

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION**

**FILED**

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT**

**FEB 6 2020**

**MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK  
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS**

**ARTHUR LOPEZ,**

**No. 18-55520**

**Plaintiff-Appellant,**

**D.C. No. 8:17-cv-00297-VBF-  
MRW.**

**v.**

**COSTA MESA POLICE DEPARTMENT;  
et al.,**

**MEMORANDUM\***

**Defendants-Appellees.**

Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Central District of California  
Valerie Baker Fairbank, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 4, 2020\*\*

Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

Arthur Lopez appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments arising from a traffic stop. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Blankenhorn v. City of Orange*, 485 F.3d 463, 470

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\* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

\*\* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

(9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lopez's Fourth Amendment claim for defendants because Lopez failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle or were unjustified in impounding the vehicle or conducting an inventory.

*See Heien v. North Carolina*, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014) (holding that to conduct a traffic stop "officers need only reasonable suspicion—that is, a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of breaking the law" (internal quotation marks omitted)); *United States v. Torres*, 828 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2016) ("Once a vehicle has been legally impounded, the police may conduct an inventory search without a warrant."); *Miranda v. City of Cornelius*, 429 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2005) ("The violation of a traffic regulation justifies impoundment of a vehicle if the driver is unable to remove the vehicle from a public location without continuing its illegal operation.").

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lopez's Fourteenth Amendment claim for defendants because Lopez failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants acted with discriminatory purpose. *See Serrano v. Francis*, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) ("To avoid summary judgment, [the nonmoving party] 'must produce evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright*, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). Lopez's motion for judicial notice is denied.

**AFFIRMED.**