

No. 20-5796

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ISAAC THOMAS, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES

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Petitioner contends (Pet. 5-12) that this Court's review is warranted to resolve a circuit conflict over whether a defendant who pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), is automatically entitled to relief on plain-error review if he was not advised during his plea colloquy that one element of that offense is knowledge of his felon status. See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). As explained in the government's petition for a writ of certiorari in United States v. Gary, No. 20-444 (filed Oct. 5, 2020), petitioner is correct that the circuits are divided on that recurring question and that it warrants the Court's review this Term.

The petition for a writ of certiorari here, however, is not a suitable vehicle for resolving the circuit conflict. As an initial matter, the court of appeals' unpublished opinion in this case did not engage with the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Gary, 954 F.3d 194 (2020), or any of the other court of appeals decisions that have addressed structural error in the wake of Rehaif. The court of appeals addressed only in passing whether failing to advise a defendant of Rehaif's knowledge requirement is automatically, or "per se[,] reversible." Pet. App. 9a n.6. Instead, applying circuit precedent, the court focused on the question whether petitioner could establish "'a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered his [guilty] plea.'" Id. at 8a (citation omitted). Moreover, having determined that petitioner was not entitled to relief because he failed to establish such an effect on his "substantial rights," Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); see Pet. App. 7a-9a, the court of appeals did not reach or resolve the separate plain-error requirement -- which this Court has found dispositive in two previous cases involving claims of structural error -- that the error have seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 633-634 (2002); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 470 (1997).

In contrast, the government's petition for a writ of certiorari in Gary arises from a published court of appeals decision expressly holding that a district court's failure to advise a pleading defendant of Rehaif's knowledge element "is structural" error that entitles a defendant to relief because it automatically satisfies the third and fourth requirements of this Court's plain-error test. Gary, 954 F.3d at 198, 202-208. Five judges of that court criticized that holding in a published opinion respecting the denial of rehearing en banc, describing it as "so incorrect" as to warrant this Court's "prompt[]" review. United States v. Gary, 963 F.3d 420, 420 (4th Cir. 2020) (Wilkinson, J., joined by Niemeyer, Agee, Quattlebaum, and Rushing, JJ., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). And three other courts of appeals have acknowledged but rejected the Fourth Circuit's approach in precedential opinions, including in opinions that similarly address both the third and the fourth requirements of the plain-error test. See Pet. at 21-22, Gary, supra (No. 20-444); United States v. Trujillo, 960 F.3d 1196, 1205-1207 (10th Cir. 2020); United States v. Lavalais, 960 F.3d 180, 188 (5th Cir. 2020), petition for cert. pending, No. 20-5489 (filed Aug. 20, 2020). Granting review in Gary would put squarely before the Court a decision that addresses both plain-error requirements about which the circuits are divided. Granting review in this case would not.

Accordingly, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be held pending the Court's consideration of the government's petition in Gary, supra (No. 20-444), and then disposed of as appropriate.*

Respectfully submitted.

JEFFREY B. WALL
Acting Solicitor General

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* The government waives any further response to the petition for a writ of certiorari unless this Court requests otherwise.