

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUITC.A. No. 19-3568

PERCY ST. GEORGE, Appellant

v.

SUPERINTENDENT DALLAS SCI; ET AL.

(E.D. Pa. No. 2-19-cv-03963)

Present: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges

Submitted is Appellant's request for a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) in the above-captioned case.

Respectfully,

Clerk

ORDER

Appellant's request for a certificate of appealability is denied.

This Court may issue a certificate of appealability "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where, as in this case, the District Court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds, this standard is satisfied if jurists of reason would debate both the procedural ruling and whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).

Here, the District Court dismissed the petition on the procedural ground that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate it because it was an unauthorized second or successive petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) ("Before a second or successive [habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254] is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application."). We need not decide whether jurists of reason might debate that ruling because Appellant has not demonstrated that his § 2254 petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right. In reaching this conclusion, we have considered the "Pro-se Supplemental Memorandum of Law" attached to the notice of appeal.

We observe that Appellant's claims relating to ineffective assistance of trial counsel are unexhausted, see O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (explaining that to

exhaust a claim, a petitioner must “invok[e] one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process”), and that Appellant may be able to raise them in a petition pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9543(a)(1)(i). We make no comment on the timeliness or merit of such claims.

By the Court,

s/Stephanos Bibas
Circuit Judge

Dated: June 30, 2020
MB/cc: Percy St. George
Ronald Eisenberg, Esq.
Max C. Kaufman, Esq.



A True Copy:

Patricia S. Dodsweit, Clerk
Certified Order Issued in Lieu of Mandate

APPENDIX "B"

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PERCY ST. GEORGE : CIVIL ACTION

v. :

MAHALLY, THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY :
OF COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA and :
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF :
THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 19-3963

ORDER

NOW, this 7th day of October, 2019, upon consideration of the Petition for Writ of *Habeas Corpus* (Document No. 2), the Report and Recommendation filed by United States Magistrate Judge Thomas J. Rueter (Document No. 7), and the petitioner's Objection to Report and Recommendation (Document No. 8), and after a thorough and independent review of the record, it is ORDERED that:

1. The petitioner's objections are OVERRULED;
2. The Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Thomas J. Rueter is APPROVED and ADOPTED; and
3. The Petition for Writ of *Habeas Corpus* is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.¹
4. There is no probable cause to issue a certificate of appealability.

/s/ TIMOTHY J. SAVAGE J.

¹ The petitioner is not precluded from seeking permission from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals to file a second or successive § 2254 motion.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PERCY ST. GEORGE

:

CIVIL ACTION

v.

:

LAWRENCE MAHALLY, et al

:

NO. 19-3963

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THOMAS J. RUETER
United States Magistrate Judge

September 23, 2019

Presently before the court is a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 2). Also before the court is petitioner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1). Petitioner is incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution located in Dallas, Pennsylvania. For the reasons that follow, the court recommends that the motion to proceed in forma pauperis be granted and the petition be dismissed without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Following a jury trial in October 1997, petitioner was convicted of kidnapping and other crimes. See Commonwealth v. St. George, No. CP-51-CR-405232-1997 (C.P. Phila. 1997).¹ Petitioner was sentenced in December 1997 to a fifteen- to thirty-year term of incarceration.

¹ Additional charges against petitioner were brought under separate docket numbers. See Commonwealth v. St. George, No. CP-51-CR-403962-1997 (C.P. Phila. 1998); Commonwealth v. St. George, No. CP-51-CR-404011-1997 (C.P. Phila. 1997). Petitioner also has filed a habeas petition in this court arising from No. CP-51-CR-403962-1997 at Civ. Act. No. 18-905. The undersigned filed a Report and Recommendation in that case on November 30, 2018, recommending that the petition be summarily dismissed as untimely. St. George v. Mahally, 2018 WL 6706050 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2018). The R&R was approved and adopted on December 20, 2018. St. George v. Mahally, 2018 WL 6701276 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2018). Petitioner's appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals currently is pending. See Docs. 12, 13, 14.

On April 3, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court.

See Civ. Act. No. 00-1716 (Doc. 1). The underlying factual and procedural background was set forth by the Honorable Louis H. Pollak in his March 30, 2009, opinion:

Petitioner's counsel at trial and sentencing, Robert Dixon, failed to file a notice of appeal or any other post-verdict motions on petitioner's behalf. According to petitioner, he requested that Dixon file an appeal.

Petitioner filed a pro se notice of appeal on February 25, 1998. Because his pro se notice of appeal was filed later than thirty days after his sentence was entered, petitioner's notice of appeal was untimely. See Pa. R. App. Proc. 903(a).

Petitioner's pro se notice of appeal was returned to him. The returned notice of appeal was unfiled and had a notation stating that the appeal was premature. The docket number on the returned notice of appeal had been crossed out and replaced with the docket number of an unrelated case, still pending trial, in which petitioner was also a defendant. Ironically, it seems that the Clerk of Courts for the Court of Common Pleas, to whom petitioner properly mailed his notice of appeal, had erroneously concluded that petitioner's tardy notice of appeal was premature because the Clerk believed, incorrectly, that the petitioner's notice of appeal had been filed in petitioner's other case.

According to petitioner, he then corresponded frequently with the Clerk's office about his appeal. Petitioner claims that, during the course of this lengthy correspondence, he was never told that his appeal had been filed late

On June 24, 1999, petitioner filed an application for leave to file an appeal nunc pro tunc. After the court failed to act on that application, St. George filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The Superior Court denied this petition on February 29, 2000. Then, on April 3, 2000, petitioner filed his initial petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this court On September 13, 2002, petitioner filed an amended petition. . . .

In the meantime, the respondents forwarded petitioner's June 24, 1999 motion for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc to the Commonwealth's PCRA unit, where it was treated as a motion for post-trial relief. Petitioner was appointed PCRA counsel, and that counsel filed an amended PCRA application on behalf of petitioner. On December 30, 2002, having learned that petitioner's case would be heard by the state PCRA unit, I placed petitioner's habeas case in suspense but kept the case on my docket in case "Mr. St. George did not obtain his desired outcome at the state level and wished to again seek relief here." See Doc. No. 44.

Petitioner's amended PCRA petition sought reinstatement of his original appellate rights, which the PCRA court granted on April 29, 2004. On April 11, 2006, however, the Superior Court overturned the PCRA court's decision on the grounds that petitioner's PCRA petition had been untimely filed. On October 23, 2006, petitioner moved this court to reopen his case. I granted that request on September 21, 2007, and referred the case to Judge Angell.

See id. (Doc. 78) (Opinion) (Pollak, J.).

In his decision, Judge Pollak ruled that although petitioner's habeas petition was untimely, petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling because the delay was caused by the Clerk of Courts' administrative error in confusing petitioner's two cases. Judge Pollak appointed counsel for petitioner, and on November 25, 2009, an amended habeas petition was filed on petitioner's behalf. Id. (Doc. 89). An evidentiary hearing was then held in November 2011. The case was reassigned to the Honorable Timothy J. Savage in May 2012. Id. (Doc. 130).

On August 2, 2012, Judge Savage issued an opinion conditionally granting petitioner's writ, finding that "in failing to consult with St. George about the possibility of filing an appeal, even though he knew or should have known that St. George desired to appeal, St. George's attorney failed to provide him with objectively reasonable legal representation." Id. (Doc. 131). Judge Savage's Order provided that petitioner's conviction would be vacated and petitioner released from custody unless the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania reinstated petitioner's direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc within thirty days. See id. (Doc. 132).²

² A motion for leave to file an amended petition remains pending on this petition. See Civ. Act. No. 00-1716 (Docs. 139, 140, 147).

Judge Savage's order was docketed in the Court of Common Pleas the same day. See No. CP-51-CR-405232-1997. Petitioner's direct appeal rights were reinstated, and petitioner filed a notice of appeal on July 15, 2013. Id. An attorney entered his appearance on petitioner's behalf on May 12, 2014. Id.

On May 8, 2015, petitioner filed a petition for leave to file an amended or supplemental habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2242 under his original habeas docket, along with an accompanying memorandum of law. See Civ. Act. No. 00-1716 (Docs. 139, 140). In these filings, petitioner alleged that he was facing inordinate delay in his direct appeal and that the state courts were "maliciously abusing [the] appellate review process," and requested the appointment of counsel. Id. (Docs. 140, 142). The District Attorney filed a response to petitioner's motion, arguing that any delay in petitioner's case was "readily explainable" and that any federal proceedings should be stayed. Id. (Doc. 147). Judge Savage entered an order on August 18, 2015, denying petitioner's motion for reappointment of habeas corpus counsel, in part because "petitioner's appeal before the Pennsylvania Superior Court is still pending." Id. (Doc. 148).

On July 1, 2015, the PCRA court entered an order pursuant to Pa. R. App. P. 1925(b), requiring petitioner to file a statement of matters complained of on appeal. See No. CP-51-CR-405232-1997. Thereafter, the PCRA docket reflects numerous continuances on petitioner's behalf. Id.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court issued a briefing schedule on September 1, 2016. See No. 2348 EDA 2013. On November 2, 2016, petitioner's appeal was dismissed for

failure to file a brief. Id. However, the appeal was reinstated on November 29, 2016, and the appellate court directed the trial court to issue another order pursuant to Pa. R. App. P. 1925(b). Id.

The trial court thereafter re-filed its 1925(b) order on April 6, 2017. See No. CP-51-CR-405232-1997. On April 27, 2017, petitioner's counsel filed a statement of intent to file a no-merit brief pursuant to Pa. R. App. P. 1925(c). Id. The trial court docket indicates that no trial court opinion would be issued, as the judge who presided over petitioner's trial is no longer on the bench. Id. The docket shows that the case was returned to the Superior Court. Id.

The Superior Court issued an updated briefing schedule on November 27, 2017. See No. 2348 EDA 2013. Petitioner was granted one extension of time to file his brief, and then his appeal was dismissed for a second time on April 6, 2018, when no brief was filed. Id. Attached to his request to reinstate the appeal, counsel filed an application to withdraw on the basis that the appeal was frivolous. Id. Petitioner's appeal was again reinstated on April 23, 2018. Id. In a decision dated November 30, 2018, the Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence and petition to withdraw. See Commonwealth v. St. George, 2018 WL 6259037, at *7 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 2018). Petitioner was then denied allowance of appeal by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on August 12, 2019. See Commonwealth v. St. George, 2019 WL 3773791 (Table), No. 25 EAL 2019 (Pa. Aug. 12, 2019).

On January 15, 2018, petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which was docketed at Civil Action No. 18-381. See Civ. Act. No. 18-381 (Doc. 12). The petition raised one ground for relief: Denial of Right to

Appeal/Inordinate Delay. Id. On August 6, 2018, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed a response to the petition, arguing that it should be dismissed as an improper successive habeas petition. Id. The court filed an R&R on August 28, 2018, recommending that petitioner's claim be dismissed without prejudice for failure to obtain authorization from the Court of Appeals to file a second habeas petition. See id. The R&R was approved by Judge Savage on November 19, 2018 (Doc. 20).

The instant pro se habeas petition was filed on August 28, 2019 ("Pet."); Doc. 2).³ The petition raises the following grounds for relief:

1. Several ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims
2. Suggestive Identification
3. Prosecutorial Misconduct
4. Missing, Omitted and Unsigned Transcripts

(Pet. ¶ 12.) Petition does not assert or demonstrate that he obtained authorization from the Third Circuit to file his habeas petition.

II. DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") provides a stringent set of procedures a petitioner must follow if he wishes to file a second or successive habeas petition. The relevant procedures are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A): "Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the

³ "[A] pro se prisoner's habeas petition is deemed filed at the moment he delivers it to prison officials for mailing to the district court." Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1998). The court presumes that the petition was delivered on the date it was executed by petitioner. See Baker v. United States, 670 F.3d 448, 451 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012).

applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.”

The impact of this statutory provision was discussed by the Third Circuit in Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 139 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 826 (2003). The court noted that with the passage of AEDPA, “[u]nless the court of appeals grants such permission [to file a successive petition], the district court may not consider the second or successive petition.” Id. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court affirmed that if a petitioner does not receive the required authorization from the court of appeals before filing a second or successive petition, the district court is “without jurisdiction to entertain it.” Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 153 (2007).

As noted supra, petitioner previously filed two petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which attacked petitioner’s conviction and/or sentence in Commonwealth v. St. George, No. CP-51-CR-405232-1997(C.P. Phila. 1997). Petitioner’s first habeas petition was considered on the merits and granted. See Civ. Act. No. 00-1716. However, petitioner did not seek or obtain the requisite certification from the Third Circuit before filing the second habeas petition, and this court was without jurisdiction to consider the matter. See Civ. Act. No. 18-381. Like the second petition, this court remains without jurisdiction to consider the instant matter. In the petition now before the court, petitioner again attacks his conviction and/or sentence in Commonwealth v. St. George, No. CP-51-CR-405232-1997 (C.P. Phila. 1997).

Faced with an unapproved second or successive habeas petition, the court must dismiss it or transfer it to the appropriate court of appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Robinson, 313 F.3d at 139-40 (citation omitted). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, a court should transfer a second or successive petition to the Third Circuit only if it is “in the interest of justice.”

There is no indication that petitioner obtained the requisite authorization from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals to file the instant habeas petition. The court concludes that it would not be in the interest of justice to transfer this case to the Third Circuit. This decision not to transfer the petition in no way precludes petitioner from seeking permission from the Third Circuit to file a second or successive § 2254 motion if he elects to do so.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the court makes the following:

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N

AND NOW, this 23rd day of September, 2019, the court respectfully recommends that the motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1) be **GRANTED**, and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be **DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE** for failure to obtain authorization from the Court of Appeals to file a successive habeas petition. The court further recommends and that no certificate of appealability (“COA”) be granted.⁴

⁴ The COA should be denied because petitioner has not shown that reasonable jurists could debate whether his petition should be resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).

APPENDIX "C

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 25 EAL 2019

Respondent

: Petition for Allowance of Appeal from
the Order of the Superior Court

v.

PERCY ST. GEORGE,


Petitioner

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 12th day of August, 2019, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is
DENIED.

A True Copy
As Of 08/12/2019

Attest: 
Patricia A. Johnson
Chief Clerk
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

APPENDIX "D"

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA	:	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee	:	
v.		
PERCY ST. GEORGE	:	
Appellant	:	No. 2348 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 3, 1997
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0405232-1997

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: **FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2018**

Appellant, Percy St. George, appeals from the judgment of sentence *nunc pro tunc* entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial convictions for four counts of robbery, six counts of kidnapping, and one count each of recklessly endangering another person ("REAP"), receiving stolen property ("RSP"), prohibited offensive weapons, firearms not to be carried without a license, causing or risking a catastrophe, and conspiracy.¹ We affirm and grant counsel's petition to withdraw.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On February 6-7, 1997, Appellant and his co-conspirators kidnapped several employees of the Financial Exchange Company in Philadelphia and held them

¹ 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1), 2901(a), 2705, 3925(a), 908(a), 6106(a), 3302, 903(a), respectively.

hostage in order to carry out what proved to be an unsuccessful scheme to seize and rob an armored truck carrying cash and food stamps. The scheme included forcing the employees into a van at gunpoint and taking them to another location to obtain information about the armored truck delivery and then taking them to one victim's home, where her two young children were present. The plan was to accompany one victim to the Exchange the next day to rob it.

A jury convicted Appellant of the offenses on October 22, 1997. On December 3, 1997, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 15 to 30 years' imprisonment. Appellant did not file post-sentence motions or a direct appeal. Between 1999 and 2016, however, Appellant made multiple attempts to have his direct appeal rights reinstated *nunc pro tunc*. The PCRA court twice reinstated his direct appeal rights *nunc pro tunc*, in 2004 and in 2006, but each of those appeals was dismissed or quashed for failure to file a brief or for having been raised in an untimely PCRA petition.

On November 25, 2009, Appellant filed an amended counseled petition for writ of *habeas corpus* in federal court (he had originally filed one *pro se* on March 27, 2000, which was suspended during the pendency of Appellant's PCRA proceedings). The federal court granted Appellant conditional *habeas* relief on August 2, 2012, vacating the judgment of sentence until his appellate rights were reinstated *nunc pro tunc* by the state court. Though the August 2, 2012 order was noted on the trial court's docket, no formal order was

entered reinstating Appellant's direct appeal rights *nunc pro tunc*.

On July 15, 2013, Appellant filed a *nunc pro tunc* appeal. The court appointed counsel on May 12, 2014. On February 19, 2016, this Court issued a rule to show cause why the appeal should not be quashed as taken from an order not entered on the appropriate docket. Appellant filed a response on February 29, 2016, stating the federal court's August 2, 2012 order should be considered a *nunc pro tunc* reinstatement of Appellant's direct appeal rights. On March 8, 2016, the Commonwealth filed an answer, agreeing that the federal court's order and the trial court's docketing of the federal court's order served to reinstate Appellant's direct appeal rights *nunc pro tunc*. Upon review of the various responses, this Court discharged the rule to show cause.

On November 2, 2016, however, this Court dismissed the appeal for failure to file a brief. Appellant filed an application to reinstate the appeal on November 18, 2016, and on November 29, 2016, this Court reinstated the appeal and remanded for the trial court to order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court ordered the Rule 1925(b) statement on April 6, 2017. In lieu of a concise statement, counsel filed a Rule 1925(c)(4) statement on April 27, 2017, of his intent to file an ***Anders*** brief. On April 6, 2018, this Court dismissed the appeal again for failure to file a brief. Appellant filed an application to reinstate the appeal on April 17, 2018, which this Court granted on April 23, 2018. On the same day, counsel filed an application to withdraw

and an **Anders** brief in this Court.

As a preliminary matter, counsel seeks to withdraw his representation pursuant to **Anders v. California**, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) and **Commonwealth v. Santiago**, 602 Pa. 159, 978 A.2d 349 (2009). **Anders** and **Santiago** require counsel to: (1) petition the Court for leave to withdraw, certifying that after a thorough review of the record, counsel has concluded the issues to be raised are wholly frivolous; (2) file a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal; and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to the appellant and advise him of his right to obtain new counsel or file a *pro se* brief to raise any additional points the appellant deems worthy of review. **Santiago, supra** at 173-79, 978 A.2d at 358-61. Substantial compliance with these requirements is sufficient. **Commonwealth v. Wrecks**, 934 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa.Super. 2007). After establishing that counsel has met the antecedent requirements to withdraw, this Court makes an independent review of the record to confirm that the appeal is wholly frivolous. **Commonwealth v. Palm**, 903 A.2d 1244, 1246 (Pa.Super. 2006).

In **Santiago, supra**, our Supreme Court addressed the briefing requirements where court-appointed appellate counsel seeks to withdraw representation:

Neither **Anders** nor [**Commonwealth v. McClendon**, 495 Pa. 467, 434 A.2d 1185 (1981)] requires that counsel's brief provide an argument of any sort, let alone the type of argument that counsel develops in a merits brief. To repeat,

what the brief must provide under **Anders** are references to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.

* * *

Under **Anders**, the right to counsel is vindicated by counsel's examination and assessment of the record and counsel's references to anything in the record that arguably supports the appeal.

Santiago, supra at 176, 177, 978 A.2d at 359, 360. Thus, the Court held:

[I]n the **Anders** brief that accompanies court-appointed counsel's petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Id. at 178-79, 978 A.2d at 361.

Instantly, Appellant's counsel has filed a petition to withdraw. The petition states counsel conducted a conscientious review of the record and determined the appeal is wholly frivolous. Counsel also supplied Appellant with a copy of the brief and a letter explaining Appellant's right to retain new counsel or to proceed *pro se* to raise any additional issues Appellant deems worthy of this Court's attention. In the **Anders** brief, counsel provides a summary of the facts and procedural history of the case. Counsel's argument refers to relevant law that might arguably support Appellant's issues. Counsel further states the reasons for his conclusion that the appeal is wholly frivolous.

Therefore, counsel has substantially complied with the technical requirements of **Anders** and **Santiago**.

Appellant has not responded to the **Anders** brief *pro se* or with newly retained private counsel. Counsel raises the following issue on Appellant's behalf:

IS [APPELLANT'S] APPEAL FRIVOLOUS SUCH THAT COUNSEL SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO WITHDRAW?

(**Anders** Brief at 2).

Appellant argues the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress the out-of-court photo array identifications, where the procedures used were unduly suggestive because Appellant's photograph occupied the first position in the arrays. Appellant also avers the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the various convictions. Finally, Appellant raises an unspecified allegation of trial counsel's ineffectiveness.² Appellant

² "[A]s a general rule, a petitioner should wait to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review." **Commonwealth v. Grant**, 572 Pa. 48, 67, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (2002). Our Supreme Court has recognized two very limited exceptions to the general rule in **Grant** regarding when trial courts may review ineffective assistance of counsel claims: (1) in extraordinary circumstances where claims of trial counsel's ineffectiveness are apparent from the record and immediate consideration best serves the interests of justice and/or (2) where there is good cause shown and review of the claim is preceded by a waiver of the right to seek collateral review. **Commonwealth v. Holmes**, 621 Pa. 595, 598-99, 79 A.3d 562, 563-64 (2013). Neither of these exceptions applies in the present case. Therefore, as Appellant concedes, this appeal is not the proper time to raise or address any ineffectiveness of counsel claim. Instead, Appellant will have to wait to raise his claim(s) in a timely filed PCRA petition. Thus, we give this generic ineffectiveness of trial counsel claim no further attention.

concludes he is entitled to some form of relief. We disagree.

We review the denial of a suppression motion as follows:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.

[W]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal conclusions based upon the facts.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 26-27 (Pa.Super. 2008) (*en banc*) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "It is within the suppression court's sole province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony." **Commonwealth v. Clemens**, 66 A.3d 373, 378 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting **Commonwealth v. Gallagher**, 896 A.2d 583, 585 (Pa.Super. 2006)).

"A photographic identification is unduly suggestive when the procedure creates a substantial likelihood of misidentification." **Commonwealth v. Fisher**, 564 Pa. 505, 522, 769 A.2d 1116, 1126 (2001), *cert. denied*, 535 U.S. 906, 122 S.Ct. 1207, 152 L.Ed.2d 145 (2002) (citing **Commonwealth v. Johnson**, 542 Pa. 384, 396-97, 668 A.2d 97, 103 (1995), *cert. denied*, 519 U.S. 827, 117 S.Ct. 90, 136 L.Ed.2d 46 (1996)). "Photographs used in line-ups are not unduly suggestive if the suspect's picture does not stand out

more than those of the others, and the people depicted all exhibit similar facial characteristics." ***Fisher, supra*** at 522, 769 A.2d at 1126. The existence of a single possibly suggestive element in an identification procedure does not automatically require suppression of the identification evidence. ***Commonwealth v. Monroe***, 542 A.2d 113 (Pa.Super. 1988), *appeal denied*, 522 Pa. 574, 559 A.2d 36 (1989).

"Whether an out-of-court identification is to be suppressed as unreliable, and hence violative of due process, is determined from the totality of the circumstances." ***Commonwealth v. Sutton***, 496 Pa. 91, 94, 436 A.2d 167, 169 (1981). Reliability of an out-of-court identification is determined under a totality of the circumstances by considering, *inter alia*, the following specific factors: "the witness' ability 'to observe the criminal act; the accuracy of the photo array selection and other descriptions; the lapse of time between the act and any line-up; and any failure to identify the defendant on prior occasions.'" ***Commonwealth v. Santiago***, 579 Pa. 46, 74, 855 A.2d 682, 698 (2004) (quoting ***Commonwealth v. Baker***, 531 Pa. 541, 614 A.2d 663 (1992)).

With respect to a sufficiency claim:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the

Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting **Commonwealth v. Bullick**, 830 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa.Super. 2003)).

The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines the offense of robbery in relevant part as follows:

§ 3701. Robbery

(a) Offense defined.—

(1) A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he:

(i) inflicts serious bodily injury upon another;

(ii) threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury;

(iii) commits or threatens immediately to commit any felony of the first or second degree;

(iv) inflicts bodily injury upon another or threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury;

(v) physically takes or removes property from the person of another by force however slight; or

* * *

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1). The Crimes Code defines kidnapping as follows:

§ 2901. Kidnapping

(a) Offense defined.—... [A] person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another a substantial distance under the circumstances from the place where he is found, or if he unlawfully confines another for a substantial period in a place of isolation, with any of the following intentions:

- (1) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage.
- (2) To facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter.
- (3) To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another.
- (4) To interfere with the performance by public officials of any governmental or political function.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2901(a). Section 2705 of the Crimes Code provides:

§ 2705. Recklessly endangering another person

A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705. The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines receiving stolen property as follows:

§ 3925. Receiving stolen property

(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of theft if he intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the property is received, retained, or disposed with intent to

restore it to the owner.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a). The Crimes Code defines prohibited offensive weapons as follows:

§ 908. Prohibited offensive weapons

(a) Offense defined.—A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if, except as authorized by law, he makes, repairs, sells, or otherwise deals in, uses, or possesses any offensive weapon.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 908(a). Section 6106 of the Crimes Code in relevant part provides:

§ 6106. Firearms not to be carried without a license

(a) Offense defined.—

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), any person who carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license under this chapter commits a felony of the third degree.

(2) A person who is otherwise eligible to possess a valid license under this chapter but carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license and has not committed any other criminal violation commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.

18 PA.C.S.A. § 6106(a). The Crimes Code also defines the offense of risking a catastrophe as follows:

§ 3302. Causing or risking catastrophe

(a) Causing catastrophe.—A person who causes a

catastrophe by explosion, fire, flood, avalanche, collapse of building, release of poison gas, radioactive material or other harmful or destructive force or substance, or by any other means of causing potentially widespread injury or damage...commits a felony of the first degree if he does so intentionally or knowingly, or a felony of the second degree if he does so recklessly.

(b) Risking catastrophe.—A person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if he recklessly creates a risk of catastrophe in the employment of fire, explosives or other dangerous means listed in subsection (a) of this section.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3302. Section 903(a) of the Crimes Code provides:

§ 903. Criminal Conspiracy

(a) Definition of conspiracy.—A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he:

- (1) agrees with such person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime;
- (2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a).

Instantly, regarding Appellant's suppression motion and sufficiency of the evidence claims, the original trial court reasoned:

[Appellant] first argues that the [c]ourt erred in not suppressing the photographic array and identifications that led to his arrest. This contention is meritless, as there was clearly probable cause for [Appellant's] arrest, and the photographic array was not suggestive.

[Appellant] challenges the photographic array as

suggestive, presumably because his photograph was in the first position. During the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, testimony from Detective Grimm of the Philadelphia Police Department established the process of generating a photo lineup. The suspect is entered into the computer, and the parameters of his build, height, and weight are determined by the computer. The computer then brings up photographs of other people with similar parameters and randomly generates the order of the lineup.

The position of a suspect's photo in a randomly generated lineup cannot be challenged as prejudicial. If this argument was accepted, then any defendant could challenge a lineup based on a purported dislike of the order of the photos, by claiming their position was prejudicial. Clearly, this cannot be allowed. As there was no possibility of police manipulation in this case, the photo array was not unduly suggestive, and properly admitted.

The information that led to [Appellant's] photo being placed in a lineup was that on February 7, 1997, Detective Senior received information from a reliable source that an anonymous black female had implicated [Appellant] in the robbery by name. Based on that information, a photograph of [Appellant] was inserted in a photo lineup, which was subsequently shown to another suspect and two of the victims.

Nothing about the manner in which the identifications took place was suggestive either. The photographic array was first shown to Jay Diaz, another suspect in the robbery and kidnappings. Diaz positively identified [Appellant]. Three lineups containing possible suspects were then shown to two of the kidnapping victims. Both positively identified [Appellant]. Although they were in the same house to view the photos, one victim was taken into the kitchen to view the photos while the other remained in the living room. There was no opportunity for them to consult with each other during the process of viewing the photos. No information was given by the Detective to suggest that the perpetrator's photo was or was not in the array. Clearly, based on three independent identifications of [Appellant's] photograph by another suspect and two of the victims, there was probable cause for an arrest warrant, and no reason to

suppress the identifications.


[Appellant's] second contention is that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the guilty verdicts returned by the jury. This is simply not the case. [Appellant] was identified, both in court, and from photographic arrays, by three of the kidnapping victims, one of his co-conspirators, and a police officer. In addition, the fact that [Appellant's] fingerprints were found on a newspaper in one of the vehicles used during the robbery provided circumstantial evidence of [Appellant's] participation in the crime.

The direct and circumstantial evidence taken together was more than sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict of guilty.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed November 17, 2004, at 3-5) (internal citations omitted). The record supports the trial court's analysis. Moreover, a sufficiency of the evidence claim must identify the specific element or elements of the offenses and how the evidence presented at trial failed to establish those offenses. ***See generally Commonwealth v. Manley***, 985 A.2d 256 (Pa.Super. 2009), *appeal denied*, 606 Pa. 671, 996 A.2d 491 (2010). Here, Appellant does not actually single out those elements or crimes, which the Commonwealth failed to establish. Therefore, we decline to address Appellant's sufficiency claims in further detail. Following-our-independent review of the record, we confirm the appeal is frivolous. ***See Palm, supra***. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence and grant counsel's petition to withdraw.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Counsel's petition to withdraw is granted.

Judgment Entered.



Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/30/18