

APPENDIX A

**Memorandum Adopting Report and Recommendation of the
United States Magistrate Judge
4:18-cv-00610**

Order deeming Vexatious Litigant Dkt#156
from the US Eastern District Court of Texas

APPENDIX A

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION

WANDA L. BOWLING

v.

LESTER JOHN DAHLHEIMER, JR.,
ET AL.

§ Civil Action No. 4:18-CV-610
§ (Judge Mazzant/Judge Nowak)
§
§
§

**MEMORANDUM ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

Came on for consideration the report of the United States Magistrate Judge in this action, this matter having been heretofore referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. On August 9, 2019, the report of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt. #129) was entered containing proposed findings of fact and recommendations that Defendant District Attorney Greg Willis's Motion for Sanctions and to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant ("Motion") (Dkt. #56), Supplement (Dkt. #94), and Second Supplement (Dkt. #120) be granted in part and denied in part. Having received the report of the Magistrate Judge, having considered Plaintiff's Objection (Dkt. #136), Defendant's Response (Dkt. #144), and having conducted a de novo review, the Court is of the opinion that the Magistrate Judge's report should be adopted.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

The facts are set out in further detail by the Magistrate Judge and need not be repeated.¹ On October 31, 2019, DA Willis filed the present Motion, seeking monetary sanctions, a pre-filing injunction against Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff be declared a vexatious litigant (Dkt. #56 at pp. 7–11). Thereafter, DA Willis twice supplemented his Motion. On August 9, 2019, the Magistrate

¹ Plaintiff makes several objections to the factual background in the Report (Dkt. #136 at pp. 1–3); upon independent review, the Court finds Plaintiff's objections to be unfounded and/or irrelevant. Plaintiff's objections related to the factual recitation contained in the report are overruled.

Judge recommended denying the bulk of the relief requested by DA Willis, but after discussion determined that a very limited and narrow pre-filing injunction was warranted, requiring Plaintiff to obtain leave of court before “filing in, or removing to, the Eastern District of Texas the case *Bowling v. Dahlheimer*, Case No. 469-51274-2015 in the 469th Judicial District Court in Collin County (the “Divorce Proceeding”) or any civil action (including any enforcement proceedings) related to the divorce proceedings between Plaintiff and Defendant John Dahlheimer, Jr.” (Dkt. #129). Plaintiff filed Objections to the report on September 9, 2019 (Dkt. #136). On September 16, 2019, Defendants filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Objections (Dkt. #144).

OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

A party who files timely written objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is entitled to a de novo review of those findings or recommendations to which the party specifically objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2)-(3). Plaintiff objects to the Court’s authority to impose a pre-filing injunction (Dkt. #136). More specifically, Plaintiff objects to the recommended sanction on the grounds that the “[d]ivorce [p]roceedings are over” and therefore the court lacks jurisdiction to impose “ANY requirement between Plaintiff and another Defendant other than [DA] Willis.” Further, Plaintiff contends that such an imposition would be a constitutional violation (Dkt. #136 at p. 2). Defendant DA Willis responds that the Court may properly impose such sanctions, and further advocates that, if anything, the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation was too lenient (Dkt. #144).

The Court has authority to impose sanctions to “deter baseless filings in district court” and “spare innocent parties and overburdened courts from the filing of frivolous lawsuits.” *Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.*, 469 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). The Court similarly has a duty to impose the least severe sanctions adequate to deter similar conduct in the future. *See Mendoza v. Lynaugh*,

989 F.2d 191, 196 (5th Cir. 1993); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1). Moreover, to Plaintiff's constitutional concern, “imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits of an action. Rather, it requires the determination of a collateral issue: whether the [party] has abused the judicial process, and, if so, what sanction would be appropriate.’ Such an order implicates no constitutional concern because it ‘does not signify a district court's assessment of the legal merits of the complaint.’” *Willy v. Coastal Corp.*, 503 U.S. 131, 138 (1992) (citing *Cooter & Gell*, 496 U.S. at 395-96.) (internal citations omitted). “[T]here is no constitutional infirmity under Article III in requiring those practicing before the courts to conduct themselves in compliance with the applicable procedural rules … and to allow the courts to impose Rule 11 sanctions in the event of their failure to do so.” *Id.* at 139.

Here, the Magistrate Judge determined that monetary sanctions were not appropriate but that a limited pre-filing injunction was warranted due to Plaintiff's “disregard of the lack of any legitimate, legal claim against DA Willis” and lack of any good-faith argument in support thereof, as well as “an emerging pattern and/or course of conduct intended to disrupt or delay the state court's consideration of certain matters in the underlying divorce proceeding” (Dkt. #129 at pp. 6–7). It is apparent from the record(s) that Plaintiff has repeatedly attempted to remove her divorce proceeding to this Court. Plaintiff has now filed and/or otherwise initiated three separate cases in federal court related to her divorce in the past year. *See* Cause Nos. 4:18-cv-610; 4:19-cv-144; 4:19-cv-22. Additionally, Plaintiff's objection evinces her possible misunderstanding of the sanction being imposed (Dkt. #136 at p. 2). Without leave of court, Plaintiff is prohibited from further filing in, or removing to, this Court any civil action related to her state court divorce proceedings. The pre-filing injunction is not specific to any defendant, rather it is specific to this Court, and to Plaintiff's state court divorce proceeding. Plaintiff's Objection is overruled.

CONCLUSION

Having considered Plaintiff's Objection (Dkt. #136), Defendant's Response (Dkt. #144) and having conducted a de novo review, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge's report (Dkt. #129) as the findings and conclusions of the Court.

It is, therefore, **ORDERED** that Defendant District Attorney Greg Willis's Motion for Sanctions and to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant (Dkt. #56), Supplement (Dkt. #94), and Second Supplement (Dkt. #120) are **GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART** as set forth herein. Specifically, Plaintiff shall be enjoined from future filings in this District as follows:

Plaintiff is prohibited from filing in or removing to, the Eastern District of Texas the case *Bowling v. Dahlheimer*, Case No. 469-51274-2015 in the 469th Judicial District Court in Collin County (the "Divorce Proceeding") or any civil action (including any enforcement proceedings) related to the divorce proceedings between Plaintiff and Defendant John Dahlheimer, Jr., without leave of court.

Plaintiff shall be required to obtain leave of court from an active Eastern District of Texas Judge assigned to the division in which the case will be filed, or the Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Texas. Plaintiff must file a written motion requesting leave of court and attach to the motion for leave copies of (1) the proposed complaint; (2) a copy of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation; and (3) this Memo Adopting. This pre-filing injunction is not intended to and shall not apply to any current or pending matters before the Eastern District of Texas but shall only be applicable to future cases.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

SIGNED this 27th day of September, 2019.



AMOS L. MAZZANT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPENDIX B

Appellant Brief 19-40914

Interlocutory appeal(before judgment)
of Order deeming Vexatious Litigant Dkt#156
from the US Eastern District Court of Texas

APPENDIX B

No. 19-40914

**IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT**

**WANDA BOWLING
Plaintiff - Appellant**

vs.

**GREG WILLIS, in his Official and Individual Capacity,
Defendants - Appellee**

Interlocutory Appeal from the United States District Court
Eastern District of Texas, Case No. 4:18-cv-00610

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

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NO ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
No. 19-40914

WANDA BOWLING,

Plaintiff - Appellant


v.

GREG WILLIS, in his Official and Individual Capacity,

Defendants - Appellees

The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons and entities listed in the fourth sentence of 5th Cir. Rule 28.2.1. have an interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that the Judges of this Court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal:

1. US Magistrate Judge Christine Nowak: US Eastern District Court Magistrate Judge for above case.
2. US Judge Amos Mazzant: US Easter District Court Judge for above case
3. Greg Willis, Defendant
4. Robert Davis, Attorney for Greg Willis



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INTRODUCTION

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

COMES NOW, WANDA BOWLING, files this Brief challenging the Memorandum Adopting Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, a prefiling injunction(ROA.1519-1522), by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman Division, in Cause No. 4:18-cv-00610, the Honorable Amos Mazzant, United States District Judge, presiding.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Wanda Bowling, Appellant, brought this case to the US Eastern District Court of Texas under subject matter pursuant to Title 42 United States Code 1983 Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, Title 42 United States Code 1985 Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights, 28 U.S. Code § 1356 - Seizures not within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, 28 U.S. Code § 1343 - Civil rights and elective franchise, 28 U.S. Code § 1367 - Supplemental jurisdiction and Title 28, U.S.C. § 754 and 959(a) Trustees and Receivers, and the overarching 28 U.S.C. §1331 Federal Question.(ROA.22)(First Amended Complaint p.2: designated for ROA/omitted)(Second Amended ROA.1417-1418)

The US District Court of Texas abused their discretion on multiple fronts, but the subject matter for this interlocutory appeal is the wrongful issuance of a sanction requested by Greg Willis, Collin County District Attorney, against Bowling. This sanction serves as a prefilng injunction. The US District's Memorandum Adopting Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge(ROA.1519-1522), sanction against Bowling, is immediately appealable under 28 U.S. Code § 1292 Interlocutory Decisions and the Collateral-Order Doctrine see, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) Bowling appeals this prefilng injunction based on abuse of discretion and it's lack of constitutional foundation, violating State and Federal Law.

The Memorandum Adopting Report and Recommendation of the United State Magistrate Judge of sanction, prefilng injunction, (ROA.1519-1522) was issued by the US District Court of Texas on 9/27/2019. Bowling filed a Notice of Appeal 10/28/2019. This case was officially docketed in the US Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on 12/3/2019. The court graciously issued an extension for Bowling's Brief to be filed timely by 2/13/2020.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW

1. First Issue: The US Federal District Court abused their discretion for issuing an Order confirming Bowling a “Vexatious Litigant”.
2. Second Issue: The US Federal District Court, in the same order, abused their discretion by issuing a sanction against Bowling, a prefilng injunction.
3. Third Issue: The US Federal District is currently abusing their discretion by declining to rule on previously filed Motions for Reconsideration under Rule 60 and a Second Amended Complaint using this sanction(prefiling injunction) as a retroactive shield. The District Court declined to respond to a Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The main cause of failure in the Federal District Court

The Magistrate Judge Nowak in this court is biased and prejudicial. Judge Nowak won her seat as a Federal Judge by Appellee's wife, Jill Willis, who served on the commission to appoint Nowak to the Federal bench. All of Nowak's reports and recommendations have gross errors of fact, omissions of argument.

Federal Case arising from the unconstitutional conduct from State Court

Individuals in their Official and Individual Capacities

This sanction arises from a State Court case in which defendants are charged with violating several U.S. Constitutional rights. Some of the actions step on both the Texas Penal Code and the US Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedures Code.

The fire of corruption began when Bowling submitted a motion in the state court after discovering her former spouse had stolen separate real estate property, forged deeds, forged contracts, used her S Corporation for his business, etc. The Trial Court Judge McCraw ignored the pleading and allowed the former spouse (Dahlheimer), the new recipient of his Trust Fund, to litigate frivolously (vexatiously) cluttering up court time to conceal evidentiary support. The frivolous litigation caused Bowling to spend an unmanageable amount of money defending herself against the false claims from Dahlheimer and his vexatious

attorney Paulette Mueller. Eventually the financial stress forced Bowling to proceed Pro Se. Judge McCraw proceeded as though she could abuse her new toy court any way she wanted. McCraw's unlawful conduct was first advertised in Bowling's Motion to Recuse McCraw. McCraw's intent to abuse Bowling increased. In the mist of McCraw's unconstitutional conduct, the District Attorney Greg Willis, conspiring with McCraw(see history below), stepped in to assist in threatening Bowling. Out of nowhere, Willis, the Collin County District Attorney charged Bowling with an outrageous accusation and tried to incarcerate her. Timely adjacent to Willis's malicious litigation would be law enforcement, who Willis is conservator over, who would call Bowling, invite themselves into Bowling's home, and begin threatening her. This happened on multiple occasions. Bowling sent the Chief of Police, Mr. Rushin, a few still pictures of their criminal threats. Bowling has the corrupt police conduct on videos cameras. Bowling furiously defended herself in the divorce only to face a default judgment due to McCraw having the bench trial without notifying Bowling. McCraw gratifyingly handed over much of Bowling's separate property to Dahlheimer(separate property already established in previous court hearings).

After the divorce was over (July 2016) McCraw forced Bowling out of her newly purchased home which the downpayment of 100K belonged to Bowling's separate property estate.

Bowling moved out and walked away waving the white flag.

Dahlheimer's response to the white flag:

Six(6) days after the Divorce was final Defendants, Dahlheimer and Paulette Mueller, vexatiously came after Bowling again trumping up false charges and tried to incarcerate her. The new lawsuit against Bowling(penniless now) was disguised as a MOTION FOR ENFORCEMENT, however, the multiple charges were false. Dahlheimer, ex-spouse, apparently didn't like Bowling's approach of peace.

Dahlheimer's attorney, Paulette Mueller, was all too happy to take Dahlheimer's newly inherited wealth to frivolously litigate. McCraw, who refused to answer Bowling's Request for Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, was so happy to entertain the vexatious litigation and charged heavily to assist Mueller and Dahlheimer.

Bowling saw no solution, but to escalate to the Appellate Court rather than face what Willis, McCraw, Dahlheimer and Mueller would do to her next.

Upon a long and approaching end to an Appeal, the Appellate Court conveniently lost 87 megabytes of evidentiary Trial clerk records (\$1100.00 transfer cost) originating from McCraw's Trial court and closed Bowling's case with a baseless opinion. Bowling requested the Appellate Court, Judge Evans and

the Clerk of the Court, to correct the records and a requested a rehearing.

Requests "DENIED".

Bowling, again, waved the white flag.

Dahlheimer's response to Bowling's white flag, again

Within approximately three weeks after the last appellate order was received, Dahlheimer and Mueller came after Bowling once again with a new lawsuit trumping up more false charges in the Trial court, Judge McCraw, who that was all too happy to oblige the vexatious litigation. The new lawsuit, again, was disguised as another MOTION FOR ENFORCEMENT.

Again, Bowling saw no solution to protect herself, but to escalate to the Federal Court. Along the journey of abuse and concealment was the Bowling's former spouse Lester Dahlheimer Jr., his attorney Paulette Mueller, Trial Judge McCraw, Greg Willis, DA, Appellate Judge Evans, Appellate Clerk of the Court, and two receivers, Herres and Penfold, who stole equity, insurance proceeds, and damaged Bowling's property.

Bowling has always been in a defensive disposition. As time moved forward in the journey, more abuse occurred, more criminal actions occurred, and once exposed unlawful concealment ensued.

A HISTORY: of Greg Willis and McCraw collusion

Greg Willis, Defendant, was nominated to the Collin County Court of Law in 2006 and subsequently ran unopposed to keep his Judgeship until 2009. Approximately, October 2009 Willis was accused of corruption by the current District Attorney's office on many fronts including taking bribes in his official position as a Judge in the Collin County Courthouse. The investigation ensued and several prosecutors were called to testify before the Grand Jury including Piper McCraw. At the time McCraw worked for the current District Attorney's office of the time. It was Piper McCraw's testimony at the Grand Jury that betrayed the current District Attorney's investigation against Willis. McCraw's testimony threw the D.A.'s entire case under the bus. Piper McCraw was immediately suspended and eventually fired from the District Attorney's office "for insubordination"(2011). Greg Willis went on to run for the District Attorney's office of Collin County(2011) and Piper McCraw, same year(2011), endeavored to to be a Judge in the Collin County 380th District Court(2011 campaigning for the 2012 term: according to the Texas Ethics Commission financial report). She did not succeed.

Interestingly, Richard Schell who currently serves as a Federal Judge in the U.S. Eastern District of Texas, administered Willis' oath to office.

In 2015, while Willis is serving as District Attorney, Piper McCraw was nominated by an unknown source and subsequently appointed by Greg Abbott as a Republican Judge in the Collin County 469th District Court.

AT THE BEGINNING: Piper McCraw's and Greg Willis's abuse of discretion

At the beginning, Bowling filed for divorce in the 219th District of Collin County 3/2015. The case was stagnant due to the unfortunate illness of the current presiding Judge. Bowling's case was transferred in September 2015 to the newly appointed Judge McCraw of the 469th District Court of Collin County. Within two months, two hearings, McCraw demonstrated an affinity for abuse of discretion in lieu of justice which precipitated Bowling to file a Motion to Recuse Judge McCraw November 2015. The recusal pleading is only 19 pages, but the attached evidence includes two transcripts with a large amount of evidence and is **A MUST READ** if this court has access to Odyssey. This document demonstrates a disgusting abuse of discretion. Pay special attention to pages 42-43 where while Bowling was testifying to the evidence on the stand, defendant Mueller took Bowling's pile of evidence from her and decided to "help admit" the evidence while Judge McCraw actively shushed Bowling from calling out the descriptions of each item that should have been admitted ("just the exhibit number

please"). This strategically gave Mueller and McCraw a way to omit whatever they selected as evidence. Evidence that should have made it into evidence did not. Some items admitted were items unlawfully admitted and not known by the Bowling. Mueller and McCraw conspired to tamper with Bowling's evidence in court. Inclusive of the evidence submitted in the courtroom was proof of Dahlheimer stalking Bowling in church for 7 months violating a Protection Order over and over, breaking into her home, arrest(s) and continued threats toward Bowling. Enough was submitted to make this Motion for Recusal of Judge McCraw A MUST READ.

Bowling appealed to Greg Willis for the issues and asked for help.

WILLIS'S RESPONSE TO BOWLINGS PLEA FOR HELP:

District Attorney Greg Willis's false accusation toward Bowling intending to wrongly incarcerate/punish her(instead of prosecuting the above offenses)

Upon the impending recusal hearing Bowling received a strange request(ROA.656) in the mail from Greg Willis's District Attorney's office to appear in court on December 1, 2015. The notice didn't indicate why Bowling must appear. The notice simply identified a gun as the subject matter(ROA.656).

Bowling arrived to court that day with her brother only to experience the below:

1. Bowling was accused by Greg Willis District Attorney of stealing Lester Dahlheimer Jr.'s gun. (ROA.743) This is false. The gun is factually in Bowling's name as owner and was tied to her CHL in Georgia. NOTE: Reciprocity for CHL exists with Texas.
2. The District Attorney lied to the court and claimed Bowling was already divorced from spouse and there was a divorce decree. (ROA.742) This is false. Bowling and Defendant were not divorced for another 7 months(July of 2016). A decree didn't exist at that time.
3. The District Attorney lied to the court that the Divorce Decree gave Lester Dahlheimer Jr., (of historical violence and recently arrested), ownership of subject matter gun. (ROA.742) This is false. A decree or any other document did not exist giving Lester John Dahlheimer Jr. any award of such gun.
4. The District Attorney insisted on incarceration.

Probable cause did not exist. Willis lied about the probable cause stating there was a Divorce and Dahlheimer was awarded the gun.

Consequently, it appeared the presiding Judge and what looks like a constable(possibly Joe Wright), who were in attendance, didn't trust the accusation by the DA and immediately jumped to Bowling's defense. These two court officials gave Bowling time to prove Bowling owned the firearm, no such Divorce

existed, and no such “award” of the gun existed. Bowling was found to be innocent of the entire set of charges and released.

More disturbing about this incident is the “notice” (ROA.656) had no indication there were criminal charges against Bowling which deceptively deterred Bowling from retaining counsel to attend the requested “appearance” further weakening her right to protect herself. Bowling had never seen the record Request for Property Hearing ROA.742 or Docket Case file ROA.743 until this lawsuit ensued in the Federal Court.

Bowling spent the next few months writing Greg Willis and demanding an answer:

1. What STANDING did the Willis have to surprise her with a false accusation of a criminal offense and why would he manufacture false evidence to portray “probable cause”. Why did he try to incarcerate her?
2. As to why Willis refused to prosecute Dahlheimer who lavishly violated the protection order against him, was arrested, and had Dahlheimer’s confession in evidence of his history of violence toward Bowling.
3. What was the basis for immediately expunging Mr. Dahlheimer’s justified police arrest for violating the Protection Order?
4. Why didn’t Willis intervene in the criminal offenses of Dahlheimer and his attorney, Defendant Paulette Mueller of forgery, fraud, and theft.

Willis's "people" finally responded to Bowling and invited Bowling into the DA's office to hear details of her issued with Greg Willis. Bowling left Greg Willis' office with the promise that they, Willis's "people", would get back to Bowling with explanations to the above issues. Bowling never heard back from Willis's office. Willis has never explained any of the above events.

McCraw's continuance to abuse her discretion and adjudicate outside her jurisdiction with the assistance of Willis

At first launch into Bowling's Appeal the Appellate Court ordered the Trial Court to have a hearing for a STAY PENDING APPEAL filed by Bowling. It was GRANTED. The STAY PENDING APPEAL stayed any enforcements on the Divorce Decree(among other orders). There was a Rule 11 Agreement in place which gave Bowling exclusive control of her residence/property. With this structure of legal grounds Bowling moved back into her home as it had been vacant for 10 months and was declining due to the lack of care.

McCraw's response to Bowling moving back into her property during the Appeal

The Trial Court, McCraw, violated its own STAY PENDING APPEAL and adjudicate outside of its jurisdiction during the appeal. McCraw threatened

incarceration, sanctions, and issued unlawful orders as during the Appeal.

McCraw re-ordered up the divorce decree and aspired to unlawfully seize more of Bowling's established separate property. Someone(?) fostered local police(who legally have nothing to do with civil issues) to harass Bowling. Police on several occasions either just showed up at Bowling's door or called her threatening her to leave her residence immediately or be incarcerated even though legal counsel confirmed Bowling could possess her own property under the Rule 11 agreement in place.

Bowling appealed again to Willis since he is conservator over law enforcement only to receive silence, not a single response. Each new unlawful order McCraw issued was a direct violation of the Stay Pending Appeal. McCraw appeared to act as though she was untouchable as she continued to adjudicate outsider her jurisdiction and violate Bowling's federal constitutional rights. Willis appeared to support the unlawful efforts.

What happened in the higher courts of Texas?

After an Appellate opinion was issued by Judge David Evans of the Fifth District Court of Appeals in Texas it was discovered that the Appellate Court lost, deleted, absconded, checked out, or misfiled(or tampered with) Bowling's entire clerk record. This record was 87 megabytes exposing the corrupt journey in Judge

McCraw's Trial Court in collusion with the Dahlheimers, Mueller, and Willis including the extreme adjudication outside of the Trial Court's jurisdiction. Bowling motioned the Fifth District Court of Appeals to correct the record(which had previously cost Bowling \$1,100.00 to transfer from the Trial court), but Judge David Evans of the Fifth District Court of Appeals DENIED the request. The convenient loss of records concealed the collusion, unlawful conduct, and corruption of the Defendants as well as thwarted any move upward to the Texas Supreme Court who simply denied hearing Bowling's Application for Petition(6/15/2018).

NOTE: Judge McCraw was appointed as a "Republican" Judge by Greg Abbott. Judge Evans was appointed as a "Republican" Judge by Greg Abbott. Judge Evans loses Bowling's records(87 megabytes) which protects McCraw. Judge Evans subsequently was voted out of his judge chair by an opposing Democrat challenger. Later Greg Abbott rewards Judge Evans by re-appointing Evans as a "Republican" Judge again. Three Texas Supreme Court Justices were appointed by Greg Abbott as "Republican" judges who served an order of "DENIED" to deny correction of the Bowlings trial clerk records(87 megabytes lost). Judge Christine Nowak, Magistrate Judge of this Federal District court which has erred, omitted facts, misarticulated facts is conveniently married to Judge Tom Nowak,

Republican” Judge appointed by of Greg Abbott of the same court jurisdiction and court as Judge McCraw. Christine Nowak and Piper McCraw serve together on a 10 panel member advisory Committee of the Collin County Women’s Lawyers Association. There is one Master Puppeteer, Greg Abbott in the Executive Branch, pulling the strings to hundreds of “Republican” Judges who play on the same team rather than act as gatekeepers at different levels of justice. This tyrannical architecture clearly blurs the lines of “Checks and Balances”.

It must be called out the Greg Willis’s wife, Jill Willis, was on the commission who selected Christine Nowak for her federal judge appointment in 2015. Judge Nowak served up the prefilng injunction, subject matter for this court’s review, in behalf of Greg Willis. Greg Willis motioned for this sanction.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

First Issue:

1. The Federal District Court abused their discretion by wrongly declaring Bowling as a “Vexatious Litigant”
 - a. The Numerous element: Numerous lawsuits must exist. There is only one lawsuit against Willis by Bowling and it is in the US Federal District Eastern Court of Texas 4:18-cv-00610(same case appealed here). There has never been a history of any other lawsuits between Bowling and Appellee, Willis. Bowling’s one lawsuit does not reach the threshold of either Texas Vexatious Litigant Statutes nor the US Federal Vexatious Litigant caselaw.
 - b. The Merit element: The lawsuit must have merit.
 - i. Bowling has merit to file for a remedy in this case.
 - ii. Willis’s conduct of perjury, producing false evidence, and impermissible conduct in both the State and Federal courts lend to the merits of Bowling’s case.

Bowling’s case has not demonstrated bad faith, recklessness, and harassment as required by State and Federal Vexatious Litigant statutes.

2. Second Issue:

The Federal District Court abused their discretion by wrongly issuing a prefilng injunction.

- a. If the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals finds the Bowling does not fall under the criteria of a Vexatious litigant, then this court must find that the issuance of a prefilng injunction is an abuse of discretion.
- b. Bowling's one lawsuit does not rise to the threshold of Federal statutes of a prefilng injunction. A prefilng injunction violates both the Texas Statutes and the United States Constitution? The prefilng injunction infringes on Bowlings right to remedy by placing an obstruction of Bowling's access to the Federal District Court.

3. Third Issue:

The United States Eastern District Federal Court is abusing their discretion by using this appealed prefilng injunction issued 9/27/2019 to decline ruling on two Motions for Reconsiderations under Rule 60 filed on 9/9/2019 and Second amended Complaint(9/16/2019) for which both were filed before this prefilng injunction was issued. One Motion for Reconsideration Rule 60 is based on the court's(Nowak) omissions/errs and fraud on the court(ROA.1314-1344). This motion is in essence a request by Bowling to the court to produce evidentiary

findings of fact and conclusions of law. The other Motion for Reconsideration Rule 60 was based on the baseless denial of Bowling's First Amended Complaint(document designated for ROA, but was omitted by the District Court). Regarding the Second Amended Complaint(ROA.1417-1468) it was the court who instructed Bowling to amend her complaint(ROA.1543). Bowling had already filed it, yet the court refuses to accept it and move forward. The federal District court is refusing to answer any of the previously filed motions using the prefiling injunction as a retroactive shield to avoid accountability.

The Federal District Court needs to be compelled to answer Bowling's Motions for Rule 60 and explain why Bowling's arguments omitted have no basis and why they did not respond to Bowling's Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal.

ARGUMENT

FIRST ISSUE

The US Federal District Court abuse their discretion for issuing an Order confirming Bowling a Vexatious Litigant.

Argument for Issue 1(a) The Numerous Element: Only one lawsuit exists between the Bowling and Willis. (Same case for this Appeal)

In order to fulfill the Federal Statutes to declare a litigant “vexatious” the criteria according to Federal law is the litigant must have “numerous” lawsuits against the specific litigant. Bowling only has one lawsuit which is the subject matter for this Appeal. Further, this sanction declaring a Vexatious Litigant is in violation of Texas law as well and is in violation of Bowling’s right in her sovereign state.

Parameters declaring Bowling a Vexatious Litigant do not exist in this case

Legal Standard: The Numerous Element

The court has inherent power to sanction parties or their attorneys for improper conduct. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980); Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2001). However, in order to sanction a litigant under the court’s inherent powers, the court must make a specific finding of “bad faith or conduct

tantamount to bad faith.” Fink, 239 F.3d at 994. Although mere recklessness is insufficient to support sanctions under the court’s inherent powers, “recklessness when combined with an additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose” is sufficient. Id. at 993-94. “[I]nherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44. Under federal law, litigiousness alone is insufficient to support a finding of vexatiousness. See Moy v. United States, 906 F.2d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1990) (the plaintiff’s claims must not only be numerous, but also be patently without merit). The focus is on the number of suits that were frivolous or harassing in nature rather than on the number of suits that were simply adversely decided.

Discussion: Does Bowling have a litigious background of numerous lawsuits against Willis?

Bowling has only one suit against Willis. Therefore, Bowlings actions do not rise to the level of the Federal Statutes standard of review to declare Bowling of being a “Vexatious Litigant”.

On another note, it is unusual that a Federal court should find their “one” and only case by a party to be vexatious if there hasn’t been any such declaration of “vexatiousness” at the State level. There is a precedence to have a history of numerous and vexatious behavior prior to reaching a Federal court, yet it does not exist. Bowling’s actions in the State of Texas do not remotely meet the criteria for

a Vexatious Litigant by Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Chapter 11. 054 Criteria for Finding Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant. Declaring Bowling a vexatious litigant is in violation of Texas law.

Further, the current Federal District Court's sanction/prefiling injunction mentions very little about Bowling's actions in the Federal court. This "Federal" sanction against Bowling incessantly articulates events in one State Court Case that was escalated to the Texas Appellate Courts. The Federal Courts invoking "inherent powers" of authority to pass judgment of vexatious litigation in one State case seems far reaching and an abuse of such powers.

It must be noted that nothing in the State court case has any relativity to Greg Willis(the Appellee requesting this sanction).

The District courts did not address criteria requirements for vexatious litigation, however, Judge Nowak attempted to illustrate the "numerous" element by trying to pass off the District Courts disregard of Bowling's two attempts to enjoin to this case one particular Defendant(Judge John Roach) as "numerous lawsuits".

Subject to this sanction the Magistrate Judge writes:

"It is apparent from the record(s) that Plaintiff has repeatedly attempted to remove her divorce proceeding to this Court. Plaintiff has now filed and/or otherwise initiated three separate cases in federal court related to her divorce in the past year".

This is misstated to pass off the “numerous” element nor is any of Bowling’s attempts to enjoin Judge Roach to this one lawsuit have anything to do with “Divorce”. The Texas state divorce case was over in 2016.

There were two attempts made by Bowling to enjoin this particular party, Judge Roach, to this one federal case.

EVENTS: The Texas state case was closed. Defendants Dahlheimer/Mueller reopened the case with a new frivolous lawsuit against Bowling(as they did multiple times) disguised as a Motion for Enforcement. Judge McCraw insisted on continuing to reign over the new case even though she was currently a Defendant in Bowlings Federal case(this one). In the Federal Court Bowling requested an injunction against McCraw’s continued efforts to preside in the state court. McCraw finally recused herself from the new state lawsuit case. Judge Roach took the new state case, but simply enjoined himself in the corrupt behavior of covering up for his colleague McCraw. Judge Roach happily stepped outside his jurisdiction to punish Bowling.

Bowling requested this new state case be removed to the Federal District Court(4:19-CV-00022) and enjoined it(page 1 of Complaint) to the current case as the subject matter was the same. The Federal District court remanded the case back to the state court. The Magistrates unjustly claimed Bowling didn’t state Federal Questions in her Complaint.

With the failure to remove the state case of Judge Roach's violations, Bowling simply filed a similar lawsuit against Judge Roach for the same exact behavior of unchecked violations as in the first case(4:19-CV-00144). Again, Bowling requested to consolidate this case(page 1 of Complaint) to the one current Federal District case due to the group relativity and subject matter. This would be the second time Bowling tried to enjoin Judge Roach to the current case. The Federal District court simply ignored the Bowlings repeated requests to enjoin the new party, Judge Roach. So, now there are two cases in the Federal District court of the same subject matter, same court, same jurisdiction, same players.

It is a waste of Federal District court resources NOT to enjoin this particular party, Judge Roach, to this case.

This district court is trying to prove a false perception of "numerous litigation" on the part of Bowling.

Argument for Issue 1(b)(i) : Does Bowling's case have merit?

Legal Standard: The Merit Element

... in order to sanction a litigant under the court's inherent powers, the court must make a specific finding of "bad faith or conduct tantamount to bad faith." Fink, 239 F.3d at 994. Although mere recklessness is insufficient to support

sanctions under the court's inherent powers, "recklessness when combined with an additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose" is sufficient. *Id.* at 993-94.

Discussion: 1(b)(i): Did Bowling have merit to seek remedy for below or was this case frivolous and harassing?

In the complaint Bowling charged Willis for the following federal violations:

- Violation of due process
- Conspiracy to interfere with Civil Rights
- Failure to Intervene,
- Malicious prosecution

And while not formally charged Willis should be charged with Fraudulent Concealment of his actions to a Federal District Court by way of perjury.

There is no question Willis lied about having probable cause in a state court to charge and incarcerate Bowling.

- a) lied to the state court about Bowling being divorced.(ROA.742).
- b) lied to the state court about gun owned or was awarded to Dahlheimer.(ROA.742)
- c) Accused Sergeant Vance of requesting this hearing and writing such document, yet it appears to lack his signature.(ROA.742). This might be

because Sergeant Vance knew of the pending divorce, confirmed the gun ownership, confirmed there was a Protection Order against Dahlheimer, and knew why Bowling kept the gun in her purse close by.

d) lied to the state court by claiming Bowling stole the gun(ROA.743) where it states under Case Type: "Possession of Stolen Property Hearing – Article 47 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure).

There is no question he interfered into Bowling's life(rights) aggressively, with surprise (ROA.656) by luring her unsuspectingly into court(ROA.656) and without provocation. Then surprising Bowling by the act of trying to incarcerate Bowling. No probable cause existed.

Willis has never explained his actions. Bowling civilly asked Greg Willis to explain with no response. This leads to the conclusion of collusion with the newly appointed McCraw who was facing recusal and the Appellate court.

There is no question that Willis violated due process in the mist of his charging Bowling with a false charge to incarcerate her without probable cause. To achieve falsely imprisoning Bowling, Willis made false claims to the court.

There is no question Willis possessed the evidentiary support that Dahlheimer had a history of violence, stalking, and threatening Bowling, yet Willis joined McCraw's abuse of discretion and declined to protect Bowling when requested. (Evidence of Dahlheimer's violence/stalking is attached to the Motion

to Recuse Judge McCraw of the 469th Court of Collin County, 11/2015, A MUST READ). All evidence of violent history, arrests, confessions, and events was submitted in a hearing in front of McCraw and submitted separately to Willis, Collin County District Attorney.

Bowling requested for Willis to explain his actions in state court, the ongoing police harassment, the ongoing failure to assist with criminal breakins/threats/vandalism, and McCraw's criminal participation in all mentioned.

See example threat capture for Bowling's attempt to obtain a TRO in the Federal Court: Denied.

- See ROA.153: picture of Dahlheimer, Herres(receiver), locksmith parked in front of Bowling's house threatening to barge in. There is no Order in place to remove Bowling or implementation order for Bowling's exit.
- See ROA.154: Bowling called police. Same individuals(police) showed up that previously threatened Bowling 2016, 2017, and 2018.
- See ROA.155: Police invite themselves in(they saw Bowling's front door camera). Bowling telling them leave immediately.
- See ROA.156: Police steps forward toward Bowling in an attempt to bully her. Police do not know of the camera in the front living room.

- See ROA.157: All leave because Bowling stood her ground. They have no rights, and no probable cause, however, the threat was real.

Willis's participation was ongoing and without explanation. Bowling had no choice, but to seek remedy in a Federal Court to stop Willis's threats toward Bowling. This is the only case between Bowling and Willis in any court.

Bowling's actions have not demonstrated "bad faith, recklessness, and harassment" as required by State and Federal Vexatious Litigant statutes.

Willis is guilty of the stated charges regardless of the Federal Court's error of dismissing Bowling's charges against him.

Argument for Issue 1(b)(ii): Does Willis's unlawful conduct lend to the merits of Bowling's case?

If Willis perjured himself in the State court, submitted false evidence in the State Court, added more perjury in the Federal Court to cover up his state actions, added more false evidence in the Federal Court to cover up his actions in the State court, filed collectively approximately 11 pleadings and letters to Bowling countersuing Bowling with sanctions, then it would seem that Willis has demonstrated corruption which lend to the merits of the Bowling's case in the Federal Court.

Additionally, Willis's conduct would be deemed "impermissible conduct" which would nullify his immunity.

Legal Standard

The caselaw (one of many) which articulate Willis's conduct is not afford immunity:

Even if a prosecutor is performing an advocacy function, he will nonetheless be denied absolute immunity if he intertwines the exercise of his advocacy function with impermissible conduct; or if he acts in excess of his statutorily conferred jurisdiction. Thus, absolute immunity will not shield him if he "has intertwined his exercise of prosecutorial discretion with other, unauthorized conduct." *Bernard v. County of Suffolk*, 356 F.3d 495, 504.

The standard to determine if false declarations and submitting false evidence to a court rise to the level of impermissible conduct is found in:

18 U.S. Code § 1623. False declarations before grand jury or court

(a) Whoever under oath (or in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code) in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States knowingly makes any false material declaration or makes or uses any other information, including any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material, knowing the same to contain any false material declaration, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

"In most cases, the courts abbreviate their description of the elements and state in one form or another that to prove perjury the government must establish that "the defendant (1) knowingly made a (2) false (3) material declaration (4)

under oath (5) in a proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States.”

Discussion:

Do the below items rise to the level of impermissible conduct and lend to the merits of Bowling's case?

Items of Willis's false declaration

1. In the State court (ROA.742) Willis produces a document insinuating Sergeant Vance issued the Request for Hearing, yet Vance's signature is absent. Vance was not visibly present at that hearing. It was presumably Joe Wright, Constable, that protected Bowling. This document has never been seen by Bowling nor does it state on the record(ROA.743) the entry “Request for a Hearing” was issued by Sergeant Vance. Sergeant Vance and Bowling had met prior to this hearing and at that time Vance previously verified Bowling's Protection Order against Dahlheimer(violence/stalking), verified the “pending” divorce, and verified Bowling's ownership(and CHL) of this particular gun. It would seem highly unlikely that Sergeant Vance would request a hearing regarding an item or probable cause that he already has verifiable information as to the contrary. It is highly unlikely that Sergeant Vance would support advancing a gun to Dahlheimer who had a

proven history of violence and stalking. Willis's production of documents was fraud on the court.

2. In the State court (ROA.742) falsely insinuates there is a Divorce Decree, that the gun belongs to Dahlheimer(or was awarded to Dahlheimer)thus this is perjury to promote probable cause. All of claims in this document are easy to validate(invalidate) before an individual is charged with a crime.
3. In the State court (ROA.743) Willis already previously charged Bowling with stealing a gun from Dahlheimer without notifying her. Bowling would have hired an attorney had she known of the charges. An Attorney would have identified(witnessed) Willis's false probable cause. Willis endeavored to falsely imprison Bowling and the motive has not been explained to Bowling regardless of her repetitive requests for an explanation.

NOTE: Bowling has not audited all of Willis's documents in the Federal District Court as he filed many to sanction Bowling. There were too many to scrutinize. Below are some material items identified as "impermissible conduct".

4. In the Federal District court Willis knowingly misrepresents law by inserting his own words into a popular caselaw recitation of legal authority. Willis's insertion of his own words insinuates his investigatory role(no probable

cause) is covered by immunity. In Willis's Motion to Dismiss(ROA.189) he writes:

"Prosecutorial Immunity Bars Plaintiff's claims against Collin County District Attorney Willis in his individual capacity

*The doctrine of absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in *Imbler v. Pachtman*, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), provides that a state prosecutor who acts within the scope of his duties in initiating, investigating and pursuing a criminal prosecution and in presenting the state's case is absolutely immune from a civil suit for damages for alleged deprivations of the defendant's constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983."*

The law actually reads:

*"When a prosecutor performs "advocative" conduct, that is, he "act[s] within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution," *Imbler v. Pachtman*, 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976), he is absolutely immune from suit."*

There is no such word as "investigating" in this statement of law, *Imbler v. Pachtman*. It is no mistake that Willis deceitfully inserted his own wording "investigating" fully knowing that he had no probable cause to prosecute Bowling and incarcerate her. An investigatory role has no immunity afforded.

Bowling also noted to the Federal District court that "Even if a prosecutor is performing an advocative function(advocate of initiating prosecution), he will nonetheless be denied absolute immunity if he

intertwines the exercise of his advocacy function with “impermissible conduct”.

Bowling’s multitude of valid arguments of the law regarding Willis’s lack of different kinds of immunity are articulated in (ROA.41-42, ROA.650-654, ROA.705, ROA.1116-1120, ROA.1461-1463 and Bowling’s First Amended Complaint designated for ROA: omitted).

5. In the Federal District court Willis maliciously falsified facts of Bowling in a pleading to mislead the tribunal into believing his prosecution of Bowling had merit.

Willis claimed that when he charged Bowling with stealing a gun that the gun in question “was eventually returned to the lawful owner” (ROA.737) falsely insinuating to the Federal District court that Bowling had indeed stolen the gun(which is blatantly false) and insinuated the gun belonged to someone other than Bowling(which is false). This false statement misleads the Federal District court to believing Bowling was found guilty of stealing a gun. This is a malicious falsification. Willis deceived the District court into believing he had merit to prosecute Bowling. This shows intention to thwart the judicial machinery.

6. *WILLIS demonstrated conduct of malicious litigation*

On top of Willis's threats to wrongly incarcerate Bowling, Willis fostered judicial(McCraw) and law enforcement(police) corruption, committed fraud on the court, and threatened to sanction Bowling in documents (ROA.623-633, ROA.635, ROA.647, ROA.640, ROA.735, ROA.747-748, ROA.996-997, ROA.1184-1191, ROA.1471-1474).

Bowling has been on the defense from Willis's aggression on many fronts. Bowling's actions do not mimic "Vexatious Litigation". Willis's malicious litigation is "impermissible conduct" which nullifies immunity and should lend to the merits of Bowling's case.

7. Willis falsely claimed innocence in a Federal Court.

Willis is the only litigant of eight who claims he is innocent of depriving Bowlings constitutional rights(ROA.187-188). The other litigants did not deny their guilt, but simply invoked different immunity strategies without stepping into the real issues of depriving Bowling's rights. Willis is guilty, but falsely claimed his innocence in a Federal Court.

With the above identified it appears the elements of perjury seem to have been met: declaration, certificate, verification or statement AND two or more declarations inconsistent with the truth AND knowing "mens rea": intent to get away with his criminal actions. *United States v. Brugnara*, 856 F.3d 1198, 1209 (9th Cir. 2017); *see also* *United States v. Dudley*, 804 F.3d

506, 520 (1st Cir. 2015) (“A statement under oath constitutes perjury if is [1] false, [2] known to be so and [3] material to the proceeding.”);

Bowling did not accuse Willis with Perjury to the State or Federal District court, but the above facts lend heavily to the merits of Bowlings case and demonstrates that Willis is not innocent of the charges articulated in Bowling’s Complaint.

SECOND ISSUE

If this court finds Bowling does not meet the threshold of Vexatious Litigant

If this court finds that Bowling's argument of the First Issue is valid this court must find that a prefiling injunction against Bowling is an abuse of discretion. No restatement of Issue One required.

Parameters of a prefiling injunction

The verbiage below is from the appealed Memorandum Adopting Report and Recommendation of the United State Magistrate Judge for sanctions(ROA.1519-1522):

(ROA.1521-1522) *Without leave of court, Plaintiff is prohibited from further filing in, or removing to, this Court any civil action related to her state court divorce proceedings. The pre-filing injunction is not specific to any defendant, rather it is specific to this Court, and to Plaintiff's state court divorce proceeding. Plaintiff's Objection is overruled.*

Specifically, Plaintiff shall be enjoined from future filings in this District as follows:

*Plaintiff is prohibited from filing in or removing to, the Eastern District of Texas the case *Bowling v. Dahlheimer*, Case No. 469-51274-2015 in the 469th Judicial District Court in Collin County (the "Divorce Proceeding") or any civil action*

(including any enforcement proceedings) related to the divorce proceedings between Plaintiff and Defendant John Dahlheimer, Jr., without leave of court. Plaintiff shall be required to obtain leave of court from an active Eastern District of Texas Judge assigned to the division in which the case will be filed, or the Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Texas. Plaintiff must file a written motion requesting leave of court and attach to the motion for leave copies of (1) the proposed complaint; (2) a copy of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation; and (3) this Memo Adopting. This pre-filing injunction is not intended to and shall not apply to any current or pending matters before the Eastern District of Texas but shall only be applicable to future cases.

Judge Nowak's misarticulation of the subject matter

First, it must be established that this case has never been about the “*Divorce proceedings*” as the Magistrate Judge intentionally misarticulates. Greg Willis is being sued for Violation of Due Process, Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights, Failure to Intervene, and Malicious Prosecution. Other Defendants in this case are being sued for the same and Unlawful Seizure, Tampering with Governmental Records, and Fraudulent Concealment. There is nothing in this subject matter relating to divorce and nothing has been “re-litigated” from those previous proceedings.

This subject matter is proper for the Federal Court only. Placing any hindrances to access the Federal Court for the ongoing threats would be unconstitutional. The District court has unjustly denied Bowling's first Amended Complaint(designated for ROA, but omitted). If this is representative of the Federal Court's "remedy" Bowling will surely be denied wrongfully for ensuing abuses.

Legal Standard

Parameters allowing a prefiling injunction do not exist in this case

A prefiling injunction might fly under the All Writs Act 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000), however courts have held that such injunctive relief is an extreme remedy that should not be routinely granted, and that such relief is inappropriate unless there is a real and immediate threat of future injury combined with objectionable past conduct. *See Payman v. Mirza*, Nos. 2:02cv23, 2:02cv35, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14262, *8 (W.D. Va. July 18, 2005).

Discussion: Such condition of immediate threat of future injury does not exist and this lawsuit is the only case that exist between Bowling and Willis. To NOTE: It is Bowling who is experiencing repetitive injury inflicted by Willis.

No Res Judicata exist here

Legal Standard: In granting pre-filing injunctions under the All Writs Act, courts generally are concerned with preventing re-litigation of issues that have already been decided. It is essentially “an extra arrow in the quiver of *res judicata* and collateral estoppel.” Ezell v. Dan River, Inc., 2002 WL at *5.

Discussion: No such condition exists here. Bowling has never sued Greg Willis in any other court as this is the only suit that exists. Willis, however, has had honorable mention in Bowling’s Motion to Recuse Judge McCraw and in Bowling’s Brief in the Fifth District Court of Appeals in Texas.

Tailored to the specific circumstances presented

Legal Standard

Prefiling injunctions should be “tailored to the specific circumstances presented,” such that no litigant shall be denied their day in court. *Armstrong v. Koury Corp.*, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS at *2; *see also Tinsley v. More Bus. Forms, Inc.*, No. 93-2086, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 14208, *5 (4th Cir. June 9, 1994) (“An absolute bar to filing actions would be patently unconstitutional.”); *Pep Boys*, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *23-24 (“[S]o long as the injunction does not completely close access to the court. . . . it should be tailored to the specific circumstances presented.”).

Discussion: The prefiling injunction recommended by Judge Nowak and issued in the US District Court by Judge Mazzant clearly states “*The pre-filing injunction is not specific to any defendant, rather it is specific to this Court*”.

This prefiling injunction is clearly not tailored to the circumstances presented between Willis and Bowling. If this injunction was lawful it should only pertain to Greg Willis alleged offenses and his circumstances with Bowling, yet the District Court abuses their discretion and creates the injunction across a broad scope of defendants, future discovery of new defendants, “*or any civil action*” etc. (ROA.1521)

Right to bring suit in unrelated cases

Legal Standard: For example, in *Cromer*, the Fourth Circuit found too broad an injunction that prevented the *pro se* plaintiff from making any future filings in *any* case (even unrelated cases) in federal court without first obtaining permission from the magistrate judge who issued the injunction. *Cromer v. Kraft Foods* 390 F.3d at 819 (stating that although the plaintiff had proved to be a “frequent filer” with respect to his employment discrimination suit, “nothing in the record justified infringing upon his right to bring suit in *unrelated cases*”) (emphasis in original).

Discussion: The prefiling injunction prevents Bowling from bringing in parties that participated in Dahlheimer criminal actions which the Trial Court prevented. If Bowling desires to widen this case she should not be prevented by the Federal District Court especially since the incorporation of certain entities related are not local which would include Diversity jurisdiction.

Access to the courts for potentially meritorious claims in the future

Legal Standard: Likewise, in crafting the injunction issued in *Payman*, the court first stated that it would “not enjoin [the plaintiff] from filing any actions anywhere against the defendants or parties in privity with the defendants, as that would deny [the plaintiff] access to the courts for potentially meritorious claims in the future. *Payman v. Mirza* 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *13.

Discussion: The current prefiling injunction violates Bowlings rights to add parties to the current claim. The current defendants have a habit of blamethrowing their offenses to others as Willis did to Sergeant Vance. Bowling should have the right to add these parties to the current claim.

THIRD ISSUE

The Federal Court is refusing to answer to a pleading forcing them to account for omissions and fraud on the court filed before the prefiling injunction was issued. They are using this prefiling injunction as a shield.

Legal Standard: No standard has been identified allowing the courts to use a prefiling sanction retroactively to abandon previously filed motions for relief (Rule 60 reconsideration), a Second Amended Complaint, and a Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal.

Discussion: After the US District Eastern Court wrongly dismissed Bowling's case against four litigants(which was issued 8/7/19), Bowling motioned the court to reconsider under Rule 60 in two different motions. One was in regards to the unjustified denial of Bowlings First Amended Complaint ROA.1346-1355). The other motion requested reconsideration based on detailed gross misrepresentations, omissions, and fraud on the court(ROA.1314-1344). The requests for reconsideration was an effort to allow the court to correct their errors before it was necessary for an appeal.

Neither of these two motions have ever been addressed and it appears the US District Court is abusing its discretion by issuing a prefiling injunction order subsequently to these motions to justify **not** answering Bowling's request for relief.

The District court requested an additional amendment(The Second Amended Complaint ROA.1417-1469) prior to the prefiling injunction, yet the court declines to acknowledge it.

The District Court received Bowling's Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal on January 27th, 2020, yet the court has not responded.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

If Greg Willis is not against the criminal aggression toward Bowling, then he is for it. His conduct speaks for itself. Bowling does not deserve the harshness of this sanction, prefilng injunction.

Bowling's prayer is that this Court reverse the District Court's Memorandum Adopting Report and Recommendation of the United State Magistrate Judge, prefilng injunction(ROA.1519-1522); that Bowling recover their reasonable expenses and costs; and that they have such other and further relief, at law or in equity, to which they are justly entitled. 1 Kings 3:9.

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this brief complies with: (1) the type-volume limitations of FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(7)(B) because the brief contains 8,111 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii), according to the word count function of the word processing system, Microsoft Word 365, used to prepare the brief; and (2) the typeface requirements of FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(6) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface, Times New Roman in a 14 point font, using Microsoft Word 365 (which is the same program used to calculate the word count).



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
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been forwarded by first class mail or efiled to each attorney/party of record on this date 3/6/2020.



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March 02, 2020

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No. 19-40914 Wanda Bowling v. Lester Dahlheimer, Jr.
USDC No. 4:18-CV-610

Dear Ms. Bowling,

We filed your brief. However, you must make the following corrections within the next 14 days. You may:

1. Send someone to this office to correct the briefs;
2. Send someone to pick up the briefs, correct and return them;
3. Send a self-addressed stamped envelope and we will return your briefs, (we will tell you the postage cost on request). You must then mail the corrected briefs to this office;
4. Send corrected briefs and we will recycle those on file.

Opposing counsel's briefing time continues to run.

You need to correct or add:

Caption on the brief does not agree with the caption of the case in compliance with FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(2)(C). Caption must exactly match the Court's Official Caption (See Official Caption below)


Standard of review, see FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(B).

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Your brief has the wrong color cover. The color should be blue, see FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(2).

Sincerely,

LYLE W. CAYCE, Clerk

By: 
Shawn D. Henderson, Deputy Clerk
504-310-7668

CC:
Mr. Robert Jacob Davis

Case No. 19-40914

WANDA L. BOWLING,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

GREG WILLIS, in his Official and Individual Capacity,

Defendant - Appellee

APPENDIX C

**Opinion dismissing complaints against John Roach
19-41003**

APPENDIX C

**IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT**

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 29, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk

WANDA L. BOWLING,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

JUDGE JOHN ROACH, in his official and individual capacity,

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:19-CV-144

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:*

Appellant Wanda Bowling was involved in divorce proceedings in Texas's 296th District Court of Collin County. Judge John Roach presided over the enforcement of Bowling's divorce decree. Bowling brought this *pro se* 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Judge Roach in his official and individual capacity.¹

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

¹ Bowling brought this suit after a failed attempt to remove her state court divorce proceedings to federal court. *Dahlheimer v. Bowling*, No. 4:19-CV-22-ALM-CAN, 2019 WL

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Bowling asserted four counts in her amended complaint: (1) unlawful seizure of property; (2) lack of due process; (3) conspiracy to interfere with civil rights by threats and intimidation; and (4) abuse of process. Bowling alleged a wide-ranging conspiracy among multiple judges to deprive her of notice, due process, and property in the course of enforcing her divorce decree.² Bowling sought injunctive relief, including “[a]n order placing Plaintiff in the position that she would have been in had there been no violation of her rights,” along with damages.

Judge Roach moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). The district court referred the motion to dismiss to a magistrate judge, who recommended granting the motion for various reasons. Primarily, the magistrate judge recommended granting the motion to dismiss because the claims against Judge Roach in his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and because the *Younger* abstention doctrine bars claims against Judge Roach in his individual capacity. Alternatively, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal of all claims under Rule 12(b)(6) because Judge Roach is entitled to judicial immunity. Bowling filed objections. The district court adopted the recommendations of the magistrate judge and granted the motion to dismiss. Bowling now appeals, arguing that the district court erred by relying on Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) to dismiss her claims. We conclude that Bowling’s arguments lack merit and affirm the district court’s order dismissing Bowling’s claims.

948046, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2019), *report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Dahlheimer v. Bowling*, No. 4:19-CV-22, 2019 WL 937313 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2019).

² Bowling sued the alleged co-conspirators in separate lawsuits. See, e.g., *Bowling v. McCraw*, No. 4:18-CV-610-ALM-CAN, 2019 WL 2517834 (Mar. 7, 2019 E.D. Tex.), *report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Bowling v. Dahlheimer*, No. 4:18-CV-610, 2019 WL 3712025 (Aug. 7, 2019).

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I.

We review de novo dismissals under Rules 12(b)(1) and (6).³ *Bauer v. Texas*, 341 F.3d 352, 356–57 (5th Cir. 2003); *Benton v. United States*, 960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992). Further, “[o]ur review of subject-matter jurisdiction is plenary and de novo.” *Google, Inc. v. Hood*, 822 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2016). When a district court invokes an abstention doctrine, “we review [that ruling] for abuse of discretion” but “review de novo whether the requirements of a particular abstention doctrine are satisfied.” *Id.* (quoting *Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Earle*, 388 F.3d 515, 518 (5th Cir. 2004)). We accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and resolve any ambiguities in the plaintiff’s favor. *Benton*, 960 F.2d at 21.

Because Bowling is proceeding *pro se*, we construe her pleadings liberally. *Howard v. King*, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983). However, *pro se* litigants are not exempt from compliance with the relevant rules of procedure and substantive law. *Birl v. Estelle*, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981).

II.

As for Bowling’s claims against Judge Roach in his official capacity, the district court held that Judge Roach is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. We agree. Absent an exception to or waiver of sovereign immunity, “Texas judges are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims asserted against them in their official capacities as state actors.” *Davis v. Tarrant Cty.*, 565 F.3d 214, 228 (5th Cir. 2009); *see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman*, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984).

³ Judge Roach argues that certain district court rulings should be reviewed for plain error because Bowling did not properly object to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. Because the standard of review is not determinative, and Bowling’s pleadings are entitled to liberal construction, we review each issue de novo.

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Bowling argues that the *Ex Parte Young* doctrine—which permits suit against state officials in their official capacities so long as it seeks prospective relief to redress an ongoing violation of federal law—applies here. *Ex parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123, 167–68 (1908); *Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Tex., Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers’ Comp.*, 851 F.3d 507, 515–16 (5th Cir. 2017). In order to apply *Ex Parte Young*, the “court need only conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” *Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md.*, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (quoting *Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho*, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgement)); *see also Warnock v. Pecos Cty.*, 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996).

Ex Parte Young does not apply here. Though Bowling does seek prospective injunctive relief,⁴ she does not allege “an ongoing violation of federal law.” *Verizon Md., Inc.*, 535 U.S. at 645. Bowling does not identify any federal statute or provision of the United States Constitution that Judge Roach is currently violating. Therefore, Bowling has not alleged facts that would allow this court to infer any ongoing violation of federal law.

For these reasons, Bowling’s claims against Judge Roach in his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

III.

As for Bowling’s claims against Judge Roach in his individual capacity, the district court held that the *Younger* abstention doctrine bars this court from considering those claims. *See Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37 (1971);

⁴ Specifically, Bowling seeks “[a]n Injunctive order permanently enjoining/restraining Judge Roach from further acts of discrimination or retaliation.”

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Middlesex Cty. Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982). We agree, to the extent Bowling's claims seek injunctive relief.

Younger "applies to suits for injunctive and declaratory relief." *Google*, 822 F.3d at 222. "*Younger* established that federal courts should not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions unless the plaintiff shows 'bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstances that would call for equitable reliefs,' such as a 'flagrantly and patently' unconstitutional state statute." *Id.* (quoting *Younger*, 401 U.S at 53–54). "*Younger* has been expanded beyond the criminal context" and also applies to "pending civil proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state court's ability to perform their judicial functions." *Id.* (quoting *Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs*, 571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013)); *see also* *Middlesex Cty.*, 457 U.S. at 432 (applying *Younger* "to non-criminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved"). Where *Younger* applies, federal courts must abstain if "there is '(1) an ongoing state judicial proceeding, which (2) implicates important state interests, and (3) . . . provides an adequate opportunity to raise federal challenges.'" *Id.* (quoting *Sprint Commc'ns, Inc.*, 571 U.S. at 81). Notably, "requests for monetary damages do not fall within the purview of the *Younger* abstention doctrine." *Allen v. La. State Bd. of Dentistry*, 835 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1988).

The first prong of *Younger* is satisfied here because there is "an ongoing state judicial proceeding." *Google*, 822 F.3d at 222 (citation omitted). "The initial frame of reference for abstention purposes is the time that the federal complaint is filed. If a state action is pending at this time, the federal action must be dismissed." *DeSpain v. Johnston*, 731 F.2d 1171, 1178 (5th Cir. 1984). "In the most basic sense, a state proceeding is *pending* when it is begun before the federal proceeding is initiated and the state court appeals are not exhausted at the time of the federal filing." *Id.* At the time Bowling filed her

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federal complaint, Judge Roach had scheduled a hearing regarding the sale of certain property outlined in her divorce decree. And not long before this suit was filed, Judge Roach was issuing orders directed at Bowling, including an order to appear. Clearly, at the time Bowling filed suit, the state action seeking enforcement of her divorce decree had begun but was not yet complete. Therefore, at the time of suit, there was “an ongoing state judicial proceeding.” *Google*, 922 F.3d at 222 (citation omitted).

The second prong of *Younger* is satisfied because the ongoing state judicial proceeding “implicates important state interests.” *Id.* (citation omitted). “Family relations are a traditional area of state concern.” *Moore v. Sims*, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979). Likewise, the division of marital assets in the course of enforcing a divorce decree falls within the ambit of important state interest. *See Estate of Merkel v. Pollard*, 354 F. App’x 88, 94 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he importance of Texas’ interest in its own domestic-relations law is obvious.”); *Jasper v. Hardin Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t*, No. 1:11-CV-408, 2012 WL 4480713, at *9–10 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2012), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. 1:11-CV-408, 2012 WL 4472261 (Sept. 26, 2012). Indeed, the Texas Family Code contains clear instructions for Texas judges enforcing property division in divorce decrees, signaling Texas’s strong interest in the matter. *See, e.g.*, Tex. Fam. Code §§ 9.001, 9.002; *cf. Estate of Merkel*, 354 F. App’x at 95 (finding it relevant to the *Burford* abstention doctrine that Texas had “created ‘a special state forum for judicial review’ of divorce actions” (quoting Tex. Gov. Code Ann. § 24.601)).

The third prong of *Younger* is satisfied because the state judicial proceeding “provides an adequate opportunity to raise federal challenges.” *Google*, 822 F.3d at 222 (citation omitted). “[A]bstention is appropriate unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims.” *Moore*, 442 U.S. at 425–26. Where “a litigant has not attempted to present his federal

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claims in related state-court proceedings,” we “assume that state court procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.” *Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.*, 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987). Bowling has not alleged any defect in the state court proceedings or in Texas law that “clearly bars” her ability to raise her constitutional claims.⁵ Therefore, we assume that the divorce decree enforcement proceedings below, and the proceedings that led to the original divorce decree, provided “an adequate opportunity” to raise federal challenges. *Google*, 822 F.3d at 222 (citation omitted).

For these reasons, the district court correctly abstained from adjudicating Bowling’s equitable claims against Judge Roach in his individual capacity under *Younger*.

IV.

As for Bowling’s damages claims against Judge Roach, judicial immunity shields the judge from those claims. “Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit and not just from the ultimate assessment of damages.” *Ballard v. Wall*, 413 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 2005). Judicial immunity can be pierced in two circumstances: (1) “a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, *i.e.*, actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity”; and (2) “a judge is not immune from actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” *Mireles v. Waco*, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991).

Bowling argues that Judge Roach engaged in a “nonjudicial action[]” when he allegedly instructed his court reporter to delay the release of

⁵ Bowling has not exhausted the state appellate process. Cf. *Jasper*, 2012 WL 4480713, at *10 (noting the availability of a right to appeal the state court’s decision when assessing whether the state court proceedings afforded an adequate opportunity for plaintiff to raise constitutional challenges). Given this further avenue for relief, any argument that Bowling cannot obtain relief from Judge Roach because of his alleged bias is unavailing.

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transcripts in order to delay or thwart Bowling's ability to appeal. Communications Judge Roach had with his court reporter regarding courtroom management and administration fall within his judicial capacity. Therefore, Judge Roach's judicial immunity withstands this attack.

Bowling also argues that Judge Roach acted "in the complete absence of all jurisdiction" when he ordered the entire proceeds of a property sale to be awarded to her ex-husband (rather than half of the proceeds). Bowling contends that Judge Roach exceeded the bounds of the divorce decree and thereby exceeded his jurisdiction. Bowling's arguments are unpersuasive. "Where a court has *some* subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes." *Malina v. Gonzales*, 994 F.2d 1121, 1125 (5th Cir. 1993). Here, the court made a finding that the disputed property was within its jurisdiction. And Texas has given its courts the power to enforce divorce decrees. *See Tex. Fam. Code. §§ 9.001, 9.002; Pearson v. Fillingim*, 332 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. 2011). Even assuming that Judge Roach "acted in excess of his authority," [he is still protected by judicial immunity." *Ballard*, 413 F.3d at 517 (quoting *Malina*, 994 F.2d at 1125). That is because "a judge is not deprived of immunity" merely "because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." *Davis v. Bayless*, 70 F.3d 367, 373 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).

For these reasons, Judge Roach is judicially immune to Bowling's damages claims and those claims are properly dismissed.

V.

Finally, although Bowling devotes significant portions of her briefing to qualified immunity and the applicability of the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine, the

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district court's dismissal order did not rest on either of those legal precepts. Therefore, we need not address whether they apply.

VI.

We affirm.

APPENDIX D

Motion for Rehearing Denied
19-41003

APPENDIX D

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-41003

WANDA L. BOWLING,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

JUDGE JOHN ROACH, IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITY,

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:19-CV-144

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and HIGGINSON, *Circuit Judges.*

PER CURIAM:

IT IS ORDERED that Appellant's motion for leave to file petition
for rehearing out of time is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is
DENIED.

APPENDIX E

**Texas judicial statistics
Greg Abbott judicial appointments**

APPENDIX E

TEXAS JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS

Years	Governor	Years Served	# of Appointed Judges
1973-1979	Briscoe	4	0
1979-1983	Clements	4	2
1983-1987	White	4	0
1987-1991	Clements	4	5
1991-1995	Richards	4	1
1995-2000	Bush	4	0
2000-2015	Perry	16	113
2015-2019	Abbott	4	109

GREG ABBOTTS JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS PER

<https://gov.texas.gov/search?q=appointments>

11/2019	Janis Holt	Commission Judicial Conduct	
11/2019	Missy Medary	5th Administrative Judicial Region	
11/2019	Geoffrey Puryear	460 th Judicial District	
11/2019	Meredith Kennedy	78 th Judicial District	
11/2019	Jesse McClure III	339 th Judicial District	
11/2019	Lawrence M. "Larry" Doss	7 th Court of Appeals	
10/2019	David Evans	5th Court of Appeals	
10/2019	Evan	193 rd Judicial District	
9/2019	Jeff Alley	8 th Court of Appeals	
9/2019	Tom Nowak	366 th Judicial District	
9/2019	Lindsey Wynne	468 th Judicial District	
9/2019	Mike Wallach	2 nd Court of Appeals	
9/2019	Megan Fahey	348 th Judicial District	
8/2019	Danny Kindred	454 th Judicial District	
8/2019	Ysmaell Fonseca	464 th Judicial District	
8/2019	Jane Bland	Texas Supreme Court	
8/2019	Andrea Bouressa	471s Judicial District	
7/2019	Christopher Hill	County Jud. Colling county	
7/2019	Jaime Tijerina	464 th Judicial District	
7/2019	Patrick Bulanek	461 st Judicial District	
7/2019	Tim McCoy	Nueces County Judge	
7/2019	Valerie Ertz	Commission Judicial Conduct	
7/2019	Fred Tate	Commission Judicial Conduct	
7/2019	Tijerina	13 th Court of Appeals	
4/2019	Dean Rucker	7 th Administrative Judicial Region	
3/2019	Sydney Hewlett	18 th Judicial District	

2/2019	Brett Busby	Texas Supreme Court	
2/2019	John Neil	10 th Court of Appeals	
2/2019	David Evans	95 th Judicial District	
2/2019	Jared Robinson	405 th Judicial District	
2/2019	Jaime Tijerina	464 th Judicial District	
1/2019	Greg Perkes	13 th Court of Appeals	
1/2019	Ashley Wysocki	254 th Judicial District	
1/2019	Angela Saucier	76 th Judicial District	
1/2019	Dana Womack	2 nd Court of Appeals	
12/2018	Lee Ann Breading	462 nd Judicial District	
11/2018	David Junkin	453 rd Judicial District	
11/2018	Carmen Dusek	51 st Judicial District	
11/2018	Steve Parkhurst	260 th Judicial District	
10/2018	Christopher Wolfe	213 th Judicial District	
10/2018	Billy Ray Stubblefield	3 rd Administrative Judicial Region	
9/2018	John Bailey	11 th Court of Appeals	
8/2018	Kimberly Fitzpatrick	342 nd Judicial District	
8/2018	Sydney Hewlett	18 th Judicial District	
8/2018	Jared Robinson	405 th Judicial District	
8/2018	Grant Kinsey	440 th Judicial District	
8/2018	Andrea Bouressa	471 st Judicial District	
8/2018	Christopher Wolfe	213 th Judicial District	
8/2018	Debra Ibarra Mayfield	190 th Judicial District	
6/2018	Kimberly Fitzpatrick	342 nd Judicial District	
6/2018	Paul LePak	264 th Judicial District	
6/2018	Brock Smith	271 st Judicial District	
6/2018	David Evans	8 th Administrative Judicial Region	
6/2018	Jaime Tijerina	93 rd Judicial District	
6/2018	Doug Wallace	378 th Judicial District	
4/2018	Larry Phillips	59 th Judicial District	
12/20/2018	Lee Ann Breading	462 th Judicial District	
11/2018	Dabney Bassel	2 nd Court of Appeals	
6/2018	Maricela Alvarado and Amy Suhl	Commission Judicial Conduct	
5/2018	Olen Underwood	2 nd Administrative Judicial Region	
3/2018	Ray Wheless	1 st Administrative Judicial Region	
3/2018	Susan Brown	11 th Administrative Judicial Region	
2/2018	Jimmy Blacklock	Texas Supreme Court	
2/2018	Alfonso Charles	10 th Administrative Judicial Region	
12/9/17	Dustin Howell	459 th Judicial District	
11/2017	Wade Birdwell	2 nd Court of Appeals	
11/2017	Angelina D.A. Gooden	280 th Judicial District	
11/2017	Livia Francis	283 rd Judicial District	
10/2017	Andria Bender	506 th Judicial District	
10/2017	Joey Contreras	187 th Judicial District	

10/2017	Brock Smith	271 st Judicial District	
10/2017	Michael Davis	369 th Judicial District	
10/2017	Bonnie Sudderth	2 nd Court of Appeals	
10/2017	Derrick McGill	Commission Judicial Conduct	
10/2017	Sujeeth Draksharam	Commission Judicial Conduct	
9/2017	Kenneth S. Cannata	458 th Judicial District	
9/2017	Kristin Guiney	232 nd Judicial District	
9/2017	Debra Ibarra Mayfield	190 th Judicial District	
9/2017	Jennifer Caughey	1 st Court of Appeals	
8/2017	Sid Harle	4 th Administrative Judicial Region	
8/2017	Josh Burgess	352 nd Judicial District	
8/2017	Judy Parker	7 th Court of Appeals	
1/2017	Jason Boatright	5 th Court of Appeals	
1/2017	Mark Pittman	2 nd Court of Appeals	
12/2016	Kelly Moore	9 th Administrative Judicial Region	
12/2016	Steve Ables	6 th Administrative Judicial Region	
12/2016	David Peeple	4 th Administrative Judicial Region	
12/2016	Bill Palmer, Jr.	451 st Judicial District	
12/2016	Grant Kinsey	440 th Judicial District	
8/2016	Robert E. "Bobby" Bell	267 th Judicial District	
6/2016	Trey Didway	121 st Judicial District	
6/2016	Phil Grant	9 th Judicial District	
4/2016	Wes Tidwell	6 th Judicial District	
4/6/16	Patty Maginnis	435 th Judicial District	
3/21/16	Ryan Larson	395 th Judicial District	
12/2015	Alyssa Lemkuil	507 th Judicial District	
10/2015	René De Coss	445 th Judicial District	
10/2015	Missy Medary	5 th Administrative Judicial Region	
10/2015	Don Clemmer	450 th Judicial District	
8/2015	Susan Rankin	254 th Judicial District	
8/2015	David Perwin	505 th Judicial District	
8/2015	Chad Bridges	240 th Judicial District	
8/2015	Emily Miskel	470 th Judicial District	
8/2015	Piper McCraw	469 th Judicial District	
8/2015	Sara Kate Billingsley	446 th Judicial District	
8/2015	John M. "Mike" Swanson	143 rd Judicial District	
7/2015	Erin Lunceford	61 st Judicial District	
5/2015	Debra Ibarra Mayfield	165 th Judicial District	
3/2015	Charles M. Barnard	89 th Judicial District	