

APPENDIX

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Northern District of Iowa

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

MONTECARLOS MARTEZE GANT

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

)

) Case Number: 0862 2:18CR01019-001

)

) USM Number: 17597-029

)

Jill M. Johnston

Defendant's Attorney

 ORIGINAL JUDGMENT AMENDED JUDGMENT

Date of Most Recent Judgment:

Reason for Amendment:

THE DEFENDANT:

 pleaded guilty to count(s) 1 of the Indictment filed on May 22, 2018 pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) _____ which was accepted by the court. was found guilty on count(s) _____ after a plea of not guilty.

The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:

Title & Section	Nature of Offense	Offense Ended	Count
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2)	Possession of a Firearm by a Felon	04/28/2018	1

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 7 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s) _____ Count(s) _____ is/are dismissed on the motion of the United States.

It is ordered that the defendant must notify the United States Attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution, the defendant must notify the court and United States Attorney of material changes in economic circumstances.

Leonard T. Strand
Chief United States District Court Judge

Name and Title of Judge

June 19, 2019

Date of Imposition of Judgment

Signature of Judge

6/20/19

Date

Appendix A

DEFENDANT: **MONTECARLOS MARTEZE GANT**
CASE NUMBER: **0862 2:18CR01019-001**

PROBATION

The defendant is hereby sentenced to probation for a term of:

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of:
120 months on Count 1 of the Indictment.

The court makes the following recommendations to the Federal Bureau of Prisons:
It is recommended that the defendant be designated to a Bureau of Prisons facility in Illinois.

It is recommended that the defendant participate in the Bureau of Prisons' 500-Hour Comprehensive Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program or an alternate substance abuse treatment program.

The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

The defendant must surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:

at _____ a.m. p.m. on _____.
 as notified by the United States Marshal.

The defendant must surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons:

before 2 p.m. on _____.
 as notified by the United States Marshal.
 as notified by the United States Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on _____ to _____
at _____, with a certified copy of this judgment.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

By _____
DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

DEFENDANT: **MONTECARLOS MARTEZE GANT**
CASE NUMBER: **0862 2:18CR01019-001**

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant will be on supervised release for a term of:
3 years on Count 1 of the Indictment.

MANDATORY CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

- 1) The defendant must not commit another federal, state, or local crime.
- 2) The defendant must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.
- 3) The defendant must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance.
The defendant must submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.
 The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that the defendant poses a low risk of future controlled substance abuse. (*Check, if applicable.*)
- 4) The defendant must cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. (*Check, if applicable.*)
- 5) The defendant must comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (34 U.S.C. § 20901, *et seq.*) as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in the location where the defendant resides, works, and/or is a student, and/or was convicted of a qualifying offense. (*Check, if applicable.*)
- 6) The defendant must participate in an approved program for domestic violence. (*Check, if applicable.*)

The defendant must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any other conditions on the attached page.

DEFENDANT: **MONTECARLOS MARTEZE GANT**
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STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

As part of the defendant's supervision, the defendant must comply with the following standard conditions of supervision. These conditions are imposed because they establish the basic expectations for the defendant's behavior while on supervision and identify the minimum tools needed by probation officers to keep informed, report to the court about, and bring about improvements in the defendant's conduct and condition.

- 1) The defendant must report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where the defendant is authorized to reside within 72 hours of the time the defendant was sentenced and/or released from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs the defendant to report to a different probation office or within a different time frame.
- 2) After initially reporting to the probation office, the defendant will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how and when the defendant must report to the probation officer, and the defendant must report to the probation officer as instructed. The defendant must also appear in court as required.
- 3) The defendant must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where the defendant is authorized to reside without first getting permission from the court or the probation officer.
- 4) The defendant must answer truthfully the questions asked by the defendant's probation officer.
- 5) The defendant must live at a place approved by the probation officer. If the defendant plans to change where the defendant lives or anything about the defendant's living arrangements (such as the people the defendant lives with), the defendant must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, the defendant must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
- 6) The defendant must allow the probation officer to visit the defendant at any time at the defendant's home or elsewhere, and the defendant must permit the probation officer to take any items prohibited by the conditions of the defendant's supervision that he or she observes in plain view.
- 7) The defendant must work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses the defendant from doing so. If the defendant does not have full-time employment, the defendant must try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses the defendant from doing so. If the defendant plans to change where the defendant works or anything about the defendant's work (such as the defendant's position or the defendant's job responsibilities), the defendant must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10 days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, the defendant must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
- 8) The defendant must not communicate or interact with someone the defendant knows is engaged in criminal activity. If the defendant knows someone has been convicted of a felony, the defendant must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the probation officer.
- 9) If the defendant is arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, the defendant must notify the probation officer within 72 hours.
- 10) The defendant must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as nunchakus or tasers).
- 11) The defendant must not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant without first getting the permission of the court.
- 12) As directed by the probation officer, the defendant must notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant's criminal record or personal history or characteristics and must permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to confirm the defendant's compliance with such notification requirement.
- 13) The defendant must follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

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SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

The defendant must comply with the following special conditions as ordered by the Court and implemented by the United States Probation Office:

1. The defendant must submit the defendant's person, property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, computers [as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1)], other electronic communications or data storage devices or media, or office, to a search conducted by a United States Probation Officer. Failure to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation of release. The defendant must warn any other occupants that the premises may be subject to searches pursuant to this condition. The United States Probation Office may conduct a search under this condition only when reasonable suspicion exists that the defendant has violated a condition of supervision and that the areas to be searched contain evidence of this violation. Any search must be conducted at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner.
2. The defendant must participate in a mental health evaluation. The defendant must complete any recommended treatment program, and follow the rules and regulations of the treatment program. The defendant must take all medications prescribed to the defendant by a licensed medical provider.
3. The defendant must participate in an evaluation for anger management and/or domestic violence. The defendant must complete any recommended treatment program, and follow the rules and regulations of the treatment program.
4. The defendant must participate in a substance abuse evaluation. The defendant must complete any recommended treatment program, which may include a cognitive behavioral group, and follow the rules and regulations of the treatment program. The defendant must participate in a program of testing for substance abuse. The defendant must not attempt to obstruct or tamper with the testing methods.
5. The defendant must not use or possess alcohol. The defendant is prohibited from entering any establishment that holds itself out to the public to be a bar or tavern without the prior permission of the United States Probation Office.
6. If not employed at a lawful type of employment as deemed appropriate by the United States Probation Office, the defendant must participate in employment workshops and report, as directed, to the United States Probation Office to provide verification of daily job search results or other employment related activities. In the event the defendant fails to secure employment, participate in the employment workshops, or provide verification of daily job search results, the defendant may be required to perform up to 20 hours of community service per week until employed.

These conditions have been read to me. I fully understand the conditions and have been provided a copy of them. Upon a finding of a violation of supervision, I understand the Court may: (1) revoke supervision; (2) extend the term of supervision; and/or (3) modify the condition of supervision.

Defendant

Date

United States Probation Officer/Designated Witness

Date

DEFENDANT: **MONTECARLOS MARTEZE GANT**
 CASE NUMBER: **0862 2:18CR01019-001**

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CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>Assessment</u>	<u>JVTA Assessment¹</u>	<u>Fine</u>	<u>Restitution</u>
	\$ 100	\$ 0	\$ 0	\$ 0

The determination of restitution is deferred until _____. An *Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case (AO 245C)* will be entered after such determination.

The defendant must make restitution (including community restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below.

If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportioned payment, unless specified otherwise in the priority order or percentage payment column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i), all nonfederal victims must be paid before the United States is paid.

<u>Name of Payee</u>	<u>Total Loss²</u>	<u>Restitution Ordered</u>	<u>Priority or Percentage</u>
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TOTALS \$ _____ \$ _____

Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea agreement \$ _____

The defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine of more than \$2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 6 may be subject to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

The court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:

the interest requirement is waived for the fine restitution.

the interest requirement for the fine restitution is modified as follows:

¹Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, 18 U.S.C. § 3014.

²Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

DEFENDANT: **MONTECARLOS MARTEZE GANT**
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SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:

A Lump sum payment of \$ 100 due immediately, balance due

not later than _____, or
 in accordance with C, D, E, or F below; or

B Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with C, D, or F below); or

C Payment in equal _____ (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ _____ over a period of _____ (e.g., months or years), to commence _____ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment; or

D Payment in equal _____ (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ _____ over a period of _____ (e.g., months or years), to commence _____ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment to a term of supervision; or

E Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within _____ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant's ability to pay at that time; or

F Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, are made to the clerk of the court.

The defendant will receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

Joint and Several

Defendant and Co-Defendant Names and Case Numbers (including defendant number), Total Amount, Joint and Several Amount, and corresponding payee, if appropriate.

The defendant must pay the cost of prosecution.
 The defendant must pay the following court cost(s):
 The defendant must forfeit the defendant's interest in the following property to the United States:

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) fine principal, (5) fine interest, (6) community restitution, (7) JVTA assessment, (8) penalties, and (9) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit

No. 19-2366

United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Montecarlos Marteze Gant, also known as Lucky, also known as Cuzzo

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Dubuque

Submitted: April 13, 2020
Filed: August 28, 2020
[Published]

Before KELLY, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Montecarlos Gant pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). After he was sentenced, the Supreme Court decided that, in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2), the government must prove ‘both that the defendant knew he possessed a

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firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019). On appeal, Gant argues the district court¹ erred by accepting his guilty plea without first determining whether he knew he was a convicted felon as required by Rehaif. Finding no basis for reversal, we affirm.

I.

On May 22, 2018, the grand jury indicted Gant on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). This charge stemmed from an incident where Gant attempted to sell a gun with an obliterated serial number at a gun shop in Dubuque, Iowa. Police eventually seized a .380 caliber pistol from Gant. The indictment did not allege Gant knew he had a prior felony conviction at the time he possessed the gun.

Gant filed a notice of intent to plead guilty. At the change-of-plea hearing, the magistrate judge did not inform Gant that one element of the offense to which he was pleading guilty was that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm, and Gant did not admit that this element was established. The magistrate judge recommended that the district court accept Gant’s guilty plea. Neither party objected to the recommendation, and the district court accepted the plea.

The court sentenced Gant to 120 months in prison and entered final judgment on June 20, 2019. The Supreme Court decided Rehaif the next day. On appeal, Gant argues that his guilty plea violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and was constitutionally invalid because he was not informed of the additional essential

¹The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable Mark A. Roberts, United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of Iowa.

element of a § 922(g) offense announced in Rehaif—namely, that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm at issue.

II.

Gant did not raise these arguments in the district court, so we review for plain error. See United States v. Jawher, 950 F.3d 576, 579 (8th Cir. 2020). This requires that Gant show (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects his substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). We will exercise our discretion to correct such an error only if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (cleaned up).

The parties agree that Gant meets the first two elements of plain-error review. Gant’s plea “is constitutionally invalid because he did not understand the essential elements of the offense to which he pleaded guilty.” See United States v. Coleman, 961 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th Cir. 2020). Gant’s plea also violated Rule 11 “because the district court did not advise him of the knowledge-of-status element established by Rehaif and did not examine the record to determine whether there was a factual basis for finding such knowledge.” See id. at 1027–28 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G), (b)(3)). Because we measure whether an error is plain based on the law at the time of appeal, both errors are plain. See id.

The parties disagree about whether this error affected Gant’s substantial rights under the third prong of plain-error review. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732. Gant argues that “a constitutionally invalid plea affects substantial rights as a *per se* matter” because “it is structural error that requires automatic reversal.”² Alternatively, he

²Gant concedes that he must satisfy the substantial-rights element of plain-error review to gain reversal for the Rule 11 errors. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004).

contends that, if we do not treat the Rehaif error as structural, he can still satisfy his burden under the substantial-rights prong. Gant points out that he expressed some confusion about his prior convictions during the Rule 11 hearing. Specifically, he believed one of his five alleged prior felony convictions was not a felony because he “didn’t go to prison.”

We previously have held that a “constitutionally invalid plea is not structural error.” Coleman, 961 F.3d at 1029. Instead, we explained that “even in the context of a constitutionally invalid plea based on Rehaif, a defendant satisfies plain-error review only by showing that the error affected his or her substantial rights.” Id. at 1030. This requires that Gant demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” Id. (quoting Jawher, 950 F.3d at 579).

Gant has not made this showing. At the change-of-plea hearing, the government alleged that Gant had sustained five prior felony convictions by the time he possessed the firearm in this case. Gant admitted that he had been convicted of three prior felonies but said he did not remember the other two. The court accepted his guilty plea based on the three felonies he admitted. Portions of the presentence investigation report, to which Gant did not object, show he was incarcerated for a term of imprisonment exceeding one year for each of those three felonies. In 2002, Gant was convicted of aggravated vehicle hijacking and served three years and four months in prison before he was paroled. In 2011, he was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and served approximately 21 months in prison. And in 2015, he was again convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and served approximately 23 months in prison. In light of his prior history of incarceration, simply alleging as he does that he “may have believed his convictions were expunged or his rights restored” is insufficient to show a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty but for the Rehaif-based error. See Coleman, 961 F.3d at 1030 (concluding that defendant did not show he would not have pleaded guilty had he known of Rehaif simply because he “may have believed his prior felony

convictions were expunged or his rights restored” (cleaned up)); United States v. Welch, 951 F.3d 901, 907 (8th Cir. 2020) (finding that, following Rehaif, the defendant could not show his substantial rights were affected because he had previously “received and served several prison sentences longer than one year for felony convictions”).

We affirm the district court’s judgment.

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT**

No: 19-2366

United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Montecarlos Marteze Gant, also known as Lucky, also known as Cuzzo

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa - Dubuque
(2:18-cr-01019-LTS-1)

JUDGMENT

Before KELLY, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

This appeal from the United States District Court was submitted on the record of the district court and briefs of the parties.

After consideration, it is hereby ordered and adjudged that the judgment of the district court in this cause is affirmed in accordance with the opinion of this Court.

August 28, 2020

Order Entered in Accordance with Opinion:
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

/s/ Michael E. Gans

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Adopted April 15, 2015
Effective August 1, 2015

Revision of Part V of the Eighth Circuit Plan to Implement the Criminal Justice Act of 1964.

V. Duty of Counsel as to Panel Rehearing, Rehearing En Banc, and Certiorari

Where the decision of the court of appeals is adverse to the defendant in whole or in part, the duty of counsel on appeal extends to (1) advising the defendant of the right to file a petition for panel rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc in the court of appeals and a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States, and (2) informing the defendant of counsel's opinion as to the merit and likelihood of the success of those petitions. If the defendant requests that counsel file any of those petitions, counsel must file the petition if counsel determines that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the petition would satisfy the standards of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a) or Supreme Court Rule 10, as applicable. *See Austin v. United States*, 513 U.S. 5 (1994) (per curiam); 8th Cir. R. 35A.

If counsel declines to file a petition for panel rehearing or rehearing en banc requested by the defendant based upon counsel's determination that there are not reasonable grounds to do so, counsel must so inform the court and must file a written motion to withdraw. The motion to withdraw must be filed on or before the due date for a petition for rehearing, must certify that counsel has advised the defendant of the procedures for filing *pro se* a timely petition for rehearing, and must request an extension of time of 28 days within which to file *pro se* a petition for rehearing. The motion also must certify that counsel has advised the defendant of the procedures for filing *pro se* a timely petition for writ of certiorari.

If counsel declines to file a petition for writ of certiorari requested by the defendant based on counsel's determination that there are not reasonable grounds to do so, counsel must so inform the court and must file a written motion to withdraw. The motion must certify that counsel has advised the defendant of the procedures for filing *pro se* a timely petition for writ of certiorari.

A motion to withdraw must be accompanied by counsel's certification that a copy of the motion was furnished to the defendant and to the United States.

Where counsel is granted leave to withdraw pursuant to the procedures of *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and *Penson v. Ohio*, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), counsel's duty of representation is completed, and the clerk's letter transmitting the decision of the court will notify the defendant of the procedures for filing *pro se* a timely petition for panel rehearing, a timely petition for rehearing en banc, and a timely petition for writ of certiorari.