No. 20-1325

In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

WES PERKINS,
Plaintiff – Appellant – Petitioner,
v.

JOHN LIPSCOMBE, Judge, County Court at Law No. 3, Travis County, Texas, et al.
Respondents – Appellees – Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
WITH APPENDICES A, B, AND C

WES PERKINS
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court@wesperkins.com

Questions Presented

Statutory Challenge

1. Is the TEX. TRANSP. CODE "unconstitutional," as applied?

Pleading standard

2. Was dismissal abusive?

Compelled Arbitration

3. Is PITMAN Disqualified?

Arising in the appeals

Ex post facto.

4. Are standards created on the fly enforceable?

Jurisdiction.

5. Are administratively promulgated rules jurisdictional?

6. May a § 451 judge ever delegate such authority?

Parties to USCA5 Proceedings

Appellant

WES PERKINS
pro se

Appellees

No official appearance at trial or on appeal.

- **JOHN LIPSCOMBE**, Judge, County Court at Law No. 3, Travis County, Texas, Officially and Individually; and
- **TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS**.

[By: DAVID ESCAMILLA
Travis County Attorney
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Hon. KEN PAXTON
Attorney General
STATE OF TEXAS
CHRISTOPHER L. LINDSEY
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Directly Related Proceedings

20-50682.

- Trial

W.D.Tex., No. 1:20-CV-493
PERKINS v. LIPSCOMBE, and
TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS.
Dismissed: Jul. 20, 2020 (Docs. [17], [18])

- Appeal

USCA5, No. 20-50682
PERKINS v. LIPSCOMBE, and
TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS.
Dismissed: Dec. 31, 2020.

Proceedings Inexorably Intertwined

20-50678.

- Trial

W.D.Tex., No. 1:20-CV-70
PERKINS v. BREWSTER (DMV), CITY OF AUSTIN, MORGAN, MANLEY, HALLMARK, SOUTHSIDE WRECKER, and YEAKEL.
Dismissed: Jul. 24, 2020 (Docs. [56], [57])

- Appeal

USCA5, No. 20-50678
PERKINS v. BREWSTER (DMV), CITY OF AUSTIN, MORGAN, MANLEY, HALLMARK, SOUTHSIDE WRECKER, and YEAKEL.
Still pending.

20-50707.

- Trial

W.D.Tex., No. 1:20-CV-296
PERKINS v. MISCHTIAN, and BELL COUNTY, TEXAS.
Dismissed: Jul. 17, 2020 (Docs. [24], [25])
Rule 60(b) Denied: Aug. 21, 2020 (Doc. [29])

- Appeal

USCA5, No. 20-50707
PERKINS v. MISCHTIAN, and BELL COUNTY, TEXAS.
Still pending.

Perkins's Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari to USCA5

Citations below

None.

Jurisdiction

(i) Date *clerk* dismissed.
20-50**682** ("493") (Lipscombe).
Dec. 31, 2020. [+90: Mar. 31, 2021]

(ii) Extension(s).
None.

(iii) Rule 12.5.
N/A

(iv) Statutes, Jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1), 2101(c).

(v) Statutory challenges, Rule 29.4(b), (c).
S.G., Texas's A.G. both Served.

Primary Statutory Provisions

TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 502.001(45) ("**vehicle**").

28 U.S.C.A. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) (jurisdictional prohibition on referring dispositive matters), (c)(1), (c)(2) (consent, "civil cases").

28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a).

5TH.CIR.RS, generally; administrative promulgations.

Statement of the Case

Jurisdiction – W.D.Tex.

28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1367.

Identical jurisdictional facts

20-50**678**, 1:20-CV-70 (Brewster);
20-50**707**, 1:20-CV-296 (Mischtian); and
20-50**682**, 1:20-CV-493 (Lipscombe).

No "transportation."

Perkins wasn't "carrying passengers or cargo."

Perkins wasn't (1) removing people and/or property (2) from one place to another (3) *for hire* (4) under the choice of law of "this state."

No "consent."

Perkins terminated the last "Certificate of Title" trust in his name in early Dec., 2016, i.e., (A) about 10 days before the stop in "296" (Mischtian) and (B) just longer than two years before the stop for both "70" (Brewster) and "493" (Lipscombe).

No Probable Cause.

Perkins gave Notice of his *non*-consent to Sixth Plank (TRANSP. CODE) policy via display of *non*-DMV-approved taggage.

Inexorably intertwined procedurally

Perkins proclaims his non-consent to arbitration in each "civil case's" case style.

"70."

YEAKEL is a named party. Case assigned to PITMAN. Service completed.

Perkins's *Roell* Notice and participation cessation followed PITMAN's compelling arbitration in "296."

"296."

Despite "70," "296" was originally assigned to YEAKEL. YEAKEL, eternally addicted to compelling arbitration, referred all issues to the un-consented-to arbiter (magistrate) "at filing."

Roell Notice; participation ceased. Service didn't happen. Non-consent reasserted.

YEAKEL *did* transfer the case, but he never withdrew his referral "order." PITMAN didn't either.

This case is the focal point of PITMAN's Disqualification. Motion referred to EZRA. With PITMAN off the case, Perkins promptly requested Summons and initiated Service. But, EZRA's denying the motion reinstated PITMAN, tanking all three cases.

Perkins reasserted *Roell* and stopped.

"493" (this one).

Case originally assigned to PITMAN. *Roell* Notice and participation cessation followed from "296." Service didn't happen. Disqualification reasserted.

Additional merits

"70."

BREWSTER ***refuses*** to update DMV's records.

STATE, CITY ***refuse*** to teach law enforcement the TRANSP. CODE's dependence on "consent."

STATE, CITY, etc., advance the nationally syndicated "witch hunt" programme by intentionally libeling, slandering, stigmatizing as "sovereigns" (code for "domestic terr*rists") *all* who challenge authority regarding "transportation" matters.

Consequently, spotting Perkins's *non*-DMV-

approved taggage, CITY's employee stopped Perkins, charged, arrested, and searched him, ordered seizure of his car and the property in it, and then jailed him. SOUTHSIDE, the towing/storage outfit, demanded ransom for return of the car and property. Perkins didn't pay and demanded return of all of it. SOUTHSIDE released the car and property for sale at public auction. The losses are permanent.

"296."

Cf. No. 19-50023 (5th Cir.). *See also* Nos. 03-19-00356-CR, 03-19-00357-CR (Tex. App.—Austin, still pending). Spotting Perkins's *non*-DMV-approved taggage, BELTON's employee stopped Perkins and then arrested him (for alleged failure to identify).

At trial, MISCHTIAN denied Perkins his full Discovery, bulldozed the evidence, accepted the advisory panel's conclusion of guilty, and set a date for sentencing. After sentencing, MISCHTIAN ***politically emphasized*** his (baseless) assertion of jurisdiction by flash jailing Perkins for the day under the pretense of setting up Bond for appeal. *But*, Perkins already *had* Bond from trial. Moreover, the *additional* (P.R.) Bond ending the flash jailing has since simply disappeared.

"493;" **682** (this one).

Advancing CITY's illegal arrest, *see* "70," STATE initiated two proceedings: **(1)** Probation revocation, *see* No. 03-19-00339-CR (Tex. App.—Austin, **still pending**), *see also* No. WR-88,116-03 (Ct. Crim. App. 2019) and No. 19-1140 (2020), and **(2)** a new case, *see* 03-20-00006-CV (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, orig. proc.), No. 20-0021 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proc.), and No. 03-20-00231-CR (Tex. App.—Austin, still pending).

Upon revoking Probation, LIPSCOMBE ordered

Perkins arrested and jailed ***immediately***, boldly declaring that Perkins had no right to appeal.

"493" (682) on appeal

USCA5, construing administratively promulgated rules as *jurisdictional*, unleashed their "Whack-A-Pro-Se," *ex post facto* rule-creating clerical staff. Perkins refuses to condone *ex post facto anything*.

Perkins's *advanced* briefing techniques *save* time for the actual readers. He doesn't write to satisfy bean-counting deputy clerks.

The Brief is *more than* substantially compliant. Perkins makes *copious* Record references, but the Clerk objects. The Table of Authorities lists *full* cites, but a Brief properly uses *short* cites. Perkins's list is alpha per the *short* cite, *greatly* facilitating finding the full cite, but the Clerk objects.

Simultaneously conjuring non-existent jurisdiction and refusing to exercise jurisdiction, USCA5 delegated § 451 authority to the Clerk to "order" dismissal; *punishment* for both non-consent and challenging jurisdiction.

But see the ruling in **678**, *accepting* an essentially identical Brief as substantially compliant.

Argument

Statutory Challenge

1. Is the TEX. TRANSP. CODE "unconstitutional," as applied?

Consent cannot be compelled. *Lozman*, 568 U.S. 115 (2013).

Pleading standard

2. Was dismissal abusive?

Perkins pled the facts.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (abrogating *Conley*, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)), and *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 677-80 (applying *Twombly*).

LIPSCOMBE exerted jurisdiction he didn't have.

Revocation is a separate proceeding, administrative (civil, agreement-based) in nature, for which STATE must have/prove standing.

STATE, asserting only terms of legal conclusion, alleged breach of the Probation agreement via an alleged "offense" defined in the TRANSP. CODE. STATE neither pled nor proved "transportation" *or* "consent." STATE had no evidence of "**vehicle**." There being no "offense," there was no breach. STATE had no "injury in fact;" hence, no standing.

Politically emphasized assertion of jurisdiction.

In Texas, revocation purports to have a few procedural safeguards, but direct appeal is key, and total lack of jurisdiction to revoke is a matter for appeal. *However*, LIPSCOMBE, the champion of the "witch hunt" programme, at least regarding Perkins, wasn't content with his oath, the law, *or* the normal course. Just exactly like MISCHTIAN, LIPSCOMBE crossed *way* over the line in order to emphasize ***politically*** the consequences for challenging his jurisdiction. Defying his oath, the law, *and* the normal course, LIPSCOMBE ordered Perkins jailed ***immediately***, obliterating the entire point of the appeal.

Abuse.

PITMAN combined show cause with dismissal,

essentially granting his *sua sponte* motion without Notice or opportunity to respond. (*Roell* Notice; thus, moot?) By compelling arbitration, PITMAN exercised jurisdiction he *never* had. By dismissing, he refused to exercise the jurisdiction he *did* have.

If discretion *is* relevant to these *jurisdictional* issues, PITMAN abused it, repeatedly.

Compelled Arbitration

3. Is PITMAN Disqualified?

Thematic punishment of jurisdictional challenges.

Just like MISCHTIAN and LIPSCOMBE, PITMAN, too, *punished* Perkins, via dismissing, in part for challenging his jurisdiction.

In "296," YEAKEL never had jurisdiction to refer *any*thing, period. Perkins never consented, rendering illegal *any* referral. § 636(c); *Gamba*, 553 U.S. 1050 (2008); *Gomez*, 490 U.S. 858 (1989), citing ***Ford***, 824 F.2d 1430 (**5th Cir. 1987**) ("grave constitutional questions"); *Kalan*, 274 F.3d 1150 (7th Cir. 2001); ***Mendes Junior Int'l Co.***, 978 F.2d 920 (**5th Cir. 1992**) (§ 636 requires consent). *See also Volt Info. Sciences, Inc.*, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).

Moreover, § 636(b)(1)(A) prohibits, *jurisdictionally*, referral of dispositive issues.

YEAKEL, a party to "70," *did* transfer "296," but he never withdrew his (illegal) referral "order." Thus, Perkins moved for PITMAN do so. PITMAN refused, preferring joining the conspiracy with YEAKEL.

Perkins documented PITMAN's Disqualification, but EZRA, too, advances W.D.Tex.'s District-wide compelled arbitration policy.

Perkins filed his *Roell* Notices and stopped.

§ 455(a).

The typical analysis is of "(fair and) impartial," but we never arrive there. There's no "trial," *at all.* Per W.D.Tex.'s District-wide compelled arbitration policy, "trial" is annihilated; it's all shipped out the back door of the courthouse to the arbiters.

Arising in the appeals

Ex post facto.

4. Are standards created on the fly enforceable?

These clerical standards, made up on the fly, are not only *ex post facto* but also not even administrative promulgations subject to Notice and "consent." Perkins doesn't consent, *especially* to the Clerk's *ad hoc*, "Whack-A-Pro-Se" proposals.

Jurisdiction.

5. Are administratively promulgated rules jurisdictional?

Now declaring their own jurisdiction, USCA5 joins W.D.Tex.'s obliteration of Structural Due Process by treating *ad hoc*, *ex post facto*, clerical whim as superior to *legislatively* established juridiction *and* to their oaths to apply/use § 451.

6. May a § 451 judge ever delegate such authority?

USCA5 directed the *Clerk* to "order" dismissal. "*Judges*" sign "judgments." *F&M Schaefer Brewing Co.*, 356 U.S. 227 (1958). Section 451 authority *isn't* delegable. *Parker*, 855 F.2d at 1524.

Relief Requested

1. Grant this petition.
2. Vacate USCA5's delegation of § 451 authority.
3. Vacate USCA5's *Clerk's* dismissal.
4. If possible already, Declare TEX. TRANSP. CODE "unconstitutional," as applied.
5. Then, either
   a. preferably,
      i. Vacate PITMAN's dismissal,
      ii. Reinstate, and
      iii. Remand to W.D.Tex. with instructions that YEAKEL, PITMAN, *and* EZRA shall not participate; or
   b. Reinstate and Remand to USCA5 for a ruling.
6. Award costs; and
7. Grant all other relief applicable.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Wes Perkins
WES PERKINS

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-50682

A True Copy
Certified order issued Dec 31, 2020

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

WESLEY PERKINS,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

JOHN LIPSCOMBE, Judge, County Court at Law No. 3, Travis County, Texas Officially and Individually; TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS,

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 1:20-CV-493

CLERK'S OFFICE:

Under 5TH CIR. R. 42.3, the appeal is dismissed as of December 31, 2020, for want of prosecution. The Appellant failed to timely file a sufficient Appellant's brief.

LYLE W. CAYCE
Clerk of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Mary Frances Yeager

By: _____
Mary Frances Yeager, Deputy Clerk

ENTERED AT THE DIRECTION OF THE COURT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION

WESLEY PERKINS, Plaintiff, v. JOHN LIPSCOMBE, *in his official and individual capacities,* and TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS, Defendants.	§ § § § § § § § § §	1:20-CV-493-RP

ORDER

Plaintiff Wesley Perkins ("Perkins") filed his complaint in this case on May 6, 2020. (Dkt. 1). After Perkins moved to disqualify the undersigned, (Dkt. 9), this case was transferred to the docket of the Honorable Orlando L. Garcia, Chief United States District Judge for the Western District of Texas, (Dkt. 10). Chief Judge Garcia referred Perkins's motion to Senior United States District Judge David A. Ezra, (Dkt. 13), who denied it, (Dkt. 14). Chief Judge Garcia then transferred this case to the undersigned's docket. Having reviewed Perkins's filings so far in this case, the dockets of other cases Perkins has filed, and the relevant law, the Court dismisses Perkins's complaint with prejudice.

Perkins is proceeding pro se. This case is one of three he has filed in the Western District of Texas this year. *See Perkins v. Brewster*, No. 1:20-CV-70-RP (W.D. Tex.); *Perkins v. Mischtian*, No. 1:20-CV-296-RP-ML (W.D. Tex.). These cases complement the two that he previously filed in the Western District. *See Perkins v. Brewster*, No. 1:17-CV-378-LY, 2018 WL 814250, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2018), *report and recommendation adopted,* No. 1:17-CV-378-LY, 2018 WL 1898402 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2018); *Perkins v. Brewster*, No. 1:17-CV-1173-LY, 2018 WL 4323948, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2018), *subsequently aff'd sub nom. Perkins v. Ivey*, 772 F. App'x 245 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). Perkins has also previously filed a habeas case, *Perkins v. Hernandez*, 1:18-CV-201-RP (W.D. Tex.), and multiple cases in state court, *see Perkins v. State*, 2016 WL 4272109 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 11,

2016, pet. denied); *Perkins v. State*, No. 03-14-733-CR, 2016 WL 691265 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 19, 2016, pet. denied); *Perkins v. State*, 2015 WL 3941572 (Tex. App.—Austin June 25, 2015).

In each of these cases, Perkins has advanced similar or identical legal arguments, each of which has repeatedly been deemed not meritorious. In particular, in each of the cases he filed in 2020, he challenges the ability of a district judge to refer a dispositive motion to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation. (*See, e.g.*, Notice, Dkt. 8; Notice, Dkt. 16). Each of his complaints stems from his arrests "for driving without a license or registration and for operating an untitled and unregistered motor vehicle," and in each case, he argues that "his vehicle was not engaged in commercial transportation, and thus was not subject to the requirements of the Texas Transportation Code." *Perkins*, 772 F. App'x at 245; (*see* Compl., Dkt. 1).

Both strains of argument are without merit. The Fifth Circuit, directly addressing Perkins's own arguments concerning referrals to magistrate, held that:

> District court judges may designate magistrate judges to "submit . . . proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition" of any motion to dismiss.[2] Thus Perkins's first two arguments are directly foreclosed by law. And because his disqualification argument is founded on the mistaken belief that district judges may not delegate certain pretrial matters to magistrate judges for review and recommendation, it fails as well.

Perkins, 772 F. App'x at 246 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)) (footnote omitted); (*see also* Order, Dkt. 14, at 3 (differentiating between statutorily permitted referral of matters to magistrate judges and forced arbitration of claims)). In his filings, Perkins also argues that *Roell v. Withrow*, 538 U.S. 580, 582 (2003), bars referrals under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Notice, Dkt. 8; Notice, Dkt. 16). In *Roell*, the Supreme Court held that a court can infer, from the parties' "conduct during litigation," their consent to a magistrate judge conducting "any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter" under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). *Roell* is inapplicable to the cases now before this Court. Perkins's arguments miss the fundamental distinction between referring all proceedings to a magistrate judge under § 636*(c)*(1), which indeed requires the parties' consent (inferred or not), and referring

individual motions to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation under § 636*(b)*(1). The question of whether or not Perkins "consents" to a referral under § 636(b)(1), the provision at issue here, is immaterial.

Similarly, multiple courts have held that Perkins's Texas Transportation Code-related claims, such as those he brings in this case, are meritless. *See, e.g.*, *Perkins*, 772 F. App'x at 246–27 ("Perkins violated these laws according to their plain meaning. And his counter-argument that he is not governed by the statutes is unconvincing."); *Perkins*, 2018 WL 4323948, at *1–2 ("[T]he entire basis for each of his claims is the oft-rejected argument that he is not required to either have a driver's license or register his car because he does not consent to be bound by the Texas Transportation Code. This is blatantly incorrect."); *Perkins*, 2017 WL 814250, at *2;[1] *Perkins*, 2016 WL 4272109, at *2; *Perkins*, 2016 WL 691265 at *1–2; *Perkins*, 2015 WL 3941572, at *2–3.

Perkins is not a prisoner and is not proceeding *in forma pauperis*. The screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a) and (e) therefore do not apply here. Nevertheless, district courts have the inherent authority to screen a pleading for frivolousness and may dismiss, sua sponte, claims that are "totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion" because such claims lack "the "legal plausibility necessary to invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction." *Apple v. Glenn*, 183 F.3d 477, 479–80 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (citing *Hagans v. Lavine*, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974); *see also Dilworth v. Dallas Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist.*, 81 F.3d 616, 617 (5th Cir. 1996)). This inherent power applies to complaints for which the plaintiff is not a prisoner and has paid a filing fee. *Black v. Hornsby*, No. 5:14-CV-0822, 2014 WL 2535168, at *3 (W.D. La. May 15, 2014), *aff'd sub nom. Black v. Hathaway*, 616 F. App'x 650 (5th Cir. 2015).

[1] "Leaving aside how non-sensical [the argument that Perkins did not consent to be bound by the Texas Transportation Code] is, the Court's analysis need go no further than the very first assertion: that to be regulated under the Transportation Code, one must assert 'commercial consent.' Because this assertion is incorrect (as numerous courts have told Perkins), the remaining steps in his analysis cannot stand, as they are based on a false premise."

The Fifth Circuit has recently affirmed that "[s]ome claims are 'so insubstantial, implausible, . . . or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.'" *Atakapa Indian de Creole Nation v. Louisiana*, 943 F.3d 1004, 1006 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting *Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida Cty.*, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974)). Indeed, "[f]ederal courts lack power to entertain these 'wholly insubstantial and frivolous' claims." *Id.* (quoting *Southpark Square Ltd. v. City of Jackson, Miss.*, 565 F.2d 338, 343–44 (5th Cir. 1977)). "Determining whether a claim is 'wholly insubstantial and frivolous' requires asking whether it is 'obviously without merit' or whether the claim's 'unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of [higher courts] as to foreclose the subject.'" *Id.* (quoting *Southpark Square*, 565 F.2d at 342). While here, the Court makes no jurisdictional findings, as the Fifth Circuit arguably did in *Atakapa*, the Court does find that Perkins's claims—made after repeated admonishments by multiple courts over several years that they are meritless—are insubstantial and frivolous. Perkins's choice to proceed in this manner harms both the Court and other litigants:

> Federal courts are proper forums for the resolution of serious and substantial federal claims. They are frequently the last, and sometimes the only, resort for those who are oppressed by the denial of the rights given them by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Fulfilling this mission and the other jurisdiction conferred by acts of Congress has imposed on the federal courts a work load that taxes their capacity. Each litigant who improperly seeks federal judicial relief for a petty claim forces other litigants with more serious claims to await a day in court. When litigants improperly invoke the aid of a federal court to redress what is patently a trifling claim, the district court should not attempt to ascertain who was right or who was wrong in provoking the quarrel but should dispatch the matter quickly.

Raymon v. Alvord Indep. Sch. Dist., 639 F.2d 257, 257 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981).

Because the Court finds that Perkins's claims are frivolous, the Court invokes its inherent authority and **ORDERS** that Perkins's complaint, (Dkt. 1), is **DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE** as frivolous. The Court will enter final judgment in a separate order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Perkins is warned that filing or pursuing any further frivolous lawsuits may result in (1) the imposition of court costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f); (2) the imposition of significant monetary sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; (3) the imposition of an order barring him from filing any lawsuits in this Court without first obtaining the permission from a District Judge of this Court or a Circuit Judge of the Fifth Circuit; or (4) the imposition of an order imposing some combination of these sanctions.

SIGNED on July 20, 2020.

ROBERT PITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE