

**FILED**

**United States Court of Appeals  
Tenth Circuit**

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS**

**FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT**

**January 24, 2020**

**Christopher M. Wolpert  
Clerk of Court**

DELMART E.J.M. VREELAND, II,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

DAVID ZUPAN; THE ATTORNEY  
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF  
COLORADO,

Respondents - Appellees.

No. 19-1244

(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-02175-PAB)

(D. Colo.)

**ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY\***

Before **HARTZ, MORITZ, and CARSON**, Circuit Judges.

Delmart Vreeland II, a Colorado prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks to appeal the district court's denial of his "Motion to Resolve Claim of Hostility and Bias Against Petitioner by Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer" (Bias Motion), and his "Motion for Relief from Judgment and Orders Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) and (d)" (Rule 60 Motion). We deny a certificate of appealability (COA) and dismiss this proceeding.

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\* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

## BACKGROUND

A Colorado jury convicted Mr. Vreeland of offenses including sexual exploitation of a child, sexual assault, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. After unsuccessfully seeking relief from his conviction in the Colorado courts he pursued a federal habeas application under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied his application. We affirmed the denial and denied his request for an expanded COA. *Vreeland v. Zupan*, 906 F.3d 866, 883 (10th Cir. 2018), *cert. denied*, 139 S. Ct. 1586 (2019).

Mr. Vreeland then filed the two motions at issue in this appeal. In his Bias Motion, he asserted that the lawyers who had represented him in his habeas application and appeal told him “that Judge Brimmer hates Vreeland and all Vreeland’s constant litigation clog[g]ing up his docket, is openly hostile toward anything Vreeland submits or associated with Vreeland, and will never grant a fair ruling or any form of hearing on anything filed on behalf of Vreeland.” R., Vol. 4 at 688. Vreeland offered two explanations for these statements: either his attorneys were attempting to cover up their own “gross negligence or deception,” or Judge Brimmer was in fact biased and “hates Vreeland and his litigation.” *Id.* at 690; *see id.* at 691. He asked the district court to “address and resolve this matter in the way the Court deems necessary.” *Id.*

The district court denied the motion. To the extent Mr. Vreeland attempted “to raise a claim against his attorneys for any negligence and deception,” the court reasoned, “[t]he ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during . . . postconviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.” *Id.* at

874-75 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i)). To the extent Vreeland alleged that Judge Brimmer was biased or prejudiced against him, he had failed to “submit a timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias and prejudice.” *Id.* at 875.

In his Rule 60 Motion, Vreeland asserted “that the integrity of the habeas corpus proceedings were corrupted by acts of [his counsel and the state’s counsel] during the habeas corpus process.” *Id.* at 698. He claimed his attorneys assured him that they had reviewed the entire record and that they had found no physical evidence relevant to his claims. But unbeknownst to him, he claimed, the state’s counsel had failed to produce “the entire trial record and all physical evidences” as ordered, *id.* at 702, and counsel “had deceived Vreeland when they stated they had reviewed the trial court records,” *id.* at 707. He further complained that due to the state’s non-compliance and his own attorneys’ negligence, the district court “simply re-quot[ed] the trial and [Colorado Court of Appeals] written opinions . . . without ever looking at [relevant physical evidence]” that would have exonerated him, *id.* at 717, and “entered judgment without first reviewing the evidence favorable to Vreeland,” *id.* at 724. Vreeland asserted this court’s decision-making process in his habeas appeal was corrupted for similar reasons.

The district court determined the Rule 60 Motion was actually an unauthorized second or successive habeas corpus application and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) (requiring petitioner to obtain prior circuit authorization before filing a second or successive § 2254 application in district court). The court further reasoned that even if the Rule 60 Motion was a “true” Rule 60(b) motion that did not require prior authorization, the motion should be denied, for two reasons:

(1) Vreeland had not shown “extraordinary circumstances” warranting Rule 60(b) relief, and (2) the motion was untimely.

After Vreeland filed his notice of appeal, we partially remanded to the district court to determine whether to issue a COA. The district court denied a COA. Mr. Vreeland now seeks a COA from this court.

### **DISCUSSION**

To obtain a COA, Mr. Vreeland must make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a district court rejects a claim on the merits, the habeas petitioner must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” *Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). But when a district court has dismissed a claim on procedural grounds he must show that reasonable jurists could debate both the validity of the court’s ruling on the constitutional claim and the correctness of the court’s procedural ruling. *See id.*

In reviewing a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) seeking relief from an order denying a habeas petition, the courts must determine the nature of the motion by examining the relief sought. A Rule 60(b) motion that “in substance or effect asserts or reasserts a federal basis for relief from the petitioner’s underlying conviction” is a second-or-successive application that requires authorization from this court before it can proceed. *Spitznas v. Boone*, 464 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006) (applying authorization requirement to Rule 60(b) motions that “assert or reassert a federal basis for relief from [an] underlying conviction”). But a motion is a “true” Rule 60(b) motion, not

a second-or-successive application, “if it either (1) challenges only a procedural ruling of the habeas court which precluded a merits determination of the habeas application; or (2) challenges a defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding, provided that such a challenge does not itself lead inextricably to a merits-based attack on the disposition of a prior habeas petition.” *Id.* at 1215-16 (citations omitted).<sup>1</sup>

### **I. Bias Motion**

As part of his argument that the Bias Motion should have been resolved differently, Mr. Vreeland contends Judge Brimmer should recuse himself from this case and from all cases to which Mr. Vreeland is a party. *See* COA Appl. at 28. An order denying recusal is a collateral order that does not require a COA for appeal. *See Harbison v. Bell*, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009) (The COA requirement applies only to “final orders that dispose of the merits of a habeas corpus proceeding.”). We therefore deny a COA on the recusal issue as unnecessary.

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<sup>1</sup> Mr. Vreeland’s motion also cited “fraud on the court” under Rule 60(d). A fraud-on-the-court claim is second or successive “if it in substance or effect asserts or reasserts a federal basis for relief from the petitioner’s underlying conviction.” *Spitznas*, 464 F.3d at 1215; *see also United States v. Baker*, 718 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 2013) (explaining that a fraud-on-the-court claim may be brought either as an independent action under Rule 60(d)(3) or as a motion under Rule 60(b)(3), but the label does not change the analysis used to determine whether it is an unauthorized second or successive petition). Mr. Vreeland’s assertions that the state’s counsel failed to produce the entire state-court record, and that his attorneys failed to cite to it, fall short of alleging a “fraud” on the habeas court. *See Thomas v. Parker*, 609 F.3d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 2010) (rejecting claim that submission of incomplete and incorrect grievance paperwork by prison officials amounted to fraud on the court).

Turning to the merits, we review the denial of a recusal motion for an abuse of discretion. *See United States v. Wells*, 873 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir. 2017). For the reasons stated by the district court, Judge Brimmer did not abuse his discretion in declining to recuse himself from this case. We therefore affirm the denial of recusal.

In the same motion, Mr. Vreeland also suggests his attorneys either made false statements about Judge Brimmer's bias to conceal their own deceptive conduct in his habeas case, or, if the statements were true, failed to protect him from Judge Brimmer's bias. *See* COA Appl. at 21. We will assume this portion of his claim attempts to attack the integrity of the habeas corpus proceedings and was therefore not subject to dismissal as an unauthorized second or successive habeas claim. But this claim still requires a COA in order to proceed. *See Spitznas*, 464 F.3d at 1217-18. Mr. Vreeland argues the district court erred in relying on 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) to bar this claim because his attorneys acted with "gross negligence and deception" rather than mere "ineffectiveness or incompetence." COA Appl. at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted). But he fails to show that the district court's basis for denying the claim—that an attack on his attorneys' performance concerning Judge Brimmer's alleged bias was not cognizable in habeas proceedings—was reasonably debatable. We therefore deny a COA concerning this claim.

## **II. Rule 60 Motion**

Mr. Vreeland fails to show a debatable issue concerning the district court's denial of his Rule 60 Motion. In his motion Mr. Vreeland claimed that had his habeas counsel reviewed the entire record (as they said they did) they would have realized that (1) police

recordings of conversations between himself and his trial counsel revealed that trial counsel withdrew because of their own misconduct rather than his unreasonable behavior, making it unconstitutional to compel Mr. Vreeland to proceed pro se at trial; (2) there were unconstitutional defects in the trial proceedings; and (3) he was innocent of the offenses charged against him. He further argues that counsel should have made these arguments, based on the entire record. Even assuming these allegations could survive the § 2254(i) bar, they represent attempts to reassert claims for relief and the district court's determination that they are second or successive is not reasonably debatable. *See Gonzalez v. Crosby*, 545 U.S. 524, 532 n.5 (2005) (“[A]n attack based on . . . habeas counsel's omissions, . . . ordinarily does not go to the integrity of the proceedings, but in effect asks for a second chance to have the merits determined favorably.”).

Mr. Vreeland also argues that the district court failed to obtain and consider the entire state-court record before ruling on his claims. We need not decide if this is a legitimate ground for relief under Rule 60(b) because the district court's alternative conclusion—that Mr. Vreeland is not entitled to Rule 60(b) relief—is not reasonably debatable.

The district court concluded Mr. Vreeland failed to file his Rule 60 Motion within a reasonable time after he was provided with its December 20, 2016, order dismissing the action. His motions were not filed until June 2019, two and one-half years later. He attacks the district court's conclusion, arguing that (1) he did not discover the omissions from the state-court record until February 2018, and (2) the district court did not permit him to file his motion pro se until his attorneys withdrew from the case in May 2019. *See*

COA Appl. at 29-31. But he admits that his attorneys knew or should have known the habeas record was incomplete before the order denying habeas relief even was entered. *See, e.g.*, COA Appl. at 14 (stating counsel knew the state-court record was incomplete); *id.* at 18 (stating counsel lied to Vreeland about having read the state-court record).<sup>2</sup>

After the district court made its decision, counsel could have filed a Rule 60(b) motion on Mr. Vreeland's behalf within a reasonable time, arguing that the district court had ruled on his claims based on an incomplete record. But they did not file such a motion, and Mr. Vreeland is bound by the actions or inactions of his counsel. *See Martin v. Mukasey*, 517 F.3d 1201, 1203 (10th Cir. 2008) ("It is a longstanding principle that in our system of representative litigation each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney." (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). In addition, as we have already stated, any omission by his attorneys in either failing to obtain and cite the entire record, or to seek reconsideration after the district court failed to do so, cannot give rise to habeas relief. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i).

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<sup>2</sup> Indeed, if the state-court record constituted "newly discovered evidence," Mr. Vreeland's claim would plainly have been second or successive. *See Spitznas*, 464 F.3d at 1216 (stating "a motion seeking leave to present newly discovered evidence in order to advance the merits of a claim previously denied" should be treated as a second or successive habeas petition (internal quotation marks omitted)).



**CONCLUSION**

We deny a certificate of appealability (COA) and dismiss this proceeding. We grant Mr. Vreeland's motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

Entered for the Court

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'C. M. Wolpert', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

CHRISTOPHER M. WOLPERT, Clerk

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT  
OFFICE OF THE CLERK**

Byron White United States Courthouse  
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Christopher M. Wolpert  
Clerk of Court

January 24, 2020

Jane K. Castro  
Chief Deputy Clerk

Mr. Delmart E.J.M. Vreeland II  
AVCF - Arkansas Valley Correctional Facility  
12750 Highway 96 at Lane 13  
Ordway, CO 81034  
#143539

**RE: 19-1244, Vreeland v. Zupan, et al**  
Dist/Ag docket: 1:14-CV-02175-PAB

Dear Appellant:

Enclosed is a copy the court's final order issued today in this matter.

Please contact this office if you have questions.

Sincerely,



Christopher M. Wolpert  
Clerk of the Court

cc: Ryan Crane

CMW/at

**FILED**

**United States Court of Appeals  
Tenth Circuit**

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS**

**FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT**

**May 11, 2020**

**Christopher M. Wolpert  
Clerk of Court**

DELMART E.J.M. VREELAND, II,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

DAVID ZUPAN, et al.,

Respondents - Appellees.

No. 19-1244

(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-02175-PAB)

(D. Colo.)

**ORDER**

Before **HARTZ, MORITZ, and CARSON**, Circuit Judges.

Appellant's petition for rehearing is denied.

The petition for rehearing en banc was transmitted to all of the judges of the court who are in regular active service. As no member of the panel and no judge in regular active service on the court requested that the court be polled, that petition is also denied.

Entered for the Court



CHRISTOPHER M. WOLPERT, Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO  
Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer

Civil Action No. 14-cv-02175-PAB

DELMART E. J. M. VREELAND, II,

Applicant,

v.

DAVID ZUPAN and  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO,

Respondents.

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**ORDER**

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This matter is before me on the "Motion for Relief from Judgment and Orders Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) and (d)," Docket No. 102, the "Motion to Resolve Claim of Hostility and Bias Against Petitioner by Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer," Docket No. 100, and the "Motion to Exceed Page Limits on Motion for Relief from Judgment," Docket No. 101, filed *pro se* by Applicant.

Applicant is a prisoner in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections. He initiated this action by filing an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the validity of his criminal conviction in Case No. 04CR706 in the District Court for Douglas County, Colorado. On September 29, 2014, pursuant to Court order, Applicant filed an Amended Application, which asserted thirty-two claims, of which one had five subparts. The September 29 Amended Application was the operative pleading in this action. On December 21, 2015, I determined that (1) Claims Six through Nine, Eleven through Twenty-Six, subpart (a) of Twenty-Seven,

Twenty-Nine and Thirty are procedurally barred from federal habeas review; (2) Claims Four, Thirty-One, and Thirty-Two are not cognizable in a federal habeas action; and (3) subparts (b)-(e) of Claim Twenty-Seven and Claim Twenty-Eight are unexhausted. I directed Respondents to file an answer that fully addressed the merits of remaining Claims One through Three, Five, and Ten. In an eighty-six-page order, I found that each remaining claim lacked merit. Docket No. 75. I therefore denied the Application, dismissed the action with prejudice, and found no basis to issue a certified of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). *Id.*

Applicant filed a Notice of Appeal. Docket No. 77. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (1) affirmed this Court's denial of relief on Applicant's Sixth Amendment Claim and (2) denied Applicant's certificate of appealability on his due process and actual innocence claims, which resulted in the dismissal of the remainder of the appeal. *Vreeland v. Zupan, et al.*, No. 16-1503 (10th Cir. Oct. 9, 2018). Applicant petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari review. The petition was denied on April 15, 2019. See Docket No. 91.

First, I will address Applicant's Motion to Resolve Claim of Hostility and Bias Against Petitioner by Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer, Docket No. 100. Applicant does not request that I recuse myself from this case in the Motion to Resolve. Instead, Applicant claims the attorneys who represented him in this case told him that I was biased and prejudiced against him. He further claims that his attorneys charged him "excessive huge fees." I will deny the Motion to the extent Applicant is attempting to raise a claim against his attorneys for any negligence and deception. "The

ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral postconviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i).

To the extent that Applicant is alleging that I am biased or prejudiced in this action, 28 U.S.C. § 144 provides a procedure whereby a party to a proceeding may request the judge before whom the matter is pending to recuse himself or herself based upon personal bias or prejudice either against the moving party or in favor of any adverse party. Section 144 requires the moving party to submit a timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias and prejudice. See *Green v. Branson*, 108 F.3d 1296, 1305 (10th Cir. 1997). “The affidavit must state with required particularity the identifying facts of time, place, persons, occasion, and circumstances.” *Hinman v. Rogers*, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). Although a court must accept the facts alleged in the supporting affidavit under § 144 as true, the affidavit is construed strictly against the moving party. See *Glass v. Pfeffer*, 849 F.2d 1261, 1267 (10th Cir. 1988). The moving party has a substantial burden “to demonstrate that the judge is not impartial.” *United States v. Burger*, 964 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1992).

Section 455(a) of Title 28 provides that a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” The goal of this provision is to avoid even the appearance of partiality. See *Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp.*, 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988). Pursuant to § 455, a court is not required to accept the factual allegations as true “and the test is whether a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality.”

*Glass*, 849 F.2d at 1268 (internal quotation marks omitted). The standard is objective and the inquiry is limited to outward manifestations and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. See *United States v. Cooley*, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993).

Applicant has not submitted a timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias and prejudice. “[B]aseless personal attacks on or suits against the judge by a party” do not mandate recusal in a case in which the judge is not a party. *Nichols v. Alley*, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” *Liteky v. United States*, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). I find no basis for recusing myself in this case for the purpose of reviewing Applicant’s Motion for Relief from Final Judgment.

Second, I will address the Motion for Relief from Judgment and Orders Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) and (d) [Docket No. 102]. In the Preliminary Statement section of the 173-page Motion for Relief from Final Judgment, see Docket No. 102 at 1-2, Applicant asserts that the motion is a challenge to the integrity of the habeas corpus proceedings held in this Court. Applicant further asserts that he is not attempting to litigate new claims or relitigate prior claims but is challenging the integrity of his counsel and Respondents’ counsel. Docket No. 102 at 1. Applicant also asserts that the Court’s “decision making process was corrupted” because Respondents withheld requested evidence. *Id.* Finally, Applicant contends that the Tenth Circuit’s decision-making process was also corrupted for the same reasons and he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the motion. *Id.* at 2.

I must construe the Motion for Relief from Judgment liberally because Applicant

is not represented by an attorney. See *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); *Hall v. Bellmon*, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). For the reasons discussed below, I will deny the motion.

First, I must determine whether the motion is a second or successive habeas corpus application or a true Rule 60(b) motion. See *Spitznas v. Boone*, 464 F.3d 1213, 1215 (10th Cir. 2006). Distinguishing between a true Rule 60(b) motion and a second or successive habeas application turns on the “relief sought, not [the] pleading’s title.” *United States v. Nelson*, 465 F.3d 1145, 1149 (10th Cir. 2006). A Rule 60(b) motion “is a second or successive petition if it in substance or effect asserts or reasserts a federal basis for relief from the [applicant’s] underlying conviction.” *Spitznas*, 464 F.3d at 1215. A Rule 60(b) motion is a true 60(b) motion if it either “challenges only a procedural ruling of the habeas court which precluded a merits determination of the habeas application” or “challenges a defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding, provided that such a challenge does not itself lead inextricably to a merits-based attack on the disposition of a prior habeas petition.” *Id.* at 1215-16.

Applicant’s request for an evidentiary hearing to review additional evidence, allegedly not presented previously, would inextricably lead to a merits-based attack on the disposition of the September 29, 2014 Amended Application and is successive. Therefore, I do not have jurisdiction to consider the arguments Applicant raises in the motion.

Even if I construed the motion as a true Rule 60(b) motion, relief under Rule 60(b) is appropriate only in extraordinary circumstances. See *Massengale v.*



*Oklahoma Bd. of Examiners in Optometry*, 30 F.3d 1325, 1330 (10th Cir. 1994). The sort of extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify relief under Rule 60(b) “will rarely occur in the habeas context.” *Gonzalez v. Crosby*, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005).

Furthermore, if the finality of judgments is to be preserved a strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is required. *Id.* Rule 60(b) contains the requirements that the motion “be made within a reasonable time” and that open-ended grounds of relief (excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, and fraud) are asserted within a one-year deadline.

*Gonzalez*, 545 U.S. at 535.

Here, Applicant was sent a copy of the December 20, 2016 Order dismissing the action. See Display Receipt for Docket No. 75. It is not reasonable that Applicant waited until now to raise his claims. Upon consideration of the Motion for Relief from Judgment and the entire file, I find that Applicant fails to demonstrate any extraordinary circumstances that would justify relief in this action.

Nonetheless, I will deny the Motion for Relief from Judgment for lack of jurisdiction to consider the arguments raised in the Motion. Accordingly, it is

**ORDERED** that Applicant’s Motion to Resolve Claim of Hostility and Bias Against Petitioner by Chief Judge Philp A. Brimmer, Docket No. 100, is DENIED. It is further

**ORDERED** that Applicant’s Motion for Relief from Judgment and Orders Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and (d), Docket No. 102, is DENIED for lack of jurisdiction. It is further

**ORDERED** that Applicant’s Motion to Exceed Page Limits on Motion for Relief from Judgment, Docket No. 101, is DENIED as moot.

DATED July 2, 2019.

BY THE COURT:

s/Philip A. Brimmer

PHILIP A. BRIMMER

Chief United States District Judge

**Additional material  
from this filing is  
available in the  
Clerk's Office.**