No. 20-6012

ORIGINAL

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR writ of CERTIORARI

Allen K. Young — PETITIONER
(Your Name)

vs.

United States Court of Appeals — RESPONDENT(S)
For the Seventh Circuit

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

Seventh Circuit Court of APPEAL #No. 18-3679
(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Allen K. Young
(Your Name)

P.O. Box 14500
(Address)

Lexington, KY 40512
(City, State, Zip Code)

N/A
(Phone Number)

QUESTIONS

x (1) Where the conviction is built on perjury, the prosecution knew of Head Agent Dana McNeal and alleged victim's false testimony ~~and~~ under oath, and prosecution misconduct. Violated my due process and Kutzner v. Johnson rule of 18:U.S.C. § 2516, 3600 or Part 1. crime, chapter 79 perjury. That an agent of officer which a law of the United States authorized an oath to be administered, that will testify truly. The Seventh Circuit says a lie can be justified as long as it is in the Government's interest, or benefits them.

x (2) Where the District Court used offensive element I was not indicted on or charged, to prove 18:U.S.C. § 1591 and 1594 commerce and jurisdiction. How can the court have the jury find me guilty of ("entice", 18:U.S.C. § 2422(b)) which I was not indicted or charged with? The Appeal Court switched "entice" to "coerced" to keep from ruling in my favor. How can the District Court sentence me under an adult charge that the jury did not find me guilty of? 9th Circuit says failure to state element of charge offense involved right and is reviewable and is a fundamental defect that rendered indictment constitutionally defective.

x (3) When did Congress of Supreme Court give the District Court power to authorize the prosecutor to strike offensive elements from an indictment without resubmission to a grand jury? When is a superceded indictment, unsigned by the Government, OK? When can the Government amend section and subsection of the statute and make it ambiguous and add sections from all section, and drop offensive element from it? The 10th and 9th Circuit say this makes the indictment constitutionally defective and should be void. This

also violates the rule in Miller v. United States by broadening my charges and indictment.

x (4) How can any court make a defendant go to trial without receiving any of his Discovery or time to mount a defense? This is a violation of my due process.

x (5) How can 18:U.S.C. § 1594 be proven without the offensive element "recruit" or "entice"? How can I be found guilty of Alexis on attempt to "recruit" or "entice"? 5th Amendment due process claim that evidence was constitutionally insufficient to sustain verdict of guilty. Fiore v. White U.S. 225 (2001). Prosecution failed topresent sufficient evidence to prove element of crime and therefore petitioner's conviction is not consistent with the demands of the Federal Due Process clause. 18:U.S.C. § 1591 or 1594, 11th and 5th and 9th Circuit say nothing in 18:U.S.C. § 1591 or 1594 lowers the Government's burden of proof; the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the 1591 crime. United States v. Mozic 752 F. 3d 1271. 5th and 11th Circuit Appeal, 7th Circuit say Government can pick one offensive element to prove out of the statute?

x (6) Where Agent violated the rule United States v. Infante-Ruiz of search and seizure. How can the First Circuit vacate conviction because the sister had neither actual nor apparent authority to consent to search of brother's bags? The Seventh Circuit District Court says it is OK because the landlord had a key; the 7th Circuit Appeal Court would not rule on it because Young asked for the evidence to be suppressed the day he went pro se. The judge chose to wait until sidebar at trial to answer the motion. The Appeal

Court says the motion was put in too late. Is this not a violation of my Fourth Amendment right?

(7) Where does defendant's due process right get violated to fair justice under the law? Fourth Amendment; Supreme Court ruled on the Carpenter case; different judges are using different loopholes not to abide by the court. The courts say the Supreme Court was not clear and needs to be clear on it's ruling. Some judges say the ruling does not say if it is retroactive, it does not say if a warrant application is OK. Chief Justice John Roberts said in Carpenter case warrants however do not ensure that CSLI is accurate, only a third-party review of the technology used to gather the evidence can do it. Denmark proves that to be true; if Denmark releases prisoners and stops prosecuting with CSLI and stated they could not live with innocent people being in prison, how can America live with this?

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[X] For cases from **federal courts**:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix A to the petition and is

[X] reported at United States v. Young 955 F.3d 608; or, U.S App. Lexis 10820; 112 Fed. R. Evid. Serv.
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix B to the petition and is

[X] reported at U.S App. Lexis 10820, 112 Fed. R. Evid. Serv.; or,
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ ] is unpublished.

[ ] For cases from **state courts**:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at Appendix _____ to the petition and is

[ ] reported at _____; or,
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the _____ court appears at Appendix _____ to the petition and is

[ ] reported at _____; or,
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ ] is unpublished.

JURISDICTION

[ ] For cases from **federal courts:**

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case was April 7, 2020.

[ ] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[X] A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of Appeals on the following date: ~~May 31, 2020~~, Sept. 4, 2020, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix UNK copy ATTACH

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and including _____ (date) on _____ (date) in Application No. ___A_____.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

[ ] For cases from **state courts:**

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was _____. A copy of that decision appears at Appendix _____.

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date: _____, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix _____.

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and including _____ (date) on _____ (date) in Application No. ___A_____.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

TABLE OF AUTHORITY

CITATIONS

Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967)

United States v. Moran 2019 U.S. App LEXIS 35574 1st Circuit Appeal 2019

United States v. Infante-Ruiz 13 F. 3d 498 (1st Circuit 1994)

Powell v. Alabama 287 U.S. 45 (1932)

Byrd v. United States 614 A. 2d 25 (D.C. 1992)

Sykes v. United States 585 A. 2d 1335 (D.C. 1991)

Harris v. United States 441 A. 2d 268 (D.C. 1982)

Asbell v. United States 436 A. 2d 804 (D.C. 1981)

Carpenter v. United States 138 S. Ct. 2206

United States v. Davis 785 F. 3d 489 (Call 2015)

United States v. Miller 471 U.S. 130 105 S. Ct. 1811 85 L. Ed 2d 99 (1985)

United States v. Vesaas 585 F. 2d 101 (8th Circuit 1978)

United States v. Harrill 877 F. 2d 341 (5th Circuit 1989) 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 12076 5th Circuit August 10, 1989

Watson v. United States 552 U.S. 74, 80 128 S. Ct. 579, 169 L. Ed 472 (2007)

United States v. Mozic 752 F. 3d 1271 11th Circuit Court of Appeal May 22, 2014 98 LED 92, 346 U.S. 374 United States v. Debrow

STATUTES

18:U.S.C. § 1591 and 1594
18:U.S.C. § 2422(b)
18:U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
18:U.S.C. § 666(a)(2)
18:U.S.C. § 2421
18:U.S.C. § 1952

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

United States Constitution - Fourth Amendment

United States Constitution - Fifth Amendment

United States Constitution - Sixth Amendment

ADDITIONAL CITATIONS

United States v. Bird 342 F. 3d 1045 (2003) Cal. Daily op. Service 8187, 2003 D.A.R. 10169 (9th Circuit 2003) op. withdrawn 357 F. 3d 1082 (9th Circuit 2004)

Fiore v. White 531 U.S. 225 (2001) (percuriam)

Sulivan v. Louisiana 508 U.S. 275, 124 L. Ed 2d 182, 113 S. Ct. 2078

EXHIBITS

See Exhibit 1

See Exhibit 2

See Exhibit 3

See Exhibit 4

See Exhibit 5

APPENDICES

Appendix A - Seventh Circuit Appeals Court

Docket Number: 18-3679

Date of Entry of Judgment: September 1, 2020

Appendix B - Seventh Circuit District Court

Docket Number: 1:17-CR-00082-1

Date of Entry of Judgment: December 10, 2018

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fourth Amendment - (Unreasonable searches and seizure)
The Constitution protects the rights of people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, against unreasonable searches and seizure.

The Sixth Amendment - (Rights of the accused)
Requires investigation and preparation.

The Fifth Amendment - (Criminal actions and grand jury guarantee)
Provisions concerning due process of law and just compensation clauses. Defendant's conviction was invalid under the Fifth Amendment requirement that Federal felony prosecution by commenced by indictment where court's instruction allow jury to find defendant guilty for offense other than one for which he was indicted.

The Fifth Amendment - (Due process claim)
That evidence was constitutionally insufficient to sustain verdict of guilty. Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 (2001) (per curiam) granting Federal habeas corpus relief because "prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to prove elements of crime and therefore petitioner's 'conviction' is not consistent with the demands of the Federal Due Process clause". A person must be convicted in the statute.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This was stated by Government at trial Ms. Kastanek; (Trial Transcript)

(1) The prosecutor said Young was not charged with controlling the alleged victim

(2) That Young was not charged with recruit, entice or 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), advertise, solicit, patronize or section and subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1) or none of section (E).

(3) Page 280 trial transcript exhibit 8. It is simply a factual matter of how he came "into" the trafficking.

(4) It is not alleged that he went to efforts to recruit them. Page 280, Line 8-9. (Trial transcript)

By the Prosecutor's own admission, Young was not the trafficker or he would not have to come into it. That means it was already going on.

That sounds like they knew it was Hawkins the 24-year old boyfriend that the landlord put out for prostitution, not Young, that "J" told the F.B.I. who she worked with and alleged victim "K".

Where is the other trafficker if Young came "into"it" and how did Young get the case and no one else?

Agent Dana lied on "Young"; she lied under oath! Could that be why they dropped the offensive element recruit and entice because it was not my case. So by the Government using so much sex the jury found me guilty. It was so much sex that one of the Government's own trafficking witnesses, a F.B.I. expert, said she have never

seen a traffick case with this much sex in it. That agent had done over 500 cases.

In the summer of 2014 I was head down town to the Ohio House. I notice two girls on the postitute stroll. I saw that one of them was walking toward a undercover police car. I drove toward the other girl and warned her, she called her friend back toward my car. They ask me if I could give them a ride to find "J" boyfriend, after driving and not seeing him. I ask them if they wanted me to take them home, but I told them they would have to first ride with me downtown and then after this I will take them home. They both agreed. On the way downtown I ask them how old they was. I could not tell both had on wigs, and makeup "K" answered me and said she was 19 years old and "J" was 18 years old. (See Exhibit 8) We arrived at the hotel called Ohio House downtown. I could not leave two girls I just met in my car, so I ask them to come up, it will only be for a second. I had brought some cloth to a friend and used the bathroom and we left. I was on my way to take them home when "K" ask do you want a date I said no, then "K" replied take us home my time is money "J" ask can she ride and talk. "J" kept in touch with me, and her boyfriend. He was 24 years old and they stayed 5 minutes from me. "J" was expecting a baby by him, that baby later died she said. They would call me for rides from time to time, to give them rides home, or just to talk, he was trying to be a rapper. They would stop by from time to time and take pictures at my house. I had salt water fish tanks, they would use to take pictures in front of, they would stop by the school

where I taught and wait until I finish teaching for a ride or to borrow a few dollars. "J" would call after to talk. Then "J" confided in me about her and her boyfriend and she was told, I told some people what she told me by Raven and Destiny the next thing I knew she went to the police dept. and told them she knew a guy that was posting girls on backpage. Officer Murphy ask her was she one of the girls she said no. He did check on her and saw she had been in a mental hospital. She called and told me what site had done and I'm going to jail. Then after that I did not hear from no one by "J". She still would call needing to talk or some food to eat. Then "J" called me and said a F.B.I. agent came by her house and left a card. She want her to say she worked for me, and get her friends to say the same. "J" said she really want you what did you do to her, she bought me clothes, feed, and a blanket and gave me money. (See Exhibit 20 and Exhibit 44)

The F.B.I. had the ower of SWC Trade School to call me to the school to teach a class. When I was a block from the school, the F.B.I. drove on the curb, jumped out of cars and trucks pointing guns, blocking me in and saying get on the ground, get on the ground, where is the gun, where is the gun. I was arrested and put in the back of the F.B.I. truck handcuff. I was not shown a arrest warrant then or now. I was handcuff and taken into the F.B.I. headquarters.

The Head Agent on the case stated under oath she had no warrant whatsoever, she repeated that. Not one allege victim parents was interviewed by F.B.I. or made statements against me,

or came to the trial in behalf of their daughter. What the F.B.I. did not contact them.

At the Ohio House hotel the allege victims gave different story's. "J" stated a girl name Brooke was at the hotel, told her whe was my partner, and showed them how to use backpage. "J" said "K" and Brooke got into a fight, Brooke slapped "K". "K" said that never happened, she never saw or met a girl name Brooke. "K" said no girl name Brooke was at the hotel and "K" could not I.D. Brooke in a F.B.I. lineup. "J" perjured herself under oath.

"J" told the F.B.I. who she really worked for but I did not get this report until the prosecution rest their case. F.B.I. Report 005-000375, 31E-CG-5199319, 01/13/2016, 3 of 3

The F.B.I., the prosecutor and court knew this I sent a copy to court or judge. How can the court say I had a successful con construction company and had time to traffick girls at the same time all night and day, thats impossible.

"J" stated to F.B.I.: The landlord told Hawkins (her baby Father) he was "no good" because of his involvement with prostitution, she testified backpage also. "J" stated that the Oak Park house was located next to a bank, right off the green line.

"J" advised that "K" (the Government allege victim twice) is the person that initially introduced her to prostitution. "K" took "J" to the stroll and showed her how the process worked. This is when Young (or I) met them. "J" stated that she always felt like she was working with Hawkins, not for him. "J" advised

that anything Hawkins asked for (not Young) she would purchase for him. Hawkins would get mad anytime "J" would get her lashes, hair, or nails done. Hawkins would tell "J" that she didn't need all that. Eventually "J" felt like she was being used. Hawkins would get mad when "J" told him this. Hawkins encouraged "J" (not Young) to continue engaging in acts of prostitution until her son was born. "J" stated that after the baby was born Hawkins offered to pay "J" to stop working. Hawkins had other girls working for him. "J" recalled sisters that worked for Hawkins, that went by names Tyra and Porsche. "J" advised that Porsche is the girl that brought up Hawkins STD on Facebook. Thats why "J" went to police on me (or Young) because she thought I told Porsche about her and Hawkins STD. She stated Raven and Destiny told her I did.

"J" stated Hawkins threatened to return to Chicago and beat her up if she spoke to law enforcement about him. Hawkins told "J" that she had better hope that he is locked up before he comes out there Chicago.

That's why his sister Raven, her girlfriend "K" and Destiny testified against me, to free him. They all worked together.

"J" testified at trial when she met me she had not started prostituting yet. They was just walking down the street and met me. The prosecutor knew this was a lie. They gave me this F.B.I. report. The prosecutor also knew all there girls was close friends and tied to one guy Hawkins.

Prosecutor Said Young Came Into Case

All the government did was took Hawkins name out and gave Young the case. The same Head Agent that lied under oath and did

not follow no laws whatsoever, look at the statements. Raven is "J" baby Father's sister, Destiny and "K" is Raven's girlfriend, Alexis is (Hawkins) "J" baby Father, and Raven's cousin. That's the Government witness and alleged victims. So the only way the F.B.I. agent and prosecutor could get a case and witness and victims was to get them to bring me in the case.

The Court gave the prosecutor permission to take out an offensive element from the indictment, then later said the prosecutor went and received a superceded indictment. I received an unsigned copy by the government and the grand jury, and I did not receive any grand jury transcript. That's a Brady violation and a violation of my constitutional right. The government did not sign it; that alone should have made it void. (See Exhibit 10 and

I asked for a Rule 29 motion after the prosecution rested. I asked the court did the government prove all the elements of the charge for each victim; the court said it has the right to answer the motion at the end of the trial. What happened to answering the motion then?

At the end of the trial I asked the court for a Rule 33; the court said it would answer both motions at a later date. The court cannot do that. I never received an answer until a month before sentencing. The court just denied the two motions, stating with all the motions Young put in the court they'd forgotten what Young asked in the two motions. This was the court's fault for not answering the motions timely.

The court did not want to answer because the prosecutor did

not prove all the offensive elements Young was charged with; even at sentencing the court would not go over did the government prove all the elements for each girl that I was charged, or my memorandum for sentence. The court said take it up with the Appeal Court, and went over the government memorandum.

I. ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE

The F.B.I. took me to Kankakee County jail; still I was not shown an arrest warrant. The F.B.I. searched my apartment; the F.B.I. knew I was in their custody. They kept going by my apartment and calling Harris instead of getting a warrant. Harris told the B.B.I. he did not live at the apartment, he stayed with his kid's mother. Harris said the F.B.I. threatened him with the same time Young was going to get if he did not work with them. Harris did; he consented for them to search the apartment. Harris said he never consented for the F.B.I. to open or take anything from the apartment. A consent to search is different from a consent to seize; even the F.B.I. never said they had permission from Harris to seize anything, they just took it upon themselves to do it. Harris sent a letter to Young stating the F.B.I. kept writing down stuff; he did not say and I still have the letter. Harris stated he told the F.B.I. the bags on the floor were Young's, and the agent still unzipped the bags and removed a notebook, keys, and Young's storage information; the prosecutor introduced these into evidence. Young asked the court to suppress the evidence the same day Young went pro se, but the court chose to wait to answer the motion at sidebar at triel. (See Exhibit 3)

This arrangement describes a sublessee relationship because Young paid Harris rent. The prosecution proffers no evidence that Harris and Y6ung co-occupied the apartment, shared rent, or even spent time in the apartment together. That Harris has a key changes nothing; most responsible landlords own extra keys to their apartment for emergencies, repairs and turnover. The record provides no evidence that Harris kept his key for different reasons. See Katz v. United States 385 U.S. 347 (1967)

The F.B.I. knows Harris does not live at the apartment, he lacks apparent authority. The District Court misses the mark with its analysis of each factor, and the Appeals Court does too. Without both, the reason supporting the admission of the notebook and paper fails and the storage papers also. The Fourth Amendment's protection is against unreasonable search and seizure. The District Court and the Seventh Circuit Appeal Court's decision was incorrect; the evidence should have been suppressed.

The First Circuit vacated the conviction because the sister had neither actual nor apparent authority to consent to search the brother's bags.

The court stated the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution proteces the rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, against unreasonable searches and seizure.

The court concluded the search was unlawful and the evidence obtained from black plastic trash bags must be suppressed. Accordingly, the court reversed the deinal of the motion for reconsideration, vacated the conviction and remanded the case to the district.

Young's case was the same he asked the court to suppress the evidence the day he went pro se; the court chose to wait until sidebar at trial. (See United States v. Moran 2019 U.S. App LEXIS 35574 1st Circuit Appeal 2019; United States v. Infante-Ruiz, 13 F.3d 498 (1st Circuit 1994)

II. HEAD AGENT ON CASE PERJURED HERSELF BY FALSELY TESTIFYING UNDER OATH

The law states: Perjury element, the essential elements of the crime of perjury as defined in 18:U.S.C.§ 1621 are (1) An oath authorized by the law of the United States (2) taken before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, and (3) false statement willfully made as to factual material to the hearing. 98 LED, 98 LED 92, 346 U.S. 374 United States v. Debrow.

How can the court say if the government witness did not understand the question or not? Can he think for her, she did not say that. That's the job of the witness. (Biased Judge)

agent Dana McNeal, the Head Agent on the case, testified falsely. This is the Head Agent on the case and her alleged victims. The prosecutor knew they were lying and did not try to correct them. The court asked how could Young prove the prosecutor knew; they were the ones who gave me and my ex-attorney the reports. Then the court said a 28-year Head Agent on my case, that did over 500 cases, was confused by Young's questions. The only thing wrong with the court statement is every time the agent was not sure what I was saying, either the prosecutor or I would clear it up, or repeat the question again. The prosecution lied doing the trial; the court covered them. (Biased Judge)

(1) Ms. Kastanek prosecutor:

Said to the jury he explained that he was not an ordinary pimp, that he would be their friend, and that they would make money together. (I objected)

The prosecutor had F.B.I. reports from taped phone conversations with no warrant, with Mr. Young stating he would never say no dumb shit like he is a pimp; I own a construction company. Matter of fact, four tapes, "K" testified this was a lie, "J" stated this was never said, no one said they heard this said. This was a violation of my due process to a fair trial. This was very bad and ambushed the defense with a lie like this and the court ok'd it. This showed the court was biased all through the trial and process to trial.
(2) The prosecutor knew that not "K" on the phone at the Doubletree Hotel. Her own F.B.I. expert told the prosecutor that the calls were outside the timeline. The prosecutor lied again and told the jury all night there was short phone calls from "K" to me at the Doubletree for me to pick her up after "K" was leaving client's house. "K" told the prosecutor under oath she did not have no calls all night. So the phone record and phone had to be someone else and not "K's". "K" stated she only had one call the next day, but she and Young got into an argument and she went home.

Worse, agent Dana McNeal, the lead case agent testified falsely about the surveillance of Young. In a "collected item log" of the F.B.I., dated July 20, 2016, it was noted that one hard drive containing pole cam surveilance collected on July 15, 2016 by Agent McNeal existed. (See Doc. 199 at 2-4) Similarly, an F.B.I. memo

by Agent Kyle Gregory discussed the FBI-installed pole camera located at Young's work. The memo concludes that Young was not positively identified during the review. Yet this contrasted aharply with McNeal's trial testimony.

Q: Did you find any -- did you find any pictures -- did you take any pictures of me with any young ladies or anything?

A: The only time we ever did a surveillance of you was you walking into a -- into SWC Institute.

Q: So that was the only Time?

A: Yes.

Q: Thank you.

Tr. 829-30.

Q: SWC school, the girls said they were going in and out for about two years taking pictures?

A: I'm sorry?

Q: Where the pictures were taken, the schoo, where the girls were taken pictures of.

A: Okay.

Q: There's a pole camera outside that school, right?

A: Is there a pole camera?

Q: Right, a police pole camera.

A: The photographs that you --

Q: Did you get any pictures of Mr. Young taking the girls in and out of the school?

A: I had nothing to do with that pole camera.

Q: You didn't ask who it belongs to to see if any pictures were there?

A: That is not an FBI pole camera.

Q: So you couldn't ask the Cicero police?

A: That is -- The Cicero police camera that is in there?

Q: Right, yes.

A: That information is -- that is not available to us, at that time. The information that we received is not available at the time that we got the information.

Tr. 832-33.

McNeal's testimony simply cannot be reconciled with the F.B.I. reports. McNeal's testimony was false and a new trial is needed without this falsity.

The District Court errored. The judge stated Document 213 filed 7/7/2018 Page 15 of 28 Page ID 1431 and denied my motion. (See Exhibit 13)

(Court stated) The Government's witnesses did not commit perjury; Agent McNeal was not asked about the pole camera installed outside of SWC school. The court never talked about the other lies she, Agent Dana McNeal, told. The court also stated I never mentioned surveillance, he only stated sting, that's why the court denied one of my motions. Then when I showed the court proof, I said surveillance; also the court, like always, just moved on.

Agent Dana McNeal stated the F.B.I. did not have anything to do with the pole camera outside of SWC school; it belonged to the Cicero, Illinois police. (See F.B.I. Report) One hard drive

containing pole cam surveillance collected on 7/15/2016 4:00pm Eastern Time.

This is almost a month's worth of surveillance from F.B.I. pole cam surveillance.

Kyle Gregory reviewed footage captured on a FBI-installed pole camera, located in the area of 5531 W. Cermak Rd, Cicero, Illinois, that's outside of SWC school. Now there were two instances of video missing on February 18, 2016, and February 26, 2016. Attempts to recover the missing video were unsuccessful. The subject, Allen Young, was not positively identified during the review.

I told the F.B.I. my keys were missing around this time. The court gave me two extra points for lying, but the jury did not say that. There were many more times the F.B.I. surveillanced me. The court stated none of the Government witnesses lied.

Jacky told the grand jury she did not ever have sex with me and never game me any money at all. Jacky told the grand jury this under oath. She also told her best friend "J" the same, then turned around under oath at the trial and told the jury she worked for me, and gave me sex and money. That's perjury. (Biased Judge)

Destiny: Destiny attempted to resolve numerous convictions during sidebar did not alleviate the effect of her false testimony on the jury. The prosecution discusses the sidebar to rehabilitate Destiny. Excluded from this discussion, the jury only hears Destiny lie about pleading guilty to retail theft. The prosecution knows she is lying because it discloses to the court that she plead guilty to retail theft and resisting arrest. During trial, the prosecution

attempts to rehabilitate Destiny on redirect because it knows the truth. "Did you plead guilty to some offenses when you went there?" However, she clings to the lie that she did not plead guilty.

After contending Destiny did not testify falsely, the prosecution claims Young failed to raise the issue. Because of the disconnect between the truth in the sidebar and the deceit in the testimony, the jury believes Destiny merely hitched a ride with the F.B.I. to settle a traffic matter in Markham. The only time Destiny's conviction is mentioned is during a sidebar, thus preserving her credibility. (Biased Judge)

On April 24, 2018, Young's attorney asked the court to explain to Young that he does not have to go the direction Young wants him to go. The court did. Young explained to the court the lawyer had not suppressed the arrest warrant, no witness for him, no exhibits, filed no motions to suppress, only had seen him three times outside of court in a year and a half, did not have the girls' medical records, did not interview any witnesses; Young had to go pro se. All the attorney wanted to know what what deal would I take. After the court gave me permission to go pro se, I asked the court for an additional 30 days that was my due process right. I told the court I had not received any of the Discovery materials from my ex-counsel. The case was already two years old; what's 30 more days? Young's former attorney told the court I did not have the Discovery the day of the trial. The court stated I warned you about the mail at MCC. The court appointed my former attorney as my standby counsel. Even the appeal court said my ex-attorney did not file my motion in time.

III. NO TIME TO PREPARE FOR TRIAL

(A) I did not receive any of Discovery until the prosecution rested their case. Young's standby attorney told the court Young did not receive the Discovery before trial had started, and the Government rushed the trial.

(B) I asked to go pro se: Thirty days before trial, attorney did not file (1) motion to suppress the apartment evidence and fruit of its storage; (2) did not ask for the girl's medical records, found out later they had been in mental hospital and were bipolar; F.B.I. knew this (3) had not interviewed one witness; (4) only wanted me to make a deal; (5) only saw him two times. That's why the Appeal Court stated no motion was raised in time. He was ineffective counsel; also the Government stated the same. Everyone agreed I had to go pro se.

(C) I went pro se, the court made Young's ex-attorney his standby attorney, bad deal - he didn't want to do anything.

(D) The same day Young went pro se he asked the court to suppress the evidence in the apartment. The judge stated he will rule on it later. He did during trial. The Appeal Court said at this point although the judge ruled on it, my ex-attorney was late filing my motions, not doing what I asked him to do. I asked the court for girl's medical record. The judge said I would not have enough time to get it. I found out later the prosecutor knew the girls met each other in a mental hospital, Hargrove on Roosevelt Road, that Kiwana was bipolar and Jyanna had mental issues. Both were not fit for trial. Prosecutor knew this and rushed the trial after I went pro se. Young never received his superceding indictment,

just (6) counts unsigned, or the transcript from the grand jury. (Biased Judge)

(E) The two times my ex-attorney asked for continuances were:

(1) The prosecutor tried to ambush us by taking two of the most important elements out of the indictment two weeks before trial. Those two elements changed the whole trial.

(2) My ex-attorney's mother had to have emergency surgery on her head; neither had anything to do with Young or caused by him, if anything both by each attorney.

(F) After I went pro se, I should have been given thirty days to prepare for trial unless I waived the thirty days in writing. I had no Discovery so if as soon as I went pro se I asked the court to suppress the evidence from the apartment and storage, the court chose to wait until sidebar to answer the motion. The Seventh Circuit Appeal Court said they would not answer the motion because it was turned in too late. The District Court answered the motion, but said it was denied because the landlord had an extra key which was Mr. Harris. So how can Mr. Young be at fault because my ex-attorney was ineffective? That's why I went pro se because he would not do his job.

Thorough and creative investigation is critical to a successful defense and is a legal and ethical obligation even for a person going pro se. It should not be a punishment for going pro se. Pro se should have time to interview all potential witnesses (whether government or defense) and complete and continuing Discovery.

Three weeks prior to trial the Government will provide material required by 18 U.S.C. § 3500 and Giglio v. United States.

The Supreme Court has recognized a legal entitlement to investigative assistance since Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) reversed the convictions of the Scottsboro defendants. Powell held that an accused is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel "during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings... from the time of... arraignment until the beginning of... trial, when consultation, thorough ongoing investigation and preparation (are) vitally important". Id. at 57. The American Bar Association has specifically identified the duty of thorough investigation as an essential ethical obligation. (See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4 1980)

The Sixth Amendment requires investigation and preparation. The Court of Appeals has reversed convictions due to ineffective pretrial consultation, investigation and preparation. See e.g., Byrd v. United States 614 A. 2d 25 (D.C. 1992); Sykes v. United States, 585 A. 2d 1335 (D.C. 1991); Harris v. United States 441 A. 2d 268 (D.C. 1982); Asbell v. United States 436 A. 2d 804 (D.C.1981).

The importance of thorough investigation cannot be over-emphasized. Even the most skilled lawyers effectiveness is undermined by inadequate knowledge of facts. Why would the court allow a defendant to go pro se but won't allow him time to prepare an adequate defense, or worse, get the Discovery to prepare or interview all witnesses, especially when the case is 10 years to life and received 254 months?

How can the Government prove 18:1594 attempt without the offensive elements "recruit", entice, (a)(1), (a)(2), E, advertise, patronize? (See Exhibit 2)

IV. 18:1594 ATTEMPTED CHARGE

Alexis did not meet the 18:1594 or 18:1591 attempt. There was no evidence linking me to Alexis.

(1) Alexis could not identify me as the driver, and stated under oath she gave Young no money.

(2) Alexis could not I.D. me in a F.B.I. lineup.

Alexis' testimony:

Q: Have you ever met that person before?

A: No.

Q: Did you see his face?

A: No.

Q: Did he say anything to you in the car?

A: No.

Q: Was there any further discussion in the car at all about where you were going or what you were going to do?

A: No.

She stated she gave the defendant no money at all. Alexis only communicates with Jyanna, and she does not know if Jyanna works with anyone. She stated they always have called each other for dates; that's what they do.

Alexis on January 11, 2018, met with Government and Assistant U.S. Attorney Christine O'Neil and F.B.I. Task Force Officer Robert Murphy.

When Alexis was picked up by Jyanna and the man, the car they picked her up in was red. Alexis never had a phone conversation with him and never exchanged a text message with him; Alexis stated

it was "J" baby Daddy's uncle; her cousin is "J".

Alexis told family members that Jyanna sent the police to her house, even though she did not have anything to do with the case. F.B.I. Report on May 1, 2018. (See Exhibit 20)

Dana McNeal, F.B.I. Task Force Officer Khin Kung, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Christine O'Neil.

18:1594 states a defendant has to tempt to recruit the victim or entice a person. I was not indicted on either, or (a)(1) or (c)(2) or E.

"J" stated she had a two girl call. She asked Young to go but her cousin to go to call also. Allegedly Young did, on the way they saw a girl and a guy walking. I allegedly replied, "That better be her Dad with her, she's too young for him." Young and "J" passed them up and "J" said "That's my cousin". I replied, "I'm tired of you bringing those young girls around me." (This is in F.B.I. Report) So even by "J's" statement, Young did not want to be around the girl.

Alexis testified "J" texted her, not the driver. She did not know the driver; after the driver just dropped her off. She did not have sex, just talked to the other guy while "J" went in the room with his friend. Alexis got back in the car and nothing was said at all, the driver just dropped her off. She never heard or saw him again.

So, if anything, "J" gets the attempt, not me, if you believe "J's" story. "J" said I picked them up at 2:00am; Alexis said in evening someone's lying there. 18:1594 you have to attempt to recruit or entice the alleged victim. I was not charged or indicted

for either, so how can Young be charged for attempt? The Appeal Court said I do not have to prove either. So I cannot be guilty; my case has to be reversed and I am acquitted.

V. HISTORICAL CELL SITE - EVIDENCE

Mr. Young asked the court the day he went pro se to suppress the evidence and asked the court during trial. The Government violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.

Special Agent Dana McNeal stated she did not have any warrant at all, even an arrest warrant, this under oath. Agent McNeal stated boldly again, she had no warrants for anything. My case was two years old; why not wait and get one? The prosecutor asked the judge if he has to start with this case. The judge helped her out and said Agent Dana McNeal had put in for application, that was not given to Young or stated by Agent McNeal under oath. If she did, why did she not wait for the warrant?

My information was being retrieved for a period of over seven days, ("two years", if not more).

Supreme Court; Carpenter v. United Staes U.S. 2018 WL 3073916 (2018) the government should not have been permitted to use historical cell site evidence at trial. (R.212)

Carpenter v. United States 138 S. Ct 2206 Nov. 29, 2017 in Re: Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data 724 F. 3d 600 United States v. Davis 785 F. 3d 498 (Call 2015)

Thousands of convictions questioned; Prisoners Release Show Why Law Enforcement Technology Must Be Tested by Third Parties.

In the U.S., law enforcement routinely use CSLI to lock up people, and the Supreme Court recognized in Carpenter v. United

States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) that CSLI is so intrusive into people's lives that cops must "get a warrant".

As Chief Justice John Roberts said, warrants, however, don't ensure that the CSLI is accurate. Only a third-party review of the technology used to gather the evidence can do that.

Denmark proved that to be true. Instead of trying to fight to keep the shaky evidence from being tossed, Denmark law enforcement leaders immediately and openly put prosecutions on hold and let people out of prison. "We simply cannot live with the idea that information that isn't accurate could send people to prison" said Denmark official Reckendorff.

The problem was with the software used by law enforcement, which used site location information ("CSLI") to establish that a suspect was in the area of a crime when it happened. The software was supposed to collect the CSLI to prove a picture of the suspect's movements and whereabouts at the time of the crime. It did do that only it did it incorrectly.

Instead, the software left out important details from the (CSLI) in creating that picture.

It linked phones to the wrong cell tower, got the location of the towers themselves wrong, and only registered some of the CSLI. It even linked the same cellphone to multiple towers at the same time, often hundreds of miles apart.

Denmark Justice Minister Nick Hackkerup said in a statement that the attorney general stopped all prosecutions based on the software's CSLI. Telecommunications data temporarily may not be used in court as evidence that the defendant is guilty.

This is where third-party auditors could provide a much needed check on technology. Having an unbiased third party test the technology is a crucial layer of verification to make sure the system is doing what it's creators say it does - and doing it correctly. Having humans involved in the technology to do the testing is not enough.

Recall the Hinton lab scandal in Massachusetts in 2011, when lab technicians falsified drug evidence that put tens of thousands of people in prison. Because the drug evidence was supposedly authenticated by machine in a lab, the evidence was accepted as accurate. Only years later did the error come to light and in 2017 the Massachusetts Supreme Court overturned 21,587 drug convictions because of the error.

In 2018, the New Jersey Supreme Court questioned about 21,000 DUI convictions after it was revealed that the officer in charge of calibrating the breathalyzers in five counties didn't do it properly.

Mr. Young was sentenced to 21 years with questionable information. This is a violation of Mr. Young's constitutional due process right to a fair trial. This information has been proven bad all over the world; what will America do about it? Do American people deserve the same right as Denmark people, or do we deserve less?

VI. INDICTMENT

I was indicted on: Violations, Title 18, United States Code, section and subsection 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (a) and (b)(2). (See Exhibit 14)

The superceded indictment states the defendant herein, in and affecting interstate commerce, knowingly harbored, transported, provided, obtained, and maintained by any means a person, namely, Minor A, and benefitted financially and by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which has engaged in harboring, transporting, providing, obtaining, and maintaining by any means Minor A, (knowing and in reckless disregard) of the fact that Minor A had attained the age of 14 years but had not attained the age of 18 years old and would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act. (Made the stature ambiguous)

18:U.S.C. § 1591 (b)(2): If the offense was not so effected, and the person recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, advertised, patronized or solicited had attained the age of 14 years but had not attained the age of 18 years at the time of such offense, by fine under this title and imprisonment for not less than 10 years or for life. (See Exhibit 15)

Section (c) whoever knowingly: "Knowingly" appears in the introductory portion of 18:U.S.C. § 1591(c) simply to supply the means required for both paragraph (a)(1) and (a)(2). The requirement does not apply to the interstate commerce. (See Exhibit 14) District Court says it is thessame as U.S.S.G. and 2G1.3 (a)(2) which is not according to 18:U.S.C. § 1591.

I was not indicted on: (a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1) or none of Section (E), recruit, entice, solicit, patronize, advertise, or the Government stated I was not indicted on controlling the girls. (See Exhibit 7)

My indictment the Government had knowingly in the wrong section in (b)(2). That changed the whole meaning of knowingly.

I was sentenced under (b)(1), but I was not indicted under (b)(1). (See Exhibit 7)

I was sentenced for 18:1591 F sex trafficking of a minor or by force, fraud or coercion. The jury was not told to fine me guilty of this. (See Exhibit 7)

United States District Court of the Tenth Circuit (2020) 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6030 United States v. Palms January 14, 2020

On June 6, 2019, a grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with sex trafficking by means of force, fraud, or coercion in violation of 18:U.S.C. § 1591.

1591 and this statute has specific definitions of "coercion", "serious harm" that will guide the jury as to the type of conduct that constitutes force, fraud or coercion.

The jury at my trial never was told to find me guilty of what the court sentenced me for or the grand jury before trial. The District Court gave the prosecutor permission to drop offensive elements after the grand jury returned it's indictment; now the court changed the charge after the trial. The Seventh Circuit continued to violate my due process.

My argument to the Appeal Court and District Court was how I could be found guilty of 18:1591 or 18:1594 without being indicted on the offensive element "recruit" or "entice". (See Exhibit 10) The court went around it by mentioning "coercion"; I never stated that as an offensive element.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal stated the District Court properly rejected this argument, disproving that he knowingly "coerced his victims because coercion is not an element of the federal crime of sex trafficking when the victim is a minor".

Then I asked, how can the District Court sentence me regarding 18:1591 sex trafficking of a minor or by force, fraud or coercion, if coercion is not an element, and the jury was not told to find me guilty of this. The Appeal Court says it's not an element of federal crime of sex trafficking when the victim is a minor. (See Exhibit 12) This is (b)(1) - I was not indicted on that section and subsection, so how can I be sentenced under those sections?

Then the Appeal Court states: Nor would it have helped Young to disprove that he knowingly "recruited" the victims to prostitution. Although recruitment is one possible means of completing the federal crime of sex trafficking, Young was not indicted for recruitment.

With that statement in mind from the Appeal Court, I was also not indicted on the offensive element "entice". The Appeal Court failed to mention that offensive element. (See Exhibit 13 for the lack of reference to "entice".) I even put in a reconciliation motion to let the court know they overlooked that element; the court denied the motion.

The Appeal Court erred; I also was not indicted on "entice". The Appeal Court should have said the same for the offensive element "entice" per 18:U.S.C. § 2422(b) enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activities. The Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) used a facility of interstate commerce,

such as the internet or the telephone system. (2) Knowingly used the facility of interstate commerce with the intent to persuade or entice a person to engage in illegal sexual activity, and (3) believe that the person sought to persuade or entice was under the age of 18. (See Exhibit 8)

Then the Appeal Court should have said nor would it have helped Young to disprove that he knowingly "enticed" the victims to prostitution. Although enticement is the other possible means of completing the federal crime of sex trafficking, Young was not indicted for "enticement" either. (See Exhibit 8)

So, how can I be guilty of 18:U.S.C. § 1591 or § 1594 without "recruit" or "entice"? The Government can't prove jurisdiction or commerce. I should have been acquitted.

The Government said they superceded my indictment. The Government's superceded indictment should have been found fundamentally defective. I put in a motion for the court to render the indictment constitutionally defective and I should have not been tried under this indictment. Further, the indictment must be signed by the Government. (See Exhibit 7) Young should have been acquitted.

18:U.S.C. § 1591: The Government bears it's unassailable constitutional burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, all elements of the crime; 5th and 11th Circuit Mozic v. United States and 24 LED2D 182, 508 U.S. 275 Sullivan v. Louisiana 508 U.S. 275, 124 L. Ed 2d 182, 113 S Ct 2028.

18:U.S.C. § 1591 and 1594 states:

(a)(1) in which the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person so recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, maintained, patronized, or solicited advertised.

I was not indicted on (a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1) or none of Section (E), recruit, entice, advertise, solicited, patronized. Yet the District Court and Appeal Court sentenced Young under them.

My Fifth Amendment due process claim that evidence was constitutionally insufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty. Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 (2001) (per curiam) 5th and 11th Circuit Court of Appeal Mozic v. United States.

VII. VERDICT AT VARIANCE WITH INDICTMENT AND STATUTE FIFTH AMENDMENT'S GRAND JURY GUARANTEE

Fraudulent schemes: As long as crime and elements of offense proved at trial are fully and clearly set out in indictment right to grand jury.

Such indictment gives defendant clear notice, and variance between indictment and proof adds nothing new to, nor broaden indictment; after indictment has been returned its charges may not be broadened through amendment except by grand jury itself. United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 105 S. Ct. 1811, 85 L. Ed 2d 99 (1985).

Defendant's conviction was invalid under Fifth Amendment requirement that Federal felony prosecution be commenced by indictment where court's instruction allows jury to find defendant

guilty for offense other than one for which he was indicted. United States v. Vesaas, 586 F. 2d 101 (8th Circuit 1978).

Defendant's conviction after jury instruction impermissibly broadened scope of indictment breech. Fifth Amendment guarantees that no one may be prosecuted for felony except by grand jury indictment. United States v. Harrill, 877 F. 2d 341 (5th Circuit 1989) 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 12076 (5th Circuit August 10, 1989).

The United States Court of Appeal of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit 2014, 752 F. 3d 1271, United States v. Mozic May 22, 2014.

Same case Chief Judge Wood quoted from states:

Nothing in 18:U.S.C. § 1591 lowers the Government's burden of proof, different from the Appeal Court of Seventh Circuit. The Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt "all" elements of the 18:1591 crime. (See Exhibit 2)

The Government or Court could not answer did each of the victims prove all the offensive elements of the crime and "K" twice.

Then the Government changed the "or" to "and"; that means the Government had to prove the crime happened both outside and inside the United States. They did not prove that. (See Exhibit 7) Young should not have been tried at all.

18:1591 2a, ("2b"), 2c, 2d, 2e - an accused's right, under the federal constitution's Sixth Amendment, to a jury trial in a criminal prosecution includes, as the right's most important element, the right to have the jury, rather than the judge, reach the requisite finding of guilty; what a fact finder must determine

in order to return a verdict of guilty in a criminal case is prescribed by the constitution's due process clause pursuant to which the prosecution (1) bears the burden of proving "all" elements of the offense charged.

The order of District Court denying defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state elements of charge offense involved important rights and was reviewable; failure to allege elements of charged offense was a fundamental defect that rendered indictment constitutionally defective and gave rise to the right not to be tried. United States v. Bird, 342 F. 3d 1045, (2003) Cal. Daily Op. Service 8187, 2003 D.A.R. 10169 (9th Circuit 2003) OP. with drawn, 357 F. 3d 1082 (9th Circuit 2004).

Section 18:1591 "reflects" agnoticism... about "who caused the child to engage in commercial sex act" quoting Watson v. United States 552 U.S. 74, 80 128 S. Ct. 579, 169 L. Ed 472 (2007).

An indictment is defective if it fails to allege elements of scienter that are expressly contained in the stature that describes the offense. "Knowingly" or "intentionally" is a definite element of the offense charged under 18:U.S.C. 841 (a)(1) where willfulness or knowledge is made an element of the crime the statutory requirement is not to be ignored. The charge must either include these terms, or words of similar import.

Our legislature speaks only through their statutes, statutes are their only voice. Statutes are law, extrinsic materials are not. This law anyone subject to its rule should have to listen only to those statutes. (Reading Law) The interpretation of legal

text by Supreme Court Justice of the United States Antonin Scalia (Page) 310 and Bryan A. Gardner.

The prosecutor asked the court to tell me I could not show the statute I was charged to the jury or bring up any of the offensive elements that I was not indicted on in the statute.

The prosecutor was allowed to do just the opposite of what the court told me. They were able to mention the statute and what I was charged with. Then even had the District Court and Appeal Court also use the offensive elements that I was not charged with to find me guilty. The prosecutor, the District Court and the Head Judge in the Appeal Court used alleged facts and words that would otherwise constitute the same as the element I was not indicted on.

The District Court, the prosecutor, and the Appeal Court said Young "facilitated" the victim's calls or Young "promoted" the prostitution, he had sex to try them out. That's the same as the offensive element I was not indicted on, "entice". The prosecutor used these words all through the trial.

The court warned the prosecutor during trial: But listen, if the -- if you drop those as elements, but then you introduce the facts that would otherwise constitute recruitment and enticement, which is then relevant to whether he also transported them and maintained and harbored and so on, then that puts that fact into issue even though it is not an element.

The court was wrong; "recruit and entice" or known as 18: § 2422(b) is offensive element. My motion should have been granted and I should have been acquitted. (See Exhibit 8)

VIII. SENTENCE

The court said in my criminal case judgment:

The Defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:

Title and Section/Nature of Offense

18:1591 F Sex Trafficking of Children or by Force, Fraud or Coercion. All six counts.

(1) The indictment was not signed by the Government.

(2) On page 11 of Direct Appeal decision from Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal, the Appeal Court stated disproving that he knowingly "coerced" his victims would not have helped Young because coercion is not an element of the federal crime of sex trafficking when the victim is a minor. Id. 1591 (a)(c)

How can I be sentenced with an adult charge?

United States Supreme Court: 136 S. Ct. 1619 Torres v. Lynch May 19, 2016 18:U.S.C. § 1591 (a)(1) which criminalizes sex trafficking of children, or of adult by force, fraud or coercion.

So I ask, how can I be sentenced with both when the Government says all the alleged victims were minors?

The court sentenced me also for elements that I was not indicted on, or found guilty of by the jury or grand jury.

(1) Base offense level: U.S.S.G. and 2a1.3 (a)(2)

(2) The participant (the defendant) otherwise unduly influenced a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct that "enticed the minor".

(3) (b)(2)(B) applies "that entice"

(4) The offense is increased two levels, as it involved the use of a computer or an interactive computer service to "entice", encourage, offer, or solicit a person to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with the minor.

(5) The defendant knew or should have known the victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim. That's "recruit or entice".

(6) Perjury with keys - jury was not told to find me guilty of this.

(7) I was not indicted on recruit, entice, advertise, solicit, patronize, (a)(1), (a)2, (b)(1) or any Section (E), U.S.S.G. 2G1.3 is not 1591(a) or U.S.S.G. and, U.S.S.G. and 2G1.3(a)(2).

How can I be sentenced on offensive elements that were not in my indictment? The Government changed the statute and made it an ambiguous statute, and section (b)(2) is ambiguous also; how can any grand jury or jury return a correct verdict?

Then the court knew, due process claim that evidence was constitutionally insufficient to sustain verdict of guilty:

Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 (2001) (per curiam) granting federal habeas corpus relief because prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to prove elements of crime and therefore petitioner's conviction is not consistent with demands of the federal due process clause.

IX. REASON FOR WRIT

Justices of the United States Supreme Court:

My rationale for submitting this Writ of Certiorari is straightforward. I feel I have been wronged judicially by being convicted of elements of 18:U.S.C. § 1591 which were not consistent with my grand jury indictment. I ask for judicial intervention at the court's discretion.

From the start of this case, the Government asked the court to tell me I could not present/introduce the elements of offense to the jury that I was not being charged with. Yet the prosecution was allowed to do the opposite by using words that meant the same. The focus of the Appeal Court was similar, using alleged facts and words that did not have any applicability to those included in the indictment. After tieing my hands so I could not mount a proper defense to the improper case elements, I decided to go pro se and would not plea out.

Following arrest without a warrant, and while in custody of authorities, with no Discovery at hand to defend myself, what recourse did I have? How can I go pro se and ask for suppression of evidence and yet constantly get motions denied? How can the Government present an unsigned indictment from the grand jury and the judge sentence me under the adult section of the 18:1591 statute? How can a lead F.B.I. agent be allowed to lie and falsify information while under oath? When is it acceptable for the Government to build a case on elements of criminal conduct that do not have applicability to the grand jury indictment?

X. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Allen Young respectfully requests that this Court issue a Writ of Certiorari to review the judgment of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal and the District Court.

Respectfully submitted,

Allen Young

9/30/20
Date