IN TH	E SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
	OCTOBER TERM, 2020
	RONNIE EUGENE FUSTON,
	Petitioner,
	vs.
	THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
	Respondent.

APPENDIX "D"

Appellant's Response to Supplemental Brief of Appellee Regarding Proposition II

Filed September 13, 2019

D-2017-773

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA District Court of Oklahoma County Case Number CF-2013-0438

RONNIE EUGENE FUSTON.

APPELLANT,

'IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
STATE OF OKLAHOMA

SEP 1 8 2019

-VS-

John D. Hadden Clerk

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,

APPELLEE.

APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE REGARDING PROPOSITION II

ANDREA DIGILIO MILLER
OBA No. 17019
Attorney At Law
Oklahoma County Public Defender's Office
320 Robert S. Kerr Avenue, Suite 400
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102
(405) 713-1550

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

September 13, 2019

TABLE OF CONTENTS AND AUTHORITIES

Page
CONTENTS
APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE REGARDING PROPOSITION II
CONCLUSION5
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE5
AUTHORITIES
CASES
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1978)
People v. Edwards, 97 N.Y.S.3d 418 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 2019)4
Poore v. State, Case No. F-2017-67 (September 12, 2019)
State v. Snowden, N.E.3d, 2019 WL 33818014
Zanders v. State, 118 N.E.3d 736 (Ind. 2019)
CONSTITUTIONS
18 U.S.C. § 2703
U. S. Const. Amend. IV
STATUTES
Okla. Stat. tit. 13, § 176.1 et seq

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

RONNIE EUGENE FUSTON,)	
Appellant,) APPELLATE CASE	
) NO. D-2017-773	
vs.)	
)	
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,) District Court Case No.	
) CF-2013-438	
Appellee.)	

APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE REGARDING PROPOSITION II

Appellee has filed, without objection by Appellant filing a supplemental brief relating to the Fourth Amendment issue raised in Proposition II of Appellant's brief in chief challenging the admission of historic cell tower records that were obtained by the Oklahoma County District Attorney's Office without a warrant but by use of a court order sought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703. Appellee's supplemental brief focuses on non-binding cases from other jurisdictions where various lower courts have upheld the use of such unlawfully obtained evidence under the good faith reliance on a statute exception articulated by the United States Supreme Court in *Illinois v. Krull*, 480 U.S. 340, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1978).

It bears noting that the prosecutors in this case never offered a justification for the warrantless seizure of the cell tower records arguing in its written response to the motion to suppress only that no court has held that a warrant is necessary. (O.R. 573-574) At the motion hearing where Judge Elliott denied the motion to suppress the prosecutors again said nothing about the good faith

exception. In fact, Judge Elliott denied the motion without any ruling on the facts or the law. (O.R. 8/16/16 Tr. 18) The actual court order is not even in this record. The State on appeal has failed to address entirely the fact that the good faith argument was waived by the prosecutor's failure to assert it or at the very least admit a copy of the order it now claims was relied on in good faith. The State bears the burden of proof to show that warrantless searches and seizures do not violate the Constitution. It is hard to see a way for the State to carry that burden in this case with no order in the record, no testimony about how the order was obtained or what the articulable facts averred and no argument at the district court relating to this issue.

The good faith exception theory advanced by the State ignores a critical element of that exception to the warrant requirement. Under *Krull* the reliance has to be objectively reasonable. *Krull*, 480 U.S. at 355, 107 S.Ct. at 1170. The specific provision of the Stored Communications Act relied on to secure a court order for the historic cell tower records in this case, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (d), states in pertinent part, "In the case of a State governmental authority, such a court order shall not issue if prohibited by the law of such State." Clearly, Congress intended that any action by state law enforcement under that provision had to comply with state law. Okla. Stat. tit. 13, § 176.1 *et seq.* is known as the "Security of Communications Act." Section 176.9 allows for the issuance of court orders for "wire, oral or electronic communications." However, the state provision requires that specific information be given to the court issuing the order. Furthermore, § 176.9 (C)(1) requires that in order for an *ex parte* order to issue,

the court must find "[T]here is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in Section 176.7" and "There is probable cause to believe that particular communications concerning the offense will be obtained through such interception."

Because Oklahoma has a state statute that requires a finding of probable cause before law enforcement can obtain historic cell tower records, the Oklahoma District Attorney's Office's reliance on the less demanding federal statute was unreasonable. The Oklahoma Attorney General's Office has recognized that "While a state law may not be less restrictive than the federal act, it may be more restrictive and therefore more protective of individual privacy." Question Submitted By The Honorable John Nance, 2000 OK AG 45, ¶ 7. (citation omitted.) Here, state law requirements for law enforcement to seize electronic stored communications is more protective than the federal statute.

Because of the applicable state law provision the federal cases Appellee supplements her argument with are unpersuasive on this issue. Additionally, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals recently upheld the warrantless seizure of cell tower records by federal officials relying on the federal statute in *Poore v. State*, Case No. F-2017-67 (Not For Publication)(September 12, 2019)(Slip Op. at 34-35)(Attachment A). Therefore, any of the supplemental cases wherein a federal court held that federal law enforcement's reliance on the Stored Communications Act are superfluous to the argument of whether the State can

establish that the Oklahoma County District Attorney's Office's reliance on the federal statute was objectively reasonable.

It appears that none of the state cases relied on by Appellee address state law enforcement's reliance on the federal statute despite applicable state statutes. As such, they are also of no avail to Appellee. In State v. Snowden, __ N.E.3d__, 2019 WL 3381801, the Court of Appeals of Ohio applied the good faith reliance on binding precedent exception to the Carpenter violation. There is no discussion in Snowden about good faith reliance on a state statute or whether there was an applicable state statute. People v. Edwards, 97 N.Y.S.3d 418, 422-423 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 2019) applies the good faith reliance on a statute exception but the issue of the effect of a more demanding state statute is not raised or addressed. Finally, the State's reliance on Zanders v. State, 118 N.E.3d 736, 744-745 (Ind. 2019) is misplaced. In Zanders, law enforcement obtained historical cell tower information from the carrier through an "Emergency Request Form." Id. at 739-740. The Supreme Court of Indiana did not decide whether either the exigent circumstances exception applied or the good faith exception because it found the admission of the historic cell tower information harmless. Id. at 743. Zanders did not involve state law enforcement obtaining a court order under the federal statute.

On the record before the Court the State cannot carry its burden is showing a good faith reliance on a federal statute justified the warrantless search and seizure of Mr. Fuston's historic cell tower records.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above and foregoing arguments and authorities, as well as those contained in Mr. Fuston's Brief In Chief and Reply Brief, Appellant asks this court to grant him a new trial, modify his sentence, or any other relief the Court deems necessary to meet the ends of justice.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT A. RAVITZ

Public Defender of Oklahoma County

By:

General.

ANDREA DIGILIO MILLER (OBA #17019)
Oklahoma County Public Defender's Office
320 Robert S. Kerr Avenue, Suite 400
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102
405/713-1550

•

ATTORNEY FOR RONNIE FUSTON

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on the date of filing of this instrument, a true and correct copy of the same was delivered to the Clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals with instructions to deliver said copy to the Office of the Attorney

ANDREA DIGILIO MILLER