because facility rules prohibit plaintiff/residents from having sex with each other'. Plaintiff never claimed this, nor even alluded to this, essentially falsifying and lying on the record, further, by 'putting words in plaintiff's mouth'. Plaintiff rather explained, his issue is that facility will not allow pro-social skills, that they claim that they teach to residents. This is because any time any resident, like the plaintiff expresses sexual interest in another, they are immediately separated. This does not allow for relationships to develop into a pro-social realm, which is not sexual, plaintiff never said that. Pro-social behavior, largely entails and requires residents to learn how to express healthy sexual interactions. The Plaintiff, being homosexual, has identified many issues with inability to socialize with persons whom he is attracted to, in a non sexual way. Defendants, and the Nashville facility fails to allow treatment issuings to teach plaintiff and others, how to engage in social interactions, in a non sexual, but healthy way, with persons they are sexually attracted to. This failure, by using 'avoidance' methods, which, again, is identified by standard sex offender treatment, as not sufficient to produce long term changes, nor to reduce risks to reoffend, these methods, is what in fact perpetuates ones risk to reoffend, because one, like the plaintiff never learns social skills in how to be around others whom he is attracted to, sexually, in a pro social manner, because he always 'avoids' because the facility discourages any persons from being around each other whom are sexually attracted to each other. Which for the plaintiff, is largely his offending issue, had predominantly exposed, or voyered, on others, because he failed to know how to engage in verbal, pro social skills with persons he was attracted to, i.e. in order to get sexual gratification, because plaintiff didn't know how to 'ask for it' or engage in a relationship, would engage in immediate gratifying offending behavior, against those whom he is attracted to. At such Nashville facility, anytime plaintiff expresses sexual interests in a resident, other residents become jealous, make up theories, like in plaintiff's statements, and facts in this litigation, then defendants or clinical therapists/defendants separate them, preventing them from being social, and withholding sexual interactions, essentially depriving plaintiff from learning prosocial skills with

persons he finds attractive, in a non sexual manner to work on plaintiffs 'issues of offending, of how to interact with others whom he is sexually attracted to, but not act on those urges'. The facility and clinical team has rather indicated to try to teach plaintiff skills with persons he is not attracted to, under the pretense, and justifications that such skills will manifest itself to sexual persons he is attracted to too. However, plaintiffs offending history shows, that he doesn't have issues with engaging in social situations with persons he is not attracted to, rather only those whom he is attracted to, so the defendants treatment in this regard is not relevant, and in fact anterior methods only does nothing to reduce plaintiffs risk to reoffend, because he has the distorted belief that he has no obligations to persons he is not attracted to, and can treat them any way, including abusive, rather persons he is attracted to, will throw himself at their mercy, leading to plaintiffs abuses by not deciphering of when to engage or disengage, for a lack of better words becomes blinded by false delusions of love. Defendants treatment issuings, trying to teach plaintiff pro-social skills from and to persons he is not attracted to, then is irrelevant, his 'issues' are only isolated to persons he is attracted to.

Defendants, Rushville Facility Treatment Staff, Courts, have permitted antiquated moot legal standards, of 'some' treatment to be issued to residents/clients at rushville facility, without legal standards as required under 14th amendment, adequate treatment, posing meaningful opportunities to be released. This can only then come in the forms of 'sex offender specific treatment' 'core/disclosure/post disclosure groups' and not solely mental health groups. As for reasonings explained, evaluations of residents/clients risk factors, state attorney general, courts, will not allow, nor identify a clients/residents risk to be identified as reduced, if he only has participated in mental health groups. Thus Defendants placement of Plaintiff, and other rushville residents only in mental health groups, i.e. ancillary groups, power to chagne, claiming such assists with sex offender treatment, and only is required to provide 'some' treatment, then is constitutionally offensive, because any time a client/plaintiff is only placed in these other mental health groups, and absent placement of in sex offender specific groups, i.e. disclosure, post disclosure, (claimign they dont have space, availability) then is clear that such program and treatment issuings are in fact constitutionally offensive, as does not provide adequate meaningful treatment for one to be released, because in order for that to occur, has to engage in sex offender treatment specific groups, i.e. disclosure, post disclosure, to be considered for release. Thus making it factual that only placement, at any time, only in mental health groups, because of space, availability, means then the program not just defendants, largely, cannot provide 'adequate' constitutionally protected treatment to afford one his release, because he essentially has to 'wait' for 'availability' into sex offender treatment groups, and or, as plaintiff is subjected to, placement solely in mental health groups, blamed, falsly of his behaviors, as a guise, under defendants false claims of their professional judgments issuings, simply because plaintiff has been deemed as 'disruptive' in groups, without denoting the truthfulness, because he 'calls out others B***S**t, also because defendants dont want someone like plaintiff in groups whom challenges their treatment issuings, for correctness, rather want someone in treatment that will just do what they need, to get out, including as plaintiff explained, casing, or telling them what they want to hear, ignoring all violations, including methods that only make a client

worse, but only because of brainwashing a client, to do what he needs to do to get out, without realizing 'what he is doing is in fact identified as not sufficient for the client to produce long term changes, but the defendants' documents reflect it is, which is why their recollections and judgments are false, lies, and only to 'make it look good for them, and the state'.

For reasonings stated herein, until courts require systemic changes against Rushville Clinical Professional Treatment, and not mere corrections behind closed doors, or settling of one particular individual's suit/litigation, which courts have obligation to do, to ensure cessation of such constitutional issues, in cases cited herein, and simply cannot rely on them making changes, behind closed doors, because such does not ensure permanent and ongoing systemic changes, such allows, at any given point, for such issues to recur, till written, court orders, via plaintiffs prevailing against such defendants is allowed.

Additionally, again, regardless of individual corrections to the 'plaintiff' 'behind closed doors' is irrelevant, because this litigation identifies facts proving of a larger systemic issue, that defendants' treatment under non regulated issuings and allowances of defendants, and Rushville Clinical Teams Professional Judgments, (i.e. without factual, unbiased records, like visual/audio recordings of such group sessions, to alleviate such incorrect conclusive lablings, absent supporting facts, including defendants' misuses of authority and judgments) in fact not only creates the multitude of constitutional, statutory, criminal violations, and as well as substantially departs from standard sex offender treatment regulations, and not only, by courts allowing of defendants to prevail, violates, and fails to comply with all such mentioned, controlling, precedential case laws, and legal standards, and constitutional rights, but in fact endangers society, and civilians, because of such incorrect treatment issuings, under the guise of one reduced his risk to reoffend, because of usages, and signing off on, by professionals' treatment was complied with, but not indicating if such issuings were made in correctness and compliance.

Rather such treatment issuings, and professionals' judgments, and completions, for reasonings explained herein, but in no way limited to, are not just an issue of substantial departures from sex offender treatment regulations, but is endangering society, because of predominately invoking and brainwashing clients to believe and comply with methods by them, and their issuings, that mostly identify as not sufficient to produce long term changes among clients, which, is no wonder why clients get out on conditional release, and violate it, and/or offend again, not as blamed because of the clients' choice, rather because of the defendants' treatment issuings were permitted to be identified as sufficient, when further scrutiny into such facts, plaintiff is giving rise to, is only making clients' recidivism risk worse.

Based on these facts, this Court shall also be aware of the other underlying issues in this matter, specifically, as the court will find in the attached appendix "E" that this Plaintiff has been through such issues before, at a prior treatment facility called "Orange County" in which the court will see similar issues presenting. That being that of the so-called treatment professionals 'claiming/boasting' about doing everything they could, and labeling the Plaintiff as 'successfully completing treatment'. This was stipulated in their 'discharged summary' report. However, as attached hereto, in appendix "F"

which is a formal letter from such treatment providers, that indicates and reflects the Plaintiff and his family, specifically his mother made many attempts to communicate concerns of sexual relapse to such treatment providers, as claimed, in their 'discharge summary' that they would provide adequate aftercare. However as clearly reflects, they basically 'ignored' such pleas, and in fact, as reflected on their discharge summary, continuously 'blamed' the Plaintiff for and pushing responsibility onto 'his choices'. Once again, this dynamic that is similarly exhibited here, in this litigation, continues, that of the irony that the so called treatment professionals brag about providing adequate sex offender treatment, and such methods are 'so effective at treating' one to prevent any relapse, ironically when 'push comes to shove' such treatment providers push blame and responsibility onto the client, as if such is 'his personal choices'. But is conflicting with such professionals findings that their sex offender treatment supposedly is 'so adequate' and 'prevents recidivism if the client complies'. However such shows that basically sex offense treatment is basically not as represented to the public to be, that rather is 'throwing information at the client, then blaming him for his choices to do it, and not reoffend or offend. Such representations then are false of sex offender treatment, that of such 'professionals' supposedly doing 'everything to give adequate treatment'. Just as in this litigation. The other factor is that THE "ONARGA ACADEMY" FALSIFIED DOCUMENTATIONS TOO, JUST LIKE IN THIS LITIGATION BY DEFENDANTS, CLAIMING OF TREATMENT PROGRESS AND COMPLETION, (i.e. their discharge summary) BUT AS LATER FACTS SHOWS, (in the attached appendix "F") THAT BECAUSE OF LEGAL, AND POLITICAL ISSUES (i.e. plaintiffs probation expiring) HE WAS "FASSTRACKED" THROUGH TREATMENT, LABELING HIM, BY PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENTS, THAT HE SUPPOSEABLY COMPLETED TREATMENT, BUT CLEARLY DIDNT. In fact "Onarga Academy" blamed that if Plaintiff continues to engage in such behaviors, then recommendations would be, ultimately recommending plaintiffs incarceration to protect community at large. THIS ALSO PROVES THE UNDERLYING MOTIVE, FOR THIS LITIGATION, AS PLAINTIFF BELIEVES, SPECIFICALLY THAT SUCH ISSUES PRESENTED HEREIN, SEEMS TO BE DELIBERATE AND INTENTIONAL TO SABOTAGE THE PLAINTIFFS TREATMENT PROGRESS, BUT MAKE IT APPEAR AS IF ITS HIS FAULT, BY BEHAVIORS, AND LACK OF RESPONSIBILITY ETC, HOWEVER THIS DOCUMENT PROVES THAT OF SUCH APPEARED UNDERLYING INTENT, TO KEEP THE PLAINTIFF CONFINED INDEFINITELY DUE TO HIS REPETITIVE OFFENDING. HOWEVER IF THAT IS THE FACTS, THEN SUCH IS MORE REASONINGS TO GRANT THIS WRIT, SIMPLY BECAUSE, THE SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSONS LAWS, AND COMMITMENT, UNDER 14TH AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, STIPULATED HEREIN, ***MUST BE BASED ON ADEQUATE TREATMENT TO AFFORD CLIENTS MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE ENOUGH TO BE RELEASED****. Point being, if not yet already obvious, that the laws, and legal standards that are authorized to detain/commit this Plaintiff at this Rushville Facility, is only under the premise that if he has meaningful opportunity to receive adequate treatment, and subsequently be released, that being, if the underlying intent by the States Attorney General is to keep plaintiff permanently confined, regardless, but make it appear as if the reasonings why he is confined is simply due to his behaviors, and heightened reoffense risk, by such documentations by facility Staff and Defendants/Treatment Professionals, then CLEARLY THAT SPEAKS TO THEIR MALICIOUS AND UNDERLYING INTENT IS TO CONTINUALLY PLACE PLAINTIFF IN SUCH SPOKEN OF "ENTRAPPING" SITUATIONS IN HIS TREATMENT, AND DAILY LIFE AT SUCH FACILITY VIOLATING SUCH LEGAL, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, IN ORDER TO MAKE IT APPEAR ITS THE PLAINTIFFS FAULT, AS TO WHY HE CANT PROGRESS, AND BE RELEASED, BUT

CONSIDERING THESE FACTS, RATHER IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO ALUDE TO THE PLAINTIFFS APPEARING FARFETCHED CONCLUSIONS ARE INFACIT ACCURATE, that being such conflicting, non compliant treatment methods to standard sex offender treatment, by the Defendants/ Rushville Treatment providers, are infact to deleriatly and intentionally place plaintiff in entrapping situations, to then cherry pick his behaviors, actions, conduct, absent lack of complainece, and unprofessional, and illegal conduct on the Rushville, and Defendants/Clinical treatment providers part, to then provide documentation to the State Attorney, that of the need to permantly place plaintiff in confinement, meeting the underlying motive, to use authroity to permantly detain plaintiff making it appear as if its his behaviors, of why he cant be released when infact its Defendants/Clinical Treatment Providers, and Rushville Staffs deliebrate and intentional lies, falsifications of records, including treatment records, (by methods described herein this writ) that is at such cause, of why plaintiff cannot progress, and cannot recieve adequate treatment.

THUS BEUCASE THE LAWS IN WHICH GOVERN THE PLAINTIFFS CONFINMENT, AND OR COMMITMENT MUST AFFORD PLAINTIFF MEANINGFUL OPPURNUTTY TO BE RELEASED, IF THERES CLEAR AND DELIEBRATE INTENT TO "SET UP" THE PLAINTIFF, AS EVIDANCE ADDUCTED THUS FAR SUGGESTS, TO PERMANALLY KEEP HIM CONFINED, THEN CLEARLY HIS CONFINMENT BY THE SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSONS COMMITMENT PETITION IS INFACIT ILLEGAL AND CONSTUTIONALLY OFFENSIVE, BEUCASE ITS NOT AS PROVIDED TO PROVIDE TREATMENT TO BE RELEASED, BUT UNDER THAT GUISE, TO PERMANILLY CONFIN THE PLAINTIFF, VIOLATING DOZENS OF CONSTIUTIONAL AND LEGAL RIGHTS AND THE SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSONS COMMITMENT ACT IN ITSELF.

CONCLUSION

For the Searousness of these issues presented herein this writ, the countless clear, delairbate vicaltions of constutional, legal/statutory rights b y the Defendants/Rushville Clincial Treatment team, Rushville Facility Staff, including the State of Illinois Attorney General having participated in such and being the cause of such illegal, and constitutionally offensive acts, under the guise of thair legal authroity, and professional judgment, this Supreme Court Shall Grant This Petition, including but not limited to its remedies, involving up to, and including the State of Illinois Attorney General, and the Court of Cook County in which the Plaintiffs civil commitment is derived from.